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Working Paper

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF LOBBYING REGULATION IN THE EU: EU'S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH TTIP

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ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the discussion surrounding involvement of interest groups in the political process on the European and global level. My purpose here is to examine how groups of interest can affect EU's role as a global actor and find out which mode of lobbying regulation could strengthen Europe's position in global governance. In this paper, I am trying to bind concepts which at first glance might seem quite remote: groups of interests and global governance. By analyzing the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), I argue that European ambitions on international arena are undermined by inner tensions. These tensions are mainly caused by discrepancy in positions of different groups of interest who try to influence the outcome of the political process and, thus, make it less stable and predictable. At the same time, adequate lobbying regulation could increase accountability and transparency and, therefore, help to overcome inconsistencies in EU's position in global governance system. The results suggest that without proper backing from inside actors like business groups and civil society associations the EU will constantly wobble and will not be able to fully achieve its global goals.

INTRODUCTION

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Being the second world's largest economy, the EU has been trying to promote its standards, values, norms, and mechanisms at various levels by enhancing foreign trade, institutional cooperation and taking part in global governance. At the same time, the EU's status of a global actor has been in relative decline mainly because of the Eurozone crisis. Therefore, Europe had to diminish its global appetite and turn back to more practical interests shifting its focus and ambitions from idealism to realism. The whole process of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) provides us with a clear vision of Europe's fears and inconsistencies regarding its role in global governance. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. There is no consistency inside the EU either.

This paper constitutes an attempt to clarify the essence of the dependency between lobbying regulation in the EU and the Union's potential to act globally. The first section presents a summary of the EU's approach to global governance. This is followed by detailed study of the TTIP case with the due attention given to the issue of impact of lobbyist and groups of interest and their role in shaping the agreement. The next section applies theoretical framework to practical context and describes different types of lobbying regulation in the EU and anticipated results of it. Finally, the conclusion sums up the main findings on political aspects of lobbying regulation and changes in EU's approach to global governance.

EU IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The European aspirations to play an important part in global governance were formulated in time of globalisation, EU's enlargement and strengthening on the international political arena. The EU has to fortify internal governance in order to be able to promote its principles and ideas of "good governance" in the entire world (European Commission 2003). It is worth mentioning that the concept of "good governance" lies in the core of the European external strategy together with "effective multilateralism" and "transatlantic partnership." However, good governance has no clear definition. In general, it covers fundamental principles of state-society interactions and encompasses rules, procedures, interest's articulation, management of resources, and the way the power is exercised. "Good governance"

is aimed at protecting human rights and democratic values, promoting development and reducing inequalities.

The EU is constantly looking for the new opportunities to promote its principles of good governance abroad – as it happened, for instance, with Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Europe showed readiness to use trade and foreign policy aid as a means to export its values to bind issues of trade and development with political ones. Another example is European Neighbourhood Policy which suggests the quality for the EU's relationships with its neighbours depending on their adherence to European values (Börzel, Pamuk and Stahn 2008, 8).

Another strand in EU's strategy of global governance is multilateralism. The concept of multilateralism is challenging in itself. Generally accepted interpretation was given by R.O. Keohane who considered multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions. It thus involves (exclusively) states and often (not exclusively) institutions, defined as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.’” (Keohane 1990). But understanding of multilateralism could not be complete without such qualitative notions as justice, international obligations under treaties and respect for law.

The EU is strongly committed to the principles of effective multilateralism in the Union's foreign policy. According to European Security Strategy, an international order should be based on effective multilateralism. Realising its interests, the EU sees its role as a promoter of the European model and systematic attitude on the global level (European Council 2003). This contributes to the EU's strategic choice.

Transatlantic partnership is another core element of EU's foreign policy. Despite existing divergence between European and American concept and practice of global governance, transatlantic relationship remains ‘irreplaceable’ for fostering EU's role as a global actor. A new European Security Strategy proclaims: “The strategic relationship between the European Union and the United States is of

primary importance to transatlantic prosperity and stability, with the EU and the USA accounting for over 30% of the world trade and over 50% of global GDP” (European Parliament 2015). Europe shows its strong commitment to act together with the US not only when dealing with security issues such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflict prevention and peace keeping, but also when working on economic and legal issues. Having moved from the policy of “building bridges across the Atlantic” in 1995 (European Union External Action 1995) to “essential partnership” in 2011 (European Union External Action 2011) and then to “unique partnership” in 2014 (European Union External Action 2014), today the EU-US relations represent full-featured partnership encompassing non-governmental and parliamentary cooperation.

