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The Role of Member States in International Security Organisations: The Cases of EU and NATO

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Abstract

This paper seeks to address the role of member states in international security organisations, and more specifically in the realm of crisis management in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In the backdrop of current crises and conflicts in Europe's nearer neighbourhood the issue of member state behaviour in crisis decision-making has become even more crucial. Despite the increasing interests of academic scholars in crisis management and foreign policy-making on the European level, little attention has been paid to the key role that member states play in different international organisations with similar thematic and geographical scope. Considering current conflicts such as in Syria and Ukraine, it has become clear that neither the EU nor NATO can agree on launching a military crisis management operation in spite of calls from individual member states. One approach is to move forward the debate on EU-NATO crisis management cooperation by analysing the interactions between the two organisations on the member state level. Drawing on findings from the study of institutional complexes, institutional adaption and their division of labour (Gehring and Faude 2013) as well as of institutional interaction (Gehring and Oberthür 2009), this paper adds to the understanding of the role of member states in inter-organisation cooperation. It is thus argued that overlapping memberships contribute to the deepening of cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management due to the overlap of military forces in theatre as well as of member state officials at the negotiation table. This paper therefore aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of member states and what means they have at their disposal to circumvent institutional constraints and incompatibility to continue institutional interactions between the EU and NATO.

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the role of member states in international security organisations and more particular, in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Both organisations have a long record of military crisis management operations in which have both have engaged in crisis in Europe's nearer and wider neighbourhood. This paper also aims to look at the specific roles and positions that member states can take in regard to cooperation of the EU and NATO in such military crisis management operations. It should be obvious to think that cooperation of the two major security organisations in Europe works efficiently in the field of military crisis management. In particular in recent times, in which Europe experiences ever growing security concerns and finds itself in the midst of simmering conflicts and crises. There is reason for this because of the values and norms that the EU and NATO share as well as their similar

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geographical scope and overlapping memberships — indeed, 22 of NATO's 28 member states are also members of the EU.

Several studies and analyses so far have concentrated on the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), its civilian and military crisis management operations, i.e. the conduct, shortfalls and capabilities (cf. Grevi et al. 2009), as well as on NATO's activities and developments in this field. This paper, in contrast, focuses on the defence and military security relations of the EU and NATO, and on the particular role that member states play in this relationship. Despite the increasing scholarly interest in the EU-NATO relationship, little attention has been paid to the key role of member states. This paper aims to move forward the debate on crisis management cooperation and on interorganisational interactions of these two security organisations. This paper examines the roles of particular member states that take up key positions: France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark, the latter representing a special case. In 2008, both the EU under CSDP and NATO launched naval anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast which were then expanded to the Gulf of Aden and western parts of the Indian Ocean (CEU 2008c, 2008b, NATO 2016a). All three member states followed different approaches, including those of the two organisations as well as national missions. The anti-piracy efforts off the Somali coast will serve as case examples which demonstrate not only the divergent interests of member states but also their objectives for institutional choice as well as their individual positioning and roles in regard to EU-NATO cooperation in theatre.

This paper therefore suggests that greater importance should be given to the role of member states within international security organisations, which would further contribute to the discussion of interorganisational cooperation among EU and NATO in planning and conducting military crisis management operations. It further aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of member states and what means they have at their disposal to circumvent institutional constraints and incompatibility to continue institutional interactions between the EU and NATO.

In the next part, the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be described. The focus is on the concurrent evolutions of their security and defence instruments as well as their approaches to military crisis management. The subsequent parts offer the theoretical and methodological foundations for the analysis. In the analytical framework, interorganisational theory is expanded and applied to the EU, NATO and member states. Part five gives an overview of the anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden conducted by the two international security organisations. Subsequently, the sixth part focuses on the member states, i.e., France, the UK and Denmark, and takes a closer look at their engagement within either or both organisations. Finally, the last part provides a summary of the most important findings and concludes with an outlook for future research on the role of member states in international security organisations.

2. Overview of the EU-NATO Relationship

Much has been contended about the parallel developments of the EU and NATO in terms of their security and defence structures as well as in regard to their approaches to crisis management (Ojanen 2006). Whereas some scholars argue that competition — or even a 'beauty contest' — between the two organisations has arisen, some assert that they are progressing towards a strategic partnership (Heise and Schmidt 2005, Touzovskaia 2006) as promulgated and reaffirmed in the *EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy*, which was agreed upon and signed on 16 December 2002 in Brussels (EU 2007, NATO 2002). In 2003, the EU and NATO agreed on the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements, a package of arrangements which imply the access to military assets and capabilities for EU-led military crisis management operations where NATO does not have interest in conducting one. The Berlin Plus arrangements further include the exchange of classified information with respect to each organisation's information security rules, using NATO's command structures under the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as well as consultation arrangements between EU and NATO (Council of the European Union 2003). Agreeing on these arrangements has moved the EU-NATO relations another step forward towards becoming stronger strategic partners in the field of crisis management. Both organisations reaffirmed their strategic partnership once again in the *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* at NATO Warsaw Summit on 8 July 2016 (NATO 2016d).

