

United or Divided We Stand? Perspectives on the EU's Challenges

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The European Identity Survey – a bridge between political science and psychology

Introduction

The year 2016 seems to hold a number of serious challenges ready for the European Union. The financial crisis questions the social fabric of the Union, the refugee crisis undermines it and the possibility of Great Britain leaving the Union – the Brexit – riddles it. As such the voices of those asking for solidarity, a sense of community, a shared identity become louder – on both sides of the political spectrum. When rising right-wing parties across Europe protest and demand protection of ‘their’ Europe at the same time that Heads of State assert to accomplish just that, it becomes evident that we can say or identify the same goals, but mean fundamentally different things. That this is especially the case for identities that can be set along commonalities within the in-group or against differences to the out-group has long been established. Moreover, Risse (2005) finds that national identities can influence the “content and substance of what it means to identify with Europe” (p. 296). Haller and Ressler (2006), conclude, for example, that today, “in an era of increasing interconnection between all countries of Europe and the world, citizens of a single state may feel themselves more and more as Europeans at the same time as they also become aware of their specific characteristics as Norwegians, Germans, or Italians, or even as Bavarians, Piedmontese or Catalonians” (p. 25).

Yet, in the past, literature on an emerging European identity has often set aside the meaning of identity in order to use the measures available to it. Fligstein *et al.* (2012) or Roose (2013), for example, only use the Moreno question of the Eurobarometer: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) European only, (2) European and [nationality], (3) [nationality] and European, or (4) [nationality] only”. Even though they go into detail by how different segments of a society answer this question, they do not include the possibility of different interpretations of the same question. Iserna *et al.* (2012) add intensity of identifications to their analysis, but do not deal “with the questions of which meanings citizens associate with their identity” (p. 111). Duchesne and Frogner (2003) focus on whether European citizens consider themselves members of a political community and do not “examine all the dimensions or components of what constitute a European identity” (p. 2). However, even though the authors consciously seek the delimitation between meaning and extent of an identity, they run into trouble when discussing the implications of their findings. Hence Duchesne and Frogner (2003) note that “[u]nfortunately, this question does not express different intensities as between one level and another” (p. 13). Van Mol *et al.* (2015) are concerned by similar limitations, admitting that their “results are based on a rather narrow measure of identification, which does not allow to investigate whether individuals refer to Europe as a cultural community or a political project of the European Union” (p. 484). That both, intensity and meaning of an identity, matter when evaluating it can be seen by the rare studies that include both elements in their design. Schrödter *et al.* (2015), for example, find that Swiss and EU citizens share a similar meaning of Europe, but the dimensions of such an identity vary in importance for each group (p. 164).

It is such an analysis that this paper hopes to contribute to, by proposing a new European Identity Survey that draws from recent advances in political science and psychology literature. To do so, the paper will, first, summarize and draw from identity concepts frequently used in political science literature. It will, then, add recent psychological advances in defining and measuring different aspects of identity. The relevant findings in political science and psychology are thus summarised and brought together on the metaphysical level. From this level, the paper will subsequently design and explain a European Identity Survey. Finally, the paper will discuss the major challenges that lay ahead and the promises for contributions to future research once these obstacles have been removed. After all, if successful, the survey can effectively bridge political science and psychology. As Schwarz (2007) points out, “much as psychology’s shift from behaviourism to information processing has made psychologists interesting partners for survey methodological work, psychologists’ growing interest in the socially and culturally situated nature of cognition may eventually make survey researchers interesting partners for basic psychological work” (p. 284). But crossing that bridge when we come to it, let us first turn to the different identity concepts frequently used in political science literature.

