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Europeanization and Transformation of the Kurdish Movement

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ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to point out the relations between the Kurdish movement of Turkey (PKK) and the European Union. It aims to answer how and through which actors the relations between the Kurdish movement and the European Union have constructed and to what extend these relations have been influential in the discourse transformation of the Kurdish movement.

Firstly, I will point out where we can see the discourse transformation of the Kurdish movement and then debate the Europeanization concept regarding the Kurdish question and try to answer three main questions to conceptualize the Europeanization process of the Kurdish movement.

Key Words: Europeanization, Kurdish movement, Kurdistan, European Diaspora, Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK,
A. DISCOURSE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT

On November 27, 1978 the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was founded as a Marxist-Leninist organization in Diyarbakir to build an independence and socialist Kurdistan through a revolutionary guerilla war. More than ten years, it had advocated Marxist-Leninist principles and fought against the Turkish armed forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it started to question its ideological approaches by taking a critical position against its communist roots, which led the organization to subtract the hammer and sickle from its flag.

The first peace negotiations started between the Turkish state and the PKK in 1993, when the PKK declared a cease fire (Öcalan, 2008). After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK officially declared that it changed its former objective, which was establishing a nation-state and declared a new cease-fire with the aim of ending the armed struggle. So, we can see three essential changes in the discourse of the Kurdish liberation movement:

1. PKK altered its objective from an independent nation-state to a democratic cultural autonomy

2. PKK changed its ideological and political direction. It renounced the Marxist-Leninist perspective and started to claim social, human and cultural rights for the Kurds. The centralized Soviet system was criticized and the decentralized system of the European Union started to be debated as a model for the solution of the Kurdish question.

3. PKK rejected the necessity of the armed struggle and violence. Peaceful solution of the Kurdish question became the main political motto of the movement.

Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK chairman explains the new approach of the organization in his book "War and Peace in Kurdistan" as such:

We demand a democratic nation. We are not opposed to the unitary state and republic. We accept the republic, its unitary structure and laicism. However, we believe that it must be redefined as a democratic state respecting peoples, cultures and rights. On this basis, the Kurds must be free to organize in a way that they can live their culture and language and can develop economically and ecologically. This would allow Kurds, Turks and other cultures to come together under the roof of a democratic nation in Turkey. This is only possible, though, with a democratic constitution and an advanced legal framework warranting respect for different cultures. (2008 : 39)
In this book, he mentions that the Kurdish question should be considered as a part of the democratization process of Turkey. A constitutional reform should be done and the Kurdish identity should be put in it to integrate the Kurds in the legal system of Turkey (Öcalan, 2008: 40). In another book, he repeats that the founding of a Kurdish nation-state is not an option for him (Öcalan, 2011: 19).

In the central publication of the PKK, Serxwebun, the new aim of the organization was declared as using the right of struggle in the peaceful and legal framework without demanding any strategic reservation (Öcalan, November 1999: 4)

**B. EUROPEANIZATION CONCEPT AND THE KURDISH MOVEMENT**

Kevin Featherstone describes Europeanization as a process of structural change influencing actors, institutions as well as ideas and interests (2003) and mentions four different meanings of Europeanization used in the European studies literature

Two of them are used in a maximalist sense involving every structural change, which are closely identified with 'Europe'. The first one is the Europeanization as a historical process. It is linked to the export of the European authority and norms: imperial control, institutional organization, social and cultural beliefs, values and behavior. The second one is the process of the cultural diffusion, which refers to the increasing transnationalism within Europe. Minimally, ‘Europeanization’ points out the responses to the policies of the European Union (EU). The third meaning of the Europeanization involves the institutional adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from European Union membership. Not only the member states, but also the non-governmental actors are able to be influenced in this process. Turner exemplified the Europeanization of the trade-unions with the help of the 'political opportunity structure' approach (1996). The last meaning of the Europeanization is the adaptation of policy and policy processes. It involves the constraints on domestic policy posed by EU regulation, indirect effects of EU's role on national policy or the evaluation of EU foreign policy coordination (Featherstone, 2003).

