

# **UACES 45<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference**

**Bilbao, 7-9 September 2015**

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

**[www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)**

## **The EU as a Security Actor under the Framework of the CSDP?**

### **A Case Study of the EU in the Ukraine**

Wei-Fang (Florence) Chen

Lecture at the Renmin University of China (Beijing, China)

Email: florene1021@gmail.com

Institutionalists have assumed that institutions can shape behaviours of actors and then achieve collective and better prospects. To this end, the EU has developed an institutionalised framework for achieving security and defence integration since the establishment of the CFSP and CSDP. This institutionalised framework not only aimed to offer ‘rules of games’ for member states for conducting common security and defence issues, but also strived to lead member states to become more socialised and embedded in the project of European integration. However, regardless of the possible positive influence made by institutions and the process of institutionalisation, the experience of the EU in resolving the Ukraine crisis so far still signified that key member states still played primary roles in tackling crises.

In fact, the institutionalisation of the CFSP and the CSDP is affected by institutionalism and intergovernmentalism at the same time. This institutionalised framework operates on the foundation of intergovernmental co-operation. It is a compromise that member states can maintain its independence to take part in security issues of the EU, but the EU can have more efficient and effective mechanisms to become a security provider. However, because of the intergovernmental basis, member states can avoid to be intervened by supranationalism in the decision-making process of making a common policy on security and defence affairs and moreover, national foreign and security policies are still very determinative in this process.

This paper aims to how the EU shapes security approach through the development of the CFSP and the CDSP, including the institutional reform by the Lisbon Treaty, and then examine whether and to what extent an institutionalised CFSP and CSDP can promote a security role of the EU. The Ukraine crisis is a serious challenge for the EU, especially because this crisis involves whether the EU has credible instruments via an institutionalised crisis management to provide security and stabilise its neighbouring area after the Lisbon Treaty. This crisis demonstrates that although the institutionalisation process is supposed to

embed member states in this common system, the role of member states and their political will are nevertheless the most decisive factor to determine whether the EU can achieve a more ambitious and credible security role in the world.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Institutions are expected to shape political actions and consequences instead of merely mirroring social activities and rational competitions among different actors (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 2). That is, institutions are not only outcome variables to reflect national interests of member states, but also independent variables to affect preferences and objectives of actors in a political process (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 192). For the purpose, institutions are able to support actors to achieve collective purposes and better end (Peters, 2005, p. 5). Accordingly, 'institutions matter' does not only mean that institutions can play an instrumental role which offers a reliable environment for actors to consolidate relations and stabilise co-operation, but also signify that institutions can create more favourable conditions for further co-operation and integration.

### **1. An Institutionalised Attempt in European Integration since 1950s**

In terms of the initiative to drive European integration in the 1950s, the objective was very clear, which was peace. In order to achieve this collective objective, the founding members of the ECSC adopted an institutional approach by creating institutional frameworks. Member states of the ECSC agreed to transfer authority to the institutions for common management of coal and steel, and therefore to fix France and Germany in an institutional framework and avoid any possibility of war between them. Since then, more institutions and mechanisms have been established to provide a stable environment for peace and prosperity in Europe, and then for European integration to make process. Therefore, the EU has usually been described as an area of high-institutionalisation (Choi & Caporaso, 2002, pp. 492-493; Gourevitch, 2002, p. 309). A series of treaties since the Treaty of Paris enforced from 1952 also provide legal foundations to define how institutions work and how member states interact within these institutions (Rosemond, 2010, p. 109).

Compared to economic integration, however, because security and defence integration (including the establishment of a common foreign and security policy) is more likely to involve national sovereignty and 'high politics' issues that were sensitive for nation states, it is very unlikely to persuade member states to adopt a supranational plan. According to the arguments made by intergovernmentalists, the nation-state is a factor of 'international non-integration', and decisions of foreign policy and defence cannot be achieved unless the goals of such policies are clarified (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 134-135, 145). That is, member states will only accept such policies on the premise that they have clear objectives and firm determination, otherwise, national interests of individual member states still dominates how individual member states shape their national foreign and security policies and take actions. The frustration of creating the EDC had illustrated that it is difficult for nation states to reach such consensus.

Indeed, this unsuccessful experience made European countries become more cautious to pursue security and defence integration for decades. Even after the launch of the EPC, EC members did not consider it as an appropriate approach for undertaking serious security or defence issues, although they did have an aim to form common positions and actions via the mechanism of the EPC. Nevertheless, a very informal and loose institutional framework the EPC still provided a crucial basis for creating an atmosphere of consultation and negotiation for member states, and then contribute to developing the CFSP in the EU. Regarding the positive effect, Michael E. Smith argued that co-operation in the EPC had changed 'a defensive or passive approach' to 'a more positive, proactive one' among member states (2004a, pp. 3-5), and the reason member states agreed to break the 'taboos' (such as security issues) depends on a long-term process of 'progressive adaptation in the midst of continuity' (Smith, 2004b). Member states of the EU therefore became used to co-ordinating their foreign policies and taking joint actions via policy adaptation of the practices of the EPC and the CFSP (Smith, 2004a, p. 123). The argument of state-centrism made by intergovernmentalists cannot easily explain why member states of the EC would like to make more efforts for further foreign and security integration.

Besides, because member states realised that a more institutional framework was nevertheless necessary for stabilising their participation and co-operation if they aimed to enhance the external political influence of the EU, a more specific framework for the CFSP and CSDP has been gradually created by a series of treaty reforms. In this process of institutionalisation, the

EU made much efforts to define decision-making process for member states and EU institutional actors to make common decisions and then fulfil the CFSP and the CSDP. Especially after the establishment of the CSDP (was named ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty), a more specific focus on common security and defence has been ensured. It signified a more ambitious project since member states determined to develop credible military and civilian capabilities so that the EU can play a more prominent role on world security issues. Along with the instruments of common foreign policies operated by the European Commission, the EU attempted to fix the gap between expectations and capabilities and become a security provider in its territory and its neighbouring area.

## **2. The Institutional Characteristics of the CFSP and CSDP**

An institutional framework favours to consolidate member states and create more possibilities for further integration, the process of developing a more institutionalised structure becomes a critical approach for the EU to implement the objective to shape common foreign and security policy. The Maastricht Treaty founded a crucial basis for this institutionalised framework, and then subsequent treaties also strengthened this framework in order to make this framework become more manoeuvrable and credible. Considering the reluctance of member states to agree a supranational project in shaping common foreign and security policy, this framework adopts an intergovernmental baseline.