Concepts of Identity in Political Science

Although arguing that there are just as many theories on identity as there are identities themselves would certainly go too far, the extensiveness of identity theories is vast. In fact, contributions to what a collective identity is are so numerous that by and large the greatest problem of the existing literature on European identity is its divergent definitions of the concept. Lengyel (2011) states that “personality traits, on the one hand, and belonging to societal categories and groups on the other, are the two major dimensions of identity” (p. 1033). Karolweski (2011) agrees when writing “the notion of collective identity can be seen as consisting of two dimensions: an individualistic dimension and a collectivistic one” (p. 937). The relationship between identities also matters to Risse (2005), as well as to Diez Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), who investigate how various identities are interrelated and arranged. In a similar effort, Schrödter *et al.* (2015) confine a European identity along national openness, European closure and relative Europeanization – all three of which posit a European identity against either a national or a global identity. Focussing just on the national identity, Haller and Ressler (2006) differentiate between the self-image (cognitive component), an attachment to the nation (emotional component), and the readiness to act on behalf of the nation (the action component). Brubaker and Cooper (2000) also propose three characteristics, all be they along different axes: the mere membership in a group, the characteristics of a group, and the individual degree of identification (p. 150). Abdelal *et al.* (2010) along similar lines distinguish between the content of an identity and its contestation. They further divide the content of an identity into constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models. This content is later on further separated into cultural and civic components (Lengyel, 2011). The contestation, on the other hand, measures how much the members of the identity group agree about the content of it. Whether this agreement is also relevant is captured by Castano. He develops the concept of ‘entitativity’ that measures how ‘real’ the EU is in the lives of its citizens, by analysing shared cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased salience and boundedness (Castano, 2004).

In political science literature, a collective identity thus consists of two parts: (1) the self, which is characterized by personality traits, and (2) the collective identity. The latter is differentiated into its content, its contestation, its salience or attachment, and its potential to trigger action. The content is

further divided into constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models that vary along cultural or civic dimensions. Both, the self and the collective identity are then placed into (3) a larger context of other identities that influence their relationship. This would describe the current state of political science notions of a collective European identity. Since including all of these dimensions into a measure, would make the survey rather lengthy, let us quickly evaluate the most disputed aspect of this definition: the distinction between a cultural and a civic sense of identity.



Figure 1: Extensive Definition of European Identity

When differentiating a civic from a cultural identity, as many authors do (Kohn, 1944; Brubaker, 1992; Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010; Best 2009, 2011; Fligstein et al., 2012), they essentially determine two polarities: “[cultural] forms of nationalism focus on how common religion, language, national traditions, ancestry and membership in a dominant ethnic or racial group are the bases for national membership”, while “civic forms of national identity tend to focus on citizenship as a legal status obtainable by anyone willing to accept a particular legal, political and social system” (Fligstein et al., 2012:112). “The first polarity refers to the substance or nature of national identity, the second to its source or roots” (Best, 2011:998). De Tocqueville also distinguished between a ‘natural patriotism’ that was based on an emotional attachment to the fatherland, traditional customs or a shared history, and a ‘rational patriotism’ that could only be achieved by exercising social and political rights, which are then merged with personal interests. Thus even though Haller and Ressler (2006) do not find evidence for a ‘state-nation’ and an ‘ethno-nation’, they discover a distinction “between the ascribed and between the functional or action-related components of national identity. The first contains national ancestry, the birth in a country and citizenship; the second contains the respect of the institutions and laws of a country and mastering of its language” (Haller and Ressler, 2006:28). Therefore, a difference between naturally given (cultural) and self-obtainable (civic) features of an identity do seem to play a role.

This role is particularly important, when considering the wider European context. Many authors have focused on the civic form of identity and found that “those who hold a civic conception of national identity tend to be more educated and from higher socio-economic statuses” (Fligstein et al., 2012:112, also Sides and Citrin, 2007; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). It thus follows that most of the elite, who holds a European identity, holds a civic European identity. That is why, one could argue, European politics is often dominated by civic concepts (regulations, laws, citizenship, rule of law). Eriksen (2006), for example, suggests that the criteria for the EU’s military activities can be derived from cosmopolitan values. The citizens then experience the European Union on this civic level and might through interaction build a civic European identity. The search for an ethnic identity would thus seem farfetched. Especially, since Risse (2004) rightly points out that “citizens who project their own

values on Europe and then identify with their ‘national’ Europe tend to be less tolerant with fellow Europeans” (p. 259) because their ethnic identity does not match or even contradicts the ethnic identity of others. Yet, only a small number of studies have been conducted that distinguish in their research design between ethnic and civic concepts of nationality. This avenue thus seems complicated, but promising.

