

UACES 45th Annual Conference

Bilbao, 7-9 September 2015

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The triangle of Europeanisation

The post-enlargement case of Hungary

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1. Introduction

Hungary's position in the international community has been determined by the gradual *rapprochement* to the European Union since the 1980s and the process accelerated at the time of the change of the regime in East-Central Europe. This led to the country's membership in 2004. The change, however, did not only determine the country's external relations. Since the Union is a unique organisation including typical intergovernmental features as well as elements of supranational nature, EU membership affected almost all fields of Hungarian domestic politics.

Focusing on the post-enlargement period of Hungary, in this paper we provide an overview of the effects of EU accession on the domestic political system and also an insight on how Hungary has affected the system of the EU as well. Europeanisation provides a suitable theoretical framework for our analysis. Due to the size limits of the paper, however, we

mainly focus on political institutions and political actors, knowing that other fields of Europeanisation, for example the sectoral policies of the EU could have been included in the analysis. Further, we have chosen to concentrate on the post-2004 time period, therefore we are not dealing with the pre-accession period either; being aware that Europeanisation could have been analysed in these time periods as well. In this paper, Hungary's ten years of post-enlargement experience is examined to demonstrate Europeanisation in the 'political science triangle' (politics, polity, and policy) in national and EU levels. It is argued that Hungary is an interesting case while apart from top-down processes; unique bottom-up Europeanisation examples can be identified.

In the second part, we briefly summarize the relevant theories of Europeanisation, and seek to provide a suitable conceptual framework for analysing the post-enlargement case of Hungary. The main argument of the paper is that the concept of Europeanisation is suitable for describing complex processes that are derived from EU membership including various directions (top-down, bottom-up etc.) In the third part of our paper, we focus on the Europeanisation process at the level of political institutions. We introduce the governmental and administrative processes that ensure the Hungarian participation in EU governance and also analyse the EU politics of the Hungarian governments in the 2004-2015 period. The participation of the Hungarian Parliament in formulating Hungary's EU position and its role in EU decision-making in particular with regard to the Lisbon Treaty's new formula that increased the role of national parliaments in decision-making is also examined. The fourth part of the paper focuses on Europeanisation of political actors including the political parties as well as the Europeanisation of Hungarian citizens.

As the international literature on Europeanisation demonstrates, there is not one rigorous methodology behind the concept, despite of the continuous pursuits to find the appropriate research methods in the various fields of Europeanisation (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). The research methodology varies to large extent including both qualitative and quantitative methods. In our analysis we have also chosen a mixture of methods starting with discourse analysis (in the case of political campaigns and party programs) through interviews with politicians, judges, diplomats and we also analyse the secondary data of Eurobarometer survey results to demonstrate the Hungarians citizens' changing attitude to the EU.

With our paper, we intend to contribute to the Europeanisation literature, by examining the Hungarian case that is currently underrepresented in the literature that mainly focuses on old member states (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012: 25).

2. The triangle of Europeanisation

The concept of Europeanisation appeared in integration literature at the beginning of the 1990s when European integration reached a stage where a significantly growing number of legal acts were initiated at the European level and adopted at national level later, when most of the decisions concerning the main EU policies were reached by qualified majority and when the EU started to become a political system with its own institutional structure and logic. In this stage the process and outcome of integration could not be adequately described by the so far available 'grand theories' of integration (Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963, Hoffman 1966, Taylor 1982), thus as Caporaso argues, the new concept: *Europeanisation* was developed. (See Caporaso, 2008:25). Nevertheless, it should not be considered as new integration theory. It is rather a conceptual framework to describe a complex set of integration phenomena. Since the 1990s, Europeanisation became a fashionable concept in the literature that is applied to describe the effects of the political system of EU on the member states. Although currently there is a wide-ranging literature on the concept - that is still growing - there are many uncertainties around it. Ladrech provided one of most cited early definitions. In his wording 'Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making'. (Ladrech 1994: 17). Later Europeanisation became the concept that was used to describe the top-down direction of policy-making and it was mostly used to describe how EU policy-making affected the domestic policies. One of Börzel's definitions from the 1990s also reflects this approach. She claimed that Europeanisation is 'a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making'. (Börzel 1999: 574). Later the concept was further stretched and not only policies but also institutions and political processes became involved in the concept. According to Radaelli's 'classic' definition, Europeanization refers to 'processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and

shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies'. (Radaelli 2003: 30). Risse et al. defined Europeanisation in the context of European governance when they provided the following definition: 'We define Europeanisation as the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance'. (Risse et al. 2001: 3) In one of the mostly used handbook on Europeanisation, it is defined as 'the domestic adaptation to European regional integration' where domestic adaptation understood in a broad context including 'administrative adaptation of executive governments' through institutional adaptation and the adaptation of interest groups and also the normative effects of EU politics. (Graziano and Vink, 2007: 8-9).

The 2000s brought a massive increase of the Europeanisation literature, due to accomplishing the largest enlargement wave of the EU, the so called 'Big-bang', in 2004 and 2007. Enlargement and the concept of *conditionality* itself proved to be as one of the most effective ways of putting pressure on the candidate countries to 'Europeanize' their political and legal systems, institutions and policies. (See Simmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2008: 88-102) Later, research of Europeanisation were further extended to those countries and territories that are currently not, and probably in the near future neither will become part of the EU (referring to some of the Western Balkan and the Eastern Partnership countries). These theories that interpret Europeanisation in the context of non-EU member state constitute a separate branch. They argue that the European Union could be considered as a *normative power* that is able to transfer its norms, patterns and methods outside the EU as well through a multi-tiered system. (Manners, 2008). Since size limitations, we cannot list all of scholarly contributions; but other authors gave definitions of different natures too. (Risse et al. 2001; Héritier et al etc.). Seeing the above *terminological cacophony* of definitions Olsen argued for looking at Europeanisation instead of a set of 'definitional puzzles' as a set of 'model building puzzles', and claimed that Europeanisation has to be understood in a broader sense than just providing definitions and unidirectional interpretations of it (most of the time referring to top-down effects) (Olsen 2002: 944)

