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Europeanization of Finnish Foreign and Security Policy: A Rationalist Perspective

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1. Introduction: Finland's Interests and European Context.¹

Europeanization of foreign and security policy (FSP) is a relatively new field of research. This has mainly to do with the slow and somewhat complicated construction of a genuine European FSP if compared to more prominent and more traditional policies like economics and social affairs.

Therefore, Europeanization approaches, too, have until recently concentrated on the analysis of those classical fields of European integration and European politics. The evolution of the – as it is now called – Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (EU) has changed this picture, leading to a more detailed analysis of the European perspective of FSP (a good example from a Europeanization perspective is Morisse-Schilbach 2006). Most of these newer studies, though, concentrated on the so-called G-3, meaning the largest member states of the EU.

In the last fifteen years or so, scholars noticed Finland to be an interesting case for Europeanization (e.g. Tiilikainen 1998) as well. The Copenhagen-led debate on securitization and the possible change of security identities (Wæver 1995; Balzacq 2011) has brought about a number of studies and approaches (Tonra 2001, Rieker 2009, Jokela 2011, Haukkala 2011, Haukkala/ Ojanen 2011, now the theoretical focus by Diez 2012) dealing with Nordic and Finnish security identity and Europeanization aspects. One main finding of these studies was: There is hardly a change in Finnish security *identity* as such. Finland has, as a national state since its thorough independence in 1917, always been a European state with a democratic tradition and a strong tendency towards international co-operation. Analyzing documents and interviewing Finnish officials has strengthened the empirical basis of this argument.

Nevertheless, there are obvious changes in the Finnish FSP. One major step, probably the most important one in modern Finnish history, was Helsinki's decision to join the EU without any *reservatio mentalis*. We observe changes in the concrete (or: material) *direction* or *characteristic* of Finnish FSP. Why does that finding occur? We argue that it can hardly be explained by a change in identity, but by a change in *interests* and the way FSP is done in the European frame. Interests are the expression of central positions states follow and articulate. So, (national) interests still are a valuable *terminus technicus* to deal with. Interests can and should be utilized for further studies on FSP Europeanization – not instead of, but complementing “identities”.

¹ The author is PhD scholar with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich. He wants to thank warmly the experts interviewed as well as two colleagues for helpful comments.

2. Theoretical Background (5 S.)

2.1 The Definition Riddle

This paper is not to re-introduce the scientific struggles on defining Europeanization. Olson (2002) has, in his seminal article, defined Europeanization in five different ways, naming among others, “central penetration of the nation state”. This aspect comes closest to our approach. Although we do not follow Olson’s designation, this very aspect can serve as the core used to give an own definition. As integration proceeds, the EU affects national politics of its member states in all policy areas. Nevertheless, it is not only the EU that determines national policies. The other way round is at least as important as the first one, especially in FSP where even the latest version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Lisbon Treaty, prescribes unanimity in basic decisions (art. 31 TEU). Therefore, we define Europeanization as follows:

A process of policy change caused by European integration, taking effect, intentionally, both from the national towards the European level and vice versa.

It makes much sense to concentrate on the procedural character of Europeanization between the two levels of national states and the “*sui generis*” political system of the European Union. This is due to democratic-theoretic reasons as well as due to aspects of power and effectiveness. Whereas the national states are, and still remain, the main actors in FSP, the EU gains more influence with every new step of integration since the TEU agreed at in Maastricht. Mere technical or follow-up issues have become subject to majority decisions. In many respects, both levels are interacting closely, especially in policy fields that prepare and support international operations and missions of every scale (logistics, intelligence and reconnaissance, negotiations). The nation states can act less autonomously than in earlier times under the pressures of budget limitations and raising costs for armament, personnel and logistics. This is even true for larger states with a traditionally global FSP approach like France and the United Kingdom. For small states like Finland, the EU becomes a forum of promoting own areas of special interest and saving money in security and defence matters. This is notably important for non-NATO member states. Europeanization, therefore, is not only a sociological process of shaping identities, but also a strategy for and of national states (and European institution) about “hard” interests and co-operating for the sake of meeting current challenges.

2.2 Modeling Europeanization the Rationalist Way

Plenty of FSP Europeanization studies draw their scheme of analysis from the model proposed by Reuben Wong (2006, 2011, Wong/ Hill 2011). Its distinguishing feature is a clear theoretical design according to which FSP Europeanization works. Wong interprets Europeanization as a junction of three specifiable, but intertwined sub-processes: “bottom-up”, “top-down”, and “cross-loading”:

In his model, national states try to promote their interests on the European level (“bottom-up”), thereby changing the European level policy. In FSP, adopting almost all decisions only unanimously is probably more visible than in other policy fields. Energy security may be a special case here, because it was traditionally seen as an economic issue.

Repercussions from the European level influence and change national policies, respectively (“top-down”). Knowledge acquired by staff sent to the EU institutions (a feature which is extremely important in intelligence matters), co-operation in planning, exerting and evaluating missions and policy programs: those diverse features have an explicit effect on national FSP. This fact has been underpinned by all Finnish officials.

The interaction of the aforementioned sub-processes can also lead to a change in the intellectual and psychological foundation of the national state as such (“cross-loading” of a national security identity). It is this kind of process most studies on Europeanization of Finnish FSP concentrate on. We will not add a study to this well-researched field.