When looking at the contestation of an identity, simple questions regarding the controversy of certain beliefs or values can be added to the survey. In order to evaluate the salience of certain issues, 7-point Likert scales – all be they disguised as sliding scales – help in grading the individual replies. For the remaining parts, let us now look at insights from other disciplines and their recent technological advancements. After all, personality traits and action behaviour have frequently been studied by psychologists.

Identity Concepts beyond Political Science

Even though political science can give great insight into European identity, other disciplines can also contribute to the issue. That is why Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) advocate a multidisciplinary approach to study identity, and Leach *et al.* (2008) describe it as a multidimensional construct (p. 485). In order to get a better understanding of these multiple dimensions, findings from sociology and psychology might be of help in two ways. First, they can help clarify the categories of identity established so far. And second, they identify another category.

Starting with the clarification of concepts that have been established thus far, psychology can help in understanding the importance of personality traits. After all, authors of this discipline find that “personality domains are among the most important predictors of individual differences in identity formation” (Klimstra *et al.*, 2013:214; see also Crocetti *et al.*, 2008). Bridging political science with psychology, Tillman (2013) argues that “future research should seek to develop a fuller understanding of the sources of perceptions of social identity and to understand their effects on EU attitudes independently and in combination with personality traits such as authoritarianism” (p. 585). Given prior research by the author, a measure of optimism will be included in the survey to test the importance of personality traits in a more comprehensive measure of European identity. Furthermore, Phinney & Ong (2007) argue that behaviours can be understood better as an aspect of acculturation or a manifestation of an identity, rather than its component. Thus, both personality traits and action-related behaviour will be studied as separate categories.

Apart from adding to the established categories, psychology and sociology also help to unveil another important aspect of identity. “Traditional social identity models describe how people divide the social world into in-groups and outgroups, identify with the in-group, and enhance their identity by comparing the in-group favourably with the outgroup on a valued dimension” (Shapiro, 2010: 636f; also Dovidio *et al.*, 1997; Haslam, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner *et al.*, 1987). But how do these groups come into existence? Denzin (1984) finds that “it is through emotionality, imagination, sympathy, fellow-feeling, and revealed self-feelings that persons come to know themselves and one another” (p. 245). “Emotions thus serve as signals to the self, regarding the quality and acceptability of one’s identity claims and performances, and emotions can lead to changes in role behaviour, network memberships, and ultimately, social structure” (Thoits, 1989:332). Taking a more macro structural-functional approach, Thoits (1989) argues that “emotion norms are produced by and

function to sustain dominant institutional arrangements” (p. 336). Reddy (1997) agrees and maintains that emotions “must be regarded as the very location of the capacity to embrace, revise, or reject cultural or discursive structures of whatever kind” (p. 331). Emotions are, therefore, vital to understanding or measuring identity. After all, they form part of Kant’s independent mental faculties and Hilgard’s (1980) *Trilogy of the Mind*: “**cognition**, the mental representation of reality through perception, attention, learning memory, and thought; **emotion**, the subjective experience of arousal, pleasure and displeasure, and their expression in behaviour; and **motivation**, the activation of behaviour and its direction toward a goal. All three of these mental states affect the determination of behaviour” (Eich *et al.*, 2000:36; emphasis added).

In summary then, collective identity is largely composed of three features. First, it is to close the gap between the ‘self’ and the outside world or the ‘other’ (Mummendey and Waldzus, 2004:60). Second, it consists of cultural and civic components; where the former would predict that citizens feel a stronger sense of belonging to other Europeans than to non-Europeans and the latter foresees identification with political and judicial structures and values (Bruter, 2004:188; 2005:11). Third, as argued by Tajfel (1981), “European identity is that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (p. 255). In a way, collective identity formation is thus about how one relates the self to the in-group and distinguishes it from the out-group using different modes of discrimination (civic or cultural) to arrive at diverse emotional intensities that yield that identity significant or not. What is new from this very brief literature review, is the equation of salience with emotional activation. Thus, when measuring salience, an affective measure could strengthen the instrument. Based on recent methodological advances, just what might such an instrument look like?

Methodological advances

Recent advances in the methodology of measuring identity have mostly focussed on capturing the implicit aspects of parts of the extensive definition of identity provided above. Especially, two developments seem worth noting. First, Maier *et al.* (2013) complement explicit attitudes (i.e. stated opinions through survey-like questions) with implicit attitudes. The latter are measured through the Affective Misattribution Procedure, where participants see either a picture of the EU or Germany, or a neutral image for a split second before they see a picture of a Chinese character. They are then asked to indicate on the computer whether they feel positively or negatively about said character. After their evaluation, they see grey noise before the test continues.




