

UACES 45th Annual Conference

Bilbao, 7-9 September 2015

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

www.uaces.org

Steffen Bay Rasmussen
University of Deusto
steffen.bayrasmussen@deusto.es

**The New Narrative for Europe and the Role of Culture in
European Union Public Diplomacy**

Draft: Please do not quote or circulate

1 INTRODUCTION

No general consensus exists, but public diplomacy is typically analysed in terms of the intent of a given country to influence the perception of foreign publics so that these come to hold a positive view of that country and increasingly share its founding values and, perhaps, political priorities. As a key instrument of soft power, the importance of public diplomacy is destined to increase in a globalised world where political influence increasingly comes through the soft power to shape situations and make friends rather than through the hard power to coerce potential enemies into submission. It is therefore a paradox, as pointed out by Zaharna (2012) that culture has been largely overlooked as a key determinant of the attractiveness of a country and as an expression of its identity in analyses of public diplomacy. One of the explanations may be the general disregard for culture in the dominant rationalist paradigm of International Relations thinking, be it in a Realist or a Liberal theoretical version, but in our contemporary world of absence of major ideological conflicts, it is tempting to turn to culture as an element explaining cooperation and conflict, as well as the success or failure of specific policy initiatives.

Leaving aside questions of the increasing importance of culture as a exportable commodity for the cultural industries and how cultural elements might explain differences in public diplomacy practices from one state to another, the present paper is focused on culture as an element of public diplomacy that communicates identity, particularly relevant for the case of the European Union. First, putting the soft power instrument of public diplomacy to work is particularly pertinent for a European Union with few hard power resources at its disposal for direct influence on the ground. On this point there seems to be a general consensus among analysts, reflected in the characterisation of the EU as a civilian power (Duchêne, 1972; Teló, 2006; Whitman, 2006), a normative power (Manners, 2002; Manners and Whitman 2013), structural power (Keukeleire et al., 2009) or, indeed, soft power (Nye, 2004). Furthermore, as a new kind of political entity, the EU is based on the withering away of sovereignty in Europe (Adler-Nissen, 2009). As such, the EU is itself the product of cultural dialogues (Rougemont, 1977/2007), and the absence of an EU *ethos*, or even *demos*, holding a distinct cultural identity means that EU public diplomacy faces a communicative challenge which the nation states do not: apart from trying to influence global public opinion, it must first and foremost communicate which kind of entity it is and what the European Union is all about: An EU identity.

The complex organization of the EU as an international actor is of course a complicating factor when analysing its public diplomacy. EU diplomatic activity generally is not simply an additional supranational layer of activity added to that of the Member States. Rather, EU diplomacy, and EU public diplomacy as part hereof, exists as a consequence of the functional disaggregation of the Member States. Whereas each state continues to realise certain activities,

¹ Culture as a source of jobs and growth is one of the three strategic objectives identified in the European Agenda for Culture (European Commission, 2007a: 8). Ward (2008) specifically analyses the relationship of the EU with the culture industries, but more interesting for the current study is Henze's (2014) argument that increasing understanding through cultural diplomacy is actually also a solid investment.

other state functions are exercised jointly through the institutions of the EU. EU public diplomacy is thus realised by a network of actors on the supranational level, on the state level and on the regional and local levels. Also, even if only considering the activities at the EU level, public diplomacy is carried out by many different actors and through a wide range of activities pertaining to different budget lines, including delegating communicative responsibility to foreign NGOs (Rasmussen, 2010). This is so because each administrative unit of the EU has been assigned the responsibility for external communication within its field of activities, and on the ground in third states, initiatives depend on the individual EU Delegation and the various desk officers working within it, with central coordination taking place only at a general level.² Although this allows the EU to tailor its communication to specific audiences, as recommended by the theoretical literature (see Melissen, 2005) this is problematic when the ideal for communicating a self-image and having an impact on foreign publics is a coherent and focused message, a fact reflected in the repeated calls for the EU to increase the coherence in its public diplomacy and start speaking 'with one voice', as well as academic analyses focused on coherence (Fiske de Gouveia, 2005; Lynch, 2005; Michalski, 2005). As with other modalities of its external relations, the reality on the ground with respect to culture is also of an EU external cultural policy that coexists with and depends on the external cultural policies of the EU Member States that "always take the national as the foci" (Topic and Sciortino, 2012: 18).

In this context, this paper considers the possibilities and limitations of culture as a tool for EU public diplomacy, in particular with respect to communicating to foreign audiences an EU identity that is distinct from those of the Member States. After conceptualising culture and identity as elements of public diplomacy in the following section, the paper considers the two dominant auto-biographical narratives of the EU in section three. The central analytical focus of the paper is in section four on the New Narrative for Europe currently being formulated. Further limitations and possibilities of recent EU initiatives are discussed in section five, where also a possible way forward is pointed out. The paper finishes with a general conclusion in section six.

2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

2.1 Culture and public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is conceptually a very complex field of study, and it is therefore necessary to situate the present analysis of culture in EU public diplomacy. For this, it is helpful to consider Leonard's (2002: 8-21) distinction between three sets of practices of public diplomacy, depending on how broad an influence is sought and on the time frame involved. First there is a reactionary public diplomacy, basically consisting in managing the news stream. Then there is the strategic communication centred on core messages transmitted through planned activities, and thirdly we find relationship building. The objective here is not necessarily to communicate specific messages, but to create better understanding generally. Culture as an element within the broader concept of public diplomacy could be thought of as

² For more details on the institutional setup of EU public diplomacy, see the analysis by Simon Duke (2013).

being mainly located within this third category aimed at a diffuse influence and a long-term time perspective, although of course there will always be some cultural element to any kind of public diplomacy activity.