Instead, we are going to follow Wong’s proposal of a trimorphous Europeanization model here in a different way. Hence, some changes have been made. These refer both to the meta-theoretical and on the practical level. Firstly, leaning clearly on an interest-based approach, communication (namely, language in its written and transcribed shape) is understood as the transmission chain of and for interests and not as a shaping feature for reality. Secondly, “cross-loading” is modeled as the synthesis of interests to the other two Europeanization directions. This is due to the observation that evolution only takes place when and if both levels are changing their *status quo ante* and both accept new policies and “ways of doing things” (as Radaelli 2000:4 put it) and create and promote them. What is observed ultimately, is the outcome, meaning: Europeanization as a change in interests, in positions, in “ways of doing things”. Here, the main difference between Wong’s and our approach becomes clear: “cross-loading” is interpreted as the balance of the other two Europeanization aspects. Those are shown by looking at the changes over time. We operationalize Europeanization in looking on this “cross-loading” outcome (see below).

To illustrate this, we have worked out a scheme that pays respect to these assumptions. It relies strongly on Wong's (2008, 2011) own studies, but re-interprets especially the cross-loading dimension of Europeanization:

Mechanism	Europeanization criteria
Adaptation (and Policy compliance) (= top-down)	a) Increasing salience of European political agenda
	b) Adaptation to common objectives
	c) Common policy outputs taking priority over national domaines réservés
	d) EU mainstreaming and internalization of EU membership in national bureaucracies
National projection (= bottom-up)	a) State attempts to increase national influence in its geopolitical environment
	b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states (especially G3)
	c) State uses the EU as a cover/ umbrella/ influence multiplier
	d) Externalization of national foreign policy positions onto the EU level
Cross-loading	a) Tendency over time recognizable?
	b) Inertia/ retrenchment
	c) Adaptive (weak) impact
	d) Transformative (strong) impact

Table: Europeanization model, adapted from Wong (2008, 2011).

2.4 Operationalizing Europeanization Effects

When dealing with Europeanization, we shall also ask to what extent it occurs. As far one can see, no clear measure range has been introduced. Measuring Europeanization, consequently, is more a question of discerning stronger and weaker influence. The “cross-loading” dimension of Europeanization has the task to give an answer to the question, “how do you measure it?” We theoretically distinguish between four degrees of Europeanization. Theoretically, retrenchment is possible, meaning less interaction between European level politics and national one. In practice, this does not occur, though. Therefore, this negative Europeanization category is put together with the second alternative, inertia. This synthesized category means that there is no European dimension of policy. We expect this category to remain rather devoid of cases. Nevertheless it cannot be excluded from a mere theoretical point of view. The third degree is an adaptive one. National (or European) policies change their salience, their importance, their direction, but to a modest degree. No structural changes take place and no 180 degree turnarounds can be observed, but nevertheless, there is change. Fourthly and lastly, transformative Europeanization changes not only the direction, but the substance of a

policy field and it has deep repercussions in the governmental system, reaching even basic constitutional provisions. A change in reference frames or the emergence of utterly new Europeanized topics serves as an indicator for transformative change. Putting together the different Europeanization effects provides us a detailed picture of a Europeanized policy. With regard to the “speed” of Europeanization, we recognize a tendency over time which enables us to say if and to what extent Europeanization penetrates the nation state.

2.5 Europeanization Is Interest Change

We operationalize Europeanization by looking at FSP interests and their evolution. The great stability of Finnish security identity as such does not mean that there would be no change in Finnish FSP. Instead, when reading through the FSP core documents, notably the white books, updated periodically, some issues gain importance (e.g. energy security), whereas others are changed in the wake of a more intensive European integration. This change in positions is to be reduced to a change in interests. It is a fundamental task of governments to articulate interests within the international system in order to push through important positions and in order to be able to actually negotiate about issues. We ask, if and to what extent is there interest change caused by Europeanization? Paul A. Sabatier (1988) proposed a useful scheme of interests. They have different salience and are bound to change to a differing degree. Relying on Sabatier’s (1988) model we distinguish between:

- vital interests,
- basic interests, and
- operative interests.

These types differ in possible (adaptive/ transformative) change. *Vital interests* must be served all the time by the state. If this is not the case, the state is failing. The most prominent empirical example of this is currently Somalia. There, the lack of a functioning government able to exert influence and to enforce the laws, secure public order and the territorial integrity of the country is a major problem for the international community. The political status of Somalia has been an anarchical one since the failure of the UNSOM missions in the early 1990s. Consequently, only very few interests should be defined as vital ones, although in everyday politics, the term is used in a different manner. Vital interests encompass in this very study: upholding the internal and external territorial security and the fundamental functions of public infrastructure, and governmental ability to act in a given situation. *Basic interests* constitute the usually slow-changing broad lines of FSP, in the Finnish context, for example,

neutrality. Basic interests are changing if and when the international context requires them to do so or if national government changes induce them. *Operative interests* are the most volatile type of interests. They change with the everyday business of political deals, negotiations and popping-up requirements of the day. The decision on a certain structure for the armed forces or a major pipeline project may be examples for this. In this very paper, we concentrate on basic interests. They give the direction and the main mid-term features of national state FSP. In the Finnish context, we identify several basic interests that, when looked at more closely, are changing not in their bare existence, but clearly in their strength, their salience, and their directions. We distinguish different basic interests in the case studies presented here. In energy security policy, Finnish basic FSP interests are:

- promoting intensive political co-operation in the European, notably the Northern European, context;
- ensuring national energy supply by a plethora of different sources (diversification);
- close co-operation in European energy policy and accepting the EU acquis.