Figure 2: “Example for a single AMP trial (here with EU prime picture)” (Maier *et al.*, 2013:10).

Unfortunately, the study was limited to Germany and focussed mostly on voter preference and the potential for right-wing party success at the next European election. Furthermore, it encountered difficulties in interpreting its results given the difficulties of subliminal messaging. Perhaps more promising is the study on European identity carried out by van Esch (ongoing). She included an Implicit Attitude Test in her survey, the results of which are currently being evaluated and interpreted.

Another development is the project *How European Do you Feel? The Psychology of European Identity* by Bruter and Harrison (2012). They have also combined survey questions with psychological measures. These include inter alia asking British respondents what the first three words were that came to mind when either seeing a picture of the European flag or simply hearing the word 'Europe'. Here the results are fairly unimaginative with 'union', 'euro', 'stars', 'continent' and 'Brussels' or 'France' being among the top answers. More interesting was perhaps their second psychological approach, where the researchers asked their respondents what images (colours, animals, drinks, paintings or flowers) it associated with the European Union. For the majority of the sample, the EU would be a spring daisy if it were a flower, classical music or an opera if it were a musical genre and blue if it were a colour. For the younger cohort, the EU would be a lion if it were an animal and a coffee or a glass of wine if it were a drink; for the older age cohort the EU would be an elephant or a glass of water (Bruter and Harrison, 2012). These similes might seem like playful games at first sight, but do reveal emotional attitudes through active abstraction when analysing the results on a psychological level. Bruter and Harrison, furthermore, found that there is indeed a difference between civic and ethnic (for them: cultural) identity; and that "the more citizens criticize the EU, the more they favour increased EU citizenship rights" (Bruter and Harrison, 2012), showing that Euro-sceptic populations are not necessarily lacking a European identity, as is often assumed. Although this study goes an astounding step toward better understanding and measuring identity, it has two limitations. First, it focusses its innovative design only on the United Kingdom making cross-country comparison impossible. And second, even though it does include novel ways of measuring identity, it does not include measures, such as SemDs, for interpreting the results. Are elephants or lions more positively connoted? Are the attributes always interpreted to be the same or similar? Nonetheless, these type of affective questions hold great promise for the future.

Endeavouring to include implicit attitudes, the survey will thus comprise an Implicit Attitude Test and affective questions similar to those of Bruter and Harrison (2012). But what will it look like exactly?

New Survey

The survey is divided into seven sections. Each section has its own focus on one part of European identity, but at the same time cross-validates other aspects of it. Thus, the first part uses direct questions from political psychology literature to identify the content of an identity. At the same time, it also captures the importance attributed to the identity and its contestation. The second step, an Identity Drawing, relates this identity to other spheres of influence and cross-validates its importance. In a third step, affective questions measure a degree of emotional involvement and salience of the identity, while cross-validating the content of the identity. The fourth step is an Implicit Attitude Test that endeavours to capture frequent thought patterns. During the fifth step, respondents are asked personality questions and their degree of optimism is evaluated. Finally, the sixth and the seventh step capture past actions and commonly used Eurobarometer questions to control for internal validity. In detail, this looks like the following.

Direct Questions

The first and most important step in revising the measure of identity is creating a set of questions that stem from political psychology. When formulated correctly, they can test conscious as well as implicit attitudes of various faculties (norms; purpose; relational comparisons; or cognitive models). This section is thus comparable to other attitude tests, although it introduces a unique composition of dimensions: explicit – implicit; norms – purpose – relation comparisons – cognitive models; and cultural – civic notions of identity; where “constitutive norms refer to the formal and informal rules that define a group; social purposes refer to the goals that are shared by members of a group; relational comparisons refer to defining an identity group by what it is not – that is, the way it views *other* identity groups, especially where those views about the other are defining part of the identity; cognitive models refer to the worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests that are shaped by a particular identity” (Abdelal et al., 2010:19, emphasis in original).

