

# UACES 47<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference

Krakow, 4-6 September 2017

Copyright of the papers remains with the author. Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

[www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)



## **Differentiated Integration, Turkey and the European Union Chance for the Accession or Alternative Form of Close Relations?<sup>1</sup>**

*Agnieszka K. Cianciara, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences  
Adam Szymański, Institute of Political Science, University of Warsaw*

**DRAFT PAPER - do not cite without authors' permission!**

UACES Kraków 4-6 September 2017

Panel: Differentiated Integration and the Future of EU-Turkey Relations (I)

### **Abstract**

*There are many interesting processes taking place in the EU nowadays. One of them is the development of the phenomenon of differentiated integration, including the emerging division into the core and circles (or centre and peripheries). The process has gained in political weight when the Member states started to look for the ways out of the euro crisis and the Brexit issue became a reality. The differentiation dynamics points to the inadequacy of conceiving the EU membership in binary (zero - one) terms. In this context, the differentiated integration seems to constitute an opportunity for the stalled enlargement policy, especially when it comes to Turkey. The aim of the paper is to analyze this issue and answer the following questions: what are the possible scenarios of the development of the EU as well as the related models of the differentiated integration with reference to the EU and its neighbourhood? Is the EU membership of Turkey in the current form possible in the case of implementation of one of these models? If not, what are the alternative forms of Turkey-EU relations which may have a chance to be implemented then? Can the old proposals be refreshed and adjusted to the current situation or is it time for new ideas, acceptable and beneficial for the EU, the member states and Turkey nowadays?*

**Keywords:** alternative to membership - differentiated integration - enlargement – the European Union - Turkey

### **1. Introduction**

European Union (EU) is conceptualized as a *system of differentiated integration*.<sup>2</sup> This implies that differentiation is not a temporary, accidental, or non-systemic feature of the integration process in Europe. On the contrary, differentiation seems to be an inherent and enduring feature of the EU, currently consisting of 28 heterogeneous member states (though one is currently negotiating its exit) which are highly divergent, both in terms of socio-economic development and political preferences. The differentiation process has been significantly accelerated by the economic crisis, which resulted in the euro zone crisis. It is no

---

<sup>1</sup> The paper is a result of the initial research being carried out within a project “Differentiated integration, Turkish accession prospects and EU geopolitics” (2016-2018), Programme SONATA 9 of the Polish National Science Center.

<sup>2</sup> D. Leuffen, B. Rittberger and F. Schimmelfennig, *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills Basingstoke 2013.

longer possible to assume that differentiated integration is simply sideline ‘noise’ around the underlying and dominant trajectory towards more uniform forms of integration (for example, a federal state).<sup>3</sup>

The phenomenon of differentiated integration in the European Union can be defined based on 4 variables: 1) time (*temporary* or *permanent differentiation*); 2) territory (variation in terms of rule extension across member states - *horizontal differentiation*); 3) cooperation method (variation in terms of level of centralization across policies - *vertical differentiation*); and finally; 4) intra/extra - EU (variation in terms of rules applied beyond EU borders - *external differentiation*).

Some elements of differentiation were already integrated into the Treaty of Rome, but the political idea (in the form of ‘two-speed Europe’) dates back to the 1975 report by Leo Tindemans. The general concept of differentiation with regard to the single market was introduced to the primary law with the Single European Act in 1986. First academic discussions on the topic were triggered by the UK's accession and took place at the end of 1970s. It was Ralf Dahrendorf who coined the term ‘Europe *a la carte*’ to account for an integration model where common policies only follow common interests without additional constraints for those who are not able or willing to join them.<sup>4</sup> The debate became more lively in the 1990s: both as the result of deepening of the European integration post-Maastricht and imminent widening to the East. The central issue was whether ‘new’ Europe could function as before according to the community method or whether it needed a more pragmatic strategy in order to maintain institutional and procedural effectiveness.<sup>5</sup> For example, Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers<sup>6</sup> saw emergence of the integration *hard core* around Germany and France that moved towards political union, whereas other states could possibly join in the future (two- or multiple-speed Europe model, i.e. *temporary differentiation*). In turn, Édouard Balladur talked about *concentric circles* with a tightly integrated core, an internal circle of less integrated member states and external circle of non-members linked to the EU with relatively loose economic and security ties<sup>7</sup> (a more *permanent differentiation*). These concepts still very much structure the contemporary thinking about the future of the European

---

<sup>3</sup> See: B. Leruth and C. Lord, *Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, a process, a system or a theory?*, “Journal of European Public Policy”, 22:6, 2015, p. 756.

<sup>4</sup> R. Dahrendorf, *A third Europe?*, Paper presented at the third Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, 26 November 1979, <http://aei.pitt.edu/11346/>.

<sup>5</sup> See: C. Schweiger, J.M. Magone, *Differentiated Integration and Cleavage in the EU under Crisis Conditions*, “Perspectives on European Politics and Society”, 15:3, 2014, p. 260.

<sup>6</sup> W. Schäuble, K. Lamers, *Considerations on European Politics*, Bonn: CDU/CSU, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> See: N. Koenig, *A Differentiated View of Differentiated Integration*, Policy Paper no 140, Jacques Delors Institut Berlin, 23 July 2015, p. 5.

Union as a system of differentiated integration. Each of them refers to a different vision of integration. A multi-speed Europe refers to the policy regimes with temporarily varying membership – laggards commit themselves to catch up over time. Concentric circles (variable geometry) indicate that various tiers of member states are organized around a “hard core” and Europe *a la carte* – policy regimes with different membership coexist, with no “hard core”.<sup>8</sup>

The existing academic literature on differentiated integration can be divided chronologically into 4 stages<sup>9</sup>: 1) the ‘early’ studies of differentiation in the post-Maastricht 1990s; 2) the post-Euro and ‘big bang enlargement’ stage, which mostly focused on policy-based differentiation; 3) the post-Lisbon period, which triggered more advanced efforts in theorizing and conceptualising the phenomenon; and, eventually, 4) an emerging new generation of literature, which aims at explaining how the multiple European crises will shape the future of European integration after Brexit through the lenses of *differentiated integration*, but also *differentiated disintegration*.

Moreover, reflection on differentiation has been focused mostly on relations between EU member states, i.e. *internal differentiation*. However, important scholarly work has already been done to integrate non- EU states (candidate and neighbouring states) into the framework, i.e. to account for *external differentiation*.<sup>10</sup> This perspective is all the more important as United Kingdom (UK) is negotiating its terms of withdrawal from the EU as well as its future relations with the bloc as a non-member. It is also vital to conceptualize the future of EU - Turkey relations as accession perspective becomes more and more problematic for a variety of reasons linked to the internal situation of both the EU and Turkey. Thus, the aim of this paper is to link the reflection on possible formats of EU-Turkey relations, which may go beyond accession, to the changes in the European integration process, i.e. differentiated integration and differentiated disintegration.

The main hypothesis, which refers to the categories embedded in the rationalist theories of the European integration (not limited to the liberal intergovernmentalism<sup>11</sup>) and

---

<sup>8</sup> A. Warleigh-Lack, *Differentiated integration in the European Union: towards a comparative regionalism perspective*, “Journal of European Public Policy,” 22:6, 2015, p. 876.