Whereas in the field of military security, Finnish FSP interests can be summed up as follows:

- baring in mind the Russian neighborhood in everything that is changed in a programmatic sense in FSP;
- close partnership with NATO, without finally deciding about a future membership;
- strong interaction with the other EU member states and promoting synergy effects in armaments and logistics;
- sustaining the capacity of autonomously defending the territory of the Republic of Finland.

3. Europeanization: the Finnish Case

In order to compare two different sectors of FSP, we took a traditional FSP field (military security) and a field of more recent activity and interest (energy security). Academic debate nowadays is not any more about traditional military security policy only. Emerging threats and an amended substance of security policy are about to widen the substantial scope of security policy. Since 2001, particularly, national security strategies and academic writing accepted this approach, examples of which are, Finnish government (2003, 2006), and BAKS (2001, 2004, 2009). In both cases, we observe change, but to a very dissimilar degree, which will be shown below.

3.1 Military Security: the “Lone Wolf” Is no Longer Alone

During the Cold War, Finland had quite an uncomfortable status. On the one hand, it was, as it had always been, a European state with a Western-democratic political system and political culture. On the other hand, its FSP was tightly adjusted to the Soviet Union, against which Finland had lost the so-called Continuation War 1941-44 (*jatkosota* in Finnish). After the fall of the totalitarian system of communist oppression both in Russia and in Europe as a whole, Finland re-gained its room for manoeuvre as a now undeniably Western democracy. The infamous times of “Finlandization” had come to an end. Accordingly, Finnish elites and the government tended to support European integration by applying for EC/ EU membership. This step was sold to the Finnish public with both security as well as economic reasons. It is quite hard to decide which one out of these two reasons was really more important as both the economic situation was bad and the need of security given the uncertainties of a further Russian development was large. The government did not want to play a separate role in military security policy like Denmark, and today’s experts state that this would have been possible even less for a new entrant country. Be that as it may be: Finland joined the EU in 1995 and prominently participated in its newly developed CFSP without any reservations. In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and the speeding up of integration, Finland had to overhaul its own FSP, especially its neutrality policy. Much has been written about the change of Finnish FSP neutrality discourses and identities (the latest two studies by Palosaari 2011 and Jokela 2011) that materialized in the Parliament’s (*Eduskunta*) debates. The change away from neutrality was a gradual one that still lives up here and there today. Nevertheless, the change since the end of the Cold War was – at least – also a change in interests. According to our proposed model of FSP interests, Finnish vital interests did undergo no change. But we observe change in some basic interests, which shall be shown displaying two examples:

Peace-keeping and International Engagement

Basic interests concern more the contents of FSP and there we can observe change. Finland has, though, since the 1950s, been an active part of UN peace-keeping. But now, under the different auspices of freedom from subtle Soviet intervention and of European integration, Finnish troops can be and indeed are deployed even in combat missions under NATO command and intense Nordic and European logistics, support, and political co-operation. The Finnish ISAF contingent, despite its limited number of around 100 troops, is a clear sign of change in those basic interests, especially when they participate in operations involving

hostilities as well. Of course, it is not a radical change and it might be argued that it's only an enhancement of traditional Finnish peace-keeping activity under different circumstances. Until now, international missions are declared by a military expert as a "number three task" after total defence and after supporting other state authorities in extraordinary and emergency situations. To some extent, this conflicts with the defence sector reforms of the last years, clearly prioritizing readiness forces and the capability of and for international engagements. This priority is also reflected by the number of personnel deployed in the Permanent Representations to the EU and to NATO at Brussels, assigned with military policy. Experts stated that especially this policy field experienced a significant growth in personnel and other resources, although the overall Finnish diplomatic resources are currently under heavy pressure of cutting costs. This ends, for example in closing down embassy in Islamabad and several consular representations. Thus, concerning the "cross-loading" tendency in time, military policy is a policy that gains importance for Finland.

The Unlikely, Un-liked Reference: NATO Membership

The terms Finland and NATO would hardly have been able to mention inside one sentence two decades ago. Until now, the Finnish people are quite divided concerning this topic. In this respect, there is an obvious gap between the critical Finns at home, notably in the rural areas, and most integration-friendly Finns in the governmental and FSP system – at least this is our impression. As long as the European Union is not capable to deploy troops to a similar degree as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there can be no solo game for the EU and its CFSP respectively ESDP/ CSDP. So Finland had to adapt to NATO operative standards and to become acquainted with the NATO "way of doing things" if it was willing to come to terms to a deeply integrated Union that co-operates with NATO – and it was.

