

UACES 44th Annual Conference

Cork, 1-3 September 2014

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The NAM and the G77: The Unexpected Persistence of Tricontinental Multilateralism

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Paper prepared for UACES, Cork, Ireland, September 1-3, 2014. Draft.

Just the mention of “G77” and “NAM” today tends to provoke a somewhat negative reaction from many non-global south scholars and even some global south analysts (for example Indian analysts who propose that India abandon nonalignment.) Certainly many northern diplomats would like to see the disintegration of these groups. They are thought to be contentious organizations whose *raison d’etre* is dubious today. The mention of these brings up memories of the north-south divide of the 1960s and 1970s; but in today’s globalized, liberalized world why have these two groupings persisted? International political economists, for example, tend today to study the dynamics of group relations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that is, the dynamic subgroups G33, the Cotton 4, the G90-- and also the continuing process of reforms of the international financial institutions to make them more responsive. Others focus on new new groupings such as the BRICS and the G20.

Indeed it cannot be disputed that the pervasive nationalistic perspectives of the 1970s which united the so-called third world (at least most of the time) are no longer appropriate now that global changes have engendered a more complex world structure characterized by heightened regionalism, the “rise” of some developing nations, and the establishment of new global south institutions such as ALBA, the Bank of the South, and the very new BRIC development bank, all hoping to be effective alternatives to the traditional IFIs. Nevertheless, caveat! The tendency to overrate the changes that have occurred must be avoided. As the wide acceptance of the validity of the MDG goals reflects, a large part of the former “third world” is still mired in poverty, lacks adequate social services, is vulnerable to human and environmental disasters, and is classified by the UN and the IFIs as low in human and economic development. While it may no longer be fashionable to blame the plight of these developing nations on external forces and the historical calamities of colonialism, slavery and northern exploitation, old

ideas , like old habits, die hard. The past has left negative memories and physical legacies in the global south, which are reflected in attitudes and behaviors in international organizations such as the UN. Indeed one civil society writer close to the UN opines: “While the East/West divide has faded after the demise of the Cold War, the one between the north and South continues to shape much of the decision-making in the UN General Assembly” (Swart 2007: 5). The NAM and the G-77 are still in existence, still relevant, and we need to ask what normative as well as functional gaps do they fill, and how successful they are amid world changes that have produced a more layered structure among the developing nations themselves. The North has always been irritated by these institutions, from their founding to today. The EU now wishes to deal with them on a more manageable regional basis while the United States prefers bilateral agreements. So we may well ask: Why are these organizations still around?

In studying international institutions, the favored approach has long been neoliberalism, the perspective that claims that international organizations play an important role *alongside* the state, that these organizations are established for rational functional reasons, and that they are a channel for learning and norm building (Keohane 1984; Oran Young 1996). However, more recently the turn to constructivism has brought a social and interpretive perspective to the study of IOs. Indeed some earlier neoliberals have redefined themselves as constructivists. In the United States the predominant approach focuses on the role of culture and identity in international affairs as a whole, and in IO work in particular on norm formation and diffusion. In this paper, I basically argue that the reason the G77 and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) persist is because of the persistence of a common collective identity as well as the success of the normative agenda in encouraging cohesion. On the other hand, I locate the development of an identity in the structure of the international system, thus proposing that it is the interaction

between material structure and historical practices that has promoted the conditions that validate the persistence of a sense of the “south.” In this brief paper, I first focus on the historical background before briefly discussing the reasons why I maintain that the persistence of the NAM and G77 is cultural. I then deal in abbreviated fashion with the manner in which these groups operate but leave details for a more extensive project.¹

Material Matters

2015 marks the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference which first brought Asians and Africans together to discuss the post-colonial state of affairs. To understand the impact of this gathering, one must consider the structure of the international system at that time, so well highlighted by Johan Galtung (1971) when he spoke of the existence of a “feudo-imperial” system. In this top-down system, colonies interacted almost exclusively with their metropolises, not only in trade but also in patterns of transportation, information, education and culture. The unequal trade patterns are well known but many may not know that at the time to make a phone call or travel from a British colony to a French one usually necessitated a call or flight through London or Paris first. Galtung’s characterization of the system is worth repeating:

- (1) Interaction between Center (metropole) and Periphery (colonized country) *is vertical*
- (2) Interaction between Periphery and Periphery is *missing*
- (3) Multilateral interaction involving all three is *missing*
- (4) Interaction with the outside world is *monopolized* by Center
- (5) Center as well as Periphery interaction with Periphery nations belonging to other Center nations is *missing* (Galtung 1971: 89)

Galtung perceived his rules of interaction as applying not only to economic interaction but also military, communications (information), and cultural (including news and technology flows) fields (p. 91).

