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Deploying Military Force Under CSDP: The Case of EUFOR *Althea*

Niklas Nováky

University of Aberdeen

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1. INTRODUCTION

On December 2, 2004, European Union Force (EUFOR) *Althea*¹ took over NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as 'Bosnia'. The British-commanded operation, which included 7,000 troops from 33 different nations, was hailed as the European Union's (EU) first 'substantial military mission'² after the two smaller operations that it had conducted in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo the year before. It was officially proposed at the end of the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, when EU Heads of State and Government 'indicated the Union's willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR.'³ However, negotiations with NATO over the exact terms of SFOR's handover and the EU's own planning process for the operation took two full years to complete before EUFOR was ready to deploy. When it was "deployed", the majority of the soldiers in SFOR stayed in Bosnia and were transferred under the command of *Althea*. Thus, the biggest physical difference between EUFOR *Althea* and SFOR was the replacement of the American's in Multinational Task Force North (MNTF-N) with a Finnish contingent.

This paper analyses the deployment of EUFOR *Althea* by conducting case studies on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. By using collective action theory, it argues that *Althea* was deployed because these countries saw it as a lucrative joint product activity, i.e. a collective action producing both public and private goods.

¹ *Althea* is Greek for 'healer'. She is also a figure in Greek mythology best known for causing the death of her own son and then hanging herself.

² *The Financial Times*. 'The mission beginning today in Bosnia marks a new phase in peacekeeping, but the Union has to find a way to co-exist with Nato', (London, UK; 02 December 2004).

³ Council of the European Union. 'Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council', (Brussels, Belgium; 29 January 2003).

Firstly, Althea produced a public good by continuing to provide stability in Bosnia. Although EU Member States recognised that the country's security environment had improved, they understood the need to maintain a military presence there as a deterrent against nationalistic movements and organised crime. Secondly, Althea produced contributor-specific benefits by allowing most of the participating countries to reduce their existing military presence in Bosnia. By enabling the Member States' to decrease their troop levels, the handover of SFOR's responsibilities to Althea allowed them to save national resources. Thirdly, Althea contributed to the production of a 'European private good' by making the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) more robust⁴. However, whereas some Member States pushed CSDP to become more autonomous from NATO and the US, others wanted it to be closely linked to the Alliance. These opposing expectations on the nature of the European private good that EUFOR was expected to produce explain the disagreements over SFOR's handover in 2003 and the exact division of labour in Bosnia between NATO and the EU in 2004.

2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND MILITARY CSDP

Since the EU entered the business of military crisis management in 2003, CSDP operations have received a good amount of scholarly attention⁵. This is no doubt due to the fact that, for half a century, the conventional wisdom in European studies held that the 'high politics' of security and defence was too sensitive to be dealt at the European level and at odds with the Union's 'civilian power' self-image. However, IR theorists have hitherto all but ignored the EU's military activities. This is surprising because the deployment of military force is something that touches the very heart of the subject. Thus, IR should be able to answer why CSDP military operations are deployed and how the participants overcome the associated collective action problem.

⁴ Before the ratification of the EU's Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the CSDP was known as the European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP. However, for the sake of consistency, this paper will use the post-Lisbon term when it refers to the policy throughout its existence.

⁵ The literature on EUFOR Althea includes the following publications: Thomas Bertin. 'The EU Military Operation in Bosnia', in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds), *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective*, (Abingdon, UK; Routledge; 2008); Cornelius Friesendorf and Susan E. Penksa. 'Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *International Peacekeeping* 15(5), 2008, pp. 677-94; Daniel Keohane. 'The European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea)', in Giovanni, Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds), *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris, France; European Union Institute for Security Studies; 2009).

The most established IR theory dealing with the use of force is neorealism. Neorealists view states as competitive units interacting in an anarchic international system. The anarchy of the system means that there is no Hobbesian “leviathan” at the international level that states could rely on to enforce agreements amongst themselves in the same way that they enforce laws amongst their citizens. Thus, anarchy implies that states have to take measures to ensure their survival, ‘a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have’⁶, largely by themselves. In other words, states are trapped in a self-help system in which ‘those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.’⁷ This means that all states have a special interest in taking action against threats that could have adverse effects on their security. Sometimes these threats can be so great that states have incentives to form alliances⁸ or integrate to increase the efficiency of their resource-consumption⁹.

The problem with neorealism, however, is its almost exclusive focus on existential threats, i.e. things that can “kill” states. As Arnold Wolfers observed in the 1960’s, threats to states’ survival have been the exception rather than the norm throughout history¹⁰. Even in the midst of Cold War sabre-rattling, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that almost blew up the world was a rare exception. After the Soviet Union collapsed and the risk of a global nuclear war faded, “lesser threats” such as intrastate wars and failed states became the dominant items in most countries’ security agendas. This was because the international community began to understand their link to less conventional threats that could cause enormous material destruction and human suffering, such as terrorism and organised crime¹¹. Although these threats do not rival the spectre of nuclear war, the international community has sacrificed an enormous amount of treasure to fight them over the past two decades. Examples include

⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz. *Theory of International Politics*. (New York, US-NY; McGraw-Hill; 1979), pp. 91-2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁸ Stephen Walt. *The Origins of Alliances*. (Ithaca, US-NY; Cornell University Press; 1987), p. viii.

⁹ Sebastian Rosato. *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*. (Ithaca, US-NY; Cornell University Press; 2011), p. 3.

¹⁰ Arnold Wolfers. *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, (Baltimore, US-MD; Johns Hopkins University Press; 1965), p. 153.

¹¹ Michael E. Smith. *International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects*, (Basingstoke, UK; Palgrave Macmillan; 2010), p. 116.

NATO's intervention to stop Serb ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 and the US-led intervention to fight Al Qaeda in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

An important feature of contemporary crisis management is that it is mainly about realising 'milieu goals', i.e. foreign policy goals aimed at shaping conditions beyond one's national boundaries¹². They are important because states have an interest in ensuring that their surrounding environment is relatively permissive. Many of the negative consequences of intrastate wars, such as refugee flows and organised crime, have a tendency to spillover outside their country of origin if left unchecked. However, the benefits produced by the realisation of milieu goals, such as stability in the Balkans, have public goods features, which means that they can be enjoyed as freely by states that did not participate in their production than they can be states that did. This creates a prisoner's dilemma-type collective action problem in which no state has incentives to invest in the production of the desired good if they can free ride at others' expense¹³. As a result, states may fail to do anything at all about some international security problems if they expect that others would deal with them first. This is essentially why the international community failed to prevent the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.

