

# **UACES 42<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference**

**Passau, 3-5 September 2012**

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

**[www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)**

# **THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE 1990s**

Paper submitted for the UACES Conference in Passau  
3-5 September 2012

Author: Christos Marazopoulos

PhD Candidate

Dept. of Politics, Languages and International Studies (PoLIS)

University of Bath (UK)

**(please do not cite this paper unless you have permission from the author)**

## **1. Introduction**

The discussion of the European Union's governance and its external role and dimension has been heavily debated in the last decades. The most innovative contributions have stemmed from the social constructivist literature. It focuses on the EU as a model that is prone to export itself by encouraging regional institutionalisation and integration. The 'EU model' is both a process and an end-product and can be considered its unique selling point in relation to other international actors. In foreign policy expressions, constructivist thinking has tried to avoid explaining the EU as if it were 'an incompetent state' (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 3). Instead, it has advocated efforts to 'rethink' the type of EU's foreign policy and to apply new or alternative approaches to the study of its global role (Tonra 2003). This paper sits in the realm of the literature that understands the EU's external relations founded not solely on a state-centred view and on material-based explanations, but highlights the importance of the trajectories of ideational structures reproduced through social interaction (Meyer and Strickmann 2011: 62; Wendt 1999).

One of constructivist basic assertions is that there is no ontological primacy between agent and structure; actor's identity and options for choice as well as institutional structures exist and evolve in a process of co-constitution. It is acknowledged that this co-constitution "*makes it difficult to build models and causality chains*" (Meyer 2011: 672). Frequently, the links between the two are acknowledged in principle, and not elaborated with theoretical or empirical details. Nevertheless, with reference to the European Union, the interest of this article lies at the synergy of its 'being' and 'doing' (Bretherton and Vogeler 1999; Hill 1996; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002). This process of interaction has been taken up by scholars, such as Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman who investigated how the nature of the EU is an ongoing "*contestation of complex, multiple (and) relational identities*" (Manners and Whitman 2003: 397). Looking at world politics, they focus on the EU's international identity reflexively as an "*an attempt to think about how the EU is constituted, constructed, and represented internationally*" (ibid.: 383).

This paper shares the above assumptions but is interested to reverse the picture and investigate what we understand the EU when it socially represents 'Others'. When studying how a repertoire of an organisation or a supranational body, such as the European Commission, brings about and constructs a policy (idea). In particular, how, when and what type of social representations has the European Commission employed in its external

relations within the EU's normative and institutional framework? The case of the Western Balkans and its construction by the European Commission is studied here. The paper investigates into the long history of the engagement of the Commission with the region – from Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans in the 1990s. In order to achieve this, the paper regards these two as a system of meanings, as signifiers. The past constitutes a laboratory from which we draw examples to match and interpret current developments and events in terms of historical patterns – while also limiting our ability to predict the future (Mahant 1995: 485). Regarding the Western Balkans in particular, it is known that the notion of the Western Balkans has rarely managed to make much sense outside the EU policy-making world; even as a regional system, it has not escaped a status of a geographic group with no more than loose ties among the local actors<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, this study here explores the role of social representations that were held before and immediately after the emergence of the Western Balkans' signifier and will aim to shed some concrete light on the broad question of the co-constitutive nature of international politics.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

Ian Hurd (2008) believes that constructivist literature is mainly opposed to materialism; unlike Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore who view rationalism as the opposite to social constructivism (1999: 702). The attempt of constructivism to reconcile structural and behavioural approaches derives from sociological theory (like Giddens' structuration theory). As Steinmo and Thelen argue, "*people don't stop at every choice they make in their life and think to themselves, 'Now what will maximize my self-interest?' Instead, most of us, most of the time, follow socially defined rules, even when doing so may not be directly in our self-interest*" (1992: 8). Extending their argument, policy-making decisions rely on those mental maps which enable actors to provide content and meaning to social structures and to navigate and interpret politics and political geography. The focus on social representations provides a way of unpacking the preferences of these 'reasonable actors' (Mérand 2006: 132). Social representations may be articulated in discourse (as they often are the subject of discussion among actors) to justify actions and/or persuade others to act. Glynis M. Breakwell describes them as "*public rhetorics used by groups to engender cohesiveness and manoeuvre relative to other groups*" (1993: 199). Studying European politics – from a constructivist perspective -

---

<sup>1</sup> On local perceptions of their regional environment, see the seminal work by Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002).

highlights the importance of discursive construction of meanings (borders, regions, ‘Others’, human rights – to name a few). The article contends that, in the external relations field, it is crucial to understand the construction of social representations as a thick concept working as a middle-range theory<sup>2</sup>; social representations here refers to *the institutional elaboration of concepts and images towards political signifiers (such as policies or international events) which help organise forms of life*.

Focusing on social representations, we are taken to a broad body of literature that goes beyond the field of politics. Cultural studies and Sociology have widely included this term in their works, but it has not been systematically adopted in Politics. The substantial work done leads us to trace two key processes which define and grasp the construction and imposition of a social representation:

- (i) the process of anchoring
- (ii) the process of objectifying<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the *anchoring* process of a social representation, we assert that actors strive to form systematised social elaborations in their effort to make international reality intelligible to them. Within this logic, actors strategically associate – or, anchor, as is the proper term – their own substantial structures, their ‘being’, to the socially-represented signifier (see below a detailed discussion of this term). In relation to the content of the EU’s ‘being’, this paper identifies three structural pillars: identity, norms/values and practices/experiences<sup>4</sup>. What needs to be studied then is how each qualitatively relates and fills the content of the signifier. With regard to the *objectifying* process of a social representation, this paper studies the way actors “*deliberately tried to ‘sell’ policy ideas to other actors*” (Elgström 2000: 458). Actors do not only form or hold representations, but equally they strive to export them; it refers to the EU’s ‘doing’, as we highlighted previously. Thanks to this process, even abstract or hazy signifiers may be used by everyone and modified like real objects (Sarrica and Contarello 2004: 550). The objectification of a social representation requires some ‘cogs and wheels’

---

<sup>2</sup> This term was coined by Robert King Merton who believes in the necessity for sociological theory constructed between minor working hypothesis and master conceptual schemes (Calhoun 2010).

<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed discussion on the emergence and use of these concepts in fields such as social psychology, see Sarrica and Contarello 2004.

<sup>4</sup> In the words of the official work programme of the European Commission about the EU as a reliable partner in the international arena of 1995, the central elements are the assertion of the EU’s identity in political terms, the adherence to principles (democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms) and the optimum use of every means available at its disposal.

that (i) establish patterns of trust and convergence (Finnemore 2008: 75) and (b) render understandable the social reality (Hernes 1998: 74). In the EU context, the study has revealed three social procedures or mechanisms that are mainly used in the objectifying process: legitimation, appropriateness and institutionalisation.

The centrality of the social representations in understanding European policy-making reality leads the paper to engage with the concept of *signifiers*. The Western Balkans is used in this paper as an instance of an externally-promoted project. Signifiers are used here, because the emphasis lies less on the search of a checklist of ‘objective’ criteria and more on the ideas and concepts attached to political objects. Associating signifier to the study of social representations, we are driven to look at two key aspects: first, a signifier consists of central nucleus which refers to (brute) facts that are socially accepted in the political space; and second, a signifier has peripheral elements, which are prone to interpretation and contestation. On the basis of this analysis, there is gap identified between the signifier/central nucleus (the Western Balkans as a collection of states with geographic/cartographic characteristics) and the signified (what the Western Balkans represents). Therefore, the signifier is in some sense ‘empty’ and able to be ‘filled’ by varying agents and forces (Brigg and Muller 2009: 133).