### **a. An institutional framework**

By and large, the framework of the CFSP and the CSDP signified a combination between institutionalism and intergovernmentalism. On the one hand, it has an institutional framework which aims to embed member states in the project of achieving common security and defence. Indeed, as the argument made by Paul Pierson, the long-term development of institutions for European integration would result in the effect of path dependence on member states, and then individual member states would find it difficult to leave this system (Pierson, 1996).

Accordingly, although member states are still decisive in the decision-making process of the CFSP and CSDP, they also find that more difficult to pursue national interests independently. That is, they always have to consult with other member states first before they adopt a final position on their own. They are also encouraged to form common positions and take joint

actions with other members instead of undertaking unilateral actions. Member states become more involved in the complex agendas and shared decision-making frameworks at the European level so as to consolidate common consciousness towards the Union. Treaty reforms made by the EU not only aim to provide a more credible system to undertake decisions and actions at the European level, but also strengthen common will of EU actors (including member states, EU institutions and the third parties that have business with the EU) in this system.

#### **b. An intergovernmental baseline**

On the other hand, this framework does not give up an intergovernmental principle to make decisions. It is because this intergovernmental framework is able to encourage member states to take part in and eliminate their worries about a federal Europe. Under this intergovernmental framework, member states do not have to concede power to supranational authority, and therefore national interests of individual member states are ensured. That is, This intergovernmental framework of the CFSP and CSDP can decrease the hesitance of member states to take part in the co-operation and integration of security and defence affairs. That is why the development of the CFSP and CSDP has much progress in terms of institutionalisation on the one hand, but the intergovernmental principle is hardly challenged during this process on the other hand.

Indeed, although member states are encouraged to form policies and make decisions at the European level, they do not have to adopt a decision they do not favour. Most decisions made at the European level have to be made by unanimity or consensus so as to ensure national interests of individual member states will not be sacrificed by majority voting. Moreover, instead of being forced to take part in this system, member states have much space to decide whether they have to shape common positions at the European level via the mechanisms of the EU, and therefore concerning the issues involving vital national interests of member states or lacking political will to intervene, it is hardly for the EU to undertake collective actions. This situation clearly happened in the 2011 Libyan crisis, the Syria crisis and the Ukraine crisis. Nevertheless, although this intergovernmental basis was considered a structure in favour of member states (Milward & Sorensen, 1993, p. 19), the roles of institutional actors of the CFSP and CSDP are also enhanced in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of relevant mechanisms. For example, the new position of the High

Representative of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy reformed by the Lisbon Treaty is also vested as the head of the EEAS, chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and the vice President of the European Commission. This reform signified that the EU aims to enhance the coordination between different actors and institutions and then have better co-ordination and co-operation to share information and resources to shape common foreign and security policy.

### **3. Identify the Logic of the Institutional Developments in the CFSP and CSDP**

The process of institutional developments of the CFSP and CSDP is a long-term historical process which has an intergovernmental framework reflecting national interests concern and also has increasing returns towards a more institutionalised framework. Since the frustration of developing the EDC in the 1950s, member states did not agree any supranational proposal for security and defence integration anymore. As the EU has absorbed more and more member states to join the European integration project, it becomes more impossible to abandon the intergovernmental baseline since it is unlikely to persuade all member states to concede their authority to supranational institutions. Especially for the member states insisting intergovernmental tradition (for example, Britain) and the member states from central and east Europe which just gained their independence after the end of the Cold War, they will not favour to transfer authority to supranational institutions of the EU.

Nevertheless, because a loose framework might be not enough to achieve collective objectives or take common actions, a more consolidated structure is acknowledged by member states when they are deliberating to shape common foreign and security policy. Therefore, the CFSP and the CSDP are created by member states according to their preferences or national interests, this framework could also reflect common conscious of member states towards collective objectives. Besides, as the framework is practiced more and more, member states are able to realise how to reform this framework and how to make it become more efficient and effective. As the result, the practice of the CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty not only offered important reference to improve the framework of the CSDP, but also contributed to defining the objectives of CFSP missions. Since the establishment of the CSDP, the EU has developed a more specific focus on enhancing its security role. The process of institutional developments is a 'learn by doing' process so that

actors of the EU can realise what has to do to achieve a more credible common foreign and security policy.

Therefore, institutions makes member states of the EU become 'locked' into a special route of policy development, so that institutional development have a persistent characteristic (Pierson, 1993, 2000). Such development also has an evolutionary characteristic since member states have invested more efforts to institutionalise the CFSP and CSDP in order to enhance the security role of the EU. That is what historical institutionalists called 'increasing returns' to explain why more and more investments would be contributed by member states (Pierson, 1996, pp. 144-148). As the result, such investments made the framework of the CFSP and CSDP become more institutionalised and also provide important vitality for further security and defence integration.

#### **4. Does an Institutionalised CSDP Promote Common Security and Defence as expected?**

Does an institutionalised framework of the CFSP and CSDP, however, would help member states of the EU to overcome different preferences or strategic cultures? Also, does an institutionalised framework of the CFSP and CSDP ensure member states to form collective conscious in terms of common security and defence issues so as to undertake common decisions or actions?

Regard the Libyan crisis in 2011, the EU did not have a credible response to the crisis. When the crisis was escalating, Britain and France, two of the most influential military powers in the EU did call for a strong involvement, but some EU members, especially Germany, preferred a non-military resolution. The institutionalised framework of the CFSP and CSDP did not resolve the split of the 'Big Three' and therefore, despite the applicable procedures and mechanisms of the EU already developed for launching CSDP missions, member states did not reach consensus for such mission to Libya. Finally, NATO proved itself again that it was more capable of resolving urgent situations. Also, regarding the Ukraine crisis happened since the end of 2013, although the EU imposed several sanctions against Russia, it is the key member states (especially Germany) to play decisive role to alleviate the crisis. It seems the highly institutionalised framework of the CFSP and the CSDP still cannot ensure common positions and actions of the EU when facing urgent crisis. Although this framework is expected to affect behaviours and policies of member states and shape collective actions, it is inevitably affected and shaped by an intergovernmental and state-centric logic.

Concerning this situation, this paper argues that an institutionalised framework of the CSDP can promote mutual understanding and consensus-building between member states, and may finally contribute to consolidating the security role of the EU, but it does not mean that this framework will definitely produce this outcome. That is, the logics of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism affect the development and performance of the CSDP at the same time. Especially, the intergovernmental logic of the CSDP gives much flexibility to individual member states to decide the time and the way to involve relevant situations, and therefore, when concerning controversial issues, it is more difficult to make common decisions among member states.

