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Human Rights and International Trade: How Depth and Market Structure shape the Politics of Social Law Design in Preferential Trade Agreements

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Abstract

Even though human rights clauses are increasingly included in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), not all PTAs contain social law and if PTAs include non-trade issues, they vary greatly in terms of scope and enforceability. What accounts for this variation? We still know relatively little about what explains the inclusion and design of human rights provisions in trade agreements. Seeking to fill this gap, this paper proposes a theoretical argument that stresses the selection process. The argument is that stakeholders - such as multinational firms, exporters, import-competing firms, labour unions, and NGOs - lobby the government regarding non-trade-issues. They opt - depending on their vulnerability to a potential PTA - for or against non-trade issues in trade agreements. Concerns rise with economic dependency on international trade partners and with depth of the planned PTA. Including human rights provisions in PTAs is the politician's response to these stakeholders' concerns. Consequently, the selection of human rights and their enforceability is dependent on a.) the market structure, and b.) other design features of the agreement. Particularly, it is expected that exporting markets are more prone than importing economies to opt for (enforceable) non-trade issues in their PTA. Moreover, I expect deep agreements to be more likely than shallow ones to include human rights clauses. A novel dataset on non-trade issues and the design of PTAs signed between 1990 and 2009 allows testing these arguments. Gravity regression analysis supports the theoretical argument.

Introduction

“Something is happening to global trade regulations.” (Hafner-Burton, 2009a, Kindle Pos. 74) They have not simply increased in terms of number, they also widened their scope. Over time preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have progressively incorporated standards that do not directly relate to trade. Especially human rights

provisions¹ in PTAs proliferated since the early nineties. However, not all PTAs contain clauses regulating domestic politics. Even if the trading partners chose to include human rights clauses in their agreement, those clauses vary widely in terms of scope and enforceability from one agreement to another. While some agreements require member states to make major efforts in their human rights policy, other agreements are so shallow that member states only have to make rhetorical commitments towards a small selection of human rights. What accounts for this variation? Up to now, no systematic research exists on explaining the variation across international trade agreements in terms of human rights scope and enforceability.

The North American Free Trade Agreement, the US-Jordan and the Cotonou Agreement (European Union with African States) were among the first ones including human rights regulations. In 1995 the European Union and in 2002 the US decided to include human rights clauses in all of their agreements (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2008). However, those clauses still not look alike from one agreement to another. The US negotiated at about the same time an agreement with Chile and Jordan (Hafner-Burton, 2009a). Whereas, the US-Chile agreement contained strong human rights language, the US-Jordan agreement was much more cautious in this regard. Also for EU agreements, design varies. The EU Jordan Mediterranean Association Agreement, for instance, is much deeper than the one with Tunisia. Costa Rica, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have included human rights commitments in their PTAs too (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2008). But again, the human rights provisions vary widely regarding their scope and enforceability.

I argue that the choice including non-trade issues in a PTA is strategic and aims at optimizing expected consequences of an agreement. Selecting design features for a trade agreement is a multidimensional decision, where actors have to choose among a great selection of trade issues, non-trade issues, and the design of such. Economically deep - i.e. extensive trade liberalizing - agreements have a greater impact on the economy than shallow ones. Enforceable non-trade issue clauses change domestic politics to a greater extent than non enforceable ones. A common instrument to enforce non-trade issues are economic sanctions. Hence, deciding on enforceability of non-trade issues depends - among other factors - on the design of economic clauses. Sanctions bear - for both parties - costs and therefore, very deep agreements are expected to have less enforceable non-trade issues.

¹For the purpose of this paper the terms 'social law', 'non-trade issue', and 'human rights clause' are used in order to describe provisions in preferential trade agreements that regulate human rights in the broader sense (including physical integrity, right to vote, rule of law, labour rights, environmental protection, security, right to health, right to education, women's rights, children's rights, protection against corruption, and against terrorism).

However, for scope the story is different: Due to the higher impact on peoples pockets, deep agreements are more intensively discussed in public and raise its awareness. Therefore, protests are more likely to be raised against deep agreements than shallow ones. Governments respond to these concerns by affirming their human-rights standards. Hence, scope of non-trade issues rises with economic depth of an agreement.

The incumbent government is in the position to finally make trade policy, but domestic stakeholders - such as exporters, import-competing firms, multinationals, labour unions, and NGOs - forward their interest and influence the government's decision. A market holding a positive trade balance is more likely to represent the interests of exporters than an economy where import-competing firms are strong. Exporters and investors want non-trade aspects regulated in order to improve law in their export destination to reduce uncertainty. Importing countries, by contrast, care less about domestic law of their trading partner. They even opt against non-trade issues in PTAs in order to remain low-prices for their importing products.

Moreover, it is expected that human rights clauses augment with an increase in positive human rights record and with a more common human rights policy of the contracting parties.

I test this expectations on a novel dataset consisting of 274 PTAs signed between 1990 and 2009. These agreements vary widely in terms of scope and enforceability of human rights. I applied a gravity regression model to control for distance and market size. The empirical results confirm the theoretical expectations. Economic depth of the agreement and export oriented markets are positively correlated with the amount and enforceability of non-trade issue in PTAs.

The paper contributes to the literature on design of international institutions (Baccini et al., 2013; Koremenos and Hong, 2010; Koremenos et al., 2001) and in particular to the discussion on issue-linkage (Leebron, 2002; Spagnolo, 2001). I find that the design of one issue in international institutions depends on the design of another issue, meaning that non-trade issues cannot be studied apart from trade issues, and that market structure matters for selecting human rights clauses in PTAs. Moreover, this study is the first one dealing with human rights clauses beyond a dichotomy differentiation of hard and soft human rights law. Being aware of the variance in design of human rights clauses in PTAs is of major importance for assessing the consequences of such (Hafner-Burton, 2009a; Kim, 2012; Postnikov and Bastiaenes, 2013). Hence, this study's results can make a contribution to the problem of endogeneity while assessing the impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental human rights

repression (Spilker and Böhmelt, 2012).

In the following, I first develop my theoretical argument, then discuss the empirical approach, and present the results. I conclude by discussing the implications of this work for further research.

1 Theory and Hypothesis

As trade agreements reduced tariff barriers, domestic policies as secondary trade barrier became central in trade negotiations (Ederington, 2002; Preeg, 1998). Consequently, the attention of some academics shifted towards policy linkage (Bhagwati, 2002; Ederington, 2002; Leebron, 2002; Perez, 2005; Spagnolo, 2001). The authors agree with the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos, 2005; Koremenos and Hong, 2010; Koremenos et al., 2001) by saying that actors are goal seeking and choose a certain PTA design, because they expect it would solve their cooperation problem. Thus, “mechanisms adopted to restructure incentives to defect also restructure the incentives to join the institution” (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001, p. 899). Consequently, “states fight over institutional design because it affects outcomes” (Koremenos et al., 2001, p. 762). Because “trade policy has major distributional consequences” (Baccini et al., 2013), it affects exporters, import-competing firms, investors, and the public. Therefore, trade policy makers need to negotiate a PTA in a way that minimizes domestic opposition (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Issue-Linkage constitutes an important instrument to do so (Spagnolo, 2001). Linking trade liberalization with social rights allows politicians to receive support from various groups despite their ideological contradictions. They can, on the one hand, negotiate an agreement that fully liberalizes trade and investment, which is in the favour of exporters and multinational firms. On the other hand, policy makers can include - in the same agreement - labour rights clauses, clauses for assuring social security, and affordable medicine, which meet the interests of labour unions, import-competing firms and the public. I therefore argue that the policy makers’ attempt to minimize opposition towards an agreement explains the inclusion of human rights provisions in PTAs. I further argue that this power play can even explain the scope and enforceability of human rights clauses.

