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The Impact of Economic Factors and the Shape of Migrant Image in EU

Galina Klimova*

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Introduction

The phenomenon of migration is one of the key questions of the global agenda. According to the World Bank the number of migrants around the world has increased from 71.9 million to 243.2 million for the past 55 years.¹ This means that the total number has grown more than threefold. The dynamics in a percentage of the population of the Earth is not so impressive (from 2.6% in 1960 to 3.3% in 2015),² but still indicative. The migration processes in the late XX - early XXI centuries are usually regarded as more intense than in previous periods, as an inevitable and routine fact. Due to the technological development, the relocation is really much more accessible than before. However, some researchers express doubts about the inevitability of the unlimited global migration as a matter of fact in a post-industrial world (Collier, 2013) and give comparable data of migration in previous historical periods (Goldin and Cameron, 2012; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). Whatever position you share, the phenomenon of migration and the elaboration of the migration policy deserve scholars' attention.

Migration is obviously a complex phenomenon and it is not less multifarious when looking at it from a European perspective. Guest workers and post-colonial recruitment policies, refugee flows and socio-economic impact of immigration,

* Assistant Professor, Department of International Policy and Foreign Regional Studies, School of Public Policy, The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, klimova-gs@ranepa.ru

¹ International migrant stock. World Bank data. Available from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL?end=2015&start=1960&view=chart&year=1997>

² International Migrants by Country of Destination, 1960-2015. Migration Policy Institute. Available from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/international-migrants-country-destination-1960-2015?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true>

cultural adaptation and diversity, political participation and migrant rights – all of these and other aspects are important to understand the phenomenon of migration. Any research of it or its’ aspects requires the scholar to take into account a wide range of political, economic, sociological, cultural and historic categories. I suppose there are two fundamental positions that are useful in studying migration within European borders. Firstly, we should remember that migration influences both sides: the country of immigration and the country of emigration. According to that, study should contribute the policy of positive sum. Secondly, it is not only political or economic question, but the moral one. Analysing migration means studying real people in different situations. From this perspective, scientific contribution to the balanced and detailed migration policy can’t be limited by the issues of incoming people, but embrace those who are already here, working up the aspects of interaction, integration and reaping the benefit both for the EU and the global world.

In this context, this paper focuses on the issue of the perception of migrants in host societies, the mechanism of its shaping and the factors that impact the image of the migrant. The working hypothesis is that the economic factors (such as economic activity, unemployment and level of education) are the key factors and triggers of the migrant image’s forming in the EU. The perception of migrants in host societies can be viewed not simply as a topical issue, connected, for example, with the migration crisis in the EU, but as one of the key social problems. The migration situation in the European Union also actualizes and fuels long-held discussions about the role, image, perception and prospects of foreigners’ integration into the host societies.

The paper proceeds by a short methodological comment that defines author’s position. Then it observes the image of a migrant and the way of its construction. Relying on the idea that the shaping of image is effected by the social patterns of the host society, the paper continues looking at the role of political and mass media discourse in this process. It then focuses on the EU citizens’ attitude to migrants, using social survey data. From the perspective of the existing external and internal types of migrants it clarifies that a “migrant” has mainly negative perception and is

generally associated with non-EU asylum seekers. It also focuses very precisely on the comparative analysis of the data of EU citizens and the types of migrants. The correlation analysis of it shows that low level of education and economic activity as well as unemployment increase risk of the migrant image as «the stranger» not «the other».

Methodological commentary

Before proceeding to the main part, I would like to note several aspects that outline the methodological field of the research. To begin with, migration is usually studied through two paradigms: “methodological nationalism” and “transnationalism”. The assumption of methodological nationalism is that the national state is regarded as the only possible and natural form of the division of the world, and also as the only possible and self-evident unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; 2003). Transnationalism is an attempt to overcome the centrality of the research view of national states (Faist, 2000; Portes and DeWind, 2007; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2017; Vertovec, 2004). The paradigm of transnationalism appeared to be on the top of agenda last decades. Today the physical movement from one country to another is not followed by the consequences with which it was associated even in the middle of the XX century. Nowadays, due to the technological development, migrants live in a special transnational space, building networks over the national borders. The methodological nationalism first and foremost faces the challenge of the convention of the defining political borders on a national basis (Malahov, 2015). The national state is a relatively new historical phenomenon, and before its uprise (as, by the way, today) people had crossed confessional or ethnic frontiers, not the national ones. Thus, this essay is written in the perspective of the transnationalism.

