


Looking Backwards to Go Forwards? Europe at a Crossroads

Newcastle, 3-4 July 2017

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

www.uaces.org



EUROPEAN UNION ENERGY REGIONALISM: AN EVOLUTION OF A MODEL ENERGY GOVERNANCE PROCESS

Abstract

In 1951, the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) prompted a process of energy cooperation in Europe that has led to the pursuit of a European Union (EU) Energy Union by 2020. This paper explores the evolving nature of EU energy regionalism, linking historical accounts with future objectives. The Constructivism theory and logic of 'challenge' and 'response' is used to analyse the pathways taken, for the development of a regional energy governance system. The analysis underscores a three-pronged approach;

- **Cooperation:** Pooling of production commodities (coal and steel) and Nuclear Energy which were all essential for an interdependent and viable industrial development.
- **Integration:** Increased regulation at EU level leading to EU energy market liberalisation and the adoption of a common energy and climate policy.
- **Governance:** A move towards completing the EU energy market integration, culminating into a harmonised common EU energy governance policy process.

The paper argues that the largely supranational nature of the EU, and the divide between Western and Eastern European national interests make it difficult to unify positions into an effective common energy governance system. However, with successes chalked in other areas (regional policy, single market), the EU has the potential to develop an exemplary model.

1.0 Introduction

European regionalism has earned its stripes as the poster child of regional integration. This has steered a cause very few or maybe no regional integration process has achieved so far. But this has not come easy for the region. Using Constructivism approaches and a logic of 'challenge' and 'response', the occurrences and evolution of European Union (EU) energy regionalism are analysed. What emerges is that essential to the EU is the ability to reconstruct itself using various policy areas especially energy.

1.1 Constructing Regionalism with Energy

For more than 30 years, theorising European regionalism has been motivated by successes and set-backs of European integration by virtue of the EU. Sustained by the ideas of peace and prosperity, and energy security and decarbonisation, regionalism in Europe has been realised and shaped by energy.

As a result of the different stages of expression of energy regionalism in the EU (between the east and the west) energy security and decarbonisation are competing interests. But this time around instead of this competition becoming destructive, it is unbelievably healthy. The two blocks of the region realise the need for each other, with a sense of mutuality, in building a region where each other's energy needs are met irrespective of their level of policy advancement, in order to prevent anyone from being left behind.

In highlighting historical accounts, the connection between how energy has changed EU regionalism and the future objectives of how energy would transform EU regionalism is drawn out. Thus, this paper is situated at the intersection of constructing regionalism and energy.



Source: BBC: Map of the European Union, <https://icchef.bbci.co.uk/>

1.2 Structure of Paper

In this section, I commence with elaborating the Theory Frame of Social Constructivism as applied in International Relations (IR) (and its subfield of EU Studies). Then I explain the Logic of ‘challenge’ and ‘response’ as well as the methods used. Section 3 discusses an overview of the evolution of regional integration in Europe. This history sheds light on the pivotal role energy played in the creation of the EU. Section 4 discusses the three-pronged analysis of Cooperation, Integration and Governance. Section 5 starts with the prospect of the EU being capable of developing an exemplary EU energy governance system, reflects on concluding thoughts and suggests further possible research areas.

2.0 Elaborating the Theory Frame: (Social) Constructivism and the Logic of 'Challenge' and 'Response'

2.1 (Social) Constructivism

By the end of the Cold War in the 1990s a new paradigmatic dimension known as Constructivism gained significant prominence as a critique of the traditional theories of Realism and Liberalism, which had dominated the discipline of IR.¹ Its antecedents can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault or Niklas Luhman² although Nicolas Onuf, Alexander Wendt and Friedrich V. Kratochwil introduced it into IR in the late 1980s and early 1990s.³ EU studies recently started taking Constructivism seriously with the special issue publication of the Journal of European Public Policy in 1999 marking a unique turning point.⁴ Even though Constructivism in this paper is presented as a theory, in general, its proponents ascribe ontological paradigms rather than theoretical underpinnings to it. They say it is not a theory, but rather an *ontology* which challenges the rationalist and reflectivist frameworks.⁵ This view is supported by the understanding that Constructivism does not considerably articulate who or what the main actors, problems, or issues in international relations are. Constructivism proffers no remedies to concrete problems in IR nor does it recommend any specific policy guidelines. In the words of Adler, the ideological convictions of Constructivism are neither anti-realist nor anti-liberalist and it is not optimistic nor pessimistic by design, however it situates itself in the middle ground.⁶ On the other hand, constructivism does provide alternative explanations of some of the most pivotal themes in IR such as the notion of anarchy and the balance of power, the interaction between state identity and interest, dimensions and expressions of power and the prospect of change.⁷ With its roots in critical theory and postmodernism, constructivism seeks to problematise that which is trivialised and to 'mystify' that which is believed to exist.⁸ Constructivism which

