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Still Relevant? Normative Power Europe and the Enabling of the EU's Comprehensive Approach – Comparing EU Strategies towards the Horn of Africa and Sahel

Bjørn Olav Knutsen, Principal scientist, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI),
Associate professor, University of Nordland (UiN)

&

Elisabeth Pettersen, Senior lecturer, University of Nordland (UiN)

Introduction and analytical approach

The Normative Power Europe (NPE) debate is now into its second decennium starting with Ian Manners' seminal article (2002) and subsequent works on the EU's international presence. Manners underlines (2002:252) that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. Hence, according to NPE proponents the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system, i.e. how the EU aims for setting standards for others through the means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either military or economic sources (Manners, 2002:244-245; Whitman, 2013:174; Lenz, 2013; Manners, 2013). The special issue of the journal *Cooperation and Conflict* in 2013 sets the standard for what ten years of scholarship on NPE has led to and paves subsequently the way for what the next years of scholarship might lead to. The present paper aims therefore to follow up on some of the cases the special issue of *Cooperation and Conflict* discusses by comparing systematically the EU's normative power at the Horn of Africa and in Sahel. In this sense our contribution in this paper is threefold.

Firstly, the next years of scholarship must turn the debate towards more empirical studies and consequently focus more on what the EU does rather than still focusing on what kind of actor the EU is. In this sense our contribution is indebted to Aggestam (2008) who underlines that the increasing role and impact of the EU in world affairs will justify such a turn in scholarship. Secondly, the importance of comparative studies, i.e. how the EU relates to other actors that being states and other international organizations and thereby illuminating the distinctiveness of the EU as an actor. Such an approach might include a systematic comparison of different actors problem definitions, strategies and instruments, as well as introducing more evaluative yardsticks like the different actors policy formulations, policy implementations and impact performances for comparing the EU with other actors policies in specific issue areas (Peters, 2015, forthcoming). In addition, it also becomes important to study the actorness and policy impacts of the EU in different regions and compare them systematically. This will undoubtedly enable us to achieve a better understanding of EU actorness in different parts of the world. Hence, by studying the elaboration of the EU's actorness and policy impacts in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region of Mali, Mauretania and Niger we will concentrate our efforts on the elaboration of the EU's comprehensive approaches towards these two regions. In such a way we might achieve a clearer picture of

what is characterizing the EU as a normative power and as a security actor on the African continent. Thirdly, the need for scholars to achieve a better understanding for how the EU defines its comprehensive approach as a means for studying the foreign policies of the EU. Most important is to develop a research design for how to study the EU as a normative power and how this is expressed through its comprehensive approaches towards these two regions.

By conducting such an approach the paper will challenge Manners' (2006:183) views that a militarization beyond the crossroads provided by the European Security Strategy (ESS) is weakening the normative claims of the EU. In stead, the paper will firstly underline the importance of achieving a more systematic knowledge about how the civilian and military means are composed in a conflict area where the EU is engaged. Secondly, to what extent there exist a regional approach and an integrated geographic strategy and, thirdly, to what extent the EU emphasize the importance of the security-development nexus in conflict-regions. These three aspects, the composition of the civilian-military interface, the regional approach, and the security-development nexus will serve as analytical yardsticks for the EU's ability to change norms in the two regions. By conducting such an approach one might achieve a better understanding of the EU's ability to act as a normative power in two important conflict regions that greatly affects, albeit quite differently, European security interests. There are two norms this paper will discuss in this regard, "African solutions to African problems" as codified in several EU-African Union (AU) documents during recent years, and the norm of "effective multilateralism and collective security in Africa". This implies that the EU shall support regional integration processes and cooperation efforts in Africa so as to secure peace and stability.

The paper is organized as follows. The next part will shortly present and discuss the status of research on the EU as a normative power, with due regard given to how researchers up until now has treated analytically the "militarization" of the EU. In the following part we will discuss how the EU's emphasis on the importance of developing comprehensive approaches towards conflict-ridden regions correspond with the normative power approach. For example, the ability of the EU to develop more regional strategies will have resemblances with norm diffusion and how EU norms are diffused. The two case studies will illuminate these issues closely even though the developments of the comprehensive approaches were developed quite differently in these two regions. The last part will critically discuss to what extent the EU in Africa acts like a normative power or not.

Status of research on Normative Power Europe (NPE)

Debating the actorness of the EU has been done ever since the first analysts started to scrutinize what kind of actor the forerunners to the EU were. For example Ernst B. Haas (1958) and the neo-functionalists were more interested in integration as functional spillover processes towards a political community, but they were unclear about what kind of community that might be. Haas himself described the possible end-state of the European integration process as a unitary state, a federation or what he quite unspecifically described as a "confederate arrangement" (ibid:8). Later analysts were also highly unspecific and Hedley Bull, the most prominent scholar within the English school, pessimistically stated that

“Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull, 1982:151). Interestingly, the neo-functionalists explained European integration as a reaction against “high politics”, i.e. security and defence, and Haas himself stated that European politicians in the late 1950’s had left the realm of high politics and devoted themselves instead to the building of Europe (Haas, 1967:325). Unfortunately, according to Haas, the functionalist process was “disturbed” by the French president at that time, Charles de Gaulle. According to Haas, de Gaulle’s aim was to establish a political community in Western Europe under French leadership that was supposed to be able to act in an independent manner from the United States (ibid:326).