Other notes are connected with the applied terms. The concept image is polysemantic and is used in different contexts. In this paper this term is used in the semiotic aspect of its meaning (Lotman, 1992). In other words, image – is the construct of consciousness, used by an individual as a way of communication. Image

is functioning in the sphere of social practice and feeling. By the means of image social norms can be framed and evaluated, consequently the image shapes the expectations and behaviour of people. (Belousova, 2017). The image of a migrant is a clear example of that function.

Although there is a language gap between emigrant and immigrant, in everyday practice we usually call all of people crossing the borders the migrants.³ This economy of ordinary language allows me to use the term migrant as a generalizing synonym in this paper. But the other reason to do so is the data source of the research. Public perception of migrants is studied by means of open sociological data and it is clear that we cannot be sure that there is clear understanding of the differences between “migrants”, “immigrants”, “asylum seekers” or “refugees” by the respondents of the used surveys.

However, one primitive typology of the migrants is applied in this paper. Studying phenomenon of migration within EU borders has some features. Political and geographical structure of the European Union frame different types of migration flows. Not taking into account migration within national borders, we see variety of international migration. Crossing EU borders with countries which are not members of the Union can be called external migration, while moving from one member-state to the other – internal. Understanding the importance of demographical, gender, economic and other criteria of migration, I will distinguish only EU (internal) and non-EU (external) migrants. This position is also connected with the structure of surveys and EU citizens answers.

The Image of a Migrant: aspects of shaping

“Who is the migrant?” – the answer to this question is obvious only at first sight. Firstly, the borderline between migrants and autochthonous inhabitants is not that clear. Many of those who are classified as indigenous residents of a particular country are not autochthons. Either they themselves, or their closest ancestors once

³ UN defines a migrant as any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country.

immigrated here.⁴ Secondly, there are a lot of people whom no one will ever regard as immigrants, although they should be attributed to this category on a formal basis.⁵ Thus, there is legal basis to determine status of a migrant, but this juridical rank will not necessarily guarantee that a person will or will not be perceived as a migrant. The image has different foundations.

The image of a migrant is one of the key aspects of the integration mechanism. In other words, the process of its formation and functioning in the public consciousness and social discourse to a great extent determines the prospects for the resolving the problem of inclusion in the host society. In fact, with the foundation of the concept of G. H. Mead, it can be said that the social process in case of the migration influences the behavior of appropriate individuals. According to Mead the mechanism of such an impact is a generalized other, “The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community” (Mead, 2009, P. 155). This means that each particular person attributes an individual as a migrant and perceives one using stereotypes and patterns functioning in the host society.

The mentioned generalized other within the migration issue can be formed on macro and micro levels. The micro level is the history and modern situation of the particular community (town, village, etc.). The cultural traditions, previous experience of migration and precise features of current migrants (demographic, economic and etc.), level of development and effectiveness of social networks and government – all of these has its impact on the attitude towards migrants and their perception. And this level of analysis seems to be perspective for comparative research. On macro level the generalized other as well is under the influence of the variety of factors, but in my submission, governmental and media discourses are the key ones. If we follow M. Foucault’s idea of “governmentality”, we can see that Foucault proposed much broader understanding of government policy than just decisions made by institutions and officials. He meant, above all, effort aimed at the

⁴ In 1988 Gerard Noiriel proved fifth French citizen who considers himself an indigenous Frenchman has at least one relative in the third generation who was born outside of France. (Noiriel, 1988).