In this article, the social construction of the Western Balkans is explored by examining the structure-agentic fabric of the social representations of the European Commission in its regional approach through the study of the vast number of policy documents and discursive productions. The Commission is an actor grounded in promoting ‘talk and practice’ that stems from the social representations it formulates. We will look at its role as a “*strategically important and sophisticated institutional actor, possessed of the resources and scope to crucially influence the direction of EU policy-making*” (O’ Brennan 2006: 74). The task is about understanding how ‘the EU does it regional’ and therefore we need to look the forces that enable such a policy choice. In relation to the emergence of the Western Balkans, we study the 1990s, which includes the period before and after the introduction of the Western Balkans’ regional signifier in the European policy-making jargon. In the period before the Dayton Accords of November-December 1995, we will examine Yugoslavia as a contested and contesting signifier, as represented by the European Commission and how this impacted on the construction of the Western Balkans as an amorphous regional signifier. In particular, we will look at the way the Commission anchored the social representation of Yugoslavia and

the Western Balkans to its (past) practices and experiences and how it objectified the representation via the social mechanism of institutionalisation. In other words (and paraphrasing Alexander Wendt's famous quote) the Western Balkans is what the European Commission made of it.

### **3. Yugoslavia as a contested and contesting signifier**

Studying the representation of Yugoslavia in the period of the tectonic changes in Europe after 1989, our attention is on the European Commission and its under-studied role in this period<sup>5</sup>. It is true that, despite the increased responsibilities acquired from the Treaty of the European Union, the Commission lacked broadly the relevant experience and the legitimacy to deal directly with the full extent of problems arising from the region. Irrespective of the fairly restricted role given to the Commission during the war, we assert that it was an important preparatory period, because the Commission was "*the motor of new policies*" (Mayhew 1998: 174) with its high profile in crucial EU policies. The paper coincides with John O'Brennan's line of argument that, from the institution of relations with the former Communist bloc in 1989, the Commission carved out for itself a more significant role than that ascribed in Article 49 of the TEU: the Commission became an entrepreneur that acted both in a functional-bureaucratic and in a normative-political manner (2006: 74-75). Even Andrew Moravcsik concedes that the ability to select among viable proposals grants the Commission considerable formal agenda-setting power (1993: 511-512).

The European Commission realised early its limited capabilities in influencing directly outcomes and it strived to adopt sui generis policy frameworks towards (the former) Yugoslavia. The contestation became the signified element when socially representing Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was strategically used as a sui generis, European signifier able to challenge the EU's 'being' and 'doing'. Yugoslavia's social representation acquired a double function – it was a contesting signifier in the European Union's anchoring process and a contested signifier when studying the objectifying process. In the part below, we will look how this representation was anchored to the EU's 'practices and experiences' and was subsequently objectified through institutionalisation.

---

<sup>5</sup> Notable exceptions here are Roy H. Ginsberg 2001; John O'Brennan 2006; and Andrew Mayhew 1998.

### *Anchoring Process: Practices and Experiences*

The 1992 Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) established the second, inter-governmental pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which solidified a long process of informal relations on foreign policy matters among the EC member states. However, the end-result did not satisfy some European actors, such as the European Commission, that were expecting the European Political Cooperation (the predecessor of CFSP) and the provisions of the Single European Act (SEA) to be turned into a pillar that would be based on the Community method. George Ross notes that Jacques Delors' cherished goal of the European Community - being an important international player - did not meet his expectations (1995: 92). The outcome of the two IGCs firmly kept the CFSP away from the supranational institutions, and only leaving the Commission a marginal part of being *associated with* the work carried out in the CFSP field (TEU Article J.9). The events of Yugoslavia became a test tube for this new institutionalised and basically intergovernmental format to see how it worked out in practice (Rees 1995: 4). In this troubled period for the Balkans, the Commission was anchoring Yugoslavia as a signifier contesting (the deficiencies of) the European project in the field of foreign policy.

At the time of transition in the Central and Eastern Europe, the Commission was not given any new substantial Community competence in fields other than the economic and social ones. Initial Commission policies offered Trade and Cooperation Agreements (TCAs) to the ex-communist countries. The basis of the agreements was trade liberalisation covering all products<sup>6</sup>. The broad ideas that were included in the agreements with Yugoslavia and Romania in the 1980s were used as the guiding frames for the approaches to the CEE. As stated in the Commission's communication on the development of relations with the CEE countries "*the Commission's responsibilities and the expectations of partner countries have given it a key role in helping to create conditions for economic wellbeing, stability and confidence in Europe. The Community, drawing on its particular experience, has been able to make an important contribution [...]*" (Commission 1990a: 2).

Yugoslavia signified the limits and problems of the European Union according to the Commission. Commissioner Leon Brittan foresaw in 1992 that there is a "*need for enhanced European defence and regional security capability*" following the tragedy in Yugoslavia

---

<sup>6</sup> Some exceptions were made on items such as coal, steel, textiles and clothing, because particular member states insisted on.

(Speech 1992a). The degree of an active EU ready to take on international responsibilities was undermined by Yugoslavia – a challenge that Europe should not accept watching unfold by waiting the US to act first (Delors Speech 1992). Commissioner Pinheiro further highlighted what he thought as a threefold problem: the lack of a comprehensive (from diplomatic to peace-making) strategy, the underdeveloped EU military capacity (hinting mainly though towards the limited capacity of the Western European Union/WEU) and the ineffective institutional structure of the foreign and security policies that restrict European political will (Speech 1993).

From Delors's point of view, in two different speeches he expressed the views of the European Commission. He went a step ahead from previous Commissioners by 'breaking the mould' of Europe being a civilian power in international politics. He condemned the weakness of the EU to project and impose decisions made for Yugoslavia by committing troops on the ground - even with UN endorsement (Doughty 1992). His criticism was less concerned on the role of individual member-states and diverging foreign policy interests, but he focused on a more institutional critique of the absence of a European-level, joint action. Yugoslavia exposed a European structural deficit in dealing with political and military crises primarily in EU's neighbourhood, but also in the outside world to adapt structures for cooperation and collective security. The thesis concurs with claims made by Jacques Delors himself that the changes in the international system after 1989 turned rather complacent the reflexes of the relevant, European institutions. Delors believed that the EC miscalculated and that "*we were all preoccupied with the problems of German unification and the fate of Gorbachev and the former Soviet Union*" and understood that the past practices and experiences of Europeans to offer economic incentives to resolve disputes, were contested in practice in the case of Yugoslavia (Speech 1993b).