Although the literature is quite limited focusing the relations between the Kurdish movement and European bodies, we are able to see different types of approaches regarding the 'Europeanization
of the Kurdish conflict’. In one context, it is referred to the evolution of EU foreign policy coordination among the member states for the Kurdish conflict (Gürbey, 1999). In another one, it indicates the indirect effects of the EU on the Turkey’s regional governance in the areas where the Kurds are living (Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005).

It is quite natural that the articles pointing out different historical periods or examining different organizational bodies have seen the Europeanization process differently. An article focusing on the Kurdish question in the 1920s would prefer the term as a historical process involving the imperial control implications due to the British support for a Kurdish nation-state in the areas of oil rich areas (Bruinessen, 1985).

In this paper, I prefer the Europeanization concept in the meaning of institutional adaptation. I will suggest that the PKK organization has exposed to the EU (or EC) adaptational pressures since the 1980s. However, due to the insufficient mediating factors, the process could only start in 1990s. After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, it became full-fledged.

Although several scholars prefer to start the Europeanization process in 1999, when Abdullah Öcalan was captured and Turkey was approved as a candidate state for EU (Blätte, 2003; Eccarius-Kelly, 2002), I believe that the interactions between the European Diaspora, which organized itself in the non-governmental Kurdish transnational bodies, and the European Union became a significant transformative force on the Kurdish movement in the 90s and thereafter. The approval of Turkey as a candidate state of EU has also been a factor accelerating the process.

In this framework, it is important to show why other actors of the Kurdish movement (the actors of 1920s and actors in the PKK (except the European Diaspora) have been ineffective and the European Diaspora has been influential after 1999. Hence, in the first part of my paper, I will try to clarify the change in the actors and in the power balances of the Kurdish national movement since the last period of the Ottoman Empire. In the second part, I will focus on the mechanisms of the Europeanization and how it has been influential on the Kurdish movement. In the last part, it will be questioned to what extent the Europeanization have been influential in the Kurdish movement in the 1980s and after 1999.
Accordingly, in this presentation, three questions below will be attempted to give proper answers:

- Who have been the main actors in the Kurdish movement regarding the historical evolution of the Kurdish question?
- What were the mechanisms of the Europeanization in the transformation of the Kurdish movement?
- To what degree did the Europeanization influence the change of the Kurdish movement during the 80s and after the 1999?

C. MAIN ACTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE KURDISH QUESTION

The Emergence of Nationalism in Kurdistan (1830-1925)

In Kurdish history, there have been different actors and classes as well as social groups, which led the Kurdish national objectives. Although there is not an agreed definition of Kurdish nationalism among the scholars, and thus, not an agreed period when the Kurdish nationalism emerged, it is able to see that the frequency of the conflicts between the Kurdish notables and the Ottoman administration had increased with the modernization attempts of the Ottoman Empire after 1830s, in the same period when the Arab nationalism also emerged (Özoğlu, 2001).

Bedirhan Paşa, who became the ruler of the Botan Emirate in 1835 (Özoğlu, 2001), was carrying an Ottoman title, mu'tesellim, (a tax collector) and seems that he was a part of the Ottoman administration. However, the modernization attempts of the Ottoman Empire led to a conflict between Bedirhan Paşa and the Ottoman Empire resulting in expelling him from Kurdistan (Özoğlu, 2001).

Another important leader of Kurds had been Sayyid Ubaidullah, a religious leader, who had close relations with the Ottoman administration. He was the chief of Kurdistan in 1880 controlling Botan, Hakkari, Ardahan and Bahdinan (Özoğlu, 2001). There was also a frequent correspondence between him and Britain. The letter he wrote to the American missionary called Cochran indicates his strong national feelings and aims:
The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and customs distinct.... We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations.... This is our object [for the revolt].... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds and the oppression which they suffer at the hands of the [Persian and Ottoman] government. (qtd from Özoğlu, 2001 : 391)

In 1880, after the Ottoman-Russian war, Sayyid Ubaidullah led the first large Kurdish national rebellion. Although it got aid from the tribal leaders of the region, he could not achieve his aim of an independence Kurdistan.

