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Title: A Transnational Proposition: Understanding the added-value of the transnational sphere in security-political cooperation between the EU and Russia

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Introduction

The socio-political environment has long been marked by an increased understanding of a transnational, transregional and global reach of threats. A broad body of literature has been produced to understand the nature and dynamics of these various threats, which are no longer bound by territory. Therein it has been acknowledged that they thrive in the current international environment, as the coordination of counter-measures is deficient.[1] The reasons given for this deficiency vary widely across disciplines, however no one reason can be determined to be most important. They encompass i.e. the sovereignty of nation states in security matters (even in more integrated regions like the EU), the underdevelopment international law (and slow attempts to develop it through codes of conduct or the development of common values), some form of security political integration is promoted through critical junctures (but that also raises numerous concerns about its legitimacy and feasibility), differences among political systems hampering cooperation, and many more. Moving away from the expansive extant literature on the adaptability of states to avert transnational security threats, this paper provides its contribution through examining the potential of actors emerging beyond the state level and analysing their capacity to facilitate and strengthen a transnational response to transnational security threats. More precisely, it evaluates the potential contribution of Think Tanks to identify, contain and roll back the current transnational political-security threats to Europe and beyond, by promoting informed dialogue to enhance cooperation. Using the example of counterterrorism as a de-territorialised threat, the geographical focus of the paper encompasses the wider European region, with an emphasis on the interaction between the EU and Russia.

In addressing security politics through a transnationalist framework, this paper impugns a practice which has formostly been reserved for debates regarding economic governance. In this regard it contributes to the broader debate of security governance. It reviews in how far the progression of sub-state actors has lead to a change in security-political cooperation that enhances possibilities to meet current transnational security challenges at eye height. Beyond that, it also enables to clarify differences in performance among security-political actors in the transnational sphere. While they share the same sphere they rely only partly on similar channels and tools. Therein the paper emphasises the need to differentiate between the actors and recognise their area of impact, when reconsidering the changes in security governance. Moreover, through the geographical choice the paper at hand is specifically conducive to the discourse of EU-Russian security relations. The paper contributes to this body of literature, by analysing whether, next to the continuously alternating relationship between the EU and Russia based on convergence and reluctance and their differing security-political approaches, levels exist at which cooperation is common and necessary. This may include more practical levels, for example boarder-control, but it may also encompass the transnational interaction of experts or academics.

Following this short introduction a succinct overview of the paper's research framework is provided, highlighting underlying theoretical approaches and methodological choices. Therein the significance of the transnationalist angle in security political research is discussed. Afterwards, the EU's as well as Russia's approach to counter-terrorism are outlined, developments are presented and criticism is voice. Subsequently, the current transnational interaction of the EU and Russia on counter-terrorism is presented. This is complemented by a section in which the contribution by Think Tanks towards enhanced transnational cooperation is considered. Finally the main outcomes are summarised and complementary additions to the research are proposed.

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[1] At this point it is important to say that it all has to be viewed critical too. Where does this increased call for transnational threats come from? Could it be securitisation in some sense?

Research Framework

The paper is based on a **transnational approach** which describes a type of structural set-up of regional and global cooperation. Drawing on definitions as early as Keohane and Nye, it acknowledges the importance of non-governmental actors in policy processes, and thereby emphasises that interaction does not only take place between states but also at sub-state level among states. Keohane and Nye defined transnational cooperation as cross-border interaction which may include governmental actors but definitely includes at least one non-governmental actor (Keohane & Nye, 1971, p.332). According to them nation-states are still the main entities in policy making and global interaction, but sub-state actors have increased their potential to take influence to such a degree that they cannot be counted as impartial part of the socio-political setting (Keohane & Nye, 1971, p.329).

The primary discussion regarding transnational cooperation concerns the applicability of the realist – state centred- paradigm. Scholars see the need of a paradigm change, as realism is not sufficient to capture a solid picture of politics, in contrast to transnationalism which acknowledges the importance of non-governmental actors (Keohane & Nye, 1971, p.334). The World Politics Paradigm they developed emphasises a broader range of interaction by adding transnationalism. However, they do not take account of the various forms of interaction and their differing degrees of impact. In a sense they managed to construct a broader paradigm, but they did not deepen it equivalently. More recent contributions emphasise that nation states are not equipped to cope with the emerging transnational security threats. Although at the same time it is usually admitted that transnational processes are not yet developed enough to act independently (Aydinli, 2010, p.18). Importantly, however, it is acknowledged that a re-organisation of the security political arena takes place which triggers the need to reassess the participants and the constellation of the socio-political setting in the respective case. Traditional state-centred approaches are no longer solitary in the political arena, due to challenges towards the traditional political hierarchy, and the progression of multilevel governance which promotes the participation of non-state and state-related actors.