In this sense, the focus here is not limited to cultural diplomacy, understood as the diplomatic negotiation of formal cultural agreements and the management of the cultural relations created by these agreements (Topic and Sciortino, 2012: 11-12). It should be noted that this definition does not necessarily mean that cultural diplomacy has an increased understanding and cultural interchange as an objective in itself. Rather, the objective of any diplomatic modality is to promote certain foreign policy objectives, whichever they may be. These may include economic objectives of promoting European cultural industries, a dimension present in both the academic literature (e.g. Ward, 2008) and in EU official documents (e.g. European Commission, 2007a), although as Davis Cross (2014: 20-21) notes, the economic promotion of culture is often counterproductive in terms of increasing understanding and communicating external images. Still, and inspired by Leonard's thinking on public diplomacy, culture can also be considered in instrumentalist terms as how a given actor seeks to influence the general structural social environment of perceptions of foreign audiences within which other diplomatic activities take place. Culture, in this diplomatic perspective, also becomes a means to an end, the part of public diplomacy related with culture and where practices are aimed at the long term. This being said, culture is obviously about more than what diplomats do, and particularly in the EU context, the term *cultural relations* is more often used.³ Cultural relations suggest a decoupling from the formal diplomatic interaction, and empirically this concept directs our attention to the fact that external cultural relations are often managed by quasi-independent national cultural institutes (as in the case of EU Member States) and suggests a broader empirical focus in the present case than on the activities of the EU External Action Service.

As a diplomatic and communicative tool, culture is closely linked to the identity of the EU, or any other actor in question, basically trying to communicate essential questions about who the European "we" is and what "we" are all about, as opposed to other public diplomacy modalities focused on strengthening a particular interpretation of current events (such the EU narrative on the crisis in the Ukraine being essentially about an illegitimate use of force by Russia in violation of international law) or specific policy objectives (the need for binding targets for CO2 emissions as the only way to combat climate change). Although this way acknowledging that cultural interchange is in several aspects about much more than using culture selectively to project certain predefined self-images, the present analysis is of culture as an instrument for public diplomacy in terms of being a way to communicate a self-image, an identity.

³ Although the EU also uses the term "Cultural Diplomacy", there is a general EU preference for using the term "culture in external relations" or "external cultural relations", a reflection of a deliberate downplaying of the instrumentalist connotations by the EU, according to the Preparatory Action on Culture in EU External Relations, prepared by a consortium of National Cultural Institutes and independent experts for the European Commission (European Union, 2014: 19).

2.2 Identity and public diplomacy narratives

By identity is meant a definition of self, i.e. a subjective quality that makes an individual what it is. Accepting Alexander Wendt's argument (1999: 157-165), based on the distinction between different types of knowledge, that the same holds true for collective actors, EU identity is here understood in terms of a corporate EU self-image. As such, the focus on identity in the present analysis is about the image the EU constructs for itself through its public diplomacy practices.⁴

Identity, and how this identity relates to past experiences, current actions and external events, constitutes a social structure constructed by the actor itself. This structure is the result of efforts to construct narratives that link being and doing, meaning the self-perception with past experiences, current actions and expectations of the future. This argument is based on the constructivist assumption of the mutual constitutiveness of structures and action: a narrative and actor identity is created through social practice, and the narrative is what gives meaning to this very practice. By linking actor identity with (public diplomacy) practices, it becomes clear that different practices contain the potential to either undermine or reinforce the ongoing processes of constructing identity and other broader public diplomacy narratives (Flockhart, 2011: 27). Thus, the practices of EU public diplomacy involving culture constantly articulate an EU identity, and thus reinforce or undermine existing narratives on the topic.

Although a public diplomacy narrative is basically something that is internal and previous to an international interaction, although continuously reconstructed through these very practices, not only theoretical and policy-strategic documents should be analysed here. It is the purpose of the present paper to complement this theoretical analysis with a consideration of current EU public diplomacy practices containing an explicit cultural element, since any practice must communicate some essential content, and thereby it necessarily draws upon and reconstructs deeper constructions of identity and meaning, although the individuals executing it are not necessarily aware of this.

It should also be noted that we are dealing here only with the intentional communication of an actor, and not all those messages transmitted involuntarily due to events beyond its control or actions not intended for communicative purposes. For instance, whereas the EU may try to communicate about its values and historical experiences, EU foreign policy generally may be communicating messages of economic crisis or weakness in the face of geopolitical challenges. It should also be noted that the concept of narratives, as used here, is used basically to assess the internal coherence of the political communication of an actor and less to the construction of shared narratives with foreign audiences, and although this is also an interesting aspect, it is beyond the scope of this paper.⁵

⁴ The link between culture and collective identity is complex and arguably worthy of much more attention than this paper can provide. Here, a broad social constructivist argument is presented, but for more detailed theoretical enquiries and a good overview, see Abbinnett (2003).

⁵ This aspect is considered in an EU context by Mai'a K. Davis Cross (2013).

3 EU PUBLIC DIPLOMACY NARRATIVES

3.1 The dominant narrative: The EU is a universal model for structural peace

The dominant narrative in EU communication to foreign publics constructs an identity for the EU as being a structural solution to the challenge of the peaceful coexistence of states, and therefore a project for peace. This has been the basic narrative of European integration since its beginnings in the late 1940s. Although the EU admits the limited usefulness of this narrative in its domestic communication and identity construction, a general impression is that the EU identity as a peace project still dominates EU public diplomacy. This has also been confirmed in earlier empirical studies, where 48 interviews with staff of the Delegations in the exterior revealed that the EU as a model for peace is the primary image communicated (Carta, 2007).

In the construction of this EU identity, the European past of warfare and diplomatic quarrels constitutes the Other. It is only not the behaviour of France under Napoleon or Germany under Hitler that is the problem, but the very Westphalian international system itself, which inevitably produces conflict and war.⁶ Only with the institutionalization of European integration in the EU have the European states become able to handle their relations in a satisfactory manner (Keukeleire, 2003:32). The key characteristic of the EU is in this regard that it has overcome the balance of power as an organising principle for inter-state relations (Cooper, 2003: 6). This is due to the fact that the EU Member States has thus stopped identifying each other as Others in their identity constructions and instead created a common Other, which is the past. The EU identity is thus of being a structural solution to the past problem of warfare among European states.

This identity is evident in official documents as early as 1973 in the Document on the European Identity (Council of the European Communities, 1973). This document explicates that the structural solution identity is the basis both for the existence of the EU and for its international activities, although it also stresses common political elements, such as democracy, human rights and social justice (Smith, 2004: 742). Add to those concepts political stability and multilateralism and we have the list of the European values in the EU's external communication policy (European Commission, 2006), i.e., the priorities of EU public diplomacy. This way, the EU clearly links its identity not only to historical experiences but also to its current foreign policy strategy generally.

