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Abstract

This research investigates whether the perception of European identity and the views on globalization are interconnected trends and if their relationship beholds a positive or negative nature, therefore bending for one or the other theory developed by the academia. The study focuses on Italy and relies on data from the Eurobarometer 85. The consistency of the prevailing hypothesis is controlled for through two blocs of demographic variables and economic variables, in order to cross out rival explanations.

I. Introduction

Nowadays the difficulty to give a unique interpretation to the panoply of tendencies spreading worldwide arises, leading often to multiple understandings of the same phenomena. The erosion of national identities and the search for new patterns to cope with the consequences brought by the incumbent political and economic crises that invest long established democracies alternates moments of euphoria and trust in positive developments with others of irretrievable pessimism about the future. Therefore, two defining trends of these times stirred the interest of this research, namely the emergence of a European identity and support for globalization, as they are perceived by public opinion.

Despite the widespread attention to both topics, up to now the debates have been generally kept separate, proceeding in rather “compartmentalized and parallel ways” (Isernia and Cotta, 2016), with few exceptions (Ross, 1998; Wallace, 2000; Rosamond, 2005). Thus, the focus of this paper is to feel a gap in the academia by observing the direction of the relationship between the perception of being a European national and to investigate how it consequently influences views on globalization, filtered through the eye of the Italian public as represented by the Eurobarometer 85.
As for the structure of the work, a theoretical framework assesses the main conceptual issues, respectively the shaping of a communitarian citizenship as a result of the process of Europeanization and the simultaneous strengthening of pushes toward globalization beyond the economic domain. For the sake of clarity, only one dimension of European integration concerning the notion of sharing a common identity among EU member countries is addressed.

The definitions provided through a review of the most relevant literature on the topics offer the necessary background of knowledge to evaluate the existing mechanisms of interaction among the chosen operational variables, to which a specific part is devoted.

Moreover, from the study it is possible to identify the alternative relationships that the independent and dependent variables are believed to hold. Therefore, two mutually excluding hypotheses are stated and motivated, whose existence is supported by different groups of scholars, whether considering people who identify themselves as Europeans to be more likely to perceive globalization as a threat or an opportunity. The data analysis attempts at revealing which dynamics prevail using the statistics collected by the Eurobarometer 85, with a focus on Italy as a case study, for reasons that are explained in the following section. The strength of the identified trend is tested against rival explanations of demographic and economic nature at the individual and aggregate level, while the conclusion gathers and comments on the learning outcomes.

Finally, although the data manipulation conducted in the following pages consists in the basic application of simple quantitative methods, the goal this paper wishes to achieve is to give a modest contribution to the field of research by drawing together previously isolated tendencies, and to call out on the use of more advanced tools in order to broaden the validity of the “globalization as opportunity” hypothesis, also beyond a single case study.

II. Theoretical Framework

In an era of “multiple identities crises” (Ntampoudi, 2014), supranational institutions can overlap with and sometimes even override national ones, accentuating the erosion of legitimacy the latter seem incapable to recover from. A parallel tendency is the loss of territorial boundedness (Tilly, 1990), hence these two phenomena – the increasing integration with neighboring countries and the rise of transnational exchanges deconstructing frontiers – deal in consistently opposite yet simultaneous ways with the spatial element as a defining feature. Some conceptual issues follow and help frame the debate.
First things first, political identity can be described as a sense of belonging to a relevant grouping of individuals with a similar political belief system; this paper aligns with the idea that such a sentiment of affiliation comes as a product of the political process, allowing for political structures to shape certain attributions of meaning (Bruter, 2005; Ford, 2005) and is therefore different from mere identity politics. As a result, the emergence of the perception of European citizenship is an outcome brought by cultural policy-making (Tsali, 2007).

In line with the modern debate started by T. H. Marshall (1950), citizenship is here defined as a form of fitting in a community – a concept resting on broader grounds than the legalistic membership to a country implied by the notion of nationality – hence setting the minimal standard for definition in terms of participatory attitudes (Mindus, 2009; Womack, 2012). Accordingly, citizenship and identity are key ingredients of the relationship between institutions and individuals of a political constituency.