To develop my argument, I first discuss the actors that opt for human rights provisions in trade agreements. Then, I show when the voices of those human rights advocates intensify. Assuming that governments need to take the final decision on the design of PTAs, I finally discuss the international negotiations, and the bargaining procedure leading to the inclusion or exclusion of human rights clauses.

1.1 Domestic Preferences: Proponents for Human Rights Clauses in Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper distinguishes three major camps that try to convince trade-policy makers to include human rights clauses in trade agreements: Exporters and investors, labour unions and import-competing firms, and civil society.

First, exporters benefit from a trade agreement as it offers improved market access and multinational firms favour a PTA once it facilitates foreign investment in the partner country. Thus, both groups opt for an economically deep agreement (Baccini et al., 2013). Indeed, Baier et al. (2007); Carrère (2006); Egger et al. (2011) find positive trade flow effects of PTAs and Bütte and Milner (2008) show increasing investment flows in countries that hold a membership of a trade agreement. However, exporting to and investing in foreign markets comes with risks. Differences in domestic politics increase these uncertainties (Jensen, 2008). An affirmation towards certain law standards lowers risks. In general, exporters as well as investors opt for non-trade issues to be integrated in PTAs. Hence, *export orientated countries are more prone to include human rights clauses in their PTA than import orientated countries (H1)*.

Second, labour unions want to protect their workers at home (Hafner-Burton, 2009a). Consequently, the unions of states with high labour standards oppose most PTAs, because they fear that workers lose competitiveness once the market barriers are eliminated (AFL-CIO, 2005, 2014). However, in case that they are not able to impede a PTA, their second best choice is a PTA with workers' rights clauses (EurActiv, 2012). By contrast, labour unions in developing countries opt for a PTA (even without linkage) (Chauffour and Kleimann, 2012; Richards et al., 2001), because they expect higher investment inflows (Bütte and Milner, 2008) and thus an increase in job supply and wages (Baldwin, 1995). Moreover, unions - especially in developed countries - publish reports and policy statements on worker's rights practice, which leads to a better labour rights monitoring system where the respective unions are active.

Also, import-competing industries take the protectionist stance and try to keep the trade barriers as high as possible (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Therefore, they are against any PTA. However, once freer trade is unavoidable, they try to keep the barriers high. Non-trade barriers are one of such instruments (Bagwell and Staiger, 1998; Brown, 2001).

In general, trade policy has a major consequence for the public (Aaronson and Abouharb, 2013; Adhikari, 2009) and the public forms an opinion on this (Umana

et al., 2013). Especially the current negotiations of the transatlantic trade and partnership agreement (TTIP) raise huge public concerns. CEO (2013a), for instance, alarm regularly on bad environmental and human rights impacts of the TTIP. However, also the free trade agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America and the United States (DR-CAFTA) achieved a high level of civil-society activity (Guisinger, 2009).

A survey conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, 2011) shows that people in the US are in general for free trade, but against preferential trade agreements since they fear job losses and bad impacts on human rights and the environment. They often see trade as a win for the nation, but a loss for themselves and their families. People fear large companies shaping trade agreements, undermining democracy, their right to work, social security, affordable medicine, food, and anti-discrimination (CEO, 2013b,a).

Even though those groups are not allowed to directly vote on trade policy, their opinion plays an important role in trade policy making (Dür et al., 2013; Hornbeck, 2008; Mansfield and Milner, 2012).

1.2 States Preferences: Salience and Protests for Human Rights Clauses in Preferential Trade Agreements

As Grossman and Helpman (1994) suggest, it is assumed that the incumbent government is in the position to set trade policy. Various interest groups, such as exporters, multinationals, import-competing industries, labour unions, and NGOs, try to influence the politicians' decision. Due to the aspiration towards re-election and the wish to successfully formulate and implement policies, the politicians value these contributions (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Once stakeholders publicly express their opinion and actively lobby their interests, trade policy makers are under pressure to consider these interests in their decision making.

Therefore, we need to pose the question when do those groups become active? Activity can mainly be expected on issues that are highly salient. In this case, stakeholder want to be sure about the outcome. By contrast, opaque affairs are not able to awake efforts for expressing interests or even lobbying the government. A trade agreement is salient once it is far-reaching in terms of requiring member states to make major changes to domestic politics. Therefore, very deep agreements are expected to cause greater lobbying activity. Hereby, the lobbying activity is assumed not only to be greater in extent, but also maintained by a greater range of different groups. What I am saying here is that trade-related groups - such as exporters and investors - forward their interest for most trade policy decisions. However, other non directly trade

related groups - such as civil society - are expected to raise their voice only once a far-reaching trade agreement is planned. The latter group especially asks for setting human rights standards through trade agreements.

Thus, *deep trade agreements are more prone to include human rights provisions (H2)*.

An example illustrates this mechanism: The US-Jordan 2000 preferential trade agreement is compared to the Colombia-US 2006 PTA and the NAFTA 1996 a rather shallow agreement that only includes narrow human rights clauses in its legal text. During the Colombia-US PTA - an agreement, which is very deep in terms of trade liberalization - negotiations civil-society, both in Colombia and the United States, have protested against its implementation. In the end the Colombia-US PTA text covered many human rights issues.

Even though, the depth of a PTA is expected to influence the number of non-trade issues, I am less sure about the explaining value of depth on the enforceability of these issues. This is because economic depth defines the amount of carrots and sticks that can be employed in order to enforce non-trade issues. Since actors are risk averse, they try to minimize costs and avoid high sanctioning. Sanctioning can be costly for both parties, the one that gets sanctioned and the one that sanctions. This means that depth and enforceability can go hand in hand for cases, where sanctioning is very unlikely. By contrast, in situations, where the application of carrots and sticks is likely, economic depth and enforceability of non-trade issues are less prone to be found in one agreement.

As no decision on trade agreement is made unilaterally, the international bargaining process over the agreement is taken into account in the following subsection.

1.3 International Agreement: Human Rights Records and Power Leverage

Once the states' preferences over institutional design are shaped domestically, the actors negotiate the agreement on the international level (Putnam, 1988). The negotiating partners agree on a particular design by the time both sides expect an improvement over the status quo after the establishment of the agreement. If preferences of the negotiating parties overlap strongly, the final legal text of the agreement will be close to the original preferences of the parties. In the case that both parties aim for the inclusion of human rights clauses in the contract, a reference on human rights is likely to be found in the final document. However, once they have very different attitudes towards human rights policy, human rights references become unlikely. Hence, I expect that *increasingly opposing positions of two parties towards*

human rights policy are associated with a decrease in scope and enforceability of human rights provisions in the PTA (H3).

However, in some cases one party succeeds in writing human rights clauses into the PTA, despite of the trading partner's averse attitude towards human rights policy. Here, "linkage can resolve the problem of reaching an international agreement without a central authority by allowing countries to use the surplus enforcement power that may be available in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other domains" (Perez, 2005, p. 742)². For instance, the United States or Europe convinced trading partners³ to commit to social clauses, although they refused provisions concerning domestic policies in the first place, by making human rights a condition for access to their markets (Hafner-Burton, 2009a, Kindle Pos. 300).

I argue that it is not so much about the size of the market, but more about the market structure. Higher economic dependency of one market from another leads to greater insecurity and therefore, *dependent economies are more prone to include human rights provisions in PTAs than independent ones (H4).*

Before testing these four hypothesis, I discuss the research design and data.

2 Research Design

In carrying out the empirical analysis, I rely on 274 preferential trade agreements signed between 1990 and 2009⁴. I have coded ten items for nineteen non-trade issues - ranging from labour rights, civil and political rights, rule of law, right to health, women rights, children rights, minority protection, social security, security, right of movement, right for education, anti-corruption, anti-terrorism, freedom of religion, environmental protection, good governance, and democracy. In total 190 data-points were generated. I coded manually and cross-checked with an already existing dataset on human rights provisions in PTAs by Spilker and Böhmelt (2012)⁵.

