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Europe's New Wilderness: The Council's Frames on Space Policy
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Abstract The European space programme has become increasingly application-oriented since the European Union became involved in space in the 1990s. This article seeks to investigate the role of the Council of the European Union in the shaping of the EU space policy. Rather than emphasising the Council's dominance as a legislator, it argues that the Council has instead acted as the primary frame-selector in the process of justifying the European Union's ambitions to engage in space. Using the Weberian notions of instrumental rationality and value-rationality, it demonstrates how the instrumental rational frames of prosperity of security have won out over the value-rational frame of exploration. Human activities in space are increasingly seen as a *means* to some material end, rather than as an end in itself. Nevertheless, we will advocate that space exploration ought to be prioritised, if the spirit of exploration is meant to be a guiding ideal of European integration.

Key Words EU, Space, Frames, Instrumental Rationality, Value-rationality

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'Where there is no vision, the people perish.'

– Proverbs 29, 18

1 Introduction

Since the turn of the 21st century, the role of Europe in space has undergone a dramatic transformation. The European Union (EU) is in the process of building its very own constellation of navigation satellites (Galileo), as well as constructing a system for earth observation (GMES). The European Space Agency (ESA), which has been implementing the space policy of its member states since 1975, has seen its proportional expenditure for satellite navigation and earth observation skyrocket between 2000 and 2012, reflecting the increasingly important role of space applications. This chapter examines the role of the Council of the European Union in the newly developed EU space policy. The Council represents both the most intergovernmental and the most influential EU institution. ESA, in turn, is similarly intergovernmental, and its vast body of experience in space makes it the obvious agent of an EU space policy. Hence the Space Councils were born out of the EU-ESA Framework Agreement of 2003, bringing together EU and ESA member states at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, as we will demonstrate, the initial enthusiasm about the Space Councils has withered away, and their significance continues to decline.

The purpose of this chapter is not to praise the role of the Council in the EU space policy, but to highlight that its role can actually be found in a more subtle realm, traditionally not been associated with the Council. The Council has facilitated the transformation of the European space programme by *selecting* the frames in which it is presented. Any policy issue is inherently multi-dimensional, as different actors are usually involved, and as different interests are at stake; 'different policy actors' thus 'focus their attention on different aspects of the policy as they seek to build support for their positions' (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008, 436). While the European Commission needs to convince the Council (and the European Parliament) of the need for a particular policy, one might expect the Council's frames to have to be in line with viewpoints of national governments, and hence also with public opinion. As

a key legislator, the Council thus has the role of selecting the dominant frame from the variety of frames presented by the Commission

In this early phase of the EU space policy two competing sets of competing frames can be identified: the value-rational frames of *inspiration* and *exploration*, and the instrumental rational frames competing frames of security, prosperity, and independence. While value-rational frames were initially drawn upon to explain the need for space-based activities, the new, application-driven approach is dominated by the *prosperity* and *security* frames. The changing frames reflect the Weberian conflict between instrumental rationality and value-rationality, and fall in line with Lyotard's (1979) postmodernist argument that knowledge is losing its 'use-value', which will be described in the following section.

After contextually placing the frames of the EU space policy into the Weberian dichotomy of value-rationality and instrumental rationality, this chapter will outline a brief history of the Council's involvement in an evolving European space programme. It will embark on an analysis of the Commission's Green Paper on Space Policy (Council of the European Union, 2003b), with the latter being a key document providing a number of competing frames for the justification of the EU's involvement in space. In an analysis of five crucial Council documents on space policy between 2003 and 2011, it will be demonstrated how the dominance of instrumental rational frames came about.

2 Competing Frames and the Transformation of Knowledge

In the introduction of his *Postmodern Condition*, Jean-François Lyotard 'define[s] *postmodern* as incredulity towards metanarratives' (1979, xxiv). While the age of modernity was shaped by an extreme appeal to myths and grand narratives such as communism or scientism, postmodernism assumes that these approaches have failed. Harvey sees modern hierarchy being replaced by postmodern anarchy, and modern purpose by postmodern play (1990, 43). The signs of postmodernity can be seen in nearly every aspect of society. In architecture, the formalism of the modern era has been abandoned in favour of a return to symbolism and a less rigid and structured style. This development can also be witnessed in the deideologification of political culture in Europe and North America. Boggs laments that 'familiar ideological traditions […] have lost their point of contact with rapidly changing global conditions,' asking what '"socialism" meant to the ruling parties of France, Spain and Greece,' as the ideologies seem to still exist in their names, but not in their practice (2000, 26). An appeal to ideology no longer secures votes, and society is increasingly elite-driven and technocratic, a state which Crouch (2004) refers to as "post-democracy". Crucially in the postmodernist era, the role of knowledge has undergone a dramatic transformation. Lyotard foreshadows that