Neutrality, formerly one if not the cornerstone of Finnish FSP was disbanded and "non-alignment" was introduced. This obvious change in basic interests meant that Finland stands outside a military alliance but is – contrary to a neutral country – willing to co-operate with alliances on an individual basis. Soon it became clear that even this new doctrine was not really plausible to many FSP observers: EU's CFSP was not fully operational yet, so NATO was the only game in town. Therefore, we find in the most recent FSP core documents – white books and strategies deviated from them – no clear reference to anything like non-alignment. Instead, Finland is now "non-allied" (Finnish government 2004:84), denomination which rather *describes* the situation of not being part of a classical military alliance instead of prescribing a certain behavior. The disappearance of neutrality in Finnish FSP is basically a

change in interests. Not being involved in security policy co-operation (or, just and exclusively in UN contexts) does not meet Finnish security policy needs any longer. Finland would isolate itself even among the Nordic countries that are very important reference points for Finnish FSP.

The FSP basic interest has changed from trying to be outside the quarrels between the Soviet Union and the West towards an active engagement on a – in the meantime – global scale. This is basically a similar case regarding the German change in FSP, by the way, which means that differences among the states' capacities and resources are not always the most important features in FSP, especially in Europe.

For a small country with limited resources, this change towards a more global approach is nevertheless noteworthy. Even though the EU is more and more becoming a “composite of states”, as the German Federal Constitutional Court named it rightly in its seminal Maastricht ruling (BVerfGE 89, 155), it is not (yet) a military alliance. There is no obligation of military assistance like article V of the NATO treaty. There has been no open debate on NATO membership in the Finnish public and no landmark decision is in sight, although the government reserves – almost traditionally – all options in this question. The fact is, actually, that the technical requirements concerning C4ISR (command, control, computing, communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and inter-operability are in the meanwhile organized along the NATO standard in the Finnish defence system. Older systems not supporting the C4ISR principle are being decommissioned (Finnish government 2009:117, 121). Finnish armament stems mainly from Western suppliers, not from the Eastern neighbor anymore. It should be noted that Finland accommodates a considerably-shaped defense industry on its own that delivers some of the needed goods for the Finnish defence forces. Nonetheless, Helsinki stresses that, under budget pressures, even before the current euro and public deficit crisis, the European co-operation should be, according to Helsinki, strengthened considerably in order to achieve synergy effects and to avoid even deeper cuts and a probable loss of capabilities. It would be hard to explain to the Finnish public that the Finnish defence forces, enjoying a good reputation and in which around 80 per cent of a male age group serve, are no longer able to defend the country. This cannot be explained without looking eastward.

Finland is now able to engage also in the institutional side of CFSP. Prominent civilian and military Finnish citizens took and are currently taking leading positions in the EU FSP system. As can be expected for a small state, Helsinki identified several core sectors of

interest. While during the Cold War, Finland wanted throughout the Kekkonen era (Jakobson 1999:63-71) to stay essentially alone and to some extent untouched by the dividing security policy lines of East and West, it now is engaged vividly. The first Chairman of the EU Military Committee was a Finn, former CHOD General G. Hägglund. Although an expert did not show too much sympathy for his performance, in total Hägglund's appointment was a strong Finnish sign towards the other Europeans that the country also wanted to make politics in the military policy sector. Since then, Finns have been appointed in various leading functions notably in civilian crisis management and military/ civilian intelligence management. This is an argument for a strong and planned Finnish "bottom-up" policy in EU security policy. Experts denied a coherent plan to promote Finnish top officials and officers into the respective EU/ CFSP positions. Nevertheless, the impression is quite striking and, talking to such officials, one receives the impression that Helsinki knows very precisely whom to sponsor: namely staff with extremely good language skills, with broad experience in international co-operation and within the Finnish administration as well. The Finnish "community" in Brussels is, additionally, connected internally as are other nationals. But some of them said there could be done more. At least, it is quite easy for small state nationals to find each other, because there is a strong effect of knowing the others, sometimes even from universities.

Assessing the Finnish Impact

Contrary to other policy fields, in military security, all supranational work is done by unanimous decision-making. Therefore, in CFSP matters, Finnish influence is guaranteed, and nothing can be decided against Helsinki. The mechanism of constructive abstention, laid down in art. 31 (ex 23) TEU, ensures the ability to act jointly even if one or a few member states are not willing to follow a decision made. Thus, it may be more interesting to look closer on the mechanisms of Finnish "bottom-up" influence: Finland's tradition of quiet and quite successful intelligence policy and of patient and enduring negotiations, as it is personalized by Martti Ahtisaari, in the past decades made it an ideal core partner for intelligence matters (expert). This applies even stronger for Russian matters, where the (in several meanings) long neighborhood enabled the Finns to build up considerable knowledge. This knowledge, of which, understandably, not very much is known in detail, ensures Finnish influence when it comes to intelligence co-operation. The same is true for the civilian crisis management. Since EU membership, Finnish governments have stressed this policy, as the experts asked confirmed. As a single actor on the global scene after 1945, Finland didn't have

that much impact. But the few chances to perform were used. After 1995, things are different and the Finnish influence is larger, as we can see in the current euro-crisis where the country performs very well, according to rating agency standards, although its economic challenges are huge as well.

Together with the other Nordic states and in EU frame, Finland has a comparatively powerful role in that it disposes of all political and military means – but only in close co-operation and partnership with the other Europeans.