While the EU is thus constructed as a structural peace project, an important additional construction is that the EU's historical experience is of universal applicability, an element characterised by van Ham (2008: 3-4) as a "founding myth." The causal idea is that due to the universality of EU values, these should be adopted worldwide, since they bring benefits to all when they are used as a basis for international interaction, and specifically, regional integration. Other states and regions in the world should clearly follow the EU's example, which not only gives rise to strategic goals, but also manifests itself widely in specific communicative initiatives of EU public diplomacy.⁷ The EU's founding values are consequently an important element of

⁶ This is by no means a new idea, but can be traced back to the philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The basic EU narrative thus uses classical elements in its identity construction. For an overview, see the work by Truyol y Serra (1999: 19-25).

⁷ Seen for instance in the public diplomacy campaign surrounding the 50th anniversary celebrations of the EU, see European Commission (2007b).

EU public diplomacy,⁵ no doubt helped by their politically rather uncontroversial nature among the Member States.

As the EU is a political entity not originally based on neither an *ethnos* nor a *demos*, the EU identity is not based on the sovereignty of a People, and the organic legitimacy a European People could bestow upon the EU as its institutional expression. Rather, the EU bases its identity on its own universal values of democracy, human rights and multilateralism, which are at the same time the primary content of its foreign policy. As opposed to the Westphalian state which is based on a *demos* with a specific cultural identity separable from the foreign policy of the state the EU cannot, in this narrative, separate its identity from the content of its foreign policy. The communicative activities of EU public diplomacy are therefore working not only to fulfil a political objective, but also simultaneously to construct an identity for the EU through discourse and thus strengthen its own very *raison d'être*. EU public diplomacy this way stresses that the EU activities to promote its own values is to do good in the world. The EU's defence of democracy, human rights and multilateralism and the promotion of its own model of European integration are seen as a universal good. The narrative thus creates coherence between EU identity and EU foreign policy.⁶

3.2 The alternative narrative and the EEAS: Euronationalism

It is also possible to identify an antagonistic narrative that stresses that the EU is, or should be, an *effective* actor. This public diplomacy narrative has as its core identity constructions for the EU that it is a responsible and effective international actor that spends money well and, further, that the EU contributes with added value to the activities of Member States, irrespective of content.

The narrative takes its point of departure in the obvious fact that the EU is internally diverse, up to the point where diversity becomes an EU brand that is communicated through its public diplomacy. The basic identity construction for the EU is that although it is a diverse political entity, these cooperate effectively for the promotion of the common good, so that the EU as an entity is an efficient actor, as illustrated by the slogan "United in Diversity," with the emphasis on *united*.

The narrative is about the effective defence of the material and geopolitical interests of the Union, and it constructs an identity for the EU as a strong and 'normal' actor on the international scene. This narrative is thus based on a very different causal idea, namely one that seems to reject the EU's own historical experience of how peace and prosperity is achieved, being based on world view dominated by *Realpolitik* and where the common good is achieved through each actor defending its own interests as rationally and peacefully as possible. It is therefore at least partially antagonistic with the structural peace narrative. Using the word of Fraser Cameron (2007:216), the construction of the EU as an effective defender of EU interests can aptly be termed a euronationalist discourse.

⁵ The EU has specific budget lines for the promotion of its values in the exterior, such as for instance the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

⁶ It is a different discussion, and beyond the scope of the present paper, whether the EU really is a force for good in the world, and if the EU really is having the impact it claims to have.

The construction is of a Westphalian-style actor identity for the EU, and is most apparent in the public diplomacy activities of DG Trade and in the debate surrounding the establishment of the EEAS. The impossibility of separating domestic and external communication and the continuous need of the EU to be legitimised internally, both with respect to its existence and concrete activities, is in no doubt a primary factor behind the rise of this narrative. A second factor is the perception, shared by the Commission (2006) and the European Council (2008) that the EU did not have the influence that it should, due to problems of coherence. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the implications of the establishment of the EEAS for EU public diplomacy more generally,¹⁰ but generally the creation of the EEAS can be seen as symptomatic for the broader development of the EU towards a more state-like entity.

The new euronationalist narrative gives rise to a serious communicative challenge for EU public diplomacy. It constructs a new identity for the EU that is in fact negatively linked to its current actions. Due to a general lack of agreement on overall strategic objectives, the EU cannot deliver a coherent foreign policy when it most matters,¹¹ a fact that destabilises the identity construction. Although it is possible to interpret this narrative in teleological terms as being essentially about a vision of an ideal future, it does seem to sever the links to the European past and alternative EU identity constructions, thus actually augmenting the communicative challenges of EU public diplomacy. It can incorporate neither the EU's past experiences nor the current state of affairs of EU foreign policy.

As a result, basic components of the formerly hegemonic narrative in EU public diplomacy are openly questioned, not only the EU's identity as a peace project, but also the construction of the universal applicability and exportability of the EU's historical experiences and model of governance as a source for peace among states (Spence, 2008: 64).

Whereas the peace-project narrative is based on renouncing the European past, which constitutes the Other in the EU identity construction, the euronationalist discourse constructs an identity for the EU similar to this Other; an effective actor in competition with others. The EEAS thus brings with it a serious communicative challenge to EU public diplomacy. On one hand, the EEAS contributes to creating stronger *Us vs. Them*-dynamics of exclusion between the EU and others through engaging, in its behaviour, in the euronationalist discourse, while on the other hand, the EU in its specific public diplomacy initiatives still seeks to communicate an identity as a model for structural peace among states based on the overcoming of difference between *Us* and *Them*, and portray itself as an altruistic actor based on universal values of democracy, human rights and multilateralism. The general development of the EU, as symbolised by the EEAS, means that the EU will increasingly be forced to have an opinion on controversial issues where formerly it has had none, and thus to assume political opinions that other may disagree with. The traditional EU image as a qualitatively different kind of international actor will be therefore be ever more difficult to sustain as relevant in EU public diplomacy. The EU thus runs the risk of losing its principal asset and soft power source: that of being an example (Manners, 2002). It is in this field of tension between two antagonistic

¹⁰ For a good overview, see the analysis by Simon Duke (2013). On the communicative challenge of the EEAS in terms of the content of EU messages, see also Rasmussen (2011).

¹¹ The fact that not an EU representative but French President Hollande and German Chancellor Merkel negotiated the Minsk agreements in the cases of the armed conflict in the Ukraine is a good illustration.

narratives of the EU self that the role of culture in EU public diplomacy is analysed in the following sections.