Even though the unique specimen of European identity is reasonably recent to scholarship, a great body of literature contributed to the development of the topic, generally distinguishing between a micro and a macro-dimension, at the individual and institutional level respectively (Favell et al., 2011; Kaina and Karolewski, 2013). The latter dimension recalls the initial approach to research from a top-down perspective (Bruter, 2005), which explored an allegedly objective model of self-interpretation, interested in identifying a presumed European heritage, as a common denominator of convergence among member states, a task considerably complicated by the enlargement process (Checkel and Katsenstein, 2009).

Since the beginning of the communitarian experience, nationals of the member states benefit from special rights of free movement as workers, according to the Union’s early economic vocation. Still, the move away from ‘market citizenship’ (Kostakopoulou, 2005) only occurred with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, when the existence of European citizenship comes to be acknowledged as complementary and additional to nationality, a result of the spillover effect drawn by the deepening and widening of integration. This event marks the turn to a more bottom-up approach in scholarship, focusing on the direct domestic impact within the public opinion sphere according to a logic of incorporation (Radaelli, 2001; Risse, 2001; Moumoutzis, 2011), addressing Europeanization as a process of “becoming more European alike” (Tovias, 2007). From the notion spurs a positive attitude towards communitarian integration and personal identification with Europe, which is explained through various mechanisms. For instance, different cost-benefit evaluations of European integration (Fligstein et al., 2012), the social dimension implied in collective interactions

1 Articles 20-25, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
and multilevel identities (Bellucci et. al., 2012), together with the degree of trust in domestic political institutions (Della Porta and Caiani, 2007) and demographic characteristics associated with the “cognitive mobilization theory” (Inglehart, 1970) are all explanations for a widespread feeling of ‘Europeanness’ (Isernia and Cotta, 2016).

An animated debate has drawn both parallels and antagonisms between regional integration and globalization, defining the latter as a phenomenon of progressive removal of international boundaries of any sort, especially in the economic arena (Held and McGrew, 2001). Although the phenomenon is not new in history, considerations have been made that the distinguishing feature of globalization is a remarkably qualitative nature, which affects the actors’ perceptions of their surroundings (Edwards, 2006). According to Rosamond (2005), such ubiquitous term owes its success to the academic elasticity with which it has been addressed since the 1960s, operating in countless dimensions, market to communication-wise and in the field of information technology (Beck, 2000). The downside is a catch-all label, often unclear and accused of emptiness, implying “the phenomenon of removing international boundaries especially in the economic area” (Pirro and Zeff, 2005).

The amount of literature on the topic is consistent and the ultimate parameter all waves seem to agree on is that of liberalization (Ladi, 2006). A brief review clustered for tendencies would identify three main bodies of theories. The first studies on globalization conveyed a sort of ‘end of history’ mood (Fukuyama, 1992), forecasting a collapse of the state in favor of new governance arrangements, such as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held, 1995; Archibugi, 1998). A second group of studies emerges, opposing the beliefs of ‘hyper-globalizers’ (Ohmae, 1995), based on the acknowledgement that the existence of the nation-state does not stand in a zero-sum game with the growth of globalization, thus allowing for its survival despite the longstanding crisis (Hoffmann, 1966). According to skeptical theorists, the background tendency today is one of regionalization rather than globalization, where a less integrated world is reorganizing according to geopolitical blocs. Hence, regional integration and globalization become contradictory tendencies, holding an inversely proportional relationship (Weiss, 1998, Hirst and Thompson, 1999).

Finally, the middle ground between the demise or the growth of the nation-state is set by transformationalists, who claim that globalization is an ongoing process that is reshaping societies and transforming the world order, thus a multi-dimensional event destined to change the global scenario in ways that are open-ended and cannot be reduced to a single cause. (Ruggie, 1993; Castells, 1996).
Literature trying to fit together analyses on European integration and globalization develops in two opposite directions, their interaction so close “it is hard to determine which is the leader and which the follower” (Wallace, 2000).