Cooperation in security and defence in Europe has become an interesting research topic and has enjoyed high levels of scholarly attention, especially since the agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements (cf. de Wijk 2004, Græger and Haugevik 2011, Howorth and Keeler 2003, Missiroli 2002). Most contributions circulate around the dominant themes of competition between the two organisations (Duke 2008, Ojanen 2006), the different approaches to crisis management of the EU and NATO (Major/Mölling 2009, Schleich 2014) or the actors involved in EU-NATO cooperation, i.e., state, international staff and military actors (Smith 2011). This high level of attention has however slowly faded away. The main cause for this, it has been argued, are the numerous *deadlocks* in the transatlantic relationship which have also halted the progress in this research area. These deadlocks include the Cyprus-Turkey issue, the problem of information and intelligence exchange, institutional compatibility, participation problem in regard to EU-NATO meetings, and the so-called 'complexity trap' (Schmidt 2006: 121).

3. Analytical Framework: Interorganisational Interaction[1]

While international relations theories primarily focus on the emergence, maintenance and internal structure of international organisations, the main focus of this paper is the relationship of two international security organisations. It takes into consideration the previous works of scholars that contribute to the understanding and explanation of particularly the maintenance and internal structures of the EU and NATO. Yet, a theory that attempts to explain the relationship and interactions of international organisations is still in the making.

At the very beginning of each analysis are definitions. They create the foundation of theorising, i.e., the process of developing a theory. Most concepts start as definitions and end as theories. By defining we give the phenomena a name and can add it to our dictionary for conceptualising the observations and phenomena (Guzzini 2013, Swedberg 2012). In this part, I define key terms in order to name certain phenomena and to make a clear distinction between particular notions and concepts. Because some of the terminology used here do not imply a single definition, but instead an array of various definitions, this section builds up on existing discussions and attempts to define them for the purpose of examining inter-organisational interaction and the role of member states.

3.1 Conceptualisation of Key Terminology

Both the EU and NATO are involved in *military crisis management operations* in various contexts and geographical areas. Whereas the European Union takes specific approaches to crisis management, i.e. by civilian or military means or by combining these through its comprehensive approach, NATO is a military alliance traditionally taking a military approach (Major/Mölling 2009). Commonly, 'military crisis management has been, by nature, mostly conned to short-term and "rapidly deployable" measures' but over the course of time, it has been 'expanded by the practice of long-term oriented "capacity-building" in the military realm' (Koops 2009: 3). Simply put in this context, the term military crisis management implies the immediate reaction to a violent and acute situation by using military means or, as Rodt defines it, military crisis management 'refers exclusively to actions that seek to address proximate causes that are likely to turn a conflict violent or indeed more violent in the near future' (Rodt 2012: 378).

A rather simple definition of cooperation is the working together of two or more actors who share the same end goal. According to Axelrod's understanding of cooperation theory, it implies that individuals collaborate in order to 'pursue their self-interests without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other' (2006: 6). Hence, *security cooperation* among individual

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[1] Due to the debate on terminology and definitions, here the word 'organisation' is used (see 3.1). When citing other scholars, the term 'institution' might be used, which then refers to organisation as well.

states 'occurs when states adjust their foreign policy and defence behaviour to the actual of anticipated preferences of others' (Jones 2007: 8). Taking this definition to the organisational level, security cooperation implies the cooperation of international security organisations such as the EU and NATO. Factors that promote security cooperation include, for example, increased levels of social interaction, a higher degree of institutionalisation, i.e. formalisation, of the relationship, as well as sharing common sets of norms, rules, procedures and interests (cf. Earns 2015, Keohane 1988).