#### *Objectifying Process: Institutionalisation*

In this period until the Dayton Accords, the European Commission adopted two approaches to Yugoslavia. The first refers to the technocratic, financial assistance where the Commission was the coordinating body. The main policy instrument was the PHARE programme which became an all-embracing framework for international actors to re-build and aid the region. The PHARE programme was run by the Commission and it extended to all parties in the Balkans with degrees of variation dependent on their role in the conflict. Institutional relations were created between the different republics and some of the Commission's DGs on

particular sectoral policies. The second approach was an EU-specific policy, meaning the instrument of association with the Community: the Europe Agreement (EA). These EAs defined the level of proximity to the European institutional core. In the case of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia, the EU's strategy was to group the different states in the former Yugoslavia together. The Commission's organisational structure became indicative of the institutionalisation process of the social representation held for Yugoslavia – a contested signifier. Three Commissions were involved in the period under investigation here, two under Jacques Delors (-1992) and (1993-1994) and one under Jacques Santer (1995-).

The European Commission external relations' portfolio of the period 1989-1992 had a more simple, but clear-cut structure. Four Commissioners were involved: RELEX (Frans Andriessen), Development (Manuel Marin) and Mediterranean Policy and North South Relations (Abel Matutes). Focusing on the DG External Relations, we see that the European affairs were all part of one Directory in charge of two major tasks: (i) coordinating the G24 assistance; relations with CEE countries, former Soviet Union and CSCE<sup>7</sup>; and multilateral issues for these countries and, (ii) PHARE programme; and EFTA and bilateral relations with the countries of northern and central Europe other than state-trading countries. The first point is that all European, non-EC member states were handled by one Directory<sup>8</sup>. Delving into this Directory, we look into the Departments dealing with the particular countries in Europe. We find three such Departments; the first is about general issues concerning the former Soviet Union and Albania, the second on technical assistance to the former Soviet Union and the third on relations with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.

We deduct two points studying these aspects. The first point is that on sectoral policies of the European Commission, such as technical and economic aspects, four out of five republics of the former Yugoslavia (meaning all but Serbia and Montenegro) had developed particular ties and agreements. The new Republics started participating in the PHARE programme or receive provisions granted by the PHARE programme – PHARE is a policy for European states and dealt with in the 'European' Directory of the DG RELEX (Commission 1992 General Report: 284-285). Such PHARE policies were addressed to 'the Republics of former

---

<sup>7</sup> CSCE was replaced by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) from 1 January 1995.

<sup>8</sup> This Directory had a large and growing number of responsibilities with issues spanning from technical aspects (such as PHARE and multilateral programmes) to enlargement discussions (Finland, Iceland, Austria and Sweden).

Yugoslavia', such as the agricultural aid policies and infrastructure programmes. In addition, we observe that other DGs were directly engaged with particular emergent states from former Yugoslavia: Slovenia and Croatia in DG Research and Technology (COST programme), Slovenia in DG Education, Training and Youth (Tempus programme) and DG Transport (transit issues), FYROM, Croatia, BiH and Slovenia given Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)<sup>9</sup> for agricultural products (General Report 1992). The second point though that we observe is that, politically, Yugoslavia did not appear to be dealt with the 'Europe' Department in DG RELEX. Yugoslavia was classified in the Mediterranean Policy Directory under the North Mediterranean Department. This is further verified when reading the annual General Report of 1992, published by the Commission, where Yugoslavia is explicitly discussed with other Mediterranean countries.

The Delors' last college (1993-1994) introduced a dual representation of the external relations of the European Commission: (i) one Directory working on the economic side under Commissioner Leon Brittan (DGI External Economic Affairs and Commercial Policy for the Western World, China, CIS and Europe, including CEE countries) and being the successor of the previous DG RELEX and (ii) one on the political side under Commissioner Hans van den Broek (DGIA External Political Affairs, CFSP and Enlargement Negotiations) which was set up from scratch<sup>10</sup>. These new divisions did little to change the general approach to Yugoslavia. An Economist article in 1993 said that the squabbles between the Commissioners as to the areas of responsibilities have ensured that little energy and time was devoted on issues such as GATT, Yugoslavia and economic aid to Eastern Europe (The Economist 1993). The gist was that Yugoslavia was split between the three DGs.

In particular, DGI's Directory L was in charge of relations with countries of Central and Eastern Europe consisting of two Departments: (i) Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states and (ii) Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. What is worth noting is that Albania was grouped here with two other Balkan states despite their different institutional statuses. Nevertheless, Albania was not placed with the Department on issues

---

<sup>9</sup> The EC/EU's Generalised System of Preferences is a trade arrangement through which the EC/EU provides preferential access to its market. The preferences are non reciprocal, non discriminatory and they apply to all developing countries though with some restrictions on products and volumes at times. Semi manufactured and manufactured products and a number of processed agricultural products originating in all developing countries are imported duty free into the Common Market (Commission 1976b: 4).

<sup>10</sup> The third, external relations portfolio remained under Manuel Marin – DG Development and Humanitarian Aid.

with the former Soviet Union as previously done and was recognised to belong to the European group now. Regarding DG Development and Humanitarian Aid, Yugoslavia was dealt with in the Directory H, Department 1 on North Mediterranean<sup>11</sup> – a continuation this time of the previous policy of the second Delors Commission. Finally, the DGIA, which aspired to become a minimal diplomatic centre of the Commission after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, had a more political structure. It is this DG that was to acquire increasingly more important roles in the years to come due to its key priority tasks of enlargement, as well as political and security issues. The Directory B was charged with all European states, as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and it dealt with them on the basis of regional groupings: (i) Central and Eastern Europe, (ii) CIS, (iii) North Mediterranean, Cyprus, Turkey and Malta, and (iv) EFTA countries.

The new Commission did not alter the basic parameters of the approach to Yugoslavia. On economic, technical and aid aspects, Yugoslavia was eclipsing in the policies of the Commission, and an increase of policies was extended to the other Republics. Slovenia, in the years 1993-1994, was clearly distinguished from any other state of the former Yugoslavia with its full participation in the PHARE programme<sup>12</sup>. Studying the annual General Reports published between 1992-1994, we measure a steady decline of references to former Yugoslavia, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Specifically, we find that Yugoslavia is referred 49 times in 1992 (8.8% of the total number of pages), 31 times in 1993 (5.8%) and 32 references in 1994 (5.5%). In addition to this, former Yugoslavia continues to exist in sectoral policies in 1992 in the DGs RELEX, Agriculture, Transport, ECFIN and Humanitarian Aid, when in 1994 we only trace it in the DGs RELEX and Humanitarian Aid. When looking at the political relations, the Commission obviously preferred to deal with former Yugoslavia in a more collective manner. Yugoslavia was again treated under the North Mediterranean banner – in the case of DG RELEX, it was part of the Mediterranean Policy and in the DGIA External Political Relations, it was a North Mediterranean one, but classified this time in the Directory of Europe.

---

<sup>11</sup> This Directory H was formally placed in the DG RELEX, but it answered to Commissioner Manuel Marin of DG Development and Humanitarian Aid, who was overseeing the works of the Directory.

<sup>12</sup> PHARE programmes, in which Slovenia was a full participant and apart from policies for the former Yugoslavia, were: (i) Programme for vocational education and training reform, (ii) Programme for energy and the environment, (iii) Cross-border cooperation programme with Italy, (iv) General Technical Assistance Facility (GTAF), and (v) Public Administration (SIGMA programme) Date from the PHARE 1994 Annual Report from the European Commission, COM(94) 366 final, 20.7.1995.