The 1908 Young Turks revolution¹ and the emergence of the modern Turkish state further stimulated the Kurdish national attempts. During this period, the relations between the Kurdish nationalists and Britain became more structured. The Sayyid Abdulkadir, the son of Sayyid Ubaidullah, representing the autonomist faction of Kurdish leadership (Özoğlu, 2001) attended to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He visited the representatives of the American, French and British governments for their support regarding the Kurdish question. Emin Ali Bedirhan from the Bedirhani family was also an important actor after the Young Turk revolution until 1926. He was the founding member of the first Kurdish organization, the Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress. The diplomatic attempts of these two leaders, who were living in Istanbul, to gain international support could not be successful and also the armed rebellions of the Kurds were defeated during this period.

The failure of the Sheik Said revolt in 1925 and the rapprochement between Britain and Turkey shaped a new period for the Kurdish nationalism, when the Kurds were abandoned to their fates and the Kurdish nationalists, but also the whole upper-class of Kurds were annihilated violently (Beşikçi, 1991). The remaining Kurdish landowners were forced to become collaborationists and spy-agents of the Turkish state (Beşikçi, 1991). Most of them have rejected their Kurdish identity to take part in the Turkish bureaucracy and Turkish parliament.
First Period of the PKK (1978-1991)

The silence in Kurdistan ended with the emergence of PKK in 1978, which counteracted the assimilation politics and mass massacres of the Turkish state with the same violent and brutal practices.

The PKK was founded by four left-wing students politicized in the international 68 youth movement. In short period, it built strong connections with the Kurdish proletariat, the poorest and the most oppressed social strata of Kurdistan (Bruinessen, 1995). Due to the collaboration of the Kurdish upper-classes and their rejection of the Kurdish identity, in short period, PKK became the only significant actor of the Kurdish nationalism. The other Kurdish organizations were deactivated with the violent attacks both from the Turkish state and the PKK.

In this period, the Executive Committee of the PKK, including Abdullah Öcalan was the only actor inside the organization. During the 1980-1990 period, we see a total collaboration and collectivism inside the Executive Committee, especially against the regional guerrilla commanders and the so-called traitor PKK Party members, who were mostly in the European Diaspora.

In this period, we do not only see the deactivation of some Party members and the regional guerrilla commanders, but also a strong discourse inside the organization against the interference of the European Party members to the PKK decision-making processes and policy formulations.

Europe was mentioned as a place, where the PKK-line could not be implemented (Öcalan, 1993). During this period, the main international actor influenced the PKK structure and ideology was the Soviet Union.
**Second Period (1991-1999)**

Although the Kurdish European Diaspora was an ineffective actor inside the organization during the 1980s, it became an economic and diplomatic force inside the organization. It successfully established diplomatic relations with various governments (Bruinessen, 1995). However, this does not change much in the organizational hierarchy of the PKK. The European Diaspora was excluded from the decision-making mechanisms of the PKK until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The fall of the Soviet Bloc was perceived as an ideological and structural crisis in the organization and led the leaders of the PKK questioning their communist ideology and Marxist-Leninist principles. The Executive Committee became ineffective during the 1990s. The gap of a leading Executive Committee was fulfilled by the charismatic leadership of Abdullah Öcalan.

The fall of Soviet Union spearheaded also structural crisis. The PKK started searching another international actor, which would support its aims both financially and diplomatically. The European states and European Union was the only option available for the Kurdish movement.