EU-US cooperation is organised through on-going dialogues on most issues covered by the action plan of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) launched in 1998 on London Summit including the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED), and the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TALD). These formal structures have contributed to wide engagement of lobbyists, groups of interests, non-governmental organisations and civil society activists. Representatives from firms and corporate lobbyists took part in the work of the Transatlantic Economic Council and advised the European Commission and the US government. From the very beginning, lobbyists were incorporated into the process of negotiations. Deepening transatlantic cooperation facilitated formation of influential transatlantic lobbies both in the EU and the US with whom we are dealing in current TTIP talks.

TTIP AS A MEANS TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Together the US and the EU represent over 60% of global GDP, 33% of world trade in goods and 42% of world trade in services. A free-trade agreement between these two largest economies after China would establish the biggest zone of economic integration covering 46% of world GDP. Despite the close economic cooperation between Europe and US, which are very important trade partners for

each other, they compete for the markets and have long-lasting economic conflicts that are currently under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) examination.

Firstly, a kind of Transatlantic Free Trade Area was proposed by Germany in the 1990s but at that time it was not appreciated. Later on, in 2006 German Chancellor Angela Merkel returned to the issue of free-trade agreement. However, the 2008 financial crisis provoked growing protectionism on both sides and yet again delayed the beginning of negotiations. Finally, in 2011 a group of high-level international experts launched the work on preparing recommendations regarding a wide-ranging free-trade agreement. On February 12th, 2013 EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and President Barack Obama officially announced the beginning of talks on the future agreement. So, the EU Commission was given mandate from the EU governments to negotiate TTIP.

TTIP is more ambitious and expansive than any standard trade agreement. Its is divided into 24 chapters, grouped into 3 parts: market access, regulatory cooperation, and rules. The negotiations are mainly focused on the most controversial issues which are tariffs reductions or eliminations, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Potential gains from TTIP depend heavily on the extent to which tariffs, technical barriers and non-tariff barriers are eliminated. The main goal of TTIP is to remove divergent standards between EU and US – which is very ambitious and challenging. Mutual recognition of equivalent rules and standards could lead not only to economic growth of participants but also to setting very important international norms and standards. An idea of transatlantic economic integration is a far-reaching geopolitical implication that aims at boosting transatlantic economic growth amidst rising threats from China and other emerging economies (Hamilton 2014).

LOBBYING TTIP IN EUROPE

Although aspirations and predicted effects from the free-trade agreement are mostly positive, potential economic gains remain a subject of heated discussions. TTIP affects a huge number of industries, sectors, and enterprises. Not surprisingly,

the launched negotiations attracted unprecedented attention and provoked protests from both civil society and business structures.

Major European fears are caused by the risk of standards harmonisation at consumer's expense. Large number of protests were and still are conducted by European farmer's associations who are concerned about competitiveness of high-standard European agricultural sector in comparison to the American one where genetically modified food and hormones are widely used to make the final price of the product lower. After several rounds of behind-closed-doors EU-US negotiations, the level of social anxiety in Europe was particularly high. Taking into consideration concerns about democratic deficit and the lack of transparency the European Council decided to publish the European Commission's mandate and make the whole process more open. The Commission launched public consultations and several groups of experts under DG Trade and DG Enterprise tried to enroll players affected by TTIP. Now business groups, trade unions, consumer, health and other interest groups were granted an opportunity to express their position and concerns. Along with that, in November 2014 the new European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström promised that civil society would be more involved into the TTIP negotiations (European Parliament 2014).

