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Rising Powers in the European Union's External Energy Relations – From Competition towards Enhanced Cooperation?¹

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1 Introduction

Governance of energy resources can be regarded as one of the greatest, yet widely underscored global challenges. A reliable and sustainable access to energy is vital for the functioning of states, economies and societies. Looking back into history, the European Union's institutional predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), already emphasized the huge role energy has always played for European integration. In fact, as energy has now become a prominent issue in nearly all of the EU's political dialogues, the external dimension is also gaining importance, whereas it barely appeared on the agenda ten years ago (Youngs 2009, Belyi 2008). Whilst energy cooperation with major supplier countries, such as Russia, the Middle East, or the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are high priority issues due to the long tradition of oil and gas agreements, it seems that the EU has missed momentum regarding cooperation with rising powers such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa (BICS) and risks being placed in an outsider position. In fact, emerging powers have triggered a fundamental shift in international energy policy. While China could soon become the world's largest oil importer, India might likewise become the biggest importer of coal by 2020 and might take over as one of the largest growing economies (IEA 2013a:1). At the same time, the emerging powers are also readjusting the compass in terms of renewable energies, as the BICS all plan to massively increase their share of renewables (IEA 2013b:1999). As interdependencies between regions/countries and competition for scarce resources grow, European external energy relations need to readjust and integrate rising powers into a close-knit network (Elgström/Smith 2013; Keukeleire / Hooijmaaijers 2014). To understand how the EU is exerting its external energy policy towards BICS, this paper seeks to explain the shape, scope and structure of the bilateral energy dialogues that have evolved between them. After displaying the energy relations with the four emerging powers, we focus on three explanatory aspects guided by the following research questions:

- How is the interaction between the EU and emerging powers initiated in the case of external energy relations? Which aspects shape the external energy governance of the EU-and emerging powers?
- Which perceptions of self and other does the EU hold? How does the EU interpret the normative energy triangle of security, competitiveness and sustainability? How does it promote its understanding in relations with emerging powers?
- Which motivations and interests does the EU follow in the energy dialogues with emerging powers?

We therefore analyze: (1) from an institutionalist perspective the multilevel-governance architecture of the EU; (2) from a constructivist approach focus on normative and discursive aspects, perceptions and external identities, i.e. the EU's self-perception and the perception of the respective dialogue partner, the normative orientation of the EU; (3) out of a rational-choice perspective concentrate on the motivations and interests of the EU in the energy dialogues. These findings are then "translated"

¹ This paper sums up research results from the VW-funded project "Challenges of European External Energy Governance with Emerging Powers: Meeting Tiger, Dragon, Lion and Jaguar".

into a set of policy recommendations, which seek to outline chances and challenges for vitalizing the energy relations between the EU and Brazil, India, China and South Africa.

Our empirical evidence is based on a cross-country survey done in the BICS between 2012 and 2013. 143 participants of the four energy dialogues took part in a network analysis and filled in a questionnaire that explored normative orientations, mutual perceptions and political preferences/interests. This corresponds with an average response rate of 52%. Additionally, 150 qualitative interviews with energy experts from the EU institutions as well as the corresponding BICS institutions, politicians, private actors, and civil society were carried out between 2011 and 2013.

2 European energy relations with Emerging Powers

European relations with emerging powers trace back to the earlier days of the European Community, as the timeline below shows. For most of the time, cooperation with the BICS had been reduced to external trade diplomacy, while an integrative approach was missing. In order to enhance – or at present better maintain – its global role, the EU has identified ten countries as strategic partners and has engaged in deeper cooperation with them. In the aftermath of the Iraq war in 2003 and the emanating crisis in the Trans-Atlantic relations between the EU and the US, the strategic partnerships were viewed as a tool to enhance multilateralism – in contrast to the US unilateralism – and from the perspective of emerging powers to recognize the emerging multipolar world order. China and India were already identified as important partners in the European Security Strategy (2003) and strategic partnerships were established at the summits 2003 and 2004, whilst Brazil and South Africa joined the club only in 2007. Still, Keukeleire et al. (2011: 24) note that EU awareness of the potential and importance of India only increased at the turn of the millennium and that Brazil joining the group of countries was also attributed to high interest of the Portuguese EU Presidency in strengthening ties with Brazil in times of stagnating trade relations in the EU-Mercosur agreement. In the case of South Africa former President Thabo Mbeki was decisive in seeking stronger cooperation with the EU. Strategic Partnerships represent a relatively flexible instrument that allows intensifying cooperation and opening up dialogic arenas in order to facilitate communication between the two partners. Political dialogue serves as an important diplomatic tool and in each of the Strategic Partnerships with the BICS a number of thematic dialogues have evolved. For the BICS the recognition of a multipolar world order and thus, their status as major powers, might have been a main motivation to engage in a strategic partnership with the EU; the EU intended to “multilateralise multipolarism” (ibid.: 23) and thus promote its model of effective multilateralism by diversifying partnerships. Keukeleire et al. (2011: 26) identify the perceived value of the relationship as follows “Now it is increasingly the case that BRICS countries are reluctant to recognize the EU as ‘a player’ or ‘stakeholder’ at all on many issues. Even worse, if the EU’s original idea was to coax the BRICS countries into its own framework of effective multilateralism, it has increasingly been forced to play ball with the game-rule preferred by the BRICS”.

Within the scope of the annual summits between the EU and emerging powers (with parallel business summits for private sector involvement), different sectoral dialogues have been established; energy is among these. Yet, as energy issues have only recently been incorporated into supra-national policy making, the history of the energy dialogues with the BICS is much shorter, with most dialogues being initiated between 2004 and 2007, except the EU-China energy cooperation, which dates back to 1994. The energy dialogues are split into different working groups focusing on specific technical issues, such as energy efficiency (in the case of China a very important working group), clean coal/carbon capture and storage or smart grids. The participants come from the political and administrative sphere, from business organizations, environmental NGOs and academia; access to the working groups is by invitation only. Over the years, the energy dialogues have been able to connect political actors and enhance a regular exchange of ideas. They have resulted in the creation of bilateral policy networks, which have been successful in (re)framing the political agenda and

introducing new topics to the field of international energy policy-making. The shape, structure and scope of the four energy dialogues varies, with considerable differences regarding the mode of interaction, the agenda and controversies about the issues in question and the prominence each of the dialogues have acquired within the EU and the Emerging Powers cooperation.