Constitutive Norms

What is your opinion regarding the following statements?

Q1.1: (Cultural) The values of the European Union are closely tied to those of Christianity.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.2: (Civic) Being European is closely tied to European citizenship.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.3: (Cultural) No one shall be condemned to the death penalty or executed.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.4: (Civic) Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.5: (Cultural) Welcoming those in need into Europe is a natural act of mercifulness.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.6: (Civic) Europe stands and advocates for human rights.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.7: (Cultural) Looking at torture, the end, if necessary, justifies the means.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.8: (Civic) Politicians should not be coerced into party lines.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.9: (Cultural) Europe preserves and strengthens local traditions.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.10: (Civic) Being European means adhering to democratic values.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.11: (Cultural) The dignity of the individual is inviolable.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.10: (Civic) Women and men should enjoy equal rights.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.11: (Contestation) European values and norms are commonly known.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q1.12: (Contestation) Which three European values matter to you most?

Human rights / equality / individual liberty / grace of charity / fairness / rule of law / tolerance / solidarity / diversity [Respondents can select three & de-select by clicking on the same item again.]

Q1.13: Amongst citizens in the EU, do you think that this response is

[Uncontested / contested / don't know]

Q1.14: Have you ever done something profoundly European? [Yes / No]

If so, what? [OPEN]

Purpose

In your opinion, **whose** goals are the following? Please note that multiple answers are possible.

Q2.1: (Civic) Promote the rule of law.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.2: (Cultural) Fighting poverty and social exclusion.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.3: (Civic) The abolition of torture or inhuman punishment.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.4: (Cultural) The respect of cultural diversity.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.5: (Civic) Peace and prosperity for all.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.6: (Cultural) The respect of linguistic diversity.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.7: (Civic) Equal rights between men and women.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.8: (Cultural) The respect of religious diversity.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.9: (Civic) Promote democratic principles.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.10: (Cultural) Good neighbourly relations.

These are the goals of [Myself / Country / the European Union / the West]

Q2.11: (Contestation) European goals are commonly known.

[Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Relational Comparison

What is your opinion regarding the following statements?

Q3.1: (Civic) It is possible to feel European and [National] at the same time.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.2: (Cultural) It is possible to feel Muslim and European at the same time.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.3: (Civic) It is possible to feel cosmopolitan – that is, not limited to just one part of the world – and European at the same time.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.4: (Cultural) It is possible to feel part of a local community and European at the same time.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.5: (Civic) The European Union upholds human rights more than other regions or countries.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.6: (Cultural) The European Union shows more solidarity with those in need than other regions or countries.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.7: (Civic) People have more equal opportunities in Europe than elsewhere.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.8: (Cultural) Europe is the biggest melting pot of cultures worldwide.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.9: (Civic) The European Union upholds human rights more than [country].

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.10: (Cultural) The European Union shows more solidarity with those in need than [country].

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q3.11: (Contestation) Please rank the following list of actors according to their divergence from European values. The actor ranked **first** adheres **least** to European values, the actor ranked last adheres the most to European values.

[Islamic State or DAESH / multinational corporations / Russia / banks / Turkey / the richest 1%]

Q3.12: (Contestation) Would you say that you have more in common with a [police officer / PhD student] in another European country than with a manager in [country].¹

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

¹ This survey will first be tested with PhD students and police officers in Germany and in The Netherlands. This is done because multi-level regression analyses of Eurobarometer data have found that both groups show heightened levels of European identification (Luhmann, forthcoming).

Cognitive Models

What is your opinion regarding the following statements?

Q4.1: (Cultural) European history, particularly the overcoming of two World Wars, should motivate a more pacifist foreign policy of the European Union?

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.2: (Civic) The European Union strengthens democracy in Europe.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.3: (Cultural) European integration leads to an increase in security.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.4: (Civic) European integration leads to an increase of the freedom to travel.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.5: (Cultural) More European integrations causes a loss of [country's] traditions.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.6: (Civic) More European integration leads to more bureaucracy.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.7: (Cultural) More European integration causes tensions with Russia.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.8: (Civic) More European integration creates more opportunities for lobbying.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.9: (Cultural) A shared history creates the basis for more solidarity.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.10: (Civic) Countries need robust safety nets in their welfare programmes to help those in need.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

Q4.11: (Contestation) There is a shared European public opinion on most issues.