The unit of observation are directed dyads - large to small market and vice versa. I chose directed dyads, since testing the power leverage hypothesis requires knowledge concerning characteristics of the larger and of the smaller trading partner. I also

²Perez (2005) derived the argument from Spagnolo (2001).

³Among the first trading partners with whom the US and Europe signed PTAs that included hard human rights law were Mexico, Chile, Chad, Gabon, Congo, Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda and the Central African Republic (Information from the Dataset of Spilker and Böhmelt (2012) and the qualitative research of Hafner-Burton (2009a)).

⁴See annex.

⁵Spilker and Böhmelt (2012) coded hard and soft human rights law in 246 PTAs. You can find the Codebook in the annex.

differentiated between good and bad human rights complier since it is likely that we see different behaviour dependent on the original human rights policy of the actors. The year of observation is the year the respective dyad signed their PTA. In total, the dataset comprises 1435 dyads. I considered a plurilateral actor - for agreements with a plurilateral actor on the one hand a third country on the other (eg. European Union with Algeria, CARICOM with Colombia, EFTA with Canada, Golf Cooperation Council with Singapore) - as a single actor. This is for the reason that one member of a plurilateral actor can not decide on its own to include a third country in the already existing trade cooperation. The original members must decide collectively.

The dyadic cross-sectional dataset allows for estimating a gravity model which was originally proposed by Tinbergen (1962). The central idea of the gravity model is to encounter a.) for distance-costs, meaning that countries that are - physically, culturally and politically - further away from each other are less likely to sign a trade agreement including non-trade issues than countries that are close to each other, and b.) for attraction by economic size. Hence, negotiating a trade agreement with large economies is expected to increase the likelihood of non-trade regulations in the agreement.

Based on a dataset that captures a measure on economic depth, market structure, and human rights compliance, I run four regressions: 1.) on the scope index, 2.) on the preciseness index, 3.) on the enforceability index, and 4.) on the socialization index.

2.1 Dependent Variables

The scope, preciseness, and enforceability of non-trade issues are the main dependent variables - socialization and capacity building two alternative concepts.

Scope refers to the amount of non-trade issues tackled. Trade agreements integrate a great variety of non-trade issues. I applied an inductive approach to identify those. In total I coded nineteen non-trade issues (security, environmental protection, right to health, physical integrity right, right to development, regional integration, labour rights, social security, right of movement, democracy, rule of law, right for education, minority protection, anti-corruption, women's rights, children's rights, anti-terrorism, freedom of religion, and good governance). Hence the scope index ranges from zero to 19.

In Figure 1, I show the percentage of agreements that contain the respective non-trade issues. The figure shows that most of the agreements deal with security issues, envi-

ronmental protection, right to health, and physical integrity rights, whereas, only few mention women's-, children's rights, freedom of religion, and good-governance. Then, in Figure 2, I present the scope of the European Union's, North American's (Canadian and US), and selected other's preferential trade agreements. This figure reveals a slight trend towards a greater scope. Moreover, we can see that the European Union tends to tackle more issues than Canada and the US. Whereas the European agreements' mean in terms of scope is ten, the North American agreements only have an average scope of five, and all other agreements hold the average scope at a level of four.

Scope does not tell us how deep this issues are regulated. Therefore, we need to dig deeper in order to measure the quality of such non-trade issue references. First, the position in the text is of relevance - meaning that for instance the reference to a non-trade issue in the footnote of the annex does not mean the same as a reference in the preamble, and in various sections of the main text. Parties regulate non-trade issues also in side agreements. This applies especially to North American agreements⁶. Second, general references to an international agreement (e.g. UDHR, ILO, OIE, WHO) are indicators for a far-reaching agreement. Moreover, some agreements define concrete measures in order to improve the status-quo of certain human rights. Therefore, I accounted for a.) the location in the text, b.) whether the agreement refers to an international agreement regulating the respective non-trade issue(s), and c.) whether concrete measures are defined in order to achieve a certain non-trade aim. These three indicators tell us more how precise the definition of certain non-trade issues is.

In order to get a preciseness score, we could again use an additive approach. However, since we face high correlation between this three variables (position in the text, reference to international treaty, and measures) a latent trait analysis is more appropriate. The idea here is to measure the difficulty of an issue to be chosen for a PTA. Since standard factor analysis is based on Pearson correlation, which is not applicable on a binary dataset as ours, I use a latent trait analysis - that has particularly been developed for binary data (Rasch, 1980). I conducted a latent trait analysis on each of the nineteen issues. Nineteen scores resulted from this Rasch model analysis and from a weighted likelihood estimation (Warm, 1989). Since running nineteen regressions is not efficient, the aim is having an overall preciseness score for each agreement. Therefore, I first, standardized these scores and then, calculate their average, which

⁶**PTAs with Side Agreements on Non-Trade Issues (mainly regulating labour rights and environmental protection):** Canada Chile 1996 PTA, Canada Colombia 2008 PTA, Canada Costa Rica 2001 PTA, Canada Jordan 2009 PTA, Canada Peru 2008 PTA, Chile China 2005 PTA, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992, Caribbean Community, Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement 2005, Canada Panama 2010 PTA, Bahrain US 2004 PTA, China New Zealand 2008 PTA, China Peru 2006 PTA, Jordan US 2000 PTA, MERCOSUR 1991, and Chile Peru 2006 PTA.

represents the overall preciseness score. Figure 3 shows these results. As for scope, the trend is towards higher preciseness and non-trade issues in European agreements are more precise than those of the US, Canada, and all others.

Since Hafner-Burton (2009b) and Spilker and Böhmelt (2012) claim that preciseness of an issue is crucial in order to achieve improvement, this indicator is especially interesting.

[Figure 1 here]

[Figure 2 here]

[Figure 3 here]

As a next step, I coded the underlying mechanisms that aim at improving the status-quo of these non-trade issues. Enforcement by means of carrots and sticks; socialization in the sense of persuasion and promotion; and capacity building are the three most prominent approaches to forward human rights.

Enforceability means the ability of contractors to impose a course of action upon the trading partner. Conditionality, dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM), and regular assessments define the degree of enforceability. Conditionality can either be the withdrawal of privileges in the event of human rights violations or the provision of positive incentives in the case of human rights compliance (Bartels, 2008). DSM can foresee a.) a political/diplomatic process (low enforceability), b.) an automatic right of access to ad-hoc third-party adjudication, or c.) a highly institutionalized judicial mechanism (high enforceability) (Chase et al., 2013). Moreover, regular assessment of non-trade issues is a precondition for great enforceability. In order to arrive at an enforceability index, I ran a Rasch model for environmental protection, physical integrity, and labour rights⁷ clauses that also call for regular assessment, dispute settlement mechanisms, and conditionality. Then, I applied a weighted likelihood estimation (Warm, 1989) to find factor scores, standardized them, and calculated their average. Figure 4 shows the enforceability of European Union's, North American's, and selected other agreements. Interestingly, the US and Canadian preferential trade

⁷I could not find enforceable clauses for other non-trade issues.

agreements are more enforceable in terms of non-trade issues than the European Union ones.

[Figure 4 here]

Moreover, an alternative to enforcement is promotion or persuasion of a specific non-trade issue. Most of the trade agreements foresee the establishment of a joint committee, commission, or working group that represents the contracting parties. The new body is responsible for the implementation, monitoring and/or supervision of the agreement. In some cases, the provision specifies the working agenda of the body. I coded first, if a new body is established with the trade agreement and second, if the working agenda of this new body includes non-trade issues and if yes which non-trade issue in particular. These new bodies serve as frameworks for meetings and dialogues between the contracting parties. Especially European agreements call for the establishment of a dialogue or cooperation regarding a non-trade issue. Therefore, dialogue and cooperation form the second part of the socialization index.

[Figure 5 here]

Capacity building is the fourth concept I controlled for. However, in 274 agreements I could only find 13 provisions calling for financial or technical assistance in terms of non-trade issues. Therefore, I ignore the concept of capacity building for now.