But what are the main conceptual questions in relation to Europeanisation? The first one is: what do we understand under the phenomenon? Is it a process or an outcome of a process? To answer this latter question could be crucial for the researcher because it can decide the


research framework and the methodology as well. If it is an outcome, the concrete changes in domestic or EU levels have to be found that is caused by the other. If Europeanisation is explained as an outcome, it is a matter of interpretation, or a matter of point of view which should be selected as the dependent and which as the independent variable in the analysis, since it is not only the EU itself that affects domestic political systems, the EU level itself can be affected by domestic actors and inputs. If it is a process, Europeanisation should be looked as a phenomenon that arises from the continuous interaction of EU and member states' political systems that can lead both to bringing closer and taking away these entities. Causality - that is one of the most exciting theoretical questions in Europeanisation literature - could not only be interpreted with regard to policy and institutional outcomes but can also be examined in case of a rather process focused approach. The other widely asked conceptual question – that is also linked to causality - is about the direction of Europeanisation. Here, the mainstream argument is that there is a *top-down* and *bottom-up* direction of Europeanisation, and we can also talk about *horizontal effects* of Europeanisation referring to the cooperation between the individual member states and its effects on the whole EU integration process. Furthermore, not only the EU and national levels can be analysed but the local, subnational and global levels too. For example, as we are going to demonstrate some evidence in the case of Hungary, the global economic and financial crisis affected in multiple respects the EU and national political systems and economies that at the end led to transformation of EU policies and institutional structures as well. Among conceptual issues, it also has to be noted that Europeanisation is not a neutral concept: it includes values as well. In its general meaning its message reflects a certain positive attitude towards the European Union. The term “Europeanisation” includes that the EU brings about peace, prosperity, solidarity and bridges gaps between the developed and the underdeveloped. We can say that it implies the positive “myths” that the EU is built on. (Arató 2014) However, some authors argue that also anti-European sentiments can be understood under this term if they appear in the European political arena – paradoxically, the recent spread of Euroscepticism may be defined as Europeanisation as well. Lastly, agreeing with the authors who emphasize the time factor in Europeanisation, it has to be pointed out that history of European integration showed that there are periods of time when Europeanisation process is faster and also periods when it slows down. Thus the speed of Europeanisation can vary from time to time. (Pierson, 2003).

The theoretical model, we are going to use in our analysis is built on the above given concepts, but it is tailor-made for describing the EU integration and domestic processes in the new member states (NMS). Since we focus on the post-enlargement period, time is going to be a crucial factor to describe the changes in both directions of Europeanisation (top-down and bottom-up). Within, the examined 10 years' time we expect to demonstrate that Europeanisation provided faster and slower periods. Our model is built on the following assumptions: Agreeing with Radelli and Pasquier we interpret Europeanisation as an “*EU-level system of interaction*” (Radelli and Pasquier 2006: 12) emphasizing the complexity and interconnectivity of domestic and European political spaces. Thus for us, Europeanisation is a phenomenon with multidirectional effects on political actors, institutions and individuals of the society. Europeanisation, in the context of the new member states should be understood as both an outcome and a process.

In the NMS, EU membership created a new framework for political actors, institutions, citizens, and in a broader understanding a new polity where not only the structural elements of the political system were re-defined but the norms, values, discourses, beliefs, identities of the citizens were changed. In this paper we use a political interpretation of the Europeanisation concept including the *politics*, *polity* and *policy* dimensions (the three Ps) of it. (Pennings et al. 1999, 23-28). These three dimensions (politics, polity and policy) that can describe a political system can also be suitable for a single case study analysis, such as the post-enlargement example of Hungary but also provide an opportunity for a comparative analysis in the CEE region in further research.

The *three junctures of the triangular model* where Europeanisation can be examined in the NMS are the following: the *politics* including political actors and parties and their interactions (1); the *policy* concerning all the EU and domestic policy decisions that result in specific policy outcomes (2) and lastly and the *polity* including the institutional framework and all sociological factors such as the transformation of beliefs, attitudes and norms of the societies of new member states that can influence the actions of political actors (3) .

Chart 1. The triangular model of Europeanisation in NMS



The causality in this triangular model however may have multiple-directions. Firstly, the three 'Ps' are interconnected and they constantly influence and affect each other at both domestic and EU levels. For example if Euroscepticism agenda appears in domestic party politics than Euroscepticism will be strengthened in the domestic polity and vice versa. Secondly, with regard to direction of Europeanisation, there are different options. Both EU level politics affect domestic politics and the acts and behaviour of domestic politicians also affect EU politics too. In the same vein, in case of policy-making, the top-down-effect of Europeanisation is obvious: regulations of the CAP for example had to be adopted and the domestic system had to be adjusted to the EU system as a prerequisite of enlargement. Nevertheless, the recent pursuits of bringing life to the genuine EMU at EU level indicated, that member states individually decided how far they want to fulfil this mission or they do not want to participate in it at all that affected the overall EU policy development¹ And last but not least, the European polity is also an interactive system, that does not only include adaptation to EU norms, but also provides bottom-up inputs to change the political community at EU-level. In case of a NMS like Hungary that has just been a little more than a decade EU membership experience, it will be interesting to see whether apart from the fast and expected top-down adaptation phase there can be any bottom-up processes detected in the examined period. Using Börzel's expressions the following question can be raised: Has

Hungary only downloaded the European institutional patterns, rules of the games and norms from the EU or has the country also uploaded some Hungarian inputs to the EU political system? (Börzel, 2012)

3. Europeanisation of Hungarian political institutions

In this chapter we analyse the first ten years of Hungarian political institutions in the perspective of EU membership from two main aspects. First, we give an overview about how main institutions (government, parliament and the judiciary, i.e. *polity*) applied to the structural challenges of being a full EU member state. However, especially in the case of the government, political aspects (*politics*) are also to be analysed. As indicated before, we cannot extend our analysis to *policy* aspects – however, some references will be made on some.

3.1. Government

Hungary had to establish a new governmental structure as a new EU member state after 2004 – although EU issues already re-defined governance processes already in the pre-accession period. As Péter Györkös, former secretary of the Hungarian delegation during accession negotiations (1998-2003) states, a member state takes part in dual governance: one on the national, the other on the community level. Being present in European governance requires horizontal, as well as vertical co-ordination: on the one hand, there has to be inter-ministerial exchanges in order to elaborate the national positions on EU initiatives; on the other hand, levels of decision-making have to be strictly set. (committees, state secretary level, ministerial level, etc.) (Györkös 2006: 424)

The Hungarian centre for EU governance is a committee named Interministerial Committee for European Co-ordination (Európai Koordinációs Tárcaközi Bizottság EKTb). Its main mandates are to elaborate the Hungarian position to be represented in the different fora of the Council, at the European Court of Justice and the preparation of the government's positions for the conciliation procedure with the Hungarian Parliament (we return to this procedure later). EKTb, members of which are state secretaries, upload their proposals for

the Hungarian positions to state secretaries committees and the top of the vertical structure is the ministerial level (Ódor 2014: 95-124).² The number of issues dealt with within this framework can be counted in thousands.³ EKTB and expert groups are in continuous contact with the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the European Union in Brussels that plays a vital role in Hungarian interest representation, especially in the Council.