The incentive structure of a collective action, however, is a prisoner's dilemma only if it is expected to produce a pure public good. In reality, collective actions such as crisis management operations may lead to the simultaneous production of multiple different goods, which may vary in their publicness. These are called 'joint products' because they consist of combinations of goods that can be purely public, impurely public, or purely private¹⁴. A crisis management operation, for example, may produce a pure public good, such as regional stability, which can be enjoyed in equal amounts by both contributing and non-contributing countries. On top of this, the same operation may produce contributor-specific benefits that cannot be enjoyed by anyone else than the contributor itself. An example would be better relations with the target

¹² Wolfers. *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 74.

¹³ Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups*, (Cambridge, US-MA; Harvard University Press; 1971), p. 21.

¹⁴ Todd Sandler. 'Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances', *Kyklos* 30(3), 1977, pp. 443-60.

state that might lead to increased bilateral trade. These contributor-specific benefits are important because ‘the prognosis for collective action hinges on the collective activity’s ratio of excludable benefits (that is, contributor specific benefits and club goods) to total benefits.’¹⁵ In other words, the more contributor-specific benefits a collective action produces, the better its chances of success.

If international crisis management is a joint product activity, then several hypotheses follow. First, states are more willing to contribute to a crisis management operation the more contributor-specific benefits they expect to gain from it. If the operation produces no contributor-specific benefits at all, then there should be little enthusiasm for launching it in the first place. States should be least enthusiastic about contributing to an operation that is expected to produce only a pure public good because then the prisoner’s dilemma re-emerges and free riding becomes lucrative. Second, states will not contribute to a crisis management operation if the private benefits gained by another contributing state are expected to lead to a decrease in the value of its own benefits. In other words, contributor-specific benefits should be as complimentary as possible and not rival each other. The more they compliment each other, the better the prospects for collective action.

To test these hypotheses, this paper analyses the deployment of EUFOR Althea in 2004. It applies a qualitative methodology using the techniques of *structured, focused comparison* and *process tracing* to answer the research question¹⁶, i.e. why EU Member States deployed Althea. The case studies on France, Germany and the United Kingdom were chosen for two reasons: firstly, their military capabilities are roughly equal, which means that all of them should be equally able to contribute; secondly, they have different views on the purpose and role of CSDP, especially vis-à-vis NATO. This is to maximize the likelihood the contributor-specific benefits they hope to gain would be far apart from and perhaps at odds with each other. To make comparison between the cases easy, they have been structured into three parts. The first part is called ‘The Road to Copenhagen’ and it investigates the period leading to the EU’s first indication of willingness in December 2002 to lead SFOR’s successor.

¹⁵ Todd Sandler. *Global Collective Action*, (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press; 2004), p. 54.

¹⁶ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, US-MA; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; 2005), p. 67.

The second part is called ‘Waiting for NATO’s Approval’ and it looks at the period from the Copenhagen European Council until NATO’s formal endorsement in December 2003 to allow the EU to takeover SFOR’s responsibilities in Bosnia. The final part is called ‘Planning and Launch’ and it looks at the period from NATO’s endorsement until EUFOR’s deployment.

3. THE DELOYMENT OF EUFOR ALTHEA

3.1 FRANCE

The Road to Copenhagen

France began to call for an eventual handover of SFOR’s responsibilities in Bosnia to the EU publicly from early 2002 onwards. President Jacques Chirac, who was campaigning for re-election throughout spring, was the first French official to propose the issue outside the closed doors of government. On March 6, President Chirac gave a campaign speech at Strasburg about his vision for Europe’s future role in international politics. Among other things, he called for an assertive European foreign policy and emphasized the need to construct *Europe de la défense*. To facilitate the realisation this goal, President Chirac proposed taking ‘immediate action’ to handover the on-going NATO operations in Macedonia and Bosnia (Amber Fox and SFOR) to the EU¹⁷. He saw that the Union was already capable of commanding such operations on its own. This, President Chirac explained, would demonstrate to the world that Europe is capable of managing its own security without being systematically dependent on NATO.

At the time of President Chirac’s proposal, France was the lead-nation of SFOR’s Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE). This division, which included a 2,200-strong French contingent, was responsible of stability in the area around Mostar and Sarajevo largely inside the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH). However, France had begun to feel that SFOR’s size could be reduced due to Bosnia’s improved security environment. The French government was encouraged by Bosnia’s progress,

¹⁷ Jacques Chirac. ‘Discours prononce dans le cadre de la campagne électorale pour l’élection présidentielle’, (Strasburg, France; 06 March 2002).

but it was also aware that nationalistic movements and organised crime could still threaten the country's fragile stability if the international community's military presence would be withdrawn. During her May visit to the Balkans, Michèle Alliot-Marie, the new French Minister of Defence, noted that she was encouraged by the signs of political and economic reconstruction in Bosnia that she witnessed during her visit¹⁸. However, Alliot-Marie was also clear that much more needed to be done in the country to ensure that it would not relapse into anarchy and ethnic warfare. She saw that the current security environment in Bosnia necessitated that the international community would continue its military presence in the country, even if a reduction of SFOR would eventually be possible.

France's advocacy for SFOR's handover to the EU seems to have been based on the observation that Bosnia's security environment had become permissive enough for the Europeans to manage the country without the US. This would allow France to reduce its military presence in the Balkans and further its goal of developing CSDP. However, there was also an understanding that it would take some time before SFOR could be concluded. On October 8, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, the French Chief of Defence, briefed the National Assembly's Defence and Armed Forces Committee. Among other issues, General Kelche spoke briefly about the progress achieved in the area of CSDP since the policy's launch at St. Malo in 1998. He felt generally positive about the progress that had been achieved, but he also felt that it was time to bring CSDP out of virtual reality by anchoring it firmly into reality¹⁹. General Kelche saw that this could be done only if the EU would be allowed to command an actual crisis management operation and noted that Macedonia and Bosnia would be good places for military CSDP to take its first steps. However, General Kelche expressed some reservation against a quick takeover of SFOR, emphasising that it should not lead to an early departure of the Americans in SFOR's Multinational Division North (MND-N).