Figure 1: Overview of EU-EP Energy Relations


	EU-Brazil Dialogue	EU-India Dialogue	EU- China Dialogue	EU-South Africa Dialogue
Most central EU actors	DG Energy, DG DevCo, DG Trade, EEAS/ Delegation	DG Energy, EEAS/ Delegation, DG Climate	DG Energy, EEAS/ Delegation, DG Trade	DG Energy, EEAS/ Delegation
Agenda	Biofuels, Renewables, Offshore Safety	Clean Coal, Technology transfer	Energy Efficiency, Renewables, Energy Security, Urbanization,	Clean Coal, Carbon Capture and Storage, Decarbonisation
Controversies	Biofuels Standards	Implementation of concrete projects	Intellectual Property Rights	Controversies over market entry
Prominence	High interest in biofuels certification from Brazilian actors, growing EU interest	New potential since 2012 and joint declaration on energy cooperation	Established high prominence for both partners	Low prominence for EU, growing South African interest in Green Economy

Source: Authors' own visualization

To analyze the differences in the respective dialogues within the mode of interaction dimension we draw back on the actors' networks of each dialogue by using the methodological approaches of network analysis and qualitative interview analysis. Due to the limited space in this paper we will only show the aggregated network data as block matrices. The networks of the EU-Brazil Energy Dialogue lead to the impression that Brazil-EU energy cooperation remains below its potential. Generally, the EU is not the most important partner for Brazil and bilateral relations with EU member states have always been more important. On the other hand, with current developments of Brazil being likely to become the fifth-largest economy within the next 20 years and with an internal market almost of the size of the EU, the EU has acknowledged that Brazil still is one of its closest strategic partners in terms of normative orientation and foreign policy goals and has uplifted bilateral relations – outside the Mercosur framework – to a Strategic Partnership in 2007. Brazil on the other hand has re-oriented its foreign policy – traditionally between the US and the EU – now leading to an increasing “Bricalization” and South-South cooperation (Gratius 2012). The network exchange block matrices for Brazil illustrate that Brazilian actors are engaging with the EU public and private actors, but not vice versa. This could be explained by the Brazilian aim of cooperating in the field of biofuels with the EU, which at the time of conducting our survey was a very salient issue. In order to expand its global reach and market shares in countries around the world, Brazil aimed at having its second generation biofuels certified according to EU sustainability standards. Through joint trilateral cooperation projects in Mozambique it would have been an implicit way of demonstrating that Brazilian and EU sustainability standards in biofuels production were compatible. This also explains the high importance that is attributed to Brazilian private actors, such as the Sugarcane Producers Union and their exchange relations with Brazilian and EU public actors. The triangular cooperation

project never materialized, so that interest from the Brazilian side has decreased. The China-EU energy dialogue has evolved considerably since its inception. Its proliferation of the actors involved, the topics covered, and the high-level meetings (the last energy dialogue was attended on EU-Commissioner and Ministerial level) indicate increased interest from both sides. Furthermore, EU-member state coordination within the 2012 High-Level Meeting on Energy, the establishment of joint centers and implementation of concrete projects give evidence of how substantial the bilateral relations have become. However, in comparison with the Brazil network we clearly see that the EU public actors address the Chinese public and private actors, whereas the average of Chinese actors is not addressing the EU vice versa. The fact that Chinese public actors contact EU private actors underlines the assumption that Chinese preferences mainly focus on private sector cooperation and technology transfer.

Figure 2: Network exchange block matrices



Source: EnergyGov, TU Darmstadt 2014

South African-EU energy cooperation definitely has large potential to increase. Currently, the energy dialogue is quite stagnant, whilst working group meetings on Clean Coal Technologies and CCS have taken place more regularly. Thus, this area and the growing investment opportunities in the South African renewable energies sector seem promising for further enhanced cooperation. Private EU actors are very active in that network and try to interact with all other actor groups whereas the public EU actors only address the South African public actors. Thus, there seems to be a problem of non-diversified communication.

The same holds true for the Indian network. In the Indian case, there is a lack of communication and the EU public actors only address the public Indian actors. There seems to be a close interaction between the Indian public and private actors. In our interviews in Delhi (September 2013), respondents from both sides emphasized that more concrete cooperation projects should be envisaged as results of the dialogue. Currently, our respondents regarded it more as a “talk-shop”, especially when comparing it to bilateral member states initiatives, such as the Indo-German Energy Forum which is a dialogue platform where joint projects are being planned and implemented. When asked why there are no joint projects, as in the China dialogue, respondents from both sides gave the same answer: the EU expects concrete inputs on what India would want; and India expects the EU to come up with concrete proposals of what it could offer. Thus, it seems like discussions are going in a circle and due to personnel constraints on both sides to follow-up and to engage in discussions with various stakeholders, no concrete proposals materialize. For the energy dialogue to remain relevant, this needs to be overcome, especially since from the Indian side there is great willingness to contribute funds for projects like the joint centers in China. Furthermore, the ongoing negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement between the EU and India might also impact energy cooperation. As long as the EU-India FTA negotiations are experiencing a series of standstills, due to different liberalization schedules and the long-standing dispute on investment conditions and IPR (which is quite typical for any North-South FTA), this will thwart agreements in the energy sector as well – especially in terms of technology transfer - and would not allow coming to more substantial cooperation.

3 Understanding EU External Energy Governance

To analyze which factors shape the interaction between the EU and the BICS, we will focus on institutional, normative and interest-based explanations. Each of them can shed light on some of the empirical phenomena and problems: the remote position of European actors and more specifically the unclear role of both DG Energy and the EEAS; the varying relevance of the dialogues, and the political interests of the actors.


3.1 EU External Energy Governance Architecture

Institutions are shaping the actions of political actors. Thus, energy governance within the EU is shaped by the institutional settings of the EU in this policy field. Here we refer to a broad understanding of institutions that implies formal organization of the political process, the rules and procedures in the field as well as the normative orientation. Within this chapter we will analyse the formal and informal dimension of European external energy governance.

Common energy policies seem to be one of the most truly “European” issues. Looking back at the times of the European Community Coal & Steel (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), one would clearly regard this policy field as an example of early supranational cooperation, based on the idea of peaceful and reliable energy supply for a growing community. Instead the EU only exhibits weak competences in the treaties, as European energy policy has been regarded as a strictly national issue for most of time and was only recently regulated at the European

level as a shared competence. With gradual integration over time the European Commission could acquire a stronger energy profile. Thus, the Commission could build up its energy competences (1) within the new integrated environmental competences in the 1980ies, (2) the development of a single European Market also for electricity, petroleum and natural gas as well as (3) through appending cross-border construction of energy infrastructure such as “trans-european networks” (see Fischer 2011).