In the scholarly literature, the terms *international organisations* as well as international institutions and regimes have been widely applied and discussed. As Oberthür and Gehring (2003) argue, the distinction between institutions, organisations and regimes are less clear in practice than in theory. While international institutions are broadly defined as 'sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other' (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 8), organisations generally 'imply an integrating and structuring of activities directed toward goal accomplishment' (Bedeian 1984: 2) and therefore actors, such as states, form organisations because they share the same overarching goal which they assume to achieve together due to the decreased costs for the individual actors. Furthermore, Levy et al. define the characteristics of organisations as 'consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas' (1995: 274). Hence, international organisations are governing entities formed by several nation states, which share common norms and values and act under similar procedures. Such organisations are created in order to reduce the costs to achieve specific goals in certain political domains. A governing body as part of the organisation as well as a set of rules that regulate the procedures and interactions, are further established to coordinate the activities and policies of the members. In contrast to international institutions and regimes, international organisations are based on a higher degree of institutionalisation, meaning that organisations are more formalised in their rules and procedures than institutions and regimes (cf. Loewen 2006, Simmons/Martin 2013).

3.2 Theory of Interorganisational Interaction

In this theoretical discussion one theoretical framework that has so far been rarely applied is the 'conceptual framework of institutional interaction' developed by Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür (2004, 2009, Gehring/Faude 2014). The conceptual framework of interorganisational interaction offers abilities, which other theoretical approaches lack to explain. Gehring and Oberthür initially applied their conceptual framework to the analysis of interorganisational interactions between global environmental organisations and international regimes.

Generally, interorganisational interaction focuses on the emergence of separate institutions and organisations in the international governance structure that are tasked with similar political and

geographical scopes. The framework is embedded in various theoretical approaches and takes assumptions from neoliberalism and institutionalism, and is often embedded in sociology and economics (Karns et al. (2015). Neoliberal institutionalism, for example, examines the formation of international organisations, and broadly shares the following core assumptions: states are the main actors within international organisations and act according to rational decisions; within the international systems, interdependence among states prevails; transnational interdependence leads to a higher interest in cooperation with other states, which then leads to the formation of international institutions and international organisations, and these organisations develop their own dynamics to act in the international system (see Keohane/Nye 1977).

Gehring and Faude state that the conceptual framework can also be used to examine the interorganisational interactions between other international organisations and institutions, such as in the field of crisis management of, for example, the United Nations, African Union, European Union and NATO. I therefore apply this approach to analysing EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management operations. Furthermore, this concept has received more attention with the increasing density of international (security) organisations. Since the end of the Cold War, numerous international security organisations and alliances in Europe have been created. The most enduring ones are the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU)/European Union (EU). Nevertheless, due to the issue-specific overlap, the concept needs a 'careful consideration of the different nature of complexes made up of transnational or operational institutions' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 494).

Interorganisational interaction theory helps to understand and analyse interactions between organisations as well as to understand and examine an organisation's causal influence on other organisations in the same policy area. It occurs 'if one institution (the source institution) affects the development or performance of another institution (the target institution)' (Gehring/Oberthür 2009: 127). Loewen refers to institutional interplay — or organisational interplay — which is defined as 'situations when the development, operation, effectiveness or broad consequences of one institution are significantly affected by the rules and programmes of another' (2006: 11). The cumulating amount of such organisations within the same policy domain exist in what Alter and Meunier (2009) have coined an 'international regime complexity'. Jönsson (1986) and Biermann (2008) call these 'inter-organisational systems' and 'inter-organisational networks' respectively. These networks develop with the emergence of increasing functional overlap, which refers to overlap of regulatory jurisdiction, tasks, geographical scope and membership. Functional overlap can either be unintentionally or on purpose.

Gehring and Faude (2014) argue that interorganisational interaction creates opportunities for institutional adaptation — also called institutional transformation by Biermann (2009). Both member states and organisations, due to their own dynamics and autonomy, can exercise influence on institutional adaptation. Institutional adaptation implies that the governance activities of both organisations gradually become accommodated and adapted to the respective other. This happens either under symmetric or asymmetric power distribution among the organisations in the institutional network. In this context, power of an organisation denotes 'its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 479). Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called 'sectoral specialisation' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 479) of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisations has to withdraw its governance activities in the concerned policy domain. In case of a symmetric power distribution, the organisations have to coordinate their governance activities in the particular policy area. Herein, the multiple members play a crucial role as they have to negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Furthermore, under symmetrical power distribution not a role specification but rather co-governance and a division of labour is more likely to occur. Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose 'that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 482). This division of labour, as argued by Schleich, results in deeper cooperation of the organisations and thus becoming so-called 'interlocking institutions' (cf. Biermann 2009, Gehring/Faude 2014, Schleich 2014).

3.3 The Role of Member States

As outlined by Gehring and Oberthür, member states play vital roles in shaping institutional design and in shaping the interactions between organisations. Member states, especially those that enjoy membership in multiple international organisations, have the capabilities to use international organisations for their national purposes, but they can also influence the organisational processes and structures of such organisations as well as of interorganisational relations. In their framework, Gehring and Oberthür distinguish two categories of actors, or rather member states: multiple members and single members. In addition to their approach, in the second part of this section, a typology of member states is established which helps to identify what specific role member states can play interorganisational relations.