This paper aims to clarify and examine how the factors of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism interact in the process of achieving common security and defence in the EU. In order to illustrate how these two factors affect the development and implementation of the security role of the EU, this paper will investigate the institutionalisation process of pursuing security and defence integration in the EU and then evaluate the resolution of the EU in involving the Ukraine crisis.

## **II. INSTITUTIONALISING THE FRAMEWORK FOR UNSERTAKING A SECURITY ROLE**

The prospect of enhancing the co-operation in the field of political affairs in Europe had got much attention since the period of the EC; however, such programme had not been ensured until the Maastricht Treaty which created a framework for the development of the CFSP. In the Maastricht Treaty, the ambitious goal of developing a common foreign and security policy and eventually forming common defence has been illustrated. For the purpose, a series of institutional developments from the CFSP to the CSDP have been done. These institutional developments not only provided the CFSP and the CSDP with a more institutionalised framework, but also brought more definite objectives and credible capability to the EU to build up a security role. In order to specify the effect of institutional developments on the EU in the field of security and defence affairs, this section will illustrate how the EU institutionalised the framework for achieving a common foreign and security policy.

## **1. First Step: Learning the Lessons from the EDC and EPC**

Before the establishment of the CFSP, members of the EC did not have operational mechanisms for security and defence co-operation within the project of European integration. The project of the EDC had not been accomplished and the EPC was more like an intergovernmental forum which did not have applicable procedures for undertaking common positions or actions. However, the attempt of developing the EDC and the EPC provided two valuable lessons for EC members when they were considering what kind of framework was more appropriate and acceptable for them to pursue common foreign and security policy.

### **a. The lesson from the frustration of developing the EDC**

On the one hand, the failure of the EDC illustrated that a supranational framework was too difficult to be adopted by nation states when conducting key political issues. Member states might favour to enhance their co-operation in these policy areas, but would not like to be bound by supranational frameworks. Accordingly, the EPC had to be undertaken under an intergovernmental framework with no supranational implications. The formalisation of the European Council since 1975 was considered to enhance this intergovernmental basis (Ifestos, 1987, p. 186). Even the establishment of the CFSP and the CSDP does not change the basis of intergovernmental co-operation. An intergovernmental path for shaping common foreign and security policy in the EU has been ensured.

### **b. The lesson from the unsatisfying performance of the EPC**

On the other hand, the experiences of practicing the EPC signified that an appropriate institutional framework was still necessary. The three fundamental reports of developing the EPC, including the Luxembourg Report in 1970, the Copenhagen Report in 1973 and the London Report in 1981 had presented an ambitious objective of developing common positions and actions on external affairs, but these reports did not provide a strong institutional framework to support these ambitions under the project of the EPC. The framework of the EPC was described as ‘decentralised, loosely structure’, and its scope as being ‘extremely limited’ (Ifestos, *ibid.*, p. 208). This decentralised and loosely structure was unable to provide applicable policy tools for member states to intervene crisis situations. Therefore, by reviewing the performance of the EPC regarding international crises from the 1973 October War to the 1991 Yugoslavia crisis, Christopher Hill concluded that on most occasions EU countries had been unable to formulate active and coherent actions via the EPC machinery (Hill, 1992, pp. 139-145).

Because the EPC did not have an applicable and legalised institutional framework, it had to fully depend on the commitment of member states. However, the commitment of member states was an unstable factor. Since consensus might not be automatically produced from informal consultations, a more formal and well-designed framework was nevertheless necessary. For example, although the EPC had addressed the objective of developing common positions and actions, it did not provide corresponding rules or mechanisms for member states to manipulate, and therefore a more institutionalised framework with effective mechanisms for co-ordination and co-operation would be necessary, rather than the EPC.

Nevertheless, if the EPC was considered a forum which aimed to consolidate common opinions and increase convergences among member states, it did some work. As Michael E. Smith stated, the EPC contributed to information-sharing among member states (Smith, 2004a, pp. 42-43); this flexible structure encouraged member states to ‘accumulate an increasing body of common positions’, and ultimately would create conditions for ‘qualitative changes into new integrative dimension’ (Wessels, cited in Ifestos, 1986, p. 210). Consequently, member states favoured to enhance their intergovernmental co-operation with a more institutionalised framework so as to stabilise and expand their co-operation.

## **2. Second Step: The CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty and the Reform from the Amsterdam Treaty**

The lessons from the EDC and the EPC illustrated that it was unlikely to replace an intergovernmental baseline, but it was necessary to develop a more institutionalised framework. Therefore, the decision-making procedure and the institutional structures of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty aimed to meet these two requirements.

### **a. A new institutional attempt in the Maastricht Treaty**

The Maastricht Treaty opened a new page for European integration. Regarding shaping the common foreign and security policy, the treaty charged the European Council and the Council to define the objectives and policies of the CFSP by unanimity. Within this framework, EU member states still maintained independence on agenda-setting and decision-making, but they were bound to discuss and make relevant policies on the European level first instead of acting unilaterally. Besides, referring to forming the common positions (Article J.2, The Maastricht Treaty) and joint actions (Article J.3, The Maastricht Treaty), the treaty

introduced relevant rules for member states to work with. These rules made these two crucial policy tools: common positions and joint actions, of the CFSP become applicable and manoeuvrable.

The first common position by the Council regarding the CFSP was on 22 November 1993, just three weeks after the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty (Council Decision, 93/614/CFSP). Since then, the Council adopted hundreds of common positions and joint actions to foreign and security affairs. The large number of common positions and joint actions adopted demonstrated that EU member states did have an ambition to establish a consolidated profile for the EU so as to fix the image that European countries cannot speak with one voice on external affairs.

#### **b. Reform efforts in the Amsterdam Treaty**

The Maastricht Treaty could be viewed as a turning point that the political integration of the EU began an institutionalised stage. However, it was argued that this framework was still unable to effectively close the capabilities-expectations gap, especially because EU countries had ambitious expectations of conducting foreign and security affairs and achieving common defence eventually, but the treaty only had limited mechanisms for the CFSP (Hill, 1998; Peterson, 1998). That is, the treaty still did not provide applicable capabilities or did not have procedures to convene such capabilities for the Union to undertake external actions. Besides, the unanimous decision-making procedure was too inflexible and therefore was unfavourable to make common decisions. It was very easy for individual member state to block decision making process if such decisions were considered disfavour to their national interests.