Figure 3: Development of EU Energy Policy



Source: Own Visualization

The Lisbon Treaty for the first time brought a contractual basis within the European treaties. Article 194 TFEU regulates, that “In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. Article 194, 2 states that: “Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. [...] Such measures shall not affect a member state's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”. Thus, the EU and the member states share energy competences within the European Union. Article 192,2 regulates that the council within a “special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt [...] measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” (192,2 TFEU.).


Already the reference towards the shared competences and the importance of Member State energy policy gives a hint that the coordination of EU and member state energy activities should exhibit an important role in the EU's external energy governance. Indeed our research showed that agreements and partnerships of the EU and member states towards the BICS in the energy sector have at times rivalled each other and there is considerable lack of information of member states' activities in DG Energy. Only recently focus has also been laid on an information exchange mechanism with EU member states (Decision 994/2012/EU in Official Journal of the European Union 2012). According to the new mechanism member states have to inform the Commission of all their new and existing international agreements (IGAs) with third countries in the field of energy; otherwise they risk sanctions. The mechanism should cover only intergovernmental agreements having an impact on the internal energy market or on the security of energy supply in the Union. Regarding future intergovernmental agreements that will be negotiated between member states and third countries, the Commission should be informed. The member states have the possibility to invite the Commission to participate in the negotiations as an observer or an assistant. Actually, the decision also covers the possibility of member states opposing the participation of the Commission in the negotiations. It is stated that: "The Commission should also have the possibility to participate as an observer at its own request, subject to the approval of the Member State concerned". In addition the Commission should facilitate and encourage coordination among member states. With this measurement the EU aims for more transparency which should allow the Commission to take coordinated action for the EU and thus, promote a common voice in energy issues; yet on the other side this could also lead to higher tensions between the member states, as the Commission could induce pressure on them (Interview Permanent Representation of an EU Member State, Brussels, 27.11.2012). Most EU member states oppose this regulation, as they see the confidentiality and sovereignty in setting up energy supply agreements endangered (EURactiv 2012). Nevertheless they comply and inform the Commission about their IGAs. Meanwhile a database has been created with more than 114 IGAs (European Commission 2013a).

The Commission has taken additional initiatives to better exchange of information between the member states on external energy relations. It created discussion forums; for instance monthly discussions in the Council's Energy Working Party, where the Commission updates the member states on the EU activities and/or prepare common EU positions. The Gas Coordination Group has facilitated coordination of security of supply measures at the EU level and had exchanges with supplier, consumer and transit countries. Formal meetings of the Energy Council continued to include international energy relations on the agenda, where discussions at a Ministerial level are taking place. The establishment of a Strategic Group for International Energy Cooperation (Commission, EEAS and member states' Energy and Foreign Affairs Ministries) allows to identify and discuss common priorities, which could lead to the development of joint initiatives and positions vis-à-vis third countries and regions; however the Strategic Group has hitherto only discussed cooperation with China, but no other BICS country (European Commission 2013a). Thus, the establishment of such a forum under the umbrella of the EU-BICS energy dialogues bringing together the working level of EU and member states would be advisable.

As our survey was conducted in 2012 and parts of 2013, this mechanism was either not yet in place or newly established, so that we cannot make clear statements interpreting our survey data on its prominence and effect. Despite overall positive ratings for the bilateral cooperation, stated by the participants of the respective energy dialogues (see below), relations and tensions between the EU and the member states level are issues of concern, as our data on coordination reveals. There does not seem to be an institutionalized coordination between the EU and the member states level. In some cases – especially India is a good example – informal coordination activities have been developed, but they do not involve all participants of the energy dialogues. In the country cases – most strikingly in the EU-Chinese cooperation – a significant amount of EU actors state that there

was no coordination between the supranational and the member states level. While interpreting the data it has to be noted that actors from the member state level were not part of our survey. Including those actors might have changed the outcome. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of the EU actors state that coordination between both levels would be an important issue. This discrepancy suggests that external energy relations tend to run on parallel paths, whereas possible synergies between the supranational and the member states' level are not highly recognized yet. It also seems that for the characteristic challenges of 'realpolitik' – for instance the wish to negotiate over concrete technology transfers – the member states' level is preferred over the supranational level. Coordination between the different negotiation arenas thus seems to be an issue that needs to be optimized, as enhanced coordination would be beneficial for energy cooperation.

Figure 4: Importance of coordination between EU and member states level from the EU actors perspective



Source: EnergyGov, Darmstadt, 2014

The dimension of policy-making procedures and routines is as well part of the institutional setting of the EU as the formal treaty regulations. The coordination mechanism just described already gives a hint of its importance. In order to have a closer look at how different political actors with the EU work together in external energy governance we will analyze these actors; for instance different Directorates General (DG) of the Commission as well as the External Action Service (EEAS). As energy has to be seen as a cross-cutting issue involving the policy fields of external relations, trade, energy, development, environment and climate policies there is much more than one DG involved in the EUs external energy governance.

Within the Commission, the *Directorate General (DG) Energy* is clearly the leading DG of European Union energy policies as the responsibility for all energy related issues lies within DG Energy. DG energy has established a number of supranational activities, with the objective of strengthening relations with third countries and transnational energy companies. Under the current Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger, internal and external EU energy strategies and policies are drafted and DG Energy takes the lead in energy dialogues with emerging powers. Nevertheless, it can be witnessed that Oettinger's priorities differ from those of his predecessor Andris Piebalgs – now Commissioner for Development Cooperation. Commissioner Oettinger has increased the strong focus on Russia and the states covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, whilst under former Energy Commissioner Piebalgs a diversification of energy relations and the initiation of various energy

dialogues (e.g. Brazil and South Africa) was followed. The main handicap of DG Energy has to be seen in the fact that it has limited budget for cooperation programs with third countries. This calls for close collaboration with other DGs with more funding for energy projects. Especially DG DevCo (see below) in the last years was one of the main cooperation partners of DG Energy in this respect.