Another very important element of the world structure at the time Bandung was held was the rigorous ideological division between East and West. The Cold War had begun just after World War II and the 29 countries (including Japan) which gathered for Bandung found their anti-colonial message complicated by East-West rivalries. The Cold War intruded on the very invitations process to the conference because various countries—the Koreas, Indochina—were denied admission due to civil conflicts and alignments that predetermined political stances (Abraham 2008: 59). As I noted elsewhere, the conference is viewed as a Chinese triumph and a disappointment for India, not least because China's foreign minister Zhou en Lai was able to overcome suspicion about his country's newly adopted communist ideology as well as its poor relations with Taiwan (Braveboy-Wagner 2012: 277).

Bandung was a precursor to the first Nonaligned Conference held in Belgrade in 1961 which overshadowed the original Afro-Asian movement and which was also attended by one newly left wing Latin American country, Cuba. The focus of both conferences, however, was similar: to develop common strategies to deal with colonialism, racialism, and development. The ten principles agreed to at Bandung are still regularly cited by the NAM as foundational (see Appendix 1). Ideas such as support for regionalism, commodity stabilization agreements, development funding, self-determination, disarmament, and UN reform were discussed at Bandung and have been discussed by the NAM ever since. The driving focus of these “uncommitted” countries (that is uncommitted to East or West) was to correct very real economic and financial imbalances in the international system, and relatedly, to gain a voice and influence in a system in which the industrialized (economically speaking) and the great powers (politically speaking) were clearly dominant. Galtung would have said, to make the system more equal and less feudal and imperial.

As more and more countries achieved independence, the NAM's attention likewise turned more and more to economic issues, and this was solidified at their third summit held in 1970 in Zambia, following a period of stasis caused by the death or deposing of various leading lights as well as the Arab preoccupation with the conflict with Israel. In the UN, developing countries began to press for more focus on development arguing that "a new international division of labour with new patterns of production and trade is necessary. Only in this way will the economic independence of the developing countries be strengthened and a truly inter-dependent and integrated world economy emerge" (UNGA 1963 in UNCTAD/NAM 1983). With Soviet support, their pleas eventually led to the calling of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva in 1964. There were 77 developing nations represented, leading to the formation of the "Group of 77," which today numbers 133. The G77 has gone on to become the interlocutor of the south at all relevant UN and associated forums. Importantly, China normally endorses the group's positions such that decisions are usually issued in the name of the *G77 and China*.

As in the case of NAM, there is a clear a structural basis for G77's positions: the economic imbalances that are the legacy of an "imperial" global system. The group wants to make the system more equitable and to promote development in their member nations. Thus in the 1960s to 1980s an agenda was developed focusing mainly on stabilizing the prices of commodities in a world in which the developing nations were low-cost primary product producers and exporters while having to import high cost manufactures from the industrialized world. The pride of the G77 then was the negotiation of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) initiated in 1975, a global preferential treatment scheme which was viewed as a lasting success if not as comprehensive in operationalization as originally anticipated. Other G77

strategies included advocacy of import substitution industrialization (ISI), regionalism, south-south cooperation (known also as ECDC), technical assistance schemes, and development financing of various types (for example, various IMF and World Bank windows, and an ODA transfer of 0.7 percent of GNP/GNI) . For more details see Braveboy-Wagner 2009 and Taylor and Smith 2007).

When the global structure changed post Cold War, the tactics of both NAM and the G77 had perforce to change to suit. The end of the Cold War, the liberalization of formerly closed economies, and the greater global integration engendered by new technologies meant that all organizations had to adapt. Both NAM and the G77, which is a negotiating body unlike the club-like NAM, bowed to the new reality by working primarily within the newly created World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO's creation signified a new global consensus on free trade, and developing countries, which had been wary of opening their weak economies to global competition, began (were forced) to liberalize. The G77 as a group has gone on to support various efforts by differentiated groups: by members that depend on agricultural production to remove developed country agricultural subsidies such as the CAP in the EU, efforts by smaller economies to gain special and differential treatment, and efforts of the larger countries to gain market access to developed country markets. At the same time, giving prioritization to development, the G77 has resisted efforts by the north to redirect attention to the so-called Singapore issues (investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation) until other issues, in particular subsidies, are dealt with. They have sought the expansion of the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) started in 1982, by which developing countries grant each other trade preferences, and pressed for more technical assistance and aid transfers. The international community's consensus on the Millennium

Development Goals (MGDs) has allowed the G77 to piggyback the goals of increased aid and better terms of trade on the MDG goals of halving poverty, and achieving targets of aid and trade and debt relief.

