

40 years since the First Enlargement

London, 7-8 March 2013

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

www.uaces.org

40 years since the First Enlargement

UACES conference, London 7-8 March, 2013

A Smart State Handling a Differentiated Integration Dilemma? Concluding on Denmark in the European Union

Lee Miles, Loughborough University and Karlstad University (L.S.Miles@lboro.ac.uk)

Anders Wivel, University of Copenhagen (aw@ifs.ku.dk)

Chapter 16 for Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds) *Denmark and the European Union*

(London: Routledge, forthcoming July 2013)

Denmark has traditionally been portrayed as an outlier when it comes to European integration (see Larsen 2011: 93). Depicted as an ‘anxious’ or ‘reluctant’ European (Miljan 1977) and a member of the ‘other’, i.e. Nordic, European Community (Turner and Nordquist 1982), this respective view has been commonplace both at the elite and at the public level within Denmark and among discussions within other states on Denmark (see Branner and Kelstrup 2000; Hansen 2002; Kelstrup, Martinsen and Wind 2012:

415–44)¹. Yet, this volume tells a slightly different and more complex story of Denmark and the European Union, and seeks to present a more nuanced appreciation of Denmark in the European Union. At the governmental level, Denmark's official political commitment to the European integration process has varied over the years (cf. Larsen 2005), but pragmatism and selective engagement have – with few exceptions – been permanent features of Denmark's approach to European integration since 1973. At the same time, playing the game of differentiated integration in a Union characterized by increasing political, economic and cultural diversity, and functional, spatial and temporal dimensions (see Dyson and Sepos 2010b), Denmark has accepted Europeanization (see Graziano and Vink 2007) as a fundamental condition for policy-making, even in policy areas affected by the Danish opt-outs (see Miles 2010; Pedersen 2000; Larsen 2011). As Larsen argues (2005: 203), almost all areas of Danish policy have some sort of EU dimension. The country could be regarded as 'a committed member – with opt-outs!' (Larsen 2011: 93).

¹For instance, Kelstrup, Martinsen and Wind find that Danish European policy may be understood as a continuation of Denmark's traditional defensive small state posture and that this is surprising given the activist turn in Danish foreign policy in general and the the institutional environment in the EU, which provides fertile ground for small state activism (Kelstrup, Martinsen and Wind 2012: 425-426; cf. Petersen 2006). See also, Kelstrup's discussion of the historical development of Denmark's policy in the EU and Wind's discussion of the (non-)implementation of the citizen directive in Denmark in this volume.

As illustrated by several contributions to this volume, Europeanization and differentiation do not preclude pragmatism, and the development of a more diverse European Union has, to some extent normalized and ameliorated, the effects of selective engagement (cf. Diedrichs et. al. 2011). In effect, while preserving its pragmatic approach to the European integration process, and in order to maintain semblances of domestic consensus (see Pedersen 2000: 232), Denmark has increasingly pursued a dualist strategy in the EU: preserving, at least officially, the (formal) reservations granted by the Edinburgh Agreement and staunchly defending an intergovernmentalist position in regard to EU's institutional development, while, at the same time, allowing for intensified cooperation in some policy areas and actively participating (both formally and informally) in day-to-day negotiations and workings of the Union based on a permissive understanding of the opt-outs. In this respect, Denmark shows similarities with certain other Nordic states in often managing the twin pressures of Euro-scepticism and adaptation (Laursen 2010).

This chapter explores the dualism of the Danish approach to Europe in three steps. First, using the chapters of this volume as a springboard, this chapter assesses how Danish dualism is played out in different policy areas and through different institutional settings in the EU; and identifies three defining characteristics of the dualistic Danish approach to Europe. Second, these characteristics are compared to the findings of the current literature on small states in the EU focusing in particular on the so-called 'smart state' approach. Finally, the chapter concludes with reflections on the Danish experience and outlines the prospects pertaining to future Danish EU engagement.

