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***Deep economic integration and political ambivalence:  
popular constraints on elite-driven integration in Europe  
and between Australia and New Zealand***

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
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comments are appreciated.

I believe that as the single market develops, we must be prepared for pressure to harmonise areas of policy-making which we now regard as sacrosanct areas of national sovereignty. This sets for us the task of identifying areas for review, reform and integration. We obviously do not wish at this stage to make judgments about the extent to which we could, let alone should, bring such policies into alignment with each other. But we ought to have a process within which we and our publics can consider such issues.

....

On the agenda I have no fixed views....I would see no need to be too precise at this stage other than to fence off possibilities that encompass or get too close to federation.

- *Letter New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer to Australian Prime Minister Mr Bob Hawke, April 1990*



- *National Party of New Zealand, Campaign Billboard 2008 General Election*

Sir Geoffrey Palmer's letter conveys the expectation that elite-driven policies sacrificing sovereignty might meet popular resistance in the integration of national economies. Yet, while Australia and New Zealand have sacrificed considerable national sovereignty in constructing a trans-Tasman Single Economic Market, a 'permissive consensus' continues to frame integration processes. Resistance to cession of sovereignty in the relationship has never mobilized mass resistance on either side of the Tasman and progress toward further integration remains securely contained within elite policy-making arenas.

This development is interesting because it is in precisely those issue areas that have been most controversial elsewhere—free movement of people and opening labour markets—that trans-Tasman integration has advanced farthest. This is not meant to suggest that labour market integration and free movement of people are not politicized in the relationship. They are highly so. The billboard above, from the New Zealand National Party's 2008 New Zealand election campaign, demonstrates that migration across the Tasman is electorally potent. In electoral politics in New Zealand free movement of people across the Tasman is associated with governments' economic competence rather than issues of national identity and national sovereignty. This difference reflects the fact that

trans-Tasman economic integration proceeded according to a different sequence of events than integration elsewhere.

Trans-Tasman developments contrast sharply with recent characterizations of forces shaping European integration. An influential contribution by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2008b) launched a research agenda based on the argument that, over the past two decades, the context of European integration has moved from 'permissive consensus', in which integration held little salience for mass publics, to 'constraining dissensus', in which mass politics limit elite-driven integration. Large numbers of European citizens, they argue, now participate in decision making about integration through referendums and by voting for political parties that support and oppose integration. Mass politicization, they suggest, has introduced a new actor and logic to processes of integration in Europe. To account for this new force, Hooghe and Marks propose a 'post-functionalist' explanation of integration.

This paper explains how mass politicization of the trans-Tasman relationship evolved in a different direction that, for the moment, does not constrain elite-driven policies aimed at deepening economic integration. The paper argues that, like other polity-shaping events, the *timing* and *sequence* of integration policies influences the structure of the evolving political arena. Specifically, freedom of movement and opening of trans-Tasman labour markets *preceded* solidification of a new 'post-materialist' division in Australian and New Zealand societies (Inglehart 1977, 1997). This 'post-materialist' division juxtaposes individuals holding traditional/authority/national values and identities with those holding green/alternative/libertarian values and identities. Because freedom of movement and trans-Tasman labour markets were entrenched before this new social division emerged, political entrepreneurs could not instrumentalize these policies once value divisions became politically important. Consequently, in electoral politics, policies of trans-Tasman economic integration have remained separate from freedom of movement and migration issues. While these issues have an important impact on electorates, particularly in New Zealand, political agents have not used them to focus public attention on elite-driven policies of economic integration.

This argument rests on a comparison of trans-Tasman and European integration. Specifically, it suggests these two cases resemble each other closely enough that their similarities can be used to isolate causes for differences in development of mass politicization of integration in each region. This claim is based on the observation that member states of the European Union, Australia and New Zealand share not only similar democratic political institutions and patterns of socio-economic development, but also similar forms of trans-national market integration—well-developed 'single markets'. These similarities make the trans-Tasman experience of integration an interesting testing ground for arguments constructed to explain integration processes in Europe.

This paper proceeds in three sections. The next section has two parts. First, it considers explanations for mass politicization of European integration. A second part presents the case for evaluating explanations for the mass politicization of

European integration in the trans-Tasman context. It suggests that, while national political institutions, socio-economic developments and the *scope* and *level* of regional integration are similar in the two cases, the *sequence* of integration in each case was different. A second section demonstrates how this difference pushed mass politicization of the trans-Tasman relationship in a novel direction. A concluding section draws lessons from the trans-Tasman case for arguments about politicization of integration from European experience.