4 THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN EU PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

EU public diplomacy will increasingly face the problem of reconciling the two antagonistic narratives on which it is currently based. One solution is of course to revert to the peace-project narrative, but this seems contrary to the contemporary *Zeitgeist* stressing the need and virtue of decisive EU foreign policy action. The problem is when EU public diplomacy in the peace-project narrative defines the EU in terms of its content, and this content then becomes politically controversial due to increased EU competences and different organizational forms and political objectives. The difference to other actors, such as the US, is obvious: many fierce opponents of US foreign policy at the same time celebrate US culture and founding values, because the cultural identity of the US is (at least to some extent) separated from its foreign policy content. An obvious answer for the EU in the present situation is therefore to actively communicate a cultural identity, so as to be able to effectively separate its identity from the contents of its foreign policy.

Also, in the identity construction, the EU cannot simply maintain the peace-project narrative's construction of the European past as the Other, as this is incompatible with the constructed ideal of defending interests in a competitive environment. In effect, to a certain extent, the effective actor narrative transforms the EU into its own previous Other (the internationally assertive actor in the structural solution discourse). To construct an identity, the EU must necessarily find a substitute Other. Culture is in this respect a common tool for differentiating a political community from another. The identity constructed for the EU will necessarily draw upon cultural differences between the EU and other political entities, the new Others. The questions are then whether the increased incorporation of cultural elements will necessarily strengthen the euronationalist narrative and whether the peace project narrative can also incorporate this element.

A more active promotion of European culture in other parts of the world would mean putting some flesh on the bones of the rather abstract EU slogan of "united in diversity," and it would possibly help create a more essentialist and tangible EU identity.

One could also argue that the communicative value of culture is greater than any number of printed folders explaining EU policies. But would the EU generally dare to appeal this way to the emotions of foreigners rather than their rationality, and which are the consequences of such a narrative shift? The European Parliament has called for a cultural dimension to the EU's external relations, and the Commission has encouraged working groups of artists, intellectuals and scientists on European culture, which has led to a series of workshops and the publication in Spring of 2014 of a "New Narrative for Europe".

4.1 The European Parliament Resolution of 12 May 2011 on the Cultural Dimensions of the EU's External Actions

The Resolution (European Parliament, 2011) builds on, and is a logical extension of, the 2008 Council conclusions on the promotion of culture in the EU's external relations (Council of the European Union, 2008). A link is explicitly created between the promotion of the EU's culture and the foreign policy objectives of exporting EU universal values of democracy, human rights and good governance. The main difference is, that whereas the 2008 Council conclusions speak of strengthening the cultural dimension in foreign policy "with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity", the 2011 Resolution calls for the EU to promote its culture. The difference may seem subtle, but it is vital. The 2008 Council conclusions recur to the "added value" construction of the EU, and basically call for EU Member States to cooperate more and generally 'do' more cultural promotion in third countries. EU activities are thus constructed as a complement to state activities that are necessary in order to achieve synergy and make the whole more than the sum of its parts. Although cultural cooperation with third states is by no means a new thing (it is typically included in the cooperation agreements that the EU has with practically all third states of the world), the Resolution is "concerned at the fragmentation of external EU cultural policy and projects, which is hampering (...) the development of a visible common EU strategy on the cultural aspects of the EU's external relations." The Resolution also calls for a person in the Delegations to be responsible for promoting "European culture" (in the singular!), as part of a proposed DG Cultural and Digital Diplomacy of the EEAS. Furthermore, this culture fosters and embodies the "European values that evolved historically."² In this sense, promoting the European culture externally is to promote EU values, which is why culture should be given more attention as part of the general normative diffusion effort in public diplomacy, and indeed be present in all EU foreign policy areas.

In the Resolution, different discursive constructions are recurred to in order to argue the necessity of EU external cultural relations and the establishment of a structure dedicated to this aspect of external communication. It recognises cultural diversity in one paragraph, but speaks of European culture in the singular in another, thus also constructing a cultural identity for the EU. There is thus no doubt, that in the narrative, although constructed as being internally diverse, the EU has a distinct cultural identity, which should be promoted internationally.

This view on European culture links the long historical cultural evolution in Europe with the EU's identity as an actor. Furthermore, it speaks of culture as a "cornerstone" for building relationships based on trust with foreign publics, thus linking also the EU's culture with its future room of manoeuvre in international politics. Interestingly, the explanatory statement accompanying the Resolution engages in the euronationalist discourse, in constructing the coherent action of the EU in external cultural relations as indispensable in a global competitive environment – and calls for the development of a "brand Europe." In one of its parts, the Resolution thus constructs a cultural identity for the EU, whilst at the same time arguing in a euronationalist vein about the necessity of the EU to promote its culture in a global competitive environment. In this sense, culture becomes a way to solve the problems of the ever more dominant euronationalist narrative on EU identity. By stressing culture, European history is

² From the explanatory statement accompanying the Resolution.

reinterpreted, not in political terms, but in cultural terms. Historical experiences are thus linked with an essentialist EU-ropean cultural identity, a powerful discursive move, since it is combined with the euronationalist narrative on present and future EU international actions. Nevertheless, the questions remains whether the EU holds such a cultural identity sufficiently strong for it to be a base of the EU's identity and external action and whether the fragmented nature of EU external cultural policies allows it to communicate a cultural essentialist identity of itself. These questions will be addressed in section five below, after the analysis of the New Narrative for Europe

4.2 The 2014 New Narrative for Europe

The "New Narrative for Europe: The Mind and Body of the Europe" published on the Commission website (European Commission, 2014) is the result of three workshops of artists, scientist and intellectuals discussion trying to define a new narrative for Europe.

The document is based on a perception of narratives that is similar to the theoretical approach in this paper, seeing the proposed narrative as "tying Europe's distant and recent past to the present and providing a vision for the future." It states that "confidence in Europe needs to be regained" and that a European narrative is indispensable because "populist and nationalist narratives must not prevail." In this case, it seems clear that the document is a defence against antagonistic discourses that undermine the process of European integration and thereby the EU's *raison d'être*. In this sense, it is also based on a recognition of the weakening of the narrative of the EU as a peace project (in the document the narrative is named "end to war"), that after a brief resurgence with the fall of the Iron Curtain and EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, which was still largely motivated by the peace-project narrative, is no longer appealing to audiences during the current economic crisis, described under the heading "The burst of the bubble."