Regarding the inflexibility of the decision-making of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty, some flexible decision-making rules, such as 'constructive abstentions' or 'qualified majority voting (QMV)' for the CFSP were adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty. Although the QMV could only apply to the issues with no military implication, it did decrease the possibility of applying veto by single member state.

Besides, the Maastricht Treaty offered the EU a legal basis to impose sanctions via forming common positions and joint actions which increased the connections between the CFSP and Community affairs (Hill, *ibid.*, p.28), but the treaty did not have a post to connect the Council and the Community. Actually, without this connection, member states became fragmented easily and therefore lacked a unified representative. Regarding this situation, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a High Representative to the CFSP and a Secretary General to the Council

in order to formulate, prepare and implement Council decisions (Article J. 16, The Amsterdam Treaty). Moreover, the High Representative had to assist the Presidency (Article J.8, The Amsterdam Treaty); therefore, the coherence of the CFSP was ensured since such post was supposed to provide ‘one phone number to call’ in Europe (Andersson, 2008, p. 125). The former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative from 1999 to 2009. During the term of office, he played a decisive role to connect member states and EU institutions, and also led the EU to develop a more reliable common security and defence role in the world.

Another problem with the CFSP framework under the Maastricht Treaty was that it did not provide exact illustrations for defining the objectives and the contents of CFSP missions. Actually, before the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Petersberg tasks, there was no clear consensus in the EU regarding the situations the EU should intervene. On the one hand, this flexible design might provide member states with much space and freedom to decide the situations they would like to intervene; however, on the other hand, without definite objectives of missions, member states would lose their focus easily about how to play a credible security role. Therefore, the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Petersberg tasks which focused on ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management and peace-making’ (The Petersberg Declaration, adopted in 1992). This incorporation, with a special emphasis on crisis management missions and humanitarian tasks, not only enabled the EU to concentrate on certain situations to involve, but also became a blueprint for the EU to define its security role afterwards.

### **3. An Evolution for developing Institutionalised Framework of the ESDP**

The outbreak of the civil war in the Balkans in the early 1990s, resulted in a serious regional crisis for almost ten years, provided an important incentive for the EU to develop more credible security role.

#### **a. The lesson from resolving the Balkan crisis in 1990s**

Because the theatre of war was so close to Central Europe, there was pressure for EU countries to take action. The Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos had argued that this should be the time for Europe to resolve this issue because it was European’s problem, not anyone else’s (cited in C. J. Smith, 1996, p. 1); meanwhile, the President of the European

Commission, Jacques Delors, also argued that the Yugoslav crisis was a European issue and should be resolved by Europeans (cited in Roberts, 1996, p. 183). However, the result nevertheless highlighted the fact that the EU lacked political will and also military capability to resolve a crisis or play a significant security role (Soetendorp, 1999, p. 140). When the crisis in Kosovo became uncontrolled in the late 1990s and was intervened by air campaigns of NATO against Serbia, EU countries finally made a determination to remedy the shortfall of political will and military capabilities.

#### **b. An evolutionary attempt of developing the ESDP**

In order to fix the problem of lacking political will and military capabilities, in the 1999 Cologne European Council, member states of the EU made the decision to develop the ESDP, and in the 1999 Helsinki European Council, a Headline Goal for building up the military capabilities was agreed.

Accordingly, for the deployment of military missions, the EU will have a Rapid Reaction Force, amounting 50,000 to 60,000 troops within sixty days, and such a deployment will last at least one year. Besides, according another Headline Goal adopted in 2004, the EU has developed the concept of 'battle groups' since 2005 for offering more responsive forces in a short timescale for crisis management operations. Each battle group consists of 1,500 soldiers and can be ready to deploy within ten days for a four-month operation. Member states promised to provide two stand-by battle groups always.

Moreover, because the EU has a special concern on non-military resolution for crisis management operations, it also developed civilian capabilities. Six priority sectors for civilian missions had been identified in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (adopted in 2004), including police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring missions, and support for EU special representatives. Accordingly, the EU aims to prepare human resources for police, prosecutors, judges, prison officers, civil administrative staff, customs officials, human rights experts, civil protection and disaster relief agents, assessment and co-ordination teams, and intervention teams. It is worth noting that the capabilities of deploying civilian and military missions basically come from voluntary contributions of member states.

The development of the ESDP not only provided the EU with credible military and civilian capabilities, but also improved the institutionalised framework of the CFSP for achieving common security and defence. The institutionalised framework of this system could be separated into vertical and horizontal dimensions (Andersson, 2008, p. 124). The vertical

dimension, indicating the hierarchical relations of different decision-making stages, prepared and implemented common positions or actions and therefore, ensured efficiency and consistency of this process. The horizontal connection networks, referring to non-hierarchical and informal connections between member states and the EU through day-by-day routines or informal meetings, helped to exchange information and consolidate opinions (ibid.). These frameworks offered an institutionalised environment for member states and EU institutions to have intensive interactions, and these interactions are supposed to shape common ideas and values. Although, in the field of security and defence affairs, it would be more difficult to form common consensus through informal interactions or day-by-day routines, these frameworks and networks still offered a place where member states, EU institutions and technical experts could associate with each other.

#### **4. A Further Institutionalised Framework of the CSDP**

The Constitution Treaty for Europe signed in 2004 aimed to create new posts for the EU President and EU Foreign Minister with substantial authority. Therefore, these two supranational institutional actors will have more access to the decision-making process of the CFSP and the CSDP. Although the Constitution Treaty was vetoed by Netherlands and France in 2005, the reform treaty (also named the Lisbon Treaty) did not give up the objective to enhance the role of the President of the European Council and the High Representative for the CFSP.

##### **a. A permanent President of the European Council**

The Lisbon Treaty has provided more improvements for the institutional framework of the CSDP. The most important one is to strengthen the roles of the President of the European Council and the High Representative. The President of the European Council (the President) becomes a permanent position elected by the European Council, via qualified majority voting, and has a two-and-half-year term that is renewable once (Article 15, The Lisbon Treaty). The new President is expected to raise the consistent profile of the EU in international affairs. Donald Tusk, the former Prime Minister of Poland, preceded by Herman Van Rompuy to become the current President of the European Council since November 2014.

##### **b. A new Foreign Affairs Council and new High Representative**

The role of the Foreign Affairs Council and the High Representative has also been enhanced in the Lisbon Treaty. The Foreign Affairs Council is split from the General Affairs and External Relations Council since the Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, foreign ministers of member states can have their council meetings and have more specific discussions on the issues of security and foreign affairs.