In 1995, when the new European Commission came in power under the former Prime-Minister of Luxemburg, Jacques Santer, he pronounced in his speech to the European Parliament in January that the effort is to introduce a strategic thinking in the External Relations portfolio and that the re-organisation of the DG RELEX will be based “*along geographical lines, so that a Member of the Commission with responsibility for a given area of the world will be responsible for all aspects of it*” (Santer Speech 17 January 1995). This was a criticism on the previous division of the Commission which had a strong thematic (political vs. economic) character. The new External Relations portfolio of the Commission was comprised of four DGs<sup>13</sup>, but now only one was now in charge of all European affairs, the Directory run by Commissioner Hans van den Broek.

Based on these, the DG RELEX divided Europe in three components. Directory B dealt with countries of Central Europe (Dept. 1 on the G24 coordination of financial assistance, Dept. 2 on Poland the Baltic States, Dept. 3 on Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia and Dept. 4 on Romania and Bulgaria); Directory C was responsible for relations with the CIS and Mongolia; and Directory D was entitled ‘Relations with other European countries’. Of special interest is the organisation of this Directory, because for the first time we observe evidence of organising this particular region of the Balkans into a regional group that would be later called *Western Balkans*. This Directory D had four Departments: the first which was just mentioned, included ‘Albania and the countries of former Yugoslavia’; the second included Cyprus, Malta and Turkey; the third was about the EFTA countries; and the fourth on financial management other than PHARE help.

Two conclusions are drawn: first, Slovenia was cut off by the Commission with regard to anything relating to Yugoslavia. By the end of 1995, a European Agreement was initialled. Although with certain trade policies, Slovenia was included in regulations with other Republics from the former Yugoslavia<sup>14</sup>, the political weight of the start of an association

---

<sup>13</sup> These four particular DGs are: DG External Relations for North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, Korea, Hong-Kong, Macao and Taiwan and Commercial Policy (Sir Leon Brittan); DG External Relations for South Mediterranean, Near East, Far East, Latin America and Asia (with the exception of Japan, China, Korea, Hong-Kong, Macao and Taiwan) including issues of development (Manuel Marin); DG External Relations for Africans, Caribbean and the Pacific countries (ACP), and South Africa, including issues of development and the Lomé Convention; DG External Relations for countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), countries of former USSR, Mongolia, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and other European countries, as well as CFSP and Human Rights and the Commission’s External Service (Hans van den Broek).

<sup>14</sup> Such EU trade relations, in which Slovenia was included with other former-Yugoslav Republics, were: (i) Council Regulation (EC) No 3355/94 on the arrangements for imports into the Community of products

agreement disassociated Ljubljana completely from the rest former Yugoslav Republics. Second, Albania was drawn away from CEE and Romania/Bulgaria not on the basis of the technical aspects and financial assistance policies, but from a political standpoint. Earlier in the year, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)<sup>15</sup> published an opinion which was given to the Commission regarding Albania. The Committee considered that Albania's democratization process was under threat by the structural fragility of the economy and strategic and security issues in the Balkans. The European Union should conduct a proper policy of aid for Albania, which "*was both a Central European country and a Mediterranean non-member country*". It is one of the first references that associate Albania with Yugoslavia. The attachment of Albania to Yugoslavia's signifier become apparent from the first, monthly Bulletins published by the Commission in 1996; Albania was discussed in the Northern Mediterranean section next to Malta, Turkey, FYROM, BiH and former Yugoslavia (Bulletin 1-2 1996: 95). Summing up this objectifying process, Yugoslavia was a contested signifier, as the institutionalisation process of the Commission has shown.

#### **4. The Western Balkans as an amorphous regional signifier**

With the completion of the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the European Commission became more eager to establish a voice and a role in the external relations. The transformation from Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans began, as we noticed in the previous chapter, since the mid-1995 and was systematically discussed in the publications of the Commission from 1996 onwards; succeedingly, the European Parliament took on board the adoption of a regionally based approach for the four countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania (EP Report 1997: 6); until finally becoming officially referenced for the first time by the European Council in the Vienna Declaration of 1998. The de-construction of Yugoslavia

---

originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Bull. 12-1994, point 1.3.59;

(ii) Council Regulation (EC) No 3356/94 opening and providing for the administration of Community tariff quotas for certain products originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1995): OJ L353, 31.12.1994;

(iii) Council Regulation (EC) No 3357/94 establishing ceilings and Community surveillance for imports of certain products originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1995): Bull. 12-1994, point 1.3.59.

<sup>15</sup> The European Economic and Social Committee is a consultative body of the European Union that gives representatives of Europe's socio-occupational interest groups, and others, a formal platform to express their points of views on EU issues. Its opinions are forwarded to the larger institutions - the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. Committed to European integration, the EESC contributes to strengthening the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU by enabling civil society organisations from the Member States to express their views at European level.

and its transformation into a regional formation allowed the EU and the Commission in particular to implement a regional thinking in its policies - what Karen E. Smith describes as the export goal of the EU and a model of multilateral, inter-state relations (2004: 144). The encouragement of regional cooperative domains has been thought to define the EU itself as well as other regional groups affiliated to the EU (ACP, Med). In this sense, the transition of the fragmented landscape of Yugoslavia into a functioning region has been a political imprint of the EU. However, the idea was met with challenges both in the anchoring and the objectifying process.

This thesis adopts the view that the European Commission's social representation of the Western Balkans until the end of 1990s was of an '*amorphous regional signifier*'. It is based on the fact that two aspects hindered the development of the Western Balkans in this period. The first refers to the divergent approaches between the two key European Union institutions that run the external affairs: the Council and the Commission. Regional cooperation was introduced as the main idea of the Commission for the region to overcome its war legacies. Regional dynamics are an autonomous force of their own that can co-create a new environment for Southeastern Europe beside the classic foreign policy one-to-one relations. The idea is that regional and bilateral aspects will feed each other in stabilising and opening new opportunities for local stakeholders. The Council, on the other hand, did not adopt the same understanding of the role of regional structures for the Western Balkans. The Council showed an interest to promote relations with each state in the region and to establish relationships with their political personnel. The regional component in the Council's narrative was based upon the implementation of bilateral agreements. The Council believed that the states themselves have the task and the obligation to run their regional affairs and the bilateral basis is the domain conditioning such a prospect.

The second aspect highlights the dis-interest of the international community to accept the Western Balkans as a new and stable signifier. Regional cooperation was used as a medium and a goal (mostly rhetorically) in most international endeavours to bring peace and stability to the region, but the differences lay in the shape and content of the regional order. Defining the region was a point of controversy between the policy-makers. The multiplicity of regional schemes revealed diverging representations by the actors involved in the rehabilitation of the Balkans. There were dividing lines about the role of regions and regional projects in post-conflict situations, as well as questions of (externally) ordering them. On one side the

European Commission aimed at (i) containing the focus of its policies to a small number of states, (ii) taking an inclusive approach, and (iii) elevating regional policies as equally important to national/bilateral aspects. The rest international projects aimed at (i) expanding the membership of their project to include a wide range of actors, (ii) adopted a selective policy approach, and (iii) downplayed regional clauses and devoted little to argue for regional solutions.

In the following section, we will look closer at the ways the European Commission managed to construct its social representation of the Western Balkans in the period 1996-1999.