> 'the relationship between suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending […] to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume - that is, the form of value' (1979, 4).

He recognises that if 'knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its "use-value"' (ibid., 5).

Max Weber (1947) categorised purposeful social action into four categories, two of which are of particular interest in this context. Instrumental rational action (cf. *zweckrationales Handeln*) refers to action which is meant to achieve concrete practical results. Parsons states that 'one type or level of rationality concerns maximising results at minimum cost. […] It includes economic rationality and rationality in the pursuit and use of political

power' (1961, 970). The instrumental rational pursuit of space-based activities would therefore have to carry some material benefit. Value-rational action (cf. *wertrationales Handeln*) on the other hand, is motivated by a 'conscious belief […] in the unconditional *intrinsic* value of a particular object, independent of success' (Weber, 1947, 12). Parsons refers to value-rationality as 'literal acceptance of the implications of an ultimate value-commitment' (1961, 970). A space programme is thus value-rational if the activity of space exploration itself is valuable, if human presence in space is intrinsically *desirable*. Weber moreover discusses "affectual action", which is caused by emotions, and traditional action, which is caused by habit. The dichotomy between instrumental rationality and value-rationality will be maintained, as this categorisation helps understand the initial competition between frames and the eventual dominance of instrumental rational frames for space policy.

Lyotard's observation of knowledge losing its use-value implies that the pursuit of knowledge, and thus the pursuit of space-based activities, must become increasingly driven by potential economic benefits, as well as by security considerations. It can thus be expected that instrumental rational frames are dominant. Historically, discoveries in astronomy have had few practical consequences, but were nevertheless deemed to be *inherently* valuable. If the nature of knowledge is indeed undergoing a radical transformation towards losing this inherent value, we would anticipate space-based activities to be justified as a means towards some valuable (presumably economic or security-related) end. The chapter will now examine to which extent this hypothesis holds true, and, as the role of human agency in this process is emphasises, it will analyse whether the Council has played a significant role in this change.

3 The Council's Involvement with Space

In order to assess the extent to which the Council has contributed to the reorientation of Europe's space policy, it is necessary to first examine how this reorientation has practically occured. As ESA is the agent that is implementing the EU space policy, its annual budget is a good starting point for visualising these changes. Within a period of four years navigation and earth observation have become the main foci of ESA (European Space Agency, 2007; 2012), a development which ESA official Charlotte Mathieu describes as an 'evolution towards applications' (Mathieu, personal communication, 15 June 2011). This correlates with the European Union involvement with ESA, and Commission President Barroso describing GMES and Galileo as the EU's 'flagship programmes' in space (2009). Budget allocations for the scientific programme as well as for human spaceflight have stagnated, which becomes especially apparent when taking an annual average inflation rate of 2% into account. While ESA's overall budget has therefore vastly increased over the past eight years, it appears as though policy-makers are interested in space applications, rather than in space exploration.

A close analysis of Galileo and GMES furthermore reveals a tendency towards the militarisation of space. "Militarisation" is here understood to refer to the use of outer space for military purposes, as opposed to "weaponisation", which refers to the placing of weapons systems in orbit around the earth. Galileo's Public Regulated Service (PRS) is aimed to deliver a higher precision signal than the standard Galileo signal which will be available for free to the general public. A survey by the Galileo Supervisory Authority reveals that 'half of all users of the Galileo encrypted signal [PRS] will be military customers' (GPS World, 2008). Despite the mantra of Galileo being a "civilian system under civilian control", it is clear that it is being built in full awareness that military customers will be one of the major sources of revenue. Nevertheless, any GNSS can potentially be used by the military, and the question of whether PRS is going to be used to guide missiles remains, as of now, unanswered. GMES, the second "flagship programme", has similar military applications. One of its components, G-MOSAIC, 'will provide intelligence to the EU and its Member States

before and after a crisis occurs' (European Commission, 2009). One of the project's reference users is the 'EU Military Staff,' further highlighting GMES's military potential. SSA, the third common EU/ESA project, could be explicitly dual-use. Sheehan (2009) poetically refers to this development as 'profaning the path to the sacred', because the ESA Convention explicitly states that the exploration of space is 'for peaceful purposes' only (European Space Agency, 1998).