The European Diaspora became an important agent by building diplomatic relations between the European actors and Kurdish leaders. Although the PKK is banned in Germany, the Kurdish associations, solidarity committees and information bureaus linked to the PKK have continued operating and have had low-level contacts with the German authorities (Bruinessen, 2000: 14). Since 1995, several high-level German representatives have met with Abdullah Öcalan (Bruinessen, 2000: 14) and then the Executive Committee after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan by the Turkish authorities. The London-based Kurdistan Human Rights Project has been influential at EU institutions. (Bruinessen, 2000: 19) Since 90s, there have been Kurdish parliamentarians supporting the Kurdish movement in the European Union Parliament. The Kurdish Parliament in Exile, which is established in 1995, and then the Kurdish National Congress established in 1999 has been effective lobbyists in Europe. In this period, the European Diaspora established a satellite TV-Channel (the MED-TV and its successors) with the contributions of the Kurdish workers and businessmen working in Europe.
Third Period (1999-..)

The capture of Abdullah Öcalan marked a significant U-turn in the discourse and structure of PKK. It reoriented itself politically and ideologically. It was called by Abdullah Öcalan as an ideological and political cut (2008). The PKK changed its approaches related to its ideological structure, the nation-state and the armed struggle. In his book, ‘War and Peace in Kurdistan’, Öcalan criticizes the old approaches of the PKK movement according to the armed struggle.

The PKK believed that the armed struggle would be sufficient for winning the rights that the Kurds had been denied. Such a deterministic idea of war is neither socialist nor democratic, although the PKK saw itself as a democratic party. (Öcalan, 2008: 29)

Not only the necessity of the armed struggle and violence, but also the necessity of an independent Kurdish nation-state was rejected by him:

The call for a separate nation-state results from the interests of the ruling class or the interests of the bourgeoisie but does not reflect the interests of the people since another state would only be the creation of additional injustice and would curtail the right to freedom even more. (Öcalan, 2011: 19)

It also changed its ideological and political direction. It renounced the Marxist-Leninist perspective and started to claim social, human and cultural rights for the Kurds. The centralized Soviet system was criticized and the decentralized system of the European Union started to be debated as a model for the solution of the Kurdish question (Öcalan, 2008).

After 1999, we see also a significant change in the organizational structure of the PKK. The hierarchical system of the PKK was criticized by Öcalan during this period:

The PKK had been conceived as a party with a state-like hierarchical structure similar to other parties. Such a structure, however, causes a dialectic contradiction to the principles of democracy, freedom and equality, a contradiction in principle concerning all parties whatsoever their philosophy. (Öcalan, 2008: 28)

In 2002, a new organization named Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) was founded and replaced the political role of the PKK. It rejected the usage of violent activities and a hierarchical system inside the organization. In 2003, it changed its name to Kongra-Gel. However, after the announcement of the US Government that they marked KADEK and Kongra-Gel as terrorist organizations, the Kurdish movement started to prefer PKK in its diplomatic relations with various governments. In 2007, PKK established KCK, which Turkey
has accused of being a terrorist organization, according to a model of a confederate state on the territories of Turkey-Syria-Iraq-Iran. KCK has relations with non-governmental organizations, political parties, local administrators and religious leaders and aims to put pressure on Turkey to recognize the Kurdish identity in its borders.

These new organizational bodies led the involvement of the European Diaspora into the decision-making mechanisms of the Kurdish movement. Furthermore, these institutional changes have spearheaded a more balanced leadership in the Kurdish movement. Abdullah Öcalan seems to have still a great authority in the organization, but due to being in prison, he does not have the ability to lead the organization in practice. The Executive Committee became more influential after 1999. The European Diaspora enhanced its influence significantly. The collectivism between the different institutional bodies of the organization enhanced after 1999 due to the Free Öcalan campaigns, which mobilized millions of Kurds all over Turkey and also in several European countries.