On one side, a positive correlation between the two is identified, defending that the more individuals feel European – implying a sense of identification in a higher level than the national – the more they are willing to see globalization as a panacea of opportunity (Isernia and Cotta, 2016; Graziano, 2003). Meanwhile and on the contrary, an equally authoritative branch of the academia defends that European identity, a territorially-bound concept, influences a perception of the globalized world as a Pandora’s box threatening stability and forcing the homogenization of identity (Wallace 2000; Rosamond, 2005).

Before briefly assessing both branches, another important issue has to be addressed, namely the direction of dependence between the variables. In Castells’ words “European integration is, at the same time, a reaction to the process of globalization and its most advanced expression” (2010). Therefore, the concepts are either considered unrelated to one another (Cowles et. al., 2001) or the main stand in the academia sees European integration as an effect of globalization, “a regional type of globalization” (Pirro and Zeff, 2005).

However, given their interchangeability and the scarcity of studies investigating the causal relationship between the perception of globalization and European citizenship, this research makes communitarian citizenship its independent variable, given the belief than Europeanization is not a merely indirect effect of globalization, but a complementary process on its own. Moreover, the establishment of the Union comes first historically and had a strong impact on the member states populations’ mindsets in their attitudes towards the rising of a globalized world. Thus, the common ground in this ambivalent friend-foe debate is that despite the nature of the relationship, the deepening of the EU did have the effect of promoting globalization, for intended that it might have been (Ross, 1998).

The abovementioned distinction leads the discourse back to the opposite yet equally valuable strands in research. Schmidt (2002) considers Europeanization as a shield against the hostile phenomenon of globalization, a collective response that consists in pooling together resources as a means to preserve a form of distinctiveness in a sort of ‘us against them’ mentality. Therefore, from this perspective a strong European identity provides the tools to mediate the impact of globalization and to contain its bewildering consequences, creating a geographical community ruled by severe rules of exclusion (Wallace, 1996). This line of reasoning assumes a negative correlation between the defensive construct of a European identity and the perception of globalization as a dangerous, risky and menacing drift (Rosamond, 2000).
A positive relationship between the perception of Europeanization and globalization is instead supported by the ‘cosmopolitan politicization’ theory (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011), according to which the boost in integration is leading to the emergence of an international civil society aware of the comparative advantage brought by the supranational management of politics. According to such model the “perceptions of (a) functional and (b) moral interdependence of a transnational scope foster the belief that the internationalization of governance is desirable” (Ivi: 7). As a result of this hypothesis, the sense of belonging to the EU is likely to trigger optimistic public views about globalization as a further chance to ‘compensate’ for the limit of the nation-state and gain ‘efficiency’ beyond national borders (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001).

A famous declaration by Massimo D’Azeglio following the country’s unification is “abbiamo fatto l’Italia. Ora si tratta di fare gli italiani”, a motto whose applicability seems to fit also the European regional integration experience. In 1861 Italy lacked a common language – the main source of a sense of community – as much as the EU does today, especially considering the several waves of enlargement; but the prompt, although far from perfect, adjustment to the one-country arrangement gives hope to other specimens. Therefore, the decision to focus the analysis on the perceptions of the Italian public opinion is not only a matter of personal preferences, but also a belief that such case study holds a unique position within Europe. Italy has historically held a middle-power status, defined as the smallest among the great powers and the greatest among the small powers2; despite being a founding member of the European community, it was deeply affected by the 2008 economic crisis together with the rest of Southern Europe. Concerning globalization, two conflicting tendencies arise, if on one side a supportive attitude dictated by a mixture of enthusiasm and fear to be left behind is traceable, at the same time a persistent North-South divide and the reality of internal fragmentation obstacle any further development.

Italy has been generally deemed to be a Euro-enthusiast country, a tendency explained by several considerations, as direct proportionality to the length of membership (Della Porta and Caiani, 2007) and a form of compensation for low trust in national institutions (Marks, 1999). Moreover, Italy is historically an exceptional case of bipartisan support for European integration, by both the three-decades long Christian Democrat (DC) governments and the once very influential Italian Communist Party (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000).

Unfortunately, the literature reveals a progressive erosion of the positive perception of European identity (Serricchio, 2012), attributable to factors as the country’s traditionally limited leverage in communitarian decision-making, also aggravated by the Eastern enlargement and the deceiving management of the economic crisis (Isernia and Cotta, 2016).