In terms of the global structure, the G77, more so than the NAM (which has primarily had to adapt to the wave of democracies), has had to work in the context of a much more layered global south. UNCTAD programs have long paid special attention to least developed countries, to small island developing states, and to landlocked states – all of which experience unique development problems. Today the south also has members that are high in economic and human development, that have been incorporated into the expanded DC clubs but whose vulnerability to dislocations of various kinds still make them members, and valuable ones, of the G77. (Only a few countries have left the group over the years Palau which is very pro-U.S.; Cyprus, Malta, and Romania which joined the EU; and Mexico and the Republic of Korea which joined the OECD. Chile, however, having joined the OECD, has opted to remain a member of G-77). G77 members have joined the G20, the OECD, and the BRICS, as well as counter-hegemonic groupings such as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of the Americas (ALBA). Thus the G77 is a highly heterogeneous grouping.

Why persist? The importance of a collective identity

The unequal global structure has been reflected as well in an unequal cultural structure. In fact, the cultural and material are so embedded in global south interaction with the north that the two can hardly be differentiated. “Third world” was the term previously used to refer to these countries: based on the idea that there was some common experience and identity among African and Asians and Latin Americans that set them apart from North America and Europe (West and East). The experience was colonialism or imperialism. The identity was as subjects. While indeed

some objected to its connotation of inferiority inherent in “third world”—and this led to the gradual evolution to the term “global south” even though not all developing countries are in the south---the common threads among these peoples and nations was indisputable. These countries had experienced colonial rule and exploitation and were now relatively underdeveloped economically compared to the north. The idea of commonalities among these diverse nations² was scoffed at by many in the north, even during the heyday of third world collective action. There was early suspicion of the Bandung participants—were they trying to establish a bloc that would counter the developed countries?--which led to much maneuvering behind the scenes by developed countries. This suspicion and jockeying for influence was carried over into the NAM which was sometimes berated by Washington as pro-Soviet and too radical and at other times congratulated for becoming more moderate. The G77 was viewed similarly. Today at the UN, developed country representatives often characterize the group as obstructionist and difficult to work with (Lund 2011:122-3).

While the era for blaming all global south ills on colonialism and external exploitation is now past, the common identity forged by colonialism remains relatively strong, at least at the national level if not among the people who today benefit from technological innovations that have advanced the integration of global communities. Developing states still share a sense of indignation over colonial exploitation and are conscious of the sense of superiority that Western/northern countries have hardly hidden. It is this psychological and cultural division that drew these countries together, once they began to be acquainted with each other in World War II and later, Bandung. This description is still pertinent:

Some of the most intractable problems generated by colonial and neocolonial relationships have been attitudinal: on the one hand, the tendency of the members of the “advanced” culture to view the dependent groups as inferior, and on the other hand, the

tendency of the members of the dependent group to develop attitudes that denigrate their own culture and values in favor of those of the advanced nations. This is not just a problem in cases of formal colonization, but has also been prevalent wherever Western economic and cultural practices have permeated developing countries (Braveboy-Wagner, 1986: 157).

I go on to cite the “civilizing” norm that permeated colonialism, the superiority complex of colonialists, an attitude summed up in a well-known statement by an English administrator in 1835 that “a single shelf of a good European library” was “worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” (Remark of Lord Macaulay cited in Shafer, 1972: 275-6). Today most political scientists are familiar with the orientalism arguments of the late Edward Said, as well as the postcolonial literature which starts from these perspectives. More concretely, these past slights were converted into postcolonial sensitivities about being told what to do and how to act. These perspectives still pervade the G-77, if responses of diplomats interviewed are to be taken to heart. Swart and Lund note various comments that reinforce this view.