### *Anchoring Process: Practices and Experiences*

The Western Balkans entered the political discussions as the successor of a turbulent state of affairs in need for transformation. When the Dayton Accords were signed, a new reflection and relationship was needed in the Continent. The construction of a new social representation is a vital part for policy-makers to understand the content and shape of the regional signifier, the Western Balkans. Hans van den Broek wrote an article for the European Business Journal that the Union needs to adapt institutionally in anticipation of enlargement that might see “*an increase from 15 to perhaps 25 or even 30 member states*” (1996: 9). He essentially hints to the prospect that not only the CEE countries are soon-to-be members (twenty-five EU member states as of 2004) but he includes the rest of the western Balkans in his calculations (talking about thirty member states) – albeit with an undertone of scepticism. Keeping these in mind, we observe that the norms of regional cooperation and integration were introduced next to the standard norms included in the Copenhagen criteria for the first time for an affiliated to the EU state/region. The anchoring process was dependent here on an in-action on behalf of the Commission to define the terms and conditions of the norms for the Western Balkans. There was an identifiable effort to use regional policies from other regions to the Balkans – a practice which though raised questions since they had been used in previous cases to address non-European regions.

The anchoring of the Western Balkans was not so much based on the experience and practices lend from the Central and Eastern European case, but more from the ones implemented for Yugoslavia – meaning an insistence on sui generis forms of interlinkages. As referred earlier, the Western Balkans was measured and represented in relation to its Yugoslav legacy, rather than the contemporary political developments in the rest of Europe.

First of all, this process was bluntly expressed in the Commission's first communication to the Council and the Parliament in February 1996 when it stressed about a future agreement with the states in this region that there is no need to speculate about "*what they will be like or what they will be called*" (Commission 1996a: 3). Any bilateral or regional agreement would be devised from scratch and would be tailored to the unique circumstances of the region, in the form of 'sui generis' approach(es).

Further to this, the cooperating countries of former Yugoslavia, as the Council statement of the 29-30 April 1997 includes, will be granted economic concessions, such as duty-free access and elimination of quantitative restrictions on industrial and agricultural products. These autonomous preferential measures linked the Western Balkans to past agreements entered with Yugoslavia. The General Affairs Council specifically mentioned that these measures are largely similar to those accorded by the 1980 EEC Yugoslavia cooperation agreement (Council 1997a: 13). In addition, and on a similar note, the Council Ministers decided to follow up a proposal by the European Commission aimed at drawing new ties between the EU and Albania. "*This objective could be achieved by the conclusion of a new sui generis Agreement slightly less ambitious than the agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but more attractive than the current Cooperation Agreement*" referred the announcement (European Report 1996a: 3). The discussions on a new relationship will be in line with certain countries in South-Eastern Europe that "*the European Community has not adopted directives for the negotiation of association agreements*" (Commission 1996c: 1) and will include the issue of the former Yugoslavia (European Report 1996a: 3) and the possibilities offered by the 1992 Trade and Cooperation Agreement in the eve of unrests in the country<sup>16</sup> (Council 1997b). It is indicative that the first official 'regional visit' of the President of the Commission and the Italian Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini<sup>17</sup>, had in the top of its agenda the Commission's regional approach which involved the four, former Yugoslavia republics minus Ljubljana plus Tirana (European Report 1996c: 1-2).

In 1999, we meet a level-changer factor for the EU's external relations and enlargement context – the NATO intervention in Kosovo. "*The changed wider political context necessitates a development of existing policy*" states the all-important European Commission

---

<sup>16</sup> In the first months of 1997, civil disorder in the aftermath of democratic discontent emerged and the collapse of pyramid investment schemes created massive protests and riots in the streets of the major towns, especially in Southern Albania. For further information, see Jarvis 1999; Kola 2003: 321-327.

<sup>17</sup> Italy was holding the rotating Presidency of the EU in the first semester of 1996.

document (1999c: 2) – in the midst of the military operation against the Milosevic regime. The critical juncture of 1999 pushed the Commission to a new direction. The Western Balkans began to be re-considered from a region of a wider Europe to a region part of the inner-European structures with a dynamic to enter in the core of European integration process within a reasonable timeframe. In this sense, 1999 evoked bilateral and regional ‘stipulations’ if it is to properly integrate. Also, the new policy approaches started to be based on European needs and values and not on some generic post-conflict reconstruction aims. Instead of linking and comparing it with ‘Yugoslav privileges and legacies’, it is now being associated with practices and experiences that (i) prevailed in the aftermath of the WWII among western European states and, more crucially, (ii) that was extended the model for the Central and Eastern European countries since the beginning of the 1990s. Both these ‘examples’ become tied up in a more direct and organic manner to the discussion about the Western Balkans. The Commission recognises the dynamics that norms such as democratisation, multi-ethnicity and reform can play in providing a healthy “*example of the progress that can be made*” and “*in the building of practical interdependence*” (Commission 1999c: 1).

The relation of the Western Balkans with developments in the Central and Eastern Europe continues to be a vital point that informs policy choices for the European Commission. In the same way that both history and geopolitics became strong push factors for the integration of the countries of CEE, the same argument is being deployed in the Commission communication for the Balkans. The geographic criterion of the Western Balkans seems to be discussed again, because the Commission argues that the future enlargement towards the CEE countries will inescapably create a ‘border’ reality for the EU. The mental map of a Europe in which the Western Balkans border the Union enforces a dynamic of integration “*to which [the western Balkans] will ultimately belong*” (Commission 1999c: 1). The Commission’s wording is that these relations have to follow the same basic logic that governed the EU to develop the concept of sui generis categories of contractual relations for CEE, the Europe Agreements; it therefore proposes “*a new category of Agreements – Stabilisation and Association Agreements*” (ibid.: 4), which would form a new class of agreements, one step lower than the ones offered to the CEE. Similarly, the Commission pledges to assist the IFIs and their financial programmes to draft agreements “*similar to that for the candidate countries*” for membership to the EU (Commission 1999: 7). The relationship between the Western Balkans and the CEE though had a reverse affect too. As a Commission spokesman put it on 28 May 1999, “*the situation in South-East Europe provides*

*reasons for moving as fast as possible towards the enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe*” (European Report 1999a: 1). In sum, we observe again here that international actors, such as the European Commission, always look at practices and experiences that informed their action in previous instances to act towards situations, especially in periods of intense moments and deliberations.

#### *Objectifying Process: Institutionalisation*

The hardest task of the European Commission was to give flesh and blood to the western Balkans, and to ‘sell’ its product to the European and international community. A Croatian Professor of International Relations, Nada Švob-Đokić, supported the idea that regional cooperation can only be small, short-term and dispersed. She based her conclusion on the fact that, in the period up to the end of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, “*a polymorphous structure of the Balkans explains the absence of a hegemonic state or a hegemonic regional project. [...] The outer regional cooperation in the Balkans has never developed institutional frameworks, although a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements have been signed. [...] Regional cooperation among the Balkan states thus remains a rather abstract idea*” (1998: 194). Similarly, Tamás Novák argues that, in spite of geographic proximity, these countries have not relied upon each other historically (more so on external powers) and therefore ‘organic’ cooperation was not present with neighbouring countries, but with those outside the region (1998: 247). Therefore, the stake was to come up with an ‘EU regional-structural assistance’ to create a Balkan framework to plan and administer any promised assistance (Jackson 2001: 58).