Waiting for NATO's Approval

¹⁸ Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens combattants. 'Conférence de presse de Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministre de la Défense et des Anciens combattants, à l'issue de sa visite au Kosovo', (Pristina, Kosovo; 20 May 2002).

¹⁹ Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. 'Audition du général Jean-Pierre Kelche, chef d'état-major des armées, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2003', (Paris, France; 08 October 2002).

After the Copenhagen European Council, France, together with Britain and Germany, began to push for the deployment of a CSDP successor operation to SFOR in early 2004. This behaviour was consistent with France's desire reduce its military presence in Bosnia and add credibility to CSDP. On January 22, the Franco-German Defence and Security Council (FGDSC) issued a statement declaring both countries' full support for a EU takeover of SFOR in early 2004²⁰. On February 4, the Franco-British summit at Le Touquet also welcomed the EU's intention to undertake a military operation in Bosnia, possibly in early 2004. A joint declaration from the summit noted also that France and Britain would issue a proposal at the February 24 External Relations Council to launch work for a EU takeover of SFOR 'on the basis of transparency and cooperation with NATO.'²¹ When it was presented in Brussels, the proposal called for a 'seamless transition, based on a shared strategic military analysis between the two (Nato and EU) organisations'²². It also emphasized that the EU force 'should not be weaker than the Nato force it replaces'.

In spring, the momentum that France and its European partners had gained for the proposed CSDP follow-up operation to SFOR was suddenly lost due to the transatlantic tensions over Iraq that reached their peak. As it became clear that Washington was going to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom and overthrow Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime, France found itself as the leader of Europe's anti-war camp. President Chirac, described by former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld as 'a man of bottomless cynicism'²³, took a highly public stance against US war plans that caused enormous anger in the US and those European capitals closest to Washington. On top of the distractions caused by the Iraq War, France was also under pressure to ensure the success of EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia, the first-ever CSDP military operation. French officers occupied most high-level position in Concordia's chain of command and France had provided the largest national contingent to the operation when it took over from NATO's Allied Harmony on April

²⁰ Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes. 'Déclaration du Conseil franco-allemand de défense et de sécurité', (Paris, France; 22 January 2003).

²¹ Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes. 'Déclaration on strengthening European cooperation in security and defence', (Le Touquet, France; 04 February 2003).

²² *The Financial Times*. 'British-French wins backing of Foreign Ministers', (London, UK; 25 February 2003).

²³ Donald Rumsfeld. *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*, (New York, US-NY; Sentinel; 2011), p. 474.

1. Although a modest operation, Concordia was highly important for France because the US had made it clear that it did not want to discuss a EU operation in Bosnia until the Europeans could demonstrate that they could handle the operation in Macedonia²⁴. Thus, if Concordia would have failed, there was little chance that the US would have risked allowing the EU to takeover SFOR in Bosnia, which was a much larger operation.

Beyond Iraq and Concordia, an event that did enormous damage to France's hopes to see a CSDP military operation in Bosnia was the April 29 "gang of four" proposal to set up an autonomous EU military headquarters in Tervuren, Brussels. The US and its closest European allies were extremely annoyed by what they saw 'not as practical military measure but a political gesture, an assertion of independence from American leadership.'²⁵ France tried to justify the proposal as a way to move CSDP forward after Europe's cacophony over Iraq, but the Bush administration saw it as an explicit attempt to undermine NATO's primacy in Europe. Washington's suspicions about Paris' true intentions vis-à-vis the Alliance were further reinforced by France's continuing rhetoric of the need to 'rebalance' the transatlantic relationship to reflect a multipolar world²⁶. As a result, Washington had very few incentives to allow the EU to takeover SFOR as long as France might use it as another opportunity to assert Europe's independence from NATO and the US. In other words, there were fears that France would use the handover of NATO's military operations in Bosnia to the EU as way to promote a more exclusive CSDP that would develop outside the Berlin Plus agreements.

In September, France and Germany reached a partial compromise with Britain over the Tervuren proposal. President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder assured Prime Minister Blair that they would not move further with it for the moment and emphasised that NATO would continue to serve as the 'basis of collective defence for its members'²⁷. This compromise made it possible to move ahead with the proposed handover of SFOR's responsibilities in Bosnia to a CSDP force. It paved the way for

²⁴ US Embassy Rome. 'Italy/EU - GoI reaction to USG GAERC points', (Rome, Italy; 11 April 2003).

²⁵ Rockwell A. Schnabel and Francis X. Rocca. *The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and its Challenge to the United States*, (Lanham, US-MD; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; 2005).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *The Independent*. 'Blair Heals Rift by Agreeing to EU Defence Missions', (London, UK; 23 September 2003).

the progress made in October at the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Rome, where the ministers agreed in principle to takeover SFOR and proposed setting up a working group to consider different options for the EU's future role in Bosnia²⁸. During this meeting, the French delegation 'proposed beginning informal planning now in order for the EU to take over SFOR's mission by mid-2004.'²⁹ However, NATO's consent was still required because EU diplomats had previously ensured the US that there would be no EU takeover of SFOR until the US, EU, and NATO would decide together that it is time³⁰. In order to secure NATO's approval of the SFOR takeover, France gave additional assurances to Washington that proposed CSDP operation in Bosnia would be planned and conducted through the Alliance in the framework of Berlin Plus³¹. These assurances appeased NATO and the US and paved the way for the Alliance's official endorsement of the EU's plans at the December meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels³².

Planning and Launch

At the beginning of the political-strategic planning process for what would become EUFOR Althea, France continued to insist that the EU force should be smaller than SFOR. This was because France saw that SFOR's force levels did not correspond to the relatively permissive security environment that prevailed in Bosnia at the time. Defence Minister Alliot-Marie noted in January 2004 that the 1,100 French soldiers that were stationed in Bosnia at the time should be reduced 400 soldiers when SFOR is handed over to the EU³³. However, she also warned that the international community should not rush to declare the end of military operation in Bosnia despite the impressions of stability in the country. Alliot-Marie pointed out that Bosnia could still come under threat from nationalistic movements and criminal networks that have

²⁸ US Embassy Rome. 'EU informal defense ministers meeting in Rome', (Rome, Italy; 06 October 2003).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ US Embassy Brussels. 'U.S.-EU Troika Political Directors - Productive Discussions on ESDP, Iraq, Non proliferation', (Brussels, Belgium; 24 July 2003).

³¹ *The Financial Times*. 'France seeks to ease US fears over Nato role in any EU-led Bosnia force', (London, UK; 29 October 2003).

³² Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session. 'Final Communiqué', (Brussels, Belgium; 01 December 2003).

³³ Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. 'Audition de Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministre de la défense', (Paris, France; 06 January 2004).

an interest in ensuring that the country remains in prolonged disorder³⁴. France was also insisting that the eventual EU force should inherit all of SFOR's responsibilities, including the power to track down war criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)³⁵. Although Washington did not allow the EU to take the lead in tracking remaining high-value fugitives such as Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, France supported the draft General Concept³⁶ at the informal EU defence ministerial in Brussels on April 5-6. Defence Ministers Alliot-Marie noted on April 13 that discussions of the exact division of labour between NATO and the EU in Bosnia were on-going, but 'common sense' would dictate that the two organisations would eventually share responsibility for tracking down war criminals, even though the US would continue to insist that NATO should retain the primary responsibility in this area³⁷. France also supported the final version of the General Concept at the April 26 External Relations Council in Luxemburg.

Towards the summer, the French government continued to call for a 'comprehensive' EU crisis management operation in Bosnia based on a military component, conducted under Berlin Plus, as well as a civilian component³⁸. These calls were in line with the previous commitments of France and other EU Member States to transform Bosnia into a modern European country that would eventually become accede to the Union. Despite of the efforts of the France and other EU Member States who wanted to see a clear division of labour between the EU force and the remaining NATO elements in Bosnia once the Union would takeover SFOR, the heads of state and government of NATO Member States decided in their June summit in Istanbul that the Alliance would continue to 'undertake certain operational supporting tasks' in Bosnia after the termination of SFOR in December, such as counter-terrorism and tracking war

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Dominique de Villepin. 'Conférence de presse du ministre des affaires étrangères', (Brussels, Belgium; 23 February 2004).

³⁶ In the EU's standard military planning process, the first planning document is normally the Crisis Management Concept (CMC). However, in the case of EUFOR Althea, the CMC was explicitly renamed as the General Concept to avoid having the word 'crisis' in the title. This was because EU Member States wanted to avoid answering the question whether there was an actual crisis in Bosnia. Interview in Brussels (08 March 2012).

³⁷ Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. 'Audition de Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministre de la défense, sur la mise en œuvre de la loi organique relative aux lois de finances', (Paris, France; 13 April 2004).

³⁸ Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes. 'Déclaration by the Franco-German Defence and Security Council', (Paris, France; 13 May 2004).

criminals³⁹. Although this was not what the French government had desired, it was viewed as an acceptable compromise that paved the way for the adoption of the July 12 Joint Action in Brussels.

As the EU's planning for EUFOR Althea moved from the political strategic level into the military strategic level during the summer, the French government continued to speak in public about the significance of the operation for the development of CSDP. Defence Minister Alliot-Marie described it as a 'quantum leap' and declared that *Europe de la défense* had finally become a reality⁴⁰. On December 2, SFOR was officially concluded and its responsibilities in Bosnia were handed over to EUFOR Althea. France had agreed to maintain a contingent of 450 in Bosnia as part of EUFOR Althea, which continued to serve around Mostar and Sarajevo in Multinational Task Force Southeast (MNTF-SE). This contribution was in line with the statements made by the French government earlier during the year, which had called for a reduction of the country's military presence in Bosnia from the 2003-level of 1,500 personnel that were part of SFOR. However, in March 2005, the number of French soldiers that were serving in the theatre was only 377⁴¹.

3.2 GERMANY

The Road to Copenhagen

Germany became a public supporter of handing over NATO's military responsibilities in Bosnia to the EU a month before the Copenhagen European Council. However, Berlin had begun to indicate that it had confidence in Europe's ability to command SFOR without the US already in the spring 2002. In April, Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping gave a speech in London in which he drew attention to the fact that Europe was already providing the lion's share of NATO's forces in the Balkans. Defence Minister Scharping pointed out that that 70 percent of the troops in Kosovo, 65 percent of the troops in Bosnia, and nearly all of the troops in Macedonia were

³⁹ NATO. 'Istanbul Summit Communiqué', (Istanbul, Turkey; 28 June 2004).

⁴⁰ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. 'Für Frankreich sind die Europäer mittlerweile das Rückgrat der Nato-Einsätze' (Frankfurt, Germany; 15 September 2004).

⁴¹ EUFOR Troop Strength (07 March 2005).

‘NATO Europeans’.⁴² He explained that this was all due to Europe’s increased willingness to share risks, burdens, and responsibility within the Alliance, which was the result of decades of cooperation within NATO and the Alliance’s integrated force command structures⁴³. These remarks were especially applicable to Germany itself, which was participating in SFOR with 1,700 personnel at the time. Most of these forces were serving in the French-led MND-SE, which was responsible for ensuring stability in the area around Mostar and Sarajevo.

A month after the re-election of Chancellor Schröder’s red-green coalition in September, Germany began to signal that it was seriously considering the possibility of supporting a EU takeover of SFOR. On November 5, Parliamentary State Secretary for Defence Walter Kolbow gave a speech on the new challenges facing German security policy and the *Bundeswehr*. Among other issues, Secretary Kolbow spoke about the progress achieved in the area of military CSDP since 1999. He declared the Europeans continued to be determined to conduct the first-ever crisis management operation under EU command, which was likely to take place in Macedonia. Secretary Kolbow spoke briefly also about Bosnia, saying that the Europeans should start considering the conditions under which SFOR could eventually be handed over from NATO to the EU⁴⁴. Three weeks later, Dr Peter Struck, Rudolf Scharping’s successor in the Ministry of Defence, proposed publicly that SFOR could eventually be taken over by a CSDP force⁴⁵. Defence Minister Struck’s proposal was the first time that a high-ranking official had publicly suggested a CSDP follow-up operation to SFOR since French President Chirac proposed it in March.

It should also be remembered that Germany had been supporting the stabilisation of Bosnia and the development of CSDP long before the Copenhagen European Council. After the Cold War and the reunification of West and East Germany in 1990, the Federal Republic began to take modest steps to assume a role on the world stage better suited to a country of its status and wealth. Due to the initial restrictions set to

⁴² Rudolf Scharping, ‘An Alliance Transformed: Reflections on the Future of Nato’, (London, UK; 11 April 2002).

⁴³ Rudolf Scharping, ‘Transatlantic Relations after September 11’, (Berlin, Germany; 22 May 2002).