2.2 Main explanatory variable

The first explanatory variable is the depth (*Economic Depth*) of the agreement. “Depth refers to the amount of liberalization achieved by an agreement.” (Baccini et al., 2013) 52 variables - covering aspects as services liberalization, trade-related investment measures, intellectual property rights and standards - in total build the depth index of Dür et al. (2013). The index is build on 587 PTAs from 1945 to 2009 and ranges from 0 to 3.34.

The second explanatory variable is market structure. Therefore, *exports*, *investment*, and *imports* as a percentage of the GDP are included. This allows testing H1: The larger exporters and investors are the more likely are non-trade issues to be found in PTAs. Furthermore, I added *trade*, as a logged value, in order to measure economic

dependency (H4) (Huang and Stomczynski, 2003). The economic dependency measurement is not perfect, but for now a better proxy for economic dependency than trade was not available. The Correlates of War Dataset offers trade data and Cepii FDI data.

Fourth, for measuring human rights compliance (H3) I use two indexes: 1.) The empowerment rights index (*EmpowermentIndex*) - an additive index summarizing government respect for electoral self-determination, domestic movement, foreign movement, religion, speech, assembly and association, and workers' rights (Cingranelli et al., 2014); and 2.) The physical integrity rights index (*PhysicalIntegrity*) - an additive index summarizing government respect for disappearance, extra judicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture (Ibid). In order to account for similarity in terms of human rights policy, I include the absolute difference of human rights records between the two trading partners.

2.3 Control Variables

I integrated several control variables in my regression analysis in order to account for confounding factors. *GDP growth* controls for economic development. It is expected that countries with great economic growth are even more risk-averse than stable economies (Baccini et al., 2013; Koremenos, 2005), which could lead to an averse attitude towards political regulations via PTAs - in the sense that they avoid general changes to keep the growth continuing. The absolute difference in GDP between the two trading partners accounts for the power, which is according to Hafner-Burton (2009a) one of the major explanatory variables for human rights clauses in PTAs.

In addition, I added World Trade Organization membership (*WTO*) of both countries. Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) expect that countries that are members in the WTO act differently while negotiating a PTA than non-WTO members.

Regarding political variables, I include *Regime* data using Polity IV as indicator. The expectation is that democracies should opt more strongly for the inclusion of non-trade issues (Mansfield et al., 2002). Hereby, I also control for regime similarity between the trading partners.

Moreover, I added dummies indicating the type of the trade agreement (bilateral, plurilateral, accession) and the number of members in the treaty since a greater number of members can make it more difficult to come to a conclusion. I also control for EU and North American PTAs. This is because Aaronson (2010) and (Hafner-Burton, 2009a) show different policy approaches regarding human rights provisions in PTAs by the US, Canada, and the European Union.

Finally, I factor in a measure for geographic distance (*Distance*) between the trading partners provided by Cepii. Countries that are close to each other are expected to be more prone to cooperate on non-trade issues since they often share similar attitudes towards political issues.

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the above mentioned variables.

[Table 1 here]

3 Results

I conducted sixteen regressions, namely four for each concept (Scope, Preciseness, Enforceability, and Dialogue). Table 2 and 3 show the regression results for dyads differentiated by small and big markets and in table 4 and 5, you find the regression results for dyads differentiated by good and bad human rights performers.

Starting with market structure (H1), the export variable has the expected positive sign in most estimations and is significant in all of them. Strong representation of Investors within an economy is mainly positively correlated with non-trade issues in their PTAs, but for the smaller trading partner and the weaker human rights performer among the actors in the dyad, investment has a negative effect. Importing economies show a negative trend.

Then, economic dependency (H4), which was measured by trade, is positive in one third of all estimations. For good human rights performers economic dependence is mainly negative for the inclusion on human rights in their agreements.

Furthermore, economic depth of the agreement is always significant and positive for including enforceable and non-enforceable human rights. This confirms hypothesis two saying that deep agreements are more prone to include human rights provisions due to greater lobbying activity. This is valid for all four concepts including enforceability. This contradicts the theory of (Downs et al., 1996) who states that enforceability does hardly correlate with depth.

Interestingly, good human rights performance is not associated with more human rights clauses in the PTA. This is particularly the case for the empowerment index, but not so much for the physical integrity index. More important, the difference in

empowerment index has a negative record and is statistically significant, which supports the theory (H3), where I expected dyads with similar human rights policy to be more likely including human rights clauses. For the physical integrity index differences in performance can even have a positive effect on the integration of human rights clauses. This is contradictory to the theory. However, we could explain this by saying that import-competing firms and labour unions are more concerned about labour rights - that are captured by the Empowerment Index - than physical integrity rights.

The beta of distance is - as expected - negative. Market size difference is not determining the inclusion of human rights in trade agreements and contradicts the power leverage theory of Hafner-Burton (2009a). Political regime is less important than expected and economic development can even be positive for the scope and enforceability of non-trade issues in PTAs.

Moreover, the results show that North American trade agreements integrate more and stricter human rights in trade agreements than the European Union. This is interesting since we would according to our descriptive statistics expect the EU to be stronger in this regard. However, controlling for other factors leaves the US and Canada as greater human rights advocates.

Comparing the four concepts - scope, preciseness, enforceability, and dialogue - we see that the variables determining enforceability of non-trade issues are slightly different than the other three indexes. Economic dependency and investors play a different role for this concept. However, economic depth of agreements is positively associated with enforceability of non-trade issues. This means that actors do not avoid to bind themselves to possibly high sanction costs.

[Table 2 here]

[Table 3 here]

[Table 4 here]

[Table 5 here]

4 Discussion and Conclusion

What accounts for the variation in scope and enforceability of human rights clauses in preferential trade agreements? I found that the degree of trade liberalization best explains the scope, preciseness, and enforceability of human rights clauses. Moreover, the market structure plays a crucial role. Especially exporting countries and dependent economies are likely to have human rights provisions in their trade agreements. Power leverage - as suggested by Hafner-Burton (2009a) - is not that important.

The results confirm that interest groups must be taken more seriously into consideration when assessing human rights and international trade. Especially, looking more closely to non-trade actors - such as NGOs - could help in better understanding the puzzle.

The gravity regression ran over 1435 dyads stemming from 274 PTAs. More observations will help to sharpen the argument. Finding better measures for economic dependency and possibly import-competition would also advance this study. Since hypothesis one (exporting economies and non-trade issues) can not be answered consistently over all dyads and concepts, but with high significance in each of them, a greater differentiation in terms of market structure would help (f.i. labour endowed countries versus factor endowed countries).

However, to the best of my knowledge, no one has collected data on the design of non-trade issues in PTAs beyond a dichotomy approach. This is the major contribution of this project and allows, besides testing for causes, also to inquire the consequences of human rights clauses that are linked to trade.

With this approach, novel insights are generated and a contribution to the scientific debate on PTAs and human rights is made (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2009a; Spilker and Böhmelt, 2012). Particularly for scholars examining the impact of human rights clauses in PTAs on government repression will benefit from this study. Spilker and Böhmelt (2012) reminded us that ignoring the selection process leads to wrong results. This work presents a first step towards better understanding the selection process of human rights clauses in trade agreements. The project is embedded in the debates regarding new institutionalism and reaffirms the importance of institutional design while studying the causes for and consequences of international treaties.

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Figures




Figure 1: The figure shows the percentage of agreements that contain the various provisions.




Figure 2: The scope of European Union's, North American's, and selected other agreements.




Figure 3: The preciseness of European Union's, North American's, and selected other agreements.




Figure 4: The enforceability of European Union's, North American's, and selected other agreements.




Figure 5: Promotion of Non-Trade Issues via European Union's, North American's, and selected other's agreements.

Tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Dependent Variables					
<i>Scope Index</i>	10.14	7.44	0.00	2.21	own coding
<i>Preciseness Index</i>	0.78	0.57	0.00	2.21	own coding
<i>Enforceability Index</i>	0.71	0.52	0.00	2.34	own coding
<i>Socialization Index</i>	0.84	0.62	0.00	2.07	own coding
Explanatory Variables					
<i>Depth</i>	1.46	0.43	-1.03	2.31	Dür et al. (2013)
<i>log(trade)</i>	12.45	0.56	8.09	14.9	CoW
<i>Imports of GDP</i>	0.44	0.15	0.03	0.66	CoW
<i>Exports of GDP</i>	0.38	0.10	0.02	1.77	CoW
<i>FDI of GDP</i>	0.10	0.04	0.00	0.46	CoW
<i>EmpowermentIndexSmall</i>	11.65	0.89	0.00	11.00	Cingranelli et al. (2014)
<i>EmpowermentIndexBig</i>	11.61	1.40	0.00	14.00	Cingranelli et al. (2014)

<i>Abs.Diff. EmpISmall&EmpIBig</i>	0.04	0.89	0.00	11.00	Cingranelli et al. (2014)
<i>PhysicalIntegritySmall</i>	6.74	0.90	0.00	8.00	Cingranelli et al. (2014)
<i>PhysicalIntegrityBig</i>	6.30	0.85	0.00	8.00	Cingranelli et al. (2014)
<i>Abs.Diff. PhysIntSmall&PhysIntBig</i>	0.26	0.61	0.00	7.50	Cingranelli et al. (2014)

Control Variables

<i>Distance</i>	7.67	0.96	6.07	9.86	Cepii
<i>WTO</i>	0.94	0.23	0.00	1.00	Dür et al. (2013)
<i>civil war</i>	0.02	0.12	0.00	1.00	CoW
<i>EU PTAs</i>	0.	0.13	0.00	1.00	own coding
<i>NorthAmerican PTAs</i>	0.	0.02	0.00	1.00	own coding
<i>Regime</i>	8.99	2.26	-9.00	10.00	Polity IV
<i>Abs.Diff Regimebig&Regimesmall</i>	0.57	1.33	0.00	11.30	Polity IV
<i>GDPgrowth</i>	4.44	2.14	-9.70	11.3	WDI
<i>GDPpC</i>	26660	6995.18	455.6	88830	WDI

Table 2: Results Scope and Preciseness Index with Differentiation between Large and Small Markets

Covariates	(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)	
	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Economic Depth	2.51	0.23	1.60	0.27	0.34	0.03	0.15	0.03
Exports p. GDP (bigM.)	-5.83	2.70	50.48	2.42	0.13	0.33	4.83	0.24
Exports p. GDP (smallM.)	13.15	1.17	-12.01	1.29	1.30	0.14	-0.90	0.13
O. Investment p. GDP (bigM.)	4.77	2.01	-36.61	2.67	0.74	0.24	-3.78	0.26
O. Investment p. GDP (smallM.)	7.21	3.94	54.62	4.77	-0.13	0.48	5.73	0.47
Imports p. GDP (bigM.)	3.41	3.08	-55.39	2.58	-0.59	0.37	-5.20	0.25
Imports p. GDP (smallM.)	-16.53	1.22	9.39	1.37	-1.65	0.15	0.74	0.13
Empowerment R. I. (bigM.)	-0.47	0.09	0.30	0.08	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01
Empowerment R. I.dif	0.11	0.08	-1.07	0.10	0.01	0.01	-0.11	0.01
Empowerment R. I. (smallM.)	-0.19	0.10	-0.92	0.09	-0.02	0.01	-0.06	0.01
Physical Integrity R. I. (bigM.)	0.81	0.14	-0.34	0.15	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.01
Physical Integrity R. I.dif	0.63	0.09	0.41	0.10	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.01
Physical Integrity R. I. (smallM.)	-0.53	0.14	1.29	0.14	-0.07	0.02	0.07	0.01
Economic Depend. (bigM.)	3.59	0.64	-2.66	0.49	0.24	0.08	-0.36	0.05
Economic Depend. (smallM.)	-0.65	0.50	-3.02	0.31	0.01	0.06	-0.19	0.03
Plurilateral T.	5.54	1.35			-0.34	0.16		
Accession	0.51	1.38			-0.70	0.17		
Bilateral T.	3.42	1.35			-0.52	0.16		
Number of T.-Members	-0.36	0.04			-0.05	0.01		
GDPdif	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
GDP growth	0.17	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
GDPpC (bigM.)	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GDPpC (smallM.)	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Pol. System Diff.	-0.23	0.04	0.40	0.05	-0.02	0.00	0.04	0.00
Civil War	0.40	0.42	3.82	0.57	0.04	0.05	0.41	0.06
Distance	-0.89	0.22	-2.14	0.12	-0.12	0.03	-0.11	0.01

EU	16.28	0.70			1.70	0.09		
North American	18.81	0.83			2.04	0.10		
WTO	-0.73	0.13			-0.09	0.02		
(Intercept)	13.86	3.43	27.11	1.12	0.91	0.42	-0.02	0.11
Observations	796		1433		796		1433	
R-squared	0.99		0.98		0.98		0.96	

Table 3: Results Enforceability and Socialization Index with Differentiation between Large and Small Markets

Covariates	(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)	
	Enforceability		Enforceability		Socialization		Socialization	
	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Economic Depth	0.45	0.05	0.12	0.04	0.39	0.03	0.26	0.03
Exports p. GDP (bigM.)	-2.30	0.58	4.57	0.33	-0.97	0.36	5.20	0.28
Exports p. GDP (smallM.)	2.26	0.25	-0.04	0.17	1.16	0.15	-1.13	0.15
O. Investment p. GDP (bigM.)	1.85	0.43	-3.61	0.36	1.57	0.27	-4.05	0.31
O. Investment p. GDP (smallM.)	0.14	0.84	5.03	0.65	-0.41	0.52	4.45	0.55
Imports p. GDP (bigM.)	1.90	0.66	-4.81	0.35	0.43	0.41	-5.50	0.30
Imports p. GDP (smallM.)	-2.57	0.26	0.13	0.19	-1.90	0.16	0.82	0.16
Economic Depend. (bigM.)	0.21	0.14	-0.60	0.07	0.43	0.08	-0.39	0.06
Economic Depend. (smallM.)	0.30	0.11	0.07	0.04	-0.10	0.07	-0.30	0.04
Empowerment R. I. (bigM.)	-0.13	0.02	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	0.01	0.05	0.01
Empowerment R. I.dif	0.07	0.02	-0.06	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.12	0.01
Empowerment R. I. (smallM.)	0.08	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.11	0.01
Physical Integrity R. I. (bigM.)	0.23	0.03	0.14	0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.02
Physical Integrity R. I.dif	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.01
Physical Integrity R. I. (smallM.)	-0.27	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.06	0.02	0.14	0.02
Plurilateral T.lateral T.	-1.16	0.29			-0.18	0.18		
Accession	-1.69	0.30			-0.13	0.18		
Bilateral T.	-1.49	0.29			-0.07	0.18		
Number of T.-Members	-0.12	0.01			-0.05	0.01		
GDPdif	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
GDP growth	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
GDPpC (bigM.)	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GDPpC (smallM.)	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Pol. System Diff.	-0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.05	0.01
Civil War	-0.04	0.09	0.42	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.48	0.07
Distance	-0.11	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.23	0.03	-0.15	0.01
EU	2.80	0.15			1.79	0.09		
North American	3.20	0.18			1.89	0.11		
WTO	-0.18	0.03			-0.07	0.02		
(Intercept)	1.92	0.74	-1.11	0.15	1.62	0.45	0.51	0.13
Observations	796		1433		796		1433	

R-squared 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.96

Table 4: Results Scope and Preciseness Index with Differentiation between Good and Bad Human Rights Performer