To make these possible, the European Commission’s representation for the newly emerging Western Balkans needed to become intelligible. We observe that the institutionalisation process of objectifying the Western Balkans’ social representation had not succeeded to institutionally solidify both this new regional group as part of the EU’s core and the makeup of the group itself. Starting with the first point made, the Commission did not promise any concrete accession plan to the countries of the Western Balkans. However, its institutional set up did begin sewing a European clock for the region since the beginning of 1996 – albeit in a patchy manner. Two groups only were recognised as ‘European’ in the External Relations Directorate of the Commission: Dir. B dealing with ‘Relations with Central *European* countries’ and Dir. D on ‘Relations with other *European* countries’ (emphasis added). The latter in particular was divided into three Departments and was responsible for three groups

of states respectively, all of which currently are either member-states or potential ones: (i) Albania and ex-Yugoslavia states, (ii) Cyprus, Malta and Turkey and (iii) EFTA countries. What is inferred is that the Commission was dealing with the western Balkans as a regional group immediately after Dayton and that the western Balkans was granted the European credential from the very start of its existence. The formal basis of the Commission's approach was set, but the picture is less clear once looking closer at the institutional initiatives employed in this period.

When reading the annual General Reports published by the European Commission to report to the European Parliament as obliged to do annually<sup>18</sup>, we find how previous processes of objectification hold value in this first transition period of the western Balkans. Despite the fact that the western Balkans was a European, external relations topic, the General Reports on the activities of the EU of 1996, 1997 and 1998 represented the 'European' group under a different light: it kept the (pre-accession) Central European group intact, while pushing the second group as a Northern Mediterranean topic. The confused status over the Western Balkans can further be argued by paying attention to the fact that within the Northern Med label, the Western Balkans were described as 'South-eastern Europe' – which though did not include Bulgaria, Romania or Turkey. Moreover, the Council officially adopted the existence of the Western Balkans as the EU's approach only at the end of November 1997 when it agreed on two important changes to its workings. Firstly, it peeled off Albania from 'The Working Party on Southeast Europe' and attached it to the 'Ad Hoc Working Party on the former Yugoslavia'. Secondly, this latter group advising the Council on the region was renamed the 'Working Party on the West Balkans Region' (Council 1997c). This was the first time the regional signifier of the Western Balkans became outspokenly used by all three major EU institutions.

However, it is worth noting the continuing incoherencies among the different approaches of the EU institutions. This was partly manifested in the continuing existence of the Council's Working Party on Southeast Europe which neither involved the Western Balkans nor Bulgaria and Romania but consisted of a diverse mix of states such as Cyprus, Turkey, Malta, Andorra and San Marino (ibid). In addition, even in the cases of collaboration of the

---

<sup>18</sup> The General Reports on the Activities of the European Union are required to be published by the European Commission under the Article 156 of the EC Treaty, Article 17 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 125 of the EAEC Treaty on an annual basis.

European Commission with other EU institutions, they never essentially adopted the Western Balkans as their signifier for conducting its policies with the region. The European Investment Bank signed contracts with governments from four international regional groups: CEE, the Mediterranean, ACP/OCT and the Latin America/Asia. The first two groups were the recipients of the largest investments funds, and the states in the Western Balkans were included in the Med group (General Report 1996: 49-50). It is significant to add here that only the southern flank (Albania and FYROM) were given finance contracts until the end of 1998 (see Appendix 9). Similarly, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had a 'Balkan Region Special Fund' at its disposal to finance projects, which though included up to 1999 Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania. Added to this, EBRD had several offices such as the Central Europe office (part of it were Croatia and Slovenia) and a Southern and Eastern Europe one (including Albania, FYROM, BiH, Romania, Bulgaria) (see Appendix 10).

On the point about the ambivalence of the Western Balkans group with regard to the membership of the group, we detect a problematic institutionalisation process. First, the PHARE programme was increasing its budget roughly 5% annually and, by 1998, it had initiated a wide range of policies. On one side, PHARE was directing its resources away from the aid programmes towards institution-building and investment projects - but only for the candidate CEE countries. This re-focusing recognised a 'conceptual distinction' with programmes for Albania and former Yugoslavia who will continue to function under the old guidelines of PHARE (European Report 1998). However, this distinction is further complicated when one looks at the national programmes of PHARE. Only Albania was a participant here from the Western Balkans (receiving a significant amount of ECU 30.5 million), while the other four former Yugoslavia states were grouped together under the 'Rehabilitation of former Yugoslavia' programme (which received ECU 150 million) (General Report 1998: 284). Next to this, one can study the strong resistance of the local actors to establish relations with the EU through a Balkan route. The exemplar case here is Croatia which tried to participate in every official meeting and organisation that was either Central European or Mediterranean. The Croatian President of the time, Franjo Tudjman, said that "*Croatia is part of Central Europe and the Mediterranean and wants to join CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement and other Central European regional institutions [...] The Republic of Croatia cannot agree with a Balkan regional approach*" (BBC 1996). The effort of the Croatian leadership is to engage with bilateral or regional projects that

promoted European integration outside any 'Balkan initiative'. We observed Croatia participating at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conferences in those years. Additionally, in the conditionality assessment report on the regional cooperation of the Commission of March 1998, the stated foreign policy aims of Croatia are CEFTA and WTO membership, access to PHARE programme and opening negotiations on a Cooperation Agreement (Commission 1998b: 9) – all of which are targets that do not relate to any regional-Balkan priorities.

The critical events of 1999 revealed though that the mechanism of institutionalisation was met with problems as regards to the appropriate organisational response on behalf of the European Union. The expansion of activities and responsibilities that the EU had to shoulder in a rather unexpected fashion was reflected in the cautionary approach of the Commission. The success of the projects was linked with the implementation of measures that would strengthen the DGs dealing with the new tasks. The ambitious programmes needed to be accompanied by mechanisms and means *“to enable the flexible, well-coordinated, and efficient use of all Community assistance instruments”* (Commission 1999c: 6). Expanding a relationship of institutionalisation was bound at the time by the insufficient manpower of the Commission, particularly in the field, as noted by COWEB (Council 1999a: 2). The problematic status of the Commission in actively intervening on behalf of the EU found a clear expression in the 'Santer/Prodi letter' which was a report from the outgoing Commission President to the Council on the shortcomings of the entire Balkan endeavour. In short, it reified what was stated above, meaning the dangers of additional bureaucracy imposed to the region and of the number of special envoys deployed to the region, as well as *“the need to preserve the EU's decision-making autonomy”* (Council 1991: 5; European Report 1999b: 2). The last point was in essence a plea to strengthen the Stabilisation and Association Process as the actual EU policy too, as they were foreseeing that the Stability Pact would be a very slow and even inefficient mechanism to help re-organise the entire region.