EU affairs are co-ordinated in the member states in two basic models: usually either the ministry of foreign affairs, or the prime minister's office is responsible for the area. The choice depends on the government's understanding of EU affairs (whether they define EU-cooperation as external affairs or European internal politics), personal standing of the responsible minister within the government and also the traditions of governance in the particular member state. In Hungary we find both models in different periods: between 2004 and 2006 a minister was responsible for EU affairs in Hungary, within the framework of the Prime Minister's Office. From 2006 until 2014 a state secretary was heading the EU unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Balázs 2006: 437-456) Since early 2015 again the PMO model has been introduced.

Being responsible for the presidency of the EU is the peak of a government's EU administration, especially for the first time – we sometimes refer to it as reaching „adulthood” within the EU. By 2011 (Hungarian presidency dated from January to June 2011) Hungarian administration and diplomatic services gained the necessary experience in EU affairs but managing the presidency period was still a huge challenge. Presiding EU Council working groups, formal and informal preparations of decision-making meant a huge workload for the Hungarian administration – all ministries and the Permanent Representation (that doubled its staff for the presidency period) as well. The Hungarian presidency - that chose the slogan 'Strong Europe' – dealt with the package of economic governance in the midst of the economic and monetary crisis, proposals dealing with growth and jobs, completing the accession negotiations with Croatia that has long been a priority of Hungarian foreign policy, decisions on the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), first drafting of the 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework, just to name a few. (Balázs 2011:5-6)

There were unexpected events to react upon – like the Arab spring or the catastrophe of the atomic power station in Japan. Among the success stories of the Hungarian presidency there was the completion of the Croatian accession negotiations or the compromise over the „Sixpack”, the package dealing with the financial crisis. 103 dossiers were closed during the six months of the presidency, out of which 43 were under the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament. However, the Eastern partnership Summit was rescheduled to the second half of the year, to the Polish presidency. The work of the Hungarian administration was acknowledged in Brussels – e.g. Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for economic and financial matters at the time said the András Kármán, state secretary at the Hungarian Ministry for Economic Affairs would deserve a Schuman prize for his work. (Győri 2011)

Member States have primary responsibility for the correct and timely application of EU Treaties and legislation, Hungary, as every member state, is under infringement procedures in a number of cases. The European Commission publishes statistics about infringement cases every year – the statistics differentiate between late transposition that may be of technical nature and incorrect transposition or bad application of EU law. According to the 2013 year statistical data, Hungary was late with the transposition of 16 EU legal acts (with that Hungary is the 19th among the 28 EU members), and 37 cases were registered as incorrect transposition or bad application (with this Hungary was 10th among 28 member states).⁴ We will come back to this issue later.

The governmental policy-making in the levels discussed above are highly technical and basically invisible for the public and generally they do not reach the political agenda. However, the government's general political attitude (*high politics*) towards the EU is much more salient. After accession, the first Gyurcsány government faced first the need to change perspective: after behaving as an outside partner towards the EU ('us' being defined as Hungary and 'them' as the EU15), after accession suddenly Hungary also became part of the club. Not only inside processes and administrative details had to be learned but new attitudes as well – the other member states who were 'them' a moment ago, became 'us'. In the first years of full membership, also the administration of financed EU policies (Common Agricultural Policy, Cohesion Policy) also had to be learned. Hungary's most visible deficiency was connected to the obligations about convergence criteria included in the Stability and Growth Pact – almost literally the day after accession, 12 May 2004 the European

Commission notified Hungary about the problem of high budget deficit (4.9%) and envisaged the initiation of the excessive deficit procedure.⁵

The second Gyurcsány government (socialist-liberal coalition, 2006-2008, but the same coalition with Gordon Bajnai as Prime Minister - 2008-2010 - can be considered as a government with similar EU policy) defined the stabilisation of EU membership as one of its major policy goals. The foreign policy strategy of 2008 states that Hungary a full member of the European Union, becomes a policy-maker instead of the former role of the passive, reactive, acceptive behaviour and thinking if the country can provide the necessary resources and staff. Hungary's place and interest representation depends on how we can contribute to achieve the common goals.⁶ However, as experts pointed out already in the period of preparing the strategy, the strategy failed to define the goals of the supposedly active European policy of the government. (GAZDAG – RÁCZ 2007) Along the line of the strategy, the government was able to secure a relatively high proportion of Structural Funds for the country for the 2007-13 period. However, at the beginning of the economic crisis – that hit Hungary especially because of excessive budget deficit and a high ratio of foreign currency loans in the population – the prime minister submitted a proposal at a European Council meeting in 2009 including a special fund for crisis management in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the proposal had not been circulated in the region before submission, it was immediately refused by the Czech and the Slovak prime minister. (Ballai 2009) Under the second Gyurcsány government, the effects of EU cohesion policy already started to become visible: by 2010 the net position reached 3.1% of the Hungarian GNI. (Állami Számvevőszék 2011: 7) Meanwhile, the excessive deficit procedure was going on in the case of Hungary throughout the entire government period.

The second Orbán government, after winning the 2010 elections with a two thirds majority, published its foreign policy strategy after the Hungarian EU presidency, in December 2011. It defines three priorities: regional co-operation (with Central and South-East Europe), Euro-Atlantic co-operation and global opening. The second priority, containing policies towards the European Union stresses that Hungarian national interests are to be represented in the EU and in the NATO, also a strong and united Europe is defined as a goal (successful crisis management and the dominance of the community method in decision-making) and transatlantic co-operation is also to be enhanced.⁷ At the same time, the reality – and the

communication - of the government's foreign policy was characterised by the strengthening of national and economic sovereignty. (Gazdag 2014: 214)

The second Orbán government's EU policy cannot be detached from its internal and economic policies. The 'unorthodox' methods of economic policy (that chose to load the expenses of the crisis with sectoral extra taxes on certain sectors and companies instead of the population), the new constitutional structures (new basic law, re-organisation of several central state agencies, the new media law and the re-organisation of the public media) effected Hungary's relations with the EU. European institutions monitored these changes and they created several conflicts. The European Commission initiated several infringement procedures in cases where EU law was relevant, like in cases of the independence of the National Bank, the retirement of judges, the abolishment of the institution of the ombudsman for data protection, the introduction of the sectoral tax in telecommunications, etc. The case for the sectoral tax in telecommunication was withdrawn by the Commission, and in the case of the independence of the Hungarian National Bank the Hungarian government changed the regulations and the other cases the European Court of Justice ruled against Hungary. As we saw above, the number of infringement cases is average in the case of Hungary – what is exceptional is the areas of infringements. While typical infringement procedures are in the policy areas of environmental protection, taxation, internal market or transport, in the case of the second Orbán government the relevant cases were in the area of the rule of law. (Gazdag 2014: 225-228).