3.2 Energy Security

Energy security or security of (energy) supply is a new facet of security policy. Previously, it was only dealt with in economic terms. New challenges have changed this assessment, making energy security one of the currently most debated issues in security policy. The European perspective on energy policy is to some extent a new and distinctively strategic one as well, although the ECSC founding treaties were prominently about energy policy. Nonetheless, energy has, for a long time, been a matter of economics and of economic policy, not of security.

In the Finnish context, the most important strategy issued by the Finnish Government is to maintain *security of supply*, which can be declared as a hardly-changing basic interest. Of course, climate policy and environmental obligations are at stake as well. But, contrary to Russia, where these latter issues are highly important due to the critical status of the ecological system, Finland is not a problematic case here. The probable effects of climate change are assessed as not really dramatic (under the recent state of knowledge), so, beneath other reasons, Finland can afford to stress its energy policy interests on the security of supply aspect.

The importance of security of supply in contrast to other energy policy aspects is owed to several reasons: The economic structure of Finland requires a stable and considerably high level of energy supply. Given the Northern geographical situation of the country and the heating infrastructure (mostly by electric energy), the focus on security of supply is quite understandable. Additionally, the Finnish industry is concentrated in a few sectors that rely heavily on security of energy supply: the IT industry as well as the shipbuilding industry and the paper and pulp sector.

This basic interest in Finnish energy security policy has stayed quite stable. Nevertheless, the *ways of achieving this aim* have undergone some change. Thus, this change in operative interests and their interchanging role in the overall EU context will be shown. We will give two examples, demonstrating the (albeit limited) influence of the EU on Finnish energy policy: the NORDSTREAM pipeline and the rising importance of renewable energy sources (shortly referred to as renewables).

NORDSTREAM and the Undisclosed Finnish Interests

Firstly, let us turn to the NORDSTREAM case. The NORDSTREAM pipeline is a project launched by the Russian state-owned Gazprom enterprise and German companies in order to circumvent East-European transit states and to accomplish a higher degree of Russian gas imports to central Europe, particularly Germany. It runs across the Baltic Sea and links Primorsk – a major Russian station – with Greifswald in North-Eastern Germany. It was opened in late 2011, after some six years of construction period. NORDSTREAM is in line with the EU Commission’s general view to secure European energy needs by additional pipeline routes. In this very project, the Commission, though, saw itself more in the role of a moderator (expert), as there are different views on the project within the Union.

It is not beyond any doubt that the Finnish government would have liked to acquire a connection to this gigantesque project, fostered above all by Moscow and Berlin. Most experts interviewed for this study, though, stressed the very limited Finnish interests in the pipeline. Official FSP core documents, like the white books on FSP, are quite silent on this specific issue. But it is hard to believe beforehand that Finnish officials renounced on a chance to strengthen the diversification in its supply infrastructure. This finding is due to the fact – stressed by the experts’ statements – that broad diversification is the central strategy to ensure security of supply. By a side-link via the NORDSTREAM pipeline, the Finns would have received an additional channel for natural gas. This could have become meaningful if and when, for technical or supply reasons, the traditional pipeline infrastructure between Finland and Russia is under stress or damaged. The argument is strengthened by a sentence in the 2001 National Climate Strategy (Finnish government 2001a:60), stating that the *“uncertainty factors related to construction of gas-fired power plants would be reduced if a new pipeline from Finland to the European internal gas market or another gas supplier were realized”*. By the way, this is a typical example of the Finnish political speech: Since the NORDSTREAM project was already in sight in 2001, and since it was the only international, regional project that could affect Finland directly, it would have been logical to frankly name

it. This was not done, obviously, because it was not at all clear if Finland could obtain a side-link. In case it didn't, which should eventually come into effect, it could be easily said that it had never been part of the official policy line. So there was no "official" political failure in this respect. The same is true for any assessment concerning Russia. Even Finland is very much dependent on the Eastern neighbor, Russia is always declared as a reliable and positive partner by the experts and the documents despite problems arising in other topics like bilateral trade in wood or in the transport sector where "negative" package deals cannot be excluded – but they cannot be proved, neither. In the interviews, it was usually noted that the NORDSTREAM project was genuinely a German-Russian one that didn't have anything to do with Finland or Finnish interests. But for the European energy policy as a whole, it was at least not very luckily communicated. Former German chancellor Schröder was the most important EU statesman to support it and, remarkably, he is currently profiting of the project by being member of the supervisory board of the NORDESTREAM company. Although there are voices demanding Germany, as the largest EU state in the Baltic Sea region, to become a more active player there, the Russian-German deal was certainly not a suitable form of promoting a stronger and more coherent EU energy policy in the Baltic. This was noted in Helsinki as well, although the traditionally close and good relations between Helsinki and Berlin were obviously not touched by NORDSTREAM.