⁴⁴ Walter Kolbow, ‘Neue Herausforderungen für die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik und die Bundeswehr’, (Berlin, Germany; 05 November 2002).

⁴⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, ‘Struck: EU kann Sfor übernehmen’, (Frankfurt, Germany; 27 November 2002).

the deployment of German forces abroad by its constitution, Germany did not participate in any of the major military operations of the early 1990s beyond its generous financial support. This all changed in 1999 when the recently elected red-green coalition made the decision to participate in NATO's military campaign in Kosovo to fulfil Germany's alliance commitments⁴⁶, making it the first time German forces were deployed on a combat mission since World War II. At the same time, Europe's impotence to use military force to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans convinced Germany of the need to construct a military capability for the EU so that Europe would not have to rely systematically on the US. Although not a party to the 1998 St. Malo agreement, the 1999 German presidency of the European Council made the development of CSDP one of its top priorities⁴⁷.

Waiting for NATO's Approval

In January 2003, Germany became clearer about the reasoning behind its support for handing over SFOR's responsibilities to the EU. Defence Minister Struck wrote in an article that there are 'good reasons' for allowing the EU to takeover the military command in Bosnia from SFOR⁴⁸. Such a takeover, he explained, would allow the Europeans to take the responsibility for securing their own continent more firmly into their own hands. On top of this, Defence Minister Struck saw that the takeover would allow the US to withdraw from Bosnia without decreasing its commitment to the 'joint responsibility' of stabilising the country⁴⁹. Germany was aware of Washington's long-held desire to pull-out its forces from the Balkans and redeploy them to strategically more important theatres, such as Afghanistan and eventually Iraq⁵⁰. As a result of Bosnia's improved security environment and the EU's willingness to lead SFOR's successor, Washington's policy towards NATO's military operations in Bosnia had become 'in together, out together, but hasten the day'⁵¹. Thus, Germany

⁴⁶ Gerhard Schröder. *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, (Hamburg, Germany; Hoffmann und Campe; 2006) p. 85.

⁴⁷ Peter Struck. *So läuft das: Politik mit Ecken und Kanten*, (Berlin, Germany; Propyläen; 2010) p. 130.

⁴⁸ Peter Struck. 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik und die Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausforderungen', *Europäische Sicherheit* 52(1), 2003, pp. 18-25.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Rumsfeld. *Known and Unknown*, p. 482.

⁵¹ US Embassy Ankara. 'Turkey Agrees to U.S. Approach to EU Balkan Ops', (Ankara, Turkey; 14 January 2003).

saw that a transfer of authority in Bosnia from NATO to the EU would also be in Washington's interest.

For a brief while, Germany was advocating a late 2003 handover of SFOR's responsibilities to the EU. In an interview, Defence Minister Struck mentioned that Germany is striving for a transfer of authority in Bosnia from NATO to the EU that could take place already in the autumn of 2003⁵². This was much earlier than anyone in Europe had suggested before. However, three days later, the FGDSC issued a statement mentioning that both countries support a CSDP force that could takeover SFOR in early 2004. The short period of time between the two statements suggest that Germany changed its position on the handover date after discussing it with France. It should be remembered that General Kelche, the French Chief of Defence, cautioned in October 2002 against a hasty handover of SFOR's responsibilities to the EU if it would lead to an early departure of the Americans in MND-N. France seems to have been sceptical about Europe's short-term ability to replace the American SFOR contingent, whereas Germany indicated that it was confident that Europe was already capable of managing Bosnia without the US.

The EU's efforts to takeover SFOR's responsibilities were overshadowed in March by the transatlantic rift over Washington's plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. As it became clear that the US was on the verge of launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq, Germany found it self as one of Europe's loudest anti-war voices together with France. Washington was particularly 'shocked' at Germany's decision to side with France and Russia on the issue since Chancellor Schröder had led President Bush to believe that he might support the US against Saddam Hussein 'as long as it was quick.'⁵³ However, in the middle of the disputes over Iraq, Germany tried its best not to neglect its priorities in the Balkans. After the launch of Operation Iraq Freedom on March 20, Defence Minister Struck explained that Germany wants to continue reducing NATO's presence in Kosovo and Bosnia 'independently' of the

⁵² *Handelsblatt*, 'Interview des Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Dr. Peter Struck', (Düsseldorf, Germany; 19 January 2003).

⁵³ Condoleezza Rice. *No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*, (London, UK; Simon & Schuster UK Ltd; 2011), p. 202.

situation in Iraq. He noted that both Europe and the US agree that their military presence in the Balkans can be significantly reduced⁵⁴.

On April 29, the handover of SFOR's responsibilities to the EU was further complicated by the proposal to set up an autonomous EU military headquarters in Tervuren, Brussels. This proposal annoyed the US and its closest European allies, who saw it mainly as an attempt to assert Europe's independence from Washington. It also raised America's fears that France and Germany were pushing for the transfer of authority in Bosnia for similar reasons, triggering a series of critical statements by high-ranking officials from NATO and the US on the planned CSDP operation in Bosnia. In his memoirs, Defence Minister Struck described the 'Bush/Rumsfeld' administration's policies on Europe as 'paradoxical' at the time. This was because Washington was pushing Europe to take more responsibility of its own defence, while simultaneously demanding that it should not lead to greater autonomy⁵⁵. In September, Germany and France reached partial compromise with Britain over the Tervuren proposal. They agreed that NATO would remain 'the basis of collective defence for its members', which was enough to alleviate British and American concerns that the proposed CSDP operation in Bosnia would undermine NATO. Soon after the compromise, a high-ranking German diplomat from the Council General Secretariat reported that there were 'signals' that the EU could soon take command of the military operations in Bosnia⁵⁶. These signals were followed by NATO's informal endorsement of the EU's plans in October at the informal defence ministerial at Colorado Springs and then formal endorsement in December.

Planning and Launch

As the EU began to initiate political-strategic planning for EUFOR Althea, Germany continued to emphasise the qualitative improvements in Bosnia's security environment. On January 26, Defence Minister Struck gave a speech in which he noted that the qualitative improvements in Bosnia had created the conditions under which SFOR could be handed over to the EU. He emphasized that the reduction of

⁵⁴ *Bild Zeitung*. 'Bundeswehr derzeit ausgelastet', (Berlin, Germany; 26 March 2003).

⁵⁵ Struck. *So läuft das*, p. 131.