This in turn draws attention to a very closely related debate which concerns the role of governmental actors. It is questionable in how far governmental actors could be seen as non-governmental actors in case that they do not follow their governmental line, but try to accomplish their own goals. Thus, it is discussed whether transnational cooperation could take place solely among governmental actors, in case one of them does not try to accomplish goals in line with his/her government (Keohane & Nye, 1972, p.334f). Beyond that it has to be considered that the lines between governmental actors and non-governmental actors (politicians and scientists) are blurred. Some scientists for example become politicians, and the other way around. In this way it is even more difficult to determine a clear case of transnational cooperation.

Generally the concept is based on the acknowledgement that cooperation is a positive aspect that helps to counter the heavily increasing transnational issues. Moreover, it promotes an inclusive approach which also acknowledges non-governmental actors and the contribution of informal approaches towards governance. In this sense it is more comprehensive than traditional approaches and drives cooperation further on a broader scale involving bottom-up as well as top-down measures. As the paper at hand acknowledges the role of the state, but examines specifically sub-state actors, the transnationalist approach provides a fitting background. Moreover, the literature on transnationalism shows that the approach acknowledges the importance to discriminate the participants and clarify their means and manners of interaction. This is of importance for this paper as the case-study concerns a transnational security threat regarding which the lines between governmental actors and non-governmental actors are blurred. In addition, tension is also added by relating 'security' and 'transnationalism', as security has been one of the major aspects constantly inherent to state sovereignty and this has only been challenged at small scale since two decades.

It is the aim of the paper at hand to speculate on the role of **Think Tanks** in transnational cooperation on counterterrorism in the wider European region, and identify their different channels and tools. The paper is based on the belief that sub-state actors have an important contribution to make in promoting cooperation and propagating the recognition of similar policy goals based on expert advice. While cooperation and integration are ongoing processes of our current socio-political environment concomitant with the progressive division of labour, it becomes more difficult for actors to gain structured information and knowledge about the context of policy issues (McGann, 2011, p.4). Sub-state actors may provide advice, translate research into policy options, or raise attention to aspects which are overlooked in the socio-political dialogue. In this paper Think Tanks are defined as organisations that perform policy relevant research and thereby contribute with analysis and advice to the ongoing socio-political dialogue, by providing policy-makers and the public with the possibility to take factually informed choices. They are organised as continuous structures and might be affiliated to the government, political parties, universities, interest groups, the private sector, or be fully independent NGOs.

When analysing the Think Tank's potential impact, a detailed actor analysis has to be conducted in the first place, which provides in depth information on intention and goals of the actor and by what these are steered, the available tools and how the actor received these tools, and much more. One of the underlying questions is the positioning of the actor towards the policy issue at hand. It has to be clarified whether the organisation is a participant, a distant or close observer, an educator, a lobbyist, or else. Moreover, it has to be differentiated between the role that the actor chose and the role he was put into by the policy environment. Which in turn is influenced by the actors' capacities and intentions. On the one hand, sub-state actors have the possibility and the role to promote social justice based on expert knowledge and an understanding of the issue at hand that is not informed by political affiliation. On the other hand, every Think Tank has its intentions and preferences, and the need to ensure funding (often project based) challenges their independence. Moreover, while some think tanks want to gain policy influence, university based think-tanks often consist of academics that want to gain knowledge above all. Beyond that, in order to be heard it is necessary to be able to communicate the information to the respective public, and to use communication media in the appropriate manner. The sub-state actor researched in this paper may have several tasks that they conduct depending on their will and capacity to be involved and the environments will and capacity to involve them. They help agenda setting, provide analysis and expertise, support negotiating outcomes, bestow legitimacy, and help to monitor and implement policy solutions. This is increasingly done across local, national, regional and global level (McGann, 2011, p.14f). Thus, policy issues are identified and pursued through different measures at different levels, recognising the importance and usefulness to employ resources in order to act comprehensively.

Essentially, a growing number of Think Tanks thrive to establish transnational, regional or global cooperation with other actors of their kind to enrich communication, information and policy analysis. However, a major criticism lies directly in this aspect, namely Think Tanks may fail to coordinate transnational or global interaction sufficiently. Many of them have been set up with regard to the environment of a certain state, and they need time and will to adjust their structures in order to work at a broader level. Finally the development of faster and easier accessible methods of communication has to be considered when determining the impact of sub-state actors. These offer a continuously new options to actors to spread information. However, their respective use of these possibilities has to be evaluated, not only regarding quantity of information and updates, but also regarding the breadth of the public that is addressed, and if possible with regard to the perception of the public (McGann, 2011, p.14f).