⁵ For example, the ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy’s father Pál Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa immigrated to France from Hungary in 1944, and became a French citizen only in the early 1970s, when the future French political leader was already a teenager. But Sarkozy, born Nicolas Paul Stéphane Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa is not considered as a migrant.

formation of the image of the thoughts and actions of those on whom it is carried out. (Gordon, 1991). The EU establishment is interested in appropriate attitude towards migrants. The EU political space is not homogeneous, but the official position of Brussels is transparent. The fundamental principles, claimed to be the basis of the European integration and the European identity, include human rights, humanism, respect to diversity and democracy. This, as well as Schengen acquis, does not work in harmony with negative migration rhetoric. The ethic aspects connected with refugee flow also contribute toward “softening” the official position. The discussions and actions devoted to the overcoming of the crisis are usually accompanied by statements similar to J.-C. Juncker’s position “Migration is both an opportunity and a challenge for the EU”.⁶ In 2011 J.M. Barroso was very accurate, saying “We know that it is now fashionable in some quarters to be extremist or populist or even to wave sometimes the flags of xenophobia. This is not what we are going to do. We will resist all these kinds of pressure. But to succeed in this, we need to give citizens the confidence that we stand firm on two things: first, on correcting the shortcomings of the existing system, so that effective relief can be brought to situations of pressure and crisis; second, on ensuring, on this basis, the full respect of human rights and humanitarian principles on which our Union is founded. The people are ready to exercise solidarity, internally and externally, if they are confident that their security concerns are addressed, decisively and comprehensively”.⁷ Insisting on people’s readiness to internal and external solidarity he acted as Foucauldian governmentality. He does not only put down to the EU citizens appropriate way of thinking, but attempted to obtrude it. It is worth noting that the deliberated and balanced discussion about migration is almost taboo. Both positive or negative discourse about migration is mainly populism. One side is accused of racism and xenophobia, the other of naivety. This taboo over the migration discourse causes the policy of panic (Collier, 2013) and fear of unknown.

⁶ See J.-P. Juncker’s Speech. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en

⁷ See Barroso, J.M. Migration flows and asylum and their impact on Schengen. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-322_en.htm

Consequently, not being gone through in detail issue of migration triggers the negative image of a migrant.

The mass media is an important factor as it can frame debates and provide the information that influences the perception of the citizens. We can refer the results of recent research of European press prepared for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in 2015.⁸ This work has found that refugees and migrants have tended to be framed negatively, described as a problem, rather than a benefit to host societies. However, mass media can have a positive impact on the image of a migrant. There were wide variations in how the press in different countries report on asylum and immigration. Sweden was the country whose press system was the most positive towards refugees and migrants. In contrast, coverage in the United Kingdom was the most negative. Interesting that in some countries (Spain, Italy and Sweden) the press, whether left or right, reported on asylum and immigration in broadly similar ways, whilst in other countries reporting was highly varied. As we see the position doesn't depend on economic development or quantity of migrants. Even more important that The European Union response to the crisis was widely seen as inadequate, yet it was still defined as the key institution responsible for solving the crisis. (Berry et al., 2015). The negative framing of the migration and consequently migrants themselves we also noted by other researchers (Dekker and Scholten, 2017; Jacomella, 2010).

Governmentality and mass media are not the only factors that affect the construction of social patterns and public perception, but they can be seen as a key one on EU level. And as we see they contribute, sometimes not deliberately, to the negative attitude to migrants, causing public anxiety and not distinguishing types of migrants.

⁸ The research embraced press in Sweden, Germany, Italy, Britain and Spain. It was focused on publications about migration crisis in EU.

Public attitude towards migrants⁹


Migration problems were always on the top of the agenda of the European policy, but it should be noted that until 2015 the significance of this direction was not considered either by the EU institutions or by its citizens as the sphere that constitutes the main challenge for the Union. As we see, in Fig. 1 over the past 7 years, the population's interest in this issue has increased dramatically. The growing attention to the problem of immigration in 2010-2011 is primarily connected with the economic situation in the EU. The growth of unemployment and negative macroeconomic dynamics, obviously, escalated the attitude towards migrants, as potential competitors in the labor market and dependents. But until Spring 2015, the immigration situation never took the first place in the European agenda, according to Europeans' opinion. Indeed, the immigration flow increased significantly during this period. The most revealing is the number of people applying for asylum. According to Eurostat data, from 2006 to 2012 the number of such requests grew gradually, whereas after 2012 the intensity increases dramatically: 431 thousand applications in 2013, 627 thousand in 2014 and about 1.3 million in 2015 and 2016.¹⁰ Thus, the change in the position of EU citizens is due to an objective external factor. Notable that as the personally most important issue immigration was in top three answers only in Germany (Denmark, Malta and Austria citizens regarded migration as personal problem Spring 2016; Autumn 2016 – only Denmark).¹¹ More Europeans estimate migrations as a challenge, but not the personal one. It is possible that social discourse and mass media effected public opinion more than individual experience.