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2 This statement is attributed to Gaetano Salvemini
Finally, the focus on Italy allows to discuss the aim of this paper, namely to investigate whether the two variables of European citizenship perception and attitudes towards globalization are interconnected, and if their relationship beholds a positive or negative nature – beware of the validity of both stands in literature. The research question leading our investigation is the following:

*How does the individual perception of EU citizenship influence the individual perception of globalization in Italy?*

In the attempt to provide a reliable answer to the abovementioned research question, two self-excluding hypotheses are set:

- (H1) The globalization as opportunity hypothesis: The perception of EU citizenship is likely to *positively* affect attitudes towards globalization: people identifying themselves as citizens of the EU should exhibit a *more* supportive perception of globalization than people not identifying as citizens of the EU
- (H2) The globalization as threat hypothesis: The perception of EU citizenship is likely to *negatively* affect support towards globalization: people identifying themselves as citizens of the EU should exhibit a *less* supportive perception of globalization than people not identifying as citizens of the EU.

### III. Relevant Variables

In order to test the prevailing hypothesis and understand the type of correlation emerging from the data analysis, a brief presentation of the adopted variables becomes necessary and therefore carried hereafter. This paper relies on the *Eurobarometer 85*, since it is the most recent survey on the topic at the time of our writing, released on May 2016, providing researchers with the ultimate data on European public opinion.²

Despite the abundance of studies concerning European identity and globalization, there is a tepid interest in analyzing them together at the public opinion level. Moreover, it is difficult to

assess the link of dependence existing between them, since “Europe has been both a creator and a receiver of globalization” (Jacoby and Meunier, 2010), therefore making their positions legitimately interchangeable.

Embracing such inspiring challenge in a rather blurry theoretical environment, this work privileges a chronological perspective, thus adopting the concept that is previous in time, European citizenship, as the independent variable, employing a question drawn from a questionnaire section that focuses on the interviewees’ awareness of the rights deriving from ‘Europeanness’ (Vergara, 2007). It follows that the perception of globalization is the dependent variable measured among other sub-questions concerning an evaluation of concepts related to welfare and an open attitude economic-wise; the variable was recoded as dummy in order to fit the chosen statistical model. Hence, a first binary regression model is simply built with these two variables, then completed by a second more complex model including several control variables in order to assess the consistency and strength of the hypothesized relationships against other rival explanations.

Control variables are organized in two blocs, the first belonging to the socio-demographic realm, namely age, gender and location of residence or type of community. The second bloc of control variables instead relate to the evaluation of the state of the economy, covering the spectrum of the household, national and EU level. Without further due, now that the fundamental tools have been given in terms of hypotheses drawn from the state of the literature and useful indicators to measure them, it is time to move to the analytic core of the paper.

### IV. Data Analysis

This study focuses on the attitudes of the Italian public, which led to the selection of a subpart of the data provided by the *Eurobarometer 85*, including those 1079 respondents who declare to be Italian citizens.
Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU citizenship perception in Italy</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Globalization perception in Italy</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly negative</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Fairly negative</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly positive</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>Fairly positive</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Total 1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the observation of Table 1 emerges that awareness about the concept of European citizenship is higher among the Italian public than the acquaintance with the phenomenon of globalization. Against the mainstream tendency of Euroscepticism, almost the absolute majority of the Italian population identifies as a European citizen – although a shift from ‘positive’ to ‘fairly positive’ evaluations would find confirmation – while such positivity applies only to the relative majority in the case of globalization. Only 2% of the respondents chose the answer ‘don’t know’ (henceforth DK) to the first question, while 15% of the sample chose the same answer for the second question, leading to the conclusion that globalization is a “foggy and slushy ‘no-man’s land’” (Bauman, 1998: 39) compared to Europeanization, which is in line with the reviewed literature on both topics. Although part of the scholarship defends the idea that a DK response gives expression to a determinate yet inscrutable state of mind of the interviewee (Manisera and Zuccolotto, 2013), the belief that that such an option allows for meaningless responses to be provided prevails, leads to the decision to exclude them in order to avoid negative consequences in the quality of the data (Bishop, 1986; Schuman and Presser, 1996). This choice is justified by the fact that the aim of this writing is to investigate the trend of the relationship between the concepts of Europeanization and globalization from a threshold of awareness, and in this framework the neutrality of the DK values would not be helpful to underline the nature of such trend.