Another group of conflicts were located in another EU institution, the European Parliament. Unprecedented, the EP held hearings about Hungary four times between the 2010-2014 government period and issued two resolutions – one of them received a lot of publicity and became known under the name of the rapporteur, Rui Tavares.⁸ It lists the developments about the new constitution, the problems with checks and balances, the media law, the electoral reform and other democratic and basic rights and lists recommendations both for Hungary and for the institutions and member states of the European Union. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán participated at the plenary session of the EP in 2011, 2012 and 2013 as well where he was questioned about these issues. In each occasion, the debate was harsh and lined along party affiliations: while socialist and liberal MEPs outlined harsh criticisms, the representatives of the European Peoples' Party were supportive. (Spiegel 2012)

Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union is regulating the mechanism of the EU for remedial actions in the event of clear risk or serious and persistent breach of common values by a member state. Since this procedure, commonly called as the „nuclear option” carries extremely severe consequences (might lead to the suspension of voting rights in the Council for the member state in question) and the criteria serving as a basis for the procedure (clear legal definitions of common values) are not adequately defined and measurable, four foreign ministers (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark) suggested the elaboration of a new 'rule of law mechanism' – allegedly, the debates about it were kept alive by the significantly because of the Hungarian case. (POP 2014) The Hungarian case was on the agenda of the Council in 2012 when the representative of the Commission reported to the institution. This kind of proceeding had been unheard of before. (Gazdag 2014: 226)

On the policy level the government worked hard to proceed. On 21 June 2013 the Council lifted the excessive deficit procedure from Hungary that has been going on since accession.⁹ During the negotiations for the 2014-20 multiannual financial framework Hungary received more resources than before both in the cohesion and the agricultural budget. A Hungarian initiative established the basis for the EU framework for National Roma Integration Strategies¹⁰ and also for the European Union Strategy for Danube Region (EDRS).¹¹

When applying the theoretical framework of Europeanisation for Hungarian government policy towards the EU in the first ten years of membership, we can see both top-down and bottom up processes. Governments have been mostly striving to apply EU policies and law in Hungary. As an exception, the processes under the second Orbán government (2010-2014) indicate that while the number of infringement cases have not become excessive, their nature changed: procedures and debates show that there are problems with applying EU values and standards in Hungarian internal decisions. These processes differentiate the understanding of top-down europeanisation processes in the post-accession period. The trend of bottom-up Europeanisation occurred in the Hungarian governmental policies also after 2010. One of the reasons for this is the date of the Hungarian presidency – in the first six months of 2011 the government administration of the second Orbán government achieved a number of its agenda – the Roma strategy, the Danube strategy, also the completion of the Croatia accession negotiations. The other reason for the occurrence of bottom-up Europeanisation derives from the understanding of governance of the Prime

Minister Viktor Orbán. With two thirds majority, the changes of the political and the constitutional system was carried out in certain elements without attention to the basic values of the European Union. These processes lead to Hungary become an agenda setter in the case of regulating democracy protection in the member states.

3.2. Parliament

The role of national parliaments in the European Union can be discussed in two levels. First, national parliaments have a role in defining the national EU policies (implementing EU law, co-operation with the government in defining EU-strategies, etc.) – that is usually dominated by the government. Second, since the Treaty of Lisbon national parliaments may contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union, they can use new procedures to become active players in the European political space.

The Hungarian Parliament and the European Parliament established relations already in the 1980s when officially there were no diplomatic relations between the COMECON (and its members) and the European Communities. After the completion of the association agreement, as a first step towards closer co-operation, the Hungarian parliament, as the first country in the CEE region to do so, set up a Committee for EU Affairs in 1992. (20 Years... 16.) Its role in the accession process was formal and symbolic: the negotiations were led by the government and the minister for foreign affairs notified the Committee about the developments from time to time. (20 Years... 31.)

After accession, together with Hungary's position, the competence of the Committee changed. Its most important task is to participate in the so-called conciliation procedure with the government. The role of this procedure is that the parliament has the opportunity to control the government in at least a limited number of issues. In this procedure the Committee has exclusive competence that means that these issues do not get to be discussed at the plenary session. The Committee receives all dossiers connected to Hungarian EU policy but during a parliamentary session (approximately half a year) only 10-15 dossiers (usually ones that require two-thirds majority or contain provisions that contradict national ones) are subject to the procedure. During the procedure, the Committee gives opinions that are politically binding for the government.

Parliamentary control over government EU policies depend on a number of procedural questions: how parliaments receive EU initiatives, how competent parliaments/parliamentary committees are (depending on staff and other resources), how thorough the parliamentary scrutiny is, how strongly the parliament can influence decisions (or make decisions themselves).(Győri 2004: 39) On the basis of these criteria, the Hungarian Parliament and its Committee on EU Affairs plays minimal role in the Hungarian EU policy-making. It is the government itself that forwards EU initiatives to the Parliament and plays the main role in identifying which dossier to put under the conciliation procedure. The Committee is understaffed and underresourced to do this job alone. As stated above, the conciliation procedure gives limited rights to the Committee and the Parliament itself – no co-decision and the number of scrutinized issues is rather limited – 10-15 as opposed to the thousands that the government processes a year.

The participation of national parliaments in EU decision-making, according to Protocol No. 2. of the Treaty of Lisbon, is about the opportunity to influence the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to the procedure, if the national parliaments with one third of their votes refuse the proposal of the European Commission, it has to be revised. This, so-called 'yellow card' procedure stopped important Commission initiatives: e.g. the Monti II case in 2012 and the proposal for European Public Prosecutor's Office in 2013. (Brady 2013) In the latter yellow card procedure the Hungarian Parliament voted for the stoppage of the proposal.

Europeanisation in the case of the Hungarian Parliament can be analysed with the limitations of the role it plays in the EU policies of Hungary since it is more of a contributor to the decision-making than a decision-maker itself. Bottom-up Europeanisation can be observed in the case of the yellow card procedure in the one case of the European Public Prosecutor's office.