After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, PKK enhanced its activities in Europe. It became also a fervent defender of the entering of Turkey to the European Union. Abdullah Öcalan described its new policy regarding EU and European states in Serxwebun:

> Turkey is suspicious of its relations with the European states ... we should support the EU-line and the actors we have relations should be convinced to provide help to this line and the transformation we attempt to realize... (Öcalan, November 1999: 5)

Not only the European Diaspora enhanced its activities in Europe and in Turkey for the acceptance of Turkey as a member state of EU, but also the Party members in Kurdistan involved in the pro-EU campaigns. In Diyarbakır, they organized a mass demonstration aiming to show the pro-EU stand of the Kurdish movement (Haber 3, Diyarbakır’da AB mitingi).

In this framework, Turkey's approval as a candidate state for the EU membership has created a new political opportunity structure for the Kurdish movement for the recognition of the Kurdish identity in Turkey and an end to the state violence targeting the Kurdish nationalists. Through mass protests, the Kurdish Diaspora has forced the European Union institutions to take a political stand on the Kurdish issue and human right violations in Turkey.
Indeed, the Regular Reports on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession pointed out repeatedly the human right violations and the oppression of the Kurdish identity:

The basic features of a democratic system exist but Turkey is slow in implementing the institutional reforms needed to guarantee democracy and the rule of law. Changes in the executive have taken place with respect to EU-Turkey relations but a number of basic issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be addressed…. The death penalty is not being carried out, including the case of Abdullah Ocalan, but many aspects of the overall human rights situation remain worrying. Torture and ill treatment are far from being eradicated, even though the matter is taken seriously by the authorities and the Parliament and training programmes on human rights are being implemented. Freedom of expression as well as freedom of association and assembly are still regularly restricted…. Compared to last year, the economic, social and cultural rights situation has not improved, particularly when it comes to the enjoyment of cultural rights for all Turks irrespective of ethnic origin. The situation in the southeast, where the population is predominantly Kurdish, has not substantially changed. (European Commission, 2003)

D. MECHANISMS OF THE EUROPEANIZATION

In order to provide a more comprehensive explanatory framework for Europeanization process, several scholars have attempted to define systematic and consistent concepts to achieve a general understanding of the impact of the European transformative force. Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) outline three mechanisms of 'Europeanization:

The first one is the 'positive' integration', which indicates that European Union prescribes a concrete institutional model to which actors should adjust their arrangements (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). The second one is the negative integration. It occurs where EU changes the 'domestic opportunity structures' based on the distribution of power and resources between actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). The last one is the 'framing integration', which alters the beliefs and expectations of the actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). However, Börzel believes that mechanisms, which EU produces by its legislatice force and which are necessary to understand the Europeanization process, are not sufficient to trigger the change (2003). She defines the mechanisms, Knill and Lehmkuhl have indicated, as the adaptational pressures, which are produced by the misfit between the discursive or institutional model of the actor and the EU.

Marc and Olsen indicate the importance of the institutions' role on the identity and behaviour transformation of the actors, which they called as the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (2006). According to them, institutions lead the change of the actors, which internalize the norms of the institution and develop identities complying with the institution identity. Börzel and Risse have
placed the 'logic of appropriateness' within the sociological institutionalism and pointed out that the mediating factors including activities of norm entrepreneurs (change agents) and the nature of the political culture should also be considered regarding the Europeanization process in addition to misfit or adaptational pressures (2000). They argue that 'misfit' could only trigger the change of an actor, if only in the conditions of sufficient mediating factors.

Börzel and Risse argue that the direction and degree of change is able to be predicted by looking at these variables. If there is a low misfit between the institution and actor, it produces a small adaptation pressure and thus a low degree of change. In the conditions of high misfit, it could provide different outcomes in the context of the sociological institutionalism (Börzel and Risse, 2000). They define four types of outcome. The 'inertia' emerges when the Europeanization is ineffective on the actor. The change is defined as 'Absorption' when the actors incorporate the European norms, ideas and policies into their structures, but not modify the existing processes, policies and institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Accommodation refers to the changes when the existing processes, policies and institutions are adapted without altering their essential features or underlying understandings attached to them (Börzel and Risse, 2000). In the processes of transformation, the existing processes, policies and institutions are replaced by new substantially new ones (Börzel and Risse, 2000).