<sup>9</sup> B. Leruth, S. Gänzle, J. Trondal, *Differentiated integration and disintegration in the European Union: State-of-the-art and ways for future research*, ISL Working Paper no 1, University of Agder, 2017, p. 3, <https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/2445530>

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. S. Lavenex, *Concentric Circles or Flexible ‘EUropean’ Integration : a Typology of EU External Governance Relations*, “Comparative European Politics”, 9:4-5, 2011, pp. 372-393; F. Schimmelfennig, *Circles and Hemispheres: Differentiated Integration in and beyond the European Union*, unpublished paper presented at the EUSA Conference, Baltimore, May 2013.

<sup>11</sup> We did not take the approach presented in the research on this topic e.g. by Cemal Karakaş who refers solely to the liberal intergovernmentalism. We follow instead the theoretical framework on the EU enlargement proposed by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, who take into consideration different rationalist

takes into consideration the interplay between the intergovernmental and supranational bodies, says that the extended model of the external differentiated integration can build the framework for the new, dynamic formula of Turkey-EU relations. However, its shape must be in accordance with the preferences and interests of the major actors of the enlargement process – European Commission, members states and Turkey itself, in order to make the implementation of the formula possible. To reach the aforementioned research goal and verify the hypothesis the following questions will be posed: What are the possible scenarios of the development of the EU? How do they position the processes of differentiation and disintegration? What do they mean for the EU enlargement? Is there any scenario which can bring new dynamics to the relations between Turkey and the EU? Is the EU membership of Turkey in the current form possible in the case of implementation of one of these scenarios? If not, what are the alternative forms of Turkey-EU relations which may have a chance to be implemented then? Can the old proposals be refreshed and adjusted to the current situation or is it the time for new ideas, acceptable and beneficial for both the EU, member states and Turkey nowadays?

This paper consists of three main parts and has as references various contributions to the debate about the differentiated integration in the context of enlargement and Turkish case – EU documents, academic publications, think tank analyses and reports as well as interviews carried out in Autumn 2016 with experts (mainly analysts and practitioners). First, we will propose scenarios for the future of the EU which are connected with the classical concepts of the European integration but they also take into consideration the current situation in the EU and the reaction of the major EU players to this situation. It will be followed by the answer to the question about the possible consequences of the implementation of these scenarios for the current candidates to the EU membership. The third part will be an analysis of the case of Turkey in order to investigate the main research issue.

## **2. Where is the EU heading?**


Factors that weaken the coherence of the EU and can thus stimulate differentiated integration but also differentiated disintegration are the following: a) consequences of the

---

approaches. See: C. Karakaş, *EU–Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration? A Conceptual Framework for Accession Alternatives*, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 51:6, 2013, pp. 1061-1062; F. Schimmelfenning and U. Sedelmeier, *The study of EU enlargement: theoretical approaches and empirical findings*, in: *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, ed. M. Cini and A. K. Bourne, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006, pp. 96-116.

Eastern enlargement; b) euro zone crisis; c) migration crisis; d) contestation of the European integration project; e) the decision of UK to exit the EU.

In its White Paper on the Future of Europe, published on 1 March 2017<sup>12</sup> European Commission outlined 5 scenarios for the future of the EU: carrying on, nothing but the single market, those who want more do more, doing less more efficiently, doing much more together. We adopt a slightly different approach that will nevertheless refer to the choices indicated by the Commission. We suggest that scenarios can be conceptualized within the field defined by two axes: 1) *integration - disintegration*; 2) *uniformity - differentiation*.



Source: authors' own work.

As presented above, three scenarios are deemed both possible and relevant: 1) 'A uniform leap forward'; 2) 'Taking a few steps back'; 3) 'Some move forward, some move backward'. Whereas the first scenario is based on principle of uniformity, the third one is based on differentiation. The second scenario constitutes an interesting case: the way it is formulated by Polish decision-makers indicates the tentative of uniformity (2a), but realistically speaking it may easily end up on the differentiation mode (2b). Whereas the first scenario leads us towards more integration, the second one privileges (partial) disintegration. The third scenario involves both integration and disintegration, thus in a differentiated way. If we were to look for analogies with regard to the Commission's scenarios, we could associate 'a uniform leap forward' with 'doing more together', 'taking a few steps back' with 'nothing but single market' and also 'doing less more efficiently'. As to 'some move forward, some move

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, *White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for EU27 by 2025*, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white\\_paper\\_on\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_europe\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf).

backward' it fits with the 'those who want more do more', but equally with 'doing less more efficiently'. Let us now look at the three scenarios more closely.

**SCENARIO 1.** The 'uniform leap forward' scenario derives from the hopes and dreams that the Union could become ever closer and ever more cohesive as soon as the British eternal 'awkward partner' is off board. The political union is being created around the reformed euro zone that progressively pulls the remaining non-euro member states (as of 2017, 8 out of 27 - minus UK - Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Sweden and Denmark) towards the centre. Moreover, as indicated by Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 'treaty-based differentiations for the new Central European member states have gradually declined over time, even if we take into account treaties concluded after their accession. Secondary-law differentiation has been low for the new member states and largely stable since accession. Besides a selected number of persistent capital mobility differentiations, the main remaining divide is between euro area and non-euro area countries among the 2004 and 2007 intake – a divide that we find among the older member states as well'.<sup>13</sup>

Thus the conclusion is that by 2017 the *instrumental differentiation* between Eastern and Western Europe, which resulted from both temporary exemptions and discriminatory provisions towards the new member states<sup>14</sup>, has been substantially reduced. Once the euro division is overcome, the EU becomes a largely uniform polity provided that no new members are accepted. However, this scenario does not take into account the fact that the UK is currently being replaced by new 'awkward partners' from Central Europe, namely Poland and Hungary. Member of the same European Conservatives and Reformists Group in the European Parliament as British Tories, the Polish Law and Justice party - in power since November 2015 - has largely taken over the British vision of pre-Maastricht integration concept refocused on the single market and based on unanimity in the Council.

**SCENARIO 2.** The 'taking a few steps back' scenario originates precisely from the British pre-Brexit vision of integration as outlined by David Cameron in his famous January 2013 speech. According to Cameron, the EU faced three major challenges: the euro zone crisis, the competitiveness crisis and the problem of democratic deficit. 'The more of the same' or ever closer Europe was not a viable option to solve those problems; 'that is why we need

---

<sup>13</sup> F. Schimmelfennig, T. Winzen, *Eastern enlargement and differentiated integration: towards normalization*, "Journal of European Public Policy" 24:2, 2017, p. 255.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. F. Schimmelfennig, *EU Enlargement and Differentiation: Discrimination or Equal Treatment?*, "Journal of European Public Policy", 21:5, 2014, p. 682.

fundamental far-reaching change'.<sup>15</sup> This change consisted of refocusing the EU on the completion of the single market and boosting competitiveness instead of on the euro zone; introducing more flexibility, while thinking about the EU in terms of a network and not in terms of a bloc; strengthening democratic legitimacy of the Union at the national level and finally, making sure that the power can flow back to the member states and not just away from them.