¹ (Flockhart 2012)

² (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001) In: (Mehlhausen 2016)

³ (Mehlhausen 2016)

⁴ (Checkel 2006; Risse 2004; Ibid. 3)

⁵ (Checkel 1998, 2006; Slaughter 2011)

⁶ (Adler 1997: 323)

⁷ (Hopf 1998:172)

⁸ (Pouliot 2004: 323)

is also known as '*Social Constructivism*'⁹ claims that social reality is constructed, thereby highlighting precisely its "*inevitability*" and the fact that it is not "*determined by the nature of things*".¹⁰ This is defined (constituted) from a complex and detailed combination of history, ideas, norms and beliefs which must be understood by scholars in their pursuit of explaining State and non-State behaviour.¹¹ Constructivism's emphasis on the social context leads it to focus on issues of identity and belief (for this reason calling out the ideationality of Constructivist theories).¹² The perception of friends and foes, in-group and out-groups, and fairness and justice, all become key determinants of (State and non-State) behaviour: While some Constructivists would accept that States are self-interested, rational actors, they would stress, however, that varying identities and beliefs undergird the simplistic understandings of rationality under which States pursue survival, power or prosperity.¹³ Constructivism also pays attention to the role of social norms in international politics. Constructivists distinguish between a '*logic of consequences*' -- where actions are rationally chosen to maximise the interests of a State -- and a '*logic of appropriateness*', where rationality is heavily mediated by social norms. For example, the argumentation that the norm of State sovereignty has a weighty influence on IR which creates a predisposition for non-interference that goes ahead of any cost-benefit analysis that States may undertake. These arguments fit under the institutionalist rubric of explaining international cooperation, but is based on constructed (constituted) attitudes rather than the rational pursuit of objective interests.¹⁴ Constructivism has done more than the other Approaches to emphasise the role of non-State actors because of their interests and ideology.¹⁵ For example, scholars have noted the role of transnational actors like Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or transnational corporations in transforming State views on issues like energy, climate change and international trade. As Keck and

⁹ See : (Ibid.1, 82 ; Risse 2004: 145-146) Constructivists understand the world as coming into being rather than existing as a pre-given entity, (Berger and Luckmann 1966) in their seminal work, *The Social Construction of Reality* argued on the relevance of an understanding of reality which is derived from inter-subjective knowledge and the essence of reality which is interpreted.

¹⁰ Ibid. 8

¹¹ (Slaughter 2011)

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid.

Sikkink (1998) opine, such ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are able to influence State behaviour through rhetoric or other forms of lobbying, persuasion and shaming.

It has also noted the role of international institutions as actors in their own right. While Institutional Theories, for example, see institutions largely as the passive tools of States, Constructivism notes that international bureaucracies may seek to pursue their own interests even against the wishes of the States that created them.¹⁶ In explicating Constructivism, one can tease out the following four core propositions that underscore key constructivist concepts or theories for that matter as articulated by Flockhart¹⁷:

1. A belief in the social construction of reality and the importance of social facts.
2. A focus on the ideational as well as material structures and the importance of norms and rules.
3. A focus on the role of identity in shaping political action and the importance of ‘logics of action’.
4. A belief in the mutual constitutiveness of agents and structure, and a focus on practice and action.