⁹ Taking into account the complexity of working with the public opinion, in this paper I will look at it through the prism of open quantitative data of sociological surveys.

¹⁰ Asylum statistics. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics


¹¹ Data of Eurobarometer - SB S2016, SB A2016, SB A2017.

Fig. 1. Immigration as a key issue of the EU.¹²



The very structure of Eurobarometer publications shows that until recently migration was not among the most acute issues, since it was not included in a separate block of the survey. But, since the Autumn of 2014, the Eurobarometer regularly polls citizens about their attitude towards the EU migration policy and migrants. In general, the overwhelming majority of the EU citizens support the EU policy, although these indicators were falling in Autumn 2015 – Spring 2016 and this Spring. (See Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. EU citizens' attitude towards common EU migration policy.¹³



¹² The graphic is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-87 for 2014-2017.

¹³ The histogram is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-87 for 2014-2017.

It is worth noting that, in the framework of a special Eurobarometer survey “The Future of Europe”, held in Autumn 2016, EU citizens have shown some reduction in migration concerns. The problem of unemployment took the first place among the main challenges for the EU (45%), as it was in 2014. But migration, as well as social inequality, worries 36% of respondents (and the issue of unemployment is, of course, connected with it). The inhabitants of Malta (62%), Hungary (56%), Estonia and the Czech Republic (53%), Bulgaria (45%) and Great Britain (42%) are the most concerned with migration. While the least of all this problem worries citizens of Portugal (14%), Finland (15%) and Spain (16%).¹⁴ Such a distribution cannot be explained only by the number of migrants in these countries.¹⁵ It can be assumed that this is due both to the socio-economic situation in the country and to the particular qualities of cultural traditions, the principles of a collective identity formation and generalized other. In the same survey, only 11% of respondents in the Czech Republic (this is the minimum indicator for the EU) and 14% in Bulgaria believe that the European community should pay more attention to cultural diversity and openness, 28% of respondents in the Czech Republic (which is the maximum result for the EU) and 27% in Hungary indicated that traditions are a priority in addressing the challenges of globalization. Only 7% of respondents in Spain, 8% in Finland and 12% in Portugal expressed support for the traditions as the main direction of social efforts (the minimum figure is 5% in Sweden). The development of openness is supported by 28% of respondents in Finland, 20% in Portugal, 17% in Spain (the highest in Sweden and the Netherlands - 34%).¹⁶ Nevertheless, we cannot find a stable correlation between the attitude to the migration crisis and the level of support for cultural diversity in the EU member states. These data are an evidence that the attitude towards migrants and their image in the public opinion are formed under the influence of up to date factors, as

¹⁴ Special Eurobarometer 451 “Future of Europe”. 2016. Available from <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2016/surveyKy/2131>


¹⁵ See: International Organization for Migration. Available from <https://www.iom.int/countries/>; Asylum statistics. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

¹⁶ Ibid. Special Eurobarometer 451.

economic development and culturally entrenched, as social practice and effect of generalized other.

Europeans differently perceive migrants from EU countries and non-EU countries. The attitude towards migrants from non-European countries has not changed fundamentally in the period of Autumn 2014 - Autumn 2016, including the migration crisis (2015). Most EU citizens have negative feelings for them (see Fig. 3). Only a slight increase can be noted in the negative attitude in Autumn 2015 (up to 59%) and some decline on the background of the maximum of positive feelings (up to 37%) in Autumn 2016.

Fig. 3. EU citizens attitude to non-EU migrants.¹⁷




At the same time the positive attitude towards EU migrants during this period is steadily growing (from 52 to 61%) with a decrease in negative one (see Fig. 4). This dynamic of opinion can be explained by deeper cultural differences between EU citizens and visitors from other regions of the world, rather than between residents of European countries. But this social interaction and attitude can also have economic background. I will come back to this hypothesis in next part of the paper. At the same time, openness and the ideas of cultural diversity play an important role in the European identity, although it is much easier to demonstrate it to less obvious differences. In everyday social practices, ethnocentrism often manifests itself more

¹⁷ The histogram is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-86 for 2014-2016.

often than cultural relativism, especially in those circumstances when “the Other” views the world exclusively in ethnocentric categories. The differences in attitudes towards migrants of different origins have both objective and subjective reasons, but objective ones are more often material than cultural.