Counterterrorism: Developments in the EU and Russia

EU counterterrorism policy

The EU Member States (MSs) have started counterterrorism cooperation in a very broad sense in the frame of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the 1970s. This was, however, at informal basis and not part of the Community framework. It has only been formalised through the Treaty of Amsterdam and been entering into force in the late 1990s (Bures, 2011, p.60f). While debates regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (importantly including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) module) among some of the big MSs constituted the framework to engage with increased security political integration at the EU level in the late 1990s, the 9/11 attacks have been the crucial event to progress integration faster than thought of possible at first. This was reinforced through the two attacks directly targeting Europe, 3/11 (Madrid) and 7/7 (London). Throughout the literature the three points of attack have generally been picked as the critical junctures that drove the development of counterterrorism measures in the EU.

After the 9/11 attacks the Council of Ministers has been fast to agree on sanctions regarding terrorists and terrorist organisations. Moreover, they developed an action plan on counterterrorism encompassing all components of the Union's scope. The most important progress have been the set up of EUROJUST and the Police Chief's task force, but also the legal strand has contributed heavily by establishing the European Arrest Warrant and legislation on combating terrorist financing and freezing assets (Messervy-Whiting, 2010, p.108). After the attacks in Madrid, applying the framework vision of a European area of freedom, security and justice, the Council of Ministers revised the former action plan and strengthened it with guidance on the implementation of the measures. This plan emphasised the importance of enhanced intelligence cooperation, increased cooperation with the UN, and further measures to combat terrorist financing. In addition, it comprised the political commitment of the MSs to the solidarity clause. Importantly, the EU stressed the importance of enhanced relations with 3rd countries and the value of global partnerships, not solely with the US, but also with neighbours like Russia (Messervy-Whiting, 2010, p.108). To provide the area with a high degree of importance, the aftermath of the 3/11 attacks saw the creation of the post of the European Counterterrorism Coordinator. However, his powers have been relatively restricted and it is questionable due to changes brought about by the Lisbon treaty, how long this position gains support from the MSs (Bures, 2011, p.144). Following the attacks in London, the Council of Ministers set up the European Counterterrorism strategy. The strategy is constituted by for modules: preventing, protecting, pursuing, responding. The European Counterterrorism Strategy is additionally supported by a strategy on combating radicalism and recruitment to terrorism. Moreover a formal review process for implementation of counterterrorism measures in MSs has been established (Messervy-Whiting, 2010, p.109). Beyond that, the EU again emphasises the importance of the external scope of its measures, and thus the interaction with 3rd countries and international organisations. Therein, the EU pushes for stronger global cooperation on the basis of the UN and its conventions. It also continues its annual high-level political dialogues with the US, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia and Japan. Furthermore it integrates counterterrorism in its international agreements, and in this regard also enables capacity-building programs for 3rd countries that are in part partly referring to the counterterrorist argument (Messervy-Whiting, 2010, p.110).

However, EU policymakers still see room for improvement, especially regarding the combat of terrorist financing, the reluctance of information sharing, and the importance of inter-cultural dialogue with reference to counter-radicalisation and recruitment (European Commission, 2010, p.9). The main difficulty though concerns the factual capacity of the EU, being based on sovereign MSs. In this regard it is of importance to be continuously cautious with rising expectations, as the EU cannot perform to the standard of expectations that its structure doesn't allow. This is a factor that increases in complexity even more so if we move beyond the scope of the EU, considering its cooperation with 3rd countries like Russia. Closely connected with this first point is the claim that EU

action has solely gained momentum due to the devastating attacks on the US, Spain and the UK. Critics argue that the EU has in so far used the attacks and the related fear to push through policies that have been in the 'waiting line', and that they have used it to promote their aim of stronger integration and more EU influence (Bures, 2011, p.65).

Russian Federation counterterrorism policy

Russia has continuously suffered bomb attacks by insurgents for almost two decades. In the literature the development of Russian counterterrorism is generally described by outlining the history of insurgency and the Kremlin's adopted counterinsurgency measures. The integration of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism shows an important specificity of Russian political philosophy. The year 1999, the when Putin became prime minister and was on his way to become president, saw the military barrack bombing in Buinaksk (Dagestan, 4 September), and a series of apartment block bombings in Moscow (9. And 13. September) and Volgodonsk (16.September). Moreover the second Chechen war started in the same year. The bombings have often been described as the 9/11 of Russia, and the war constantly provided reasons for increased counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures (Moore & Banard-Wills, 2010, p.149f). Critics argue that the Putin administration instrumentalised the counterterrorism politics in order to assert control in Moscow and push forward the policy of re-centralisation of power. They see the narrative of the threat of insecurity, Islamism and terrorism at the southern flanks of Russia as a part of the overriding policy (Baev, 2006, p.2).