2.2 Logic of ‘Challenge’ and ‘Response’

The classical concept of challenge and response – introduced by Arnold J. Toynbee in his seminal work on World history – is another beneficial toolbox that seems to assist in clarifying the process of European integration in the policy area of Energy. In certain instances, European integration has been a matter of trial and error. Employing this dialectical dynamic has led in certain cases to unintended consequences. In describing policy processes and its evolution in the context of EU regionalism, one is inclined to express it as a vacillation between ‘Failure and Success’ or between ‘Challenge and Response’. Toynbee characterised this notion of challenge and response, although in a completely different context, as an *“alternating rhythm of static and dynamic, of movement and pause and movement fundamental to the nature of the Universe.”*¹⁸ Toynbee opined that challenges trigger responses which can be appropriate or

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. 1

¹⁸ (Toynbee 1947:51) In: (Kuhnhardt 2008: 2-4)

misleading.¹⁹ Contingent to the nature of the responses, challenges may lead to positively remarkable outcomes or disastrous consequences for the relevant structures.²⁰ In this paper, challenge and response are intertwined like the notions of 'present state' and 'future occurrence'. Applying this concept of challenge and response to our understanding of the evolving processes of EU Energy Regionalism vis-à-vis the approach of Constructivism seeks to unravel the complicatedness of the rationale for these processes and to assuage any understanding that these processes are simplistic and can be reduced to any single explicatory variable. At the heart of this application of the logic of 'challenge' and 'response' is the idea that crisis serves as an engine of progress in EU energy regionalism. For over 60 years, EU Energy regionalism has been accompanied by many curves and bends with tremendous consequential effects. In terms of integration theory, the recurring path of challenge and response tends to confirm many Constructivist assumptions, particularly that of the *'logic of actions'*.

2.3 Methods

The analysis is based on documents reviewed and webpages found on the EU Commission (Energy and Climate) websites, websites of Thinktanks and research centres that concentrate on energy issues in the EU, internet searches for scholarly articles and reports on literature concerned with the topic. Key words and word combinations include: EU energy; Constructivism; Social constructivism and energy, Energy in Europe, History of EU Energy, the European Union (EU), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Finally, the analysis is presented under the headings of Cooperation, Integration and Governance outlining the stages of how EU energy regionalism has evolved.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

3.0 History of Regionalism in Europe

A united Europe has been the aspiration of many European leaders (both political and intellectual) throughout the ages. In spite of Europe's unique diversity, the idea of European unity has been facilitated on the compactness of its geography and proximity of its peoples. This attempt in the earlier years was executed through violent means. The Holy Roman Emperors, Napoleon, Hitler, and others sought in horrifying ways to achieve continental unity based variedly on monarchical and canonical alliances, ethnic cohesion, ideology and raw power. Since the emergence of the modern State in the mid-seventeenth century, philosophers and political thinkers have also imagined a united Europe which overcomes a myopic notion of national interests and allegiances.²¹ Today's European Union (EU) is singular among these competing visions. In tempering the nationalist ethos that had become the ruling principle of European political development, the countries that formed the European communities and the foundations of the EU, chose to limit but not exclude their sovereignty which is the hallmark of a modern nation-state, in favour of collective peace and prosperity, economic integration, and supranational governance.²²

3.1 Early Regionalism

3.1.1 Mid-War Years

After the disastrous years of the early twentieth century -- two major world wars, millions of dead, and a total collapse of the economic system -- the destructive nationalist mindset was put at bay and the forward-looking idea of united Europe was picked up again, this time around with a completely affirmative fervour coupled with the inclination to do it right this time (meaning treaty based with effective institutions to serve both political and economic integration after World War II).²³

²¹ (Dinan 2014:1)

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

The first formal discussions of creating a Europe-wide organised region was mooted in various discussions after World War I (which ended in November 1918). After Germany had subdued the newly founded Soviet Union, the Western allies with the assistance of the US overpowered Germany and slapped it with substantial fines and limited its sovereignty through occupation and agreed norms (between the loser and winners at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919). This affected the German economy adversely and impacted negatively on Franco-German relations. This stoked German nationalist fervour against the democratic Weimar republic that had signed the Treaty.²⁴ The nationalist ideals and sensibilities in the west of Europe which were heavily inflamed during the wars was inimical to the idea of voluntary European integration. Also, the new nation-states in the east part of Europe after the demise of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires were more committed in consolidating their newly found sovereignties than committing to any conglomeration.²⁵