Besides, the High Representative now has the capacity to make proposals in the Council and chair the Foreign Affairs Council, and is also the Vice-President of the Commission at the same time (Article 18, The Lisbon Treaty). Moreover, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) can assist the High Representative to monitor international situations, prepare Council meetings, initiate proposals, and implement Council decisions (Article 27.3, The Lisbon Treaty). Because the creation of the EEAS increases the independence and capability of the High Representative, it is considered a phenomenon of Brusselsisation (Rosemond, 2010, p. 251). Federica Mogherini, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, preceded by Catherine Ashton to be appointed the High Representative since November 2014

#### **c. Broader definitions for CSDP missions**

Apart from adjusting the framework of the CSDP, the Lisbon Treaty also codified the content of CSDP missions into the treaty framework. Accordingly, the EU will be able to undertake five kinds of CSDP missions: (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, such as peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Article 43.1, The Lisbon Treaty). This content is broader than the Petersberg tasks because it increases joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. In other words, the treaty enhances the military implication of deploying CSDP missions and signifies that the EU is supposed to be more ambitious in undertaking military operations. Although the Lisbon Treaty does not build general procedures about how to assure contributions from member states, this broader definition nevertheless offers a legitimate basis for member states to apply in case if they have political will to intervene relevant situations.

#### **d. Multi-track for military co-operation**

Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a project for permanent structured co-operation in the EU (Article 42.6, Article 46, The Lisbon Treaty). This project allows some member states of the EU to establish permanent structured co-operation just between them by making more

binding commitments on military capabilities. Although this project has not yet been fulfilled, this framework provides an approach that member states can utilise it any time once it is necessary.

**e. The expected effect of institutionalisation**

To summarise, although the institutional developments of the CFSP and CSDP do not change the intergovernmental path to make decisions on undertake common foreign affairs and security policy, such developments have increased the role of EU institutions. The reason to enhance the role of EU institutions is for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the CFSP and CSDP, but the result will increase the influence of institutional actors in the decision-making process and therefore, contribute to further integration on common foreign affairs and security policy.

This institutionalisation process is also a result of learning-by-doing, which means member states realise the shortcomings of institutions through continuing practice and participation. In other words, the more member states take part, the more they will know how to improve this framework. This is what institutionalists called the ‘reciprocal relationship’ or the ‘reciprocal link’ between institutional developments and the habit of member states in co-operating to achieve joint objectives (March & Olsen, 1984; M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 17). Once they are used to this link, co-ordination, consistency and coherence can happen between different actors in the EU.

As the result, if member states continue the practice of the CFSP and the CSDP, they are supposed to become more embedded in this framework and contribute to a path for further institutional developments. However, does this institutionalised framework fully fix the incapability of the EU to undertake common positions or actions? The lesson of resolving the Ukraine crisis signified that the EU still had problem to address the critical security situation, and the capability to export security to its neighbouring area is also deeply questioned.

### **III. THE EU IN RESOLVING The Ukraine Crisis**

Due to its critical geopolitical position and strategic importance, Ukraine has been one of the most crucial target of the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2000s and then the EU also developed the Eastern Partnership (Eap) since 2008 in order to promote democracy, human

rights and rule of law with these former Soviet states. It is a specific approach of the EU to stabilise the local situation and export its soft power. Compared to the European Neighbourhood Policy, the project of the Eastern Partnership provided more instruments to enhance the political association and economic integration with these eastern neighbours, including signing Association Agreements and establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) (Nielsen & Vilson, 2014, pp.248-249). Although concerning the possible resentful sentiment by Russia, the EU is hardly to offer commitment for these countries to potential access to the EU, these efforts did attract these countries to become closer to the EU.

The relationship with Ukraine is the most complicated case of the EU to shape Eastern Partnership. Ukraine is not only the largest country of the Eastern Partnership project, but also has historical and strategic connections with Russia. This complex situation leads to serious divisions of languages, religions, cultures and even political attitude within this country (Kuzio, 2014, p. 30-31). Following the Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukraine undertook a westward foreign policy and then upgraded the relationship with the West. Since 2008, the negotiations for establishing an Association Agreement which would replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement were initiated between Ukraine and the EU.

The former President Viktor Yanukovich, elected in 2010, however, chose a foreign policy which was politically close to Russia and then the domestic politics of this country became even more unstable since this policy inevitably caused much opposition. Concerning the pressure made by Russia, in November 2013, he claimed that Ukraine would suspend to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and then opposition people who demanded closer European integration began serious demonstrations in Kiev. These demonstrations soon spread to the rest of the Country and caused domestic armed conflict. After the interventions by great powers, especially Russia, the situation became more difficult to be dealt with. Crimea, standing the strategic position to connect the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov was annexed by Russia in March 2014 and then the east territory of Ukraine became more unstable.

Since whether to get closer to European integration was the trigger for this crisis, the EU should have more responding actions to intervene the event. However, because the crisis involves not only the internal developments of Ukraine or whether the EU shall have further enlargement to this region, but also refers to the Russian factor, the crisis actually is a serious

challenge for the EU to consider whether the established institutionalised mechanisms are able to undertake this hard security issue.

### **1. The Prospect to be a Security Actor**

Before investigating the actions that the EU took in the Ukraine crisis, it is crucial to identify the mechanisms that the EU can rely on in response to international crises. According to the existing institutional framework of the CSDP, there is a set of mechanisms and procedures for the EU to tackle CSDP-related issues.

Firstly, the EU has developed a bureaucratic system to work for CSDP-related issues. This system can be separated into three levels: strategy-making bodies, suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies, and policy-supporting bodies. The strategy-making bodies include the President of the European Council and the High Representative. The new roles of the President and the High Representative introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are expected to enhance the capabilities of the EU in response to external relations and international crises. Both of them can address CFSP and CSDP-related issues on behalf of the EU and represent the EU speaking with one voice on the international scene (Article 15, 18, The Lisbon Treaty). Since Herman Van Rompuy is appointed for the first President and Catherine Ashton is appointed for the first High Representative, how they exert their authorities and responsibilities is decisive in the development and influence of these positions in the future.

Especially speaking, the Lisbon Treaty vested the High Representative with more competence to co-ordinate different attitudes between member states and to propose initiatives to the Foreign Affairs Council, the new High Representative, Catherine Ashton was supposed to play a critical role in encouraging member states to adopt coherent positions and take actions. Concerning the leadership in the EEAS, Ashton also expressed her ambition to create a 'new diplomatic service that is genuinely Europe on the ground' (Ashton, 2011, p. 5).

The suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies include the EEAS, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Article 38, The Lisbon Treaty) and the Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER) (Article 16.7, The Lisbon Treaty). They are built for providing policy-planning suggestions and decision-implementing supervisions. The EEAS and the PSC especially are responsible for assisting the work of the High Representative and the

Foreign Affairs Council; meanwhile, when crisis occurs, the PSC is charged with political control on the situation in order to avoid the EU being powerless or inaction in response to urgent situations.

Besides, there are some policy-supporting bodies subordinated to the EEAS and PSC for crisis management situations or operations, including the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Committee for Civilian Aspects for Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the Civil & Military Planning Department (CMPD), the Political and Military Group (PMG), the Civilian Planning and Conducting Capabilities (CPCC), and the EU Operations Centre. These institutions are responsible for providing more detailed information and advices to help the EEAS and PSC define situations; meanwhile, they also assist with carrying out or monitoring the implementation of CSDP missions.

Secondly, the High Representative is offered more authority to involve the decision-making process of the CFSP and the CSDP. Like member states, the High Representative now can make proposals or initiatives referring to the CFSP to the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 27.1, The Lisbon Treaty); meanwhile, if a rapid decision is required, the High Representative can convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours (Article 30.2, The Lisbon Treaty).

Besides, since the Foreign Affairs Council is separated from the previous General Affairs and External Relations Council, it becomes more independent (Article 12.5, The Lisbon Treaty). This Council is chaired by the High Representative (Article 18.3, 27, The Lisbon Treaty) in order to consolidate a coherent profile of the EU on external relations. Although by and large, the procedures for adopting a Union position or action do not have much change because it still maintains an intergovernmental procedure, the authority and the role of the High Representative are enhanced. Therefore, he/she becomes more capable of co-ordinating member states and related policies. Moreover, the High Representative is the Vice-President in the Commission (Article 17.4, 18.4, The Lisbon Treaty). This dual responsibility will increase more co-ordination and connection between the Council and the Commission.

In terms of deployable military capabilities, the EU already developed European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and two standby battle groups for CSDP missions. When the crisis in Libya became serious, the EU actually had two standby battle groups; the one was from

Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, and Lithuania, while the other one was from Nordic countries (C. Major & Molling, 2011, p. 36).

Regarding the civilian dimension, the EU aims to prepare a dozen CSDP civilian missions, including *inter alia* police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3,000 experts) which could last several years (Council conclusions on Civilian CSDP capabilities, adopted in 2011). Especially for policing operations, member states are asked to provide more than 5000 police officers and up to 1400 can be deployed in less than 30 days. There are other civilian staffs have been promised by member states for undertaking civilian CSDP missions (ESDP, Civilian Aspects, 2009).

To summarise, according to this institutionalised framework, the EU has developed a definite decision-making procedure and hierarchical administrative system on the one hand, and has deployable capability on the other hand. This framework is supposed to make the EU become more responsive if the international situations are so required.

## **2. The EU in Resolving the Ukraine Crisis**

The Ukraine crisis since 2013 has attracted much attention in the world. Because this crisis involves Russian factor and Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Security Council is unlikely to impose sanctions against relevant actors. As a result, the crisis largely depends on whether the EU and other regional mechanisms in Europe are able to deescalate the situation. The measures undertaken by the EU can be separated to diplomatic and economic dimensions; some refer to restrictive measures and some involve negotiations and co-operation.

When the crisis escalating in February 2014 and concerning the armed intervention by Russia to the Crimea, the EU had an extraordinary Council meeting on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2014. Besides condemning the armed forces provided by Russia to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the EU also implied that it may suspend the bilateral talks with Russia on matters of visa and new agreement if Russia did not withdraw its armed forces. The High Representative was charged to contacts with all relevant parties to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis. However, instead of committing a substantial and independent action, the EU only played an

assistant role for the OSCE mission deployed to Ukraine. It signified that when encountering a crisis involving complicated politics between great powers, the EU may be incapable of undertaking robust actions.

Regarding the main diplomatic measures by the EU, besides calling for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to resolve the crisis, the EU also cancelled the Summit with Russia and suspended bilateral talks over the matters of visa matters and new agreement. Also, the EU reassessed the cooperation programme with Russia, did not attend at the 2014 G8 Summit held in Sochi, and suspended the support to Russia for joining the OECD in order to pressure Russia to take actions.

Besides, regarding the main restrictive measures, on the council meeting held on 17 March 2014, the EU imposed the first travel bans and asset freezes against 21 officials from Russia and Ukraine who were considered to be responsible for the illegal annexation of Crimea. Since then, the EU has launched visa and economic sanctions against 150 persons and 37 entities of Russia and Ukraine. In order to support the implementation of the Minsk Protocol which was a ceasefire agreement between Ukraine government and the armed forces in the east Ukraine, the current sanctions have been extended to 2016.

Moreover, referring to economic support to Ukraine, on the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council held on 14-15 April 2015, the EU announced it will provide economic and financial support to Ukraine, including €1b macro-financial assistance for Ukraine to stabilise its economic situation and continue structural reform. Also, the EU agreed to grant unilateral trade preferences to Ukraine. On 27 June 2014, the EU signed the part of the Association Agreement with Ukraine in order to enhance bilateral economic integration. Although the EU did not commit to the potential membership for Ukraine, these efforts did make Ukraine become closer to the EU and the West.

Currently, although the EU has expressed deep concern about the crisis, because it is impossible to persuade Russia to withdraw its interventions to Ukraine, the measures that the EU may undertake to deescalate the crisis are restricted. Because considering the possible reactions of Russia, because diplomatic and economic sanctions, the EU did not launch military or civilian missions to resolve the crisis. It seems that the institutionalised framework reformed by the Lisbon Treaty did not ensure the EU to become a more credible security provider and moreover, has little effect on coordinating different attitudes of member states towards Russia. When the wars in Balkans occurred, the EU did not have appropriate

procedures and mechanisms to address this crisis. Such frustration encouraged the EU to reform the institutional framework of the CFSP and the CSDP so as to develop credible capabilities, and therefore the EU could not defend itself for the same reason that it was unable to resolve the crisis because of lacking appropriate procedures and deployable capabilities. Now the EU already had capabilities to deploy CSDP mission, but in front of a serious crisis situation, the gap between expectations and capabilities seems hardly to be fixed.