Fig. 4 EU citizens attitude to EU migrants.¹⁸



In general migrants of the same race or ethnic group are more attractive to Europeans and migrants from poor non-European countries are the least desirable. There was no global change according to the European Social Survey on the types of migrants in the EU from 2002 to 2014. However, the existing shifts are symptomatic and confirm the Eurobarometer data. The study demonstrated some small positive dynamics in respect to migrants of the same ethnic group. Migrants from poor European countries are seen as less desirable, but their overall evaluation has not changed significantly in 21st century. The attitude towards migrants from non-European poor countries has changed the most significantly: 11% of respondents showed a sharply negative attitude towards them in 2002, while in 2014 they were already 20%. At the same time, the number of people who believed that such migrants needed to be allowed into the EU increased by 1%. (Heath, Richards, 2016). The ethic, the everyday routine and the Foucauldian governmentality played their roles in this dynamic.

¹⁸ The histogram is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-86 for 2014-2016.

Significant differences with respect to undesirable migrants from non-European countries exist between Europeans with different levels of education and income. 60% of Europeans with high education approve the admission of migrants from poor non-European countries. While among people with secondary education this position is supported only by 38%. A slightly smaller but noticeable gap in attitude to migrants from non-European countries is between the people with the highest (57%) and the lowest (42%) income. These data are anticipated. Migrants, and primo non-EU migrants, are the competitors for the working places. In the situation when unemployment is always one of the key issues of EU agenda, fears of autochthonous inhabitants are clear. The most vulnerable are the poorest (and usually the least educated) members of the host society. Migration decreases their wages and limits access to the social welfare. However, as recent researches show the reasonable migration is not abstractly beneficial for the host society. C. Dustmann and his colleagues studied the effect of immigration on wages in the UK and they have found that while the lowest sector of wages is coming down due to migration, the other part is growing (Dustmann et al., 2013). F. Docquier, C. Ozden and G. Peri have also proved that migration encouraged growth of earnings of autochthonous workers by general increase in labour productivity (Docquier et al., 2010).

As we see quantitative data of sociological surveys give complex picture of EU public opinion and image of a migrant. On one hand, EU citizens express support to common EU migration policy. This is both the aspiration to share the challenge and the intention to share the important idea of diversity and openness of European identity. On the other hand, negative attitude and perception of migrants, first of all external non-EU ones, are not hypocrisy or neglect to the ethic aspects (of course, sometimes it is), but the anxiety about the social capital and functional social system that attracts migrants to EU. That is true that part of the world migration is the attempt to escape from the poverty and danger of dysfunctional social systems (Acemoglu et al., 2012), but migrants are inclined to bring them to the host societies

(Collier, 2013). Along with the economic fears that is the basement of the negative attitude and image of a migrant.

Who are migrants/immigrants in public opinion

Studying public attitude towards migrants on the basement of social survey, it is crucial to remember that respondents may mean something that doesn't correspond this the initial intention of the research. That is why we should consider who do people have in mind when thinking and answering questions about migrants. Most social surveys do not offer definition for the terms they use and respondents may mean an asylum seeker or a refugee using the word "migrant" or "immigrant". It is usual for opinion polls and surveys to assume a level of knowledge about the terms they used (Crawley, 2009). But this level of knowledge does not really exist. To clarify the considered data let us turn to several important researches.

The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford initiated a survey in the UK in 2011. One of the questions was "who do you have in mind when thinking and answering questions about immigrants and migrants?". They got rather sobering results. The respondents were mostly like to think of asylum seekers (62%) and least likely to think of students (29%), when they were asked about migrants. They tended to think of migrants as those who come to the country permanently (62%) rather than those who stay temporarily (less than 30%). People most commonly think about foreigners (62% about non-EU citizens and 51% about EU citizens) answering questions about migrants. Repatriates (7%) and UK-born children of migrants (12%) were mentioned by few people (Blinder et al., 2011).