Richard Couden-Kalergi, a count of the old Holy Roman Empire triggered a movement for European Union in 1923, after the ravages of the Great War by publishing his influential book *Pan-Europa*. This book called for a federal union of European States hinged around the Franco-German alliance. However, the exceptions were that the Soviet Union (due to communism and its reach into Asia) and Britain (due to its imperialistic interests) be excluded. The *Pan-Europa* movement's rise was dented by the rejection of it by Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator. Couden-Kalergi then realised the essence of democracy in building an integrated Europe.²⁶

Even though the *Pan-Europa* movement's surge had suffered a blow, it still maintained chapters all across continental Europe. Two of its members, Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand, had risen to prominence in French politics and sought rapprochement with the Germans. Briand became foreign minister in France in the mid-1920s, worked tirelessly with his counterpart on the German-side, Gustav Stresemann, to revamp the

²⁴ *Ibid.* 1, 2

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1923)

ailing Franco-German relations which was seriously suffering as a result of the punitive policy towards Germany. Together with Britain, they concluded the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 which guaranteed the territoriality of the borders of Western Europe and aided Germany's entry into the League of Nations. The years 1925-1929 were dubbed 'Years of Hope' after the ratification of the Locarno Treaty because it created the perception that Western Europe was on the road to a brighter future.²⁷ Stresemann's latter years saw the unravelling of extreme nationalism in both countries because intense suspicion had shrouded the relationship. In 1929, the very year he died, he addressed his last speech to the League of Nations, predicting European Integration and even prophesying the coming into being of a common currency.²⁸ He followed the path set by Herriot, the French Prime Minister who in 1925 publicly spoke of a United States of Europe. Stresemann's French colleague, Briand extolled the virtues of European Integration in a speech at the League of Nations also in 1929. Enabled in part by Stresemann's untimely death, Briand called for an association of European States (that would not share sovereignty), subordinate to the League of Nations which would promote a political union and coordinate economic policies. This he presented in a famous memorandum in May 1930 which was far ahead of its time. The League then set-up the Committee of Enquiry on the European Union.²⁹

An idea of a Customs Union between Austria and Germany (also open to other countries) was proposed in March 1931 using the language of European Integration. This idea, was reminiscent of the Zollverein of 1834, the Customs Union which brought the German states together and led to the rise of Prussia and unification of Germany in 1871. Many European nations who attributed the Region's problems to German unification, were apprehensive of the customs union and believed that it could lead to an Austro-German *Anschluss* (Political Union). France blocked the idea. Immediately Hitler assumed power, the voluntary process of European integration with Franco-German relations serving as its anchor came to an abrupt end.³⁰

²⁷ (Sontag 1971)

²⁸ (Wright 2002)

²⁹ (Deak 1931)

³⁰ *Ibid.* 1, 4

The Transatlantic Anglophone alliance between Britain and the US, played a pivotal role as an intellectual haven for the nurturing of the united Europe idea in the mid-war years during the dismal decade of the 1930s and the war years. Coudenhove-Kalergi fled Europe to the United States in 1940, rendering his Pan-Europa movement almost non-existent.³¹ Britain fostered leading Federalist intellectuals in the face of the rise of Fascism in continental Europe as among which were Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), and Harold Laski. They, together with others, founded a new group in November 1938, the Federal Union³². The Federalist idea was heavily influenced by the book *Union Now*, published by a US academic Clarence Streit³³, calling for a transatlantic union of democratic states. As World War II raged on, the Federalists community in Britain churned out a steady stream of books and pamphlets advocating for the establishment of a federal system of European States as part of the Post War settlement.³⁴ Britain also became home to exiled continental politicians who equally influenced and imbibed this Federalist ideology.³⁵

3.1.2 After War Years: Euro - Atlantic Bodies and Towards the European Union

The outcome of the second World War, a devastated Western Europe with an annihilated Germany, coupled with a rising communist liberator – the Soviet Union - that was occupying Central and Eastern Europe altogether influenced the urgency for a strong Euro-Atlantic partnership with the United States of America (USA). The purpose of this alliance was to block the furtherance of the Soviet Union's communist ideological advance to the west of Europe and to rebuild the economy of Western Europe. The establishment of the first regional post war body in 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was at the instance of the USA. The

³¹ On Coudenhove-Kalergi's exile to the US and return back to Europe after the war, see (Zurcher 1958), He later received the 1st Charlemagne Prize, an award presented by the city of Aachen in the service for the cause of the European union.