DG Climate Action and *DG Environment* would seem like natural partners for DG Energy, as there are considerable overlaps in policies and discourses. The discussions on the new Commission Green Paper “A 2030 framework for energy and climate policies” (EU COM 2013) as well as the 20-20-20 goals of the Energy 2020 Strategy) prove the close linkages between both issues. Yet, our survey has interestingly shown that DG Environment is not very knowledgeable of most energy dialogues, although our respondents attribute high importance to it. DG Climate is quite prominently visible in all countries due to the strong links between climate and energy policies.

For *DG Trade* energy issues are one of the few topics that are not yet part of a consistent liberalisation strategy, and according to our interviews with DG Trade officials, their activities concentrate on bringing this topic back into the liberalization discourse, e.g. in line with the demands of the Singapore issues². (Interviews with DG Trade officials, (.5.2012; 7.6.2012). Neither the multilateral negotiations at the WTO's Doha Round, nor the expansive bilateralism (e.g. promoted by DG Trade in its 2006 Global Europe strategy) currently cover energy issues on a regular basis (the ongoing EU-India FTA negotiations might be an interesting exemption) The only initiative that actually meant to extend WTO standards to the field of energy policies, the Energy Charta Treaty, has lost relevance due to the retirement of Russia. Thus, DG Trade takes part in energy dialogues, but concentrates on embedding energy into bilateral free trade agreements and lobbies for a sectoral approach at the WTO as well. Currently the negotiations for a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) prove to be the most important negotiation arena for DG Trade's attempts as liberalization of energy services is a clear component of the political agenda.

DG Research has a strong focus on emerging powers and partly shares goals with DG Trade, especially regarding intellectual property rights and possibilities of technology transfer. Coordination with member states is exerted. Generally, a shift in R&D relations with emerging powers can be observed, most intensely with India and China, which serve as pilot countries.

DG Development and Cooperation (DevCo) is generally responsible for all energy projects implemented under the development heading in emerging powers. Within the current financial framework (2014-2019) phasing out of development cooperation with emerging powers is envisioned, which will be of great significance for the EU-BICS energy relations. As measures and programs in the energy cooperation between the EU and BICS have been predominantly financed through DG DevCo new financial strategies have to be sighted. In its “Agenda for Change” (EU COM 2011) the EU has set out a new development cooperation strategy, also with emerging powers, by stating:

“Through comprehensive political and policy dialogue with all partner countries, the EU should define the most appropriate form of cooperation, leading to informed and objective decisions on the most effective policy mix, aid levels, aid arrangements and the use of new and existing financial tools, and building on the EU's own experience in managing transition. For some countries this may result in less or no EU development grant aid and the pursuit of a different development relationship based on loans, technical cooperation or support for trilateral cooperation”.

² The Singapore Issues are a package of strategies for deep trade integration taking place beyond borders, namely competition in energy services should be introduced, and liberalization of government procurement and investment conditions

While the broader aim behind this strategy is the need for a change of the relationship between the EU and emerging powers from a development (recipient) relationship to more equal partners, a new financial framework for EU-EP cooperation is not yet in place, thereby leaving emerging powers in an awkward position. This also affects the organization of technical assistance, as in this regards, certain budgets were allocated to energy projects, so now a challenge is to find financing for projects agreed in the energy dialogues. With phasing out development cooperation in some of the countries studied in this book comes a reduction of staff in the EU Delegations abroad, so that many energy contacts will be lost. As other staff in the Delegations – e.g. from DG Trade as in the case of China – have to be in charge of energy in addition to their own responsibility, the importance of energy policy in the relationship is impaired. Of the countries studied in this book, only South Africa will continue receiving assistance. This explains the strong connection with DG Development and Cooperation (DevCo), which is even seen as the second most important DG behind DG Energy in South Africa.

Created under the Lisbon Treaty, the *External Action Service (EEAS)* plays a very interesting role in EU energy governance and is characterized by several distinctive features: It aims at being the overall coordinator of EU energy governance. As a strategy it frames energy relations as “energy diplomacy” in all its facets and thus tries to streamline energy into general external relations. In an internal non-paper on energy and EU foreign policy (EEAS 2012) the EEAS acknowledges changing dynamics and power relations in energy governance and aims at supporting EU external energy relations and ensuring policy coordination. It sees itself as bridging political and business interests, e.g. in coordinating events with Brazil and South Africa. Thus far, the EEAS lacks issue-specific competencies due to a clear role in the EU’s institutional system. The EEAS’ understanding of energy governance as “energy diplomacy” is not yet accepted as a positive advantage by the other institutions that stand in concurrence over governing energy. “Energy diplomacy” would imply a more flexible way of connecting public and private energy actors both in the EU and in the respective country. This might thwart the competencies of other EU actors involved, as long as roles and competencies are not clearly defined. The EEAS is recently being evaluated and the report gives evidence of a considerable gap between self- and xeno visions, which was also found in our survey results. A member of the European Parliament stated in the report:

“Political leadership and visibility of the External Action Service could be improved if there were more coordination and synergy between it, the Commission and the Council, as was the intention when the functions of High Representative, Commission Vice-President and Foreign Affairs Council chair were merged [...] The EEAS must be streamlined and duplication of services in the Commission and the Council Secretariat must end to allow for effective decision-making and timely policy responses [...] There should be more focus on strategic planning and more consistency between short and longer-term measures” (European Parliament 2013).

This institutional mapping shows that the governance network of European institutions resembles a polyphonous structure. Obviously the EU does not 'speak with one voice' and while the cross-cutting nature of energy issues underlines that there is not a need to do so, this institutional structure bears both potentials and risks. Ideally, these tailor-made modes of governance allow creating flexible relationships with the EU's strategic partners and allow releasing synergies deriving from close-knit coordination between the different DGs that are involved into energy relations – e.g. the DGs Energy and Development. Knowledge management may be facilitated through close informal connections and through regular personnel exchange, which is one of the bureaucratic principles within the EU administration. At the same time, the institutional fragmentation as well as inadequately defined roles and responsibilities (e.g. the EEAS' positioning) may foster concurrence between different EU actors involved and this may result in highly fragile forms of coordination. Also, the absence of a clear leading position may hamper the cooperation with the EU's strategic partners. This is a point where the cross-cutting nature of energy issues may also weaken the role of DG Energy, as we can think of

constellations where other actors such as DG DevCo or the EEAS may be in a more apt position to meet the interests of both the EU and its partners. Due to this diffuse design of the EU's governance architecture, some actors have to face the risk of being isolated from informalized communicative networks and information exchange within the dialogues.