3.3. Court of Justice

Hungary started to apply EU law 1st May 2004, just like every member state. The application of EU law – although a compulsory element of EU membership – is not a mechanic process. Hesserlink talks about a new European legal culture where it is hard to detach

community and national law, he argues that we can observe the Europeanisation of private law. (Hesserlink 2001) Thus, in this framework it is necessary to have a look at different aspects of the Europeanisation of the Hungarian legal system. In the following we have a short look on the system of preliminary rulings, the occurrence of European law in Hungarian court rulings and also the institutional changes in the Hungarian court system

Preliminary rulings give an opportunity for national courts to turn to the European Court of Justice about the interpretation of EU law. Its frequency is determined by several criteria: structural factors like population, litigation culture, the application of EU law (there is a hypothetical correlation between the frequency of infringement procedures and preliminary rulings), but factors like the knowledge of languages of judges, their knowledge of EU law, etc. (Osztovits 2013: 40-46) The determination of the use of preliminary rulings by national factors is proven by the fact that while France and Germany are founding members of the EC with similar population size, France used this tool in 862 cases, while Germany in 1953 cases by 2012. (Court of Justice 2013: 117-119) However, it is worth noting that Hungary was the most active member state in the Central and Eastern European region (64 cases between 2004 and 2012, while e.g. Poland 49, Czech Republic 27 cases in the same period). (Osztovits 2013: 26) In this respect, bottom-up Europeanisation in terms of adequate application of EU law is considerable in Hungary.

The relevance of EU law can be also examined by the referencing of EU law in the explanations of judgement. According to the database of the Curia of Hungary, between 1992 and 2014, there are 6817 references to EU law, 6367 of which is dated after 2004, the date of accession. Out of 18.000 judgements (2012-2014) one thousand references EU law. (Kálmán 2014) However, the qualitative analysis of these data are still to be carried out: the Europeanisation factor of law application of Hungary could be analysed only on the basis of a thorough content analysis of the judgements. (D. Tóth et. al. 2008)

While the entry into force of EU law in Hungary can be connected to a date, courts started their preparations for a new legal system years before Hungarian accession. At the moment, the institutional structure of the Hungarian court system includes a support for the application of EU law: in every Hungarian Court there is an EU law expert judge who can give advice to his colleagues. This structural characteristic can be viewed from two sides: from

one perspective, it is useful to have advice at place if necessary; on the other hand, if judges were trained satisfactorily in EU law, this system would not be necessary.

4. Europeanisation of political actors

4.1. Political parties

To what extent did the Hungarian national parties fit in the transnational European party system? The founding fathers of European integration believed that due to the 'spill over' effect, the national political parties are going to be Europeanised over time. It can be argued, that to some extent this is what happened: there are transnational parties in the European Parliament. The currently governing Fidesz (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party*) and KDNP (*Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt; Christian Democratic People's Party*) are members in the European People's Party, the MSZP (*Magyar Szocialista Párt, Hungarian Socialist Party*) and the DK (*Demokratikus Koalíció, Democratic Coalition*) are members in the European Socialist Party, the LMP (*Lehet már a politika, Politics Can Be Different*) and the PM (*Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt, Dialogue for Hungary*) are the members of European Green Party. Jobbik (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom; Movement for a Better Hungary*) is not a member of any European party. And the Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) fraction at present has no Hungarian member; previously SZDSZ (*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, Alliance of Free Democrats*) was a member of it. The relationship of the domestic and European parties could be characterised by double logic. For the domestic political parties on one hand, it is essential to identify themselves in a larger European political space. On the other, the European parties are stronger if the member parties have a larger electorate. It is therefore not surprising that the European People's Party's website has a map of Europe, where golden stars indicate when their member party is in a governing position, e.g. in case of Hungary Fidesz is marked as such. For the newly established domestic parties, their acceptance by a transnational European party has a legitimising function. In 2014 the DK announced with pleasure, that the European Socialists included them in their fraction.

In order to examine the Europeanisation of the political parties, their programs and campaigns in the so far held three EP elections can be analysed. As we will see, the

Hungarian case demonstrates the overall trend in the new members (CEE region). (Ughy, 2010:17) As the first practical experience were obtained in the enlarged European political space, the political actors started to change their attitude towards the Union. The political parties' attitude to Europe is essentially determined whether they are in governing or opposition roles. Generally, opposition parties are more successful at EP elections than the governing parties except in cases where national elections are close in time to the EP elections. Although there are more arguments that the EP elections shall be considered as 'second-order' elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) there are also explanations that bringing specifically European issues in focus may affect electoral behaviour at national level. (Hix and Marsh, 2004: 27) The 'Big Bang' members could vote at EP elections in 2004 at first time, in 2009 the second and in 2014 the third time. The voter turnout at the three EP elections remained below the average of the Union in each election period and demonstrates a decreasing trend in Hungary: in 2004 it was 38,50 percent, in 2009 36,31 percent and in 2014 28,92 percent. At the most recent, 2014 EP election wave, the Hungarian electoral participation was the fifth lowest in the V5¹² region after the Slovak, the Czech, the Slovenian and the Polish participation rate.

The first 2004 European Parliament elections – that were held at the middle of the domestic electoral cycle - provided the opportunity for Hungarian political parties to be challenged at European level and gave the opportunity to be able to come up with Europe related messages in their campaigns. At that time, the popularity of the governing coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats significantly decreased. It is therefore not surprising that the centre right opposition headed by Fidesz interpreted the EP elections as a new territory to be able to criticize the government and the governing parties in their campaign. (Bátory and Husz, 2006: 181-215) Consequently, the governing parties received hard criticism from Fidesz because of their too adaptive approach to the EU, highlighting that compared to Poland; Hungary had lower interest representation ability at the accession negotiations. The messages of the political parties were communicated to the voters in bullet points that however only sporadically contained EU content, and were mainly focused on domestic issues. Thus, the campaigns of the first EP elections were mainly focused on domestic issues. The weakening MSZP, seeing an opportunity in the EP elections to regain sympathy and recover popularity, was urging for the collaboration of all parties.