[On a sliding scale with indications: Agree / Neither Agree nor Disagree / Disagree]

In order to avoid a primacy effect, answer categories in Q1.12 and Q 3.11 are set to shuffle randomly. Furthermore, check-all-that-apply items were not included, since they are known to increase satisficing among respondents. Finally, even though Q1.14 might be criticized for being completely open to individual interpretation, this was exactly intended to be so. As Schwarz (2007) describes:

When asked, 'What have you done today?' respondents will certainly understand the words – yet they may nevertheless not know on which behaviours they are to report. [...] To provide a meaningful answer, respondents need to infer the questioner's intentions, that is the pragmatic meaning of the question. To do so, they rely on the tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of conversations in daily life (Grice, 1975) and draw on the context of the utterance to infer the intended meaning. (p. 279).

This intended meaning is what the questions aims to measure.

The answer categories were largely based on existent literature, which found that religious beliefs mattered (Garcea, 2001). Previous studies have also looked at what ‘typically European’ can connote (Gnutzman *et al.*, 2014) or what aspects respondents associate the EU with (Schrödter *et al.*, 2015). Given that this section is rather long and text-heavy, the next section will be of a more visual nature.

Identity Drawing

In the next step, participants are encouraged to locate themselves in different spheres of influence. This helps, amongst other things, establish the inter-identity relations: How does the participants relate to the in-group and how to the out-group? How do these groups correlate or merge? For this, a new screen will appear that bears similarity to the windows programme ‘paint’ and gives exact instructions of what respondents need to do and what each shape means. It looks like the following:

Please draw yourself using the rectangular shape. Size and position are completely adjustable. Once you have done so, surround yourself by the following spheres: [your region], [your country], the European Union and your religion, as you deem appropriate. You can move the spheres freely and adjust them in space, by clicking on them. Please note that you can also choose to skip a sphere should you wish to do so. Once you are done, just click the ‘Finish’ button to continue to the next section.




Figure 3: Identity Drawing

The size, position and overlapping of the different spheres of influence, as well as the self, can then be evaluated using psychological standards. For example, the European identity could embody all other identities, meaning that there is little personal contestation between, for example, the national and the supranational identity. The size of the individual shapes can also give insight into more personal

characteristics, such as how social or egocentric the person is. Rather than coding each single drawing by hand, this programme is integrated into the UniPark survey, which subsequently captures the location, size and intersections of the shapes. The only shape that will be coded by hand is the 'other' category to avoid duplication under different terms, e.g. one respondent adds 'sport' and another adds 'football club'.

Affective Questions

In the third step, respondents are asked affective questions, similar to those of the Bruter and Harrison (2012) project to test previous answers and open a new category of abstraction. The following questions are currently included:

For the next section, please imagine that the European Union was a person. In a few words, how would you answer the following fictitious scenarios?

Constitutive Norms

Q5.1: If the European Union were a school teacher, what kind of behaviour by students would be punished?

Q5.2: If the European Union was a father, what virtue would he teach his son?

Purpose

Q5.3: If the European Union were an athlete running a marathon, what would motivate it during a dry spell and keep it going?

Q5.4: If the European Union were a person, what would make it so mad that it would immediately spring into action?

Relational Comparisons

Q5.5: If the European Union were a hypochondriac, what would be its biggest fictitious type of fear?

Q5.6: If the European Union were a person, whom would it most likely marry and why?

Cognitive Models

Q5.7: Imagine that the European Union is an old man, who five years from now dies. What is most likely to have caused his death?

Q5.8: Imagine that the European party is a person who has just invited all of its friends and neighbours to a giant celebration. What could be the occasion for this celebration?

These questions have two purposes. On the one hand, they invite respondents to reflect indirectly on their previous questions and validate them on an abstract level. On the other hand, they maintain an indirect emotional state of the participants without being too obvious about it. That way, respondents are already indirectly more prepared to answer the following three questions:

Q5.9: The history of the European Union makes me
[happy / sad / angry / disgusted / afraid / surprised / indifferent]

Q5.9: The abolition of borders under the Schengen Agreement in 1995 made me
[happy / sad / angry / disgusted / afraid / surprised / indifferent]

Q5.9: The introduction of a common currency, the Euro, in 1999 made me
[happy / sad / angry / disgusted / afraid / surprised / indifferent]

Although being a rather crude measure of emotional involvement (either indifferent or feeling an emotion), these questions can lead to interesting comparisons regarding whether two historic moment of European integration were interpreted the same way across societal groups and across two member states. After all, a shared interpretation of history is the basis for a shared memory.