Consequently, integration theorists have traditionally been skeptical towards a European integration process that also included security and defence issues. These issues were both “un-functionalistic” and sovereignty-prone and could hamper the process towards a united Europe. It is in this perspective one must understand François Duchêne’s civilian power Europe approach as a new foundation for power in international politics (Duchêne, 1972; 1973). Hence, according to Duchêne, the EU is a special international actor whose strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stability and power through economic and political means. Civilian power is, however, far from the same as normative power. While the first type of power emphasize diplomatic and economic cooperation, also including international law, will normative power, instead, emphasize the cosmopolitan nature of the EU’s principles, particularly by a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the center of its relations with its member states and the world (Manners, 2006:176; Whitman, 2013:174). Hence, central in the normative power debate is the EU’s ability to shape and change conceptions of the normal in international relations (Manners, 2002:239-240).

Importantly, the normative power Europe approach also rejects the Westphalian perspectives on international relations one will find in realist as well as liberal theories of international relations, and which also is found in the civilian power approach. Consequently, according to some analysts, a militarization will therefore weaken the EU’s distinct profile of having a civilian international identity (Zielonka, 1998; Manners, 2002; Smith, 2005). Furthermore, a militarization of EU foreign policy might also represent a culmination of a state-building process towards some kind of a European super-state. The EU, with military capabilities, will therefore not be a new political unit beyond the nation-state, but continue to reproduce the state-centric Westphalian order and thus, in reality, be a “normal power” (Pardo, 2011). Normative power, according to Manners (2002:242), is therefore for the EU to be different from pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way. As Whitman (2013:174) underlines, normative power focuses on “non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation and representation of the EU which has become a pole of attraction”.

Hence, by a militarization, the EU’s normative power might be undermined where it might be tempted to use military means to pursue short-term interests (Riddervold, 2011:388). According to Manners, unreflexive militarization will endanger the EU’s normative foundation. However, Manners states further that as long as the EU avoids great power

mentality and give priority to long-term goals of local capacity development and/or place conflict resolution in conflict-ridden regions at the center-piece in EU policy formulations, a military dimension to the EU will not endanger the EU's position as a normative power (Manners, 2006:191; Whitman, 2013:181). As Aggestam (2008) underlines, the EU might continue to be an "ethical power" also when militarized. According to her, the analytical focus when studying EU foreign policy should therefore not be on its foreign policy means, but rather on why it pursues the policies it does, on whether or not it is 'proactively working to change the world in the direction of its vision of the 'global common good'" (ibid:1; Riddervold, 2011:388).

This paper will follow up on this last aspect and describe what the EU does in two conflict-regions. An important aspect of the discussions is to what extent it is possible to identify the normative power of the EU through the comprehensive approaches towards the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions. The method of structured, focused comparison will help us in this regard. Hence, the three yardsticks presented above will enable us to identify the normative power of the EU. As Howorth (2007:209-212) emphasize, the distinctiveness of the EU as a security actor is that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) involves both civilian and military elements thus making the EU a comprehensive security actor. Nevertheless, being a comprehensive security actor is not enough to become a normative power. The next part will discuss this issue closely.

Normative Power Europe through a Comprehensive approach to conflict resolutions?

The elaboration of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises has been a long and difficult process. It resulted in December 2013 in a Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the European Parliament and the Council. One of the main messages was that the EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU institutions and the member states work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and vision: "This is what the comprehensive approach is about" (Joint Communication, 2013:3). It cites the Lisbon Treaty that calls for consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between these and its other policies. Furthermore, the EU's comprehensive approach is a common and shared responsibility of all EU actors in Brussels, in member states and on the ground in third countries (ibid:4).