³² Ibid. 30

³³ (Streit 1939)

³⁴ (Burgess 1995)

³⁵ Ibid. 30

Secretary of State of the US, George Marshall, in 1947 called on Europe to unite in rebuilding their economies assuring them of US assistance. This led to the successful implementation of the Marshall Plan, that provided the basis for the rapid reconstruction of Western Europe. When the US and Canada joined the Organisation, its initial purpose of trade liberalisation between member countries transformed by including the promotion of economic progress in Third World Nations through development. The OEEC then changed its name to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 1949, a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was formed between the Western European States, the US and Canada. Subsequently, the Western European Union (WEU) was founded in 1954 with the purpose of strengthening security cooperation and marked the beginning of security and defence policy in Europe. WEU brought together the countries that had concluded the Brussels Treaty (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) together with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Greece, Spain and Portugal have since become members.³⁶

The next wave of early European regionalism was structured in way that could permit as many members on the continent to join, yet it sought not to overreach its mandate by going beyond traditional international cooperation.³⁷ Notably, on 5th May 1949 the Council of Europe was formed as a political organisation without a mandate to move towards a Federation or a Union. The United Nations also created an organisation, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), that would pull European nations together with a mandate to rebuild post war Europe and to promote pan-European economic integration.³⁸ Created as part of the UN Charter, the Economic and Social Council is responsible for implementing” internationally *agreed development goals*”, along with economic, social, and environmental issues.³⁹

³⁶ (Borchardt 2010:10)

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ (Economic Commission for Europe n.d., n.d.)

³⁹ United Nations. About ECOSOC; 2017 <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/>

The third wave of European organisation culminated in the formation of the European Union. Its novel feature was that the Member States agreed to cede some of their sovereign rights to the EU and conferred on the Union powers to act independently on their behalf. In exercising these powers, the EU is able to issue sovereign acts which have the same force as laws in individual States.⁴⁰

The foundation stone of what we call the European Union was laid by then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, in his well-known 9th May 1950 declaration, in which he put forward the plan he had worked out with Jean Monnet to bring Europe's coal and steel industries together to form a European Coal and Steel Community. This would, he declared, constitute a historic move to create an "*organised and vital Europe*", which was "*indispensable for civilisation*" and without which the "*peace of the world could not be maintained*". The 'Schuman Plan' finally became a reality with the conclusion of the founding Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the six founding States (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) on 18th April 1951 in Paris (Treaty of Paris) and its entry into force on 23rd July 1952. This Community was established for a period of 50 years, and was 'integrated' into the European Community when its founding Treaty expired on 23rd July 2002. An additional progress came six years later with the Treaties of Rome of 25th March 1957, which fashioned the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These commenced their mandate when the Treaties entered into force on 1st January 1958.⁴¹

3.2 The Founding of the European Union (EU)

The foundation for the EU was set up by means of the Treaty of Maastricht which marked a progressive path towards the political unification of Europe. Although the Treaty faced a couple of setbacks due to constitutional clarification in Germany and a second referendum in Denmark, it was eventually signed in Maastricht on 7th February 1992 and came into force until 1st November 1993. The Treaty referred to itself as "a *new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of*

⁴⁰ Ibid. 35, 11

⁴¹ Ibid.

Europe".⁴² It contained the instrument establishing the European Union, although it did not bring this process to completion. It was the initial step in the process ending in a European constitutional system.