The delegates we have spoken to from the G-77 countries ... contend that the North’s primary goals are to impose Western values, to continue their economic dominance, and to avoid providing resources to the South for capacity-building. (p. 123)

The extent to which the South considers the North to be arrogantly dictating policies based on their own perceptions is illustrated by Timor-Leste’s President, Jose Ramos-Horta, who said: “Maybe some donors think they hold the Pope’s infallibility virtue (...) Some donors might think, ‘We are a bit like the Pope – we are the ones who know what is best’” (p. 154; ellipsis in original)

..most G-77 members continue to share a strong resentment towards the sense of entitlement and superiority that many of the richest countries display in the UN. For many in the South, especially the lack of implementation of GA resolutions exemplifies that arrogance that accompanies the economic advantages of the North (p. 149)

Of course some countries continue to translate these resentments into anti-north policies. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela are all clearly seeking to radically change the system. On the other hand, the sentiment also applies to the moderate countries which constitute the bulk of the

current membership of the NAM and G77. Timor-Leste and others like it are hardly to be viewed as radicals.

Identity translates into norms

The collective sentiments (identity) described above are given expression in the shared norms which G77 and NAM countries subscribe. Both NAM and the G77 have a relatively strong commitment to normative development, even though the G77 is more narrowly focused than the politically-oriented NAM. (Since the NAM and the G77 coordinate policies through the Joint Coordinating Committee established in 1994, their norms are not dissimilar.)

Normative development is an area in which the NAM can be deemed successful. There is a direct line between the early values of the Afro-Asian Movement and the expansion of these into the present (see Appendix 2). Initially the members' main value was anti-colonialism and it was largely through their sustained efforts that decolonization was achieved. By the 1970s they had turned to "neocolonialism" with the new focus on development issues. More recently, with the end of the Cold War and the spread of liberal norms, the NAM, while reiterating the validity of its original principles, has applied them creatively within the new context. Anti-imperialism has been transformed into anti-unipolarity and renewed support for multilateralism in all respects; democracy has been championed while emphasizing that there is no one model of democracy and linking democracy to development; human rights have been embraced while reiterating that human rights also apply to economic rights such as the right to food and development; and the call for UN reform continues to be accompanied by rhetoric about inequality and the democratic deficit (NAM members have complained about not having an adequate voice even in discussions of the MDGs). Social issues such as gender, governance, and

global health, as well as the concept of the dialogue of civilizations bring new normative twists to the agenda.

The same normative consistency applies to the G77. The goal of development, after all, is not a changeable one. The development gap is even larger than before so principles of social justice remain highly relevant. “Free and fair trade” is a more recent mantra to just “free trade.” The morality of the transfer of development aid from rich to poor remains an underlying norm. Democracy demands fair treatment of the Palestinians. Cultural practices and universal rights must be balanced. Democracy also requires that poorer countries be given more voice in international forums.

In sum, both organizations continue to adapt their basic abstract norms to new situations. Symbolic language has long been particularly instrumental in UN debates. The global south continues to employ older emotive language to highlight new concerns and in the process to enhance their groups’ cohesion.

It should be noted that far from dying the post Cold War NAM now includes previously disinterested and pro-U.S. Central American and Caribbean members as well as the former Soviet states of Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan which see a parallel between their situation and the situation of other states which have experienced hegemonic influence in the past and continue to be threatened by same. Other former Soviet states are now observers.

Group Behavior, Cohesion, Leadership

Space does not permit a lengthy discussion of these issues but some general points are worth noting. One of the key questions today is whether the rising countries of the south will retain their sense of inferiority and zeal for appropriate reform as they move into the clubs of the north. This is not a new concern. When OPEC emerged as a major player in the 1970s, many in the

south wondered if they would retain a “third world” identity. Yet OPEC nations, China, and G20 nations have continued to work within the G77. (A G-7 representative from a “prosperous” country told Lydia Swart that apart from solidarity, “shared skin color” is a reason not to join the OECD. (Swart 2011: footnote 177, p. 151). While one can be skeptical about the comment, it also reinforces the view that there is an identity among developing nations that is not easily changed. The question for the future is whether identity factors will fade as material status removes the sense of inferiority and inequality.