Single members are those states are members in only one organisation and who might not be directly affected from functional overlap of organisations. Furthermore, single members do not have the ability to exert influence immediately and are not involved in the decision-making process of those

organisations of which they are not member. Multiple members, in contrast, are those states that are members of two or more regulatory organisations and which enjoy the advantage of forum-shopping. By the term forum-shopping it can be understood, in terms of organisational theory, that a member state can chose one organisation over another to put a particular issue on the agenda because it is convinced that in this particular organisation it will receive more gains than it would receive in the other (Gehring/Oberthür 2009). Gehring and Oberthür claim that multiple members can 'transmit influence from one institution to another' (2009: 150), and in particular multiple members play key roles in exerting influence on both organisations and their interactions with other organisations. Hence, multiple members can create functional overlap on purpose to create an organisation 'to challenge the regulatory dominance of an existing one (…), or if they seek to shift regulatory activities from one to another institution [organisation]' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 474).

In regard to both the European Union and NATO, states of both categories can be easily identified. Cyprus is the only state that is member of the EU but neither of NATO nor its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Some EU member states did not join NATO as full members but have joined PfP programme. These are Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. NATO treats PfP states as a special category of membership. By taking part in the PfP these states can join military operations under the Alliance's framework and are granted access to essential classified information and intelligence, but they do not have the ability to directly influence NATO's policies (NATO 2011, NATO 2016b). Among those states that enjoy membership in both organisations, three are of special interest for the purpose of this paper: France, the United Kingdom and Denmark; their approaches and involvement in military crisis management will be elaborated in the following parts.

While international organisations can take different roles within networks of international organisations, also member states can take particular positions and roles in the interorganisational interplay. Member states cannot only be single or multiple members, but, more importantly, they can also take different roles and positions. Member states can thus act as either: (1) drivers and advocates of interorganisational cooperation, or (2) as blockers of interorganisational cooperation, or (3) as neutrals of interorganisational cooperation. Advocates are those member states that are multiple members and that usually prefer a functioning and effective relationship between international organisations in overlapping policy domains. These states can also play the role of bridging two or more international organisations, such as is the case of the UK due to its special relationship with the United States and its role in the EU.

In contrast, blockers of interorganisational cooperation do not favour cooperation of international organisations because of particular national interests and therefore block or veto any efforts to strengthening the EU-NATO relationship. This role can be taken by both single and multiple member states. For example, Turkey and Cyprus block each other's memberships in the respective other

organisation and thereby also block EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management to a certain extent. France also serves as case example because of its disintegration from NATO and its role as main driver of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Here it is important to note that this status has been partially overcome due to France's reintegration into NATO military structures.

Neutrals are neither advocates nor against interorganisational cooperation. These states are neutral because of particular national interests or national constraints, such as in regard to the use of force. A case example is Denmark which is a member of both the EU and NATO, but despite its opt-out of CSDP (European Council 1992) it does not advocate or block stronger cooperation of the two organisations.

Typology of the Role of Member States in Interorganisational Interactions

Role of member state	Description
Advocate	In favour of interorganisational interactions; promotes cooperation and interplay with other organisations in a network through membership or functional overlap; most likely to be a multiple member.
Blocker	Not in favour of interorganisational interactions; makes use of veto rights to prevent deeper cooperation; take this position based on particular national interests or conflicts with other organisations in the network; can be single or multiple member.
Neutral	Neither advocates nor blocks interorganisational interactions; takes this position based on particular national interests or restraints; can be both type of member state but more likely to be single member.

3.4 Interorganisational Interaction of the EU and NATO

Applying the theoretical concept of interorganisational interaction to EU-NATO relations, it becomes clear that this concept offers valuable insights on their institutional interactions in the regard to the policy area of crisis management. Especially the role of key member states that enjoy membership in both organisations (multiple members) needs more attention in this analysis.

In the context of the theoretical concept of interorganisational interaction, NATO can be regarded as the existing organisation and the EU as the newly established, challenging organisation. This distinction originates in NATO's initial *raison d'être* as a military alliance and the EU's origins in the European Coal and Steel Community. Particular member states of the Alliance, were the drivers behind the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Especially France, a multiple member, is among the most important drivers, which desired to create a competitive institution in the field of security and defence policy in order to defend its own lead role as well as to challenge NATO and its member states in the post-Cold War era (Ratti 2014).