⁵⁶ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*. 'EU-Einsatz in Bosnien möglich', (Frankfurt, Germany; 28 September 2003).

NATO's military presence in the country to 7,000 soldiers, agreed by the Alliance in 2003, would also allow the *Bundeswehr* to redeploy some of its 1,300 personnel that are serving in SFOR⁵⁷. However, high-ranking NATO officials expressed concern at the time that if EU Member States continued to reduce their military presence in Bosnia after SFOR's responsibilities are handed over to the EU, then the CSDP force would not have the credibility to deal with all problems that it might encounter. One of these officials was Admiral Rainer Feist, the out-going German Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who warned the EU that the CSDP force would not be seen as credible if its strength would be less than 7,000.⁵⁸ When the External Relations Council of April 27 agreed on the EU's General Concept on the Bosnia operation, the German government agreed provisionally to contribute 1,800 soldiers to SFOR's successor operation⁵⁹. Thus, it is possible that Germany was forced to rethink the size of its planned contribution to EUFOR Althea after NATO officials had expressed their warnings.

The first half of 2004 was also marked by differences between NATO and the EU over the exact division of labour between the two organizations in Bosnia after SFOR's conclusion. Like France, Germany was part of the group that wanted the eventual CSDP force to inherit all of SFOR's responsibilities, including tracking war criminals indicted by the ICTY, so that its authority could not be questioned on the ground⁶⁰. However, the German government was also careful not to give an impression that it was opposing of having a residual NATO presence in Bosnia after the deployment of EUFOR Althea. The Foreign Ministry, for example, indicated that it did not have any major objections for NATO's plans to maintain a small presence in the country that would continue carrying out some of SFOR's responsibilities. In March, the Political Director of the German Foreign Ministry, Dr Michael Schaefer, said that NATO 'should and will' retain a role in Bosnia that will compliment the

⁵⁷ Peter Struck. 'Punktation des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Dr. Peter Struck, für das 12. Aktuelle Forum zur Sicherheitspolitik für Chefredakteure und Ressortleiter', (Berlin, Germany; 26 January 2004).

⁵⁸ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. 'Admiral: Für Bosnien 7000 EU-Soldaten nötig', (Munich, Germany; 14 February 2004).

⁵⁹ *Die Welt*. 'Die EU übernimmt mit der Sfor ihre dritte Militärmission', (27 April 2004).

⁶⁰ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. 'Washington will nicht loslassen', (Frankfurt, Germany; 16 March 2004).

CSDP military operation⁶¹. In the end, Germany and France were not able convince all of their NATO allies, most importantly the US and the UK, over the merits of allowing the EUFOR to takeover all of SFOR's responsibilities. In June, NATO decided in Istanbul to conclude SFOR by the end of the year, but it also decided that it would continue to carry out certain tasks in Bosnia, such as counter terrorism and tracking war criminals.

Germany made the formal decision to commit forces to EUFOR Althea at the end of the EU's military-strategic planning process. On November 17, the *Bundesregierung* decided that Germany would indeed participate in EUFOR⁶². One week later, it requested the *Bundestag* to approve the deployment of a maximum of 3,000 German soldiers to Bosnia as part of EUFOR⁶³. However, the *Bundesregierung* did not intend to increase Germany's military presence in Bosnia from its previous levels. On November 26, Defence Minister Struck explained to the *Bundestag* that the *Bundesregierung* had decided to continue Germany's military presence in Bosnia by sustaining 1,100 troops on the ground⁶⁴. According to the government, the deployment of these troops would cost the German taxpayer approximately €94.5 million for the first twelve-months⁶⁵. The much larger number forces that was requested, Defence Minister Struck explained, was to ensure that the *Bundesregierung* had a degree of flexibility in its hand so that it could increase Germany's military presence in Bosnia relatively quickly in case the situation on the ground turned worse. On November 26, an overwhelming majority of 583 of a total of 590 *Bundestag* members approved Germany's participation in EUFOR Althea⁶⁶. This allowed Berlin to transfer its soldiers in SFOR's MNTF-SE under the command of EUFOR, where they continued serve in the area around Mostar and Sarajevo as part of the same Task Force.

⁶¹ Michael Schaefer. 'NATO & ESVP: Gestaltung des europäischen Pfeilers einer transformierten Allianz', (Berlin, Germany; 15 March 2004).

⁶² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. 'Kabinett beschließt Sudan-Einsatz' (Frankfurt, Germany; 18 November 2004).

⁶³ Deutscher Bundestag. 'Antrag der Bundesregierung Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten Operation ALTHEA', (Berlin, Germany; 22 November 2004).

⁶⁴ Deutscher Bundestag. 'Plenarprotokoll 15/143', (Berlin, Germany; 26 November 2004).

⁶⁵ Deutscher Bundestag. 'Antrag der Bundesregierung'.

⁶⁶ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. 'Bundeswehr bleibt länger in Bosnien', (Munich, Germany; 27 November 2004).

3.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Road to Copenhagen

The United Kingdom did not endorse a handover of SFOR's responsibilities to the EU publicly until the Copenhagen European Council. However, London's views on the Alliance's military presence in the Balkans prior to December suggest that the country did not have any fundamental objections for an eventual CSDP follow-up operation to SFOR provided that it would be conducted under the Berlin Plus agreements that were still under negotiation. On March 18, Prime Minister Blair gave a statement to the House of Commons during which he reconfirmed Britain's commitment to 'play our proper role in the Balkans' by being 'part of the system of peacekeeping there.'⁶⁷ On top of this, he emphasised that Europe should upgrade its defence capability so that it has the ability to act 'in circumstances where NATO does not want to be engaged'⁶⁸ and pointed out that the Alliance was already in the process of withdrawing from Macedonia. At the time, the UK was participating SFOR's Multinational Division Southwest (MND-SW) with 1,700 personnel. This division was responsible for stability in the area around Banja Luka that covered parts the FBH and Republic of Srpska. However, since the US had it made it clear that it would also like to pull-out its remaining troops from Bosnia, it is likely that Britain understood that NATO's military presence in country would have to be restructured and reduced during the coming years.