These ideas have been recently taken further by the Polish government advocating for a new reformed union. This Union – according to minister for European affairs Konrad Szymanski<sup>16</sup> – would re-establish political consensus on European integration and the unity of the West. It cannot be a “little federal union” that excludes some of the current members. Weakening trust in the European project can only be restored by strengthening the position of member states and national parliaments. The European Commission should be reduced to an executive role and the EU’s legitimacy must be based on existing political communities –the European nations. The EU should focus on a limited agenda: security and single market. This means taking a step back, abandoning the dream of a political union and fostering a loose but inclusive union of sovereign states. In a similar vein, five steps for the reconstitution of Europe were proposed by Krzysztof Szczerski, secretary of state in the chancellery of the President of Poland: 1) 'intergovernmental democracy' (back to unanimity, national parliaments, national referendums); 2) profound deregulation; 3) equality between member states and solidarity at the service of convergence and not exploitation of the weaker by the stronger; 4) polycentric Union - multiple regional centres of power; moving away from one hierarchy between euro members and non-euro members; 5) openness (though not necessarily enlargement of the EU, but rather of NATO); 6) return to the Christian spiritual heritage.<sup>17</sup>

Importantly, this move away from a federal and *de facto* back to a confederal logic invalidates - in theory - the problem of differentiation. The latter is based on an exclusionary logic, where a closely integrated (federal) core is surrounded by circles/individual countries that are not able/willing/allowed to join given policy areas. The Polish determination to avoid differentiation is not surprising as in Poland the concept is associated with a relegation to a second-class membership. However, the major problem with this approach is that it requires

---

<sup>15</sup> The full text of Prime Minister David Cameron's speech about his plans for a referendum on British membership of the European Union, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum>.

<sup>16</sup> K. Szymański, Minister for European Affairs, *What Kind of Union Does Poland Need?*, in "Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny", 1(67)/2016, <http://www.ppd.pism.pl/Numery/1-67-2016/What-Kind-of-Union-Does-Poland-Need-Minister-Konrad-Szymanski#>

<sup>17</sup> K. Szczerski, *Utopia Europejska: kryzys integracji i polska inicjatywa naprawy* [European Utopia: Integration Crisis and Polish Improvement Initiative], Biały Kruk, Kraków 2017, pp. 235-238.

all member states to take a uniform step back across policies and modes of cooperation. This is highly unlikely, which in fact makes this scenario a highway to differentiated disintegration.

*Disintegration* can be defined as a 'general mode of strategies under which a member state withdraws from participation in the process of European integration or under which EU policies are transferred back to member states'.<sup>18</sup> In other words, 'individual member states may leave the EU entirely or withdraw from specific EU institutions or some issue areas are - *de jure* or *de facto* - renationalized or the authority of supranational organs towards national ones becomes weaker'.<sup>19</sup>

We may conceptualize integration not as a process towards a uniform quasi-state, but a more complex process that features stages of progress and stagnation, as well as differentiation with regard to time, scope, policies and methods. Similarly, disintegration should not be seen as a linear process leading to the disappearance of supranational institutions and reinstatement of sovereign nation-states. Although differentiated integration should not be considered as equal to or leading to disintegration, growing differentiation could nevertheless be the result of disintegration processes.

**SCENARIO 3.** The 'some move forward, some move backward' scenario features more differentiated integration and more differentiated disintegration. As stated by Jan Zielonka, 'it is probable that future developments in the European Union will combine accelerated integration for some, disintegration for others, and greater differentiation in commitments to policies and institutions for all the members'.<sup>20</sup> What could be the end result of such parallel processes? One could imagine the emergence of an ever more integrated hard core around Germany and France with other individual states or groups of states linked to the core in a differentiated way. Outside the core, differences between members and non-members (EEA, candidates, associated neighbours) become increasingly blurred. Whereas formal members of the EU may choose to withdraw from given policy areas or from the EU altogether and seek an alternative status, candidates and associates may choose to selectively integrate within some policy areas. The question remains as to whether the core consists of the current euro zone (19 EU member states) or whether the euro zone eventually

---

<sup>18</sup> B. Leruth, S. Gänzle, J. Trondal, *Differentiated integration and disintegration in the European Union...*, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>19</sup> D. Webber, *Can the EU Survive?* in: *The European Union in Crisis*, ed. D. Dinan, N. Nugent, W.E. Paterson, Palgrave 2017, p. 356.

<sup>20</sup> J. Zielonka, *Is the EU doomed?* Polity Press, Cambridge 2014.

disintegrates and the core is constituted by a smaller group of up to 12 'northern' (including France) states.

Differentiation resulting from the integration deepening may take place within or outside the treaties (the Schengen method, also used for the conclusion of the 2012 fiscal compact). Intra-treaty differentiation (enhanced cooperation) allows for maintenance of institutional coherence of the EU although its mainstreaming is bound to change the decision-making logic anyway. States may not seek consensus/ qualified majority and all negotiations could be led in the shadow of enhanced cooperation. On the other hand, mainstreaming of the intergovernmental cooperation outside the treaties petrifies the segmentation between the core and peripheries, where the latter may be increasingly and negatively affected by decision-making in the policy areas they were not part of.<sup>21</sup>

What currently seems to be on the table is the proposal for more flexibility understood as temporary differentiation according to procedures laid down in the EU treaties. Goals and directions are the same, but the pace and levels of ambition vary.<sup>22</sup> However, such differentiation paradigm should rather be considered as a pilot project. Further consolidation of the euro zone outside the treaty framework is possible and depends on the dynamics between Western euro-zone members and Central-Eastern states whose currency is not the euro.

### **3. Consequences for candidates and neighbours**

What are the consequences of each scenario of internal developments in the EU for its external relations with candidates and associated neighbours? In the first scenario enlargement seems out of the question. The huge gap in terms of a) socio-economic development and b) governance standards between the ever closer integrated political union and non-EU countries from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe makes the enlargement process untenable. Thus alternative forms of cooperation with the current candidates need to be established.

If the EU moves backward in a uniform way (scenario 2a) and concentrates mostly on single market and security, it should be possible for candidate and associated states to progressively join such a loose union. Importantly, these countries will not be confronted with a sovereignty challenge as many more decisions than it is currently the case are to be taken by

---

<sup>21</sup> T.G. Grosse, *Wprowadzenie. Polityki europejskie w dobie zmiany modelu integracji* [Introduction. European Policies at the Time of Change of the Integration Model], in: *Polityki europejskie w dobie kryzysu* [European Policies at the Time of Crisis], ed. T.G. Grosse, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup> According to the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017 Member states pledged that they 'will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction (...)', <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/>.

consensus. Moreover, weaker rule of law and democratic standards should not be an issue as the Union will not be allowed to interfere with the national democracy models of the member states.

Differentiation (under scenario 2b and scenario 3) provides ample opportunities for different types of flexible/selective membership. From the EU point of view, flexible membership constitutes an interesting strategy, where integration deepening is possible within the core and simultaneous widening of economic and political sphere of influence can take place without compromising the deepening.<sup>23</sup>

However, practical application of this concept raises two important questions. Firstly, to what extent flexible integration would be acceptable to candidate and neighbouring countries as an alternative to accession process as it currently stands? Here, the case of Turkey is of a particular interest. After many years of insisting on nothing less than full membership, this official candidate country (since 1999), under an almost absolute rule of president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, may finally be tempted by a perspective of “selective membership” where it is allowed (the question is under which conditions) to participate in the policies of its choice. Secondly, to what extent the development of flexible forms of integration runs the risk of fragmentation and eventual disintegration of the European Union? Differentiated integration also creates prospects for maintaining EU openness and strengthening its geopolitical position. It also reinforces the position of the current EU members who do not and will not belong to the euro zone, as it creates more opportunities for cooperation between different circles of integration.<sup>24</sup> However, if the new differentiated Union is to function effectively, it must maintain the inclusiveness of the integration process. Joining the subsequent circles of integration must be guaranteed, provided that a country is able and willing to do so, i.e. it fulfills the formal criteria and expresses political will to deepen integration in a given area. The case of Turkey refers also to this issue. Thus the following part will be dedicated to relations between the European Union and the Turkish candidate.