Initially, however, one can conclude that the EU started to elaborate on the comprehensive approach concept by applying NATO's concept on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). This resulted later on in what the EU labeled as civil military coordination (CMCO), essentially meaning the cooperation among different actors (political, civilian and military) in theatre (Pirozzi, 2013:6), but also at the political level in Brussels. The EU started to elaborate on CMCO and comprehensive planning in 2002, the year before the then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became fully operative. In fact, the comprehensive planning concept is built along the same principles as the UN's Integrated Mission Planning concept, and has consequently led to the so-called Crisis Response Coordinating Teams (CRCTs) prior to most

EU missions and operations since 2003 (Norheim-Martinsen, 2012). The overarching aim of CMCO was to enhance the EU's abilities to act in civilian and military crisis-management missions and operations as an internal measure for closer coordination between different EU actors (Khol, 2006:125). Nevertheless, CMCO was in the beginning regarded as an issue mainly at the Brussels level primarily related to the relationship between the European Commission and the Council. This also demanded a permanent interaction between the Brussels-based crisis-management committees, including the structures of the Council Secretariat and the European Commission (Grevi, et.al. 2009:406; Knutsen, 2009:442). Furthermore, it implied a close interaction between the strategic, operational and the tactical level so that CMCO and its emphasis on a "culture of coordination" should be able to filter down from the Brussels level to the concrete EU missions and operations. As Vanonen (2007) underlined, CMCO, which initially was considered an issue at the Brussels level, was now addressed more widely – all the way down to the field level. Consequently, CMCO was in internal EU circles, before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, regarded as equal and synonymous with a comprehensive approach. This is, however, not the case anymore.

As Pirozzi (2013:7) underlines, in the post-Lisbon period, the comprehensive approach has been developed in a much broader framework, essentially by enlarging the scope and assigning greater responsibilities to the HR/VP for its development and implementation. As Pirozzi (ibid) further emphasize, the aim of the comprehensive approach is to break out of the "CSDP box" and interpret the comprehensive approach in the dimensions of the EU's external relations with the concurring contribution of different policies and actors. As a consequence, the case now is to change the focus from the question of how to coordinate other tools with a CSDP mission or operation, to a much broader issue of how to intermingle a range of instruments, prioritize these and center the work around a diplomatic effort led by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in cooperation with the instruments of the European Commission. This might of course be difficult to realize, as Pirozzi (ibid) also emphasize.

On this basis we propose a research design that underlines the following norms and features in analyzing to what extent the EU acts like a normative power in Africa or not. The two norms we will discuss in the following two cases are the norms of "African solutions to African problems", meaning that the EU as a normative power will reject any form of colonial and/or neo-colonial practices. The second norm is the norm of "effective multilateralism and collective security in Africa", by supporting and enabling the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) to act as security actors within their respective fields.

The first feature we will conceptualize as the composition of the civil-military interface, which furthermore has two sub-features, the internal organization of the CSDP-mechanisms with the other means of the EU, and externally, how the EU manages to support and enable the UN and the AU to conduct peace-operations in Africa. Internally, this will concretely imply the ability of the EU to break out of the above-mentioned "CSDP box" and to avoid a composition of the civilian-military interface that is based upon a security-first logic. A policy towards a conflict-region based upon such logic will inevitably be short-term only and not be

able to handle the root causes of conflict. Previously, before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, one of the main challenges were that the ESDP operations then conducted through the second pillar mechanisms focused on the conduct of short-term, high profile diplomatic or crisis-management actions. These were institutionally and practically divorced from the longer term conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction activities supported by the European Commission (Gourlay, 2006:60; Knutsen, 2009:447). The first EU-military operation outside Europe, Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003 is an example in this regard. Even though some analysts like Gourlay and Ulriksen (2004) praised this operation as a “shape of things to come”, it did not support the EU’s comprehensive approach in DRC since it was institutionally detached from other EU activities in the country (Norheim-Martinsen, 2012).

After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, there are still, however, reports of institutional infighting both within EEAS and between EEAS and the European Commission that has constrained the effective implementation of the comprehensive approach and the achievements of its objectives of effectiveness and sustainability (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2013:5). The external sub-feature is the external cooperation and coordination with other actors like the AU and the UN. Within a classical realist approach towards EU actorness in Africa, EU support to AU and UN peace operations shall be interpreted as providing security through proxies (Rye Olsen, 2014). That is, instead of providing own troops, African troops are doing the actual fighting and peacekeeping on the ground. Western powers, like the EU and the US, provides for the costs. It is evident that such a neoclassical realist approach is contradictory to the EU as a normative power, since one of the basic features of normative power Europe is the rejection of any affiliation with colonial or neo-colonial practice (Whitman, 2013:174). To support the UN and making this organization effective in conducting its tasks, also within the field of security, is an important norm in building a system of effective multilateralism, a central aim in the European security strategy (ESS, 2003).

The second feature is security through norm-diffusion through the ability of the EU to develop more regional strategies and to support regional integration processes based upon that specific region’s own conditions. Concretely, this feature will firstly include the ability of the EU to elaborate strategies and operations and missions within a more comprehensive and regional strategic framework (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2013:7). Secondly, to what extent the EU promotes regional cooperation and integration, as seen at the Horn of Africa through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)(Brosig, 2014). This feature will set under closer scrutiny Manners’ claim that as long as the EU avoids great power mentality and give priority to long-term goals of local capacity development and/or place conflict resolution in conflict-ridden regions at the center-piece in EU policy formulations, a military dimension to the EU will not endanger the EU’s position as a normative power.