DENIFING DANISH DUALISM

Small states seek to further their interests by trying to preserve as much autonomy as possible while influencing the actions of the great powers upon which their security and survival ultimately depend. They seek to expand their influence over the great powers mainly through international organizations, but this participation typically reduces their own political autonomy (Goetschel 1998: 17). The European Union presents small states with a particularly intense version of this autonomy/influence dilemma, because European integration entails cooperation across a very broad spectrum of policy areas, challenges autonomy more fundamentally by use of supranational decision-making and increases the costs of opting-out by being an ever more inclusive monopoly provider of political integration in Europe (cf. Kelstrup 1993; Petersen 1998; Wivel 2005a). At the same time, differentiated integration helps to ameliorate this 'integration dilemma' by allowing for multiple positions along a continuum of integration thereby normalizing a position of less than full integration. The success of a small state in uploading into, and in impacting upon the EU, and in managing these simultaneous pressures of EU downloading are largely dependent upon the intelligence and effectiveness of national political elites in addressing these two aspects of autonomy and influence (Miles 2002: 95), and in particular on devising strategies that effectively prioritize national political and administrative resources to take advantage of the decentralized institutional landscape of the EU (Wivel 2005a; Wivel 2010).² Thus, whereas the elites of some

² See also the discussions of the opportunities and challenges of small states in the EU in Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) and Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006).

small member states choose to stress more fully the benefits of participating fully in all aspects of the integration project, contributing actively towards its developments, and thereby maximizing influence, those of other small member states highlight the value of continually safeguarding of selected political bastions (monetary policy, migration policy and defence policy in the case of Denmark); thereby preserving a greater degree of autonomy yet foregoing the chance of influencing affairs in certain policy areas (cf. Mouritzen and Wivel 2005; Wallace 1999).

This volume has illustrated that whereas the tension between autonomy and influence continues to play an important role in Denmark's relations with the European Union, formal institutional affiliations tell only part of the story on how Denmark has handled this challenge. On the one hand, since 1973, all Danish governments have formulated their general approach to Europe in the context of the integration dilemma. As argued by Kelstrup in Chapter 2 this general approach has developed through five phases: selective and reluctant engagement from 1973–86; a more positive attitude from 1986–92 seeing the EU as a necessary part of Denmark's strategy for preserving the Scandinavian welfare state in a globalizing international order; a short phase of shock and adjustment in 1992–93 following the rejection of the Treaty on the European Union by the Danish electorate and resulting in the Edinburgh Agreement with four Danish opt-out from the original treaty; a return to a more selective engagement from 1993–2001 but with an acceptance among a majority in the political elite and the electorate that pragmatism now included acceptance of increased majority voting and intensification of European integration in some areas even if they touched on symbols of national autonomy (such as the Schengen Agreements); and finally from 2001 the

Danish approach to Europe has been a low priority for government and been dominated by considerations of domestic politics combining the acceptance of the EU opt-outs with the acceptance of differentiated integration (cf. Chapter 2). This pragmatic approach reflecting the continuing importance of the integration dilemma between influence and autonomy was continued even after the change of government in 2011. Thus, the Danish EU Presidency in 2012 was focused on effective and low-cost problem-solving rather than visions about Europe's future. In effect, all five phases represent variations upon a theme: the pragmatic balancing between the preservation of national autonomy and maximizing influence through institutional engagement. At the same time, Denmark's approach to Europe through all five phases is best characterized as reactive: Denmark followed Britain into the European Union in 1973 and changes in the Danish position were primarily due to external developments such as the Single European Act and the Treaty of the European Union.

This duality is reflected in Danish behaviour in central EU institutions. When Denmark has uploaded preferences in the Council, these have typically defended the institutional status quo against developments further challenging national autonomy. As noted by Brun Pedersen in Chapter 7, Danish Council policy has combined 'foot-dragging' and the formal defence of political bastions against further institutional integration with active participation in the informal everyday politics of the Council and attempted to exploit the existing institutional framework of the Council, e.g. by being actively involved in the everyday negotiations in COREPER and the working groups. Despite of the Commission's reputation as the protector of small state interests (Bunse, Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2005; Geurts 1998), Denmark has traditionally had a rather reluctant

attitude towards the Commission, because as a supranational EU institution, it has been a symbol of the potential threat to Danish autonomy resulting from participation in the integration process. Therefore, Grøn argues in Chapter 8, Danish actors have traditionally attempted to avoid interacting with the Commission and even aimed at delimiting its role. Thus, Danish actors have typically seen a need to shelter against Commission downloading and used formal channels of influence as an emergency break.