### **Mass politicization of European integration and comparison with trans-Tasman integration**

This section makes the case for transferring explanations of mass politicization of integration from the European to the trans-Tasman context. It consists of three parts. The first part considers explanations of mass politicization of integration in Europe. These approaches explain mass politicization of European integration—contestation of integration policies in public protests, referendums and/or electoral politics by several thousand people across several years—for which neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism provide no account. As the first attempts to understand anomalies and new developments of the past decades, these accounts offer insights into new causal mechanisms, but lack refinement in terms of explaining variance in their operation. Evaluation of these explanations against other cases sheds light on sources of variance. The second part of this section draws in arguments from comparative politics that use the *timing* and *sequence* of events to explain variation in how important, historical issues—like trans-national integration—become integrated into mass politics. The third part of this section makes the case for comparison between European and trans-Tasman integration. Because the focus of inquiry is variance, the paper demonstrates how similarities between the two cases permit isolation of the potential causes of difference. It demonstrates the broad similarity of background conditions as well as the ‘scope’ and ‘depth’ of integration in the two cases. It also considers the limitations of this comparison.

#### **Explanations of mass politicization of European integration**

Most accounts explain the mass politicization of European integration as a two-step process (Hooghe and Marks 2008b, De Vries and Edwards 2009, DeVries and Hobolt 2012, Green-Pedersen 2012). The first step focuses on creation of ‘demand’ for politicization, or a potential for mobilization around integration issues among large groups in European publics. The second describes the ‘supply’ of politicization, or how agents like political parties, interest groups and social movements activate this potential in mass protests, referendums and elections. The following considers these two elements of explanation in turn.

The central development leading to ‘demand’ for mass politicization of European integration, according to most explanations, has been a growing mismatch between the boundaries of political jurisdictions and national communities (Hooghe & Marks 2008b, Kreisi 2008, Green-Pedersen 2012). In regard to this development, most observers place the consequences of European integration inside a broader set of developments labeled: ‘globalization’, ‘denationalization’

of policies, or something else (Hooghe and Marks 2008b, Kreisi 2008). The principal force driving extension of policy boundaries beyond national communities has been a desire to 'internalize externalities' (Mattli 1999). Jurisdictional boundaries are stretched as actors push for transnational coordination and welfare-enhancing transactions that national boundaries, in particular, impede. Economic actors may seek economies of scale or reduction in costs of complying with regulations that vary between jurisdictions. State actors may desire trans-national policy coordination to reap economies of scale in, for example, regulatory policies, or to reduce cross-border circumvention of policies, or to enhance their influence in international negotiations.

Until the past two decades, trans-national policy coordination in European integration concerned small numbers of elite actors, principally policy makers and interest group leaders. A 'permissive consensus' among European publics permitted decisions about integration to remain contained within these elite arenas. In these arenas, logics of efficiency and distribution prevailed in integration processes. 'Permissive consensus' meant policy making on integration remained the preserve of elite actors, who were more inclined to avoid zero-sum conflicts in favour of mutually beneficial compromise. As a consequence, integration moved forward—perhaps slowly and unevenly, but progressively.

Two changes have undermined the 'permissive consensus' around European integration: broad socio-economic changes in industrial societies since the 1960s and particular developments in European integration. These changes have forced policy making out of insulated elite realms, transforming the process of European integration. Placing socio-economic changes in the idiom of earlier social scientists, observers have collected considerable evidence of a new cleavage dividing advanced industrial societies (Lipset and Rokkan 1964; Inglehart 1977, 1997). Using a variety of different labels, these observers suggest a new conflict divides societies between those who hold *green/alternative/libertarian (gal)* values, on the one hand, and those who adhere to *traditionalism/authority/nationalism (tan)* values, on the other (Hooghe and Marks 2009, p.16). Some observers argue that this new cleavage and, therefore, identity is now the most important division within West European polities (Lachat 2008).

In the past two decades, it is argued, the agenda of European integration has expanded to issues relevant to this new cleavage. Integration processes now encompass issues that can be framed, using the labels that conform to the opposition between *gal* and *tan* orientations. In particular, movement of issues like immigration, asylum and citizenship from the exclusive competence of member states to a status where member states and Community institutions share policy-making competences has associated European integration with issues that touch many Europeans' values and sense of identity (Boerzel 2005). Integration now affects issues that can be framed in terms that motivate masses of Europeans to act politically: immigration, membership in political communities as well as access to labour markets, political and social rights.

This association with such issues changes processes of European integration qualitatively, for two reasons. First, identity issues attract a broader audience. Greater political salience has the potential to generate mass mobilization around integration and push policy making out of elite realms into public and electoral arenas. Second, values and identities may be less fungible than calculations of material interest. Conflicts that involve identities, therefore, are more likely to become 'zero sum' and, therefore, less amenable to compromise. These arguments hold that an expanding agenda has made European integration salient to a wider audience and intensified conflicts surrounding it.

The second aspect of standard arguments about mass politicization of European integration focuses on the 'supply' of mass mobilization and the agency of political entrepreneurs. While the evidence of a value shift in advanced industrial societies and the alignment of integration policies with this new cleavage have led observers to agree on the potential for mass mobilization around European integration, they disagree about whether and how entrepreneurs might activate this potential. All sides share a view that this potential cannot manifest itself spontaneously. Mass mobilization requires the agency of actors such as political parties, interest groups and or social movements. This perspective draws on a substantial body of work that explains the impact of shifting values on party systems in industrial democracies, particularly in West Europe (Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Disagreement arises, however, over whether the potential for mass mobilization is sufficient to bring new actors—social movements, interest groups and political parties—into the political arena. Opposing this position is another group that claims that openings for new actors depend on the behaviour of incumbent political actors, especially mainstream parties.