Covariates	(1) Scope		(2) Scope		(1) Preciseness		(2) Preciseness	
	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Economic Depth	3.59	0.19	2.36	0.25	0.41	0.02	0.21	0.02
Exports p. GDP (badHR)	196.58	11.34	44.15	12.58	13.90	1.31	0.06	1.21
Exports p. GDP (goodHR)	-61.58	13.51	180.86	13.42	1.09	1.56	21.40	1.29
O. Investment p. GDP (badHR)	-3.56	1.57	0.42	2.37	-0.19	0.18	0.22	0.23
O. Investment p. GDP (goodHR)	21.75	1.74	-16.54	2.29	1.80	0.20	-2.02	0.22
Imports p. GDP (badHR)	-256.66	12.60	-2.06	15.60	-18.07	1.46	5.52	1.50
Imports p. GDP (goodHR)	6.87	14.91	-222.34	14.55	-7.61	1.73	-24.54	1.40
Empowerment R. I. (badHR)	-3.92	0.40	-12.71	0.55	-0.62	0.05	-1.17	0.05
Empowerment R. I.dif	-3.92	0.40	-13.26	0.55	-0.65	0.05	-1.27	0.05
Empowerment R. I. (goodHR)	3.27	0.38	12.10	0.53	0.57	0.04	1.14	0.05
Physical Integrity R. I. (badHR)	-0.90	0.26	-0.09	0.30	-0.01	0.03	0.13	0.03
Physical Integrity R. I.dif	-0.28	0.28	0.43	0.33	0.09	0.03	0.20	0.03
Physical Integrity R. I. (goodHR)	1.16	0.27	0.59	0.27	0.00	0.03	-0.07	0.03
Economic Depend. (badHR)	5.80	0.36	-1.90	0.37	0.52	0.04	-0.27	0.04
Economic Depend. (goodHR)	-6.04	0.57	-0.03	0.28	-0.59	0.07	0.07	0.03
Plurilateral T.	8.85	0.95			0.35	0.11		
Accession	7.80	1.06			0.43	0.12		
Bilateral T.	7.74	1.05			0.30	0.12		
Number of T.-Members	-0.02	0.04			-0.01	0.00		
GDPdif	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GDP growth	0.03	0.02	0.19	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
GDPpC (badHR)	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GDPpC (goodHR)	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pol. System Diff.	-0.15	0.03	0.28	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.04	0.00
Civil War	1.89	0.30	-0.09	0.45	0.18	0.03	0.14	0.04
Distance	-1.96	0.16	-3.33	0.11	-0.22	0.02	-0.23	0.01
EU	8.77	0.67			0.76	0.08		
North American	15.01	0.72			1.40	0.08		
WTO	-0.72	0.10			-0.09	0.01		
(Intercept)	21.11	2.53	34.68	1.20	1.02	0.29	0.59	0.12
Observations	796		1433		796		1433	
R-squared	0.99		0.98		0.99		0.97	

Table 5: Results Enforceability and Socialization Index with Differentiation between Good and Bad Human Rights Performer

Covariates	(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)	
	Enforceability		Enforceability		Socialization		Socialization	
	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Economic Depth	0.44	0.03	0.19	0.03	0.44	0.03	0.31	0.03
Exports p. GDP (badHR)	5.32	2.12	0.18	1.57	12.62	1.72	0.59	1.51
Exports p. GDP (goodHR)	-15.06	2.53	27.01	1.67	-8.16	2.05	24.54	1.61
O. Investment p. GDP (badHR)	0.94	0.29	-0.37	0.30	0.02	0.24	-0.19	0.29
O. Investment p. GDP (goodHR)	3.64	0.33	-1.59	0.29	2.62	0.26	-2.92	0.28
Imports p. GDP (badHR)	-15.94	2.36	5.67	1.94	-21.88	1.91	4.99	1.88
Imports p. GDP (goodHR)	7.81	2.79	-28.42	1.81	-0.38	2.26	-26.87	1.75
Empowerment R. I. (badHR)	-0.65	0.07	-1.44	0.07	-0.38	0.06	-1.18	0.07
Empowerment R. I.dif	-0.76	0.07	-1.57	0.07	-0.39	0.06	-1.24	0.07
Empowerment R. I. (goodHR)	0.68	0.07	1.41	0.07	0.32	0.06	1.12	0.06
Physical Integrity R. I. (badHR)	0.44	0.05	0.36	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.04
Physical Integrity R. I.dif	0.58	0.05	0.38	0.04	0.12	0.04	0.07	0.04
Physical Integrity R. I. (goodHR)	-0.49	0.05	-0.27	0.03	-0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03
Economic Depend. (badHR)	0.68	0.07	-0.36	0.05	0.48	0.05	-0.38	0.04
Economic Depend. (goodHR)	-0.52	0.11	0.15	0.04	-0.39	0.09	0.08	0.03
Plurilateral T.	0.29	0.18			0.35	0.14		
Accession	0.55	0.20			0.79	0.16		
Bilateral T.	0.48	0.20			0.54	0.16		
Number of T.-Members	-0.04	0.01			-0.01	0.01		
GDPdif	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
GDP growth	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
GDPpC (badHR)	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GDPpC (goodHR)	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pol. System Diff.	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.05	0.01
Civil War	0.44	0.06	0.43	0.06	0.18	0.05	0.06	0.05
Distance	-0.23	0.03	-0.14	0.01	-0.28	0.02	-0.24	0.01
EU	1.38	0.12			1.15	0.10		
North American	2.51	0.13			1.53	0.11		
WTO	-0.18	0.02			-0.06	0.02		
(Intercept)	0.75	0.47	-0.20	0.15	1.43	0.38	0.94	0.14
Observations	796		1433		796		1433	
R-squared	0.96		0.94		0.98		0.96	

Codebook

Preciseness - Place of Reference

- Is there a provision calling for protection of civil and political rights?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**humanrights_pre**]
 - in the main text [**humanrights_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for protection of the rule of law?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**law_pre**]
 - in the main text [**law_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for protection of workers rights?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**labour_pre**]
 - in the main text [**labour_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for the promotion of democracy?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**democracy_pre**]
 - in the main text [**democracy_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for the protection of public health (access to affordable medicine, etc.)?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**health_pre**]
 - in the main text [**health_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for protection of minority rights?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**minority_pre**]
 - in the main text [**minority_main**]
- Is there a provision calling cooperation to enhance women rights?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**women_pre**]
 - in the main text [**women_main**]
- Is there a provision calling cooperation to enhance childrens' rights?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**child_pre**]
 - in the main text [**child_main**]
- Is there a provision calling cooperation to enhance education?

- in the preamble or the annexes: **[education_pre]**
 - in the main text **[education_main]**
- Is there a provision calling cooperation to enhance social security?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[social_pre]**
 - in the main text **[social_main]**
- Is there a provision calling for good governance?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[governance_pre]**
 - in the main text **[governance_main]**
- Is there a provision calling for cooperation to enhance the free movement of people/worker?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[movement_pre]**
 - in the main text **[movement_main]**
- Is there a provision calling cooperation to enhance economic development?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[movement_pre]**
 - in the main text **[movement_main]**
- Is there a provision calling for cooperation in the fight against corruption?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[movement_pre]**
 - in the main text **[movement_main]**
- Is there a provision emphasizing support for regional integration?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[region_pre]**
 - in the main text **[region_main]**
- Is there a provision calling for cooperation in security realm (including conflict prevention, peace building etc.)?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[security_pre]**
 - in the main text **[security_main]**
- Is there a provision calling for cooperation in fighting terrorism?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **[antiterror_pre]**
 - in the main text **[antiterror_main]**

- Is there a provision calling for cooperation in fighting corruption?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**anticorruption_pre**]
 - in the main text [**anticorruption_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for good governance?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: **governance_pre**]
 - in the main text [**governance_main**]
- Is there a provision calling for environmental protection?
 - in the preamble or the annexes: [**environment_pre**]
 - in the main text **environment_main**]

Preciseness - International Treaty and Measures

- Is there a reference towards (a) international/regional already existing convention(s) or not?
 - [**treaty...**⁸]
- Is there a clause calling for the application of appropriate measures and actions in order to meet non-trade provisions?
 - [**measure**]
 - [**measure...**]

Enforceability - Conditionality, DSM, and Assessment

- Is there a clause calling for the implementation of (certain) non-trade issues as a prerequisite for further progress in the economic cooperation or does the violation of this issue is followed by sanctions?
 - [**conditionality**]
 - [**conditionality...**]

⁸here comes the abbreviation of the respective non-trade issue to which the international/regional treaty(ies)/ convention(s) refer to (f.i.humanrights (f.i. UDHR), labour (f.i. ILO), environment, security (f.i. UN), etc.