In the ISSP 2003 questionnaire on "National Identity"¹⁹ four items of migrants were asked and only one was specified by the probe "Which type of immigrants were you thinking of when you answered the question?". The probe answer showed that from one-fifth to one-third of the respondents in EU countries assumed to have

¹⁹ See International Social Survey Programme Research Group. Available from <https://www.esis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity/>

thought about immigrants in general, but the rest associated migrants with non-EU citizens and reflect the migration situation in the country.

Consequently, thinking of a migrant EU citizens would rather have an image of an asylum seeker or a refugee from not European country, than a professor or a top manager. EU-migrants (internal) are less associated with this category, even if they arrive for permanent stay. The image of a migrant (mainly negative) is stereotyped. Waves in statistic data clearly demonstrate that migration, is mainly presented and then perceived as a basically crisis-driven issue (Beutin et al., 2006). Perception of a migrant and migration itself is effected by many factors, including functioning generalized other.

The economic factors of a migrant's image.

There is variety of factors influencing public attitude and image of a migrant. 14 years ago, the European Monitor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) did a broad research on European public attitude to migrants. It was the analysis of European cross-national data of Standard Eurobarometer (1997, 2000, 2003) and European Social Survey (2001, 2003).²⁰ EUMC has distinguished geography, social categories and education, individual perception and unemployment as main factors that impact public opinion about migrants (Coenders et al., 2003). The authors of this research have found significant cross-national variety in attitude towards migrants. A common logic that culture, economic development and migrant policy influence the perception was proved. The impact of education and unemployment shown in EUMC research has already been looked through in this paper. The role of individual perception is closely connected to demography (age, sex, race and etc.), religion, actual and perceived social norms, lifestyle, psychological type, political believes (left-wing/right-wing ideologies) (Crawley, 2009). These data correspond both to the results of other important researches and a common sense.

Nevertheless, since the initial attitude underlying this report is that another, it can be supposed that the degree of migrants' integration in the host society, their

²⁰ The data of these surveys was also used in this paper.

acceptance of existing social norms, contributes to the improvement of the image in the eyes of autochthonous inhabitants. I assume that the level of integration to the host society is caused by the economic factors.

The European Union uses special indicators to measure the integration of migrants. The indicators were developed following the meeting of EU ministers on the integration of migrants in the Spanish city of Zaragoza (the Zaragoza Declaration)²¹ and approved by the Council for Justice and Home Affairs in June 2010. Coordinated indicators are used to measure the integration of migrants, monitor their socio-economic status and the results of the respective policies of the EU countries, assessing the integration of migrants in four areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. Variable survey data of labor force (EU-LFS), statistics on income and living condition of the EU (EU-SILC), migration statistics of Eurostat, data of the OECD International Program for the Evaluation of Education Achievement of Students (PISA) are used for the calculation of these indicators.

The active citizenship is mainly depended on over spheres and is the aim of a following research. In this paper only indicators of employment, social inclusion and education will be studied. To understand how effectively are migrants integrated into the EU society I will evaluate the figures of indicators of EU citizens, internal migrants (mobile EU citizens) and external migrants (citizens of non-EU countries). The level of economic activity can be examined through: unemployment rate, long-term unemployment, employment rate, youth employment rate, self-employment rate, temporal employment and part-time employment. While social inclusion can be measured by risk of poverty and median net income. The education can be rated by highest educational attainment (share of population with tertiary, secondary and

²¹ Zaragoza declaration. 2010. Available from <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-conference-on-integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010>

primary or less than primary education) and etc. The effectiveness of this approach was shown by series of EU reports.²²

On 1 January 2016, the number of people residing in an EU Member State with citizenship of a non-member country on 1 January 2016 was 20.7 million, representing 4.1 % of the EU-28 population. In addition, there were 16 million persons living in one of the EU Member States on 1 January 2016 with the citizenship of another EU Member State (3.2 %). The number of people acquiring the citizenship of an EU Member State in 2015 was 841.2 thousand, corresponding to a 5 % decrease with respect to 2014.²³ As we see the total quantity of migrants is 7.3 % of EU population, with a slight superiority of EU migrants.