Be that as it may: the Finns did not get a side-link to NORDSTREAM and the issue was, on the Finnish side, moved to the mere, albeit salient, ecological field. Ultimately, the Finnish environmental authority was the last one to approve the project among all states in the region, acceptance without which the whole project would have failed. This is surely no sign for an alleged Finnish laggard bureaucracy, but a political expression of interests at stake. We assess this case as a sign of a *non do ut non des* policy, based on operative interests. These operative interests consist, above all, in a diversified supply situation, not relying on a single source of energy. There is one clear limit of European influence. Finland will in the foreseeable future, simply not be able to rely entirely on renewable sources of energy, even if peat were accepted generally as such a sustainable source. Therefore, any European initiative excluding nuclear energy will meet strong Finnish resistance. The second limit would be a harder standpoint vis-à-vis Russia, which is one of the most important trade partners also in energy policy terms. The fairly constructive, if not heartily relationship between the Finnish and the Russian political elite is a cornerstone of Finnish FSP. Therefore, Finnish basic interest would be severely touched by a hard anti-Putin and anti-Russian policy conducted by the European Union. This is not to say that Finns are too uncritical towards current events in the "steered

democracy” since 2000. But, contrary to Baltic experiences of Russia, the Finnish government doesn’t see itself in the position to become the spearhead of anti-Russian policies.

An Interest-ing Understanding of Renewables

Secondly, the importance of energy security and security of supply has undergone considerable change in the overall Finnish FSP. Usually not referred as a “high” political issue, it nevertheless gains security political relevance from the government’s awareness in the white books. Since the 2004 white book on FSP, the Finnish government articulates and describes more and more its specific interests in energy security. Until the 2001 white book, energy was one topic among others in the realm of economics that, surely, had a certain importance, but was a minor one.

A concrete example for this is the role of peat, which is called by the Finnish “*slowly-renewing biomass fuel*” (Finnish government 2001a:56). Peat is being promoted by the Finnish government as a “green” kind of fuel and not one with a more doubtful ecological impact (as an expert declared it to be). The importance of peat for the Finnish energy policy, and apparently only for the Finnish one, is a clear example that Helsinki promotes its own energy policy interests (with its prominent security-of-supply dimension) in the EU context. It is an expression of the governmental statement that is repeated in many contexts, namely that “*no technically and economically feasible mode of production, which also supports environmental objectives, will (...) be excluded from the set of electricity production alternatives*” (Finnish government 2001a:60). Since peat is declared as a renewable source of energy, which can be contested with good reasons, it stays an integral part of the overall energy mix, above all of the electricity production of Finland. This feature will become even more interesting in the future if the EU authorities should declare peat as a fossil source of energy. The Finnish will of adaptation will be tested in a really hard way, since peat is not to be replaced on the long term, posing a considerable challenge for the government. For, now, the peat issue is a form of “bottom-up” Europeanization insofar as national peculiarities are safeguarded even under intensifying Europeanization: The Finns accept the demands of European energy policy, but insist on their specific form of promoting renewables.

Although there was a separate paragraph under security of supply in the 2001 white book, it mainly dealt with the consequences of market liberalization. The *security* aspect in the term “security of supply” was rather neglected. In what concerns a European perspective, it was not even mentioned. Since 2004, energy has become an environmental and a security policy issue. 2004 was insofar a watershed. Still in 2003, the government strategy on securing the

vital functions of society (Finnish government 2003:32) treated energy security as a question of economic importance with which above all the ministry of trade and industry was engaged. The developments on the European policy scene strongly triggered this. As an expert put it, EU membership didn't introduce anything completely new to Finnish energy security policy. But it considerably "speeded up" things. It could be argued that Finnish FSP interests were directed towards a comprehensive approach of energy security, entailing also the important role of renewables. These are signs for an adaptive form of "top-down" Europeanization.

In general, as politics in Brussels are proceeding so fast, it is, even for a well-coordinated country like Finland, difficult to come to terms with current events. In a more specific sense, especially the energy saving policies of the EU are fostered by the Finnish government (2001a:64), although this is still, in 2012, an area where much more could be done, as an expert stressed.

What has changed, though, is the newly introduced overall framework of functions vital to society. This *comprehensive approach* enabled energy security to become a distinct facet of security policy and not "only" a feature of "Daseinsvorsorge" or part of services for the public. In this concept, energy policy interests were more and more formulated in a different way, receiving a separate section in the white book and thus gaining additional and more systematic attention. This goes very much in line with the European trend of a new understanding of energy policy as energy *security* policy that contains changed basic interests of security of supply as its core.

The Russian role must be analyzed in a final section as well. On the one hand, Russia is attributed no influence any more on Finnish politics on behalf of official politics. This goes as far as not even "to mention the (Continuation) war" in political documents, stating there is no special threat to Finland. On the other hand, Russia clearly has an influence on Finnish interests. Even if it only delivers around ten per cent of electricity, around ten per cent of overall energy consumption (via gas imports), there is something special. In no other issue experts have so diverging opinions. Even within one interview, there is a kind of uncertainty on how to deal with the big neighbour (*iso naapuri*). The Finnish status as a small state is mentioned in almost each and every context, regardless the actual topic. This goes so far as to an expert sentence like, "we have to behave quite neutrally towards Russia", which is a remarkable statement that would not be shared by plenty of other Finns asked. To some extent, those statements are a question of age: younger officials with a more international education and career steps abroad are a lot more open towards the international system, and