- Is there a provision calling for a dispute settlement system (that might also capture non-trade issues)?
 - **[dispute_settlement]**
 - * political
 - * quasi-judicial
 - * judicial
 - **[dispute_settlement...]**
 - * political
 - * quasi-judicial
 - * judicial
- Is there a provision calling for the assessment of the compliance with the agreement (or specific non-trade issues)?
 - **[assessment]**
 - **[assessment_...]**

Socialization - Cooperation, Dialogue, and Institutionalization

- Is there a clause calling for cooperation in the respective non-trade issue?
 - **[cooperation]**
 - **[cooperation_...⁹]**
- Is there a clause calling for establishing or holding a dialogue regarding the respective non-trade issue?
 - **[dialogue]**
 - **[dialogue_...]**
- Is there a clause calling for a body responsible for the agreement?
 - **[body]**
 - **[body_...]**

⁹here comes the abbreviation of the respective non-trade issue (f.i. labour, environment, women, etc.)

List of Preferential Trade Agreements

	Year	Name	Abbreviation
1	2003	Afghanistan India	AF-IN
2	1991	African Economic Community	AEC
3	2004	Agadir Agreement	Agd
4	2003	Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina	AL-BA
5	2003	Albania Bulgaria	AL-BG
6	2002	Albania Croatia	AL-HR
7	2006	Albania EC SAA	AL-EU
8	2009	Albania EFTA	AL-EFTA
9	2003	Albania Kosovo	AL-BA
10	2002	Albania Macedonia	AL-MK
11	2003	Albania Moldova	AL-MD
12	2003	Albania Romania	AL-RO
13	2003	Albania Serbia	AL-RS
14	2006	Albania Turkey	AL-TR
15	2002	Algeria EC Euro-Med Association Agreement	DZ-EU
16	1997	Algeria Jordan	DZ-JO
17	2008	Algeria Tunisia	DZ-TN
18	1999	Andean Community Brazil	Andean-BR
19	1996	Andean Community Trujillo Protocol	Andean
20	2000	Andean Countries Argentina	Andean-AR
21	2004	Andean Countries MERCOSUR	Andean-MERCOSUR
22	1990	Andorra EC	AD-EU
23	1989	Arab Maghreb Union	AMU
24	1990	Argentina Brazil	AR-BR
25	1991	Argentina Chile	AR-CL
26	1999	Argentina Cuba	AR-CU
27	1993	Argentina Ecuador	AR-EC
28	1989	Argentina Paraguay	AR-PY
29	2003	Argentina Uruguay	AR-UY
30	1992	Argentina Venezuela	AR-VE
31	2002	Armenia Estonia	AM-EE
32	1995	Armenia Georgia	AM-GE
33	1995	Armenia Iran	AM-IR
34	1999	Armenia Kazakhstan	AM-KZ
35	1994	Armenia Kyrgyzstan	AM-KG
36	1993	Armenia Moldova	AM-MD
37	1992	Armenia Russia	AM-RU
38	1995	Armenia Turkmenistan	AM-TM
39	1994	Armenia Ukraine	AM-UA
40	2005	Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (Bangkok Agreement amended)	APTA
41	1994	Association of Caribbean States	ACS
42	1992	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA	ASEAN
43	2009	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Australia New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA)	ASEAN-AU-NZ
44	2004	Association of Southeast Asian Nations China	ASEAN-CN
45	2007	Association of Southeast Asian Nations China Services	ASEAN-CN
46	2009	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Goods	ASEAN
47	2009	Association of Southeast Asian Nations India	ASEAN-IN
48	2008	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Japan	ASEAN-JP
49	2006	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea	ASEAN-KR
50	2007	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea services	ASEAN-KR
51	2008	Australia Chile	AU-CL
52	1995	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Services	ASEAN ser
53	1991	Australia Papua New Guinea	AU-PG
54	2003	Australia Singapore	AU-SG
55	2004	Australia Thailand	AU-TH
56	2004	Australia US	AU-US
57	1996	Azerbaijan Georgia	AZ-GE
58	1995	Azerbaijan Ukraine	AZ-UA
59	2001	Bahrain Jordan	BH-JO
60	2004	Bahrain US	BH-US
61	1996	Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA) agriculture	BAFTA
62	1993	Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA) industrial	BAFTA
63	1997	Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA) Non Tariff Barriers	BAFTA
64	1999	Belarus Russia (Union State)	BY-RU
65	2009	Belarus Serbia	BY-RS
66	1992	Belarus Ukraine	BY-UA
67	2006	Belize Guatemala	BZ-GT
68	2006	Bhutan India	BT-IN
69	1993	Bolivia Chile	BO-CL
70	2000	Bolivia Cuba	BO-CU
71	1996	Bolivia MERCOSUR	BO-MERCOSUR
72	1994	Bolivia Mexico	BO-MX

73	1994	Bolivia Paraguay	BO-PY
74	2003	Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria	BG-BA
75	2000	Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia	BA-HR
76	2008	Bosnia and Herzegovina EC SAA	BA-EU
77	2002	Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia	BA-MK
78	2002	Bosnia and Herzegovina Moldova	BA-MD
79	2003	Bosnia and Herzegovina Romania	BA-RO
80	2002	Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbia Montenegro	BA-RS
81	2001	Bosnia and Herzegovina Slovenia	BA-SI
82	2002	Bosnia and Herzegovina Turkey	BA-TR
83	1989	Brazil Cuba	BR-CU
84	1999	Brazil Cuba	BR-CU
85	2001	Brazil Guyana	BR-GY
86	2002	Brazil Mexico	BR-MX
87	1993	Brazil Peru	BR-PE
88	2005	Brazil Suriname	BR-SR
89	2007	Brunei Japan	BN-JP
90	1995	Bulgaria Czech Republic	BG-CZ
91	1993	Bulgaria EC	BG-EU
92	1993	Bulgaria EFTA	BG-EFTA
93	2001	Bulgaria Estonia	BG-EE
94	2001	Bulgaria Israel	BG-IL
95	2002	Bulgaria Latvia	BG-LV
96	2001	Bulgaria Lithuania	BG-LT
97	1999	Bulgaria Macedonia	BG-MK
98	2004	Bulgaria Moldova	BG-MD
99	2003	Bulgaria Serbia	BG-RS
100	1996	Bulgaria Slovenia	BG-SI
101	1998	Bulgaria Turkey	BG-TR
102	1996	Canada Chile	CA-CL
103	2008	Canada Colombia	CA-CO
104	2001	Canada Costa Rica	CA-CR
105	2008	Canada EFTA	CA-EFTA
106	1996	Canada Israel	CA-IL
107	2009	Canada Jordan	CA-JO
108	2008	Canada Peru	CA-PE
109	1994	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Colombia	CARICOM-CO
110	2004	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Costa Rica	CARICOM-CR
111	2000	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Cuba	CARICOM-CU
112	1998	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Dominican Republic	CARICOM-DO
113	1997	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Protocol on Services	CARICOM
114	2001	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) revised	CARICOM
115	1992	Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Venezuela	CARICOM-VE
116	2008	CARIFORUM EC EPA	CarECEPA
117	1999	Central America Chile	Cent-CL
118	1998	Central America Dominican Republic	Cent-DO
119	2002	Central America Panama	Cent-PA
120	2004	Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)	CAFTA
121	2004	Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) Dominican Republic	CAFTA-DO
122	1991	Central American Integration System	CAIS
123	1992	Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)	CEFTA
124	2006	Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)	CEFTA
125	2005	Chile China	CL-CN
126	2002	Chile EC	EU-CL
127	2003	Chile EFTA	CL-EFTA
128	2006	Chile India	CL-IN
129	2007	Chile Japan	CL-JP
130	2003	Chile Korea	CL-KR
131	1998	Chile Mexico	CL-MX
132	2003	Chile US	CL-US
133	2003	China Hong Kong	CL-HK
134	2003	China Macao	CL-MO
135	2008	China New Zealand	CN-NZ
136	2006	China Pakistan	CN-PK
137	2009	China Pakistan Services	CN-PK
138	2009	China Peru	CN-PE
139	2008	China Singapore	CN-SG
140	2008	Colombia EFTA	CO-EFTA
141	2006	Colombia US	CO-US
142	2003	Common Economic Zone	CEZ
143	1993	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	COMESA
144	1992	Czech and Slovak Republic EFTA	CZ-EFTA
145	1993	Czech Republic EC	CZ-EU
146	1996	Czech Republic Estonia	CZ-EE
147	1996	Czech Republic Israel	CZ-IL
148	1996	Czech Republic Latvia	CZ-LV