Nevertheless, the main financial instrument that the European Commission had at its disposal towards the CEE countries was only partly used for the Western Balkans as a region, because regional cooperation was *“presently not feasible due to the fact that not all potential partners are eligible for the underlying PHARE programme”* (Commission 1999c: 6). The combined OBNOVA and PHARE funding were planned in February of 1999 to be disbursed to

individual countries without any vision for a regional allocation of funds (Council 1999a: 5). The EU was obviously not fully ready at the beginning of that year to re-direct its institutional means to establish a recognisable and legitimate region. Furthermore, studying the outlines of the EU's General Budget on external action of 1999 and 2000 (as drafted by the Commission), we observe that in 1999, the amount was designated for '*the Republics formerly part of Yugoslavia*' (section B7 - 54) – a 4.5% share of the overall external action budget, while the pre-accession budget of CEE was roughly 20%. In the preliminary draft of the 2000 budget, the allocated funds would go to '*the Balkan countries*' and had an increase to 8.7% - almost double the amount from the previous year and a logical consequence of the commitments made. However, even in the budget, the Western Balkans was not specifically targeted in the economic programming of external action budget. It ceded the fact that the concept of regional interdependence had not been succeeded despite the assistance. The institutionalisation of a regional prerequisite as form of conditionality continued to function in minimal manner, as it was more a political wishful thinking than a concretely institutionalised initiative.

By December of that year and following the observations and critiques made in the months following the end of the conflict in Kosovo, the European Commission and its RELEX Commissioner, Chris Patten, decided to streamline the different financial assistances on one side and to direct it exclusively to the Western Balkans on the other side. The Memorandum that set out this new initiative reflects the Commission's "*own experience and comments made by the Parliament and the Court of Auditors*" – while the Council is left out of any reference in the text as a contributor to this policy (Commission 1999g: 1). PHARE and OBNOVA programmes would merge into the new 'Community Association and Reconstruction Assistance' (CARA) Programme which would fall under the SAP framework and would last for the period 2000-2006. It was a new tool intending to send a 'political' signal that despite the difficulties to draw a "duly substantiated financial statement" for the Western Balkans, the sum of €5.5bn<sup>19</sup> serves as a "'political' financial reference point", as precisely stated in the Commission's press release (1999h). The emphasis on the 'political' dimension is important, because it was this exact reason that Chris Patten highlighted as the basis of the failure of the EU in the region, saying that "*early EU efforts to stem conflict in*

---

<sup>19</sup> This amount was later reduced by a billion euros after pressures from member-states.

*former Yugoslavia failed, again largely because we lacked the political will to take the bold and resolute action” (Patten 1999: 3).*

## **5. Conclusion**

Social representations are a useful framework to uncover and understand social activities. As we have seen in this paper, they are embedded in institutional and macro-social conditions and are co-constructed by policy-makers (individuals or institutions) in their daily ‘talk and action’. We have asserted that we can understand and interpret actions not just by studying utilitarian motives and material interests, but also by the way actors frame issues. In this paper we have seen how Yugoslavia, as a signifier, acquired a dual quality for the European Commission in the first half of the 1990s. It was framed and represented as a contesting signifier to the European Union’s being, when studied in relation with the Union’s past practices and experiences; while being contested as a signifier when the Commission aimed at communicating and exporting it to the international community, as shown in the institutionalisation process. When a critical juncture arrived (the Dayton Agreement of November-December 1995), the EU’s social representation of the Western Balkans received the form of an amorphous regional signifier. When the European Commission was anchoring this social representation, we observed that the thinking for the Western Balkans was linked to past experiences and practices with Yugoslavia. Only when at the end of the Kosovo campaign do we start to witness a change in the mindset of the Commission to anchor the Western Balkans to the Central and Eastern Europe and to EU’s own, post-World War II history. The objectifying process of the Western Balkans was met with significant challenges. It was communicated and represented with an in-determinate status in relation to the EU’s integrations process. The Kosovo juncture pushed the Western Balkans in a position closer to accession by engaging with sui generis arrangements. On a final note, the social representations, working at the meso-level and in-between agents and structures, help us realise better the way the social field of policy-making at the European level is conducted.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### Primary Sources

- BRITTAN, L. (1992a) *The European Community: new structures in an old continent*. Address to the Chicago Club on Foreign Relations, 24 April 1992.\*
- (1992b) *The European Community: what approach should it adopt towards the rest of the world?* Speech at the Faculte de Droit, Speech/92/63, Caen, 19 June 1992.
- COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996) Concerning the arrangements applicable to imports into the Community of products originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and to imports of wine originating in the Republic of Slovenia. *Official Journal* L 016, Council Regulation No. 70/97, 18 January 1997.
- (1997) *Conclusions of the General Affairs Council on the first conditionality report of 3 October 1997*. 10 November 1997.
- COURT OF AUDITORS (1998) Special report No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (period 1996-1997) with the Commission's replies (submitted pursuant to the second subparagraph of paragraph 4 of Article 188c of the EC Treaty). *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 98/C - 241/01, 31 July 1998.
- DELORS, J. (1992) *The former Yugoslavia*. Speech at the special session of the European Parliament committees on the former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 10 August 1992.
- (1993a) *On the occasion of the investiture debate following appointment of the new Commission*. Speech to the European Parliament, RAPID Speech/93/8, 19 February 1993.
- (1993b) *Questions concerning European security*. Speech at IISS conference, RAPID Speech/93/90, 10 September 1993.\*
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (various years) *General report on the activities of the European Communities/European Union*. Brussels, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- (various years) *Bulletins of the European Communities/European Union*. Brussels, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- (1990a) *The development of the Community's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe*. SEC (90) 717 final, Brussels, 18 April 1990.\*
- (1990b) *Extension to the other Central and East European countries of the facilities for the European Investment Bank to finance projects in Poland and Hungary*. COM (90) 384 final, Brussels, 10 September 1990.

- (1992) *Europe and the challenge of enlargement*. Annexed to the Presidency's Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 26-27 June 1992, Brussels, 24 June 1992.
  - (1995a) Commission's work programme for 1995. RAPID DOC/95/1, Brussels, 8 February 1995.\*
  - (1995b) *Humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: prospects and guidelines*. COM(95) 564 final, Brussels, 17 November 1995.
  - (1995c) *The European Union's financial contribution to reconstruction in former Yugoslavia*. COM (95) 581 final, Brussels, 18 December 1995.
  - (1996a) *Prospects for the development of regional cooperation for the countries of the former Yugoslavia and what the Community could do to foster such cooperation*. SEC (1996) 252 final, 14 February 1996.
  - (1996b) *The Task Force on the energy interconnections in the Balkans starts its activities*. IP/96/859, Brussels, 26 September 1996.
  - (1997a) Agenda 2000: for a stronger and wider Union. *Bulletin of the European Union*, Document drawn up on the basis of COM (1997) 2000 final, 15 July 1997.
  - (1997b) *Regional co-operation in Europe*. COM (97) 659 final, 1 December 1997.
  - (1998a) *Second report on economic relations between the countries of South-eastern Europe concerned by the EU's regional approach*. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (1998) 381, 27 February 1998.
  - (1998b) *Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with the conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania)*. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (1998) 586, 30 March 1998.
  - (1999) *On Community assistance for the Stabilisation and Association process for certain countries of South-East Europe – Community Association and Reconstruction Assistance (CARA) Programme: Guidelines and detailed arrangements for assistance to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the future CARA programme 2000-2006*. COM (1999) 661 final, 8 December 1999.
- EUROPEAN COUNCIL (1988) *Conclusions*. Strasbourg European Council, 8-9 December 1989.