Figure 1: Taken from Börzel (2003)
Börzel systematizes which conditions produce which outcomes of change in a chart (2003). I summarized them in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptational Pressures: New norms, rules, procedures, meaning structures</th>
<th>Mediating factors</th>
<th>Outcome of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Change agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) A cooperative political culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia-Retrenchment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence + under conditions of crisis</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Adapted from the chart used in Börzel (2003)

Regarding the Kurdish movement, there is one condition we have to add to this table. In a framework, when we try to conceptualize how extent a member state, candidate state or a non-governmental organization is Europeanized, it is not an option that they could not have an interaction with the EU. However, the PKK, which is accepted as a terrorist organization by EU and several European states, it is vital to show through which channels and actors the Europeanization emanates to the organization. It should be questioned whether there is interaction between the EU and the actor. In the absence of interaction, the aforementioned discourse transformation should be emerged through other variables. In such cases, the globalization or the domestic reasons as well as another actor could trigger the change of the organization. Until the end of 1980s, the interaction between the EU(EC) and the PKK was quite limited. The European Diaspora had only limited connections with the European institutions and other European bodies as well as European states. It fits well that we do not see a rapprochement with the EU during this period. However, during the 1990s, the relations between the European
actors and the Kurdish movement enhanced dramatically and it exceeded the diasporic relations. European states and other actors preferred to build direct relations with the Executive Committee of the organization. These relations have continued also after 1999.

In accordance to the Kurdish cause, the table is modified as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interactions between the actors</th>
<th>Misfit-Adaptational Pressures: New norms, rules, procedures, meaning structures</th>
<th>Mediating factors</th>
<th>Outcome of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia - Retrenchment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence + under conditions of crisis</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence + under conditions of crisis</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Modified version of Table 1 - The Europeanization Variables and Outcome of Change for the Kurdish movement

Another important variable, the adaptational pressures should also be specialized regarding to the Kurdish question. The positive integration pressures emanated from EU, which the Kurdish movement exposed, arise from the differences of the definition of the Kurdish question. While EU defines the Kurdish problem as a minority problem and provides a highly comprehensive model for the solution involving the individual and cultural rights, The PKK, despite changes in
time, perceives the problem in the framework of collective rights of the Kurdish people. Whether
they compromise on the human and cultural rights dimension of the problem, they differ on the
definition whether Kurdish question should be debated in the framework of minority rights or of
national problem. The EU prescribes a detailed model and a struggle line in accordance with the
minority rights perspective. However, the PKK is still not fit to induce the Kurdish nationalist
approach to Kurdish minority perspective.

The negative integration pressures, which the PKK exposed, are related to the structural change
of the organization. The EU has defined legitimate political actors, who are able to influence the
member state politics and the way, how they are able to do that. The legal political parties or
NGOs including cultural and human rights associations are accepted as legitimate political actors.
In the case of the Kurdish movement, the PKK has born as an armed organization, which has
used terror as a propaganda tool against the assimilation practices of the Turkish state. In years,
the PKK organized legal political parties and a significant network of human and cultural rights’
associations; however, it does not dissolve its military wing. The pressure for the liquidation of
the military wing led also changes in the power balances of the organization. While the
representatives of the legal parties and associations became much more influential in the
organization, the existence of the armed wing became a subject of the negotiations between the
Turkish state and the PKK. The misfit regarding the methodology of the solution of the Kurdish
problem has declined in years. After 1999, the armed measures were criticized by the
organization and the peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem has been accepted. However, the
armed wing was preserved for the reasons of self-protection. It is still not certain how the
members of the armed wing will be integrated in the society, if the Turkish state and the PKK
agree on a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question. It will definitely enhance the influence of
the members of the legal Kurdish parties and of the legal associations; especially the associations
in Europe would increase their influence in the organization.