The rich –poor divide apart, in reality neither the NAM nor the G-77 has ever been truly cohesive. The former has, from the beginning, been divided between conservative, moderate and more radical members and at different times each of these has been ascendant. Most notably, the movement was taken in a pro-Soviet direction during the 1970s and ideological tensions reached their zenith in 1979 under the chairmanship of Cuba. But ideological fatigue soon brought moderation. Later, as liberalization norms spread, the influence of militant countries was even more reduced. It is important to note that the decision making procedure of the NAM, consensus, does not infer unanimity. In fact since the 1960s it has been established that those who disagree with the conference outcomes can state their reservations in the final document. With this inclusive approach in place, very few members have withdrawn from the grouping (Cyprus and Malta because they joined the EU; Argentina, and Burma, the latter returning in 1992).

On specific issues, especially human rights issue, the NAM is divided (as is the G77). NAM members also take different sides in specific conflicts (naturally, based on national interests), making attempts at mediation generally unsuccessful. In 2009, I put forward a short cut for determining NAM cohesion using data readily available from the U.S. Department of State:

If, as a rough measure of NAM cohesion with regard to U.S. interests, the percentage of members voting plus or minus five points above or below the average percentage coincidence with the United States is taken to suggest relatively close intragroup voting patterns, then the NAM went from an average intragroup cohesion of 56 percent in 1986 to a low of 27.7 percent in 1997 and back to 56.6 percent in 2006 (Braveboy-Wagner 2009: 25).

Moving on to 2013, using the same procedure, on important votes—primarily human rights issues and arms issues--average voting agreement between NAM and the U.S. was 46 percent. 28.3 percent of members coalesced around a range of five plus or minus the average. This suggests that insofar as what is important to the U.S. is concerned, the NAM group is more divided than it was in 2006. But it also suggests that the majority of members are moderate or neutralist on these selected issues – that is, neither very much pro or very much against the United States. Note that one economic issues, consensus is the norm.

The same decision-making procedure, consensus, has been adopted by the G77. Again, this does not necessarily imply unanimity but it allows for a united front to be presented on most issues. A country can, of course, disassociate itself from a position if necessary during earlier deliberations. Like the NAM, the G77 is divided into subgroupings: conservatives, moderates, radicals and also economic groups: least developed countries, landlocked countries, SIDS, B(R)ICS (or BASIC), G20, oil producers, and regional groupings. The groupings take care to bring their own concerns forward, and once their foci are included, are able to vote in support of most of the larger grouping's positions in the main committee.

In both groups, some countries are categorized as leaders who influence the agenda and promote their own as well as group interests. This is normal group behavior – some members of a group will always feel more invested in the group than others and usually have or devote more resources to the project. G77 expert-level meetings, for example, are usually attended by “only

15-20 delegates and rarely by more than 40” (Swart 2009: 20) even though the meetings are open to all.

Among the leading nations in the NAM are India and Egypt, founders of the movement who have played larger than life roles, despite the fact that Egypt was at one time out of favor in the Arab world, after signing a peace accord with Israel, and despite the fact that India has today moved closer to the U.S., with some questioning of its commitment to nonalignment. Both countries are likewise influential in the G77. India has played a particularly strong role in multilateral negotiations within the WTO as well as climate change negotiations. Cuba is another highly influential country in both NAM and G77. In fact, these platforms are more and more important to Cuba given its loss of ideological allies. (Naturally, the influence of countries like Cuba makes the North grumble about the domination of these institutions by “radicals,”) In fact, moderate countries have the upper hand in both groupings: countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina are influential in their own ways and of course any country that chairs the group—elected annually in the case of the G77, for three years in the case of the NAM—is by virtue of the position able to help set the agenda during that time (Chairs from larger and more influential nations are at an advantage however.)

In both organizations, smaller countries may appear to be less involved by choice or lack of resources, and countries vulnerable to U.S./EU solicitations may abstain from voting on issues which the northern nations oppose. (The United States and the EU seek to break the consensus in the G77 in particular.) However, if they want to, small nations can not only influence but even block the agenda. The G77 gives them a voice they would not have as individual nations. SIDS and AOSIS, for example, have been very proactive on environmental issues. Meanwhile, Singapore created an informal group, the Forum of Small States (FOSS) in 1992, and more than

100 countries are members. The group meets a few times a year to discuss issues of concern to small states. It should be stressed that not everything a group does implies that the larger G77 is involved. Subgroups also promote their interests in other environments.