---

<sup>23</sup> K. Raik and T. Tamminem, *Inclusive and Exclusive Differentiation: Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy*, in: *Multi-Speed Europe: Differentiated Integration in the External Relations of the European Union*, ed. J. Jokela, “FIIA Report” no 38, January 2014, [www.fiaa.fi/assets/publications/FIIA\\_Report38\\_web.pdf](http://www.fiaa.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_Report38_web.pdf), pp. 45-46.

<sup>24</sup> A.K. Cianciara, *Differentiated Integration in the European Union and its Prospects in the Context of Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies*, in: *The Euro-Atlantic System in a Multi-polar World. A Forecast*, ed. J.M. Fiszer et al., Logos Verlag, Berlin 2015, p. 119.

## 4. Case of Turkey

### 4.1. Which scenario for EU-Turkey relations?

When we link the reflection on possible formats of EU-Turkey relations to the aforementioned scenarios of changes in the European integration process, it is quite clear which scenario can potentially bring a new dynamics to the enlargement policy in general and EU-Turkey relations in particular. Scenarios 1 and 2 (at least 2a) are not very probable and, as mentioned before, scenario number 1 does not take into account the current developments and ongoing irreversible processes in the EU. Scenario 2 in turn would need the consent of all member states and European Commission to take substantial steps back, which in both cases seems highly unlikely.

Even if one of these scenarios is implemented, it will not bring new life into EU-Turkey relations. As we have already argued, scenario 1 means that further EU enlargement is not possible and some alternative concepts that exclude the prospect of accession, even in the long run, must be developed. In the Turkish case it would have to be a concept similar to the privileged partnership - the proposal debated in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century but abandoned after some years even by their propagators (governments of France or Austria as well as German CDU/CSU) because of their total rejection by Turkey. As in the case of this concept (and a similar “extended associate membership”), its equivalent by the implementation of scenario 1 would not give decision-making rights (consultation only) and even more limited introduction into EU policies and programmes due to the differences in economic development and legal systems with the EU members in the future. For the same reason, the conditionality would be even stricter than to date (it was also a part of the concept of the privileged partnership that Turkey had to fulfil some, mainly political criteria).<sup>25</sup> It is not the scenario acceptable for Turkey, particularly when it requires also democratic reforms. Therefore, the idea to revise the privileged partnership which can be proposed this time by Turkey following the UK example is not a realistic proposal, at least with reference to scenario 1.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> For more, see e.g. A. Szymański, *Alternatives to EU Membership. The Case of Turkey*, “The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs”, 4, 2007, pp. 57-61; C. Atilgan and D. Klein, *EU Integration Models beyond Full Membership*, Working Paper, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin 2006, pp. 7-8 and 11-12, [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_8414-544-2-30.pdf?061221153540](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_8414-544-2-30.pdf?061221153540)

<sup>26</sup> Cf. G. Dalay, *Turkey and Europe after Brexit: Looking beyond EU membership*, Report, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, 17 October 2016, p. 5, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/10/turkey-europe-brexiteu-membership-161018050604985.html>

At first glance, implementation of scenario 2 looks as something attractive for Turkey. It is in accordance with the general Turkish vision of the EU as a loose union of the sovereign states. It is about integration in economic and security areas (in which EU and Turkey have a common interest), excluding the inconvenient political issues. However, in the case of very doubtful implementation of this scenario, it could appear that the EU is not so attractive for Turkey to foster the accession process. When it comes to the economic sphere, Turkey is already integrated with the EU in the framework of the customs union. Membership in a loose EU could of course lead to more economic integration and symmetric relations, but with some limits, in accordance with the current enlargement framework providing e.g. safeguard measures to protect the interests of member states, first of all in the free movement of workers. In terms of security, apart from the problematic inclusion of Turkey due to the Cyprus issue, Turkey could opt more for involvement in NATO activities. The involvement in the issues concerning the internal security would be more realistic, again with limitations which can discourage Turkey from continuing the pre-accession process.

Scenario 3, involving both differentiated integration and differentiated disintegration, is more probable in comparison with the previous ones. Differentiated integration and disintegration are increasingly relevant processes. Moreover, they should not be treated as something defective but on the contrary, as phenomena that can be functional, helping to solve EU problems.<sup>27</sup>, including the challenge of EU enlargement and Turkish candidacy. We agree with Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Brooke Luetgert that the functional models of differentiated integration can be a solution to the problems of effectiveness of EU enlargement policy and European Neighbourhood Policy. Accordingly, these models can be “the solution to the problem of the integration capacity of the EU. It is difficult for the EU to continue the process of enlargement with the “classical” membership form and the principle - full membership or nothing at all which “poses particularly high barriers on the future of enlargement.”<sup>28</sup> More flexible forms can be acceptable for the EU and its members being not so harmful for the EU institutions, budget or policies.

Thus the model of differentiated integration can contribute to the revitalisation of EU-Turkey relations. After more than ten years of accession negotiations, the process is in a stalemate with only 16 of 35 chapters opened (one provisionally closed). There are no prospects for the progress mainly due to the political situation in Turkey, but also due to the

---

<sup>27</sup> A. Warleigh-Lack, *Differentiated integration in the European Union...*, op.cit., pp. 881-882.

<sup>28</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and B. Luetgert, *The European Union's Alternative Models for Maximizing its Integration Strategy for Candidates and Neighbour States. A Process of External Differentiation*, MAXCAP Working Paper no. 35, November 2016, p. 8, [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/maxcap/system/files/maxcap\\_wp\\_35.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/maxcap/system/files/maxcap_wp_35.pdf)

EU still troubled by crises. However, it is in the interest of both Turkey and the EU (its members) to change the current situation to avoid clashes and competition as outlined (with some exaggeration) by Nathalie Tocci.<sup>29</sup> Paradoxically, because of the importance of Turkey for EU members and their absolute rejection of something else than full membership (later also because of the political situation in Turkey), the talks about alternative forms of cooperation were not continued after the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>30</sup> However, it seems that the attitude is slowly changing, especially with Brexit, which generated discussions about the model of EU-UK relations, with an impact on the Turkish case.<sup>31</sup>

#### ***4.2. Which model of the differentiated integration for the Turkish case?***

It must be underlined that the solution can be in the case of EU-Turkey relations only the model of the external - not internal - differentiation. With reference to the Turkish case it has been argued that the implementation of the differentiated integration model within the EU with a group of more integrated core countries and the less integrated rest is a chance for Turkey to become an EU member within the latter group, thus making the pre-accession process easier. This could be true only in the situation of substantial change of the enlargement method (being a reflection of the integration method) - i.e. the requirement of the adoption of the entire *acquis communautaire*.<sup>32</sup> However, this would mean the change of the EU institutional framework and implementation of the two-tier model with separate institutional and formal arrangements for the core and the rest, and in consequence – the possible deconstruction of the EU.<sup>33</sup> The change of the general institutional framework is not very probable, also due to the path dependence mechanism and resistance to change from the EU institutions.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the differentiated integration in the EU within the existing institutional framework will not make Turks' life easier. Turkey would still need to fully adopt the *acquis communautaire*, even if it does not plan to (and can) join such major EU projects

---

<sup>29</sup> N. Tocci, *Turkey and the European Union: Scenarios for 2023*, pp. 5-10, [http://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user\\_upload/FEUTURE\\_Background\\_Paper\\_final.pdf](http://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user_upload/FEUTURE_Background_Paper_final.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> Note from the interview with Dr Oliver Ernst, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, 20.09.2016.