Further advancement came in the form of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, which came into force on 1st May 1999 and 1st February 2003 respectively. The purpose of these reforms was to preserve the EU's capacity for effective action, having had its membership expanded from 15 to 27 or more members. Therefore, the two Treaties focused on institutional reforms and a stronger political will to deepen European integration, where the commitment for European integration in Nice, for example, was relatively weak⁴³. When in the mid-1980s the Member States recognised that globalisation was spreading its tentacles quickly, they saw the European Community (EC) as the key weapon to surmount this challenge; and this spearheaded a revitalisation of the EC. Leveraging on this renewal of dedication to the EC, Jacques Delors, the EC Commission President then, sought a form of legalised commitment from the Member States mainly to ensure the closure of the rich-poor divide among Member States. This he achieved through the first ever major Treaty reform – the Single European Act – which put cohesion as a core EC policy. This resulted in the coercion of Member States to complete the single market by a 1992 deadline and also brought about a wide range of institutional reforms connected to the single market.

3.3 Energy in the EU

Robert Schuman's declaratory statement, "*The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war,*

⁴² (European Union 1992)

⁴³ *Ibid.*

*of which they have been the most constant victims*⁴⁴ set the tone for a nascent beginning of energy policy making what eventually became the EU. Energy was omitted from the Treaty of Rome, because the other founding treaties dealt with coal energy and atomic energy, the major energy sources at the time. However, in 1968, the European Commission submitted the first proposed guidelines for a common energy policy to the Council of Ministers which did not receive prioritised attention for many years. Reasons attributable to this inertia were the wide disparities of national energy use and industry ownership within the Community. As the energy situation degenerated in the early 1970s a call for clarity in this policy area led to the insertion of a paragraph in the 1972 Paris Communique asserting the following, “the *Community institutions to formulate as soon as possible an energy policy guaranteeing certain and lasting supplies under satisfactory economic conditions*”.⁴⁵

The outbreak of the global oil crisis in 1973 spelt an unmitigated disaster in the area of energy policy for the EC. Member states such as Britain reneged on their commitment for a common energy policy by preferring to develop its North Sea reserves and contract with oil-producing countries. France and Germany were at odds in terms of policy direction, the former opting for an individualistic approach and the latter pushing for a more common approach. The crisis dominated discussions at the Copenhagen Summit of October 1973. Unfortunately, there was no common position on energy at the end of the Summit. A separate non-binding declaration was attached to the Communique which read that there was a need for an “*orderly functioning of a common market for energy*” which subsequently needed “*concerted and equitable measures to limit energy consumption*”.⁴⁶ This regional confusion on energy policy persisted in the mid-1970s. The Paris Summit of the Community in December 1974, sought to “*work out and implement a common energy policy in the shortest possible time*” and to accede to the request of Francois-Xavier Ortoli, then Commission President, to declare 1975 as the ‘Year of the Common Energy Policy’.⁴⁷ The essence of both clarion calls took a

⁴⁴ (Schuman 2011:1)

⁴⁵ (Dinan 2014: 146)

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

while to become a reality; eventually becoming so by the advent of a series of Energy Packages in the subsequent years which has resulted in the intended European Energy Union by 2020.

4.0 Analysis: From Cooperation and Integration to Governance

Inherent in Schuman's declaration was the realisation of the Constructivist conviction that "*the world is of our making*"⁴⁸, challenging Rationalist notions that we cannot do much about something or there is only a definite path to human progress. The European Union remaining faithful to its creed of not *being made once* or by a *single plan*⁴⁹ has tirelessly evolved in shaping its energy policy process by pooling production resources and integrating rules, eventually leading to a governance structure.

⁴⁸ (Onuf 2013)

⁴⁹ (Schuman 2011)

Table 1: Evolution of Common Energy Policy Processes in the EU

	Cooperation	Integration	Governance
Period	Mid-1950s to late 1980s	Late 1980s to mid-2000s ⁵⁰	Since mid-2000s
Legal Frame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Coal and Steel Community (1951) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single European Act (1987) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Treaty of Lisbon (2007)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Atomic Energy Community (1957) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 	
Mandate of EU Energy Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Energy Security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) principle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Functioning of energy markets
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Common market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Energy as a priority matter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Energy supply
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Energy efficiency
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renew able energy
Challenge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Post-war reconstruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of collective action in aftermath of Oil Crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Over dependence on foreign fossil fuels
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oil Crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gas Crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Global climate change risk Increasing energy consumption and waste
Response	<p><i>Identity:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forging a solidarized identity Creating structures to curb chaos <p><i>Idea:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constituting a sense of unity for common peace and prosperity Constituting around a deconstructed notion of coal power and atomic energy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creation of an integrated electricity market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Energy Union
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creation of an integrated gas market 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased regulatory norms to facilitate the energy markets 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nexus of energy networks 	