One side of this debate sees the emergence of new actors as a (inevitable?) consequence of shifting values in European publics and the suitability of European integration as an issue around which to mobilize this potential (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 2009; Kreisi 2009; de Vries and Edwards 2009). These observers view mainstream parties as passive actors in this process. They hold that shifting values in the polity do not align neatly with the conventional Left-Right cleavage of economic class, which has defined European party systems for a century. As a consequence, party leaders are reluctant to engage voters on issues that activate this new cleavage. Doing so risks dividing a party's partisans and voters in pursuit of the highly uncertain outcome that a re-aligned polity will enhance the party's vote share, its coalitional possibilities and/or its capacity to influence policies (Dalton, et al 1984; Kitschelt 1994; Müller and Strom 1999). Instead, the argument holds, mainstream parties remain immobile and maintain a 'conspiracy of silence' with regard to integration. This passivity permits new parties to enter, using integration issues, among others, to mobilize voters around the new cleavage. As evidence of this line of causality they point to the emergence of new social movements around referendums and far right parties' effective use of integration as an issue (De Vries and Edwards 2009, De Vries and Hobolt 2012).

Adherents of this position allow that institutional differences may shape opportunities for new entrants in different countries. So, for example, constitutional provisions prescribing and permitting referendums have opened significant opportunities for entrepreneurs to engage masses on integration issues. Proscription of referendums, pluralitarian and majoritarian electoral systems as well as thresholds in proportional systems, on the other hand, raise hurdles to new entrants. The underlying logic of mobilization remains the same, however: incumbents remain passive, while new entrants provide the impulse for mobilization.

Opposing this logic is another group of observers who regard mainstream parties as far from passive in the process of mobilizing masses around integration. This position draws on a longer tradition investigating the relationship between mainstream and niche parties (Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Meguid 2005). From their perspective it is the activities, not the passivity, of mainstream parties that create opportunities for new entrants to exploit issues of integration (Green-Pedersen 2012). The entrance of new actors may be an unanticipated or unintended consequence of these activities, but leaders of mainstream parties had options and exercised choices that either put integration on the agenda or did not. Where mainstream parties have maintained their 'conspiracy of silence', integration has remained off the agenda and new entrants have been unable to instrumentalize it (Green-Pedersen 2012, p.119)

The 'supply' of politicization, agents willing and able to mobilize masses around integration, and 'demand' for it, the importance of social divisions that can be activated by integration issues, are likely to co-vary. In Europe, the more Eurosceptic a member state's society is, the more likely a mainstream party is likely to anticipate an electoral or coalitional advantage in politicizing integration. At the same time, this situation is also likely to present tempting opportunities that attract the attention of potential entrepreneurs. This relationship raises questions about the direction of causality: do the actions of mainstream agents stimulate new entrants or does a latent demand and potential entry of new competitors drive pre-emption by mainstream incumbents? These questions remain contested by those who observe politicization of European integration (Adam and Maier 2011, Finke 2009, Down and Wilson 2010, van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009).

These contending accounts of politicization offer two broad lines of explanation for the presence or absence of mass politicization of European integration. On the one hand, 'demand'-centered explanations suggest that either a mass potential is present or it is not. A second line of explanation focuses on 'supply', or the agents of politicization, and the presence/absence of mass mobilization. Are mainstream parties able to maintain a 'conspiracy of silence' about integration successfully? Are there new entrepreneurs to politicize a latent potential? The problem with these perspectives is that they anticipate the politicization of integration to occur as a conflict over whether or not to cede national sovereignty. Politicization may take form as a conflict over an issue area that can be framed in terms of a threat to (national) identity, such as movement of people, opening of labour markets and/or extension of social benefits.



Alternatively, as we will see in the next section, conflict could erupt over policies that cede national sovereignty over distribution of the social product. Both perspectives regard politicization as a conflict over cession of national sovereignty. The trans-Tasman arrangement has not—yet—experienced mass mobilization around the cession of sovereignty. The free movement of people, in New Zealand at least, has been thoroughly politicized as a measure of governments' economic performance.

### The role of timing and sequence in politicization of social cleavages

A long tradition in comparative politics scholarship explains how the same cleavage takes different forms in different societies. Many of the contributions in this tradition focus on the context within which social cleavages are activated. Context, particularly the timing and sequence of events, shapes options available to agents as they seek to politicize masses. The following demonstrates how arguments about the timing and sequencing of events have been used to explain variance in the history of politicization of other societal cleavages. Then it demonstrates how similar arguments have been used to explain variations in the politicization of integration among European member states. Finally, it asks whether *when* freedom of movement is introduced to the agenda might have an impact on *whether and how* integration becomes politicized.