The whole TTIP issue became a subject of heavy media coverage in Europe. Widely known internet resources like EurActive.com, corporateeurope.org, and lots of others published series of reports or report-like investigations dedicated to TTIP. They launched an anti-TTIP campaign which resulted in civil interest being mobilised. Self-organised European citizen's initiative against TTIP and CETA called "STOP TTIP" is worth mentioning here. This initiative was officially refused a registration under the European Commission (European Commission 2014) but they continue their outside lobbying campaign along with gathering signatures contra TTIP. One of the major arguments voiced by "STOP TTIP" campaign leader Pia Eberhardt is that Commission officials who were not democratically elected on their posts have the right to decide on agreement that contradicts the principles of democracy and affects every single European citizen. Moreover, Commission

conducts behind-the-closed-door negotiations with business lobbyists sacrificing democratic rights to satisfy corporate interests. Under such harsh criticism Commission had to announce open consultations on TTIP. But almost a year after Commissioner Malmström's claim the consultation policy on TTIP has not become less business-biased. Among total meeting with groups of interest only 16,7% are held with the public interest groups and only one out of five business lobbyist are registered which can easily be checked by analysing the list of the Commissioner's meetings (European Commission 2015).

It is difficult to deny the fact that now organised civil interest groups can make a real impact on perception of TTIP by the public and officials. The question about effectiveness of public groups' ability to shape opinion was studied by Dür and Mateo (2014) on the example of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) defeat. By the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament was given the right to approve or reject international agreements. ACTA is a curious case when a campaign initiated by a small number of citizen groups against the agreement ratification in the Parliament turned out to be successful. Dür and Mateo have explained "the success of the anti-ACTA campaign by showing how interest groups managed to increase the public salience of the issue; how the increasing public salience motivated a growing number of interest groups to mobilize; and how the resulting dynamic made decision-makers opt against ratification of the agreement" (2014). The TTIP scenario does not have to be the same but still is a good example to show the power of civil groups and possible outcome of interest mobilization.

US POSITION ON TTIP

In the USA the TTIP issue receives less public attention and is definitively perceived not as negative as in Europe. Americans are not afraid of consumer protection weakening. Instead of that, the major US concerns are circled around possible erosion of US' energy advantage and weakening of US financial regulations. The United States were hardly hit by the recession caused by the 2008 financial crisis and they want to stay as far as possible from another overheating of markets and prevent risky transactions. Now, the economy shows signs of

improvement and any serious agreement seems to jeopardize the hard-won and delicate economic balance. Another sensitive issue is the US energy market. Current shale gas boom along with improvements in technology and efficiency makes it possible to keep the price on energy resources low. Exporting liquefied natural gas would make the prices higher.

The interests of huge transnational American companies are articulated by the American Chamber of Commerce which is the most powerful pro-TTIP lobby group. The main discussion on TTIP is concentrated within the Senate which includes trade liberalisers, fair traders and trade skeptics. But despite that division the Senate is generally considered to be in favour of the TTIP.

It should be mentioned that lobbying regulation and practice of interest representation in the USA is completely different from the European one. Lobbyists and groups of interest play an active role in the American decision-making process and the regulation of their activity is much stricter. According to the Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995 all lobbyists are required to register with the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate and to provide semiannual reports of their activities and expenditures. Lobbying activity is highly controversial and is often negatively depicted in mass media. At the same time, this occupation is subject to extensive rules and regulations which can lead to prosecution if not followed. It is worth mentioning that in contrast to Europe, in the US officials are not allowed to conduct meetings with non-registered lobbyists. Professional lobbyists make a layer between officials and civil servants from one hand, and business associations and trade union from another hand. By the way the activity of professional lobbyists is interpreted as the right for free speech which is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The US faces its own challenges regarding immense number of lobbyists and growing lobbying budgets, but it is hard to deny that this kind of tightly regulated interest representation system works well when it concerns consolidation of public position and then finding a compromise in the Congress which enables the American governance to act in a cohesive way and stand for the state's interests.