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 Putin started a strong diplomatic strategy aimed at enhancing cooperation with the US and the EU (Baev, 2006, p.10f) Establishing these ties has not only helped to set up an international frame for countering terrorism commonly. Beyond that it helped to raise Russia's status in the world at that point of time, and it opened up dialogue with NATO. In opening dialogue with the West, Russia has taken over the language of the war of terror. This has been rather easy, as Russia has been fighting insurgency and terrorism with heavy use of military force already before (Moore & Banard-Wills, 2010, p.162). In this regard the 2nd war in Chechnya has usually been referred to as war against terror in Russia, relating to the international environment in this way. However, at the same time Russia always claimed Chechnya to be an internal affair, aiming to isolate the conflict (Buckley, 2003, p.234). Beyond that, by portraying Chechnya as a front of international terrorism the Russian government strengthened its information warfare, claiming the connection of Chechnya to al-Qaeda (Moore & Barnard-Wills, 2010, p.157). With the use of propaganda and modern technology the Russian government aimed to enhance control and at the same time undermine terrorists' and insurgencies' propaganda. As side-effect of this information warfare, reports of foreign organisations have often picked up on law enforcement based on stereotyping and racial profiling, particularly with regard to Muslims and their civil society organisations.(UN, 2011, p.60). This touches upon often reported human rights infringements that represent a major criticism towards Russian counterinsurgency- and counterterrorism activities. They became visible in the war with Chechnya, but is also integrated into the federal law which enables increased control measures of civil society without the need of judicial permission.

The second war between Russia and Chechnya has shaped the structure of Russian counterterrorism. An increased use of terrorist components by the Chechens in the early 2000s, was difficult to handle for Russia due to their complex counterterrorism structures, with a high number of state agencies being involved. The Russian government saw the need to 'create operational command and control groups (GOU) to coordinate counterterrorism operations' and promote an allocation of responsibilities (Moore & Banard-Wills, 2010, p.155). Beyond that ongoing enhancements all across Russian legislation contribute to the structure of Russian counterterrorism. While it has first been part of the Criminal Code, President Yeltsin established Law No. 130-FZ On the Fight Against Terrorism in 1998, encompassing definitions of terms, principles and competences.

Over the years bits of counterterrorism legislation have slowly been spread throughout the federal law, e.g. in the law On the Police, On the Combat of Terrorist Financing, On State Protection, On the Federal Security Service, and On the Countering of Extremist Activities. New momentum has then been provided through the 2006 Federal Law On Counter-Action of Terrorism has provided some more clarity regarding the structure of counterterrorist activities and has provided the FSB with key positions in this. Next to this President Putin established the National Antiterrorism Committee, an advisory body consisting of high ranking officials. Based on the high FSB involvement in key positions of Russian counterterrorism politics critics warn of a too centralised and vertical approach that disables accountability (Baev, 2006, p.6).

Transnational cooperation: a role for think tanks?

Russia - EU cooperation on CT

Counter-terrorism has become a specific aspect of Russia-EU cooperation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In joint statements they announced: 'W*e declare that we stand united in the fight against terrorism with due regard for the rule of law, for democratic principles and for the territorial integrity of states. Together we are part of the nucleus of the global coalition against terrorism'* (EU-Russia summit, 2002, p.6). The need for cooperation has been continuously reinforced at subsequent critical junctures of terrorist incidents, formostly the hostage taking in the Moscow theatre, the Massacre on Beslan, the attacks on Madrid and the attacks on London.

Most important for transnational interaction between Russia and the EU are the innumerable **Summits & Meetings** taking place in a relatively structured manner. As Rettman notes the EU has its busiest calendar with Russia among all other third countries, averaging, including summit meetings, meetings between Baroness Ashton and Russian foreign minister Lavrov, foreign and security policy meetings, and numerous meetings of specific experts (Rettman, 2010). While the Permanent Partnership Council represents the main body of interaction encompassing all policy areas, monthly ambassadorial meetings between the European Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the permanent representative of Russia to the EU gave specific significance to security political cooperation.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the summits in Brussels (2001), Moscow (2002) and again Brussels (2002) paved the way for increased security political cooperation. The first measures where to declare counter-action and cooperation, as well as to promote Council of Europe and UN conventions and resolutions for a strong international framework on counterterrorism. Beyond that, ideas for interaction have been mainly circling around information exchange regarding individuals and groups belonging to terrorist networks, terrorist financing, arms supply, and new forms of terrorist threats (mainly weapons of mass destruction weapons) (EU-Russia summit, 2002, p.7f).