### **3. Evaluate the Performance of the EU as a Security Actor**

From the frustrating experiences in conducting the Kosovo crisis, under the initiative of the German Presidency, EU member states made a determination in the European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999 to develop the ESDP in order to make the common security and defence become feasible. For the purpose, member states declared that they would develop ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’.

#### **a. Have the EU Fulfilled the Objectives Made in the Cologne European Council?**

According to this declaration, three objectives have to be implemented in order to fix the shortfall of deployable capabilities. Firstly, the EU aims to undertake autonomous external actions. Secondly, such actions have to be accompanied with credible military capabilities and appropriate procedures. Thirdly, such developments cannot undermine the presence of NATO. The three objectives could be considered as criteria by which to examine whether the EU have achieved the objective of the Cologne European Council.

In terms of whether the EU is able to undertake autonomous external actions, it depends on two conditions, which are if there are proper procedures and if there are corresponding capabilities. As was mentioned in the previous section, the EU has established an institutionalised and organised policy-making process for implementing common security and defence affairs. Once a common decision is made by the Council, member states and EU institutions are liable to implement the decision. Besides the voluntary capabilities contributed by member states, the EEAS, the PSC and other policy-supporting bodies are charged with the responsibility to provide political control, strategic direction and monitoring

during the period of implementation. This framework actually has ensured that the EU will have technical and administrative assistance in order to undertake a CSDP mission.

Besides, regarding the relationship with NATO, the EU has made a joint declaration with NATO on 16 December 2002 in order to develop a permanent co-operation framework. This framework is called 'Berlin Plus' and aims for undertaking crisis management operations, which are consistent with the focuses of the CSDP missions. The 'Berlin Plus' included three elements: offering the EU the access to NATO planning, having European command in NATO, and allowing the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities (EU–NATO Declaration, 2002). Accordingly, a NATO permanent military liaison team has been built at the EUMS since November 2005 and an EU cell has been set up at SHAPE (NATO's strategic command for operations in Belgium) from March 2006. The 'Berlin Plus' has built a co-operative and complementary relationship between NATO and the EU and then avoids possible conflicts between these two institutions.

Accordingly, the EU has accomplished the objectives made by the 1999 Cologne European Council. Indeed, since the establishment of the ESDP/CSDP, the EU has not only developed deployable capabilities for external missions, but also reformed institutional procedures and frameworks in order to make this system become practicable. Then, why did the EU still fail to address the Libyan crisis effectively?

#### **b. Can Institutionalisation Resolve the Gap between Expectations and Capabilities?**

Since the 1999 Cologne European Council, the EU attempts resolve the lack of capabilities via the reform of institutional frameworks, that is, a process of institutionalisation. It was because member states recognised that the reason the EU was unable to resolve the Balkan crisis was due to the lack of appropriate procedures and capabilities for external actions. Therefore, they made lots of efforts to mend the shortfall of institutional frameworks and capabilities so that the EU can play a dominant security role in the world. However, is an institutional resolution really able to fix the gap between expectations and capabilities? Is an institutional resolution able to underpin the prospect of the EU to play a dominant security role in the world? The Ukraine case signified that even though the EU already had applicable capabilities to intervene a crisis, when facing a hard security situation, it is still unable to launch credible actions to resolve the crisis.

Regarding this situation, this paper provided three explanations to clarify why an institutionalised CSDP cannot ensure a credible security role for the EU. Firstly, the process

of institutionalisation in the field of the CFSP and the CSDP has little effect on shaping common identity and enhance political will of member states. Especially, it is still very controversial among EU member states that whether it is necessary to undertake a military approach to resolve a crisis and moreover, concerning this case, member states have no consensus about whether the EU shall impose more serious sanctions against Russia or whether the EU shall adopt Ukraine as a new member. More specifically speaking, although most EU members agreed to pressure Russia to concede, they are also afraid too much sanctions may cause unnecessary over reactions by Russia. For example, due to the consideration of energy interests, Germany was very cautious about the collective actions against Russia and sought for informal and personal contact to persuade Putin to concede. France is afraid a too tough attitude may undermine the arms deals with Russia, and Britain concern the financial impact since London is a financial centre for Russian businessman and officials to invest their assets. Moreover, the Euro debt crisis since 2010 distracted the attention of EU members to focus on shaping common foreign and security policy, and therefore instead of considering common interests or collective actions, member states are inclined to take their national interests as the most priority. In fact, without the strong support of member states, especially the 'Big Three', the EU can hardly rely on existing institutional mechanisms to take actions.

Secondly, because the decision-making process in the CSDP is basically based on unanimity and consensus, especially on the matters which have military implications, regarding very controversial issues or uncertain situations, member states may not determine an ambitious project. Although from the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has gradually developed an institutionalised framework to have more capable ability to undertake common foreign and security issues, this framework does not change this intergovernmental basis. Especially concerning the matters with whether to deploy a CFSP mission, qualified majority voting are not allowed. Even though some member states of the EU preferred a robust response to resolve a crisis, especially Baltic countries, they have to act on the premise of consensus or unanimity. Therefore, it usually takes much time for the EU to look for consensus and compromise from member states. However, sometimes crises, like the Ukraine crisis, may be too urgent to wait for such consensus.

Thirdly, the new High Representative and the President of the European Council reformed by the Lisbon Treaty are expected to play a decisive role to co-ordinate member states and

promote the objective of common security and defence since the Treaty vested them with more authority to take part in the decision-making process. Especially Ashton was expected to play a proactive role and she also considered herself able to do this. Compared to the national leader of individual member states, for example, German Chancellor Merkel, either Ashton and Van Rompuy, the former High Representative and the President or Mogherini and Tusk, the current High Representative and the President did not play decisive role to lead the EU to respond the crisis. Lacking ambition and experience made them unable to provide a strong leadership for the EU to improve its role on the international stage (Brady, 2012; Howorth, 2011). Although it is definitely a difficult task to co-ordinate divisions of 28 member states of the EU and then to form a coherent foreign policy, they still have to strive for this mission since they are expected to be a crucial impetus to promote a more coherent profile of the EU in the world.