The socialist prime minister of that time, Peter Medgyessy even came up with the idea to form a common list of EP member candidates with the opposition parties. This proposal was however rigidly rejected by the opposition party, Fidesz: Viktor Orbán commented the proposal as: 'the proposal of the prime minister (Medgyessy) set the country against Europe and Europe's democratic traditions'. (Viktor Orbán, 21 February 2004)

Eurocritical and Eurosceptic elements appeared in the 2004 Fidesz EP campaign in particular with reference to EU accession, its negative effects and the losers of the process. This was the first time when the demand on 'Emancipation' first time appeared in Fidesz campaign, emphasizing that the uncritical adoption of EU proposals and initiatives is a false direction (namely emphasizing the purely top-down direction of Europeanisation), and Hungary shall provide its own solutions (literally arguing for bottom-up initiatives). The Alliance of Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (*Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF*) strived to stay detached from the two big parties, the Socialists and the Fidesz. However, as the content of the EP campaigns show, European themes only appeared in the campaign of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). They were campaigning for free movement of labour in the EU, bureaucracy and tax reduction and for a constructive attitude to the European constitutionalisation process. Although it is outside the focus of our paper, it should be noted that the radical Eurosceptic attitude in 2004 was only represented by two non-parliamentary parties in Hungary: the extreme right-wing MIÉP (*The Hungarian Truth and Life Party*) and the ultra-left-wing Hungarian Workers' Party. The 2004 EP election brought the victory of Fidesz: it acquired 12 mandates from the 24, while the MSZP gained 9, the SZDSZ 2, the MDF 1 seats.

The 2009 European Parliament elections delivered new party campaigns and messages. Since they were close to national parliamentary elections in time, and they even preceded them, the Hungarian political parties assumed that the results of the EP elections might affect the national results. Five years of EU membership provided several European subjects for the campaign too. Nevertheless, these elections were significantly determined by the domestic politics too, because of a serious internal political crisis. The domestic crisis broke out with the famous 'Ószöd speech' in 2006, when Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted that the government was continuously lying to the citizens.¹³ The crisis led to the liberals' (SZDSZ) exit from the coalition in 2008 and in 2009 Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány

also had to renounce. At the same time, in 2008 the negative effects of the global financial and economic crisis hit Europe causing a long-term recession in the EU and in Hungary as well. Fidesz, the opposition party, interpreted this position as a chance to outbreak from the second time 'loser' position (in the last two parliamentary elections Fidesz lost), and regain the sympathy of the Hungarian electorates. Accordingly, Fidesz prepared a detailed EP campaign and worked out a strategy how to re-win the mandates first at EP and then also at national elections.

The *'Yes, Hungary can do more'* program contained a detailed analysis of the Hungarian EU membership on the 'bad Copenhagen deal' at the accession (in 2004), the five-year experience as a new member, the negative effects of the crisis as well as the disappointment of Hungarians in EU membership. In each of the listed areas, Fidesz blamed the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition for weak economic performance, being excessively adaptive to European Union's proposals, and for the weak interest representation capability in the Hungary-EU relations. Fidesz communicated a need for a new political power in the government. Campaign visuals and posters of Fidesz in EP campaigns often included the word *'Enough!'*.

The demand for 'emancipation' was more strongly emphasized in the Fidesz campaign program than in 2004. In the campaign program a chapter heading reminded the voters: not only the European Union shall affect the member states, but also the member states shall affect the Union. This is a reminder of the double nature of Europeanisation in which not only the top-down but also the bottom up process has relevance. The program stressed, however, that 'Brussels is not Moscow' and the decisions of EU institutions are not 'external dictates'. In the same document we can also find reference that Fidesz sketches the future of Hungary in a strengthened Europe that represents a 'community of common values'. The program further stresses that common principles and values shall be protected, therefore: 'The European Union shall be vested with means to compel its members to comply with the common principles and encourage them to respect the common values. Without it, there is no strong Europe.'¹⁴ The regular personal appearances of Fidesz party leader Viktor Orbán in campaign events also supported the implementation of the campaign objectives. (Mihályffy and Szabó, 2010: 50). In contrast, the text of EP campaign of the socialists – which were at that time governing alone¹⁵ - was labelled as 'With renewed power' and suggested that the party itself recognised: it needs to gather impetus to convince their electorates that the

party is different from the Gyurcsány-government. In their campaign they emphasized that the EP elections should be about European issues and not domestic politics. Despite this, however, in their campaign they mostly formulated domestic political messages.

After the breakdown of government coalition, the position of the liberal party, SZDSZ was significantly weakened. Therefore, the campaign of the liberals compared to 2004 proved to be modest; they had only minimal ambitions and less clearly defined messages. The question they put into the forefront of their communication was the following: '*Are there 200 001 free democrat voters?*' They only wanted to obtain one mandate, but finally they could not get any.

For the future of the MDF, it was also a key issue to obtain at least one mandate at the EP elections. They decided to put Lajos Bokros, an internationally recognised economic expert who is however a sharing personality in Hungary at the first place of their EP list that proved to be a good strategy. MDF acquired a mandate. The real winner of the 2009 EP elections however was the radical right-wing *Jobbik*. The program of *Jobbik* embedded Eurosceptic messages in its electoral program. The title of the campaign was 'Hungary belongs to Hungarians. The program of *Jobbik* to defend the Hungarian interest and create the nations of Europe'.¹⁶ The program further emphasized: 'In the EU institutions, in Brussels and at home, instead of the current principle of adaptation there is only one principle: the interest of the nation that is above everything.'¹⁷ Later, the campaign text described the EU as a 'Brussels guided empire' and it highlighted that there should be an alternative to it. Nevertheless, the program of *Jobbik* stressed that the party aims to undertake an active role in forming the EU on a specific ideological basis. *Jobbik* took a stand against the free purchase of land, the common agricultural policy rules. As the EP election results show, four parties obtained mandate: the Fidesz-KDNP: 14, the Hungarian Socialist Party 4, the *Jobbik* 3 and the MDF 1.

For the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections, a substantially changed Hungarian party system was preparing. (Enyedi-Benoit, 2010: 17-18). The national elections were held 6 April 2014, first time since the new Hungarian constitution entered into force 1 January 2012 and according to the new electoral system. This new electoral system is characterised by a single round election mechanism that represents the winner takes all logic. Further, due to the new electoral system, the Hungarian parliament shrank significantly: instead of the former

386 members of parliament, in 2014 only 199 members could be elected. Accordingly, the party system and the actors on the left-right ideological scale changed fundamentally. The two small parties that initiated the change of the regime in 1989, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) did not get into the national parliament. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) shrunk significantly and become a small party in size. At the same time the coalition of the centre right-wing Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) acquired two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament. In 2010, two new parties appeared in the parliament, the radical right, Jobbik and a green party LMP (Politics Can Be Different). Additionally, the three other smaller parties appeared on the palette: the Democratic Coalition (Demokratikus Koalíció, DK) led by the former prime minister Gyurcsány, the Together – Party for a New Era (Együtt – A Korszakváltók Pártja) led by the former, left wing prime minister Gordon Bajnai and the Dialogue for Hungary (Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt, PM) established by former members of the green party: LMP. The latter two formed an electoral alliance (Együtt-PM) against the government of Viktor Orbán and won four seats in the national assembly and one in the EP. This coalition ceased to exist after the two elections (national and EP) in 2014. At the national elections, the victory of Fidesz was repeated; with KDNP the party gained two-third majority in the parliament. This is a unique phenomenon in the post-1945 political history of Hungary and created a new era of party politics, too. (Enyedi – Benoit, 2011:22)