Scholars have used the timing and sequence of events to explain variance in how societies adapt to similar changes. First, arguments based on timing are not easy to separate from those that focus on sequences of events, so no attempt is made to do so here. This fuzziness aside, arguments about the timing and sequence of events stand at the centre of the sub-field of comparative politics. The relative timing of industrialization and 'development', for example, has been used to explain the trajectories taken by different societies toward liberalism, authoritarianism and 'underdevelopment' (Gerschenkron 1962; Gundar Frank 1966). Such arguments also explain why similar cleavages produced different politics in different societies. Moore (1966) and Wallerstein (1974), for example, explain the—conservative or progressive—organisation of agrarian interests and the prospects for liberal democracy (in the case of the former) as the consequence of whether the (international) commercialization of agriculture preceded or followed conversion of feudal obligations to monetized leases. Anderson (1983), Deutsch (1957), Gellner (1983) and Hroch (1985) explain the emergence of 'ethno-cultural' and 'civic-liberal' nationalisms as a consequence of whether processes of nation-building preceded or followed consolidation of centralized state structures. Luebbert (1988) and Röth (1979) explain the reformism or radicalism of working class movements—and (in the former's case) stabilization of interwar democracies—as a consequence of whether industrialization preceded or followed extension of universal (manhood) suffrage. The timing and sequence of events are central to explanations of varying patterns of development and democracy.

Scholars of European integration have also used sequencing arguments to explain differences in how integration has been politicized in member states.

Hooghe and Marks (2008b, p.18), for example, argue that politicization of integration has taken place differently in eastern and western member states because social cleavages differed in these two groups of societies as the agenda of integration expanded to include identity issues. Greater material insecurity in Central and Eastern European societies mean that the *gal-tan* cultural cleavage reinforces—rather than cross-cuts—the left-right cleavage. Accordingly, party competition is less complicated: Left parties are *tan* and *tan* parties are Left. Both can appeal to voters by opposing integration as a threat to identity and material security. While this observation explains differences in the mode of politicization, it nonetheless assumes politicization of European integration in both places erupts in conflicts over cession of national sovereignty. While freedom of movement is highly politicized in trans-Tasman integration, conflicts about it revolve around the relative performance of the Australian and New Zealand economies rather around the cession of sovereignty.

### A trans-Tasman Comparator?

This paper began with the observation of a difference: integration has joined the agenda of mass politics in completely different ways in the European Union and trans-Tasman relationship. Comparison presents an opportunity to use each case to help understand the other. To understand differences, it is helpful to have cases where many conditions that might explain difference are similar—and can, therefore, be eliminated as explanations. The argument here is that European and trans-Tasman experiences share many features that can help us understand processes of mass politicization around ‘deep’ integration. The following demonstrates similarities between Europe and the trans-Tasman relationship in terms of ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ conditions for mass politicization around integration. The subsequent section explains how different sequences of events in European and trans-Tasman integration created different contexts for mass politicization.

Explanations of the ‘demand’ or potential for mass politicization around integration focus on perceptions of a gap between the trans-national reach of policy jurisdictions and national communities of identity. Denationalization of policy competences has aroused attention from masses that perceive such developments as a threat to values and identities. According to these arguments, ‘gaps’ result from the interaction of both elements. First, the structure of social divisions must be such that identity issues are salient to masses of individuals. Second, scope and level of policy integration must trigger mass concerns about values and identities.

The structure of society in Australia and New Zealand is quite similar to those of European member states, particularly the EU-15. Identity issues have also been politically salient among voters in both countries. European and trans-Tasman similarities are reflected in measures of GDP per capita. The OECD measures per capita GDP (PPP) in Australia (2010) at USD40,790—in sixth place, above all EU-15 countries except the Netherlands and Luxembourg. By the same OECD measure, New Zealand is 21<sup>st</sup> with a per capita GDP of USD29,711—just below

the average, at about the level of Spain and Italy, but behind all other EU-15 countries except Portugal and Greece.

The two cases also resemble each other in terms of measures of values in society. On the World Values Survey measure (2006) of Traditional/Secular-rational and Survival/Self-expression values, Australia and New Zealand score 0.21/1.75 and 0.00/1.86, respectively. This locates them closer to countries of (northern) Catholic Europe (Belgium, France and Luxembourg) and Protestant Europe (Finland, Iceland, Netherland, Switzerland) than some of the other English-speaking democracies (Ireland, Northern Ireland, US). Perhaps most interestingly, they are closest to each other, Great Britain (0.06/1.68) and Canada (-0.26/1.91) (world Values Survey tables and Cultural Map 2005-8). The structure of social divisions does not distinguish Australia and New Zealand from member states of the European Union where masses have been mobilized around integration issues.

Identity issues are also no less salient in Australian and New Zealand electoral politics than they are in Europe. In Australia, the entry of foreign nationals from Asia and the Pacific sits high on the electoral agenda. This is particularly true of asylum seekers and their treatment once they reach Australian jurisdiction. The large number of New Zealanders resident in Australia has not been an electoral issue, however. In New Zealand, identity politics have featured significantly in parliamentary elections. In 2005, the National Party ran a divisive campaign, focusing on differences between New Zealanders of European descent and those of non-European descent, particularly Maori. This campaign played a role in erasing the 20-percentage point difference that separated the National and Labour Parties in 2002 (Stephens and Leslie 2011). New Zealand also has an anti-(Asian) immigration party, New Zealand First, that has consistently won seats in Parliament. Australian and New Zealand electorates seem no more or less attuned to electoral appeals based on identity than electorates in EU member states.