A few final thoughts

The persistence of the G77 and the NAM conforms to the view that organizations tend to adapt and find new roles rather than to die from obsolescence. However, the performance of these groups does not conform to some theoretical approaches. For example, Mancur Olson's theory of public goods claims that in large groups, individuals will prefer to go after their own interests because their efforts in the group appear to be inconsequential (Olson 1971). In neither of these groups do most small states seem to see their concerns as inconsequential, even if, as we have said, a few stronger nations may seem to monopolize the agenda. It is also interesting to consider Irving Janis' idea that groupthink leads to dysfunctional decision-making. The UNGA is structured around groups and this in itself may be a dysfunctional type of structure. However it is also a way to promote efficient negotiations on resolutions. The EU group, for example, is singled out as being particularly cohesive. In other words, the nature of the organization is group or bloc oriented, and there is not much room for individual negotiations. Members of the more tightly knit groups may disagree before the group position is formed but afterwards, there is agreement, at least on economic issues. Whether this is an optimal approach to decision making is something that can be debated elsewhere. Related to this is the matter of coalition building – how exactly do the groups reconcile diverse positions? While this has been touched on in the description of group decision making, the details remain to be outlined in another paper.

Appendix 1

The Founding Principles of the Non-Aligned Movement	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small; 4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; 5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers and; (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; 7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; 8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement or other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 9. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; 10. Respect for justice and international obligations. 	

Source: Braveboy-Wagner 2012: 285-6 from NAM Summit documentation.

Appendix 2

The Principles enshrined in the Declaration on the Purposes and Principles and the Role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Present International Juncture adopted in the 14th NAM Summit in Havana.	
Respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and International Law.	Condemnation of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and systematic and gross violations of human rights, in accordance with the UN Charter and International Law.
Respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States.	Rejection of and opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. In this context, terrorism should not be equated with the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and national liberation.
Recognition of the equality of all races, religions, cultures and all nations, both big and small.	
Promotion of a dialogue among peoples, civilizations, cultures and religions based on the respect of religions, their symbols and values, the promotion and the consolidation of tolerance and freedom of belief.	
Respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including the effective implementation of the right of peoples to peace and development.	Promotion of pacific settlement of disputes and abjuring, under any circumstances, from taking part in coalitions, agreements or any other kind of unilateral coercive initiative in violation of the principles of International Law and the Charter of
Respect for the equality of rights of States,	

<p>including the inalienable right of each State to determine freely its political, social, economic and cultural system, without any kind of interference whatsoever from any other State.</p> <p>Reaffirmation of the validity and relevance of the Movement's principled positions concerning the right to self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation and colonial or alien domination.</p> <p>Non-interference in the internal affairs of States. No State or group of States has the right to intervene either directly or indirectly, whatever the motive, in the internal affairs of any other State.</p> <p>Rejection of unconstitutional change of Governments.</p> <p>Rejection of attempts at regime change.</p> <p>Condemnation of the use of mercenaries in all situations, especially in conflict situations.</p> <p>Refraining by all countries from exerting pressure or coercion on other countries, including resorting to aggression or other acts involving the use of direct or indirect force, and the application and/or promotion of any coercive unilateral measure that goes against International Law or is in any way incompatible with it, for the purpose of coercing any other State to subordinate its sovereign rights, or to gain any benefit whatsoever.</p> <p>Total rejection of aggression as a dangerous and serious breach of International Law, which entails international responsibility for the aggressor.</p> <p>Respect for the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.</p>	<p>the United Nations.</p> <p>Defence and consolidation of democracy, reaffirming that democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social, and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their life.</p> <p>Promotion and defence of multilateralism and multilateral organisations as the appropriate frameworks to resolve, through dialogue and cooperation, the problems affecting humankind.</p> <p>Support to efforts by countries suffering internal conflicts to achieve peace, justice, equality and development.</p> <p>The duty of each State to fully and in good faith comply with the international treaties to which it is a party, as well as to honour the commitments made in the framework of international organisations, and to live in peace with other States.</p> <p>Peaceful settlement of all international conflicts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.</p> <p>Defence and promotion of shared interests, justice and cooperation, regardless of the differences existing in the political, economic and social systems of the States, on the basis of mutual respect and the equality of rights.</p> <p>Solidarity as a fundamental component of relations among nations in all circumstances.</p> <p>Respect for the political, economic, social and cultural diversity of countries and peoples.</p>
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Source: Braveboy-Wagner 2012: 285-6 from NAM Summit documentation.