To summarise, the EU has largely improved the institutional framework for shaping the CFSP and the CSDP, but this framework does not ensure that the EU is able to play a successful security role. The consensus of member states is still the key. A well-designed institutionalised framework and more capable institutional actors can assist the job of member states, but they cannot replace member states to make decisions. The incapability of addressing the Ukraine crisis inevitably undermined the united image of the EU in the international scene.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION: IS IT POSSIBLE TO FORM A CONSOLIDATION FOR A CREDIBLE SECURITY ROLE?**

This paper does not argue that it is the responsibility of the EU to deploy substantial missions to any situations, but it is an unavoidable task for the EU. If the EU aims to play a significant role for crisis management, it cannot ignore the possibility to intervene urgent crisis situation. Actually, according to the five goals identified in the Lisbon Treaty, the contents of CSDP missions have been expanded to more military operations, including joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, such as peace-making and post-conflict. Since joint disarmament operations, conflict prevention and

peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management are involved military actions or with military implications, the EU has to make more efforts to implement these political objectives. Also, the EU has to be prepared that it may have to address a crisis situation in short time so that it is more necessary to overcome different positions among member states as early as possible.

More specifically speaking, the problem of the EU in resolving the Balkan crisis in 1990s was about whether the EU had enough capabilities and corresponding institutional frameworks to support crisis management operations, but the problem of the EU in the Ukraine crisis is more about whether the process of institutionalisation is able to consolidate EU member states to embed this framework and become more willing to undertake common actions. An institutionalised framework may help with such consolidation, but such an effect is still limited. Especially without the support of the Big Three, the EU cannot rely on existing institutionalised mechanisms to launch independent actions.

Although the process of institutionalisation will have the effect of path dependence on member states and make member states may become more used to relevant institutional frameworks and policy instruments, when concerning military affairs or serious situation, it still maintains an intergovernmental basis. In other words, the process of institutionalisation has also confirmed and enhanced the path of intergovernmentalism for developing the CFSP and CSDP. As the result, member states will find it more difficult to change the intergovernmental principle of the existing institutional frameworks. In fact, compared to economic issues, nation states overcome more difficulties in converging on security and defence policies and take longer to overcome their divergences. Since the development of the CSDP only begins from the late 1990s, it is not surprising that member states of the EU have not accumulated enough consensuses about whether and how to conduct a military action in response to an urgent crisis.

Nevertheless, the lack of efficiency and effectiveness to manage crisis will inevitably undermine the capability and the image of the EU to play a significant security role. Lack of credible response to the Ukraine crisis unavoidably affected the profile of the EU of being a security actor on the international stage. Although EU member states will not just abandon the efforts to develop a common foreign and security policy, they will have to make more efforts and have a clearer definition about what they really expect to achieve and what they really can do. Besides, if the EU is expected to play a prominent role on the international

stage, member states of the EU have to develop more specific mission targets for achieving this ambition. Unlike the situation in Kosovo, this is not about lacking an institutional framework, but about whether EU member states have enough political will to work this framework well.

It is still not clear that how the crisis would be ended, but the Ukraine crisis is definitely another challenge to the CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty, and it unavoidably reflects the shortcoming of the EU to pursue a common foreign and security policy; that is, national interests of member states are still much more important to common interests. Currently, Russia has dominated Crimea and it is unlikely to persuade Russia to withdraw its intervention, the EU can play a role to persuade the United States and Russia to cooperate on this issue and avoid more serious confrontation between Russia and the West. The EU may continue to promote to sign the rest of the Association Agreement with Ukraine and assist Ukraine to undertake further structure reforms; however, concerning whether to commit membership to Ukraine, the EU has to reach consensus between member states. For example, France does not support the EU to undertake enlargement at the moment since the EU is overloaded to absorb new members in the near future. Concerning American re-constructing its influence European continent and Russia stabilising traditional sphere of influence, it is more difficult for the EU to undertake independent and ambitious attempt at resolving the Ukraine crisis.

## References

- Andersson, J. J. (2008). The European Security Strategy and the Continuing Search for Coherence. In S. Biscop & J. J. Andersson (Eds.), *The EU and the European Security strategy: Forging a Global Europe*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Aspinwall, M. D., & Schneider, G. (2000). Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration. *European Journal of Political Research*, 38(1), 1-36.
- Ashton, C. (2011). Charting the EU Course. *Fletcher Forum*, 35(1), 5-9.
- Choi, Y. J., & Caporaso, J. A. (2002). Comparative Regional Integration. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2006). Introduction: The 1992-Project, the Revival of Neofunctionalism and the Liberal Intergovernmentalist Challenge. In Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.), *Debates on European Integration: A Reader*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gourevitch, P. (2002). Domestic Politics and International Relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London Sage Publications Ltd.
- Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. In Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) (2006), *Debates on European Integration: A Reader*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ifestos, P. (1987). *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?* Hants: Gower.
- Hill, C. (1992). EPC's Performance in Crises. In R. Rummel (Ed.), *Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community*. UK: Westview Press (Short Disc).
- Hill, C. (1998). Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap? In J. Peterson & H. Sjursen (Eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*. London: Routledge.
- Kuzio, T. (2015). A New Framework for Understanding Nationalism in Ukraine: Democratic Revolutions, Separatism and Russian Hybrid War. *Geopolitics, History and International Relations*, 7(1), 30-51.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. *The American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 734-749.
- Major, C., & Molling, C. (2011). EU Battlegroups: What Contribution to European Defence? Progress and Prospects of European Rapid Response Forces. SWP Research Papers, 2011(8). Retrieved 3 September 2015, from <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=130540>

- Milward, A. S., & Sorensen, V. (1993). Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice. In A. S. Milward, F. M. B. Lynch, R. Ranieri, F. Romero & V. Sorensen (Eds.), *The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992*. London: Routledge.
- Nielsen, K. L. & Vilson, M. (2014). The Eastern Partnership: Soft Power Strategy or Policy Failure?, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 19(2), 243-262.
- Peters, B. G. (2005). *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'*. London: Continuum.
- Peterson, J. (1998). Introduction: the European Union as a Global Actor. In J. Paterson & H. Sjursen (Eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*. London: Routledge.
- Pierson, P. (1993). When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change. *World Politics*, 45(4), 595-628.
- Pierson, P. (1996). The Path to the European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29(2), 123-163.
- Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251-267.
- Roberts, A. (1996). Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organisation. In A. Danchev & T. E. Halverson (Eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*. London: Macmillan.
- Rosemond, B. (2010). New Theories of European Integration. In M. Cini & N. P.-S. Borrigan (Eds.), *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, M. E. (2004a). *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Themes in European Governance)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, M. E. (2004b). Institutionalisation, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(1), 95-136.
- Smith, C. J. (1996). Conflict in the Balkans and the Possibility of a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy. *International Relations*, 13(2), 1-21.
- Soetendorp, B. (1999). *Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and Practice*. London: Longman.