At the St. Petersburg summit in 2003 Russia and the EU agreed on the 4 common spaces in to conduct enhanced cooperation. These include the 'common space on freedom, security and justice' and the 'common space on external security' (EU-Russia Summit, 2003, p1). Both of them encompass security political cooperation and comprise aspects the coordination of counterterrorism activities. Beyond that the joint statement emphasises the importance to fight the cultivation and trade of drugs in Central Asia, which find their way into Russia and possibly beyond. Also, practical aspects of cooperation have been pushed forward, the focal point being crisis management. All this has been reinforced in 2005 by a roadmap to pursue clear objectives and foster implementation, being annually reviewed twice. The reviews in have listed ongoing progression in the field of counterterrorism, most importantly in information exchange and promotion of international norms through dominant discourse. A milestone on this account is that negotiations on a cooperation agreement between Europol and Russian law enforcement agencies have started (March 2010

review report, p.47). Throughout the continuous statements and reviews it becomes clear that Russia and the EU have established a strong structure that enables ongoing dialogue in a vast amount of policy areas. However, so far they fail to establish practically applicable measures and tools (Russia-EU Permanent Partnership Council, 2010, p.2). This depends on various known reasons: firstly the limited sovereignty of the EU in security-political matters, and the related reluctance of Russia to recognise the EU as a suitable security-political partner. Secondly the EU and Russia have partly different norms and approaches towards security political issues as the example of counterterrorism shows above. Thirdly, there exist a vast amount of practical issues concerning each part of counterterrorism activity that the EU cannot yet deal with among its own MSs.[2] However, this paper is not written to highlight the impossibility of cooperation, in contrast it recognises present structures in order to propose in the next step the potential for sub-state actors to contribute to enhanced cooperation and dialogue.

While the high number of meetings and summits ensure an ongoing dialogue and output of joint statements, the amount of **factual agreements** established specifically between Russia and the EU remains very limited. An early example of an agreement that pursues increased cooperation on counterterrorism is 'the agreement on co-operation between the European Police Office and the Russian Federation', established in 2003. This agreement has called for the exchange of strategic and technical information, common threat assessments, interaction on law enforcement, cooperation regarding training methods; but it has been based purely on requests for cooperation. A rather new agreement that influences the aforementioned one 'on the protection of classified information' has been signed in 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2010). This agreement is construed to reflect trust and promote increased cooperation between Russia and the EU. It has to be noted, that both of the aforementioned agreements are not explicitly related to counterterrorism. Instead they refer to the common combat of transnational crime more in general. This is related to the fact that both the Russia and the EU agreed early on in joint statements that terrorism has to be countered within the broader field of transnational crimes that are often interrelated.

In a more general sense, counterterrorism cooperation is currently based on the structure of the four common spaces, and herein particularly on the 'common space of freedom security and justice' and the 'common space of external security'. The road map on the common space of freedom, security and justice refers specifically to the objective 'to improve cooperation to tackle terrorism and all forms of organized crime, as well as other illegal activities in order to increase security' (EU-Russia Summit , 2003a, p.3). To reach the objective cooperation is to be intensified, the agreement on increased interaction between Europol and the Russian Federation is to be implemented, cooperation and legislation in regional and global fora (especially in the UN and the Council of Europe) is to be promoted. In this regard, the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that is still in discussion may provide further steps and indications for factual agreements on cooperation.

Another level that has to be taken into account when evaluating transnational cooperation between Russia and the EU is the **international realm**. In all their joint-statements Russia and the EU emphasise the importance to expand their cooperation in the wider scope of regional and global fora. Both saw the need to counter terrorism on a broad and comprehensive front. From the beginning, they have promoted particularly a leading role of the UN. Therein they have highlighted the significance of the work of the UN Counterterrorism Committee, and have emphasised the high importance to pursue the major Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1624 as well as and Global Counterterrorism Strategy agreed on in 2006 (EU-Russia summit, 2002, p.7f). While the argument for a broad and comprehensive approach that involves as many states and regions as possible is respectable and clearly accurate, critics often draw attention to the fact that Russia may support the UN as primary global actor on counter-terrorism cooperation due to its position in the security

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[2] See Section on EU counterterrorism (p.6f) for critical issues.

council. However, when offering this criticism, Russia's efforts and contributions have to be appreciated as well. Working as a driving force of the 'Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies, and Law-Enforcement Organizations' that takes place annually, proposes a strong will to be involved in transnational, regional and global debates on the basis of equality and sovereignty (Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2011). But the need for caution to a broad approach that involves many actors has also been shown through action of the EU. The uninspected adoption of the UN's lists of terrorist and terrorists groups has lead to an awkward judicial position that required a revision of the established relation between the EU and the UN (Bures, 2011, p.211f).