Appendix 3: NAM Voting Coincidence with the United States 2013 – Important Questions.

The following tables summarize UN member state performance by regional and other groups in comparison with the United States on the 11 important votes identified in Section IV. Each table is arranged alphabetically by country. Each vote is listed by the number assigned to it below. (The votes are numbered just as in Section IV.)

Key:

S = Same as U.S. Vote; O = Opposite of U.S. Vote; A = Abstained; X = Absent

1. Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (68/8)
2. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (68/12)
3. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (68/13)
4. Arms Trade Treaty (68/31)
5. Transparency in Armaments (68/43)
6. United action toward total elimination of nuclear weapons (68/51)
7. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (68/80)
8. Report of the Human Rights Council (68/144)
9. Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (68/182)
10. Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (68/184)
11. Agricultural Technology for Development (68/209)

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM)

COUNTRY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	COINCIDENCE: IMPORTANT VOTES ONLY
Afghanistan	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	A	S	O	S	50.0%
Algeria	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	O	A	O	S	33.3%
Angola	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Antigua and Barbuda	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Bahamas	O	O	O	S	S	S	A	A	S	S	S	66.7%
Bahrain	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	A	S	A	A	42.9%
Bangladesh	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	O	A	33.3%
Barbados	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	S	S	54.5%
Belarus	O	X	X	A	S	S	O	S	O	O	S	50.0%
Belize	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	S	S	54.5%
Benin	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	A	S	50.0%
Bhutan	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Bolivia	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	O	O	O	O	20.0%
Botswana	O	X	X	S	S	S	A	O	S	S	S	75.0%
Brunei Darussalam	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	O	A	33.3%
Burkina Faso	O	O	O	S	S	S	X	O	S	A	S	55.6%
Burundi	O	X	X	S	S	S	X	O	S	O	S	62.5%
Cabo Verde	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	S	S	50.0%

COUNTRY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	COINCIDENCE: IMPORTANT VOTES ONLY
Cambodia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	X	X	O	S	44.4%
Cameroon	O	A	A	X	X	S	A	O	S	A	S	60.0%
Central African Rep.	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0.0%
Chad	O	O	O	X	X	X	X	O	A	A	S	20.0%
Chile	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	S	S	S	S	63.6%
Colombia	O	A	A	S	S	S	A	S	S	S	S	87.5%
Comoros	O	O	O	X	X	X	O	O	S	S	S	37.5%
Congo	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	X	A	S	44.4%
Côte d'Ivoire	O	A	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	A	S	55.6%
Cuba	O	O	O	A	A	X	O	O	O	O	A	0.0%
DPR of Korea	O	O	O	A	A	O	O	O	O	X	A	0.0%
Dem. Rep. of Congo	O	X	O	S	S	S	X	O	S	X	A	57.1%
Djibouti	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	37.5%
Dominica	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	A	S	S	X	66.7%
Dominican Republic	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	S	S	S	S	63.6%
Ecuador	O	O	O	A	S	A	O	O	O	O	A	12.5%
Egypt	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	O	S	O	A	14.3%
Equatorial Guinea	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	S	33.3%
Eritrea	O	O	O	A	S	S	A	O	A	O	S	37.5%
Ethiopia	O	O	O	S	S	S	A	O	A	A	S	50.0%
Fiji	O	O	O	A	S	S	A	O	A	A	X	33.3%
Gabon	O	X	X	S	S	S	X	O	S	A	S	71.4%
Gambia	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	O	S	A	S	44.4%
Ghana	O	O	O	S	S	S	X	O	A	A	S	50.0%
Grenada	O	A	A	S	S	S	O	A	S	A	S	71.4%
Guatemala	O	A	A	S	S	S	A	S	S	S	S	87.5%
Guinea	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	A	X	44.4%
Guinea-Bissau	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	A	S	50.0%
Guyana	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Haiti	O	X	X	X	X	X	O	A	X	S	S	50.0%
Honduras	O	O	A	S	S	S	A	O	S	S	S	66.7%
India	O	O	O	A	S	A	O	O	A	O	S	25.0%
Indonesia	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	O	S	O	A	33.3%
Iran	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	A	O	O	X	0.0%
Iraq	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	A	S	O	A	37.5%
Jamaica	O	O	O	S	S	S	A	A	S	A	S	62.5%
Jordan	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	S	S	A	A	50.0%
Kenya	O	X	X	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	57.1%
Kuwait	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	A	S	O	A	28.6%
Laos	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	A	A	A	A	33.3%
Lebanon	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	A	A	O	A	28.6%
Lesotho	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Liberia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	S	X	50.0%
Libya	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	37.5%
Madagascar	O	X	X	S	S	S	X	O	S	X	S	71.4%
Malawi	O	X	X	S	A	S	A	O	S	S	S	71.4%