If social divisions and the electoral salience of identity issues in Australia and New Zealand are broadly similar to those in European member states, can differences in the *level* and *scope* account for differences in mass politicization around integration (Boerzel 2005)? Has trans-Tasman integration not—yet—begun to impact national sovereignty in ways that have concerned Europeans? In what some will regard as this paper's most surprising claim, we hold that trans-Tasman and European integration are quite similar in terms of *level* and *scope*. First, in terms of *level*, Australia and New Zealand have transferred significant dispute-settlement and legislative authority to trans-national arrangements (this section follows Leslie & Elijah 2012b). Like arrangements in the EU, trans-Tasman supra-nationality takes two forms. A few trans-national agencies—Joint Accreditation System Australia-New Zealand (JASANZ), Food Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ), and the Australia-New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency (ANZTPA, to be operational in 2014)—exercise dispute resolution and legislative authority in specific issue areas. These agencies supplement a much broader array of dispute settlement and legislative arrangements the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) ministerial councils and officials meetings.

Supra-nationality in these arrangements takes the form of ‘pooled sovereignty’ and resembles supra-nationality in the European Council/Council of Ministers. Representatives of New Zealand sit alongside their counterparts from the Australian Commonwealth, States and Territories in COAG structures. Each government gets a single vote in majority votes. These pooled sovereignty arrangements are also issue-specific with more than 30 COAG ministerial councils in existence until July 2011. The difference between trans-Tasman and EU supra-national arrangements exists in their relative mix of international agencies and pooled sovereignty arrangements and the breadth of their issue competencies. The trans-Tasman relationship has relatively few international agencies and supra-national authority, whether delegated to an international agency or exercised through pooled sovereignty, is circumscribed narrowly by issue area. As a consequence, trans-Tasman supra-national authority is of a similar *level*, but less visible than European arrangements.

The *scope* of integration in the trans-Tasman relationship is also similar to the EU. Like the EU, supra-national coordination of policies between Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions takes place primarily in regulation of markets, while distributive, foreign and security policies remain under national sovereignty—although there is significant intergovernmental coordination of these policies in both cases. Elsewhere (Leslie and Elijah 2012a) we have demonstrated how in three decades, Australian and New Zealand policy makers have transformed an inclusive but conventional Free Trade Area (Australia – New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) 1983) into a trans-Tasman Single Economic Market that resembles the Single European Market. While trans-Tasman economic integration includes neither a currency<sup>1</sup> nor a customs<sup>2</sup> union, it has undertaken to advance free movement of goods, services, capital and people in a manner resembling—and, at times, inspired by—the Single European Market project. A harmonized process exists for government procurement and setting goods and food standards. A sweeping mutual recognition regime governs at least the same percentage of goods trade between the two countries and a far greater percentage of labour qualifications and

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<sup>1</sup> While the possibility of a trans-Tasman currency has been considered at least three times—late 1970s (docs 2003, Templeton 1995), the early 1990s (MFAT, MED docs) and in the present review of the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (APC 2012)—differences in the export profiles of the two countries have always led policy makers to dismiss the possibility as counterproductive.

<sup>2</sup> Construction of a customs union between Australia and New Zealand has also been considered several times over the past three decades. The possibility was dismissed during the ANZCERTA negotiations as ‘too hard’ because the profiles of protection in the two countries were sufficiently different that harmonization would impose disruptive adjustment costs on one side or the other. As both countries subsequently reduced external tariff rates close to zero on all but a few products (e.g., textiles and luxury automobiles), the issue is not seen as a means to stimulate growth. The idea has, however, found some advocates among Australian and New Zealand officials as a matter of symbolic importance in promoting broader Asian Pacific economic integration.

services trade. Trans-Tasman capital market integration has lagged behind the EU, but has been catching up since 2009. Integration of labour markets and movement of people between Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, has surpassed Europe (Messerlin 2011). Until 2001, citizens enjoyed most of the same rights in both countries and Australian citizens continue to have this status in New Zealand. Since 2009, 'net trans-Tasman benefit', rather than national interest, has set the threshold for economic policy coordination (Australian Treasury, 2009). In sum, the *level* and *scope* of trans-Tasman integration touches issues similar to those affected by European Union and this integration takes place in a context framed by similar social cleavages.

This brings us to the 'supply' side of explanations for politicization of European integration. These focus on the strategic interaction of mainstream political parties and potential new entrants into the political arena. If there are different constraints on the behaviour of mainstream political parties and/or new entrants into the Australian and New Zealand political systems, this might explain the different politicization of trans-Tasman integration. Again, however, the constraints on Australia's and New Zealand's party systems appear similar to those in the EU's West European member states.