- (1998) *Presidency conclusions*. Vienna European Council, 11-12 December 1998.
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1996) *On the Commission communication on humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: prospects and guidelines (COM(95)0564 - C4-0535/95)*. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, 30 May 1996.
- PINHEIRO, J. d. D. (1993) *The European Community and the Balkans*. Speech RAPID Speech/93/82, Corfu, 4 July 1993.
- SANTER, J. (1995) *On the occasion of the investiture debate of the new Commission*. Strasbourg, European Parliament, 17 January 1995.
- (1996a) *EU's foreign policy*. Speech/96/242, The French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris, 10 October 1996.
- (1996b) *Europe in the XXI Century: Act or Suffer*. Speech/96/257, Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels, 17 October 1996.
- (1996c) *Common principles for future contractual relations with certain countries in South-Eastern Europe*. COM (1996) 476 final, 2 October 1996.
- (1998) *The EU in the 21st century: political dwarf or world actor?* The Bologna Centre of the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Speech/98/80, 23 April 1998.
- VAN DEN BROEK, H. (1993) *The new Europe and the lessons of history*. Speech at Tilburg University seminal 'Europe revisited', RAPID IP/93/439, Tilburg, 4 June 1993.
- (1995a) *PHARE: preparing for a larger European family*. Statement on the occasion of the publication of the PHARE Annual Report, PAPID IP/95/1018, 21 September 1995.
- (1995b) *The challenge of enlargement*. RAPID Speech: 95-264, East-West Institute, Brussels, 1 December 1995.

#### Newspapers, Media and Other Sources

- EUROPEAN REPORT (1996a) *Foreign Affairs Council: Ex-Yugoslavia, East and South on agenda for January 29/30*. No. 2102, 27 January 1996.
- (1996b) *EU/Bosnia: Paris and Bonn reject Van den Broek's proposals*. No. 2131, 11 May 1996.
- (1996c) *EU/Former Yugoslavia: EU anxious to restore normal relations with Balkans*. No. 2140, 15 June 1996.
- (1998) *PHARE: Commission finalises guidelines on funds for candidates*. No. 2326, 24 June 1998.

FINANCIAL TIMES (1996) *EU seeks to boost Balkan cooperation*. FT Energy Newsletters – East European Energy Report, 25 October 1996, p. 19.

- (1998) *The European Commission Maintains Trade Suspension for Croatia, Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. 15 April 1998.

THE ECONOMIST (1993) *Uncivil war in the European Community*. 30 January 1993, p.49.

### Secondary Sources

ANASTASAKIS, O. & BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC, V. (2002) *Balkan regional cooperation and European integration*. Report published by The Hellenic Observatory of the LSE, July 2002.

BARNETT, M. N. & FINNEMORE, M. (1999) The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International organization*, vol. 53 (4), pp. 699-732.

BREAKWELL, G. M. (1993) Social representations and social identity. *Papers on Social Representations*, vol. 2 (3), pp. 198-217. Available from:

[http://www.psr.jku.at/PSR1993/2\\_1993Brea2.pdf](http://www.psr.jku.at/PSR1993/2_1993Brea2.pdf) [Accessed 10 July 2012].

BRETHERTON, C. & VOGLER, J. (1999) *The European Union as a global actor*. London, Routledge.

BRIGG, M. & MULLER, K. (2009) Conceptualising culture in conflict resolution. *Journal of intercultural studies*, vol. 30 (2) pp. 121-140.

CALHOUN, C. J. (Ed.) (2010) *Robert K. Merton: sociology of science and sociology as science*. New York, Columbia University Press.

ELGSTRÖM, O. (2007) European Union foreign policy: norms, values and responsibilities. *Cooperation and conflict*, vol. 42 (4), pp. 467-472.

FINNEMORE, M. (2008) Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and social structure of unipolarity: why being a unipole isn't all it's cracked up to be. *World Politics*, vol. 6 (1), pp. 58-85.

GINSBERG, R. H. (2001) *The European Union in international politics: baptism by fire*. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield.

HERNES, G. (1998) Real virtuality. IN HEDSTROM, P. & SWEDBERG, R. (Ed.), *Social mechanisms: an analytical approach to social theory*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HILL, C. (1996) *The actors in Europe's foreign policy*. London, Routledge.

HURD, I. (2008) *Constructivism*. IN D. SNIDAL & C. REUS-SMIT, (Ed.) *Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- JACKSON, M. (2001) *Intra-Balkan trade and economic cooperation: past lessons for the future*. IN G. PETRAKOS & S. TOTEV (Ed.) *The development of the Balkan region*. Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 31-65.
- MAHANT, E. (1995) Foreign policy and European identity. *History of European Ideas*, vol. 21 (4), pp. 485-498.
- MANNERS, I. & WHITMAN, R. G. (2003) The ‘difference engine’: constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 10 (3), pp. 380-404.
- MAYHEW, A. (1998) *Recreating Europe: the European Union’s policy towards Central and Eastern Europe*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- MÉRAND, F. (2006) Social representations in the European Security and Defence Policy. *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 41 (2), pp. 131-152.
- MEYER, C. O. (2011) The purpose and pitfalls of constructivist forecasting: insights from strategic culture research for the European Union’s evolution as a military power. *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 55, pp. 669-690.
- MEYER, C. O. & STRICKMANN, E. (2011) Solidifying constructivism: how material and ideational factors interact in European defence. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 49 (1), pp. 61-81.
- MORAVCSIK, A. (1993) Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 31 (4), pp. 473-524.
- NICOLAIDIS, K. & HOWSE, R. (2002) This is my EUtopia: narrative as power. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40 (4), pp. 767-792.
- NOVÁK, T. (1998) *Economic relations between Central and Southeastern Europe: considering reorientation towards the European Union*. IN T. G. STAVROU & J. R. LAMPE (Ed.) *Redefining Southeastern Europe: political challenges and economic opportunities*. Südosteuropa-Studien, vol. 61, pp. 243-266.
- O’ BRENNAN, J. (2006) *The eastern enlargement of the European Union*. New York, Routledge.
- REES, N. (1995) *The management of the EU’s external relations: a case of overstretch?* Paper presented at the Biennial European Community Studies Association Conference, Charleston, 11-14 May 1995.
- ROSS, G. (1995) *Jacques Delors and European integration*. New York, Oxford University Press.

- SARRICA, M. & CONTARELLO, A. (2004) Peace, war and conflict: social representations shared by peace activists and non-activists. *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41 (5), pp. 549-568.
- STEINMO, S. & THELEN, K. (1992) *Historical institutionalism in comparative politics*. IN STEINMO, S. & THELEN, K. & LONGSTRETH, F. (Ed.) *Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- SVOB-ĐOKIĆ, N. (1998) Regional disruptions and regional cooperation in the Balkans. IN T. G. STAVROU & J. R. LAMPE (Ed.) *Redefining Southeastern Europe: political challenges and economic opportunities*. *Südosteuropa-Studien*, vol. 61, pp. 189-198.
- TONRA, B. (2003) The European Union's global role. *FORNET Working Paper* (unpublished), Working Group 1: theories and approaches to the CFSP, London.
- WENDT, A. (1999) *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.