The document explicitly acknowledges that what it proposes is a paradigmatic shift, a "new renaissance," in which "culture is a major source of nourishment and supply for Europe's social and political body." In the theoretical framework of this paper, what is argued is essentially that the EU should stop seeing itself in Gesellschaft-like 'cold' rationalist terms and create a Gemeinschaft-like identity based on identifying essential elements of European culture. It is the "cultural heritage (that) reveals what it has meant to be European throughout time". This can indeed be seen as a clean break with the hitherto dominant peace project narrative above that construct the EU as a unique political entity based on the fading away of particularisms and the cultural sense of belonging and instead being a model for how to overcome particularisms and strive for a common non-culturally specific universalism, in Europe and beyond.

The document also states that cultural heritage "is a powerful instrument that provides a sense of belonging amongst and between European citizens." But whereas the motivation may thus primarily a question of an internal EU debate on the nature of the European integration process, the EU must also "deploy fully its "soft power" (...) also beyond its borders to make it a respectful and respected international partner." The 2014 document is thereby clearly constructing a discourse on causality in international relations also identified in the 2011 EP

resolution, which sees culture as an instrument of foreign policy that serves to construct relationships in the long term, but also achieving influence so as to shape the world in the EU's image.

4.3 Uses of culture in EU public diplomacy practice

The two documents analysed above are clearly motivated by the current crisis of EU public diplomacy narratives and propose culture as a way forward, something which would constitute a paradigmatic shift in EU communication with foreign publics. The implications of this potential shift is discussed further in section 5 below, but before engaging in this discussion, since this is related mainly to the abstract level of defining public diplomacy messages in terms of the identity constructed through public diplomacy, the analysis would not be complete without considering also some of the practical implications of an increased use of culture as a communicative tool in EU public diplomacy.

Culture is generally at the margins of what the EU was set up to deal with, reflected in the nature of the competences attributed to the EU by the Member States in the area of culture. EU competences are neither exclusive nor shared, but defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (article 6) as a support competence, meaning that it should restrict itself to complement and support Member State activities in this area, as made clear under title XIII "Culture" (art. 167): "Action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action."

Just as the EU communications efforts are mainly directed at the internal audience of EU citizens, the EU's cultural policy is also largely focused on intra-EU cultural relations. It is clear that the main focus of the competence is internal cultural policies, with only the third paragraph of article 167 mentioning specifically an external dimension, in that "The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe." The mention of the Council of Europe seems to focus the geographical extent of the external cultural policy and in any case, culture has been systematically incorporated into relations with third states mainly in the cases of the ACP states and with the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including its Eastern and Southern dimensions (Lisack, 2014: 24-44). The evolution has been characterised by a reduction of funding opportunities for third states, along with the cancellation of the specific budget for cooperation with third states under the Creative Europe programme (Lisack, 2014: 40-41), although third states can generally be part of proposals with EU partners under the general call. But also in this sense, there are few funding opportunities for projects if they come from other third states than the strategic partners and those included in the ENP (Lisack, 2014: 45).

Basing the model for promoting EU culture abroad on applications for funding for specific projects, it is obvious that there is not a clear strategic dimension to the use of culture and external cultural relations. This seems to also be the perception of foreign audiences (European Union, 2014: 46-80). It could be argued that this is because the basis is a belief in the long-term benefits of cultural interchange, to the point of resembling a model where cultural interchange is an end in itself, rather than a means. At least with respect to the construction of

specific EU identities through narratives using culture, it is clear that what the EU has been doing so far is a long way off.

Apart from funding specific projects, another main area of EU activity in the field of culture is that of organising events and campaigns, where the EU Delegations assume a coordination role and the main players are the EU Member States, their national cultural institutes, private foundations, sub-state public actors (regional and local governments), private companies etc. The national cultural institutes have already created a structure for cooperation in the form of the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), that seeks to coordinate the work of these quasi-independent actors. Typical activities include cinema festivals, conferences, food festivals, concerts and organisation of competitions about the EU etc. (Azpiroz, 2014) as complements to the Brussels-managed exchange programmes.

Improving the coordination of activities undertaken by the EU Delegations or centrally in Brussels is in the preparatory action identified as the way forward, suggesting a unit within the EEAS (European Union, 2014: 113). It is undoubtedly important for the EU to be able to effectively use culture in its external relations to make Council working groups, Commission DGs, Parliamentary Committees and EEAS directorates coordinate and cooperate more effectively. Perhaps just as important is the coordination with Member States and their cultural institutes integrated in EUNIC. The coordination here suffers from the fact that each cultural institute have as their main objective the promotion of their national culture and identity (European Union, 2014: 28-45), something which creates a competitive logic in third states and makes it difficult to communicate an overall cultural picture to foreign audiences. Obviously, there are synergy effects of cooperating on the ground in third states when organising food festivals, film festivals, art expositions etc. in terms of visibility and costs. However, from an EU perspective, there is a clear limit to the usefulness of letting national cultural institutes implement cultural policy, at least as far as the role of culture as an element of EU strategic communication with foreign audiences is concerned. As long as no EU dimension is visible in the national initiatives, what is communicated is basically at best the cultural diversity of EU Member States, but not anything about the EU as a political entity, thereby missing the vital part of its strategic message "united in" and leaving the foreign audiences only with "diversity".

The basic picture with respect to EU foreign cultural relations is therefore of ad-hoc projects (subject to applications for funding) and decentralised cultural relations. In practical terms, the challenge is therefore for the EU to add an EU-dimension to the cultural projects and events implemented by the Member States. The more fundamental reason behind this current state of affairs is of course that no essential EU culture exists than can be used in foreign policy communication, apart from the sum of the cultures of the Member States. From a communicative perspective, what is important for the EU is to actively push its very attractive message of how the cultural diversity at display in a given event is by no means an obstacle for moving beyond the national as a form of political organization and source of antagonism but rather the EU being the existing example of how it is possible to move beyond cultural stereotypes and Us v. Them logics and create a supranational political structure.

This task is of course further complicated by the fact that the EU Member States maintain very different cultural relations with a given third state or region. In the case of the ACP states,

the former colonial power tends to have a qualitatively different relationship and level of activities. Also, if we consider Latin America broadly, there is of course a very special role for Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal, due to the historical, linguistic and cultural bonds. In this sense, the EU is a very asymmetric actor, and there is of course a limit to how much it makes sense for Spain to coordinate with Bulgaria and Slovakia when it comes to cultural relations with Latin American countries.