In order to allow the testing of the suggested causal relationship within a binary logistic regression, the “globalization perception in Italy” has been recoded into two macro-categories, a ‘positive’ and a ‘negative’ one, respectively containing the very-to-fairly dimension of agreement or
disagreement. This is done in order to simplify the overall tendency of public attitudes. Whereas instead, for the “EU citizenship perception in Italy” variable all four values are maintained, since all temperatures of support for the European Union are to be taken into consideration as an indicator of the population’s maturity with regards to the issue. Bearing these considerations in mind and the effects that such manipulations provoke on the percentages hereinafter, it is now possible to study the relationship between the two variables for, shown in the cross-tabulation reported in Table 2.

### Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globalization perception in Italy</th>
<th>EU citizenship perception in Italy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Fairly negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>62.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>37.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A first remark is that the positive feeling about globalization falls by moving across the EU citizenship perception in Italy from left to right. Among those who favour EU citizenship lies also the highest percentage (72.67%) of positive attitudes towards globalization; the same happens in the case of the ‘fairly positive’ value. Moreover, when it comes to the ‘fairly negative’ evaluation of EU citizenship in Italy, the percentage of respondent who support globalization is much lower, and the same applies for the ‘negative’ answer. Therefore, according to the data provided by the Eurobarometer 85 and the case study of Italy, people who affirmatively perceive themselves as European citizens are also more likely to see globalization as a positive asset.

Likewise, moving to the ‘negative’ value of the dependent variable, once can notice that less than a third of those who have a ‘positive’ or ‘fairly positive’ attitude towards European citizenship have negative perception of globalization. Conversely, almost two thirds of those who have a ‘fairly negative’ perception of EU citizenship also share a pessimistic view of globalization, and of the 78% expressing ‘negative’ opinions on Europeanization also judge globalization poorly. Logically, people who take an unenthusiastic stance with regards to European citizenship are more likely to have also a negative attitude towards globalization. The positive direction is portrayed by Figure 1a; although a bar chart gives the most appropriate graphic representation of two categorical
variables, a better understanding can be obtained from visualizing a line graph, thus a second representation of the relationship is given by Figure 1b.

Figure 1a.

According to the graphs, hypothesis H1 seems to be verified:

- The perception of EU citizenship is likely to positively affect attitudes towards globalization;
- People identifying themselves as citizens of the EU should exhibit a more supportive perception of globalization than people not identifying as citizens of the EU.
In addition to the calculations, this relationship is visible in the line chart; the shape of the graph underlines the positive relationship between the perception of the concept of globalization and Europeanization. However, this relationship has to be tested in a statistical model and then controlled for rival hypotheses, as already mentioned in the previous section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2 (with controls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds ratio (Std. Err.)</td>
<td>Odds ratio (Std. Err.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.118*** (.028)</td>
<td>1.456 (.989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU citizenship perception</td>
<td>2.477*** (.218)</td>
<td>2*** (.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bloc I</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Gender (1 = female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Age</td>
<td>.983*** (.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Location of residence</td>
<td>1.251 (.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bloc II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Household financial situation</td>
<td>.701** (.0861)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− National financial situation</td>
<td>1.55** (.225)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− EU financial situation</td>
<td>.467*** (.069)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-566.66</td>
<td>-494.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly classified</td>
<td>69.26%</td>
<td>69.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p< .5; ** p< .01; *** p< .001

First of all, a logistic model is built (Model 1), which strongly confirms our first hypothesis, and one independent variable alone explains 10% of the variance of the dependent variable, both being statistical significant at the 0.001 level. The overall positive predictive value of the model with perception of EU citizenship alone is estimated at 69.26%. Model 2 is completed by two blocs of control variables. Age is a very meaningful demographic indicator, and the changing perception among different age ranges holds valuable explanatory power to the degree of understanding of the implications that globalization has on everyday life (Demirdjian, 2005). Different patterns of support within age-cohorts can be explained as a consequence of an increasing socio-economic intra-generational gap (Buchholz et al., 2009). For instance, younger generations born in a globalized reality, who also have a direct experience of the programs implemented by the EU, are usually expected to show a stronger identification with European citizenship and major support
towards globalization than the older generations, struggling to replace their traditional single national citizenship with new identities.