The first time Britain spoke publicly of the possibility that the EU could takeover SFOR's responsibilities was in December. During a statement to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Blair declared that the Berlin Plus agreement that was finalised at the Copenhagen European Council implied that the EU can now 'undertake peacekeeping operations using NATO planning, and the option of NATO headquarters and NATO assets as well.'⁶⁹ He went on to declare that the Union stands ready 'to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR.'⁷⁰ As already noted, it

⁶⁷ House of Commons Debate. 'European Council (Barcelona)', (London, UK; 18 March 2002).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Tony Blair. 'PM Statement on European Council Meeting 12-13 December', (London, UK; 16 December 2002).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

is likely that Britain's decision to endorse a CSDP follow-up operation to SFOR at the EU's Copenhagen summit stemmed primarily from the governments policy of supporting the withdrawal of US forces from the Balkans. At the time, the US was fighting a war in Afghanistan and it had already begun planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thus, London understood that Washington needed to withdraw its forces from the Balkans in order to redeploy them in strategically more important theatres⁷¹.

It is also worth remembering that, with regards to Europe's security and defence policy, the British government's default position was to cooperate with its European partners. Unlike its Conservative predecessors in the 1980's and 1990's, the Labour government did not suffer from similar Eurosceptic resistance to almost all forms of EU-level cooperation that had handicapped the Thatcher and Major governments. The Labour government was keen to cooperate with its European partners on issues that it saw to be in the UK's interest, one of them being the creation of a EU defence capability. Frustrated by Europe's impotence during the wars of Yugoslav secession in the 1990s, Britain committed itself to the construction of a credible European defence policy at the 1998 Franco-British summit at St. Malo. Furthermore, Europe's inability to stop Serb ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 without the US convinced Britain of the need for 'a proper European defence strategy.'⁷² In order to realise these goals, London was already supporting the handover of NATO's Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia to the EU. Therefore, it is likely that Britain would have supported a SFOR handover for the same reasons.

Waiting for NATO's Approval

In January 2003, London began to step up its public support for an eventual EU takeover of SFOR. As NATO had already expressed that it would like to see the Europeans to take the lead in both Bosnia and Macedonia⁷³, Britain did not have to worry that supporting a CSDP follow-up operation to SFOR would run against the interests of its American ally. On January 24, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for

⁷¹ *The Guardian*. 'Britain Rejects Plans to Extend EU Defence Powers', (London, UK; 21 December 2002).

⁷² Tony Blair. *A Journey*, (London, UK; Hutchinson; 2010), p. 227.

⁷³ *The Financial Times*. 'Nato presses Europe to take lead in the Balkans', (London, UK; 21 January 2003).

Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Mike O'Brien explained the British government's position on the possible transfer of authority in Bosnia. Mr O'Brien told that the government 'would anticipate' that, as in the case of Macedonia, the EU's Bosnia operation would be planned and conducted in the framework of Berlin Plus⁷⁴. He saw that the operation would support Britain's long-term strategy of moving the country 'in a European direction' and that the EU's Macedonia operation would be 'useful preparation' for the more demanding operation in Bosnia. However, O'Brien also emphasised that the possible handover of SFOR to the EU 'would not mean the end' of NATO's presence in Bosnia as the he Alliance would continue its Partnership for Peace activities. Thus, the British government was behind the proposed EU takeover of SFOR, but only if it took place under close cooperation with NATO.

The British government continued its steady support for a CSDP successor operation to SFOR the following month. On February 4, Prime Minister Blair travelled to the annual Franco-British summit at Le Touquet to meet with President Chirac. The summit produced a declaration on strengthening European defence cooperation that reconfirmed that both countries 'welcome' the EU's intention to undertake a CSDP military operation in Bosnia⁷⁵. It also mentioned that this could happen in 'early 2004', which was the first time London had set a time for the possible transfer of authority in Bosnia in public. Three weeks later at an External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, Jack Straw, the British Foreign Minister, and Dominique de Villepin, his French counterpart, presented a joint proposal that called for a 'seamless transition, based on a shared strategic military analysis between the two (Nato and EU) organisations'⁷⁶. The ministers emphasised that the CSDP operation 'should not be weaker than [sic] the Nato force it replaces' and the Alliance should start planning 'at the earliest opportunity' for the transition. After the meeting, the British government reported that ministers from other EU Member States had 'joined the UK in stressing the importance of a robust mandate and close co-operation with NATO.'⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Mike O'Brien. 'European Defence and the NATO/EU Relationship', (London, UK; 24 January 2003).

⁷⁵ Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes. 'Declaration on strengthening European cooperation in security and defence'.

⁷⁶ *The Financial Times*. 'British-French wins backing of Foreign Ministers', (London, UK; 25 February 2003).

⁷⁷ House of Commons Written Answers. 'General Affairs and External Relations Council', (London, UK; 04 March 2003).

As Washington's push to launch a pre-emptive war against Iraq and the transatlantic tensions that followed came to dominate European capitals' everyday foreign policy agendas in March, the British government entered into a period of silence over the proposed handover of SFOR to the EU. Prime Minister Blair, 'one of America's closest and best allies in the War on Terror'⁷⁸, had pledged to Washington that Britain would support the US war effort even without UN Security Council authorisation. This caused enormous tension in the UK's relations with France and Germany, who were the loudest anti-war voices in Europe. Britain's relations with its continental partners were further strained by Paris and Berlin's the decision to go ahead with the "gang of four" proposal to set up an autonomous EU military headquarters in Tervuren, Brussels, which also made the issue of handing over SFOR's responsibilities to the EU highly charged. Britain's position on the Tervuren proposal was that the government would 'not accept anything that undermines Nato or conflicts with the basis of European defence we have set out'⁷⁹. Thus, London was unlikely to move further with the SFOR handover until France and Germany were ready to compromise over the Tervuren proposal.

Britain reached a partial compromise over the issue with its continental partners in September. Although the disagreements over a EU military headquarters was not fully resolved at the time, Britain and the US were appeased by the assurances of France and Germany that NATO would continue to serve as the 'basis of collective defence for its members'⁸⁰. This paved the way for further progress on the proposed handover of NATO's military operations in Bosnia to the EU at the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Rome, where EU Member States agreed to set up a working group to consider options for the EU's future role in Bosnia⁸¹. It also enabled NATO to agree informally to a CSDP successor to SFOR in October at the informal meeting of the Alliance's defence ministers at Colorado Springs, and then officially in December at a formal meeting in Brussels.

⁷⁸ Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney. *In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir*. (New York, US-NY; Threshold Editions; 2011).

⁷⁹ *The Daily Telegraph*. 'Blair fears new Cold War over EU rift with US', (London, UK; 29 April 2003).