Observers have described the Australian political system as 'Westminster adapted' (Lijphart 1999). It modifies the majoritarian Westminster structure in two broad ways. First, it replaces Westminster's 'unitary' state structure with a federal structure composed of six states and two territories. Further, this federal structure is integrated into legislation at the central level through a second legislative chamber, the Senate. The Senate represents each of the states equally (12 senators), despite large differences in population among them,<sup>3</sup> and it has relatively broad legislative powers, although it is not the equal of the lower chamber, the House of Representatives.

Australia's second modification to the Westminster model concerns the election of Senators. Voters elect Senators directly, but they do so by a different electoral system than is used for elections to the House. The latter take place according to a majoritarian alternative vote system. Voters elect senators according to a more proportional Single Transferrable Vote (STV) system. These adaptations make the Australian system more 'consensual' than other Westminster systems, but it remains a member of the majoritarian camp (Lijphart 1999, p.318).

The implications of Australia's 'Westminster adapted' system for the politicization of trans-Tasman integration remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the majoritarian electoral system for the House imposes the logic of a two-party system over that chamber and the creation of (single party) cabinets. From this perspective, the electoral system should eliminate uncertainties around coalition formation and reduce calculations about the effects of politicizing integration to an estimation of its impact on voter behaviour (Green-Pedersen 2012). Will politicization help the electoral prospects of either Labour or the Liberal-

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<sup>3</sup> The Northern Territories (NT) and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) receive two Senators each.

National Coalition?<sup>4</sup> In this sense, the Australian context resembles Great Britain, where the Conservative Party chose to politicize European integration. However, the proportional logic of STV has led to multi-partism in the Senate and, with it, a need for the larger parties to build legislative coalitions with smaller parties. The proportionality of Senate elections, together with elections in federal units and the (formal or de facto) factionalization of the Labor and Coalition parties lower barriers to entry for new actors in the political system. The Australian system seems to create conditions that are neither more nor less favourable to politicization than party systems in European member states.

A similar assessment holds for New Zealand. Since 1996, New Zealand has conducted parliamentary elections for its unicameral parliament according to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system with a 5% threshold. Introduction of MMP led to a proliferation of smaller niche parties on both the Left and Right. Since 1996 all New Zealand governments have been coalition or minority governments. As in Europe, multi-partism in New Zealand creates coalitional uncertainties for mainstream parties around politicization of new issues. It also lowers barriers to new entrants. It should also be noted that, since the early 1990s, New Zealanders have used referendums to decide several issues, including the structure of the electoral law and at least one issue that was calculated to engage the *gal-tan* cleavage, the legality of parental use of corporal punishment. Like Australia, New Zealand's party system seems to create no special inducements or impediments to the politicization of integration.

If 'demand-' and 'supply-side' constraints on politicization of integration in Australian and New Zealand resemble those in European member states, can the context in which integration is politicized explain differences? Can context explain why freedom of movement became linked to integration on the agenda of mass politics in Europe but not the trans-Tasman relationship? The next section explores the context of contemporary trans-Tasman integration and how a peculiar sequence of developments has kept freedom of movement separate from conflicts over sovereignty and integration.

### Politicizing freedom of movement in the trans-Tasman relationship

Why did freedom of movement between Australia and New Zealand become politicized as an issue of managerial competence rather than national sovereignty? In New Zealand, in particular, movement of people across the Tasman Sea has become a charged electoral issue. The yearly and monthly figures for New Zealanders emigrating to Australia has become an electorally potent gauge of governments' management of the economy. This outcome reflects the sequence of events according to which Australian and New Zealand societies and economies have integrated. Free movement of citizens across the Tasman began long before the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and has only been

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<sup>4</sup> The Liberal Party, the National Party, the Liberal National Party of Queensland and the Country Liberal Party engage in a more-or-less permanent coalition and, for the purposes of this analysis, are treated as a single party.

regulated, since the First World War. Accordingly, freedom of movement became politically and culturally entrenched before a new societal cleavage emerged over identity issues. Indeed, freedom of movement was entrenched before national identities consolidated in each country during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. As a consequence of this development, free movement has settled into both polities as a taken-for-granted entitlement. Political agents have instrumentalized migrant's movements as a metric of government performance, but not as a threat to sovereignty and identity. The following considers, first, the development of regulation of the trans-Tasman movement of people. Then, it considers the politicization of New Zealand emigration to Australia as a metric of the New Zealand government's economic performance.

### Regulating trans-Tasman movement of people

The politicization of trans-Tasman integration reflects, first of all, the fact that free movement of people across the Tasman Sea survived the construction of nation states in Australia and New Zealand during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. This paper cannot attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the development of these nation states or even the evolution of regulations on movement between them. Rather, it describes the institutional and regulatory context in which politicization of movement of people evolved. The first and most obvious element of this context is geography. The 1200 miles (2000 kms) of water separating the two countries created impetus for their separate political development, impediments to movement of people, but also strong bonds of communication and commerce.<sup>5</sup>

When the logic of nation-state organization came to Australasia at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, there were contending views about how to reconfigure the region's existing colonial structure. New Zealand had an independent colonial administration from 1840, but, prior to this, had been administered from Sydney as part of New South Wales. New Zealand's political leaders took part in meetings during the 1890s that led to promulgation of Australia's 1901 Constitution and creation of the Australian Commonwealth. However, while the Constitution's preamble explicitly recognizes New Zealand as a potential state, its leaders, citing geography, chose not to join the federation. This decision set the stage for the evolution of distinct Australian and New Zealand national states and identities.