Age reveal to be a statistically significant indicator in study of individual perceptions of globalization, differently from location of residence. The latter variable recalls Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who drew attention to the importance of the centre-periphery cleavage in political affairs, a ‘geographical anchor’ (Arndt, 2016) that seems to be re-gaining momentum within European politics, an example being the striking variation in the voting distribution along this dimension in the British referendum to exit the European Union. Last but not least among demographic variables, gender is not a statistically significant indicator in explaining different perceptions of globalization in Italy, although the positive direction of the relationship suggests that women are more likely to support globalization as it credibly evened the gender gap, which continues to be a sensitive issue in Italian society.

The second bloc of control variables relate to the state of the economy at the individual, Italian national level and European communitarian level, taking into account the egoistical evaluation in the former and a sociotropic perspective in the latter respectively (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). The selected variable have a similar four-points scale of possible responses asking individuals to define whether the economic situation of their household, country and EU is ‘very-to-rather’ good or bad. Economic performance is a fundamental matter to South European countries, which were deeply hit by the 2008 economic crisis. Therefore, the financial dimension consistently put to the test our leading independent hypothesis, in order to unveil whether other factors are better suited at explaining public attitudes towards the observed phenomenon. For instance, the relationship upholds also for these controls, although household and national evaluations are statistical significant at the 0.1 level and the state of the economy in the European Union is statistically significant at the 0.001. The latter variable provides an interesting notion of how much of support for supranational forms of integration is vehicled by economic performance and the extent to which this indicator can present a disturbing factor in future studies on European identity and globalization. However, Model 2 confirms that EU citizenship perception, as the main independent variable is superior to all other controls, with the highest and most significant coefficient. In general, the rate of correct classification estimated for the second model is 69.88%, an almost imperceptible improvement from the initial model without the six control variables. Overall, although the R-squared in both models is rather low and the log likelihood ratio relatively high, we are satisfied by our models’ fit, which demonstrated that simple statistical tool can help achieve learning outcomes.
V. Conclusions

At the beginning of the analysis, two alternative hypotheses have been set out to inquire the strength and the direction of the influence of European identity toward the perception of globalization within the Italian public opinion. An initial approach revealed that research on globalization and European identity-building have generally proceeded in parallel yet separated ways, with few exceptions that considered globalization the independent variables triggering mechanisms of regional integration. A decision was taken based on the chronological principle to refine the causal relationship in terms of European citizenship being the independent variable influencing globalization attitudes. The literature review provided the theoretical basis for the formulation of the abovementioned assumptions, and the investigation verified that the “globalization as opportunity” hypothesis (H1) seems to hold extensively. Therefore, the perception of being a European citizen is more likely to exert a positive influence on individuals’ support of globalization, which in turn is perceived as a chance rather than a menace.

The controlled comparisons conducted along the data analysis section – relying on a bloc socio-demographic variables and economic ones – have confirmed that the same pattern of correlation is at work, in addition to the fact that such positive correlation is not only a zero-order relationship. The control variables employed vehicle a more understandable depiction of the manner in which this direct relationship is distributed across the Italian public opinion.

The inquiry also discards charges of widespread Euro-skepticism in Italy and consequently of distrustfulness towards the phenomenon of globalization, a tendency registered by the Eurobarometer 85 dataset which seems consistent with the country’s course of path-dependence, despite the limitations existing with oversimplified questions typical of surveys.

In conclusion, this research is nothing but the tip of the iceberg of knowledge obtainable by statistical means, whose most basic techniques find application here. The modest contribution this piece of research hopes to have given is also an invitation to continue further investigations on the topic.
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