3.2 Norms and perceptions of the EU's external energy governance

To explore and analyze European external energy relations, normative aspects and mutual perceptions will be considered in order to find out, how normative orientations affect the political interaction, and to what extent the EU's role and its external energy relations are shaped by a normative background (Aggestam 2008). We therefore draw back on constructivist norms research, which provides an appropriate background for analyzing the transfer or quality of norms (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998, Klotz 1995, Wiener/Puetter 2009).

For the field of energy relations the role performances and mutual perceptions form an important analytical puzzle, as these issues affect the way in which the dialogic partners view each other's political interactions, agenda-setting qualities, and consensus-building activities (Holland et al. 2009; Lucarelli/Fioramonti 2010). Another facet touches the mutual perceptions of energy policy norms and the development of common understandings as an outcome of dialogic communication. Here our research points out how the EU interprets the issue-specific norms on which international energy relations are based as well as how the EU perceives itself respectively the BICS.

An empirical starting point for norms research in external energy relations is the 2006 Green Paper of the Commission on "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy". It states that European energy policies should strive to fulfill three main objectives:


- Sustainability: (i) developing competitive renewable sources of energy and other low carbon energy sources and carriers, particularly alternative transport fuels, (ii) curbing energy demand within Europe, and (iii) leading global efforts to halt climate change and improve local air quality.
- Competitiveness: (i) ensuring that energy market opening brings benefits to consumers and to the economy as a whole, while stimulating investment in clean energy production and energy efficiency, (ii) mitigating the impact of higher international energy prices on the EU economy and its citizens and (iii) keeping Europe at the cutting edge of energy technologies.
- Security of supply: tackling the EU's rising dependence on imported energy through (i) an integrated approach – reducing demand, diversifying the EU's energy mix with greater use of competitive indigenous and renewable energy, and diversifying sources and routes of supply of imported energy, (ii) creating the framework which will stimulate adequate investments to meet growing energy demand, (iii) better equipping the EU to cope with emergencies, (iv) improving the conditions for European companies seeking access to global resources, and (v) making sure that all citizens and business have access to energy" (EU COM 2006: 17-18).

In its 2007 communication "An Energy Policy for Europe", the Commission elaborates and justifies the combination of these three goals as follows: First of all, the Commission admits, that today's energy policies are not sustainable, as energy contributes to 80% of the EU's emissions of greenhouse gases. Also, the Commission faces the fact, that dependency on external energy sources is rapidly growing with imports of gas expected to increase from 57% to 84% and from 82% to 93% by 2030, and regards this as a major risk for the security of supply (EU COM 2007). Third, the Commission states that price volatility and rising energy prices on international markets will

increasingly affect the EU. Therefore, a common internal energy market should stimulate competition and investment in order to benefit substantially from the liberalisation of energy markets.

Eventually, the Lisbon Treaty for the first time provides a legal basis for EU energy and climate policy and the sustainability and competitive object gained prominence in the energy policy field (Title XXI, Art. 194 (TFEU) as already stated above.


Figure 5: Normative Energy Triangle



Source: Fischer 2011, authors' own visualization

Our survey provides detailed information concerning normative orientations and mutual perceptions of the participants in the energy dialogues and allows us to assess the political interactions of the dialogue partners, in this case the EU side. Regarding normative orientations, we asked our interviewees to rank the aspects of sustainability, security and competitiveness and choose between different possible understandings of each norm. This allows us to find out more about the shape and structure of each normative triangle, and thus the normative background that predetermines political interaction within energy governance. Regarding our data, we can conclude that liberal and green motivations become closely interwoven in the European normative orientations, though comparing the normative orientations of the EU actors with the emerging powers actors shows a different pattern, as a high variance of normative orientations is displayed. The normative orientations in the four surveys differ highly, a fact which can be explained by the differing political agendas of European officials. Obviously the EU does not perform as a coherent normative actor which is promoting the same energy norm in each of the four dialogues. That means that the norm hierarchy of the EU changes according to the context of the respective dialogue. In addition the normative orientations between EU and EP within the dialogue do not always show the same orientation. Whereas in China and Brazil the normative orientations of the EU-EP dialogues do not match at all the European and EP normative orientations in India and South Africa match quite well.

Figure 6: Normative orientation of EU and EP actors



Source: EnergyGov, Darmstadt, 2014

Together with Brazil, China is the case in our sample where normative orientations within the EU-EP dialogue do not match. In the case of China we find security as the widely preferred norm by Chinese actors whereas the EU prefers the sustainability norm. Here it might be helpful for the EU to reframe political goals in light of China's security ambitions, in order to build more common ground on which political dialogue can be based. This might for instance imply a focus on the potentials of renewable energy for guaranteeing security of supply. The EU-China negotiations give evidence of a long-standing cooperation that strongly focuses on sustainability issues, a fact which is comprehensible when looking at the creation of the Europe-China Clean Energy Center (EC2), at energy law cooperation or the energy subgroup on energy efficient buildings, which is part of the energy dialogue.

The abovementioned incompatibility of the normative orientation within the EU-Brazil dialogue is obvious. Whilst the security norm seems to be most important for the Brazilian actors in the dialogue, for the EU actors the sustainability norm has the strongest weight and security is not an option. It is likely that the strong focus of the Brazil-EU energy dialogue on renewable energies is regarded as one aspect of energy security by Brazilian actors and framed within sustainability ambitions by the EU side. Due to Brazil's green energy mix with over 45% renewable energies, further investments in wind and solar energy are regarded as a measure to enhance energy security due to the excellent climatic conditions for wind and solar energy, and not as measure to enhance sustainability. Yet, as aforementioned, a normative discontent between the EU and Brazil exists in interpreting the sustainability norm with reference to licensing of Brazilian second generation biofuels. Whilst Brazil aims for EU certification of its second generation biofuels, the EU does not regard its sustainability standards to be fulfilled.


The Indian case is together with South Africa one of the cases, where the normative orientations overlap. The Indian and European normative configurations match relatively well, with competitiveness and sustainability each as most important norms, followed by security. Here EU and

Indian actors show similar orientations; a fact which might facilitate cooperation if taken into account as a point of reference within political communication. Competitiveness plays a very important role, which can be explained by the growing European interests in market entry and enhanced energy cooperation with India. Possibly the ongoing EU-India FTA negotiations also influence this orientation. For EU officials this is obviously a situation, where the impetus to enhance the competitiveness is more important than sustainability or security concerns.