The median net of the activity rate²⁴ of EU citizens is 71% (73.1 % for 2016). The internal migrants are the most active and rated in average – 76.98% (78.9%). While the external migrants are the less economically active, but the gap with the EU citizens is practically insignificant – 70.4% (71.2%). The data of the employment rate (see Fig. 5) demonstrate almost the same situation. The more employed are internal migrants and the less external ones. It is rather predictable. EU citizens are usually crossing borders of member-states having rather high possibility of a job there (higher income, career promotion and etc.). Due to the language ability and social patterns, the EU citizens of the host country have some logical advantages. The highest percentage (21.8%) of temporary employed is among the external migrants (EU citizens – 13.3%, EU migrants – 17.49%). These data cannot be evaluated negatively, as it can be connected with the fact of temporary migration. The rate of part-time employment does not show significant difference between types of migrants and gives comparable data – 22.4% external migrants, 22.3%


²² See Indicators of Immigrant Integration - A Pilot Study (2011). Available from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-statistical-working-papers/-/KS-RA-11-009>; Migrants in Europe - A statistical portrait of the first and second generation. Available from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-books/-/KS-31-10-539>; Migrants in Europe - A statistical portrait of the first and second generation (2011). Available from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-books/-/KS-31-10-539>; Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015. Settling In. Available from <http://www.oecd.org/migration/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-2015-settling-in-9789264234024-en.htm>

²³ Migration and migrant population statistics. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

²⁴ All data (2002-2015) are given in module, without sex differences, age 15-64, as the most active economic involvement (except youth employment rate).

internal migrants. In average 17.9% of the EU citizens are partly occupied. These figures can be connected with variety of positive and negative factors, including education or lack of permanent contracts.

Fig. 5. The employment rate (2002-2016).²⁵



The negative trend exists in the rate of the youth employment. If the EU youth, as well as young EU migrant, in average is 74% employed, the external migrant youth is involved in labour market only for 63%. Of course, it is comparable to the general figures, but the youth integration is crucial for the development of the EU society and it is important in case of the perception of the migrants from non-EU countries (as they are mainly young male).


The median net of the self-employment rate is the lowest among internal migrants (0.4%), only 0.7% non-EU migrants are self-employed, which means that the minority of migrants organises workplaces for the locals or other migrants. In comparison with 13% of self-employed EU citizens these figures are really minute.

The unemployment rate demonstrates more controversial situation (See Fig. 6). The data reveals permanent tendency, that the non-EU migrants suffered from unemployment almost double more often than the EU citizens, and 30% more than EU migrants. Even in the period of economic crises locals (who are usually more

²⁵ The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.


expensive labour force) are more ensured from unemployment than any category of the migrants.

Fig. 6. The unemployment rate (2002-2016).²⁶



We can submit that autochthonous social capital is working in favour of the natives. The long-term unemployment rate proves this tendency, although the gap in figures is not that big (See Fig. 7).

Fig. 7. The long-term unemployment rate (2002-2016).²⁷




²⁶ The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

²⁷ The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

The indicators of integration in the employment sphere (first of all the unemployment rate) clearly declare that migrants from non-EU countries are less integrated into the host society, while the EU migrants benefit Schengen acquis.

The external migrants are also the most sensitive to the risk of poverty (See Fig. 8). And it is almost twice higher than the risk of the locals and 30% higher than for the EU migrants. It corresponds with the rate of unemployment and proves the negative trend in integration among external migrants.


Fig. 8. The poverty risk rate (2002-2015).²⁸



The data of median income is likewise meaningful (See Fig. 9). The median income of internal migrants is the highest (> 17000 euros per year) and it can be the evidence for the fact that EU migrants in general are specialists of higher quality than external migrants, whose median income is about 14000 euros per year. That also confirms the data of unemployment and risk of poverty.


²⁸ The histogram is done according to the data of Eurostat. There are no figures for internal migrants in 2007, 2008.

Fig. 9. The median income (2010-2015).²⁹



As well as the figures of the poorest residents. Only 6.5 % of the internal migrants faces with severe material deprivation, while it affects 8.3% of the locals and 12.7% of the external migrants (See Fig. 10). Lack of social networks and unemployment can explain that. But education rate reveals more precise explanation.

Fig. 10. The severe material deprivation rate (2010-2015).³⁰




The education rate in correlation with the previous data show the reasons of the negative economic trends. The EU migrants are notable for higher level of education. The number of people with tertiary education is 10% larger among the EU migrants than among autochthonous inhabitants and non-EU migrants. It is

²⁹ The histogram is done according to the data of Eurostat.