The last adaptational pressure, framing integration is defined as the weakest mechanism by Knill
and Lehmkuhl (1999). The PKK is founded as a Marxist-Leninist organization, but it changed its
ideological direction after 1999, which is able to be called as ‘Democratic socialism’. Although it
does not completely fit to the framework of ‘European free market’ applications, its approach
toward the democratic principles complies with the EU’s.
As a mediating factor, the European Diaspora has always been in the periphery of the organization, where the party line could not be implemented and the influence of the European actors has been high. Thus, it has become an important transmitter of the European norms and values inside the organization. With its increasing political and economic power as well as the decline of influence of other actors inside the organization, the European Diaspora as a change agent has been influential in the organization after 1999. To understand the political culture of the organization, whether it is cooperative or not, the power relations inside to organization should be investigated.

When we group this approach in three periods, we see the Europeanization pattern of the Kurdish movement:

During the 1980s (1978-1990), the interaction between the EU(EC) and Kurdish movement was absent due to limited relations between the European Diaspora and low-level European politicians. The European Diaspora was not powerful economically and diplomatically and excluded from the decision-making mechanisms of the organization. Moreover, there was a strong discourse against the political interventions of the Diaspora members to the PKK politics. There was also no cooperative political culture during this period due to the monopoly of the founding leaders including Abdullah Öcalan on all decision-making mechanisms of the organization. During this period, there were thousands of executions of Party members, who advocate a transformation for the discourse of the PKK. There was also a high misfit between the European Union and the PKK summarized in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During 1980s</th>
<th>EU’s position</th>
<th>PKK’s position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the Problem</td>
<td>Minority problem</td>
<td>National rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>peaceful solution</td>
<td>guerrilla war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: The misfit during the 1980s

During the 1990s, the interaction between the EU and the Kurdish movement was present. During this time, the European Diaspora became powerful economically and diplomatically. It became an important actor in the diplomatic relations of the PKK. However, we see a more
polarized leadership in this period. The Executive Committee became ineffective, while the gap of a leading Executive Committee was fulfilled by the charismatic leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. We see that the mediating factors were present during this period, but they were not powerful enough to push a transformation in the organization. During this period, we also see a high misfit between EU and the PKK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU's position</th>
<th>PKK's position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>During 1990s</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the Problem</td>
<td>Minority problem</td>
<td>National rights + Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>peaceful solution</td>
<td>guerrilla war + peace attempts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The misfit during the 1990s

After 1999, the interaction between EU and Kurdish movement has continued to exist. European Diaspora has become more powerful economically, diplomatically and in the hierarchical order of PKK. It has become an important actor in the decision-making mechanisms of the PKK. Moreover, we see a more balanced leadership during this period, which enhanced the cooperative political culture in the organization. Abdullah Öcalan has had still a great authority, but become a symbolic leader due to being in prison. European Diaspora has enhanced its influence significantly. Furthermore, the Free Öcalan campaigns have enhanced the collectivism between the actors inside the organization. In addition to the presence of the mediating factors, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan was perceived as a crisis by the members of the PKK. During this period, the high misfit between Europe and the Kurdish organization has continued despite the radical discourse changes of the organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU's position</th>
<th>PKK's position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>After 1999</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the Problem</td>
<td>Minority problem</td>
<td>Autonomy + Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>peaceful solution</td>
<td>peaceful solution + self defence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: The misfit after 1999
When we summarize all these variables in table 2, we see inertia during the 1980s, accommodation during the 1990s and transformation after 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Interactions between the actors</th>
<th>Misfit-Adaptational Pressures: New norms, rules, procedures, meaning structures</th>
<th>Mediating factors</th>
<th>Outcome of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia - Retrenchment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During 1990s</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1999</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence + under conditions of crisis</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During 1980s</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Presence + under conditions of crisis</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 - The Europeanization Variables and Outcome of Change for the Kurdish movement during 1980s, 1990s and after 1999
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