Table 1 Source: Author's adaptation of Table 1 in (Biesenbender 2015:24)

4.1 Cooperation

The Constructivist notion that old practices of rivalry and war making can be transformed with the assistance of institutionalisation is seen clearly through the impact of the Schuman declaration and what it sought to achieve. It completely, over time, changed individualistic and competing nation-state identities to a collective united Europe identity. It unified national interests around a concerted Community Interest. This led to a new set of rules of engagement, institutions and practices.

Changing the prevailing interactions across European borders (particularly the Franco-German relations around coal and steel) led to a new socio-political relationship that influenced the formation of an energy security community in Europe. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is one example of how this undergirded the new socio-political reality of a constituted agency spearheading energy policy action. This process of forming new relationships and the mending of broken relations based on mutual friendship, trust, solidarity and cooperation rather than destructive competition or enmity has transformed fundamentally the collective European identity and interests relating to energy and other policy areas. Schuman proved what Karl Deutsch and Alexander Wendt had theorised about '*cultures of anarchy*' could be changed.

Following a logic of 'challenge' and 'response', the prevailing challenges of Post-War reconstruction, prevention of the factors that triggered the World War II and the Oil crisis of the 1970s resulted in forging these Constructivist notions articulated above.

4.2 Integration

As the institutional structures of energy in the European Community took off with intense cooperation (i.e. Integration to a Single Market) under the threat of a lack of collective action in the aftermath of the Oil Crisis and a looming Gas crisis in the mid-2000s, energy became a priority area. This evolution meant increased regulation – rules and norms development – to guide this deepening energy market integration. The constructivist assumption which emphasises the importance of shared knowledge

suggests that structures are primarily codified in formal rules and norms thereby socialising agents into adhering to them. Norms are collective understandings that make behavioural claims on those actors who (because of their identity) see the norm as salient.⁵¹ The intensified coming together of electricity and gas supplies led to the liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets. Three major energy (liberalisation) packages within the period were rolled-out to facilitate this process of market integration and behaviour. Ultimately, a common energy and climate policy was adopted at the EU level. These processes have confirmed what constructivists agree that rules and norms have a structural function which is both constraining and constitutive and can be perceived as structures of relevance. This increased collective action centred on common understandings and rules has spearheaded advancements in the interconnectivity of energy networks and national regulatory institutions.

4.3 Governance

Governance consists of both structure and process.⁵² With the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the most comprehensive approach to energy policy in the EU since its inception was set out. Sufficient for the Constructivist way of thought, EU energy policy requires continually improving structures (where agency is not only State-centric but also non-State centred) and governing processes.

Contemplating on the elimination of the most problematic challenges facing the EU in the areas of energy and climate, such as the over-dependency on foreign fossil fuels, the imminent risk of global climate change and increasing energy consumption and energy waste, a combative response has been proposed – a consequential Energy Union. The creation of the Energy Union would bring into fruition the outline set out in the Lisbon Treaty. It seeks to ensure the most effective management and functioning of the energy markets, ensuring security of supply of energy sources, increased efficiency with the transformation in residential, transportation, distribution and storage technology, diversification of energy use in favour of Renewable energies and the efficient interconnection of energy networks. However, despite these rather ambitious

⁵¹ (Flockhart 2012:84)

⁵² (Börzel 2016)

but achievable goals, there is tussle between the Eastern and Western European member nations of the EU. Due to the largely supranational nature of the EU, the competing interests of the Eastern (Energy security) and Western (Decarbonisation) blocks make it almost impossible to realise an effective common energy governance system. Considering the historical antecedents of the mid-1970s, the Oil Crisis caused a surge in individualistic competition in a Community that had cooperated for 20 years under coal and nuclear power. These competing interests may highlight an impending threat to progress. But the success of *process* integral to the bureaucratic structures of the EU in dealing with its creation and the accomplishments chalked in the implementation of other policy areas, such as the Single Market and Regional Policy, assures observers that the EU has the potential to develop an exemplary energy governance model that could be replicated.