This paper postulates that functional overlap and competition between the EU and NATO in military crisis management cooperation, also called 'beauty contest' by many scholars, has steered into institutional adaptation, which was impinged by multiple members which have the steering power to influence the degree of institutional adaptation. Thus, institutional adaptation of NATO and the EU has occurred over time. Institutional transformation took place on both sides which is illustrated by the course of development of the EU's policy instruments and the introduction of NATO's Strategic Concepts in 1999 and 2010. In addition, the finalisation of institutional adaptation as well as the subsequent division of labour and the first attempts of cooperation in military crisis management operations resulted in the formalisation of EU-NATO relations through signing the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy in 2002 and the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003.

In regard to the power distribution between the EU and NATO, however, it can be argued that this is an asymmetrical distribution. The military capabilities of the Alliance predominate those of the member states of the EU and the civilian capabilities of the EU outweigh those of NATO (cf. IISS 2015). This resource dependency on both sides therefore suggests an asymmetrical power distribution which would further call for a sectoral specification of both organisations. In contrast, it can also be argued that a symmetrical power distribution among EU and NATO member states caused a co-governance and a division of labour in which each organisation 'performs a specific function within the area of overlap that is complementary to the functions performed by other institutions' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 481) — or the by the respective other organisation.

3.5 Methodological Framework[2]

The emphasis is on these member states as the key in shaping policies and in contributing to both organisations. Analysing their involvement under the framework of both CSDP and NATO is especially of interest because in the past it has become evident that '[m]ember states of the EU and NATO have been unable to agree on the political relationship between the two organisations in a way that would allow for joint operational effort and sound strategic cooperation, let alone for a unity of command in this important matter' (Gebhard/Smith 2015: 108). Despite this 'inability' it is in the power of member states to shape and influence potential cooperation between the EU and NATO. Therefore, what is the role of member states in EU-NATO relations in the field of security and defence? How can member states contribute to move forward the EU-NATO relationship towards a functioning strategic cooperation in military crisis management operations?

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[2] It is important to note that this paper is still in progress and that the actual conduct of field work is scheduled for spring 2017.

Since this paper contributes to the understanding of the role of multiple member states, it takes two perspectives on the role of member states. It looks at their involvement on the one hand, and on the other hand, examines member states' means to circumvent institutional constraints and deadlocks to continue interorganisational interaction between the EU and NATO. This hopes to open new avenues for future cooperation and for further reducing costs and duplications.

By applying the theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction to the EU-NATO relationship, the vital role of member states becomes even more evident. This theoretical approach helps to understand the various dynamics and processes in the rapprochement of both organisations. As explained above, steps of institutional adaption have already been recorded and member states played an important role therein. In this paper, the focus is directed at the roles of France, the United Kingdom and Denmark. France and the United Kingdom are not only important global security actors due to their permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and due to their possessions of nuclear weapons, which makes them the only nuclear powers on the European continent.

In addition to analysing the roles of these three member states, this paper also examines their involvement and contributions to EU and NATO military operations. For this purpose, the anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden serve as useful case studies. Prior to the launch of both EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in December 2008 and NATO's Operation Allied Provider in October 2008, the EU and NATO have been involved in similar geographical territories, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Darfur. However, except for their cooperation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other cases have not be categorised as successful or effective (cf. Haugevik 2007).

4. Piracy off the Somali Coast and in the Gulf of Aden

The root causes for the emergence of piracy attacks in parts of the West Indian Ocean originate back to the devastating political situation in Somalia as well as the instability and insecurity in the region. For over two decades Somalia suffered under the suppression of the dictatorship under Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre (1969-1991). During this time, however, Somalia received humanitarian and economic aid from Western states as well as the Soviet Union in order to recover from several conflicts with neighbouring states (Loubser/Solomon 2014). With the emergence of the civil war in Somalia (1988-1991) Barre's authoritarian regime ended and the country was left in a state of civil war, dominated by clan-based groups. This has resulted in a state of political chaos and fragmentation as well as in state of economic dislocation. In addition, in 1992, Somalia was heavily hit by drought and subsequently by famine which cost the lives of thousands of Somali people. Despite numerous

international efforts and military interventions, such as the UN-led Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993) and the US-led military operation named Operation Gothic Serpent (1993), Somalia tumbled deeper into instability and chaos (cf. Petrovic 2012, Loubser/Solomon 2014). It has since then been characterised as a *failed state* and divided into three autonomous and independent regions: Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. Consequently, poverty, insecurity and corruption as well as political instability, insecurity and a dysfunctional economy prevail and have been among the trigger points for organised crime (Beri 2011). Another explanation is the security vacuum which was left after the military interventions by the United Nations and the United States as well as by the lack of functional political institutions and the absence of the rule of law (Petrovic 2012).