5 DISCUSSION: IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN EU PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

At this point, it is clear that the EU is currently immersed in a process of adopting a new identity narrative, due to the fact that the formerly hegemonic narrative of being a structural solution and a peace project is no longer enough, because increasingly the EU is so much more than a structural solution among states, namely a system of governance across the European continent and an actor in itself that defends its own narrow interests. The structural solution identity was so successful because it constructs a rationalistic *Gesellschaft* identity for the EU, which focuses on the EU's political and administrative organization and function. It thus avoids culturally essentialist elements, and appeals only to the rational mind, and not the feelings of belonging of an individual. To promote a cultural identity for the EU would therefore be a revolution in European integration. The hitherto dominant public diplomacy narrative has included an autobiographical discourse that constructs the EU identity by been renouncing the past and effectively constructing the past the Other, whereas the new cultural identity is based on a celebration of the European past.

Two main problems can be identified with this proposed paradigmatic shift for EU public diplomacy: The creation of negative identification dynamics with other cultures internationally and the failure to distinguish collective (European) cultural identities held by European citizens and an EU corporate identity.

It is highly questionable whether an EU *Gemeinschaft*-like cultural identity could be created that is sufficiently coherent so as to form a basis for a public diplomacy narrative. In specific EU public diplomacy initiatives, the EU would need to associate itself actively with European culture(s) and to a certain extent redefine Member State culture as EU culture, that is, promote Goethe as an EU-ropean writer and Picasso as an EU-ropean painter. Apart from the practical problems with this approach, as identified above, a negative consequence of this is that it would identify non-EU cultures as Others and create an EU cultural diplomacy based on Othering in the international system. Indeed, this would be difficult to incorporate into the classical identity construction of the EU based on international universalism and the construction of an Other only in terms of the past of warfare among EU Member States. A cultural dimension to EU public diplomacy would therefore not necessarily help the EU achieve a greater coherence in its public diplomacy, except perhaps in the very long term, since it would further destabilise the hitherto dominant identity narrative of the EU.

This argument is related to a second problem when analysing issues of EU identity and how this is communicated through public diplomacy: The equation of an EU corporate identity, that can form the basis of public diplomacy narratives and be projected internationally through specific public diplomacy initiatives, with the existence internally of a pan-European cultural

identity held by the individual citizens in a *Gemeinschaft*-type community. The “New Narrative for Europe” does not distinguish between these two concepts, although it sees culture as the basis for both.

Arguably, an EU-isation of individual and state identities within the EU in cultural terms could form the basis of a stronger public diplomacy narrative, although with the problems identified above. So the argument here is not so much that there is no link between these two different forms of EU identity, but rather stress that the relationship is very complex. One dimension of the issue is the problem of linking a European cultural identity held by individuals with the EU as a political entity. For instance, should a citizen identify positively with “Europe” or feel part of it in cultural terms, this does not mean that she also necessarily identifies positively with EU institutions and with EU foreign policy (about which public diplomacy also needs to communicate). It is perfectly possible to feel very European in cultural terms, but have a negative perception of the EU as it currently functions and disagree with EU foreign policy initiatives. Also, there is no ground for assuming that non-EU citizens feel less European than EU-citizens, such as Norwegians, Swiss or Ukrainians. When people increasingly identify with “Europe”³ it is just as plausible that they identify more broadly with post-national (Western) cosmopolitanism, which is as relevant for Canada and New Zealand as it is for Switzerland or EU Member States.

Another more theoretical point follows from Alexander Wendt’s distinction between the corporate individual identity and the social identity of an actor (1999; 157-165 and 224-225). The corporate individual identity is collective in that it is not necessarily held by any member of the group (the Member States and citizens) but emerges through their interaction. In this case it could be based on a singular European culture, diverse in nature and distinct from that of any Member State or nation. It is also analytically prior to international agency. In contrast, social identity is that which emerges out of the interaction of the EU with other actors, in other words, it is a role-specific identity. The degree to which an individual or a Member State identifies with the EU in cultural terms, might say something about the existence of an EU corporate individual identity (depending on the compatibility of the definition of “EU” incorporated into the different Member State and individual narratives). But even if the New Narrative should be successful and create generalised cultural identification with the EU among individuals and Member States, at best this says something about the potential strength of an EU international social identity (which is the one of primary relevance to public diplomacy efforts), and not necessarily much about its real strength or its essential contents. The link is complex. For instance, an international actor can have a social identity as an international actor and an effective public diplomacy based on coherent narratives without having a “people” identifying with it in positive terms, such is the case of NATO. There is no shared identity among its populations, but a corporate individual identity based on states and an international social identity, which leads it to be able to communicate elaborately about itself. It is therefore also perfectly possible for the EU to de-couple the issue of an internal cultural identity constructed by citizens and the social identity constructed for the EU in public diplomacy narratives. In fact,

³ On the issue of citizen’s identification with Europe, see the analysis by Thomas Risse (2010).

the rationalist traditional discourse on the EU as a peace project has been effective without any kind of link with an EU corporate identity, culturally defined or otherwise.

One factor complicating any practical solution is that two needs of the EU clash. On one hand, there is a perceived need create a New Narrative for Europe, because of a perceived general legitimacy crisis of the EU, as evidenced in the high number of votes for so-called Euro-sceptic or anti-European parties in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament.⁴ Indeed, culture is an interesting discursive shift in this respect. On the other hand, such a shift towards a culturally essentialist EU does not necessarily help the EU in public diplomacy terms, where the narrative of the EU as a peace project still has a great appeal to foreign audiences. One option would be to separate internal and external communicative initiatives, but in today's interconnected world, this is of course an option of doubtful viability.

The argument here is not that culture cannot be included in EU public diplomacy. On the contrary, culture is undoubtedly a powerful form of communicating to the feelings of foreign publics, rather than only to their rational minds, and thereby it could greatly help the diffusion of the EU public diplomacy narratives. Recalling the purpose of this paper being analysing public diplomacy narratives and without engaging in specific policy recommendations, the analytical approach adopted in this paper nevertheless suggests an alternative way forward. So whereas incorporating culture as an element of EU public diplomacy is not without its pitfalls and potential drawbacks, it does not necessarily entail that cultural relations cannot be used to further strengthen existing EU communication.