5.0 Conclusion

As the Energy Union comes into being, it requires a transparent and accountable governance. The curbing of the shared competence with Member States on energy policy making as established by the Lisbon Treaty is the appropriate step to adopt. Ideally, with the pooling of resources to create a common EU-wide energy union and avoiding the privileging of state and formal institutions provides a governance approach with a framework that can deal with the complexities of energy regionalism and at the same time transcend Europe to become a model regional energy governance system.

Social Constructivism is consolidating its place in European Union Studies. In addition, there is a resurgence in academic research work on formal and informal regionalism among political scientists. In this article, these two research agendas were combined along with the logic of 'challenge' and 'response' which in its compatibility with Social Constructivism, was applied to explore the progressive nature of energy regionalism in the European Union. The analysis here suggests that the undulating process of energy regionalism in the EU has shaped the identity of Europe and characteristic to it is the EU's ability to reconstitute itself.

Further research in this area could possibly be targeted in various directions. First, the analysis here just scratched the surface so it should be taken as preliminary. More research should be done focusing on the constructed history of EU energy. Furthermore, thoroughly investigating non-State actors' involvement in the EU Energy Union using Constructivist Approaches would be an invaluable contribution to the field.

Finally, an in-depth institutional case study of EU energy bodies and how they were constituted would be an interesting line of research.

6.0 References

- Adler, Emmanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 3(3): 319–63.
- Biesenbender, Sophie. 2015. "The EU's Energy Policy Agenda: Directions and Developments." In *Energy Policy Making in the EU, Lecture Notes in Energy*, eds. Jale Tosun, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze. London: Springer-Verlag, 21–40.
- Borchardt, Klaus-dieter. 2010. *The ABC of European Union Law*. http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_en.pdf.
- Börzel, Tanja A. 2016. "Theorizing Regionalism: Cooperation, Integration, and Governance." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, eds. Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42–63. <http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199682300-e-4>.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory." *World Politics* 50(2): 324–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054040>.
- . 2006. "Constructivism and EU Politics." *Handbook of European Union Politics*: 57–76.
- Dinan, Desmond. 2014. "Europe Recast: A History of European Union." : 373. <https://he.palgrave.com/page/detail/Europe-Recast/?K=9781137436443> (June 18, 2017).
- Economic Commission for Europe. "United Nations Economic Commission for Europe - History." <https://www.unece.org/oes/history/history.html> (June 18, 2017a).
- . "United Nations Economic Commission for Europe - Mission." <https://www.unece.org/mission.html> (June 18, 2017b).
- European Union. 1992. "Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version): Treaty of Maastricht." *Official Journal of the European Communities* C 325(5): 253. http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
- Flockhart, Trine. 2012. "Constructivism and Foreign Policy." In *Foreign Policy*:

- Theories, Actors, Cases*, eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 78–93.
- Hopf, Ted. 1998. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security* 23(1): 171–200. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539267?origin=crossref>.
- Kuhnhardt, Ludger. 2008. *Crises in European Integration : Challenges and Responses, 1945-2005*. Berghahn Books, Inc. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qcqnp> (June 15, 2017).
- Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 2013. *World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. 2nd ed. Routledge. https://books.google.de/books/about/World_of_Our_Making.html?id=DRopO0A-38oC&redir_esc=y (June 19, 2017).
- Pouliot, Vincent. 2004. "The Essence of Constructivism." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7(3): 319–36. <http://link.springer.com/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800022>.
- Risse, Thomas. 2004. "Social Constructivism and European Integration." *European Integration Theory*: 144–60.
- Schuman, Robert. 2011. "Declaration of 9 Th May 1950 Delivered by Robert Schuman." *European Issue* (204): 1–3.
- Sikkink, Kathryn, and Margaret E Keck. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks In International Politics*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2011. "International Relations, Principal Theories." *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*. 7.