Piracy activity has begun in the 1990s as a succession of individual attacks off the Somali coast. Growing numbers as well as increasing international threats have attracted the attention of the international community to respond to the piracy problem off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. Among individual operations by national navies, the African Union, coalitions of the willing led by the United States (Combined Task Force CTF-151) as well as initiatives by non-state actors (see Møller 2009), two military operations stand out: EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO's Operations Allied Provider/Allied Protector/Ocean Shield. The international efforts by multilateral operations is coordinated through the framework of Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) which meets on a regular basis.

4.1 Background Information and Mandate of EU NAFVOR Operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta is the EU's first naval military operation and was agreed upon on 10 November 2008 by Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP by the Council of the European Union (CEU 2008c) — called the Council hereafter — and then officially launched on 8 December 2008 by Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP (2008d) as a reaction to the United Nations Security Council's call for action against piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden (UN 2008a, 2008b).

Even prior to the UN's initial call for action, the EU expressed its concern of the rise of piracy activity and acts of armed robbery in its Council Conclusion of 26 May 2008 (CEU 2008a). As a first reaction to the UN Security Council Resolutions 1814(2008) and 1816(2008), the Council established NAVCO which is the EU's coordination cell to be based in Brussels in order to coordinate the various actions in the field (CEU 2008b).

The overall objective of Operation Atalanta is the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme that deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia as well as the protection of vulnerable vessels, such as merchant and commercial ships, passing by Somali waters (CEU 2008c: Article 1(1)). Furthermore, Operation Atalanta shall 'take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent

and intervene in order to bring an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present' (Article 2(d)) as well as 'to liaise with organisations and entities, as well as States, working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (…)' (Article 2(f)).

Operation Atlanta is under political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and monitored by the EU Military Committee. Its Operation Headquarters are located in Northwood, United Kingdom, which is commanded by the Operation Commander. Since its launch, ten member states[3] have been participating in Operation Atalanta along third states[4], and these provide a manpower amounting to 2,000 personnel (cf. Helly 2009). The common costs for the military operation were agreed for €8.3 billion for the first twelve months (CEU 2008c). In 2009, as well as in the following years, Operation Atalanta was then extended until 12 December 2016 (EEAS 2014).

4.2 Background Information and Mandate of NATO's Anti-Piracy Operations

In August 2009, the member states of NATO launched Operation Ocean Shield, a naval military mission operating off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. Prior to this, NATO had already been active in the area through Operation Allied Provider (October 2008-March 2009) and Operation Allied Protector (March 2009-August 2009).

The operation's overall mandate is to counter maritime piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and, after expanding the mandate, the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean (NATO 2016a). NATO acts in accordance to the UN authorisation of regional organisations to combat the problem of piracy (UN 2008a, 2008b) by taking necessary action. This includes helicopter surveillance and patrol of the waters by aircrafts and warships as well as disrupting potential pirate attacks. Another task is the escort of vessels delivering food aid to Somalia under the World Food Programme and commercial vessels passing the Gulf of Aden towards Europe and Asia (NATO 2016c). Among the participating member states are nine EU member states, including Denmark and the United Kingdom, however excluding France. Other participating EU and NATO member states are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In the field, NATO collaborates with other multilateral efforts such as the US-led Combined Task Force (CTF-151), the African Union and with EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as with national commands.

Since the launch of Operation Ocean Shield, NATO has been able to deter numerous piracy attacks and has contributed to reducing the numbers of successful attacks of piracy and armed robbery in

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[3] Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden

[4] Croatia, Montenegro, Norway and Ukraine

joint efforts with Operation Atalanta and CTF-151. However, it is important to note that in the case of anti-piracy efforts off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, NATO does not play the lead role. In contrast, 'it is clear that it is an ESDP lead; it is a European force first, and NATO co-operates with it' (House of Lords 2010).

5. The Role of Member States

This part focuses on the roles of particular member states within both the European Union and NATO and within their relationship. In each section, a general position is identified and described first, then the theoretical approach of interorganisational interaction is applied. Subsequently, the case study of anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden as outlined above, is used to demonstrate the member states' roles in reality. When examining the roles of France, the United Kingdom and Denmark it becomes evident that these states have divergent interests and ambitious when it comes to security and defence on the one hand, and when it comes to choosing over participation in security organisations on the other hand. Each of these member states takes a different role, either advocate, blocker or neutral (see 3.3).