even an experienced Finnish EU official noted that he had “become much more talkative here”. There is a clear dependence of Finland towards Russia when looking at energy policy. And historic experience of the 20th century is quite vivid in the Finnish society, where we can find, until today, outmoded-looking graphics of “red” tank armies marching towards the small “blue” country in the tabloid press. On the practical level, this doesn’t play a political role between the governments, although official Russian comments, even of minor importance, are closely monitored by the Finns (one of the most recent examples is Helsingin Sanomat 2012). In total, Russia is still a “fleet in being” and has an incalculable influence on Finnish FSP. But it is not the only or the most important reference point since Finnish heads of state and government make their visits in Moscow not only as the leaders of a minor neighboring country, but also with the power of 500 million Europeans in their luggage. Insofar, the constellation has eased a lot (as experts were eager to state), but Russia stays and probably will (some even say: it should definitely) be a major topic for Finnish FSP actors.

3.3 Finno-Russian Aspects: Although You Know Your Neighbor, You Never Know

Energy policy: Looking for Alternatives

While Finland is actively pursuing a policy of diversification in energy supply, Russia does exactly the same, acting as the main supplier at the other end of the pipeline. Moscow has been, for a few years now, diversifying its preferred trade routes as well, opening up new sea and land routes and pipelines towards Asia that enable the country to act independently of (Middle-East European) intermediaries. The severe problems between the Kremlin’s insisting on raising oil and gas prizes with stubborn governments in Minsk and Kiev clearly showed that this would make much sense in the Russian view. China is an upcoming market for energy, although the current crisis may slow down the development to some extent. Regarding this situation and the probable future scenarios of a more independent and a visibly more self-confident Russia, wishing to regain and foster its global power status, it would be practical at least for the Europeans to act with one energy policy voice. This notwithstanding, the energy policies of the EU member states are and stay very different. Finland, for instance, promotes, even after the Fukushima incident, its nuclear energy branch, and that for ecological and climate-political reasons – a position that would be virtually suicidal for any German politician. For Finland, the variety and diversity of energy policy interests within the EU means on the one hand trying to serve its own interests best, in the absence of a common EU position. One consequence is to make its own position seen, for example by approving a

project like NORDSTREAM at the latest moment possible. But, by doing so, it is important for Helsinki to always stay in the EU mainstream. Finland shall not become a Eurosceptic, although the landslide victory of the populist basic (or, “true”) Finns (*perussuomalaiset*) in the 2011 Eduskunta election had an influence on the governmental policy that can no longer afford to accept almost everything that is agreed upon on the European level. On the other hand, it means to foster almost each and every piece of legislation coming “top-down” from Brussels to set the fundamentals of a future common EU energy policy. In total, there is something of an absence of a coherent EU policy that drives Finland to come close the European Union.

Military Security: Trust, But Verify (doverjaj no proverjaj)

It is still important to note that Finland is a sovereign country, deciding autonomously on its belonging to an alliance political or military. Nevertheless, Russian reactions on any change of the *status quo* are recorded closely in Helsinki. Russian leaders, notably of the second row, do seldom hesitate to express their overall critical view on a possible Finnish NATO membership. Although the Finnish-Russian relations are in general very good and there are no serious areas of conflict, in military security the past is very present. This means that Russia has about 100,000 troops in the North-Western federal district bordering Finland (Finnish government 2009:56). This is about one third of the Finnish wartime (!) strength. On the other hand, the Finnish system of universal conscription is only undisputed and kept up despite severe budget cuts because of the Russian neighborhood (experts). Even in quiet times, there is something of an abstract, albeit perceived threat, and indeed: the only threat for the integrity of Finnish territory that can be thought of comes from Russia. This is not outspoken, but it is a fact. We see that Sweden, that had very strong armed forces during the cold war, reduced its troops to a number that could obviously not defend the country if they were bound to. Finland has not gone into such a reform, even though there are cuts in number as well. But Sweden doesn't have a direct, about 1,400 km border towards a major military and nuclear power. This difference is important. In Finnish official policy, this reads as follows:

“Russia’s most stable neighbouring areas border on Finland and other countries in Northern Europe. Still, the possibility of change in the security situation of our neighbouring areas cannot be excluded, nor can the possibility of armed aggression or the threat thereof.” (Finnish government 2009:66)

Observing current trends in Russia is an important feature for any Finnish FSP, especially for its intelligence community that profits of international co-operation. Not being a NATO member, the Finnish government has a special interest in promoting a European branch of

intelligence co-operation. Finns are unusually often found in intelligence-related positions both in the CFSP civilian side and in the corresponding J-2 departments in the EU military staff. To demonstrate this, it will suffice to have a look at the organization chart of the EUMS, where (in August, 2012) both the intelligence production section of the J-2 department and the EU cell at NATO's SHAPE are headed by Finnish officers. Keeping in mind that the NATO question is deeply controversial in Finland, this is a sign of a "bottom-up" form of adaptive Europeanization.