Russia and the EU also started to interact in some ways through the scope of the NATO-Russia Council, as many member states of the EU are members of NATO. This interaction takes place under different circumstances, as the participants are all acting as sovereign nation states. Moreover it has to be noted that the US and Turkey are strong members of NATO. The cooperation with Russia started in 2002 when increased dialogue following the 9/11 attacks lead to the establishment of structures. Interaction on counterterrorism was however only formally started in 2004 (Kelin, 2005). On the one hand Russia perceives NATO as a threat to its sovereignty and it opposes a strong security-political position of the US in the wider European region. But on the other hand NATO has a rather military approach to security which is in some ways more relatable for Russia. This has also lead to the cooperation that is not only organisational and paper based[3], but beyond that encompasses applied interaction (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2012).[4] Although progress has been made at organisational, strategic and applied level, both NATO and Russia appreciate the necessity to further increase genuine interaction.

The OSCE represents another organisation of which -amongst others- both the EU MSs (all of them) and Russia are part. Again, all participants are acting as sovereign nation states and the realm of members includes European, Central Asian and North American States. The OSCE initiated counterterrorism cooperation as a focal point of the organisation after the 9/11 attacks. The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, paved the way for increased cooperation in late 2001 and provided for establishing the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU). Initially the interaction has been started based on 12 conventions and instruments that the MSs commonly agreed to adopt (Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe, 2012, p.3). Over the years several instruments and conventions have been added and amended, and other instruments by the Council of Europe as well as the UN have been integrated into the scope of promotion(Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe, 2012, p.8f). Moreover, the OSCE reviews the implementation processes and supports MSs in drafting and implementing laws that contribute to counteract terrorism. The EU MSs and Russia being part of the OSCE share debates and coordinate with regard to broadly similar guidelines. However in security political terms the OSCE does not play as a major role compared to NATO or even the UN. Especially Russia sees a strong need to reform the OSCE before it can be utilised more purposively in the future.[5]

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[3] NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism has been renewed in 2011.

[4] Examples are the common Stand-off Detection of Explosives project (STANDEX), an operative information exchange system as part of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), and Russia's provision of ships to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. Moreover, taking a rather practical approach NATO and Russia also conducted several exercises together to fight terrorism with military means. These include for example an airspace initiative in June 2011 and a counter-terrorism tabletop on hostage taking in March 2012.

[5] In this regard Russia brought forward a proposal for a common European Security Treaty in 2009 to replace the old structures and overcome cold war stereotypes that are hanging on to the persistent organisations. The proposals also talks about an Agreement Governing Relations among NATO-Russia Council Member States in the Security Sphere.

Think Tanks

As the above overview of transnational cooperation shows, research so far has been very state-centred and apart from that only provides some insights on the role of international organisations. What it lacks, however, is a consideration of the contribution of sub-state actors as well as civil society actors towards security-political interaction. This article focuses particularly on the possible role of sub-state actors (like Think Tanks) which have been identified in the transnationalist literature as important actors to be considered in the policy environment. It believes that the sub-state level has an important contribution to make, thereby re-affirming some of the principles outlined at the beginning. In his report on the role of Think Tanks at global, regional and national level McGann highlights the increased establishment of partnerships and networks of Think Tanks across borders. He identifies transnational cooperation of think tanks to be *'in full bloom'*. These partnerships allow cooperation on research specifically with regard to transnational issues, commonly increasing knowledge and similarly reducing duplication (McGann, 2011, p.10). Still the literature lacks research on the role of Think Tanks in transnational cooperation on security matters. This can have various reasons. As nation states so far remain the major players in security politics it might be that the role of Think Tanks (and their networks) in this domain is factually still minor. Or it might be that habits of state focused research linger.