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. G. Dalay, *Turkey and Europe after Brexit...*, op.cit.; J. Pisani-Ferry, N. Röttgen, A. Sapir, P. Tucker and G. B. Wolff, *Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership*, <http://bruegel.org/2016/08/europe-after-brex-it-a-proposal-for-a-continental-partnership/>

<sup>32</sup> Ch. Preston, *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*, Routledge, London, New York 1997, pp.8-22.

<sup>33</sup> K. Raik and T. Tamminem, *Inclusive and Exclusive Differentiation...*, op.cit., pp. 58-59; Note from the interview with Dr Barbara Lippert, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 19.09.2016.

<sup>34</sup> Note from the interview with Almut Moeller, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 21.09.2016.

as Schengen or euro zone right after (currently doubtful) accession (as it was the case of the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargement).<sup>35</sup>

A model of external differentiation is promising, having also a strong basis in EU policies' practice. Actually, Turkey has already built a model of external differentiation within its relations with the EU - thanks to the customs union and inclusion to many EU policies and programmes (*de facto* opt-ins). The customs union, which entered into force in 1996, embraced industrial goods and processed agricultural products. "Turkey adopts the common external tariff and the *acquis* in the area of technical barriers to trade, and it aligns its legislation in other essential internal market areas, notably competition policy and protection of intellectual property rights."<sup>36</sup> There have been talks about the extension of the customs union to services and agricultural products as well as enhancing Turkey's compliance with the EU's public procurement rules – the step recommended in recent years by the European Commission. In terms of EU economic policies, the High Economic Dialogue initiated in 2015 is also promising. Unfortunately, the customs union is based on an asymmetric relationship and does not guarantee decision-making rights e.g. with reference to trade agreements with third countries (consultation mechanisms prevail). Turkey has also been included to some extent into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It takes part in EU-led missions and informal meetings of EU foreign ministers – Gymnich; adopts many CFSP positions; there is a CSDP Dialogue Instrument between Turkey and the EU as well as the formal channel of communications through regular meetings between the EU's High Representative and the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister. Other EU policies, where Turkey is involved are: energy policy (adoption of many regulations, establishment in 2015 of the High Energy Dialogue) as well as education, research and development (participation in Erasmus+ and European Research Area). Turkey participates more and more in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; it has an agreement with Europol and Frontex. The readmission agreement and visa liberalization dialogue (with 65 of 72 criteria fulfilled) contribute to it. In 2009 Turkey joined the European Gendarmerie Force as an observer and was included into the Civil Protection Committee of the Commission's DG ECHO.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> B. Lippert, *The Nexus Between Enlargement and Differentiation*, IAI, 7 February 2017, p. 8 ff, [http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60\\_2.pdf](http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60_2.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> S. Gstöhl, *Models of external differentiation in the EU's neighbourhood: an expanding economic community?*, "Journal of European Public Policy," 22:6, 2015, p. 861.

<sup>37</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and B. Luetgert, *The European Union's Alternative Models...*, op.cit., p. 12; E. Turhan, *Thinking out of the Accession Box: The Potential and Limitations of Internal and External Differentiated Integration Between Turkey and the EU*, CIFE Policy Paper no. 58, 3 July 2017, pp. 3-4,

Thus, there is a solid basis for further development of the external differentiation model for EU-Turkey relations – in the extended form going beyond the current state. The question is about its precise form and whether the model should be built beyond accession. We share again the opinion of Müftüler-Baç that it should be a model of “external differentiation as a possible route for the revitalization of this relationship, along more functional lines, and perhaps putting formal membership at a backburner for the time being.”<sup>38</sup> This means temporary, virtual membership going beyond its classical form, without formally ending accession negotiations and without excluding the possibility of formal membership in the long run. As Sinan Ülgen or Ioannis Grigoriadis argue, in the long run we may expect more favorable political conditions in Turkey and member states thinking more realistically about the formal membership perspective as closing the door completely is not a solution.<sup>39</sup>

When it comes to accession talks, we should take political reality into consideration. They are difficult to continue (due to politicization in the EU and the situation in Turkey) and difficult to stop. Some EU politicians pushed for suspension of the accession negotiations.<sup>40</sup> However, no major enlargement policy player wants to formally end the talks with Turks. Although Commissioner Johannes Hahn mentioned a new formula of relations, this does not mean that Commission supports the end of membership talks as it was clearly expressed by the President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker.<sup>41</sup> This could be too costly for the enlargement policy and the EU as a whole: both EU institutions and member states recognize that Turkey is too important in economic and security terms. Equally, Turkey is not interested in ending the talks, despite its harsh rhetoric. Thus the realistic option is not a full membership, but a “membership minus” formula.

It is clear that alternative concepts (EEA, with or without plus, or continental partnership for UK), which can work in the case of other countries, are not adequate options for the Turkish case. Models created for one group of countries are not easily translated for

---

[http://www.cife.eu/Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20paper/CIFE\\_Policy\\_Paper\\_58\\_Thinking\\_out\\_of\\_The\\_Accession\\_Box\\_EU\\_Turkey\\_Ebru\\_Turhan\\_2017.pdf](http://www.cife.eu/Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20paper/CIFE_Policy_Paper_58_Thinking_out_of_The_Accession_Box_EU_Turkey_Ebru_Turhan_2017.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç, *Turkey's future with the European Union: alternative model of differentiated integration*, “Turkish Studies”, 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1300534>, p. 2

<sup>39</sup> S Ülgen, *Avoiding a Divorce: A Virtual EU Membership for Turkey*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 December 2012; Note from the interview with Dr Günter Seufert and Dr Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 19.09.2016.

<sup>40</sup> E. Turhan, *Thinking out of the Accession Box...*, op.cit., p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> *EU membership talks with Turkey should not be halted, Juncker says*, “Hurriyet Daily News” of 3 August 2017, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-membership-talks-with-turkey-should-not-be-halted-juncker-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=116311&NewsCat ID=510>

others. Contrary to Turkey, countries like Norway or UK do not have difficulties with the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria, they are stable and rich enough to function without EU funds. Whereas Turkey declares its membership aspirations, EEA countries and UK reject the idea.