The EP campaigns of the parties also reflected the changed power relations in the Hungarian national assembly, where apart from a centre-right wing coalition of Fidesz-KDNP there were significantly smaller parties on the left side. With regard to timing the 2014 European Parliamentary elections can be characterised as unique too. They were very close in time to the domestic parliamentary elections (April 6, 2014). The EP elections were held 25 May, 2014. The consequence of this was that the campaigns were not separated from each other and since the national elections preceded the EP elections, the emphasis was mainly on the previous ones. As a proof of its confidence, the Fidesz-KDNP did not even publish an official program neither for the national elections nor for the EP elections. This was a significant change compared to 2009, when Fidesz in opposition as it was discussed above, prepared a detailed document, and invested high energies in the European Parliament election campaign. In 2014, for Fidesz, the EP campaign was not a priority. Fidesz-KDNP only

published the list of candidates for EP elections. Among the parties, the radical right wing opposition party, Jobbik prepared the most detailed program. However, compared to 2009 elections, this proved to be less radical and one which tried to bring the party closer to the centre of the ideological spectrum. The Hungarian Socialist Party did not prepare a detailed program either and only included nine bullet points in which the national and European issues were mixed. Among the issues the Socialists' program mentioned the common European objective of creating more jobs and workplaces Europe-wide. The program of the Democratic Coalition that tried to reflect to the government's national campaign which was titled as 'Hungary performs better', but DK turned it to 'Europe performs better' was built around the concept of creating a supranational Europe and proposed the creation of the United States of Europe. The LMP's EP campaign program included the need of the reform EU institutions and the decision-making, and creating a single European labour law, and eliminating the nuclear power plants from Europe. The *Együtt-PM* electoral alliance gave priority to the protection of European values in their campaign. From the twenty-one mandate allocated to Hungary, Fidesz-KDNP obtained 12, Jobbik 3, MSZP and the DK 2-2, LMP and *Együtt-PM* 1-1 mandates. In sum, it can be claimed that Fidesz won without a real program and a separate EP campaign, the MSZP further shrunk, while the two mandates of the Democratic coalition should be considered as a victory of the party.

Above, we have summarized the Hungarian political parties' campaigns and performance at the three waves of EP elections. In the followings, we are going to refer to the results of two research group that tried to characterise the Hungarian political parties' EU attitudes. The question here can be raised, to what extent the parties' attitude to the EU changed as being a member? A Hungarian think-tank, *Policy Solutions* published a study on 'Euro-scepticism in Hungary' in 2012, that was based on a survey conducted among the Hungarian political parties in 2010-11. They characterised parties in a five-grade scale on the basis of their party program and communications. The EU-attitude of the party can be anti-EU (1); EU-sceptic (2); Inconsistent (3); Supportive (4); Full supportive (5). According to party programs, Fidesz-KDNP was supportive, the right-wing Jobbik EU-sceptic, the MSZP full supportive and the green, LMP also proved to be supportive. However, based on their communication, Fidesz-KDNP was put into the EU-sceptic, the Jobbik into anti-EU, the MSZP into full supportive and LMP into supportive categories. Consequently, while in case of left-wing parties

categorisation was similar based on programs and rhetoric, in case of right-wing parties the political communication proved to be more Eurosceptic than their programs would suggest. (Bíró Nagy and Boros and Varga, 2012: 1-36).

Another qualitative research based on a more sophisticated methodology was conducted by the *Hungarian Europe Society* in two waves (between summer 2009 and summer 2012 and the second one between summer 2012 and end of 2013).¹⁸ The research group worked out an own methodology to measure the political parties' EU attitudes, and developed an indicator: the *PERC indicator (Party EU-attitude Report Card)*. They determined a 10-grade scale to rank the parties. The Parties at the ten-grade scale could be ranked as EU-destructive (1); EU-phobic (2); hard EU-sceptic (3); soft EU-sceptic (4); EU-pessimistic (5); EU-pragmatic; (6) soft EU-pragmatic (7); EU-constructive (8); EU-optimistic (9) and Federalist (10). The analysis was built on plenary speeches at the European Parliament and at the national assembly, and on media-appearances.¹⁹ In 2012, Fidesz was characterised as EU-pragmatic, the MSZP as soft-EU pragmatic, the Jobbik as hard EU-sceptic, the LMP as EU-constructive, the DK as soft EU-pragmatic²⁰ The second wave of the research that was based on a data collection between summer 2012 and the end of 2013 brought different results. According to this, the Fidesz was already EU-pessimistic, LMP is only EU-pragmatic, the MSZP, the Együtt-PM and DK were all soft-EU pragmatic, and Jobbik remained hard EU-sceptic. Consequently, in 2013 the research group did not find any parties that could fall into the category of EU-constructive. Moreover, according to their conclusions, not only the rhetoric of the governing Fidesz turned to be critical towards the Union, but this attitude seemed to become consistent.²¹

4.2 Hungarian citizens

The analysis of the attitudes and opinions of the Union's citizens towards the Union can bring lights to the processes coming from the individuals, whose consent is necessary to keep the European polity together. With regard to the NMS as Hungary, the question can be raised whether with more than ten years behind the country as full member, how do Hungarians relate to the European Union? The attitudes and opinions of Hungarian citizens

are going to be demonstrated based on the secondary data of Eurobarometer (EB) opinion polls.