Before directly addressing the frames on space policy, it will be shown that the Council's significance in these developments is not in its role as a legislator, but that its importance lies elsewhere. For this purpose a brief history of the formal involvement of the Council with EU space policy is needed. Many points of departure could be chosen to narrate a brief history of the Council's involvement with space policy, but the single most meaningful event occurred in 2003 with the signing of the ESA-EU Framework Agreement (Council of the European Union, 2003a). As already mentioned in the introduction, the intergovernmental nature of the Council and ESA appears to pre-designate the two institutions to close cooperation.

In reality it was of course the European Commission that negotiated the Framework Agreement 'on behalf of the Community' (ibid.), with the Council merely signing the agreement, an important albeit functional role. The agreement emphasises the 'peaceful use of space,' as well as the potential for 'economic growth,' with the basic intention behind the agreement to avoid 'any unnecessary duplication of effort' (ibid.). The Agreement mentions eight specific fields of cooperation, which cover nearly all elements of ESA activities, including, of course, navigation and earth observation, but also 'human space flight and micro-gravity' (ibid.). The only major field of activity that was omitted was the robotic exploration of outer space. An intense debate surrounded possible trajectories for future cooperation between ESA and EU (e.g. Hoerber, 2009; Sheehan, 2009), with suggestions reaching from case-by-case cooperation to the incorporation of ESA into the EU family of institutions. The reality of EU-ESA collaboration has been remarkably close the vision outlined in the Framework Agreement. The latter foresees the 'management by the ESA of European Community space-related activities,' as well as the 'carrying out of activities which are coordinated, implemented and funded by both parties' (Council of the European Union, 2003a). Both strategies have been put into practice, most prominently in the Galileo and GMES programmes.

While the actual signing of the agreement is a noteworthy aspect of the Council's involvement with the EU-ESA Framework Agreement, Article 8 of the document potentially bears real significance, as it establishes the Space Councils, which are defined as 'regular joint and concomitant meetings of the Council of the European Union and the Council of ESA at ministerial level' (Council of the European Union, 2003a). Here the institutional similarities between the two bodies come into play, and the eight Space Councils that have been facilitated since the signing of the Agreement provide useful markers in an analysis of the Council's role in European space policy. Since the first Space Council in 2004, the event is usually held during the Competitiveness Council sessions, and sometimes shortly before the regular ESA Council, where ideas brought up at the Space Council can potentially be implemented.

The Space Council has experienced a somewhat parabolic development, where the peak of its importance was reached around 2009, and where a steady decline can be demonstrated ever since. The primary focus of the first two meetings appears to have been the preparation of the subsequent Space Council. A major issue of concern was the 'identification of priorities of the ESP [European Space Programme], including estimation of costs' (Council of the European Union, 2004). The third Space Council, in turn, focused on GMES (Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security), having played an important role in turning the project into one of the EU's "flagship programmes" in space. While the first three Space

Councils developed "orientations", the fourth Space Council of 2007 was the first to produce a Resolution (Council of the European Union, 2007). The Resolution was in line with the Lisbon Agenda, highlighting 'the emerging European knowledge society' (ibid.), yet it also stresses the security dimensions of GMES and Galileo. The Council saw the need for a 'structured dialogue' between the EU and the 'European Defence Agency for optimizing synergies,' and recognises the dual-use potential of many space-based systems (ibid.).