4. Concluding Remarks: Small State, Active Player

When overlooking the developments in Finnish FSP during the hitherto EU membership of the country, some striking changes can be subsumed:

- Finland rapidly decided to engage in the speeding-up process of European integration, not withholding any political reservations or special requirements;
- Finland actively promoted further integration steps and accepted the European requirements resulting from that, even by giving up old traditional basic interests like neutrality;
- Finland decided to co-operate as closely as possible with NATO although not seeking full membership;
- Finland developed and systematized its FSP core documents, coming more and more to terms with the new security situation in Europe and in the world;
- Finland accepted and promoted the mainly EU-steered new requirements ("acquis") of energy security and energy co-operation in Europe, especially in Northern Europe;
- Finland managed to interpret these requirements in a way compatible to its interests, like in the peat issue.

Energy security policy is an noteworthy case, as Finland actively is participating in this policy field without having to change much in its basic energy security policy interest of security of supply. Here, Finland has been mainly compatible to European Union politics even before its EU membership. Nevertheless, the operative side with its detailed European requirements sometimes poses a challenge for the Finnish administration (expert). Additionally, the Finnish way of diversifying energy sources may pose problems of understanding in other member states that do not accept some of the hitherto traditional energy sources any more, namely nuclear and coal. On the long run, all fossil energy sources will come under public pressure.

On the other hand, several other member states, like France and Poland will, even on the long term, not be able to renounce on these two contested sources. Finnish pragmatic attitudes towards these fuels make it hard to believe that the government in Helsinki will renounce on them in the foreseeable future, regarding the difficulties for the more “green” energy sources in the Northern country.

In total, Finland has strong features of a Europeanized FSP. This is true for both the theoretically derived Europeanization mechanisms and the overall picture as well.

“Bottom-up”: Intelligently Promoting Interests

In the “bottom-up” aspect of Europeanization, Finland added some important features to the European policy. The civilian side of crisis management would not have evolved so intensely if Finland, together with Sweden, had not promoted it with such an effort. A small state with an assumedly limited impact on foreign and security policy, Finland proved its ability and political will to deploy troops in combat scenarios, too, accepting even casualties. The number and quality of top-ranking personnel deployed to the developing CSDP system underlines the importance of a European FSP for Helsinki.

In energy security, Finland was a relative laggard with no active status although the topic was acknowledged as even more important. The only thing really important for Finland was not to prematurely exclude any source of energy from the energy mix. This aim was – and is – easy to fulfill, because of the diverging national approaches towards the energy mix – reaching from the French nuclear way to the dramatic change in Germany. Nevertheless, a common EU energy policy would be favoured, provided that the basic interest is served.

“Top-down”: Accepting but Interpreting

When analyzing the “top-down” perspective, we find that Finland accepted the EU energy security policy acquis, but was not always that happy with it (expert). It’s because (until now) the EU energy policy is still in the making, contradictory and unclear, Finland tries to foster the development towards a stronger role for the EU. Since there are no major obstacles in the Finnish view concerning such basic interests as security of supply and meeting the Kyoto goals (an aspect that cannot be dealt with here) and IEA obligations and even creating a sustainable market situation, Helsinki supports those developments. Nonetheless, this does not mean giving up the specifically Finnish approach of highlighting security of supply. As was shown with the NORDSTREAM, the peat fuels and the security of supply cases, Finland

is an active and smart player, avoiding open conflict. It is, in the field of energy policy, even the absence of a European policy that can have an influence on national security policy.

In military security policy, nothing can be prescribed for Finland. But there are significant effects nevertheless: notably a focus in sharing armament infrastructure and co-operation in logistics as well as education of professional personnel. Personnel exchange with other EU and/ or NATO states fosters knowledge in the Finnish military that cannot be renounced on when the government wants to take part in international missions. The “top-down”-effect here could be seen in spreading information and experience, in “ways of doing things” on an operative and tactical level in the armed forces. Since NATO is the state of the art in operative affairs, Finland is indirectly forced to comply with NATO standards, although the “grand strategy” of total or territorial defence is declared obsolete in other states. Universal conscription, abolished in most Western states, is another example of Finnish peculiarity. But this is no example of negative Europeanization as conscription is compatible with the other requirements and can be understood basically as solely national and societal question with no direct international effects.

“Cross-loading”: Steady Effects

Eventually, the “*cross-loading*” picture of the Europeanized Finnish FSP is relatively clear. The EU has, by means of its increasingly active security policy initiatives and TEU-driven gain in power, a remarkable and ever stronger influence on Finnish security policy. The tendency over time is harder to see in the energy policy case, as a coherent EU energy security policy does so far not exist. In the military security case, we found Finland to be a proactive and massively engaged member state that manages to avoid a decision-in-principle on a future NATO membership by participating very closely with this organization and by setting some areas of priority in the European context. International missions under NATO command have become an option for Finland. As far as the civilian side of CFSP/ CSDP is active, Finland takes part intensely and proactively on both the European and the national level.

The modified interpretation of “cross-loading” has shown its aptitude to deal with Europeanization effects. It makes sense not only to look on the both main directions of up- and downloading European policies or positions, but also to survey the development over time, especially. This is due to the considerable speed of European integration and its spilling-over to most and also sensitive policy fields like security policy.

Finland is an active, interest-inputting member state, a mostly eager adapting member state and a member state that is capable of actively and passively applying both directions of Europeanization policy. The theoretical approach of Europeanization can show this in detail and should be used more often, especially concerning the often overlooked small member states. This is true even if one relies on an interest-based concept that should not be put away prematurely.

5. Annex

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