Apart from an additional channel or form of communicating in EU public diplomacy, the challenge is to incorporate culture in a narrative that links culture with an EU identity in a specific way and does not leave it up to chance. This would be to use culture as a communicative tool in specific public diplomacy initiatives that communicate how "United in Diversity" is actually possible in practice, but stress the diversity of European cultures, rather than to promote an EU culture in the singular. The difference may be subtle, but it is important. By using culture to communicate not so much about the cultural similarities but rather the differences among European peoples, this powerful communicative instrument could be harnessed to strengthen traditional EU identity narratives. Cultural events linking the EU as an entity to European cultural expressions would need to be complemented by a political component, so that it becomes clear to the audience that it is the multiplicity and diversity of EU cultures that is celebrated rather than its singularity and that it is possible for such a culturally diverse continent to move beyond stereotyping, *Us v. Them* dynamics and construct a post-sovereign and post-national Union, based on universal *political* values and not on a single shared culture.

This public diplomacy narrative would include culture, but stress how it is possible for reason and rational modes of thinking to overcome cultural differences and achieve peace among states, with the EU being the prime example. A further advantage would be that this cultural dimension would not necessarily need to be coordinated strictly by the EEAS in terms of content, but with their strategically defined EU messages added on, and could possibly be

⁴ Depending on which parties are included figures vary, but around a quarter of the votes went to parties against (the current functioning of) the EU.

executed by or in cooperation with the EU network of national cultural institutes,⁵⁵ that already has cooperation programmes in place, where synergy effects between EU public diplomacy and Member State cultural and public diplomacy should be relatively straightforward to identify. So when designing initiatives to communicate about human rights and the horrors of armed conflict and how to move beyond these problems by emulating the EU, drawing on the constructions in the peace-project narrative, why not complement the references to international treaties and European historical experiences with a display of Picasso's "Guernica" and Anne Frank's diary? In communication terms, this would arguably increase the impact of the EU message. The point is here that it is vital to complement the exposition with the story of how the EU is the result of an integration process that made possible leaving the horrors described behind.

An approach to systematically incorporating a cultural dimension into EU public diplomacy such as the one suggested here, has the distinct advantage of not being dependent on the creation of a European-wide *Gemeinschaft*-type identity, based on a paradigmatic shift in the attitudes of European citizens. The EU obviously cannot communicate something externally upon which there is not a widespread internal consensus, partly due to the impossibility of separating internal and external communicating. 60 years of European integration and at times conscious efforts to create a *Gemeinschaft*-type identity for EU citizens to adopt has not yet led to a general sentiment in EU publics of being EU-ropean, and of sharing an EU-ropean culture.⁵⁶ As the *Homo Europeus* does not yet exist, this points to the necessity of using culture in a different way in public diplomacy, stressing the cultural diversity in Europe but also how EU history shows the possibility and viability of overcoming differences and achieving international peace and economic and social progress jointly. Indeed, I believe this would be a powerful and very attractive message at a time when we are witnessing a resurgence of geopolitics and global tendencies to see international politics as a zero-sum game rather than a plus-sum game leaving all parties better off. In this sense, not only confidence in Europe needs to be regained, as stated in the New Narrative, but global confidence in the virtues of the EU model of peaceful coexistence among sovereign states and the possibility of achieving a global Kantian culture of friendship in the 21st century, just as it was possible in Europe after the Second World War and again after the Cold War.

Whereas this use of culture in public diplomacy narratives could increase coherence of EU public diplomacy, it would of course still not resolve the more basic tension with the evolution of the EU as a polity in terms of competences and an assertive international action that seems to contradict the fundamental perception of self as a way of overcoming zero-sum logics. Here, further efforts should be made to consider how these empirical developments could be interpreted into the hitherto dominant narratives or whether a paradigmatic shift to other narratives is necessary. In this sense, adding a stronger cultural dimension to EU public diplomacy is a solution with obvious limitations to resolving the more fundamental problem of

⁵⁵ On EUNIC, see Fisher (2013).

⁵⁶ Van Ham (2001: 59) specifically concludes that the EU's internal identity remains a *Gesellschaft*-type and not a *Gemeinschaft*-type.

EU public diplomacy having to communicate an EU essence on which there is no internal agreement.

6 CONCLUSION

Starting from the puzzle that the role of culture in public diplomacy has so far not been the object of many focused studies and the fact that the EU has in recent years been focused on enhancing its external cultural relations, this paper set out to assess the potential and limitations of culture in EU public diplomacy, focusing both on practical issues and the theoretical implications of these in terms of EU identity.

With respect to public diplomacy practices incorporating cultural elements, the first conclusion is that it is basically of an ad-hoc nature in that it consists of financing specific activities of cultural interchange after an open call or the organization of specific events, where the national cultural institutes of the EU Member States often play the central role. Starting from the premise that cultural exchange is not an objective in itself, it was argued that these modalities of public diplomacy do not effectively link the EU as a political identity to the substantial culture being exchanged. Therefore, the EU would need to adopt a strategic focus and actively associate itself as a political identity with the culture promoted through specific projects and events, in cooperation with the Member States. Also, as long as the cultural activities of the Member States retain their national foci and do not incorporate an EU dimension into the communication surrounding cultural events, this method suffers severe limitations for the EU to use culture in its public diplomacy.

A further conclusion was reached based on an analysis of EU policy documents in the context of the practices undertaken by the EU, with a particular focus on the New Narrative for Europe. Associating the EU with an essentialist culture contains the danger of destabilising the dominant EU public diplomacy narrative, constructing an identity for the EU as a peace project and a structural solution to the problem of the peaceful coexistence of states with their inherent cultural differences. For the EU to avoid undermining this, in the eyes of foreign audiences very attractive message, it is important for the EU to not insist on its own cultural particularism, but to stress the diversity of Member State cultures and how it is possible to move beyond these particularisms and create a supranational non-cultural and political body based on universal *political* values that guarantees peace and promotes economic well-being while not threatening the cultural identity of the European peoples. In effect, explain how “united in diversity” contains the hope of how culturally diverse peoples can unite politically without losing their cultural diversity, insisting on the universality of the European political history, whilst recognising the cultural particularisms of its peoples.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbinnett, R. (2003), *Culture & Identity. Critical theories*, London, Sage, 2003.
- Adler-Nissen, R., "Late sovereign diplomacy", *Hague Journal of diplomacy*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 121-141.
- Azpiroz, M. L., *European Union public diplomacy through the EEAS: The cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico*, Conference paper, 2014, available at:

<http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/731f6f7a-e0d7-4716-910f-ecac99fd15f3.pdf> (last accessed 30th of June 2015).