The following 2008 Resolution on Space (Council of the European Union, 2008) placed much greater emphasis on Galileo and GMES, with nearly half of the document devoted to the two programmes. In the 2009 Space Council (Council of the European Union, 2009), the security dimension of space-based activities was pushed further into the focus. References are made to MUSIS, a European military surveillance satellite system, as well as to SSA, a project aimed to monitor near-earth objects, including foreign satellites. While the former application has never been implemented, both systems have clear military purposes, highlighting the role of the Space Council in pushing the dual-use potential of space onto the agenda. While SSA's preparatory stage has been completed, it remains to be seen whether the programme as a whole will be put into practice. The 2010 Space Council meeting abandoned references to MUSIS, yet underlined that the 'GMES programme will allow Europe to deal more effectively with global security issues' (Council of the European Union, 2010). Furthermore, the document contains a section on cooperation with Africa, emphasising the potential benefits of EGNOS for the continent, a system designed to maximise the operability of GPS for European, and potentially African users.

The most recent Council Resolution on Space that followed the 8th Space Council in 2011, is shorter than previous resolutions, and focused almost entirely on security (Council of the European Union, 2011a). Although it contains hardly any new material, it clearly reveals the priorities for the Council in space: exploiting its security potential. The Resolution contains a more detailed examination of SSA, and follows the tradition of all previous resolutions in highlighting that the completion of GMES and Galileo is paramount for Europe. Nevertheless, the repetitiveness of the resolutions, particularly after 2009, shows the declining importance of the Space Council meetings, which have also become significantly shorter. While the first Space Council was scheduled for taking two hours, the latest meeting required a mere 65 minutes (Council of the European Union, 2011b). Indeed, the space section on the Council's internet presence contains links to all documents produced by the Space Councils, apart from the 2011 resolution. This not only accentuates the decreasing significance of the meetings, but it puts the transparency of the Space Council sessions into question.

	Date	**Outcomes**
1st Space Council	25/11/2004	Preparing programme of next Space Council in spring 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2004)
2nd Space Council	7/6/2005	Preparation of future European Space Programme; defining roles and responsibilities of actors involved, particularly EU and ESA (Council of the European Union, 2005a)
3rd Space Council	28/11/2005	Orientations on GMES, which is to provide information for policy-makers on security and the environment (Council of the European Union, 2005b)
4th Space Council	22/5/2007	First resolution on European Space Policy, focus on growth and creation of a knowledge-based economy; focus on security dimensions of GMES and Galileo; dual-use potential of space; dialogue with European Defence Agency (Council of the European Union, 2007)
5th Space Council	26/9/2008	Resolution focuses on Galileo and GMES as the flagship programmes; identification of four priority areas for the

		European Space Programme: 1. Tackling climate change 2. Space as a means to implement Lisbon Strategy 3. Contribution of space to Europe's security 4. Space exploration (Council of the European Union, 2008)
6th Space Council	15/6/2009	Resolution puts even greater emphasis on the security dimension of space, mentioning MUSIS and SSA (Council of the European Union, 2009).
7th Space Council	25/11/2010	Resolution emphasises Galileo and GMES and abandons references to MUSIS; section on cooperation with Africa (Council of the European Union, 2010)
8th Space Council	6/12/2011	Resolution has a very strong focus on security; detailed examination of SSA; highlights the importance of completing Galileo and GMES (Council of the European Union, 2011a)

4 The Council's Frames on Space

The main argument advanced in this chapter, is that the Council's role in European space policy was not in shaping and proposing new programmes, but in determining the frames used to justify European space endeavours. For this purpose the following six documents will be examined:

1. The European Commission's Green Paper on European Space Policy (Council of the European Union, 2003b): although this is a Commission document, it is included in this analysis because it is the first extensive EU document on space policy published in January 2003. It furthermore sets up archetypical representations of different competing frames for space policy, from which the Council would be able to select the dominant frame.
2. The EU/ESA Framework Agreement (Council of the European Union, 2003a): published in October 2003, this document draws on the Green Paper, and it represents a major hallmark in the history of EU space policy.
3. The Resolution on the European Space Policy that following the 4th Space Council (Council of the European Union, 2007): this is the first major document that clearly outlines the Council's vision of the EU's role in space.
4. The Resolution following the 5th Space Council (Council of the European Union, 2008): this document is a very clear formulation of the Council's ideas, and it is important as it establishes Galileo and GMES as the cornerstones of the EU space programme.
5. The European space strategy (Council of the European Union, 2011d): this is one of the most important documents on the EU's role in space, and it is very useful for analysing the competing frames as a draft version is available (Council of the European Union, 2011c).
6. The Resolution following the 8th meeting of the Space Council (Council of the European Union, 2011a): this document is the most recent Council Resolution on space.