The EEA is about inclusion into the internal market but EEA+ for Turkey would mean exclusion from the free movement of workers (in comparison with membership), which will not be easily accepted by this candidate state. Similarly, EEA (or EEA+) members do not have the decision-making rights (only consultation applies) and have limited access to EU funds (agriculture and regional policy). As a result, this would only give Turkey some more trade benefits and nothing else. Moreover, in comparison to such countries as Norway or Iceland, it would be not certain if Turkey can be easily included into other areas of EU activities, going beyond the current state. The preferences and interests of member states could create obstacles for this inclusion. They can be against it for economic reasons (if Turkey is not sufficiently prepared to be included or when the Turkish inclusion is too costly for a particular EU country) or due to bilateral problems in relations with Turkey. Furthermore, EEA or even EEA+ does not give the accession prospects but is rather a permanent arrangement beyond the membership (in the case of the EEA+ there is such a possibility but very unclear).<sup>42</sup>

The continental partnership provides for the inclusion of the UK (possibly also other countries such as Turkey) into an intergovernmental tier outside the EU as opposed to the supranational system of the EU. The former group would have the opt-in options when it comes to the participation in the common policies consistent with the internal market (with the exclusion of the free movement of workers), contribution to the EU budget as well as foreign and security policy. Within the Council of the continental partnership, with a participation of EU institutions, EU non-member states would discuss the drafts of EU legislation concerning their opt-in areas with the right to propose amendments. However, the EU member states will not be obliged to take their positions into consideration.<sup>43</sup> Putting aside the many question marks concerning the details of the decision-making process, the crucial problem is that the implementation of this concept would mean the change of the general institutional framework of the EU and development of two-tier integration which can lead to the deconstruction of the EU. Moreover, this concept generates the same problems as in the

---

<sup>42</sup> M. Müftüleri-Baç and B. Luetgert, *The European Union's Alternative Models...*, op.cit., p. 10; E. Turhan, *Thinking out of the Accession Box...*, op.cit., p. 5; K. Raik and T. Tamminem, *Inclusive and Exclusive Differentiation...*, op.cit., pp. 47-49.

<sup>43</sup> J. Pisani-Ferry, N. Röttgen, A. Sapir, P. Tucker and G. B. Wolff, *Europe after Brexit...*, op.cit., pp. 6-9.

case of the EEA or EEA+ – it was designed for countries that do not want to be the EU members but at the same time comply with EU values and norms.<sup>44</sup>

What is left among the previously proposed concepts, is the *gradual membership*, first proposed by scholar Cemal Karakaş, followed by the German CDU politician Matthias Wissmann. It is about gradual introduction of Turkey into different EU policy areas – from foreign and security policy, through justice and home affairs (currently Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to the EU economic policies and internal market. There are criteria to be fulfilled to reach the next integration stage (conditionality mechanism) after the decision is made by EU member states. Once Turkey is integrated within a policy area, it would acquire decision-making rights but without a veto. The concept includes the formal membership prospect.<sup>45</sup> Karakaş rightly points out that it is the only concept that gives Turkey something more than it currently has in economic and political realm, being at the same time a kind of operationalisation of the existing negotiating framework, not changing substantially the existing institutional framework (important for the European Commission).<sup>46</sup> The problem is that the progress in the integration would depend on the decision by the member states, which due to the increasing politicization of the pre-accession process of Turkey and its internal situation could lead to staying at one stage for decades and never reaching the advanced stages of the process.

However, the general idea of: a) introducing Turkey into different EU policy areas; b) with a stake in the decision-making in these areas; and c) maintaining the general enlargement dynamic, is something worth following. This is a reference point in the EU discussion about the “new formula” of the EU-Turkey relations, which seems to be supported by the EU officials and representatives of the member states.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, it is not rejected by Turkish authorities.<sup>48</sup> In fact, it was initiated in the situation of the refugee crisis by the November 2015 EU-Turkey summit. It generated the talks on the modification of the existing institutional framework of relations into the direction of the differentiated integration model going beyond the current form - based mainly on the customs union.<sup>49</sup> In addition to launching new dialogue mechanisms (the aforementioned economic or energy dialogue), the

---

<sup>44</sup> Note from the interview with Dr Günter Seufert and Dr Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, op.cit.

<sup>45</sup> A. Szymański, *Alternatives to EU Membership...*, op.cit., pp. 61-61; C. Atilgan and D. Klein, *EU Integration Model...*, op.cit., pp. 8-10.

<sup>46</sup> C. Karakaş, *EU–Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration?...*, op.cit., p. 1069.

<sup>47</sup> E. Turhan, *Thinking out of the Accession Box...*, op.cit., p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> C. Karakaş, *EU–Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration?...*, op.cit., p. 1067.

<sup>49</sup> E. Turhan, *Thinking out of the Accession Box...*, op.cit., p. 4.

EU officials and Turkey began discussions on the working out of the regular high level summits. These summits can be either part of an inter-governmental summit with the 28 (27) member states or a trilateral meeting with the presidents of Turkey, the European Commission and the Council of the EU.<sup>50</sup> Their institutionalisation can mean a new form of the “extended Council” within which expectations of both sides and common interests can be defined and discussed. The summits can also contribute to revising of the association institutions and have some impact on the decision-making process, instead of purely consultation rights. The next step in a longer term could be Turkey's observer status in the European Council.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to revising the institutional framework the differentiated integration model can be developed through more intensive integration into EU policies. Müftüler-Baç gives food for thought in this context, while referring to the extension of the customs union. The idea is broadly shared by Sieglinde Gstöhl, who writes about a model of differentiated integration between Turkey and the EU in the form of the Customs Union 2.0. It will be not only about embracing agriculture products or services. “The EU could insert a ‘Turkey clause’ in new trade agreements to encourage its trade partners to negotiate parallel agreements with Turkey. It could hold consultations with Turkey on trade agreements or include a Turkish representative as observer in its Trade Policy Committee.”<sup>52</sup> Müftüler-Baç proposes in the area of the foreign and security policy a participation of Turkey in permanent structure cooperation (PESCO) and foreign and security-related Council meetings as well as involvement in the European Defense Agency. As far as the energy policy is concerned, she argues that it is possible to include Turkey into the European Energy Community. When it comes to the former justice and home affairs area, she proposed in turn an opt-in for Turkey in the form of involvement into FRONTEX going beyond the agreement to date as well as attending as the observer the JHA Council.<sup>53</sup>

### **4.3. Implementation dilemmas**

Interesting as it is, could this model be effectively implemented? Below we point to some important dilemmas related to EU institutions, members states and Turkey. We argue

---

<sup>50</sup> S. Erkuş, *EU choosing to ‘re-engage’ with Turkey: Official*, “Hurriyet Daily News” of 12 June 2017, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-choosing-to-re-engage-with-turkey-official-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=114201&NewsCatID=510>

<sup>51</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç, *Turkey’s future with the European Union...*, op.cit., pp. 17-18.

<sup>52</sup> S. Gstöhl, *Models of external differentiation...*, op.cit. p. 862.

<sup>53</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç, *Turkey’s future with the European Union...*, op.cit., pp. 10-17.

that preferences and interests of all major players must be taken into account in order to allow for smooth implementation.

As to EU institutions, the question is, how much flexibility could be accepted by the European Commission, the main supranational body. There is a risk that the path dependence mechanism and the institutional memory and resistance to change could prevent embracing a model that is going too far beyond the current enlargement policy, its institutional framework or concept of membership.<sup>54</sup> It is thus important, as proposed by Karakaş, to stay within the substance of the negotiating framework for Turkey but also not to exclude totally the idea of formal membership (even if it can be achieved only in long run) and not to end formally the accession negotiations (it would undermine the enlargement policy being already in crisis). For the same reason it would be a difficult task for the EU institutions, again primarily the European Commission, to decide to what extent Turkey can be involved in the decision-making process. Going too far would mean blurring the boundary between a member and non-member.