149	1995	Czech Republic Lithuania	CZ-LT
150	1994	Czech Republic Romania	CZ-RO
151	1992	Czech Republic Slovakia	CZ-SK
152	1993	Czech Republic Slovenia	CZ-SI
153	1997	Czech Republic Turkey	CZ-TR
154	2006	D8 PTA	D8
155	2001	EC Egypt Euro-Med Association Agreement	EU-EG
156	1994	EC Estonia	EU-EE
157	1995	EC Estonia Europe Agreement	EU-EE
158	1996	EC Faroe Islands	EU-FO
159	1995	EC Israel Euro-Med Association Agreement	EU-IL
160	1997	EC Jordan Euro-Med Association Agreement	EU-JO
161	1995	EC Latvia Europe Agreement	EU-LV
162	2002	EC Lebanon Euro-Med Association Agreement	EU-LB
163	2007	EC Lisbon	EULisb
164	1994	EC Lithuania	EU-LT
165	1995	EC Lithuania Europe Agreement	EU-LT
166	2001	EC Macedonia SAA	EU-MK
167	2000	EC Mexico	EU-MX
168	2007	EC Montenegro SAA	EU-ME
169	1996	EC Morocco Euro-Med Association Agreement	EU-MA
170	1991	EC Poland	EU-PL
171	1993	EC Romania	EU-RO
172	1991	EC San Marino	EU-SM
173	2008	EC Serbia SAA	EU-RS
174	1993	EC Slovakia	EU-SK
175	1993	EC Slovenia	EU-SI
176	1996	EC Slovenia Europe Agreement	EU-SI
177	1999	EC South Africa	EU-ZA
178	1995	EC Tunisia Euro-Med Association Agreement	EU-TN
179	1995	EC Turkey	EU-TR
180	1993	Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)	ECOWAS
181	2007	EFTA Egypt	EFTA-EG
182	1995	EFTA Estonia	EFTA-EE
183	2009	EFTA GCC	EFTA-GCC
184	2005	EFTA Korea	EFTA-KR
185	2004	EFTA Lebanon	EFTA-LB
186	2000	EFTA Mexico	EFTA-MX
187	2009	EFTA Serbia	EFTA-RS
188	2002	EFTA Singapore	EFTA-SG
189	2005	Faroe Islands Iceland	FO-IS
190	1992	Finland Lithuania	FI-LT
191	2008	Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Singapore	GCC-SG
192	1997	Hungary Israel	HU-IL
193	1999	Hungary Latvia	HU-LV
194	1998	Hungary Lithuania	HU-LT
195	1994	Hungary Slovenia	HU-SI
196	1997	Hungary Turkey	HU-TR
197	2009	India Korea	IN-KR
198	2004	India MERCOSUR	IN-MERCOSUR
199	1991	India Nepal	IN-NP
200	2009	India Nepal	IN-NP
201	2005	India Singapore	IN-SG
202	1998	India Sri Lanka	IN-LK
203	2007	Indonesia Japan	ID-JP
204	2004	Iran Pakistan	IR-PK
205	2006	Iran Syria	IR-SY
206	1995	Israel Jordan	IL-JO
207	2007	Israel MERCOSUR	IL-MERCOSUR
208	2000	Israel Mexico	IL-MX
209	1994	Israel PLO	IL-PS
210	1997	Israel Poland	IL-PL
211	2001	Israel Romania	IL-RO
212	1996	Israel Slovakia	IL-SK
213	1998	Israel Slovenia	IL-SI
214	1996	Israel Turkey	IL-TR
215	2005	Japan Malaysia	JP-MY
216	2002	Japan Singapore	JP-SG
217	2009	Japan Switzerland	JP-CH
218	2007	Japan Thailand	JP-TH
219	2008	Japan Vietnam	JP-VN
220	1992	Jordan Lebanon	JO-LB
221	2002	Jordan Lebanon	JO-LB
222	1992	Jordan Libya	JO-LY
223	1994	Jordan Morocco	JO-MA
224	1998	Jordan Morocco	JO-MA

225	1995	Jordan PLO	JO-PS
226	2004	Jordan Singapore	JO-SG
227	2001	Jordan Syria	JO-SY
228	1998	Jordan Tunisia	JO-TN
229	2009	Jordan Turkey	JO-TR
230	2000	Jordan UAE	JO-AE
231	2000	Jordan US	JO-US
232	1995	Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan	KZ-KG
233	1994	Kazakhstan Ukraine	KZ-UA
234	2005	Korea Singapore	KR-SG
235	2007	Korea US	KR-US
236	1995	Kyrgyzstan Moldova	KG-MD
237	1992	Kyrgyzstan Russia	KG-RU
238	1995	Kyrgyzstan Ukraine	KG-UA
239	1996	Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan	KG-UZ
240	1991	Laos Thailand	LA-TH
241	1992	Latvia Norway	LV-NO
242	1997	Latvia Poland	LV-PL
243	1996	Latvia Slovakia	LV-SK
244	1996	Latvia Slovenia	LV-SI
245	1992	Latvia Sweden	LV-SE
246	1992	Latvia Switzerland	LV-CH
247	1998	Latvia Turkey	LV-TR
248	1996	Lithuania Poland	LT-PL
249	1996	Lithuania Slovakia	LT-SK
250	1996	Lithuania Slovenia	LT-SI
251	1991	Lithuania Sweden	LT-SE
252	1992	Lithuania Switzerland	LT-CH
253	1997	Lithuania Turkey	LT-TR
254	1991	MERCOSUR	MERCOSUR
255	1992	Namibia Zimbabwe	NA-ZW
256	2000	New Zealand Singapore	NZ-SG
257	2005	New Zealand Thailand	NZ-TH
258	1992	North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	NAFTA
259	2006	Oman US	OM-US
260	2002	Pakistan Sri Lanka	PK-LK
261	2006	Panama Singapore	PA-SG
262	2003	Panama Taiwan	PA-TW
263	2007	Panama US	PA-US
264	2008	Peru Singapore	PE-SG
265	2006	Peru US	PE-US
266	1999	Poland Turkey	PL-TR
267	2003	Romania Serbia	RO-RS
268	1994	Romania Slovakia	RO-SK
269	1997	Romania Turkey	RO-TR
270	1993	Russia Ukraine	RU-UA
271	2001	Tajikistan Ukraine	TJ-UA
272	2005	Trans Pacific Strategic EPA	TPS
273	1994	Turkmenistan Ukraine	TM-UA
274	1994	Ukraine Uzbekistan	UA-UZ