5.1 France

France has been the driver behind the EU's foreign, security and defence policy since the creation of the European Community and desired the establishment of a European Defence Community, which however failed in the mid-1950s. Ever since, France maintains its ambition of fostering Europe's role in the world, especially in the field of security and crisis management. Due to dissatisfaction with NATO's approach to the Suez Canal issue in the mid-1950s, France has distanced and disassociated itself from the Atlantic Alliance. In 2007, then President Nicolas Sarkozy announced France's re-integration into NATO (Ratti 2014). Despite its rapprochement with NATO, France has been strongly involved in moving forward the EU's security and defence policy and also, it has been the initiator of most of the EU's military crisis management operations under CFSP. France has further acted as framework nation in military operations and has thus taken the lead especially in operations conducted on the African continent (Lakomy 2011, Ratti 2014).

As a member of both the EU and NATO – despite its temporary disintegration – is considered a multiple member. It has decision-making powers under both frameworks; whereas in the case of NATO, it regained such powers through its re-integration, i.e., its full participation in the Integrated Military Command Structures since the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit held in April 2009 (France Diplomatie 2014). France can therefore enjoy the advantages of forum shopping as well as from

blocking modifications and progress in the institutional structure of one of the organisations –- in this case of the Alliance –- or it is able to create functional overlap as in the case of the EU's foreign, security and defence policy. Moreover, France can be regarded as blocker of stronger interorganisational cooperation between the EU and NATO because of its disintegration from NATO and because it is the main driver of CSDP and thereby neglecting progress within NATO.

Even prior to the launches of Operation Atalanta and NATO's anti-piracy operations, France launched its national naval mission called Opération Alcyon. The French navy was tasked to support vessels from the World Food Programme that deliver food aid to Somalia (Nováky 2015). As the 'political mobiliser' with Spain (Riddervold 2014: 554), France participates in and contributes to EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta. In fact, Atalanta was launched during the French Presidency in the European Council. The French naval operation occurred due to the increasing hijackings of French vessels and private yachts such as the *Care d'As* in autumn 2008. Furthermore, France had a strong interest in clearing the Gulf of Aden off piracy attacks because of the high number of international trade going to and from France. Operation Atalanta, it can be argued, was not only a success 'for the EU as a whole, but especially for France' (Nováky 2015: 503). In contrast, however, France did not participate in or contribute to any of NATO's naval operations off the Somali coast despite its efforts to re-integrate into the Atlantic Alliance.

5.2 United Kingdom

In contrast to France, the UK sees the European Union as an economic power and it therefore follows an economic-driven approach in the Union. It did not envisage to move integration forward in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. The UK was therefore opposed to ideas such as the creation of a European Army or the European Defence Community and still opposed the idea of creating European operation headquarters (OHQ) (Biscop 2012). A change of course of the UK's direction occurred under Tony Blair's Labour government by signing the Franco-British St.Malo Declaration in 1998, when the UK made another step towards EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and permitted deeper integration in this policy field. In 2010, the UK further strengthened its bilateral defence cooperation with France when both states signed the Lancaster House Agreements. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has been a long advocate of NATO and the alliance's approaches to military crisis management operations. Some even argue that NATO still is and will remain the UK's cornerstone in security and defence.

As another multiple member, the UK enjoys membership in both the EU and NATO. There is a long record of the country's involvement in the decision-making procedures and how it has used its veto power in general in the EU decision-making process, and also in particular in regard to the

development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. More than taking the advantage of forum shopping, the UK thus makes use of its right to veto and to limit the progression of the EU in the field of security and defence. However, in the EU-NATO relationship, the UK plays an essential role linking the two organisations, and it therefore serves as an advocate of interorganisational cooperation due to its bridging function. The result of the UK referendum on its EU membership of 23 June 2016 and the subsequent so-called *Brexit* is therefore critical for the future of this special relationship. Despite the UK's future as a single member it will nevertheless be able to participate in CSDP operations (Farmer/McCann 2016).

The UK participates in both Operation Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Initially, it opposed the launch of the EU's first naval military operation but then was convinced that it should not block it to enable France's re-integration into NATO (Nováky 2015). Due to British engagement in international trade, it was of their interest to secure the trade route through the Gulf of Aden, which thus triggered the UK's participation in Operation Atalanta. However, it does not contribute any naval personnel or capabilities in theatre. Instead it decided in October 2008 to provide the operational headquarters in Northwood which is located exactly where NATO's OHQ are situated (FCO 2015), and thereby taking over the command for Operation Atalanta. The UK further participates in the EU's comprehensive approach, i.e., it does not only participate in Operation Atalanta but also in the EU's civilian missions EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. In addition, this facilitated the UK to act as the contact as well as the connection point between the EU and NATO.