For the research at hand it is important to recognise some differences between Russia based think tanks and EU based think tanks which are caused by their political environment. Many established **Russian Think Tanks** date back to the direct aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, in a recent study on the worldwide ranking of Think Tanks the BRICS[6] have been defined as outstanding as they increased the number of think tanks across the countries by over 100 percent between 2008 and 2011. Therein Russia ranks two times among the top-thirty Think Tanks in the world and leads the table of top-thirty Central and Eastern European Think Tanks. (McGann, 2012, p.16). Despite these positive rankings, Think Tanks based in Russia are increasingly restricted through the centralisation policy followed by the government. Particularly the non-governmental institutions are limited in their freedoms by the governmental administration. Most Recently, re-elected president Putin pushed through a law that NGOs that receive foreign funding have to register themselves as 'foreign agents'. This legislation has been developed particularly with human rights and environmental organisations in mind, but the scope of the law encompasses all NGOs involved in political activity.

The main focus of the Think Tanks' work concerns economic reform, modernisation and Russia's position in the international environment. But, importantly, their international outreach is limited due to the abovementioned restrictions caused by centralisation and according legislation (McGann, 2011, p.11). Interestingly Deriglazova, Makarychev and Reut found in their topical research on Russian foreign policy that a new generation of students, educators, activists and professionals is emerging in Russia that does not agree with the current foreign politics. Instead they highlight the existence of a value gap between the current governmental administration and the new generation of IR specialists. Therein the new generation promotes their wish for Russia to progress in a cooperative world (Deriglazova, Makarychev & Reut, 2012, p.6).

European Think Tanks, though, are not immediately the shining counter-example, instead they have their own issues. First of all a division between the former communist countries of Central- and Eastern Europe and the slightly longer-term democracies of Western Europe becomes visible. Western European Think Tanks are strongly influenced by the dominant political dialogue. This is due to the fact that only few of them are truly independent and most of them operate on a project to project basis that heavily relies on donors. Generally a degree of government affiliation is pre-dominant, primarily because the governments are often the main investors in research. But this also

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[6] Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

increases the dialogue between researchers and politicians. However, at the same time it hinders diversity. As one of the interviewees mentioned, there are major trends in foreign policy research and that is where the money goes and that is what everyone turns to for the next period of time. Another issue that is yet to be overcome is the prevalence of a national approach that a lot of Think Tanks chose in order to tackle transnational or European issues. However, it has to be emphasised that their work has evolved a Trans-Atlantic and Pan-European focus, showing in their interest of European integration, U.S.-European relations and democratisation (McGann, 2011, p12).

The Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe are widely called upon for having contributed to the post-communist transition of. Usually they are found to be more varied regarding their interests and more focused towards policy-making than their Western partners. They obtain funding from the public and the private sector, including organisations like NATO and others, but problems with their capacities and sustainability remain. Moreover, in this manner they are similarly reliant on support like their western partners, which limits their independence to some degree. Central and Eastern European Thin Tanks focus in their work mainly on addressing political and economic challenges of the transition period, European integration and relations with Russia as well as the US. Beyond that, they emphasise the creation of partnerships and networks with Think Tanks across the wider European region (McGann, 2011, p11).

As the reviews on Think Tanks in the EU and Russia shows, both have an interest in the international environment. Currently this is more extensive across the EU, as it is a regional organisation itself in which MSs are constantly bound into transnational and supranational cooperation. But as the paper by Deriglazova et al. shows, younger generations of IR specialists in Russia seem argue for a need to take part in transnational cooperation (Deriglazova, Makarychev & Reut, 2012, p.6). Another aspect highlighted above is that the number of Think Tanks is rising among the BRICS, which shows that their expert community is increasingly organising itself to make enforced research contributions.

The foremost manner in that **Think Tanks can contribute to transnational cooperation** is by spreading their expert opinion regarding advantages and disadvantages of transnational cooperation with regard to the specific policy issues. This can be done in three ways. On the hand, by providing policy advice directly to the policy makers. On the other hand, by discussing and providing opinions in the expert community, at conferences and the like. And thirdly, shaping the dominant socio-political dialogue through sensibilizing the civil society. Therewith they may influence agenda setting, support negotiating outcomes, bestow legitimacy, and help to monitor and implement policy solutions (McGann, 2011, p.10). Their tool in any of the cases is that they are acknowledged as experts, thus having a knowledge based authority. This authority, however, is not to be seen as to provide them with the sovereignty to shape policy making to their liking. Ideally it is used to contribute to enabling and developing an informed dialogue among a plurality of actors. However, within the overview of the EU's and Russia's approaches to counterterrorism as well as in their approaches to cooperate the importance of the attacks as critical junctures becomes visible. Following the attacks, there has usually been a fastened progress in policy-debates and implementation. This makes it questionable in how far Think Tanks get the possibility to contribute to an informed dialogue with their expert knowledge. When policies are implemented that fast, Think Tanks may be left with the role of reviewing their implications. The good thing here is that policies often leave room for interpretation and thus a dominant dialogue that criticises components of a policy, or criticises the options this policy gives, may lead politicians to use policy in a certain way.