However, at the same time, Danish civil servants have actively pursued informal strategies, often using technical arguments, in order to upload Danish interests to the European level. The European Parliament possibly has an even worse reputation in Denmark than the Commission with numerous press reports painting a picture of incompetence and excessive use of taxpayers' money and this view of the Parliament is to some extent reflected in recruitment patterns and lack of interest in the Parliament by the political elite. Still, Rasmussen finds that official Danish institutions cooperate with MEPs, mostly informally and on an ad hoc basis, in uploading Danish interests and ideas to the European level in order to preserve Danish autonomy and influence. Concurrent with these efforts, the work of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is relatively well coordinated with that of the national government and parliament compared to many EU member states. This makes sense as the chapter shows that Danish MEPs continue to differ from their colleagues from other member states on key issues and sometimes promote political agendas more compatible with Danish domestic society than that of their respective party political parliamentary groups.

The duality of the Danish approach is reflected in Danish behaviour in some of the most central policy areas affected by Danish EU membership such as the internal market and agricultural policy as well as justice and home affairs, EMU and defence policy, i.e. the three policy areas on which Denmark has obtained an opt-out.

Regarding CAP and the internal market these policy areas continue to play an important role in Danish EU policy, but, as shown by Nedergaard in Chapter 3, now in a different way than previously. When Denmark first joined the EU, CAP was used as a major selling point, because of its importance for Danish agriculture and the importance of Danish agriculture for Danish economy. In addition, a significant part of the Danish electorate had emotional ties to agriculture as their families had left the countryside only a generation or two earlier. Today, the combination of CAP reforms, the dwindling importance of Danish agriculture to the Danish economy, and a more diverse array of interest groups concerned with the production and distribution of agricultural products in Denmark (including environmental groups undermining the dominance of agricultural interests) has resulted in a normalization of the Danish approach to EU agricultural policy. Likewise, whereas internal market policy in the 1980s became an ideological battle ground on the grand design of the European Union, Nedergaard shows how former idealist arguments for and against have now been replaced by realist pragmatism. Like agricultural policy, internal market policy has become normalized. Indeed, these observations also confirm the views of Miles (2011b) that there are now notable instances of Danish participation in the EU where Danish policy-makers are extensively 'fused' into the EU policy-making system, with internal market policy

representing an example of ‘clustered fusion’ where national adaptation is extensive and where Danish preferences are fully immersed into EU internal market policy.

Yet, do the opt-outs prevent normalization of politics in an EU context? On the face of it, it seems that they do. The Danish opt-outs define the baseline for Danish policy options in each of the affected policy areas and the starting point for any formal political statement regarding Denmark’s position on the EU’s policy on EMU, JHA and defence. However, Marcussen (in Chapter 4 on the EMU), Adler-Nissen (in Chapter 5 on justice and home affairs), and Wivel (in Chapter 6 on defence policy) point to the dual nature of elite level administration of the Danish reservations. On the one hand, for political and administrative decision-makers the opt-outs constitute a legal as well as a political binding that restrict the Danish action space. On the other hand, the political and administrative elites share a permissive understanding of the restrictions imposed by the opt-outs allowing them to participate in informal EU discussions on most issues related to the cases directly affected by the opt-outs. Certainly, the findings in this book also confirm the view of Larsen (2011: 109) that Denmark can be characterized as a ‘committed participant in EU foreign policy’.

Formally, the opt-outs define the legitimate space for Danish participation in the affected policy areas. In that sense, they transport policy options at the Union level to Danish policy choices like a light tube transporting the light to its designated location. However, when looking at the administration of the opt-outs another analogy conveys better what is going on. Rather than a light tube, the opt-outs affect policies like a prism reflects the light. It bends in all kinds of different – and sometimes unexpected – ways.

Due to the opt-outs formal politics are stuck in the exceptional and somewhat crude distinction between autonomy and influence, and structural change is only possible in the event of a referendum that allows for an abolishment. However, as Miles illustrates in Chapter 15, day-to-day politics have been normalized, and the challenges of conducting informal and formal Danish policy within the formal confines of the opt-outs have not proved that 'painful' for Danish policy-makers. Denmark informally uploads preferences to the European level and may influence policy changes.

Implementation has been normalized as well. Martinsen shows in Chapter 13 how administrative autonomy varies across policy areas and stages in the policy cycle. As in domestic politics, it is highly dependent on the engagement of the national legislature and societal actors. However, as argued by Wind in Chapter 11, domestic politics may occasionally push Denmark's approach to Europe back to exceptionalism as has been the case in citizenship and migration issues. Also, Danish EU coordination remains organized in the after same centralized intergovernmentalist model as it has been since 1973 with the European Affairs Committee of the Danish parliament and the Foreign Ministry continuing to play central roles. Again, however, dualism seems to be at play. As argued by Nedergaard in Chapter 14 the centralized EU negotiation system has provided Denmark with legitimate political and administrative procedures for participating in an on-going federalising process of the European Union. Thus, rather than creating tension between influence and autonomy these procedures have allowed Denmark to maximize influence by maximizing autonomy. As shown by Schuck and de Vreese in Chapter 12, the co-existence – even mutual reinforcement – of autonomy and influence fits with Danish public opinion on EU membership with support for