⁸⁰ *The Independent*. 'Blair Heals Rift'.

⁸¹ US Embassy Rome. 'EU informal defense ministers meeting in Rome'.

Planning and Launch

After the had EU initiated political-strategic planning for a CSDP successor force to SFOR, tensions between NATO and the Union surfaced over the exact division of labour in Bosnia between the upcoming EU force and the residual NATO presence that would remain in the country after SFOR's conclusion. Many EU Member States as well as CFSP High Representative Solana were arguing forcefully that the Union should take over all of SFOR's functions, including tracking ICTY-indicted war criminals, in order to appear credible in the eyes of the Bosnian people⁸². However, Britain believed that the residual NATO presence 'should retain some operational activities, such as hunting for indicted war criminals and counter-terrorist operations.'⁸³ London wanted to see Bosnia 'on an irreversible track towards European and Euro Atlantic integration', which it saw could happen only with the assistance of both NATO and the EU⁸⁴. The British government continued to maintain this position in the run-up to the adoption of the EU's General Concept at the External Relations Council on April 27⁸⁵, as well as after its adoption. Defence Minister Geoffrey Hoon explained to the House of Common on May 17 that the British government expects the coming EU force to 'provide the security framework to enable political and economic development to continue' in Bosnia, whereas NATO would focus on 'defence reform, including advising the Bosnians on NATO accession' and operational tasks such as counter-terrorism and support of the ICTY⁸⁶.

Britain's views on the delineation of tasks between NATO and the EU remained firm in the run-up to the Alliance's June 2004 summit in Istanbul that made the formal decision to conclude SFOR by the end of the year. The summit also confirmed that the Alliance would continue providing advice to Bosnia on defence reform and undertake certain operation tasks, such as counter-terrorism and tracking war criminals. This meant that Britain's views had prevailed over those of other EU Member States, such as France, who were arguing that the EU should inherit all of SFOR's previous functions. The results of NATO's Istanbul summit paved the way

⁸² US Embassy Rome. 'Solana on Bosnia: Partnership Requires Trust, Too', (Brussels, Belgium; 12 March 2004).

⁸³ House of Commons Written Answers. 'Bosnia-Herzegovina', (London, UK; 06 February 2004).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ House of Commons Written Answers. 'Bosnia', (London, UK; 19 April 2004).

⁸⁶ House of Commons. 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', (London, UK; 17 May 2004).

for the EU Council's adoption of the Joint Action on a military operation in Bosnia on July 12, which appointed an experienced British officer and future Director General of the EU Military Staff, Major General A. David Leakey, as EUFOR's first Force Commander⁸⁷. General Leakey's appointment followed London's decision in October 2003 at NATO's informal defence ministerial at Colorado Springs to lead the eventual CSDP force in Bosnia⁸⁸. The British government made this decision to appease concerned voices in Washington, who were concerned after the "gang of four" debacle that the operation might be used by France and Germany as another opportunity to assert Europe's independence over NATO.

The military-strategic phase of EUFOR Althea's planning process did not present any major surprises for the British government. Since British officers occupied all the most important positions in the operation's chain of command from Operation Commander to Force Commander, the government did not have to worry about having its views heard. Some EU Member States disagreed with Britain's view that the EU would not have to sign a new Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) with Bosnia since EUFOR was taking over from SFOR, but this issue was ultimately solved in the UK's favour in the UN Security Council Resolution 1575 that authorised EUFOR. The Concept of Operations was drafted under the direction of General Sir John Reith, the Operation Commander, and agreed without discussion by the General Affairs Council on September 13. This was followed by a single force generation conference on September 15, where Britain pledged to provide approximately 950 troops consisting mostly of Grenadier Guards, making it EUFOR's largest troop contributor. When the operation took over from SFOR on December 2, Operation Commander Sir Reith brushed aside scepticism that the force would not be as capable as SFOR by declaring that '(a)nybody who was even thinking about testing our mettle would see that it is not worth their while.'⁸⁹

4. CONCLUSION

⁸⁷ *Official Journal of the European Union*. 'Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina', (Brussels, Belgium; 12 July 2004).

⁸⁸ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. 'EU kann Mission Despin Bosnien übernehmen', (Frankfurt, Germany; 22 November 2003).

⁸⁹ *The Independent*. 'EU Army takes over in Bosnia Where Hatreds still Simmer Despite Peace', (London, UK; 02 December 2004).

As this paper showed, the deployment of EUFOR Althea was possible because the participating EU Member States saw it as a lucrative joint product activity that produced both public and private goods. By continuing to provide stability in Bosnia and serving as a deterrent against nationalistic movements and organised crime, EUFOR produced a public good that could be enjoyed by the entire EU and the international community at large. During the period from the Copenhagen European Council to EUFOR's deployment, France, Germany and the UK indicated they all believed that the international community should continue to maintain a military presence in the country even after SFOR's conclusion. None of them wanted to see Bosnia relapse into the type of chaos and ethnic violence that had plagued the Balkans throughout the 1990's and costs thousands of lives.

It is unlikely, however, that France, Germany, and the UK would have pushed for the handover of SFOR's stabilisation responsibilities in Bosnia to the EU already in 2002 if it had produced only a relatively pure public good. The case studies show that all countries thought that the transfer of authority in Bosnia from SFOR to EUFOR should lead to a reduction in their military presence in Bosnia and save national resources. It should be remembered that at the time EUFOR was deployed, France, Germany, and the UK were sustaining large deployments in Iraq and/or Afghanistan or both, which was putting considerable strain on their armed forces. Thus, the economic rationale to save national resources seems to have been a more compelling reason for their desire to handover SFOR's responsibilities to the EU than its public goods feature.

The case studies showed that the countries supported the deployment of EUFOR also because it allowed them add credibility to the EU's embryonic military structures. In other words, they expected the deployment to support the production of a European private good in the form of a more robust CSDP. However, they had very different perspectives on what this European private good should look like and what its relationship should be vis-à-vis NATO. These perspectives clashed after the "gang of four" proposed setting up an autonomous EU military headquarters in Tervuren, which raised concerns in Britain and the US that France and Germany were pushing for the handover of SFOR's responsibilities to the EU to undermine NATO's primacy in Europe. Thus, there was clash between two distinct schools of thought on the role

of CSDP vis-à-vis NATO, which explains the transatlantic and intra-European differences over EUFOR's deployment in 2003.