It is also important for the Commission to keep the general integration process intact, which may be at risk if other, particularly the so called new member states demand opt-outs looking at Turkey or other countries within the new model of differentiated integration. Therefore, an important part of the model should be still conditionality, another crucial component of the enlargement policy to date. Of course, the question is what conditions should be taken into consideration, a kind of Copenhagen criteria 2.0.<sup>55</sup> This would be a difficult task for the Commission to propose the list of clear, detailed criteria and effective mechanism of conditionality.

Another practical problem is that it would be difficult to introduce Turkey to one cluster of EU policies, not doing this at the same time in other areas. That is why the concept of gradual membership in its initial form does not suit the reality in the EU, where different dimensions of security, politics and economy are interconnected.<sup>56</sup> Only simultaneous introduction of Turkey into different clusters would make sense in this context, but there is significant risk of member states' objection

At the member states level, the major dilemma is whether concrete solutions are in accordance with the states' interests and preferences. Turkey may be important for the EU in areas such as trade, energy, foreign policy or security, but this may not be enough for member

---

<sup>54</sup> For more, see; P. Pierson, *The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis*, „Comparative Political Studies”, 29:2, 1996, pp. 123-163

<sup>55</sup> B. Lippert, *The Nexus Between Enlargement and Differentiation*, op.cit., pp. 8ff.

<sup>56</sup> Note from the interview with Dr Barbara Lippert, op.cit.

states to accept the details of the model. Increased politicization and a growing number of bilateral challenges in relations between Turkey and EU member states can lead to serious implementation difficulties. Key issues are: 1) how Turkey will be integrated into decision-making within particular EU policy areas and 2) how member states will decide if criteria for integration have been fulfilled. If unanimity is required we may expect blockage by a single country, precisely as it is the case for accession negotiations. For instance, Cyprus could easily block Turkish participation in European Defense Agency or any other CFSP institution. Moreover, the question is if the interests of a particular EU member state would allow for the introduction of Turkey into the decision-making process or single policies crucial for one EU country (the same problem as discussed in the case of application of the EEA+).<sup>57</sup>

Finally, is the new solution of differentiated integration acceptable to Turkey? Previously, Turkish authorities rejected all alternative concepts below the threshold of full membership. The 'Norwegian model' advocated by major Turkish players was nothing more than a tactical move to put pressure on the EU.<sup>58</sup> But the idea of the extended model of differentiated integration for EU-Turkey relations was not rejected Turkish politicians, former Minister for the EU Affairs Eğemen Bağış or former Minister of Economic Affairs Kemal Derviş. However, as Bağış claimed, the new model must give Turkey 'something more' in economic, political and legal terms (this added value was missing in the previous alternative concepts). Moreover, such an offer should be made to all candidates; a special offer for Turkey raises doubts as to a hidden agenda to exclude Turkey from accession process. Derviş accepted that Turkey stayed outside the EU core, especially that fears of losing sovereignty were widespread among Turks. However, this last argument raises doubts because Turkey can have ambition to be in the areas reserved for the core, maybe in the long run.<sup>59</sup>

The proposed extended model of the differentiated integration for EU-Turkey relations can be proposed to other candidate and associated (ENP) countries. Müftüler-Baç and Luetgert prove quite convincingly that it can be a model for Serbia or Ukraine.<sup>60</sup> It seems that it will provide added value to Turkey, when it comes to the political dimension (participation in EU decision making process), economy (inclusion into many EU economic policies thanks to the extension of the customs union) and legal field (adoption of EU regulations). Moreover,

---

<sup>57</sup> Cf. M. Müftüler-Baç and B. Luetgert, *The European Union's Alternative Models...*, op.cit., p. 9.

<sup>58</sup> İ. Küçükaya, *Gül'den AB yorumu 'Bizim için en iyisi Norveç modeli'*, "Akşam" of 8 April 2013, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/ismail-kucukkaya/yazarlar/gulden-ab-yorumu-bizim-icin-en-iyisi-norvec-modeli/haber-184692>

<sup>59</sup> C. Karakaş, *EU-Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration?...*, op.cit., p. 1067.

<sup>60</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç M. and B. Luetgert, *The European Union's Alternative Models...*, op.cit., p. 9.

it keeps the prospect of the formal membership in the long run. However, the success depends on the scope and pace of Turkey's integration into EU policies, institutions and decision making process. If, due to the unfavourable positions of some member states or European Commission Turkey's inclusion will be limited and slow (showing that the temporary model with dynamic integration method to gain the formal membership – i.e. the method providing for progressive integration with the EU - is actually becoming permanent and static), and at the same time conditioned by fulfillment of strict political criteria, it can be rejected by Turkey as not sufficiently beneficial and too problematic.

## 5. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to link the ongoing reflection on the possible future format of EU-Turkey relations to changes in the European integration process. As a first step, we proposed three scenarios for the future of the EU. They refer to choices indicated by the European Commission in its March 2017 White Paper, but their originality lies in conceptualization along two axes: 1) integration - disintegration; 2) uniformity – differentiation. Implementation of each scenario would mean different things for candidates to EU membership. While scenario 1 'uniform leap forward' would enable solely the application of alternative concepts excluding the possibility of membership, the scenario 2 'taking a few steps back' (to be more precise, scenario 2a providing for the uniformity and to a large extent disintegration) could be quite attractive for candidates who share the vision of the EU without the enhanced political union. However, putting aside the fact that the implementation of these scenarios is currently rather unlikely, both of them, particularly scenario 1, do not seem to be sufficiently attractive for Turkey, because they do not involve any substantial improvement over the *status quo* in relations with the EU.

We argue that only scenario 3 'some move forward, some move backward' - based on differentiated integration, but also differentiated disintegration - is adjusted to the current situation in Europe and can serve as a central reference point for revitalising the enlargement policy in general and EU-Turkey relations in particular, while giving real new incentives to Turkey. On the basis of the already existing form of differentiated integration in EU-Turkey relations connected with the customs union, the extended model of the differentiated integration for EU-Turkey relations can be developed. It draws on the concept of gradual membership proposed by Karakas.

This extended model must provide for more flexible and functional institutional framework of the enlargement policy. It requires going beyond the classical model of

membership and building a more complex concept of temporary, kind of “virtual” membership with a dynamic integration method to gain the “formal” membership in the long run. The last issue would probably determine the formal continuation of the accession talks which are problematic to continue but at the same time difficult to be stopped, taking into consideration the political reality. The flexible and functional model would also mean, in more concrete terms, the involvement of Turkey into the institutional framework and decision-making system of the EU as well as clusters of the EU policies, leading clearly to the improvement over the *status quo* in relations with the EU.

Once the decision to proceed according to the model is taken by the EU and discussed with Turkey, concrete implementation modalities should be designed. The key issues here are pace and scope of the Turkey’s integration with the EU. Moving too far and too fast can lead to opposition from both the European Commission and member states, resulting in effective blockage. Small steps over a long period of time could result in rejection of this model of relation by Turkey. Thus effective implementation requires taking into consideration the preferences and interests of the EU institutions, member states and Turkey. It will be then a real challenge for both the EU and Turkey to settle the details of their new relationship.

## REFERENCES

Atilgan C. and Klein D., *EU Integration Models beyond Full Membership*, Working Paper, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin 2006, [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_8414-544-2-30.pdf?061221153540](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_8414-544-2-30.pdf?061221153540)

Cianciara A.K., *Differentiated Integration in the European Union and its Prospects in the Context of Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies*, in: *The Euro-Atlantic System in a Multi-polar World. A Forecast*, ed. J.M. Fiszer et al., Logos Verlag, Berlin 2015.