Geography permitted the maintenance of liberal regulation of movement between Australia and New Zealand even as two world wars, de-colonization, the emergence of national economies and welfare states led to creation of distinct national identities in the two countries. Security concerns during the First World War precipitated the first regulation of trans-Tasman movement of people (Mein Smith and Hempenstall 2007, p.62). In 1920 the two countries

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<sup>5</sup> Until the advent of mass air travel the bonds between New Zealand and the cities of Australia's Eastern seaboard were stronger than those between Australia's East and West coasts.

removed these restrictions and formalized the right of ‘white’, British subjects and Maori New Zealanders to move between, reside and work in either society (Mein Smith and Hempenstall 2007, pp.62-3). As geography and—increasingly—nationalism separated the two countries, people continued to move freely between them.

By the 1960s the changing structure of the world economy—especially UK applications to join the EEC—began to draw the attention of Australian and New Zealand policy makers back toward one another. A liberal regime governing movement across the Tasman has survived, mostly intact, the ensuing half-century process of integrating the Australian and New Zealand economies. Re-engagement began with managed trade under the mis-named New Zealand – Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1965). Under this managed-trade regime, Labo(u)r governments in the two countries introduced the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA, 1973). The TTTA permitted all citizens—regardless of race—to visit, reside and work in either country without passport or visa (Mein and Hempenstall 2007, p.64). Earlier trans-Tasman agreements facilitated movement by easing migrant’s access to naturalized citizenship and social benefits. The TTTA represents the high point of freedom of movement across the Tasman.

Deepening trans-Tasman economic integration from the 1980s was accompanied by ambiguous developments in the freedom of movement. In 1983, an inclusive free-trade regime, the Australia – New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA, 1983), replaced the NAFTA. Implementing ANZCERTA generated movement toward ‘deep’ integration of the Australian and New Zealand economies that resulted in, among other things: service market integration, harmonization of government procurement practices, agreements on technical barriers as well as coordination of customs and quarantine policies (Leslie and Elijah 2012a). By the mid-1990s momentum toward economic integration produced the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA, 1998). The TTMRA created a mutual recognition regime for not only goods standards, but also all registered occupations. Individuals working in a (publicly or privately) registered occupation could now practice their trade or profession in any jurisdiction in Australia and New Zealand. These steps, in conjunction with agreements to make healthcare and pension benefits portable, facilitated deep labour market integration.

Even before developments around ANZCERTA began to drive labour market integration deeper, another development was pushing the opposite direction. For security reasons—to deter terrorism and drug trafficking—Australia reintroduced passport and visa requirements in 1981 (Mein Smith and Hempenstall 2007, p.64).<sup>6</sup> More dramatically, Australia restricted unilaterally the rights of New Zealanders residing in Australia in 2001. While resident New Zealanders retained unrestricted access to labour markets, they lost access to unemployment insurance, subsidized loans for tertiary education and other

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<sup>6</sup> New Zealanders received a visa automatically that they were never aware of having.



social benefits. They no longer acquired automatically permanent resident status or special access to naturalized citizenship. The rights of Australians resident in New Zealand remained intact in all of these areas. Deep integration of labour markets has paralleled emergence of an asymmetry in the rights of Australians and New Zealanders.

### Politicizing trans-Tasman freedom of movement in New Zealand

Against the backdrop of increasing economic integration and liberal travel regulation, trans-Tasman migration has become highly politicized in New Zealand, but much less so in Australia. Occasionally Australian backbenchers have attempted to stir public attention by denouncing the TTTA and 'open door' policy toward New Zealanders as a threat to Australians' quality of life. These attempts have failed to resonate in public and party leaders have been quick to marginalize them (Espiner 2009). In New Zealand, on the other hand, the monthly statistics about the number of New Zealanders taking up permanent or long-term residence in Australia is one of the country's most frequently reported 'economic indicators' (Statistics New Zealand 2012, New Zealand Department of Labour 2012, p.1). These numbers attract considerable partisan commentary, usually from the major party in opposition and, most vehemently, during the run-up to general elections. Politicians in New Zealand's major centre-right and centre-left parties, National and Labour, have turned these statistics into an electorally salient indicator of governments' competence in managing the economy. This section considers statistics on trans-Tasman permanent and long-term migration—what they do and do not mean. Then, it demonstrates how both major parties have used these statistics to politicize trans-Tasman migration.