³⁰ The histogram is done according to the data of Eurostat.


noteworthy that quantity of people with this level of education is approximately the same among the EU citizens and the external migrants (See Fig. 11). And if in tertiary education we can see positive dynamic in all categories of people, upper-secondary level demonstrates rather different trend. If the quantity of the locals with

Fig. 11. The tertiary education rate (2007-2016).³¹



upper-secondary education seems not to change greatly, the amount of internal and external migrants is decreasing (See Fig. 12). This data is ambivalent. On one hand, we see the positive trend, that is proved by the decrease of number of low educated people and early leavers of education in all categories, on the other hand, it is obvious that external migrants are the least educated.

Fig. 12. The upper-secondary education rate.³²



³¹ The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

³² The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

And if we do correlation analysis of these data, we will see obvious, but important bonds. The significant correlation coefficient (r) is between the tertiary education level and economic activity rate (0.7). This means that the higher is the level of education, the more economically active is a person. However, there is no meaningful correlation ($r=0.47$) between tertiary education and employment rate. It means that people with that level of education are less effected by the economic risks, they do not have any special guarantee for job, but, due to their features and ability to action, they are more likely to be involved in economic process and to be integrated. And we know that the highest percentage of such people is among EU migrants. Though the EU citizens and the external migrants could be the main competitors, as they demonstrate almost the same level of education. As we know such competition leads to the increase of the wages in this sector, but it is not clear that all the locals understand that.

Likewise, there is strong ties between upper-secondary education level and unemployment rate ($r=-0.89$) and risk of poverty ($r=-0.99$). It indicates the fact that the lower level of education has the person, the bigger is his risk of unemployment and, consequently, poverty. As far as there is also no correlation with the level of economic activity, we can suggest that this category of people is under the strongest economic pressure. And we remember that the external migrants demonstrate the lowest percentage in quantity of people with upper-secondary education, so they are likely to face the poverty and be less integrated. Besides, they are the competitors of the locals, but this competition leads to the decrease in wages. Thus, we see the economic basement of the negative image of a migrant.

Of course, it is important to understand that correlation and causality are not the same thing. The fact that some characteristics are correlated with particular position of a migrant and a particular image of a migrant does not necessarily mean that these features are the primary cause. As everything in human society, the factors influencing attitude towards migrants and the image of a migrant in EU are complex. But the considered data let us state that economic factors play key role in the process of migrants' integration and as a result effect the shape of a migrant's image. They

are not less important than cultural ones and can promote the benefit of cultural differences and maintain it on effective level.

Conclusion

There is no typical migrant, but there is a typical image of a migrant. And this image in the EU is mainly negative. The EU citizens associate refugees or asylum seekers with the term “migrant”. The citizens of other EU countries are rarely identified as migrants. Thus, in perception of the EU autochthonous inhabitants a typical migrant is a person from non-EU country, escaping from the war or poverty in his native country (even though the reality is much more complicated). The indicators of integration, which have economic background, demonstrate that such attitude towards non-EU migrants has some reasons. The external migrants are more affected by risk of poverty and unemployment and less integrated in general.

This economically based integration could be called structural and it is closely connected with social integration. The more person is involved in economic networks, the more efficient is the process of his perceptions of host social patterns. This also contribute to the improvement of the image of a migrant. Thus, one of the ways to build up better connection between host society and migrants of all types is to promote their excess to the economical and then political institutes. On 7 June 2016 the European Commission adopted an Action Plan on integration of third-country nationals which included actions across education and labour market, but they should be more precise and broad.

What is even more important is the balanced, open and non-taboo discussion about migration to be initiated on all levels of the EU construction. It is important to define the way how the host society receives the migrants - as a trouble or as a potential? The question “Is a migrant “the Stranger” or “the Other”?” itself is not less important as the answer to it both for the migration, and the European identity. To what extent integration policy is open to social diversity? To what extent and in what way the right to be different coordinates with the necessity of the appropriate level of social harmony? The more aware people are about the issues of migration,

the more effective is the process of interaction and integration, which corresponds to the better image of a migrant. The image of a migrant and the effective level of the diversity in the EU are the different sides of one medal.

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