The third feature is the ability of the EU to give priority to the security-development nexus debate, and to what extent this nexus, in reality, will frame the conditions for EU involvement

in Africa. In 2005, the European Council decided to promote sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa, and it identified security as a pre-requisite for attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) within 2015 (Martinelli, 2008:112; Knutsen, 2009:444). It is evident, that this feature also has strong resemblances with the first feature, i.e. on the necessity of long-term engagement in conflict-ridden regions far beyond the security-first logic, which tend to neglect longer-terms development and security issues.

In the next part we will compare the EU's comprehensive approaches towards the Horn of Africa and Sahel based upon the three features and thereby achieve a better knowledge about the EU as a normative power in Africa. To achieve this, the method of structured, focused comparison will be applied (George & Bennett, 2005:67-72). The method is structured in the sense that we apply the three features as a foundation for our analysis of both cases. Since we are dealing with certain aspects of the two cases, mainly the civilian-military interface; we have a relatively focused approach in our research. This method was originally devised to study historical experience in ways that yielded useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems (ibid:67). This method is therefore applied here so as to gain a better understanding of how the EU works as an actor and possible normative power on the African continent. In perspective, the EU has since 2003 conducted 16 civilian missions and military operations on the African continent, making this continent the most important laboratory for EU crisis management (Brosig, 2014:74).

The EU's comprehensive approaches towards the Horn of Africa and Sahel: Does the EU act as a normative power?

The Horn of Africa: Building a comprehensive approach "bottom-up"

Since 1990 the Horn of Africa has been one of the most conflicted regions in the world, and in the period between 1990 and 2011 experienced over 200-armed conflicts. Measured by almost any criteria, Eastern Africa has been one of the world's most conflicted regions. There are mainly two causes towards conflicts and humanitarian crises at the Horn of Africa. Firstly, it is triggered by natural disasters, such as drought and famine, and secondly by violent internal political turmoil and periodic conflicts between states in the region (Margesson, 2012). Poor governance, corruption, and economic mismanagement have further exacerbated these crises (UCDP, 2011).

After 2005, piracy off the coast of Somalia, and in the Gulf of Aden, increased as a security challenge, with 111 attacks in 2007 rising to 217 attacks in 2010 (Møller, 2013: 188). As a consequence, the region's own security situation became more visible to the wider international community, making the conflict dynamics at the Horn of Africa an international issue the international community as such had to address. The situation resulted in several UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846), where the UNSC called upon states and regional organisations to address the need for deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

The EU responded to the UN's requests towards counter piracy and launched EU NAVFOR Atalanta in December 2008. Initially, the aim of the operation was to take action towards

deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery. This operation was accompanied with the European Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in 2010, where the objective was to develop the Somali security sector through specific training and support of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNF). The training of these forces has taken place in Uganda and is focused on commander up to battalion and company level, in addition to specialist training in the areas of military police, civilian-military cooperation, intelligence, company commander and combat engineering (EEAS, 2013). Furthermore, in December 2011, the EU's engagement was complemented with a civilian CSDP mission (EUCAP Nestor), assisting the development of a self-sustainable maritime capacity for continued enhancement of maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (ibid; Ehrhart & Petretto, 2012).

Hence, the EU's engagement in the Horn of Africa consists of both military and civilian instruments, where several civilian instruments fall within the realms of the competencies of the European Commission. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the programs of Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) are important elements in linking short-term humanitarian aid with development coordination mechanisms (Joseph, 2014). The European Commission and the EU member states constitute the largest donors to Somalia, through both development aid and various thematic programs. The Joint Strategy Paper (JSP) for Somalia (2008-2013) covers the strategic framework for the European Commission towards co-operation with Somalia under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) of the revised Cotonou Agreement. There are currently 79 ongoing projects under the EDF, with a main focus on governance, education and economic growth. Food security and human rights programs are also important areas within the JSP (EEAS, 2013). The European Commission's total funding for Somalia amounts to €412 million in the period 2008-2013 (European Commission, 2013). The EU is also a major sponsor of the AU's military peace-support mission in Somalia (AMISOM), both financially and with regards to planning and capacity building. Since AMISOM was launched in 2007, the EU has contributed with €512 million (ibid.).

Interestingly, the EU's policies in this region has developed incrementally as part of a pragmatic process where the perceived needs and the different tools available to the EU made it necessary for the Union to combine all elements into a more unified strategy. Hence, the EU Council approved in November 2011 a Strategic Framework to guide the EU's engagement, a framework that included the appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the region, the Greek diplomat Alexander Rondos (Council Document 16858/11). The building of the comprehensive approach has therefore been a "bottom-up" process.