COUNTRY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	COINCIDENCE: IMPORTANT VOTES ONLY
Malaysia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	A	S	A	A	50.0%
Maldives	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	S	S	S	A	60.0%
Mali	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	X	37.5%
Mauritania	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	28.6%
Mauritius	O	O	O	S	S	A	O	O	S	A	S	44.4%
Mongolia	O	X	X	S	S	S	A	A	S	A	S	83.3%
Morocco	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	28.6%
Mozambique	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Myanmar (Burma)	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	O	X	X	S	16.7%
Namibia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	A	37.5%
Nepal	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Nicaragua	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	O	O	O	A	22.2%
Niger	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Nigeria	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Oman	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	O	S	O	A	25.0%
Pakistan	O	O	O	S	S	A	O	O	S	O	A	33.3%
Palau	A	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	100.0%
Panama	O	A	A	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	88.9%
Papua New Guinea	O	A	A	S	S	S	A	A	S	S	S	85.7%
Peru	O	A	A	S	S	S	A	S	S	S	S	87.5%
Philippines	O	O	O	S	S	S	A	O	A	A	S	50.0%
Qatar	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	A	S	O	A	28.6%
Rwanda	O	X	X	S	S	S	X	O	A	A	S	66.7%
St. Kitts and Nevis	O	X	X	S	S	S	X	O	A	S	X	66.7%
Saint Lucia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
St. Vincent/Grenadines	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Sao Tome/Principe	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	A	S	50.0%
Saudi Arabia	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	28.6%
Senegal	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	A	S	50.0%
Seychelles	O	O	O	S	S	S	X	O	S	S	S	60.0%
Sierra Leone	O	O	O	S	S	S	X	O	S	A	S	55.6%
Singapore	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Somalia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	S	O	S	45.5%
South Africa	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	A	37.5%
Sri Lanka	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	O	A	O	S	33.3%
Sudan	O	O	O	X	A	S	O	O	A	O	A	14.3%
Suriname	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Swaziland	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Syria	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	A	O	O	A	0.0%
Thailand	O	O	O	S	S	S	A	A	S	A	S	62.5%
Timor-Leste	O	X	X	S	S	S	A	O	S	X	S	71.4%
Togo	O	O	A	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	50.0%
Tonga	O	A	A	S	S	S	A	X	S	S	X	83.3%
Trinidad and Tobago	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	A	S	S	S	60.0%
Tunisia	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	37.5%
Turkmenistan	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	O	X	33.3%

COUNTRY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	COINCIDENCE: IMPORTANT VOTES ONLY
Uganda	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	O	A	A	S	16.7%
United Arab Emirates	O	O	O	S	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	37.5%
United Rep. of Tanzania	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Uzbekistan	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	O	O	O	S	30.0%
Vanuatu	O	X	X	X	X	X	A	A	S	S	X	66.7%
Venezuela	O	O	O	A	S	S	O	O	O	O	A	22.2%
Vietnam	O	O	O	X	X	S	O	O	A	O	S	25.0%
Yemen	O	O	O	A	A	S	O	O	S	A	A	28.6%
Zambia	O	O	O	S	S	S	O	O	A	A	S	44.4%
Zimbabwe	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	O	O	O	X	0.0%
Overall Percentage												46.0%

Totals: 120 Members = 1320 Votes. S = 443; O = 521; A = 254 ; X = 102.

Source: United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, April 15, 2014; <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2013/2013/224853.htm>

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¹ Much of the following, about the NAM in particular, has been previously written by me (see Braveboy-Wagner 2009 and 2012). I also draw a lot from an excellent civil society work by Lydia Swart and Jakob Lund on the G77, written for the Center for UN Education Reform, which is based on extensive interviews and observation at the UN.

² Initially Latin Americans set themselves apart from the newer independent nations, but by the 1970s they began to define a common set of interests with them.