Within the EU-South Africa energy dialogue, the orientations match, as here both actors share a preference for security of supply as a guiding norm for energy policy-making, and might take this as an important normative basis for intensifying the dialogue, in light of developing common solutions for security of supply and for battling energy poverty. Energy security as the most important issue in the EU-South African dialogue does certainly not point to a highly competitive struggle over resources taking place. Rather this underlines the high importance the EU devotes to security of supply issues in the South-African case. At the same time, in a country driven by energy path dependencies with the energy state owned enterprise ESKOM as a single monopolist and only few private energy providers, competitiveness is of minor importance for the EU as long as this solid structure is only changing slowly. Yet, a growing interest in getting access to the South-African energy market for renewables technologies can be observed and it is likely that competitiveness will gain on importance in the next years.

Another important moment to analyze the dialogues is the mutual perceptions of the dialogue partners. In order to explore how the actors perceive each other's behaviour as dialogue partners, we asked our interview partners to assess different properties, for instance "being an agenda-setter" or "playing with a hidden agenda".

Figure 7: Perception of the EU's properties as a dialogue partner – from EU and EP side




Source: EnergyGov, Darmstadt, 2014

This allows further conclusions on the quality of bilateral energy cooperation and on strategies for optimizing energy cooperation. We therefore inquired the mutual perceptions of the dialogue partners, especially agenda-setting qualities, compromise-building skills and diplomatic attitudes in negotiations, such as initiatory activities, trade-offs, open vs. hidden agendas. In their self-perception, the EU public actors tend to view the EU as an active agenda setter and emphasize high

compromise-building qualities, as well as an interest in the other negotiation partner, which is also visible in the openness for mutual learning. This very positive self-image of course needs to be contrasted with the perceptions the emerging powers have of the European actors. The emerging powers actors agree that the EU acts as an agenda setter but is also willing and able to learn from the EP side. While they do not regard the EU as a dominant promoter of interests, they also point out, that the EU is not that eager to compromise or change standpoint. Also they would not subscribe to the claim that the EU was acting with an open agenda. Instead, some of our collaborators from India and China stated that the EU was sometimes acting with a hidden agenda. Interestingly the same holds true for the opposite view. If we have a look at the EP's properties as a dialogue partner from EU and EP side, the self-perception of the EP's is to have an open agenda whereas the EU sees this rather critical. Rather the same holds true for compromise.

Figure 8: Perception of the EP's properties as a dialogue partner – from EU and EP side



Source: EnergyGov, Darmstadt, 2014

The perceptions of the partners match when referring to the way they see the EP's as agenda setters, to a strong interest and to the ability to change the standpoint. The EPs see each other in a slightly more positive light in being able for mutual learning. The European public actors stress that the BICS had increased political pressure and had made use of policy trade-offs along the dialogue. As this perception might weaken private actors' confidence in the negotiations, it might be an important task for EU resp. BICS public actors to prevent further irritations along the process.


3.3 European motivations and interests in external energy governance

Energy dialogues have only during the last decade been incorporated into the broader negotiation arena provided by the Strategic Partnerships (except in the case of China). This might underline our assumption, that close cooperation with major emerging powers is still an underrated issue that only

slowly gains in relevance. All the more the motivations and interests of the EU in cooperating with the BICS come into question. Our survey asked for the importance of cooperation with emerging powers, as well as for the motivations that guide the decision for initiating energy cooperation in each case.

Looking at the views of our respondents it becomes clear that the status, relevance and meaning of the four dialogues differ considerably, while the potential and opportunities of some dialogues are highly underrated. Overall, nearly all EU public and private actors stated that cooperation on energy issues was considered important. Only in the EU-Brazil cooperation a high number of European actors disagreed (42,9%). This matches the problems identified already when looking at the mutual perceptions. Yet this underlines that the actors involved need to develop a common "story line" that echoes common objectives, especially when recalling that the normative orientations of both actors match significantly and would allow closer cooperation.

Figure 9: European powers public actors' motivation in EU energy cooperation with EPs




Source: EnergyGov, Darmstadt, 2014

The motivations for engaging in cooperation with the BICS seem well-connected to the normative orientations. Overall, combating climate change functions as most important motivation for entering cooperation, whereas security issues are in all cases of lowest relevance. Entry into energy markets and promotion of private sector cooperation are of special importance in the cooperation with South Africa, a fact which can be explained by the recent market opening for private renewables investors and "first mover" advantages, currently exploited by Spain. Promotion of private sector cooperation

also plays an important role for EU-India and EU-China cooperation. In contrast the EU-Brazil case gives evidence of a cooperation that does not yet live up to its possibilities, as the interest in technological transfer or market entry seems quite limited in comparison to the three other cases, even if the EU would have the chance to cooperate much more intensely on renewable energies. Here it seems the European actors are downgrading the potential of bilateral energy cooperation, driven by the experience that Brazil has acted quite reluctant as a cooperation partner. The Brazilian perspective backs this view, as a considerable amount of Brazilian public and private actors tends to rate issues such as market entry as less important.

The comparison of the four dialogues and the converging/diverging motivations gives evidence of quite some shared interests, but also of some reframings which might facilitate the dialogue and sort out differences.

Figure 10: Emerging powers public actors' motivation in EU energy cooperation



Source: EnergyGov, Darmstadt, 2014

In the EU-Brazil dialogue the motivations are partly convergent. Both actors share the interest of promoting private sector cooperation, while Brazilian actors rate the meaning of combatting climate change a little lower, which can be explained by Brazil's very clean energy mix. Overall, Brazilian actors show a slightly higher interest in the dialogue than EU actors, a finding which underlines our impression that this dialogue might profit from intensified activities.

In the EU Chinese case, we find quite some converging interests, given that besides the shared political interest in combating climate change, the EU's interest in promoting private sector cooperation may match very well with China's interest in technology transfer, at least if pending IPR and licensing issues can be solved to everyone's favor. Also, China's interest in security of supply could be satisfied that way.

In the EU-India dialogue the motivations are highly divergent regarding India's very high interests in technology transfer; a position, which is only vaguely echoed by the EU. As for the EU, promotion of private sector cooperation seems to be an important point of interest; hence the dialogue could clearly benefit if a stronger focus on technology transfer would be made and if European interests in market entry and private technology cooperation would be backed in a more articulate way. Certainly issues such as absorptive capacity of the Indian energy sector might be a point of concern.