In general, it can be argued that the hopes of the Hungarian population in relation to membership were not fulfilled during the more than a decade of membership in the Union. In particular, this can be demonstrated in the negative turn in the trend of the support for EU membership in Hungary. Before entering the EU, in spring 2004 the support for membership of the European Union was 45 percent among the Hungarians; at the same time 32 percent of the citizens thought that the country's EU membership is 'neither a good nor a bad thing' and 15 percent had negative opinion on it.²² For 2008, Hungarians' support for EU membership has decreased to 31 percent, that was the lowest in the CEE region this proved to be long-lasting trend.²³ The non-fulfilment of expectations linked to membership could be demonstrated through the citizens' views on the image of the EU. Those that identified the EU with a positive image fall to 30-31 percent from a previously much higher level of 40-50 percent in 2011.²⁴

As one of the most valuable benefit for individuals, the Hungarian citizens become EU citizens with wide range of rights for the individuals. But did it result in also becoming European citizens during the first decade of membership? Although the economic and financial crisis presumably had a negative effect on the support for EU membership and the perceived image of the EU, the feeling of EU citizenship remained relatively stable during the ten years period.²⁵ In the European Union there are in majority that feel themselves to some extent as European citizens too.²⁶

Table 2. Do you feel yourself as.....citizen?²⁷

Member states	Only national	National and European	European and national	Only European	To some extent European
EU28	39	51	6	2	59
eurozone	39	54	7	2	63
non-eurozone	49	43	4	2	49
Bulgaria	49	41	6	0	47
Czech	48	45	4	3	52

Republic					
Estonia	38	56	4	1	61
Latvia	44	44	8	2	54
Lithuania	45	49	4	1	54
Hungary	46	44	8	2	54
Poland	36	55	4	1	60
Romania	47	46	4	3	53
Slovenia	37	56	3	2	61
Slovakia	44	48	6	1	55

In 2004 67 percent of the Hungarians answered that they feel themselves solely as national citizens, in 2014 it was only 46 percent. And if we add the values where the European citizenship also present, we can further argue that currently in Hungary the majority of the population feels themselves to some extent European citizen as well. With this result Hungary fits to the average of the CEE new member states'. (Table 2.)

Conclusions

The first ten years of EU membership has been briefly discussed in the previous chapters. Returning to our theoretical framework, Europeanisation and its conceptual questions, they can frame Hungarian developments as well. The triangular model that includes the policy, politics and polity aspects of Europeanisation was capable to describe the multidirectional effects of the process and also to identify the outcomes of the process.

Recalling the process and/or outcome question in the 'polity', institutional changes – in the government, in the court and in the parliamentary committee procedures can be understood as permanent changes and thus can be put to the outcome category. However, in case of the analysis of political developments and social effects, it can be understood as a process. After 2004 the left-liberal governments - while declaring active EU policy to be conducted - were undecisive in their goals and methods. After 2010, the Orbán government with a two-thirds majority clearly defined Hungarian national interests frequently as

opposed to European interests and in internal politics introduced reforms that were against EU law and also European values. Thus, Europeanisation as a process includes constant change – maybe in the politics ‘angle’ (of our triangle) there is no outcome (defined as some sort of a stable result) at all.

The conceptual question of the direction of Europeanisation also showed significant changes in the first ten years of EU membership. Driven by the principle of conditionality during the accession process, top-down Europeanisation dominated the first period and on the policy level it remained so also under the Orbán government. However, in the latter period, bottom-up processes could also be observed. The 2011 Hungarian presidency provided the framework for putting issues that were important for the government on the EU agenda. Also the internal political development in Hungary triggered European processes – the initiatives for an EU scrutiny procedure for democracy-control of the member states were pushed forward by the Hungarian case. In the same vein, the attitude of the political parties has changed significantly during the ten years of membership by developing a stronger eurosceptic rhetoric.

This leads us to the issue of Europeanisation as a value driven concept. As we noted above, Europeanisation has a certain image in itself, suggesting that the EU brings about peace, prosperity, solidarity and bridges gaps between the developed and the underdeveloped. Thus, its embedded meaning refers to the idea of an ‘ever closer Union’. But is that really meaningful if we call certain processes ‘Europeanisation’ when they are - while truly happening on the European level – are against common values or (like Euroscepticism) are against the European polity?

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Notes

¹ For example, the new member, Czech Republic did not sign the Fiscal Compact together with United Kingdom in 2012.

² Meetings of EKTB are supported by 53 expert groups. The system is regulated by Governmental decree 1169/2010 (VIII. 18.).

³ The number of expert group meetings at the Council level reaches a yearly average of 3-4.000, the COREPER sits 80-100 times a year with an agenda of 40-50 items. These numbers reflect the workload of the Hungarian governmental structures as well. Source: Interview with Krisztina Varga, head of EKTB unit, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 November 2014.

⁴ REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 31st ANNUAL REPORT ON MONITORING THE APPLICATION OF EU LAW (2013) Brussels, 1.10.2014 COM(2014) 612 final. 4-11.

http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_31/com_2014_612_en.pdf

⁵ REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION. Hungary. Report prepared in accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty. Brussels, 12.5.2004 SEC(2004) 578 final.

⁶ 1012/2008. (III. 4.) Korm. határozat Magyarország külkapcsolati stratégiájáról

⁷ Magyar külpolitika az uniós elnökség után. Külügyminisztérium, Budapest, 2011.

http://eu.kormany.hu/download/4/c6/20000/kulpolitikai_strategia_20111219.pdf.

⁸ Report on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI)) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Rui Tavares.

⁹ COUNCIL DECISION of 21 June 2013 abrogating Decision 2004/918/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Hungary (2013/315/EU)

¹⁰ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 COM/2011/0173 final

¹¹ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS European Union Strategy for Danube Region. Brussels, 08/12/2010 COM(2010) 715

¹² This indicates the Visegrád member states plus Slovenia.

¹³ Prime minister's speech at the party summit at Ószöd, 17 Sept 2006.

¹⁴ 'Yes, Hungary can perform better!' European Parliamentary Elections Program: www.valasztas.2009.fidesz.hu

¹⁵ The Alliance of Free Democrats got out of the coalition in 2008.

¹⁶ 'Hungary belongs to Hungarians. The program of Jobbik to defend the Hungarian interest and create the nations of Europe' European Parliamentary Elections Program, Jobbik, March 2009.

¹⁷ 'Hungary belongs to Hungarians. The program of Jobbik to defend the Hungarian interest and create the nations of Europe' European Parliamentary Elections Program, Jobbik, March 2009.

¹⁸ PERC indicator (Party EU-attitude Report Card) Dec. 2012 (I. volume)

http://www.europatarsasag.hu/images/2012dec/perc_web.pdf and

http://www.europatarsasag.hu/images/2014Marc/perc2_web.pdf

March 2014 (II. volume)

¹⁹ PERC indicator (Party EU-attitude Report Card), 25-26.

²⁰ PERC indicator (Party EU-attitude Report Card), 146.

²¹ PERC indicator (Party EU-attitude Report Card), 153.

²² EB 70

²³ A 2004-ben mért támogatottsági arány, már egy jelentős csökkenés eredménye, hiszen 2002 őszén az új tagállamok lakosságának körében 52, míg Magyarországon 67%-os volt a támogatottság.

²⁴ EB 80

²⁵ EB 73-81.

²⁶ EB 81.

²⁷ EB 81. The dark grey cells indicate the percentage of the citizens who feel themselves to some extent European.