In summary, the totality of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM and EUCAP Nestor forms, together with the efforts by the European Commission, a comprehensive package, with the intention to support the EU's Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. This was also emphasized by HR/VP Catherine Ashton at the Somalia conference in Brussels on 16 September 2013, where the Somali Compact was agreed upon (Ashton, 2013). The compact's objective is to establish a partnership between the Somali government and parliament on the

one hand, and the international community on the other. In this respect, the EU and the member states plays a particular important role as the main donors to the region.

Therefore, the EU plays an important role in achieving a political breakthrough, so as to improve security in the Horn of Africa. The aim in the years to come is to establish a permanent and more integrated EU presence in Mogadishu as a consequence of the enhanced security situation in the capital. In sum, the EU itself considers the progress made in Somalia during recent years as a result of the EU's deep engagement in the area through the mix of its various instruments and policies. This is also the main background why the EU considers the engagement at the Horn of Africa as a flagship in its comprehensive approach (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2013).

It is important to note that the two norms being discussed, "African solutions to African problems" and "effective multilateralism and collective security in Africa", have both institutional as well as policy dimensions. Concerning the composition of the civil-military interface, normative power Europe proponents will underline that it is on this continent much of the conceptual and operational experiences of the CSDP has been elaborated on. These proponents will underline how, in an institutional way, the EU handles its coordination challenges with coordination both via the EUSR and the EU Operations Center (OpCen). OpCen was activated in 2012 to strengthen civil-military synergies between the three CSDP actions in the Horn of Africa. Normative power Europe proponents further emphasize the weight the EU gives on operationalizing the comprehensive approach. For example by initiating the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) the EU has helped the AU with the establishment of norms, structures and procedures so as to enable the AU to carry out its new tasks in the field of peace and security (Pirozzi, 2009: 11) by supporting AMISOM. In this way the EU has helped support both norms.

As regards both the first and the second feature, security through norm diffusion, the initiation of EUCAP Nestor marks a shift of resources away from a military-centric strategy towards more integrated strategic and long-term planning, indicating the EU's long-term self-interests in the region. Thus, with the activation of OpCen it now, firstly, becomes more feasible to enhance coordination between the CSDP operations. Secondly, with the gradual embedding of the CSDP operations within the EEAS (Soliman, et. al, 2012: 43), we might identify more visible seamless webs between CSDP operations and other EU activities that fall within the competencies of the European Commission. Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the setup of EEAS, the CSDP seems to be moving away from targeted, small-scale missions based on partial sub-strategies, to missions employed within a more comprehensive and regional strategic framework (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2013:7).

This might also support the claims that the EU is a normative power, as also underlined in the third feature, the security-development nexus. In the Joint Communication (2013:4) it is underlined that "the connection between security and development is ... a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach". In this security-development nexus perspective it was therefore important for the EU's comprehensive approach designated with the responsibility to lead the process towards a peaceful solution. In this context it was

important for the EU to uphold the set deadline for the transitional government in Somalia, and replace the Parliament with a constituent assembly that included members of the regions Puntland and Somaliland. Towards this area, the EUSR underlined that the mandate for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) “must not be extended because of the urgency of stabilizing Somalia, which have had no Federal Government the past two decades” (Rondos, 2012). The policies of the EUSR was therefore to convince Somali politicians that only the establishment of a rule of law system and to provide for economic development, were the best measures so as to stop the country from being a bleeding ground for organized crime (ibid.). Thus, the support of a new Government in Somalia has been on top of the agenda for the EU, and on 20 August 2012, as part of the official “Roadmap for the End of Transition”, the TFG’s interim mandate was terminated, and overtaken by the Federal Government of Somalia.

The claims made here point in the direction that the EU acts like a normative power. However, there are still several impediments which we shall discuss in the last part. The most important one, when discussing to what extent the EU acts like a normative power in Africa or not, is that the EU to a large degree has been driven by a security-first logic, primarily focused with handling the issue of piracy, while the main challenge is ashore providing Somalia with stable governance structures (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2014:8).

The Sahel: A regional comprehensive approach

The security situation in Western- and Central Sahel that includes the countries Mali, Mauretania and Niger, are as complex as at the Horn of Africa. In fact, several of the states in the Sahel belt that stretches from Mauretania in the west to Sudan and Eritrea in the east can easily be identified as failed or failing states. In common they have a lack of political accountability, human right abuses, underdevelopment and lack of governmental presence inside the countries. In Mali the government has had to struggle with the uprisings and rebellions in the northern Tuareg region which also covers parts of Mauretania, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso and Niger. Together with severe problems within the Malian government, the coup in Niger in 2010 and the Libyan downfall in 2011, this illustrates clearly that the “problems in the Sahel are cross-border and closely intertwined”, as also the EU Strategy for security and development in the Sahel from March 2011 underlines (Council Document, 8030/11:1-2). Hence, the Sahel strategy stresses the need for a “regional, integrated and holistic” approach by the EU (ibid).