For the US TTIP is a question of geostrategic importance. Congressional debates on TTIP usually focus on general topics like overall economic impact and implications for global governance and international standards. Creating new global norms, technical standards, and regulatory convergence is meant to boost the US's economy as well as the EU's as opposed to Asia and China in particular. In the meantime, the USA is conducting negotiations with China on the Trans-Pacific Partnership which could be an alternative to TTIP in creating the biggest free-trade area. Also during negotiations, the Congress has referred to the situation in Ukraine as one of the reasons to pursue transatlantic efforts to help it macro-economic revitalisation. On the whole, if signed TTIP definitively will have an impact on the future of global economic governance and on multilateral structures like the World Trade Organisation. Therefore, neither US, no EU want to stay on the sidelines of this agreement.

DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

European Commission is constantly engaged in designing various initiatives in order to increase participation of interests groups, particularly NGOs, in politics and therefore increase the level of the democratic legitimacy of the organisation. However, during TTIP negotiations the Commission has faced harsh criticism for the lack of transparency in the ways in which interest groups and particularly corporate lobbyists participate in policy-making process.

Any democratic political system should envisage regulation of political actors' behaviour, and the EU is not an exception here. Lobbying regulation is particularly important, because European political system is characterised by high degree of reliance on civil society. It is widely agreed, that lobbying regulation is characterised by two major aspects: public officials' behaviour and lobbyists' code of conduct. Speaking of lobbying regulation, I consider both of these notions. Bringing together theoretical considerations on democratic deficit with lobbying regulation approaches, I argue that an adequate regulation of interest groups representation increases accountability and transparency and, therefore can be

considered to be a method of dealing with democratic deficit and contributing to consolidation of Europe's position on international arena.

First of all, let us define what democracy is and what is democratic deficit. A clear definition was given by Beetham who says that democracy is about popular control and political equality (Beetham 1994, 4-5). Both of these concepts require accountability which is the central element in any democratic system, be it national or supranational. In a democratic system of governance, rulers should be accountable for their actions as they defend public interests and represent people who have elected them. Here we come to the second major characteristic feature of democracy which is transparency. It is obvious that transparency itself is presupposed by accountability. Lack of transparency compromises accountability (Persson 2009, 144). Of course, there might be plenty of other more sophisticated designs of democratic systems depending on interpretations, positions and scholars' opinions. But talking about democracy in the EU while trying to not compromise any of the complexity of interest representation practices would only make it tangled.

The issue of the democratic deficit of the European Union seems to have been there forever. Yet there is no common attitude among scholars to this problem. On the one hand, we have such prominent intellectuals as Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik who argued that the EU should not necessarily meet all the expectations in what is considered to be democratic, meaning that the EU is already as democratic as it could, or should, be. On the other hand, there is a polar point of view articulated by Simon Hix, who called the EU policy-making an "enlightened form of benevolent authoritarianism" (Hix and Follesdal 2006, 534). Most researchers' position falls somewhere in-between.

A "standard version" of democratic deficit elaborated by Weiler and his colleagues (Weiler and Mayer 1995, 4-39) and, then, improved by Simon Hix still reflects the EU situation. Five major claims described by Simon Hix and Andreas Follesdal are still relevant even after reforms under the Treaty of Lisbon came into force (Hix and Follesdal 2006, 533). Obviously, we are witnessing "an increase in

executive power and a decrease in national parliamentary control” (Hix and Follesdal 2006, 534; Jans and Piedrafita 2009, 19) which became especially problematic in light of Eurozone crisis.

One would argue that growing role of the European Parliament is a step forward on the path to a more democratic union. On the one hand, there is a clear tendency of the enforcement of the European Parliament’s role that has been described by democratic deficit scholars since the mid-1980s. The Lisbon Treaty extended Parliament’s legislative power making it a lawmaker equal to the Council. Among other important decision-making procedures and budgetary powers the role of Parliament is bolstered by election of the President of the Commission. Jean-Claude Juncker became the first elected head of the Commission, which is definitively a step forward.

Finally, there is a clear tendency of “policy drift” on the supranational level. The EU takes political decisions that are not popular in member states. Of course, it is not a common case but the whole institutional system of the EU empowers governments to conduct policies at the European level that they could hardly follow at the national level. Because at the domestic level they are controlled by national political actors like parliaments, courts, groups of civil and corporate interests. Common Agricultural Policy and the single market neo-liberal regulation may be good examples here. Such a “policy drift” is highly criticised by most social democratic scholars for the lack of transparency, lack of accountability (Chrysochoou 2010, 377-89) and groups of interest’ inclusion in the decision-making process (Scharpf 1999, 72-89).

INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN EU POLICY-MAKING

There is a suggestive cleavage between business and civil interest groups on their lobbying aspirations. Among all European institutions, the Commission has been criticised for the lack of transparency more than the others have (Heard-Laureote 2010, 31-33). The inconsistencies in Commission’s functions we are facing today stem from the early intension of Jean Monet to hold this body as a functional representative board assisting technical experts. Lately the technocratic and elitist

nature of this institution became salient and accompanied by the weak democratic legitimacy (Featherstone 1994, 154). The Commission was blamed for being a “black box” in which political decisions were taken by unelected elite technocrats. Therefore, from the late 1990s The European Commission launched several new initiative trying to fix the issue of its technocratic lack of accountability. It has deliberately drawn groups of interests in capacity of experts into decision-making process, both to compensate the lack of democratic participation and improve the effectiveness of policy outcomes (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999, 25-29). Today’s situation has not changed dramatically, except for the post of the Commission’s President who is to be elected by the European Parliament according to the Treaty of Lisbon. The problem of democratic deficit was officially recognised as Jean-Claude Juncker stated among his political guidelines a need for a democratic change (Juncker 2014, 10). It is also important that the President-elect declared his commitment “to enhanced transparency when it comes to contact with stakeholders and lobbyists” (Juncker 2014, 11).

Being “understaffed and overstressed” (Greenwood 2003, 180), the Commission launched new initiatives to grant access for those lobbyists who are able to provide them with technical expertise on issues that exceed competences of its members (Hauser 2011, 689). As Henri Hauser notes, “By involving a range of public and private interests in discussions concerning policy initiatives, the Commission circumvents “obstruction of national governments” (Hauser 2011, 696). Interest groups’ participation in the decision-making process allows the Commission to find a consensus among key stakeholders.

This was definitively a shift to neo-corporatism type of political organisation (Coen 2007, 333-345). On the one hand, advocates of this type of political organisation claim that groups of interest participation in the consultations with the Commission serves better regulation, improves the level of legitimacy and effectiveness (Broscheid and Coen 2007, 346-365; Michalowitz 2005, 23; Heard-Laureote 2010, 155). On the other hand, it seems to be a rather strained and limited argument. Firstly, how to make sure that lobbying participation in policy-making

does not harm common European interest? Secondly, which type of regulation will allow interest group to contribute to the policy-making process?

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF LOBBYING REGULATION

Given that the Commission is “understaffed and overstressed” (Greenwood 2003, 180) and cannot do without engaging groups of corporate and civil interests in consultations we should admit that the only way to decide who merits participation in the political process is at least proper regulation of access. “Regulation of lobbyists refers to the notion that there should be rules which the interest groups must abide by when trying to influence public decision-making” (Kanol 2012, 522). Being one of the most lobbied institution of the EU Commission still envisages no regulation of lobbying practice, which takes place every day. We cannot ignore the Commission’s engagement in designing various codes of conduct and registers for lobbyists under the European Transparency Initiative (ETI). But after years it was launched there was no definite progress. There is also concern about the financial information disclosed by lobbyists (Greenwood 2011, 324) because a number of revisions conducted have shown that the information in the registry was highly inaccurate (EU Observer 2010). It is no surprise because there are not enough benefits for interest groups in voluntary registration. It is difficult to argue that self-regulation initiative had any substantial effect in terms of transparency improvement. The whole ETI seem to have failed due to above described reasons (ALTER-EU 2009, 13; ALTER-EU 2012, 3). Self-regulation is not a remedy in the case with interest groups participation (Chari 2010, 4).

As Chari has noticed, “The basic rationale behind implementing regulations is that the public should have some insight into, as well as oversight of, the mechanisms that draw lobbyists into the policy-making environment, in order to better understand how they influence policy outputs” (Chari 2010, 2). Enacting a mandatory lobbying register could increase the level of transparency and accountability. Apart from that, regulation of lobbying promotes political equality.