Dahrendorf R., *A third Europe?*, Paper presented at the third Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, 26 November 1979, <http://aei.pitt.edu/11346/>.

Dalay G., *Turkey and Europe after Brexit: Looking beyond EU membership*, Report, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, 17 October 2016, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/10/turkey-europe-brexit-eu-membership-161018050604985.html>

Erkuş S., *EU choosing to ‘re-engage’ with Turkey: Official*, “Hurriyet Daily News” of 12 June 2017, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-choosing-to-re-engage-with-turkey-official-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=114201&NewsCatID=510>

*EU membership talks with Turkey should not be halted, Juncker says*, “Hurriyet Daily News” of 3 August 2017, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-membership-talks-with-turkey-should-not-be-halted-juncker-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=116311&NewsCatID=510>

European Commission, *White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for EU27 by 2025*, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white\\_paper\\_on\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_europe\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf).

Grosse T.G., *Wprowadzenie. Polityki europejskie w dobie zmiany modelu integracji* [Introduction. European Policies at the Time of Change of the Integration Model], in: *Polityki europejskie w dobie kryzysu* [European Policies at the Time of Crisis], ed. T.G. Grosse, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016.

Gstöhl S., *Models of external differentiation in the EU's neighbourhood: an expanding economic community?*, "Journal of European Public Policy," 22:6, 2015, pp. 854-870.

Karakaş C., *EU–Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration? A Conceptual Framework for Accession Alternatives*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", 51:6, 2013.

Koening N., *A Differentiated View of Differentiated Integration*, Policy Paper no 140, Jacques Delors Institut Berlin, 23 July 2015.

Küçükaya İ., *Gül'den AB yorumu 'Bizim için en iyisi Norveç modeli'*, "Akşam" of 8 April 2013, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/ismail-kucukkaya/yazarlar/gulden-ab-yorumu-bizim-icin-en-iyisi-norvec-modeli/haber-184692>

Lavenex S., *Concentric Circles or Flexible 'European' Integration : a Typology of EU External Governance Relations*, "Comparative European Politics", 9:4-5, 2011;

Leruth B. and C. Lord, *Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, a process, a system or a theory?*, "Journal of European Public Policy", 22:6, 2015.

Leruth B., S. Gänzle, J. Trondal, *Differentiated integration and disintegration in the European Union: State-of-the-art and ways for future research*, ISL Working Paper no 1, University of Agder, 2017 <https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/2445530>

Leuffen D., B. Rittberger and F. Schimmelfennig, *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills Basingstoke 2013.

Lippert B., *The Nexus Between Enlargement and Differentiation*, IAI, 7 February 2017, [http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60\\_2.pdf](http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60_2.pdf)

Müftüler-Baç M. and Luetgert B., *The European Union's Alternative Models for Maximizing its Integration Strategy for Candidates and Neighbour States. A Process of External Differentiation*, MAXCAP Working Paper no. 35, November 2016, [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/maxcap/system/files/maxcap\\_wp\\_35.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/maxcap/system/files/maxcap_wp_35.pdf)

Müftüler-Baç M., *Turkey's future with the European Union: alternative model of differentiated integration*, "Turkish Studies", 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1300534>

Note from the interview with Almut Moeller, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 21.09.2016.

Note from the interview with Dr Barbara Lippert, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 19.09.2016.

Note from the interview with Dr Günter Seufert and Dr Ioannis Grigoriadis, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 19.09.2016.

Note from the interview with Dr Oliver Ernst, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, 20.09.2016.

Pierson P., *The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis*, „Comparative Political Studies”, 29:2, 1996, pp. 123-163.

Pisani-Ferry J., Röttgen N., Sapir A., Tucker P. and Wolff G. B., *Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership*, <http://bruegel.org/2016/08/europe-after-brexit-a-proposal-for-a-continental-partnership/>

Preston Ch., *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*, Routledge, London, New York 1997.

Raik K. and T. Tamminem, *Inclusive and Exclusive Differentiation: Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy*, in: *Multi-Speed Europe: Differentiated Integration in the External Relations of the European Union*, ed. J. Jokela, "FIIA Report" no 38, January 2014,

[www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA\\_Report38\\_web.pdf](http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_Report38_web.pdf).

Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/>.

Schäuble W., K. Lamers, *Considerations on European Politics*, Bonn: CDU/CSU, 1994.

Schimmelfennig F., *Circles and Hemispheres: Differentiated Integration in and beyond the European Union*, unpublished paper presented at the EUSA Conference, Baltimore, May 2013.

Schimmelfennig F., *EU Enlargement and Differentiation: Discrimination or Equal Treatment?*, "Journal of European Public Policy", 21:5, 2014.

Schimmelfennig F., T. Winzen, *Eastern enlargement and differentiated integration: towards normalization*, "Journal of European Public Policy" 24:2, 2017.

Schimmelfennig F. and U. Sedelmeier, *The study of EU enlargement: theoretical approaches and empirical findings*, in: *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, ed. M. Cini and A. K. Bourne, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006.

Schweiger C., J.M. Magone, *Differentiated Integration and Cleavage in the EU under Crisis Conditions*, "Perspectives on European Politics and Society", 15:3, 2014.

Szczerski K., *Utopia Europejska: kryzys integracji i polska inicjatywa naprawy* [European Utopia: Integration Crisis and Polish Improvement Initiative], Biały Kruk, Kraków 2017.

Szymański A., *Alternatives to EU Membership. The Case of Turkey*, "The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs", 4, 2007, pp. 55-72.

Szymański K., Minister for European Affairs, *What Kind of Union Does Poland Need?*, in "Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny", 1(67)/2016, <http://www.ppd.pism.pl/Numery/1-67-2016/What-Kind-of-Union-Does-Poland-Need-Minister-Konrad-Szymanski#>

The full text of Prime Minister David Cameron's speech about his plans for a referendum on British membership of the European Union, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum>.

Tocci N., *Turkey and the European Union: Scenarios for 2023*, [http://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user\\_upload/FEUTURE\\_Background\\_Paper\\_final.pdf](http://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user_upload/FEUTURE_Background_Paper_final.pdf)

Turhan E., *Thinking out of the Accession Box: The Potential and Limitations of Internal and External Differentiated Integration Between Turkey and the EU*, CIFE Policy Paper no. 58, 3 July 2017, [http://www.cife.eu/Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20paper/CIFE\\_Policy\\_Paper\\_58\\_Thinking\\_out\\_of\\_The\\_Accession\\_Box\\_EU\\_Turkey\\_Ebru\\_Turhan\\_2017.pdf](http://www.cife.eu/Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20paper/CIFE_Policy_Paper_58_Thinking_out_of_The_Accession_Box_EU_Turkey_Ebru_Turhan_2017.pdf)

Ülgen S., *Avoiding a Divorce: A Virtual EU Membership for Turkey*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 December 2012.

Warleigh-Lack A., *Differentiated integration in the European Union: towards a comparative regionalism perspective*, "Journal of European Public Policy," 22:6, 2015.

Webber D., *Can the EU Survive?* in: *The European Union in Crisis*, ed. D. Dinan, N. Nugent, W.E. Paterson, Palgrave 2017.

Zielonka J., *Is the EU doomed?* Polity Press, Cambridge 2014.