The EU’s strategy came after two years of work by several EU institutions (the EEAS, the European Commission and the EU Council) and goes through instruments like the Instrument for Stability, the European Development Fund (EDF) and CSDP (Pirozzi, 2013:15). The strategy has some key elements. Firstly, that security and development must be holistically integrated and help must focus on economic growth and to reduce poverty by education and local economic opportunities. Secondly, it points out that security in this region is not possible without regional cooperation and that the EU has a special role to support this. The third point is that capacity building is important, especially when it comes to good government activity, which includes a re-establishment of administrative presence and of accountable governance,

provision of security and development cooperation. The strategy also point out that it is important to prevent violent extremism and radicalization and that this is not only a serious threat to people in this region but also to European citizens. Examples are kidnapping of European citizens and drug trafficking from Latin America smuggled to Europe via West Africa.

The three core Sahelian states for this strategy is primarily Mali, Mauritania and Niger, but severe problems is also deeply affecting parts of Burkina Faso and Chad. Problems also have an impact on neighboring countries, including Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Nigeria. The choice of these three countries was primarily due to the fact that they were more likely to agree on the EU's development initiatives and possible deployments of CSDP missions on their territories. By focusing on these three countries the EU then fails to involve key regional players such as Algeria and Nigeria from the outset (ibid: 16). Involving these two countries would, however, be far more demanding and challenging. Therefore, to fully develop a comprehensive approach it also needs to interact with Algeria and Nigeria as the problems of the Sahel cannot be solved without their contribution.

As regards these three countries, over €1 535 billion has been allocated to them under the 10th EDF (2007-2013). In addition and due the Sahel strategy, the EU has mobilized additional financial resources for projects relating to development and security, with a budget of €167 million (EUTM Mali Factsheet 2014). As part of this, and in accordance with UNSC resolution 2085 (2012), the EU launched in February 2013 a training mission for the Malian armed forces, EUTM Mali. The aim of the mission is to support the Malian armed forces and to meet their operational needs by “providing expertise ... as regards operational and organic command and, logistic support, human resources, operational preparation and intelligence” (ibid). This mission is, however, not involved in combat operations. This military operation consists of 580 personnel where 23 EU member states contributes, and must also be seen in perspective of the fact that the EU is the largest contributor to Mali's development. The crisis in Mali has also made stability in Niger all the more vital. Therefore, the civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger was initiated in August 2012 seeking to address the specific needs resulting from this crisis in order to strengthen Niger's security framework (EUCAP SAHEL Niger civilian mission Factsheet 2014). This mission is smaller, it consists of 80 personnel and the mission's main objective is to strengthen the implementation of the security dimension of Niger's development and security strategy. It shall furthermore support the development of regional and international coordination in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and finally, it shall strengthen the rule of law system (ibid).

Both of these engagements are therefore consequences of the lack of state capacities in these countries, where the EU must assist them in this regard. This is also enshrined in the overall EU strategy for security and development in Sahel. In addition, and also based on UNSC resolution 2085 (2012), Operation Serval, a French-led military operation, was launched in January 2013 to support Malian troops overwhelmed by Islamist groups takeover of Northern Mali (Fiott, et. al 2013). The third military operation, the African-led Military Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), based upon the same UN mandate, is complementary to

Operation Serval and EUTM Mali. AFISMA is the military operation organized by ECOWAS to support Mali against the Islamist insurgents in the northern part of the country. ECOWAS is furthermore an important regional organization in the area and the framework for Conflict Prevention is pivotal also for the EU in its implementation of the Sahel strategy.

Concerning the first feature, the civilian-military interface, there have been some observers who stress that the Sahel strategy seems to disproportionately emphasize the development instruments in the Strategy to the detriment of security responses through CSDP action (Bello, 2012). The Sahel Strategy itself, however, does not clearly overemphasize development instruments over security ones. However, in the implementation of the strategy one can easily remark that until the deployment of EUTM Mali in February 2013, there was no proper security dimension in the Strategy. The civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger is focusing on capacity building of the Nigerian security actors to fight terrorism and organized crime, but with a role limited to assisting and advising. While also this strategy seems to emphasize missions within a more comprehensive and regional strategic framework, one can also argue that OpCen that was activated in March 2012 should extend its activities to also cover this region. Such a geographical widening, however, may be difficult to achieve due to resistance from some member states (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2013: 6). As Hatzigeogopoulos (ibid: 6-7) also underline, “with multiple Sahel missions ahead of the EU, there is clearly a role to play for the OpCen by supporting real effective cooperation on the ground which would simultaneously increase the EU’s legitimacy in its claims for comprehensiveness and effective multilateralism”. In addition, and as underlined by Pirozzi (2013) and Bello (2012), the choice of the three above-mentioned countries has inevitably undermined the possibility to tackle crucial economic, security, humanitarian and governance aspects through a genuine and inclusive regional dimension. As an example, in connection with Operation Serval a contingency plan for supporting AFISMA was drafted, but never implemented (Tramond & Seigneur, 2013: 43). As a consequence, the engagement of anchor countries in the area and regional organizations such as ECOWAS has been partial and exclusive, rather than comprehensive and complementary (Pirozzi, 2013: 16).