5.3 Denmark

In regard to integration in the field of security and defence policy of the European Union, Denmark represents a special case. In the course of the Danish referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in which the Common Security and Defence Policy was created, Denmark negotiated four opt-outs including defence policy, justice and home affairs, citizenship and the Euro. Hence, 'Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area' (European Council 1992: 54, Section D). Since the end of World War Two, Denmark exercised its security and defence policy through multilateral organisations, and more specifically through the UN and the Atlantic Alliance. Contrastingly to CSDP, Danish membership in NATO received high support among the Danish population and was followed by Danish active engagement in multilateral operations. This also led to Denmark's transformation from a soft power to a hard power making using of its military capabilities (Pedersen 2006, Rye Olsen/Pilegaard 2005).

Even though Denmark would need to be considered as a multiple member because of its *de facto* membership in both organisations, it should rather be treated as a single member due to its opt-out. Whenever decisions are taken in regard to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy or when it comes to military crisis management operations, Danish representatives are requested to leave (Pedersen 2006). Hence, Denmark does not have the advantage of forum shopping or of influencing the institutional development of the EU's security and defence structure, and it therefore does not take its share in the process of institutional adaptation like those multiple members such as France and the UK. Furthermore, Denmark can be regarded as a neutraliser of interorganisational cooperation because it neither blocks nor advocates stronger EU-NATO cooperation.

As a seafaring and trade nation, Denmark has an interest in securing the essential sea route. Due to its opt-out of CSDP and its non-participation in Operation Atalanta, it is strongly involved in Operation Ocean Shield. Its participation and contribution is in line with the Danish maritime strategy as outlined in the *Strategy for the Danish Measures against Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 2015-2018* (MoFA of Denmark 2016). Apart from its military contribution Denmark also participates along France, the United Kingdom and other member states of both the EU and NATO in the prosecution of pirates. Under NATO's framework, Denmark has contributed with a maritime helicopter, a ship, surveillance aircraft and a Special Maritime Insertion Unit (MoFA of Denmark 2016).

6. Conclusion and Future Research Agenda

The main objective of this paper was to emphasise the role of member states in military crisis management and in international security organisations, in particular in the EU and NATO. Recognising the importance of member states in military crisis management contributes to scholarly debate on the relationship between the EU and NATO, and to the understanding of their possibilities to cooperate. The debate on cooperation in military operations varies from non-cooperation and illusionary cooperation to first attempts of successful cooperation efforts. By suggesting that member states are key actors in the EU-NATO relationship, I provide an additional dimension to the study of multilateral military operations and a contribution to the study of institutional cooperation in the field of security and defence.

Within the theoretical framework based on the studies of Gehring and Faude and of Biermann, I have developed a typology of member states' positions in interorganisaitonal interaction: advocates, blockers and neutrals. Subsequently, I have illustrated the role of multiple member states and why special cases, such as Denmark, cannot be neglected anymore in the analysis of the EU-NATO relationship in military crisis management operations. Member states are the ones that take decisions, whether on the conduct of military operations or on the institutional development of the respective

organisations. Hence, member states are the key actors in moving EU-NATO cooperation forward. As emphasised in the typology, they can either facilitate future cooperation efforts or diminish any such visions and block any progression. Despite the numerous deadlocks in this special relationship, which also includes tensions between individual single members, member states can decide over the future institutional path. The theoretical framework and the typology therefore help to understand the specific roles of member states and help to explain their behaviour when it comes to deciding over military operations as well as to coordination and cooperation of crisis management efforts.

Since this paper is embedded in a wider research project on the Euro-Atlantic relationship and more specifically on EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management operations as well as on the role of multiple member states, these findings here will be used to explain additional case studies. The theoretical approach of interorganisational interaction will be applied to crises in which both the EU and NATO are or have been involved. So far, not many missions demonstrate such cases; hence, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and NATO's Operation Active Endeavour would serve as cases to illustrate the potentials of EU-NATO cooperation. For future research I will therefore seek to contact military staff from both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance as well representatives from the field of security and defence from Denmark, France and the United Kingdom in order to investigate this issue further. The focus on member states can also be extended by looking at additional multiple members such as Germany which would illustrate an interesting case due to its war past and its subsequent constitutional constraints in regard to the conduct of military operations. The theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction will be of great use for this endeavour. It sheds light on the interaction of international organisations with similar portfolios, such as security and defence, and on structural adaptions and institutional changes with a particular emphasis on the role of member states.

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