Furthermore, transnational cooperation may be increased by setting up partnerships and networks between different Think Tanks. Thereby they can focus much more on addressing common transnational issues. Partnership and networks also enable them to gain knowledge while saving resources and reducing duplication of work (McGann, 2011, p.10). The problem in establishing transnational networks comprising European and Russian Think Tanks is the difficulty to coordinate cooperation. Think Tanks across Europe have often been set up in the socio-political environment of

one of the MSs and it costs time and resources to adjust to a broader frame. Russian Think Tanks have the additional problem of being increasingly restricted through the centralisation policy followed by the government. Moreover, entering a partnership with a foreign Think Tank might bring even more restrictions, e.g. referring to the recent law of foreign agents.

To step up the impact of expert opinions in the policy environment, Think Tanks can contribute by including policy-makers into their transnational partnerships and networks with other Think Tanks. Thereby they can initiate a direct dialogue which might enhance performances and policies (McGann, 2011, p.10). This happens in policy communities and in epistemic communities. The problem is that such a long-term interactive structure may reduce the independence of the experts. But across the EU and in Russia, the review above highlighted a predominance of government affiliation of Think Tanks. This is likely to be primarily due to the funding of research projects by the state. Thus the issue of independence could be promoted though transnational or international projects, in which funding does not rely on single governments, but on a multiplicity of actors.

Another aspect of contribution is the development of faster and easier accessible methods of communication. They provide far-reaching opportunities for exchanging information, constructing partnerships and networks across long distances, and conducting common research projects at different standpoints. In this way distance is not hindering cooperation, but in contrast the internet allows to make use of the geographical differences and include them into projects. An interviewee specifically mentioned the use of the internet as channel of communication for a project on counterterrorism including Think Tanks from a broad spread across the EU.

For the research ahead, it is of importance to capture the broad scope of variation among Thinks Tanks. As mentioned in the research framework of this paper, different types of Think Tanks vary according to their tools and channels, which in turn provides them with different capacities. To get a more precise insight, it is thus of importance to differentiate among them. Several possible structures stand out according to which Think Tanks may be differentiated, but choosing anyone of them poses an emphasis that evokes specific answers. The option not far to seek is a geographical division into EU based Think Tanks and Russia based Think Tanks. Another option is a division regarding the scope of reach, national-regional-global, and the according contribution they can make to transnational cooperation. Corresponding to the interviews for the research at hand, however, the main factors making a difference in the contribution associate with the affiliation of Think Tanks. As the work of think tanks primarily relies on projects provided for by investors, think tanks rely on affiliation. The nature and dynamics of their affiliations in turn provides information about their way of work and thus their potential contribution to transnational cooperation. Relating to the categorisation provided James McGann provided in a report that analyses Think Tanks, the paper differentiates Think Tanks in the following categories:

> *Independent/multiplicity of donors: Non-governmental*
> *Reliant on a major donor: Quasi Independent*
> *University affiliated: Academic influence*
> *Quasi Governmental: (Highly) Government funded*
> *Set up by Government: Governmental*
> *Work for profit: Corporate*
> *A mix of several: Hybrid*

(McGann, 2011, p.10)

Along the spectrum, sub-state actors have the possibility and the role to promote social justice based on expert knowledge and an understanding of the issue at hand that is not informed by political affiliation. On the other hand, every Think Tank has its intentions and preferences, and the

need to ensure funding (often project based) challenges their independence. Their affiliation may provide them with resources fiscal and intellectual, but may also keep them from other resources. At this point it is important to make a differentiation between those Think Tanks that have been set up under the premise of a certain affiliation, and those that have been set up as independent organisation but receive their position by the donors they manage to attract.

Conclusion

Within this paper, a need has been identified for further research into the role of Think Tanks as actors in transnational cooperation on counterterrorism between Russia and the EU. The main challenges within this are substantial differences between the Russian and European approaches towards counterterrorism policy, as well as differences between the two with regard to handling sub-state actors in the policy environment. Furthermore, think tanks are not homogenous entities, but instead hold different potentials to make a contribution. Further research will have to take that into account as well.

However, through scoping the involved structures and difficulties, this paper has identified space for potential positive contribution of Think Tanks. On a wider level, this represents potential for transnational approaches to contribute to a comprehensive engagement with transnational threats.

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