Lastly, the EU-South African dialogue at first sight seems to be driven by highly divergent motivations, as the European respectively South African motivations vary quite considerably. Yet, South Africa's high interest in enhancing security of supply might be matched by the European interest of enhanced access for the private sector, and the growing FDI activities in South Africa's renewable energy sectors might be a first indicator.

Overall, this gives the impression that the actors keep high expectations in the dialogue, so it might be important for EU actors to ensure how these interests might actually be met. Possibly, the interest in technology transfer by some of the BICS is not always echoed by heightened EU interests in market entry in these countries, a fact, which might in the long run mean that the BICS could prefer technological cooperation with other countries, whereas the EU might be singled out. This indicates that in some cases the EU might need to focus more on designing specific arenas dealing with issues of technological transfer or private actors' cooperation. Probably such a strategy could be exerted in a plurilateral mode or else IRENA could serve as a focal point for such ambitions.

Finally it is notable that China, India, Brazil and South Africa all prefer bilateral energy cooperation with the EU member states over cooperation with the EU as a supranational body. Member states have more concrete offers to make, represent their respective business' interests and usually have a specific (technical) knowledge, which is of interest for emerging powers. Thus, synergies need to be actively created by adequately including member states in the EU approach. The China-EU High Level Meeting on Energy and the two declarations signed there by both the EU Commission and the Member States are an excellent example for future cooperation designs: The uplifting of the Chinese energy dialogue to a higher level of cooperation between equal partners with business and government interests being represented seems to be the future way to go.

4 Policy Recommendations: Vitalizing EU-BICS Energy Cooperation

Our empirical findings allow drawing some theoretical conclusions, which we then reformulate as a set of policy recommendations for enhancing the quality and intensity of the four bilateral energy dialogues. From an *institutional perspective* we have illustrated that within the polyphonous EU institutional network different DGs are involved and play a more or less active role in the energy dialogues. This bears both potentials and risks. The institutional fragmentation as well as inadequately defined roles and responsibilities may foster concurrence between different EU actors involved and this may result in highly fragile forms of coordination. The absence of a clear leading position may hamper the cooperation with the EU's strategic partners, if the role of DG Energy is not strengthened. This is a point where the cross-cutting nature of energy issues may also weaken the role of DG Energy, as we can think of constellations where other actors such as DG DevCo, DG Trade or the EEAS may be in a more apt position to meet the interests of both the EU and its partners. Due to this diffuse design of the EU's governance architecture, some actors have to face the risk of being isolated from informal communicative networks and information exchange within the dialogues.

Second, looking at the *normative orientations* of the actors involved in the dialogues we observe that the EU is not following one normative orientation in all the dialogues. The EU generally aligns its

energy policies along the triangle of objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and security, yet EU public actors devote different priorities to each of the norms when comparing their preferences between the four dialogues. We have assessed, whether the BICS share these objectives and how they interpret the specific norms in the different country contexts. As a theoretical assumption, but also back by empirical examples, e.g. in environmental policy-making normative convergence can be a highly valuable outcome of a political dialogue, as this allows for mutual policy learning. This may result in the development, implementation and operationalization of common policies to which both partners feel explicitly committed. The normative orientations in the four surveys differ highly, a fact which can be explained by the country specific contexts and EU priorities. There is a strong divergence in the normative orientation in the EU-Brazil as well as the EU-China dialogue. In both cases this mainly regards sustainability. Here we can witness differing interpretations of the same norm: Whereas the EU interprets the promotion of renewable energies and energy efficiency as sustainability, this is a primarily a matter of energy security for Brazil and China. The normative orientations within the EU-South Africa and EU-Indian dialogue converge. This might lead to the conclusion that there is a need to redesign political agendas within some cases in order to ensure, that common "storylines" (Hajer 1995, Hajer/Wagenaar 2003) can be developed, which then serve the interests and normative orientations of both actors. This would facilitate political communication and might "refresh" some of the dialogues.


Also perceptions do matter - an equally important facet for analyzing political interaction is the mutual perceptions of the dialogue partners. In their self-perception, the EU public actors tend to view the EU as an active agenda setter and emphasize high compromise-building qualities, as well as an interest in the negotiation partner, which is also visible in the openness for mutual learning. This very positive self-image needs to be contrasted with the perceptions the emerging powers keep. They agree that the EU acts as an agenda setter but is also willing and able to learn from the EP side. Also, some of our respondents from India and China stated that the EU was sometimes perceived to be acting with a hidden agenda.

These findings indicate that the EU is not perceived as a normative, but mainly as an interest-driven actor. This stands in contrast with its self-image of intending to act and to be perceived as a benign normative power in its external relations already since the mid-1990s. Also the EU and the BICS set in most cases different normative priorities. This allows the conclusion that both partners mainly regard the dialogues as arenas for energy cooperation merely based on shared interests, yet do not anchor their political activities onto a common normative basis. This may result in highly strategic approaches which are at times characterized by a certain degree of lack of trust, as the accusation of playing with a hidden agenda indicates. In the long run, this may lead to only weak commitments with regards to a common political process.

Third, the *interests and motivations* to enter into the dialogue between the EU and the EPs also do not converge. The data gives the impression that the actors keep high but different expectations in the dialogue. Whereas the EU in all the dialogues is motivated mostly by the aim of advancing in the combat against climate change and less in technology transfer, the priorities of the EPs focus mostly on technology transfer and on the promotion of private sector cooperation or else market entry. Thus, it might be important for EU actors to ensure how these interests might actually be met. Possibly, the interest in technology transfer by some of the BICS is not always echoed by heightened EU interests in market entry in these countries, a fact, which might in the long run mean that the BICS could prefer technological cooperation with other countries or member states, whereas the EU might be singled out. This indicates that in some cases the EU might need to focus more on designing specific arenas dealing with issues of technological transfer or private actors' cooperation. Probably such a strategy could be exerted in a plurilateral mode or else IRENA could serve as a focal point for such ambitions.

Deduced from the three strands of our analytical framework and the results of our cross-country survey, the following policy recommendations are aimed at policy makers in Brussels as well as Brazil, India, China and South Africa.