However, it must also be taken into consideration that the EU has funded €9 million to institutional reform undertaken by the ECOWAS Commission, €20 million for support to the Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centers managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), €27 million for ECOWAS mandate to advance peace and security and €17 million to tackle ECOWAS fight against drug trafficking and drug abuse in West Africa. These facts point obviously in the direction of the second feature, namely security through norm diffusion and the EU efforts to enhance regional integration also in Western Africa. The output of state and capacity building efforts and regional integration in Sahel is difficult to tell at the moment. The initiatives and efforts established within the framework of the Sahel Strategy have not yet been achieved and therefore, have not produced tangible results. Therefore, one must obviously question how and when the EU will decide that the end state has been reached. Regarding the third feature, the security development-nexus, it is obvious that the EU’s involvement in assisting the Malian military is in line with this security-development nexus that underpins the Strategy for security and development in the Sahel. Nevertheless,

this army equipped by the West was unable to respond to the threats coming from the north in 2012-2013. One can therefore question whether there is any use of the military capacities if there is no proper chain of command and political control of the armed forces.

The EU in Africa: A normative power?

Africa has since 2003, together with the Western Balkans, become the largest laboratory for EU crisis management. What these two case-studies clearly illustrate is how EU foreign policy has become more comprehensive and more integrated which also is in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, the Horn of Africa engagement also illustrates how the engagement tend to be based on a security-first logic, implying that the engagement is more short-term and focused upon the fight against piracy (Ehrhart & Petretto: 2012; 2014). The engagement in Sahel tend, as critics have emphasized, not to be regional enough (Pirozzi, 2013: 16). In addition, and unlike the Horn of Africa case, the Sahel strategy has also overemphasized the development part of the security-development nexus even though the Strategy itself underline that there are few areas where the interdependence of security and development is more clear.

A critical assessment of the two norms analyzed in the paper, “African solutions to African problems” and “effective multilateralism and collective security in Africa”, will show that they tend to be contradictory. Both of them have, however, been steering guides for the EU engagement in Africa for years. The first one can be found in several EU-AU documents from recent years, the most important one is the decision by the European Council in 2005 to promote sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa, where it in addition identified security as a pre-requisite for attaining the millennium development goals (MDGs) within 2015 (European Council, 2005). The last one is clearly inspired by the European security strategy (2003: 9) which underlines that “...Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective”. The contradictory elements in these two norms is that while the first is based upon a rejection of colonial and neo-colonial practices, will the other one present Europe as a role-model for others to follow by exporting the European experience to other parts of the world, as also was a concern for the early integration theorists (see e.g. Haas, 1967).

This is not unproblematic. As Cebeci (2012:571) underlines in her critique of the “ideal power Europe” through theory, “... the EU and its model are portrayed as the ideal, superior, desirable – the peaceful – against the conflictual others”. This is in line with Dietz’ argument that NPE establishes a discourse that establishes a particular identity for the EU through turning third parties into “others” and representing the EU as a positive force in world politics (Dietz, 2005: 613). Cebeci, from her post-structuralist approach, follows Dietz’ analysis further and argues that the EU by “... imposing their own model without considering the specific cultural, economic and social characteristic, add to the colonial tradition rather than engaging the people of those regions and meeting their local needs” (Cebeci, 2012: 572). In this sense, Cebeci present the NPE approach also as part of a colonial project since it “...

legitimizes the EU's imposition of its – disciplining – power on others” (ibid: 577). However, the contribution by Cebeci and others, first and foremost Dietz (2005), Hyde-Price (2008), Sjursen (2006), Whitman (2013) and Ian Manners (2002; 2006; 2013) himself are important in the sense that they ask the question about what kind of actor the EU is. Manners main argument is that the EU is a transformative actor by being able to change the conceptions of the normal in the international system.

The question that follows is whether NPE is a relevant approach when analyzing the EU engagement in Africa. One of the main arguments in this paper has been to emphasize what the EU does, the importance of comparative analysis, also including a comparison of what the EU does in different regions, and lastly, the importance of studying how the EU implements its comprehensive approaches as a vital element in the conduct of EU foreign policy. In this sense our contribution is an attempt to answer the critique raised by Sjursen (2006) who claims that without identifying criteria and assessments standards that makes it possible to qualify, substantiate or reject whether the EU is a “force for good”, it will be impossible to decide whether the EU is a normative actor or not.