membership and assessment of EU membership as beneficial for Denmark being well above the EU average at the same time as Danes trust their national institutions more than EU institutions and continue their resistance to selected aspects of the integration process. Concurrent with the findings of the volume in general, Schuck and de Vreese suggest that EU attitudes and domestic considerations should not be viewed as competing alternatives for the explanation of voting behaviour in EU referenda.

In sum, the contributions to this volume points to four defining characteristics of the dualist Danish approach to European integration. First, the Danish approach is essentially pragmatic. Danish policymakers have seized the opportunities to maximize influence when they have occurred even in policy areas formally restricted by the opt-outs, which they have interpreted in a permissive way allowing them to participate in the everyday deliberations of European Union politics as long as policy was not directly affected by the Edinburgh Agreement. Furthermore, as Marcussen in Chapter 3 and Adler-Nissen in Chapter 4 demonstrate Danish policymakers have been at times rather creative in exercising such permissiveness and in enabling, in a pragmatic way, Danish participation even in policy fields where the opt-outs could be deemed operational. Second, this pragmatic pursuance of influence have been by way of depoliticizing issues related to the European Union thereby allowing for a gradual normalization of most policy areas. Perhaps most remarkably, the opt-out areas, which were highly politicized as a consequence of the Maastricht referendum and the ensuing public debates over the future of Europe and Denmark's place in it, have been managed in a permissive way which have only rarely attracted political attention. As Miles illustrates in Chapter 15, any pain accruing from managing the opt-outs has become rather bearable for Danish

policymakers. In addition, institutional issues, that have traditionally played an important role in the EU policies of Denmark and other small states, have been depoliticized as well. Thus, Danish policymakers agreed to qualified majority voting in the Council, increased influence for the European Parliament, and the undermining of the importance of the rotating Council presidencies, a traditional showcase for small states, without much public attention or debate. Indeed, this is all the more surprising given that Danish policymakers had been rather adept at utilizing Council presidencies to enhance the image of Denmark in the past and did ‘lead from the periphery’ (Miles 2003c). Danish policymakers have only (and rarely) been stuck in the integration dilemma and forced to choose between autonomy and integration, when domestic politics have not allowed for depoliticizing. Citizenship and border policies were important exceptions to pragmatic normalization of the Danish approach to the EU because they were so closely related to migration which played a major divisive role in Danish politics throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

Pragmatic depoliticizing of most policy areas allowed for an incremental Danish approach to European integration, a third characteristic of Danish dualism. Thus, whereas official Danish EU policy has undergone little change since the early 1990s with – on the one hand – policymakers ritually repeating their respect for the outcome of previous referenda and therefore the opt-outs and – on the other hand – voicing their concern that these bindings reduce Danish influence, the same policymakers have actually pursued an influence maximizing strategy in day-to-day politics. For instance, as noted by Brun Pedersen in Chapter 7 constitutional bargaining and successive rounds of EU enlargements have gradually eroded Danish Council ‘bastions’. Danish

policymakers have pragmatically adapted to integration dynamics in order to manage the dilemma of integration and to avoid marginalization of Denmark. Finally, Denmark's approach to Europe is reactive, a fourth characteristic of Danish dualism. The opt-outs lead to a natural focus on defending autonomy which logically leads to a reactive position vis-à-vis new developments in the EU. Even outside opt-out areas, Denmark has rarely acted as a pacesetter and when it has – i.e. leading the way in post – Cold War defence and security reforms as pointed out by Wivel in Chapter 6 or pursuing private sector interests as shown by Ronit in Chapter 12 – pacesetting has been a question of pursuing Danish interests in a globalized world order rather than agenda-setting in the EU.

LEARNING FROM THE DANISH EXPERIENCE: FROM SMALL STATE POLICY TO SMART STATE STRATEGY?