Looking at these documents chronologically allows for drawing conclusions about the impact of the Council on defining appropriate frames.

The Commission's Green Paper on European Space Policy sets itself the task of initiating 'a debate on the medium- and long-term future use of space for the benefit of Europe' (Council of the European Union, 2003b, 6). The document was developed after a request by the European Parliament, and relied on a 'series of five consultation workshops' organised by 'the EC/ESA Joint Task Force' (Council of the European Union, 2003c). These workshops were meant to contribute the views of different interest groups; there was thus one workshop for the industrial community and one for the scientific community. Contrary to expectations, the industrial workshop was indeed very supportive of ESA's scientific activities, and encouraged further funding for the International Space Station. The consultation report on the Green Paper does not inform the reader about the outcomes of the open web-consultation, which gave members of the public the opportunity to voice their opinions. The 2003 White Paper however mentions the conclusions of the web-consultation, singling out a call for the 'support of the exploration of the solar system,' as well as the 'need for a long-term vision including human spaceflight' (Council of the European Union, 2003d). In fact the instrumental rational view that space should be used primarily for economic growth and job creation is particularly visible in none of the workshops, although it is mentioned in some. The workshop for the scientific community is noteworthy because 'a plea was made to stop the trend to significantly reduce the funds for European space science research' (ibid.).

The Green Paper, which was finally the product of these workshops, begins its introduction with the following paragraph:

> '"Last Frontier…", "discovery of the Universe and its origins…", "…life on other planets…", "…first footsteps on the Moon…", "…space heroes…". Space represents to humanity an infinite, timeless source of dreams and striking reality' (Council of the European Union, 2003b, 6).

The Green Paper seeks to inspire its readers, reminding them of the deep effect that the view of the stars has had on humanity. It essentially states that the EU cannot ignore this 'timeless source of dreams,' referring to 'space heroes' and the 'last frontier' – space is a challenge for humanity that it simply must engage with (ibid.). Going to space is seen as valuable in itself, and two value-rational frames are set up:

1. The *inspiration frame* puts forward that space is a source of dreams for humanity. Human presence is space is desirable simply because it inspires.
2. The *exploration frame* advocates that exploring, discovering and understanding the universe is part of human destiny.

The Green Paper nevertheless also sets up several other frames, which can be categorised as instrumental rational. The document states that

> 'a strong European presence in particular key areas of space applications is indispensible both as a political asset and in order to enable the Union to maintain its strategic independence and contribute its economic competitiveness' (ibid., 19).

This sets up three distinct instrumental rational frames for space policy, which became recurrent in the Council's publications on space:

1. The *security frame* argues that space is important for 'monitoring hazardous transport operations' or 'border surveillance' (ibid., 19).
2. The *independence frame* proposes that Europe has a strategic interest in independent access to space, which is why an EU space policy is important.

3. The *prosperity frame* argues that space is critical to the European economy, and that it is therefore paramount for the EU to possess a space policy if it intends to remain highly competitive.

The document does highlight however that 'space is […] a high-risk sector, of fragile economic viability' (ibid., 6). This statement was of course underlined by the failure of the public-private partnership that was initially meant to fund Galileo. Nevertheless, it establishes two competing sets of frames, allowing the Commission to choose which frame will become dominant.

The Framework Agreement between ESA and the EU already gives us a hint about the Council's preferred choice of frames. Although the Agreement is silent about justifying space-based activities, it mentions in the first paragraph of Article 1 that the European Space Policy ought to 'link demand for services and applications using space systems in support of the Community policies with the supply of space systems in infrastructure necessary to meet that demand' (Council of the European Union, 2003a). This should be seen reference to the Lisbon Agenda, and is hence exemplary of the instrumental rational *prosperity frame*. It clarifies the Council's perspective on why the EU needs a space policy: to meet the demand of its economy. Space is clearly a means to an end rather than an end in itself, and while human space flight is mentioned as a specific area of cooperation, it is unclear to what extent this can be accommodated under a supply-and-demand rationale.