Table 1: A comparison of EU engagements in the Horn of Africa and Sahel

	Horn of Africa	Sahel
The composition of the civil-military interface	<p><u>Internally</u></p> <p>-Security strategy from November 2011 with incremental evolution of policy instruments</p> <p>-Activation of OpCen to coordinate CSDP missions</p> <p><u>Externally</u></p> <p>Financing of AMISOM and cooperation with other actors at sea (the US and NATO) and ashore with e.g. USAID. Training mission EUTM Somalia</p>	<p><u>Internally</u></p> <p>-Security strategy from March 2011 and the integration of the two CSDP missions in the broader framework of EU engagement</p> <p>-No agreement to enlarge OpCen’s activities to include the Sahel engagements</p> <p><u>Externally</u></p> <p>Support to AFISMA and cooperation with other actors in the area (France).</p>
Security through norm-diffusion	<p>-Support to IGAD and regional cooperation</p> <p>-From targeted, small scale operations to broader regional policies where EUCAP Nestor will support the build-up of a self-sustained maritime sector</p>	<p>-Financial and political support to ECOWAS</p> <p>-Too narrow regional focus?</p>
The security-development nexus connected with MDG	An overemphasis on the security-part of the security-development nexus due to the threat from piracy	An overemphasis on the development-part of the security-development nexus

By introducing the three features, also presented in the table above, we aimed to identify some of the criteria that might make the EU a normative power, that is a power that breaks with what is expected from “normal” (great) powers in the international system.

In both cases the strategic frameworks represent, as Hatzigeorgopoulos (2013: 6) emphasize, a renewed line of thinking that goes beyond targeted, limited policies and missions addressing particular issues in individual states, to broader regional approaches where a wider range of complementary tools, including CSDP packages are mobilized and deployed to support and advance a complex agenda within a wider strategic framework. Such an approach will also make it far more feasible to link short term humanitarian aid with development coordination mechanisms. Enhancing resilience in both regions will also shift responsibility away from the international community and on to local actors who are now held accountable for failures of governance. In such a way we might argue that the EU efforts in both cases support the norm of “African solutions to African problems”. The results as regards the other norm, “effective

multilateralism and collective security in Africa” are a bit more mixed, even though the EU has supported both regions with financial and political sources so as to enhance regional cooperation and integration. This makes us conclude that the EU is an actor that is moving in the direction of being such a transformative and normative actor.

As regards the Horn of Africa applying some counterfactual arguments can be illustrative. Instead of its comprehensive engagement, the EU could have chosen a far more modest strategy. Some international aid programmes, armed guards at commercial ships passing through the waters off the Horn of Africa, some more robust measures against the pirates, and thereby leaving the international engagement in the region to the AU and the UN, could of course been a possible strategy. Nevertheless, with its comprehensive strategy, and often portrayed to be a weak “small power” (Toje, 2011), the EU has been able to take responsibility for a resource demanding, long-term engagement which stretches from short-term crisis-management to longer-term development tasks. This also illustrates that the EU has become a stronger and more integrated actor which is able to conduct a policy not only based upon strategic self-interests, but in fact has been able to promote development in one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world.

Whether the EU is able to act as a normative power, a “force for good” and be a “transformative power” in Africa is still open for discussion. The composition of the civil-military interface, by firstly being able to “break out of the CSDP box”, and to be an enabler for partners to achieve their goals, including promoting regional integration efforts, might be a sign of the EU acting like a normative power. However, as Sjursen (2006: 247-248) and others underlines, this risks being a subjective definition linked to a particular European understanding and defined in a particular European cultural context.

Conclusions

This paper has partly been indebted to Aggestam’s (2008) argument that the EU might continue to be an ethical power also when militarized. Furthermore, when studying EU foreign policy the research focus should not primarily be on its foreign policy means, but rather on why it pursues the policies it does. The most important part, however, should be to what extent the EU is working to change the world in the direction of its vision of the “global common good”. This is also why this paper has put focus on Africa since this continent has been a major laboratory for EU foreign policy, including its CSDP missions and operations.

This paper has debated to what extent the EU acts like a normative power in Africa or not. The answer is that this is still not clear. The paper has identified some major weaknesses with the concept; the most important one is the Western biases in it, and the need for identifying some features that makes it analytically more feasible to grasp what NPE in reality is. The paper has tried to pave such a way by arguing for three such features, the composition of the civil-military interface which has become even more important after the Lisbon Treaty, security through norm diffusion and the security development nexus. The two case-studies clearly illustrates that the EU aims to act in a comprehensive and integrated manner in both of the two conflict regions, but that the EU has responded differently in the two regions when it

comes how to handle the security challenges in them. This has of course to do with the different security challenges in the two regions. Hence, the EU's self-interests must also be taken into consideration. Piracy against merchant ships in the Bay of Aden and off the coast of Horn of Africa will affect European economic interests more than the Tuareg insurgents who threatened the governance structures in Mali. This is again an argument in favour of comparative analysis since EU policies might vary due to how conflict dynamics around the world affects European security interests in different ways. An important research focus in the years to come should therefore be on the relationships between norms and interests and how this is treated empirically, and not just theoretically which might be considered a weakness in the current research literature.

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