- 1. Tap into the full potential of the energy dialogues:** The basis for this is developing a common understanding of political dialogues, based on mutual trust and mutual commitments, as our research has indicated that the partners involved on all sides of the dialogues do not devote sufficient commitment to the energy dialogues. Dialogues need to be truly regarded as a "two-way street", where both partners have the chance to meet on an equal basis. Therefore it seems necessary that the partners enter the dialogue guided by a reflexive political agenda and more flexible mandates. Also the partners need to devote more commitment to the political process. Furthermore, it is advisable to develop a long-term vision for the dialogues and the expected results of engaging in this cooperation mode. This needs to consider past experiences and collaboration systematically. Currently, a loss of institutional memory can be observed due to constant changes in personnel involved in the energy dialogues, which thwarts any form of knowledge production and knowledge transfer. This underlines the need for systematic knowledge management of the energy dialogues by all actors involved, in order to allow for enhanced learning and innovation within the dialogue and/ or cross-sectoral networks. Therefore a longer term vision needs to be embedded in the dialogues' history.
- 2. Carve out clearly the value added of the EU:** The preference of the BICS for cooperation with EU Member States is often derived from unclear mandate and "offer" of the EU for energy cooperation. Thus, the EU needs to carve out clearly its value added and identify the role it would like to play in energy cooperation with the BICS. No matter which kind of role the EU will take up in energy cooperation with the BICS – and this will vary from country to country and issue area to issue area – the minimum requirement – especially for the responsible DG Energy – would be to bridge the gap. This implies that DG Energy should play the complementary role to what is missing in a certain energy dialogue and identify ways of ensuring that these elements are brought in internally or externally. Thus, this could also pave the way for enhanced cooperation with the private sector and civil society organizations, depending on the specific expertise required. Leutner and Müller (2010: 54) generally visualize this for development cooperation in the following:



Also the EU needs to clarify its internal role in relations to the member states. An adequate perspective could be a coordinating role for matching EU Members State's expertise with the partner country's interest/ demand. Also, the EU could pave the way for Member States' engagement with the BICS in negotiating the regulatory and political frameworks of cooperation. Especially smaller EU Member States are more likely to orient their actions along the broader scope of EU strategies and engagement, so that it could play an influencing role in shaping cooperation. The step from dialogue to collaboration in the form of joint projects is a measure to strengthen the EU's concrete offer for cooperation. More such projects should be envisioned also in the other dialogues.

3. **Introduce peer review mechanism:** Even after installing the information exchange mechanism, the EU still lacks coordination with the 28 Member States. Instead of just collecting information on existing or negotiated international agreements between Member States and the BICS, it would be advisable for the EU to enhance cooperation with Member States. One first instrument could be the introduction of a peer review mechanism. Therein Member States would peer review their relations with the BICS. Thus, the EU as well as all the Member States could learn and identify best practices.
4. **Do not count on the „one voice paradigm”, rather make smart use of polyphony and diversity:** The cross-cutting nature of energy issues suggest already that it is not necessary to “speak with one voice”, which too often seems to be the only paradigm suitable for EUs external policies. The one voice might limit the possibilities of EU engagement as well as its overall mandate. In contrary we would suggest to take the cross-cutting nature of energy serious and fully tap its potential.
5. **Create energy policies based on joint ownership.** A strong understanding of ownership as the capability of both partners to conceptualize and implement policies based on a common understanding of the demands and needs can be the key for intensified energy cooperation between the EU and emerging powers. At the moment the energy dialogues are driven by competing ownership: each partner claims to be in the lead in terms of designing policies, setting the agenda or suggesting concrete outcomes. Joint ownership will instead ignite innovative forms of energy cooperation: Joint research strategies in the energy sector would allow transcontinental research cooperation for the era beyond Horizon 2020; joint transformative knowledge would allow managing an energy transition, and joint funds would empower both partners to set up budget lines for energy cooperation.
6. **Introduce a Trialogue of EU, EU Member States and BICS:** In addition to introducing further communication channels among the EU and all Member States, it would be advisable to involve Member States more systematically in the energy dialogues. Such a triadialogue was introduced already within the EU-China dialogue, were the EU and its Member States have jointly agreed on the Urbanization Partnership and a dialogue on energy security. Especially the Member States should be involved at a project level. In addition the coordination role of the EU in those triadialogues should be strengthened.
7. **Matrix-structured dialogues:** Instead of attempting to streamline the energy dialogues by concentrating the coordination responsibility within one DG, the dialogue could stretch over existing dialogue boundaries. In a matrix-structured dialogue focused on the most important problems within the Strategic Partnerships all EU actors within the field of energy could be involved. Thus, under the umbrella of the Strategic Partnerships the matrix would overcome the pillarization of EU-BICS communication. This should lead to tailor-made dialogues with flexible composition and greater problem orientation. Thus, we recommend bundling funds and personnel in a problem resolution oriented modus within the energy realm. In each of the cross-cutting dialogues clear roles and responsibilities have to be identified. Thus, there is more room of maneuver also for other DG’s according to the issue area.
8. **Conduct a systematic evaluation of sectoral dialogues under the Strategic Partnerships:** By systematically assessing the lessons learned, best practices as well as the actors landscape of the sectoral dialogues, this instrument could be steered towards deeper, more efficient and trustful cooperation. A comparison across sectors as well as between the energy dialogues in different countries would allude to possibilities for replicating success models and scaling-up existing dialogues. At times, this might mean clustering similar sectors under the umbrella of one dialogue. Also, using this instrument flexible by creating cross-sectoral networks of actors might give more impetus to the existing dialogues.

- 9. Give it enough Love – innovative cooperation modalities, financial and personnel structures of the dialogues:** Doubtless, in a world of increasing energy demands by rising powers, resource scarcity and competition over resources, energy cooperation with the other large “consumer” states is crucial for the European Union. An approach focused only on the supply side of energy – cooperation with e.g. Russia and the Middle Eastern OPEC countries – appears shortsighted when leaving out the demand side. Thus, the question arises “if we see it as an opportunity, do we give it enough love?³”. Taking this thought further, it needs to be asked “do our objectives coincide with the amount of love we give our processes?” Even more after phasing out bilateral development cooperation with many emerging powers, funding for joint initiatives or projects of the energy dialogues is limited. Thus, new funding models, such as joint funds provided by the EU and the BICS could be thought of. This also ensures joint ownership of the dialogue and its step towards collaboration. Furthermore, it should be ensured that sufficient personnel capacities exist in order to offer a support structure in Brussels as well as in the EU Delegations in the BICS for the energy dialogues.

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³ Quote by an interview partner in South Africa, July 2013, Pretoria.

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