The 2007 Resolution on the European Space Policy that followed the 4th Space Council grants us more detailed insight into the Council's ideas for European Space Policy. While a section with the title 'Vision for Europe' evokes expectations for value-rational justifications, the Council looks at space as a 'strategic asset,' which can 'contribute to the independence, security and prosperity of Europe' (Council of the European Union, 2007). It thus contains explicit references to all three instrumental rational frames. Reference is made to the Lisbon Strategy, identifying the potential of space to generate 'growth and employment' (ibid.). As this is the first justification for going to space that is mentioned in the Resolution, it is evidence for the Council pushing the instrumental rational *prosperity frame* into the spotlight. The Council recognises the 'inspirational ability of space activities,' hence referring to the *inspiration frame*, but wants to use it for 'attracting young people into science and engineering' (ibid.). Space exploration has historically had this inspirational ability precisely because it is seen by many to be an end in itself; the Council however wants to use this ability to implement the Lisbon Agenda, turning it into a means to an end. Nevertheless, the Resolution also contains a paragraph referring to the *exploration frame*, 'recognising that the exploration of space contributes to answer far-reaching questions on the origin and evolution of life in the Universe' (ibid.), an aim which is not economically or militarily motivated. Hence the two sets of frames are still present and competing.

The next Council Resolution of 2008, "Taking forward the European Space Policy", took on a very similar discourse, with a further emphasis on instrumental rational frames. The document's introduction contains an explicit reference to the *independence frame*, reaffirming the 'importance for Europe to maintain an autonomous access to space' (Council of the European Union, 2008). The 'vision for Europe is space' that is outlined in the document sees the primary objective of the European space policy in strengthening 'Europe as a world-class space leader responding to the needs of European policies and objectives, in terms of applications, services and related infrastructures' (ibid.) This is an important reference to the *prosperity frame*. It includes a separate section in the Lisbon Strategy, containing more such references, using particularly instrumental rational terms such as 'economic opportunities,' 'growth,' or 'economic exploitation' (ibid.). The *security frame* is also present, although in combination with the *prosperity frame*. The Resolution state that 'space assets have become indispensable for our economy and that their security must thus be assured' (ibid.) However,

to a lesser extent, the value-rational *exploration frame* is referred to as well, and a 'human expedition to Mars' is mentioned (ibid.). Space exploration is nevertheless seen as a 'global endeavour' that ought to be conducted 'within a worldwide programme' (ibid.), hence justifying the moderate European funding for robotic exploration. The Resolution shows how the dominance of the *prosperity* frame is being established out of the initial variety of frames.

In 2011 the Council worked on a document outlining the European space strategy, and the differences between draft versions emphasise competition between frames as well as the increasing dominance of the *prosperity frame*. The short section on space exploration is particularly striking, as there seems to have been significant internal debate about the precise wordings of each point. While a draft version emphasises the importance of space 'for the benefit of all mankind' (Council of the European Union, 2011c), the same point in the final version calls for an examination of 'possible options for involvement in space exploration setting out a cost benefit analysis' (Council of the European Union, 2011d). Furthermore, the section on space exploration was made significantly shorter. The two versions project the contrast between instrumental rational and value-rational frames for going to space. The draft version is a reference to the inspiration frame; it is reminiscent of the plaque left on the Moon by the crew of Apollo 11, and the heroism that is inevitably connected to the moon landings. Space exploration is regarded as an inherent good, requiring no further justification. The final version on the other hand appeals to notions of *prosperity*, measuring the value of space exploration in economic terms. This rationale becomes more evident as one reads the remainder of the document, which refers to a 'strict economy of resource' and 'user-driven applications,' emphasising that 'space activities and applications are vital to our society's growth and sustainable development' (ibid.). The two versions do not only show that the Council is adopting an increasingly instrumental rational discourse on space, favouring the *prosperity* frame, but they also demonstrate that particular formulations are chosen consciously. Competing forms of rationality seem to exist within the Council, with instrumental rationality seemingly being given priority; as the title of the document states, a European space strategy has to 'benefit' the citizens (ibid.).