Implicit Attitude Test

In a fourth step, an experiment will open that closely resembles the Implicit Association Test from Harvard University. Because even if the survey measures identity more fully than previous surveys, there still remains one serious pitfall: What if subjects answer true to their feelings but feel differently in a real-world setting? This is where an experiment that tests latent identity is beneficial. Although quite a variety of experiments on identity have been conducted, most have focussed on sexual or race-related and identities. A ‘European experiment’ would thus be quite unique.

In the original test, implicit attitudes toward African-Americans were captured by measuring the time it took respondents to place pictures and words into two categories: Black and White Patient; and Good or Bad. Through layering the two meanings on top of each other, researchers could measure latent racism, if participants took longer to move words into the ‘good’ category, if it was also the ‘Black Patient’ category – i.e. field d of Figure 4.




Figure 4 (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013)

A similar test is conducted regarding latent European identities, using the following items:

Positive: Honest, free, development, gain, trust

Negative: loss, danger, violence, pain, dishonest

Country: Capital, [national] politics, symbols

European Union: Brussels, European politics, symbols



Figure 5: European Implicit Attitude Test (van Esch, 2013)

Such a test cross-validates previously found answers on an implicit level and ideally is fun for the respondents.

Personality Questions

In the fifth section, respondents take a short Revised LOT-R optimism test. This includes one personality trait in the analysis and tests whether such traits truly impact identity. The test looks like the following:

Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout. Try not to let your response to one statement influence your responses to other statements. There are no "correct" or "incorrect" answers. Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think "most people" would answer.

Q7.1: In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.2: It's easy for me to relax.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.3: If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R)

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.4: I'm always optimistic about my future.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.5: I enjoy my friends a lot.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.6: It's important for me to keep busy.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.7: I hardly ever expect things to go my way. (R)

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.8: I don't get upset too easily.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.9: I rarely count on good things happening to me. (R)

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Q7.10: Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.

[Agree a lot / Agree a little / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree a little / Disagree a lot]

Scoring:

Items 3, 7, and 9 are reverse scored (or scored separately as a pessimism measure). Items 2, 5, 6, and 8 are fillers and should not be scored. Scoring is kept continuous – there is no benchmark for being an optimist/pessimist.

Behavioural Questions

Based on the assumption that identity predetermines behaviour, questions that capture behaviour can be used to measure the content validity of the instrument. Thus the survey includes the following questions:

Q8.1: Have you contacted a member of the European Parliament regarding a political issue before?

[Yes, frequently / Yes, once or twice / Not sure / Never]

Q8.2: Did you vote in the 2014 elections of the European Parliament?

[Yes/ Don't Know / No]

Q8.3: Did you vote in the [insert year] national elections?

[Yes/ Don't Know / No]

Q8.4: Did you visit European member states in the past 6 months

[Yes, many / Yes, one or two / Don't Know / No, none]

Q8.5: Will you vote in the next European Parliament election?

[Yes/ Don't Know / No]

Behaviour is thus measured directly in terms of action.

Personal Information

Finally, in the last step, individuals are asked about their personal information relevant to the analysis, as well as the Moreno question to test the content validity. In order to allow for comparisons with Eurobarometer data, these questions use the Eurobarometer wording and look like the following:

Q9.1: What is your highest level of achieved education?

Q9.2: What is your gender?

[Man/Woman/Other]

Q9.3: How old are you? [open]

Q9.4: In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your position? Please use a scale from 1 to 10, where '1' means "left" and '10' means "right". Which number best describes your position? [Scale of 1 to 10]

Q9.5: Would you say you live in a...?