- Cameron, F., *An introduction to European foreign policy*, New York, Routledge, 2007.
- Carta, C., "The Commission's diplomats and the EU international image", in Lucarelli, S. (ed.), *The external image of the European Union*, Garnet Working Paper 17/2007, 2007, pp. 302-324.
- Cooper, R., *The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century*, London, Atlantic Books, 2003.
- Council of the European Communities, *Document on the European Identity. Published by the Nine Foreign Ministers, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973*.
- Council of the European Union, *Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States*, 2008, (2008/C 320/04).
- Davis Cross, M. K., "Conceptualizing European Public Diplomacy," in Davis Cross, M. K. and Melissen, J. (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Palgrave, New York, 2013, pp. 1-12.
- Davis Cross, M. K., "Transatlantic cultural diplomacy," in Henze, R. and Wolfram G. (eds.), *Exporting Culture: Which role for Europe in a global world?*, Wiesbaden, Springer, 2014, pp. 13-24.
- Duchêne, F., "Europe's role in world peace", in Mayne, R. (ed.), *Europe tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look ahead*, London, Fontana, 1972, pp. 32-47.
- Duke, S., "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy," in Davis Cross, M. K. and Melissen J. (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Palgrave, New York, 2013, pp. 113-136.
- European Commission, *The EU in the world: towards a communication policy for the European Union's external policy, 2006-2009*, Brussels, 2005.
- European Commission, *Europe in the world - some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility*, 2006, COM (2006) 278.
- European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European Agenda for culture in a globalising world*, 2007a, COM(2007) 242 final.
- European Commission, *The EU's 50th anniversary celebrations around the world. A glance at EU public diplomacy at work*, 2007b, pp. 5 and 11.
- European Commission, *New Narrative for Europe: The Mind and Body of the Europe*, 2014, available at http://ec.europa.eu/debate-future-europe/new-narrative/pdf/declaration_en.pdf (last accessed 30th of June 2015).
- European Council, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*, Document S407/08, 2008.
- European Parliament, *Resolution of 12 May 2011 on the Cultural Dimensions of the EU's External Actions*, 2011, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0239+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (last accessed 30th of June 2015).
- European Union, *Preparatory Action: Culture in EU External Relations*, Luxembourg: European Union, 2014.
- Fisher, A., "A network perspective on public diplomacy in Europe: EUNIC", in Davis Cross, M. K. and Melissen, J. (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Palgrave, New York, 2013, pp. 137-156.
- Fiske de Gouveia, P., *European infopolitik: Developing EU public diplomacy strategy*, London, Foreign Policy Centre, 2005.

- Flockhart, T., *After the strategic concept. Towards a NATO 3.0*, DIIS Report 2011:06, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011.
- Henze, R., "Spending on culture is a solid investment", in Henze, R. and Wolfram G. (eds.), *Exporting Culture: Which role for Europe in a global world?*, Wiesbaden, Springer, 2014, pp. 39-52.
- Keukeleire, S., "The European Union as a diplomatic actor: Internal, structural, and traditional diplomacy", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003.
- Keukeleire, S. et al., "Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union", *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009.
- Leonard M., *Public Diplomacy*, London, the Foreign Policy Centre, 2002.
- Lisack, G. (2014), *European external cultural relations: Paving new ways?*, Stuttgart, Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen.
- Lynch, D., *Communicating Europe to the world: what public diplomacy for the EU*, EPC working paper no. 21, Brussels, European Policy Centre, 2005.
- Manners, I., "Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258.
- Manners, I. and Whitman, R., "Normative power and the future of EU public diplomacy in Davis Cross, M. K. and Melissen J. (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Palgrave, New York, 2013, pp. 183-203.
- Melissen, J. (ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*, Houndsmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Michalski, A., "The EU as a soft power: The force of persuasion", in Melissen, J. (ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*, Houndsmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 124-144.
- Nye J. S. Jr., *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004.
- Rasmussen, S. B., "The messages and practices of the European Union's public diplomacy", *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2010, pp. 263-287.
- Rasmussen, S. B., "El Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior: un reto comunicativo para la diplomacia pública de la Unión Europea," in *Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto*, no. 44, 2011, pp. 147-166.
- Rasmussen, S. B., "The conceptual field of public diplomacy" in *Comillas Journal of International Relations*, no. 1, 2014.
- Risse, T., *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Smith, M. E., "Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe's common foreign and security policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 11, no. 4, 2004.
- de Rougemont, D., "Sur le rôle de l'Europe dans le dialogue des cultures," in Sidjanski D. and Saint-Ouen, F. (eds.), *Dialogues del cultures à l'aube du XXI^e siècle*, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007.
- Spence, D., "EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats", in Cooper, A. F. and Hocking, B. (eds.), *Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart*, New York, Palgrave, 2008.
- Teló, M., *Europe: A civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order*, New York, Palgrave, 2006.
- Topic M. and Sciortino, C., "Cultural diplomacy and cultural hegemony: a framework for the analysis" in Topic M. and Rodin, S. (eds), *Cultural diplomacy and cultural imperialism. European perspective(s)*, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2012.
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
- Truyol y Serra, A., *La integración europea. Análisis histórico-institucional con textos y documentos I*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1999.

- Van Ham, P., *European integration and the postmodern condition. Governance, democracy, identity*, London, Routledge, 2001.
- Van Ham, P., *The power of war: Why Europe needs it*, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 19, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2008.
- Ward, D. (ed.), *The European Union and the cultural industries. Regulation and the public interest*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008.
- Wendt, A., *Social theory of international politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Whitman, R. G., "Muscles from Brussels. The demise of civilian power Europe?", in Elgström, O. and Smith, M. (eds.), *The European Union's roles in international politics. Concept and analysis*, London, Routledge, 2006, pp. 101-117.
- Zaharna, R. S., *The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy*, Los Angeles, Figueroa Press, 2012.