Following the release of the "space strategy", the Space Council met once more, creating a further resolution. Reference is made to the Europe 2020 strategy in the opening section, and there is an emphasis on the 'role which space systems play to provide […] practical tools for […] the implementation of European policies' (Council of the European Union, 2011a). The Council's rhetoric is dominated by the instrumental rational *prosperity frame*, arguing that space exploration will enable 'economic expansion and new business opportunities' (ibid.). However, apart from the prosperity frame, the *security frame* is a similarly important theme in the resolution, which is abundant in references to 'European and non-European citizens' safety and security requirements' (ibid.). The section on space exploration on the other hand contains few novelties, being partially assembled using phrases from previous documents. By 2011, we can therefore conclude that the instrumental rational frames and the *prosperity frame* in particular have become thoroughly dominant in the Council's discourse on EU space policy.

Document	**Date**	**Frames**
Green Paper on Space Policy	24/1/2003	Document sets up two value-rational frames (*exploration* and *inspiration*) and three instrumental rational frames (*prosperity*, *security* and *independence*); the dominant frames will emerge from this selection
EU/ESA Framework Agreement	7/10/2003	Emphasis on *prosperity* to justify EU engagement with ESA and in outer space in general

4th Space Council Resolution	25/5/2007	References to *prosperity*, *security* and *independence*, with particular emphasis on *prosperity*; some references to *inspiration* and *exploration*
5th Space Council Resolution	29/9/2008	Emphasis on *prosperity*, in combination with *security*; *independence frame* is present, and to a lesser extent also the *exploration frame*
European Space Strategy	31/5/2011	Different versions show how the *inspiration frame* had been replaced by the *prosperity frame*
8th Space Council Resolution	6/12/2011	Strong emphasis on the *prosperity frame*; important role of the *security frame* in justifying space endeavours

5 Conclusions – The Council as a Frame-Selector

The Lisbon Treaty has fundamentally altered the European supranational decision-making process, as the European Parliament has been granted co-decision powers. Nevertheless, the Council arguably remains the more influential institutional in the new bicameral politics of the EU (Hagemann & Høyland, 2010). This is visibly demonstrated by the current economic crisis, where the Council is central to discussions surrounding the future of the eurozone, as opposed to the sheer absence of the Parliament and even the Commission. It was our goal for this chapter to investigate the role of the Council in the shaping of the EU space policy. Space policy is an example of the interplay between the Commission as the frame-creator on the one hand, and between the Council as the frame-selector on the other, and it is arguably a microcosm of inter-institutional relations. Whether the Parliament takes on a similar role remains the subject of another potential study. Nevertheless, due to the difficulty involved in attempting to access the minutes of all relevant meetings, it is one of the weaknesses of the argument presented here that it cannot be sufficiently shown to what extent the Council's discourse has practically led to a reorientation of the ESA programme.

Lyotard's argument was that knowledge is becoming ever more commodified, which is a development that this analysis of the Council's frames for space policy vividly validates in two ways. Space applications providing services and generating economic or security gains have relatively greatly gained in importance. GMES and Galileo are not only the EU's "flagship programmes" in space, but they also constitute the largest parts of the budget of the European Space Agency, which has undergone a radical transformation. While the European space exploration programme remains ambitious, and while much was achieved using modest financial resources, it has hardly benefitted from the massive investments into ESA during the past decade. It appears to be easier to justify space-based projects that 'benefit the citizens of Europe' economically, than to argue that we should develop more powerful rockets for missions to Mars. Although this instrumental rational reasoning stands on loose feet, as Galileo seems to fail in delivering the promised superiority to GPS in terms of signal quality, it has nevertheless generated a revitalised European interest in space. On the other hand, the fact that space exploration is justified by making reference to job creation and economic expansion, further underlines the cogency of Lyotard's point.

The meeting of the ESA Council at Ministerial Level in November 2012 ran under the slogan, "Space for competitiveness and growth". Funding for a larger version of the European heavy-lift rocket Ariane 5 was secured, and the ESA Member States agreed to fund several

probes to Mars in collaboration with Russia. The Lunar Lander programme was scrapped. Europe must make sure that the constant references to cost-benefit analysis and international cooperation do not take on a ritualistic character, preventing serious investment in space exploration (e.g. the Aurora Programme). The idea of the human exploration and colonisation of the solar system can provide a *vision* in a postmodern society where knowledge has become a mere means to an end. Using space as a catalyst fostering human curiosity is essential, if the human spirit of exploration is to be the guiding ideal for future European integration.

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