[Rural area or village / small or middle sized town / large town / DK]

Q9.6.: In the near future, do you see yourself as

[European only / European and [nationality] / [nationality] and European / [nationality] only]

Upon completion, respondents are thanked for their time and given the opportunity to leave their e-mail address on a separate page (storing the information independently due to data privacy concerns) should they wish to be informed about the outcome of the study. Throughout the survey, respondents are informed about the structure of the test, their personal progress in it and how the results will be used, to increase rapport. Furthermore, minor details of gamification are included to maintain the interest of respondents. Nonetheless, the survey faces some important obstacles.

Challenges

The four main challenges that need to be addressed before conducting the survey are: its length, the sampling mechanisms, the order and visual design of the survey, as well as its technological compatibility with smartphones.

First, the length of the survey is currently at its maximum. During trial runs with focus groups, the drop-out rate was at 15%. One of the reasons often given for the fatigue was a repetition of similarly sounding questions. It is thus of paramount importance to, in the next step, identify the items that discriminate especially well, and drop some of the ones that do not. What might also add to the fatigue some respondents report is that often they might not have predefined judgements, and thus need to take decisions on the spot, which can be exhausting. This is particularly the case for respondents who do not have a pronounced European identity. When evaluating the results, this needs to be taken into account so that the results of a European identity are not over-reported.

Second, the sampling mechanism can complicate the execution of the survey. Sampling PhD students and police officers in Germany and The Netherlands can be difficult because no list of the populations are accessible. Currently, the solution is to look at graduate schools and worker unions of police officers for the distribution of the survey. This would further impede the generalizability (i.e. external validity), but not affect the construct validations (i.e. internal validity). At least the two groups should not be affected by the uneven diffusion of high-speed internet, since they both frequently work on computers.

Third, the sequence of the question might bias the answers obtained. Thus questions relating to the EU only, might be answered differently before and after other salient identities were mentioned and evaluated. Yet, keeping the structure similar for all respondents (except for Q1.12 and Q 3.11) will help control for this effect as answers can be compared before and after national identities were evoked.

Finally, the survey will need to be compatible with different browsers and operating systems. As Stern *et al.* (2014) point out, “web survey designers must now evaluate how their questionnaires appear on smartphones and tablets. Not doing so is no longer an option” (p. 294). Especially the design of the survey needs to be kept constant, as this could otherwise bias results. So far, the survey has been tested on different browsers, but has trouble displaying all items correctly with operating systems older than 10 years. It has also been successfully tested on mobile devices (including iPhones) but has difficulties with iPads. These limitations need to be explored fully so that the instructions of the survey can be completed where necessary.

If all of these challenges are kept in mind, however, the survey promises to deliver insightful results.

Outlook & Conclusion

When successful, the survey will be able to add to the literature on European identity by discerning the internal validity of some of the measures used thus far. Furthermore, it will connect questions from political science to methods from psychology, bridging both disciplines. Through this interdisciplinary synapse, new answers can be found. After all, psychology has in the past frequently contributed to discussions on the differences between in- and outgroups. In group members, for example, are more open to persuasion by other members, more likely to recall information from an in-group member, find something more funny when it was said by an in-group member, are more open to influence from other in group-members, and find group-directed criticism more acceptable when it is expressed by in-group members (O’Donnell *et al.*, 2010:136). Understanding who belongs to the European in- and who to the out-group, would thus be extremely relevant to the future of the European project. Especially if, as expected, groups within the European population will come to very different definitions regarding their belonging. If for one group of citizens all Christians belong to their European in-group, whereas all Muslims belong to their European out-group, this group will demand fundamentally different tasks from its Europe, than a group who might identify all citizens of the EU as their in-group and all legal foreigners as their out-group.

This process is particularly relevant in current times of heightened communication. Through contact with a great number of differing ‘others’ the ‘self’ is continuously questioned and re-evaluated. To an extent, this would explain the re-emergence of right-wing parties in many Western countries that are perhaps more mired into global interactions through their liberal economic policies and where citizens react to a great number of ‘others’ by fortifying the ‘self’. The causal connection drawn here, however, remains merely speculative. Nonetheless, an increase in transnational communications, be they of professional or be they of social nature, surely does impact local identities. That is why it is all the more pertinent to study and measure to what extent a supranational identity has emerged in the EU and against whom it is directed, to mitigate the otherwise potentially destabilising threats to democracy of increased xenophobia or a fissure in the internal social fabric of Europe.

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