Danish dualism is pragmatic, depoliticized, incremental and reactive. In that way, Danish EU policy resembles the behavioural characteristics often seen as typical for small states in international relations: A tendency to pragmatically adapt to their external environment, and to seek influence through membership of international institutions in order to cushion the effects of international anarchy (Amstrup 1976: 178; Antola and Lehtimäki 2001: 13–20; Archer and Nugent 2002: 2–5; Christmas-Møller 1983: 40; Hey 2003: 2–10; Knudsen 2002: 182–5; Panke 2010c: 15; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010: 4–7). At the same time, this volume documents the success of Danish dualism which can be partly seen as a both a reflection of the 'smart strategies' of Danish policymakers and of the effectiveness with which Danish elites are now

immersed or possibly ‘fused’, on a selective and differentiated basis, into the EU system (Miles 2011b). The protection of bastions of national autonomy and active participation in order to maximize influence is conducted in parallel and points to a differentiation and potential amelioration of the integration dilemma.

In day-to-day EU politics, there is rarely a clear-cut choice between autonomy and influence. Rather it is well documented in parts of the EU literature that while the two may intuitively be seen as conflicting goals, they can be used by national policymakers to reinforce each other. Thus, Andrew Moravcsik, shows how the public identification of national ‘win-sets’ may be used strategically as a bargaining tool at the supranational level that can be used to influence the composition of the overall agreement (Moravcsik 1998: 60–7; cf. Putnam 1988). However, we would expect the strategic use of win-sets to be a significantly stronger tool for big EU member states than for small EU member states: small states can only rarely threaten to block the agreement, because blockage would lead to stronger repercussions for the small state than for the EU (cf. Moravcsik 1993). Hence, small states only rarely use their veto power (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006). For this reason small states choose a slightly different strategy. Rather than identifying win-sets that may be used to influence the overall composition of an agreement at the EU level, they define political bastions denoting selected issues, where their national interests or domestic preferences are particularly intense (Mouritzen 1997; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). Bastions serve a double purpose for small member states: they signal to the domestic audience that the political elite is willing to defend core values against supranational infringements and they signal to the other member states and politicians and civil servants operating at the EU level what is negotiable and what

is not. From this starting point, bastions of autonomy may be used to defining the baseline for negotiating influence at the supranational level and for getting the domestic legitimacy to do so.

From that perspective, Danish EU policy may fit the stereotype of pragmatic, depoliticized, incremental and reactive small state behaviour, but at the same time this may be seen as a viable road to maximising influence in the EU. A recent wave of literature on how small states maximize influence in the EU focus on so-called smart state strategies (cf. Arter 2000; Joenniemi 1998; Wivel 2005a; Wivel 2010; Grøn and Wivel 2011). A smart state strategy has three fundamental characteristics. First, goals and means must be highly focused and sharply ordered in accordance with preferences. Small states do not have sufficient resources to pursue a broad political agenda with many different goals. They must therefore focus their resources and signal their willingness to negotiate and compromise on issues that are not deemed to be of vital importance. Second, small states must present their initiatives as being in the interest of the Union as a whole, i.e. a common interest. Thus, political initiatives, at least at the formal level, from small EU member states should avoid conflict with existing EU initiatives or political proposals from any of the big EU member states. Ideally, they should be presented as specific contributions to a general development as opposed to a change of policy or attempt to slow it down. Finally, small states launching policy initiatives should seek to mediate between the different great power interests in order to achieve consensus. This will allow the small state agenda-setting powers not otherwise

at their disposal.³ Smart state strategies are most often seen as activist and high-profile (such as the Finnish Northern Dimension-initiative or the role played by Denmark and Sweden in EU enlargement with Central- and Eastern European countries), but if being smart is essentially about maximizing influence in accordance with the three defining characteristics of the smart state strategy then low-profile and reactive – or even inactive – strategies may be just as valuable depending on the conditions for policy-making. Thus, foot-dragging or fence-sitting policies on some policy issues may be seen as signalling bastions, not dissatisfaction with the entire integration process.⁴ In this way, a delicate mix of pace-setting, fence-sitting and foot-dragging by Danish policymakers can be understood as a logical response to the demands of differentiated integration, which has become the norm for the EU evolution (Miles 2010). It might be wise then to also think about small state strategies as including an integral blend of differentiation, with differentiated degrees of reactivity and proactivity on the part of policymakers, in which they may pursue both formal and formal strategies as part of representing a smart small state.

The recent literature on small EU member states suggest that these states tend to rely on soft bargaining strategies (Dür and Mateo 2010; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010;

³For elaborations and discussions of these three defining criteria, see Grøn and Wivel (2011) and Wivel (2010).