Numerous researchers’ attempts to reveal the key elements of successful lobbying make us believe that information supply and financial recourses are the key

(Bouwen 2004, 337-369). That is why groups of business interests seem to be the most successful lobbyists while civil interests seem to be depressed (which in fact is not as dramatic as it sounds). Recent empirical study conducted by Heike Klüver tries to overcome shortcomings and contradictions of previous researches. Professor Klüver assumes that “lobbying is a collective enterprise in which information supply, citizen support and economic power of entire lobbying camps account for variation in lobbying success” (Klüver 2012, 73). It is important that citizen support is treated as one of the major determinants of lobbying success. It means that even without strict regulation lobbying is not as vicious as sometimes perceived by scholars and activists. In order to succeed in a lobbying campaign one has to take civil interests into consideration. Another notable issue in Klüver’s approach is identifying lobbying camp not as a single player but as a “set of actors who share the same policy goal” (Klüver 2012, 64). Meaning that lobbying is not an individual enterprise, but a complex collective process which involves multiple interest groups including business and civil society. Being united by one political goal, they are trying to shift the policy outcome towards their ideal point.

Another supportive argument to Klüver’s approach was also proposed by Coen and Katsaitis who think that “it is too simple to posit that business groups dominate across all policy domains” (Coen and Katsaitis 2013, 1105). Prior to that Coen and Richardson revealed limitations in elite pluralism approach defining interactions between interest groups and the Commission. They see it as “a form of chameleon pluralism, where interest group type, density and activity is a function of the policy type, age and capacity of the Directorate-General’s responsible for policy-making” (Coen and Richardson 2009, 8).

According to the procedure, if a DG decides to establish a new expert group, it needs only the Commission’s General Secretariat’s approval – no further public announcement is required. An expert group can be both formal and informal. Formal groups can be established only with the Commission’s decision or a legal act which is time consuming, to say the least. While establishing of an informal expert groups requires no public document announcing or results reporting. Consequently, a huge

amount of existing expert groups are informal meaning that they are non-accountable. Only mandatory lobbying registration could put an end to this type of unreported consultations.

Making it clear who is lobbying for what along with penalising codes of conduct can increase the level of transparency and accountability in the Commission and promote political equality. It is up to Commission to decide to reveal the information about its experts or not. But it is evident that without mandatory registration of lobbyists and public announcement of experts involved there will be low transparency and the democratic deficit will persist.

CONCLUSION

Lobbying regulation's impacts are highly controversial. We should admit that we have no strong empirical proof that strict regulation of interest groups representation and the level of democracy are directly correlated. However, positive effect of lobbying regulation on political equality may be contested. Absence of access regulation only exacerbates the inequality of political influence among groups of interests: "This absence of regulation seems to reinforce a situation in which groups possessing financial and social resources are privileged whereas the voices of small interest groups, be they general interest or small business groups, are not heard quite as loudly in the consultation process" (Saurugger 2008, 1283).

Certainly, lobbying regulation will have some side-effects. For example, entering the lobbying industry and starting lobbying campaign would become more costly and, consequently, would limit participation of some interest groups, which is, of course, normal for any political process. At the same time, lobbying regulation influences the level of transparency and accountability that are constituents of democracy. In this respect, we can consider the necessity of lobbying regulation to be a way of overcoming the democratic deficit in the EU. But still, regulation of interest group participation has limited effects and it won't ever be a 100% remedy. Democratic deficit is a systematic problem and should be addressed on all levels and not only on the level of interest representation. Apart from lobbying regulation other means to overcome democratic deficit should be undertaken.

On the whole, the EU represents a complex public-sector organisational system with its own specific features and unique path of development. In this paper I wanted to examine an impact of interest representation and lobbying regulation on the outcome of multifaceted negotiations and shaping the global governance. Whether stricter lobbying regulation can contribute to strengthening the EU's position on the global level is a question for another research. But for now we can assume that lobbying regulation could foster coherence inside Europe and thus improve Europe's performance in global governing.

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