⁴The evidence on Danish public opinion provided by Schuck and Vreese in Chapter 12 suggests that this may be true in the Danish case. The Danish electorate finds that Danish EU membership is highly useful, but that bastions must be defended and that Danish political institutions are vital in doing so.

Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006), but it tells us only little on the particular content of these strategies. However, drawing on Grøn and Wivel's recent theoretical discussion of smart state strategies in the EU and looking at the findings of the present volume from a smart state perspective, Danish EU policy may be seen as an example of a small member state acting as a lobbyist (Grøn and Wivel 2011), pursuing an ever more complicated mix of formal and informal channels of access and communication in a fusing EU (see Miles 2011a: 2011b), in order to compensate for the weakening of traditional channels of small state influence. Just as corporate actors can utilize their expert knowledge, so can states, and just as some interest group lobbyists work from a well-defined political brief so do politicians and civil servants from a state with well-defined political bastions (Grøn and Wivel 2011). States may utilize their knowledge of a specific issue area or domestic interest groups and public opinion typically working to influence the Commission, the Parliament and COREPER working groups. When pursuing a lobby strategy, domestic administrative competencies are particularly important, i.e. the prioritization of EU work by lead ministries, effective cooperation between the small states' Permanent Representation and the lead ministries, and procedures for solving conflicts between ministries (Panke 2010c). Also, experience with new policy areas (e.g. climate policy) and technical expertise have proved highly valuable administrative competences when pursuing a lobby strategy in the Danish case. This potent mix of Danish experiences help us to at least partly understand why Danish policy-makers have yet to go the extra mile and achieve the removal of the opt-outs over the last decade, as Danish informal and formal lobby strategies have been able to reduce any 'pain' (see Chapter 15) accruing from Denmark's asymmetrical status in the EU with the opt-outs.

DIFFERENTIATING THE INTEGRATION DILEMMA

Playing the game of differentiated integration in a Union characterized by increasing political, economic and cultural diversity, the Danish political elite have been involved in a careful pursuit of Danish influence within the still relatively elite circles of EU decision-making, that sometimes seems to be beyond the confines of the official parameters of the domestic-orientated Danish opt-outs. The starting point for this policy has been formal and public identification of political bastions in the form of the Danish opt-outs on justice and home affairs, monetary policy and defence and the national Danish EU coordination process including the Danish parliament and several sector ministries under political coordination of the government and the administrative coordination of the Foreign Ministry.

This policy points to a necessary differentiation of the integration dilemma. The classical integration dilemma literature points to a fundamental trade-off between autonomy and influence (e.g. Kelstrup 1993; 2000a; Pedersen 1998; cf. Goetschel 1998). We find this trade-off in its purest form when a state is about to enter the EU: national autonomy is traded for influence on EU politics through membership. However, the trade-off is complex and not easily unpacked. Above all, the pressures of the integration dilemma become increasingly more nuanced, differentiated and are demonstrated in ever more complex strategies, and mixes of complex strategies, as a state adapts over time to EU membership, becomes ever more fused into the EU system, and is confronted by the demands of differentiated integration as a normal part of EU development (Miles 2010; 2011a; 2011b). For instance, an EU outsider with strong

economic and political ties to the EU will be dependent on EU policies even though it is excluded from influencing EU policies by institutional membership. Conversely, most EU insiders have defined political bastions protecting autonomy, while still pursuing influence inside an ever more differentiated EU.

Denmark is a notable case of this potent combination whereby policymakers identify political bastions of autonomy and simultaneously pursue selective supra-nationalism. This volume shows that a differentiated EU leaves a surprisingly large action space for a member state like Denmark, where managing the pressures of any integration dilemma and participating in a fusing, yet also differentiated integration process, may not be that incompatible in practice. Thus, even though the Danish opt-outs are typically seen as defining a narrow action space for Danish EU policy-making and influence (e.g. Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier 2008), one important finding of this volume is that the formal restrictions are less damaging when pursuing influence than the literature has suggested so far, and that the identification of political bastions may even be used in an effort to maximize influence. A second important finding is that EU policy-making takes place in a context of global and domestic politics and that the integration dilemma can rarely be seen in isolation from these dilemmas. A third important finding following from these two findings is that what is important for policy outcomes is not the existence of an integration dilemma as such but rather the differentiation of dilemmas across different policy areas, embedded within different institutional settings and played out at different levels of decision-making. To be sure, this does not point to the obsolescence of the integration dilemma, but it does leave us with an altogether more

optimistic scenario for combining autonomy with influence within the realms of EU politics.