As reported by Statistics New Zealand, the raw data about the numbers of New Zealanders taking up permanent or long-term residence in New Zealand are striking. In its report for July 2012, for example, Statistics New Zealand (2012, p.5) reported 'a net loss of 3,200 migrants to Australia, the same as in July 2011.' It also reported (p.6) for the year ending in July 2012 'a net loss of 39,800 people to Australia'. This was the 'highest ever net loss to Australia'. At face value, this regular 'net loss of people to Australia', which cycles up and down, but has persisted since the 1970s, is shocking in a country with only 4.44 million inhabitants. To many, this development appears unsustainable and as the symptom of an economy and society in terminal decline. As we will see, politicians have portrayed these numbers in this light. Adding to their potency, these statistics also have immediate relevance for most New Zealanders: few people do not have a family member or close friend who is currently residing in Australia. Many people have themselves lived and worked in Australia at some point in their lives. The scale and immediacy of these statistics gives them considerable political potential.

In context, however, the meaning of these statistics changes. Table 1 places trans-Tasman migration in the context of overall patterns of migration in New Zealand. While departures of New Zealand citizens for Australia exceed arrivals from there, and account for an overwhelming proportion of the 'net loss' of New

Zealanders to permanent and long term migration, these numbers are more than compensated by citizens from other countries *migrating to* New Zealand. Contrary to an often cited trans-Tasman 'brain drain', these arrivals are more than three times as likely to hold a degree or higher qualification than those departing for Australia (New Zealand Department of Labour 2012, p.7). While trans-Tasman migration creates real costs for families and relationships, overall migration patterns are beneficial to New Zealand's economic performance.

Table 1 Immigrants and emigrants 1997-2003 compared to 2004-2010


Table 2 Immigrants and emigrants 1997-2003 compared to 2004-2010 (June years)

|  | <b>Arrivals</b> | <b>Departures</b> | <b>Net</b> |
|--|-----------------|-------------------|------------|
| New Zealanders to and from Australia         |                 |                   |            |
| 1997-2003                                    | 52,300          | 187,900           | -135,600   |
| 2004-2010                                    | 62,200          | 221,900           | -159,700   |
| New Zealanders to and from rest of the world |                 |                   |            |
| 1997-2003                                    | 108,400         | 153,300           | -44,900    |
| 2004-2010                                    | 110,700         | 117,700           | -7,000     |
| Net PLT migration of New Zealanders          |                 |                   |            |
| 1997-2003                                    | 160,700         | 341,200           | -180,500   |
| 2004-2010                                    | 172,900         | 339,600           | -166,700   |
| Migration by other citizens                  |                 |                   |            |
| 1997-2003                                    | 352,000         | 109,300           | 242,700    |
| 2004-2010                                    | 409,100         | 157,200           | 251,900    |
| Total PLT migration                          |                 |                   |            |
| 1997-2003                                    | 512,700         | 450,500           | 62,200     |
| 2004-2010                                    | 582,000         | 496,900           | 85,100     |

Source: New Zealand Department of Labour, 'Permanent and Long Term Migration: The Big Picture' Table 2, p.6.

The meaning of statistics about New Zealand citizens migrating to Australia also changes when viewed over time and in the context of New Zealand's growing population. Figure 1 presents the development of migration of New Zealand citizens to Australia as a percentage of New Zealand's population. Because New Zealand's population has continued to grow, migration to Australia, as a share of the population, has declined cyclically but steadily since the 1970s (New Zealand Department of Labour, p.2). As a percentage of the population, fewer-and-fewer New Zealanders are choosing to relocate across 'the Ditch' to Australia. In context, migration of New Zealanders no longer seems an 'existential' crisis, but rather a development of declining significance—at least in economic and social terms. In politics, however, these statistics have assumed more, not less, significance in the past decade.

Figure 1 Permanent Long Term Trans-Tasman departures as a percentage of the New Zealand population, 1979-2011 (June years)



Source: New Zealand Department of Labour (201, 'Permanent and Long Term Migration: The Big Picture' Figure 2, p.2.

When and how politicians first instrumentalized these statistics for partisan purposes remains uncertain. Famously, National Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon responded to the surge of New Zealand migration to Australia in the 1970s by claiming, 'New Zealanders who leave for Australia raise the IQs of both countries' (Walrond 2009, p.4). The present use of migration statistics as a measure of governments' competence in managing the economy goes back, at least, to 2000, when the then-Labour Prime Minister, Helen Clark, expressed concern over the large number of New Zealanders migrating to Australia. Clark attributed this development to the 'earnings gap' that had developed between Australia and New Zealand under the National Party governments that governed New Zealand between 1991 and 1999 (New Zealand Parliament 2008a). Such use of trans-Tasman migration statistics has not been confined to New Zealand's Labour Party.

Campaigns for parliamentary elections in 2008 and 2011 demonstrate that the migration of New Zealanders to Australia is an electoral weapon available to opposition parties, regardless of political ideology. Two months before the 2008 election, the leader of the National Party opposition, John Key, asked Prime Minister Clark what it said

about her Government's management of the economy when, after 9 years of Labour, 46,000 people went to live permanently in Australia last year and only 13,000 came back the other way, making the largest ever net exodus across the Tasman? (New Zealand Parliament 2008b)

Competency in economic management became a core theme of the National Party's campaign and the party linked this theme to trans-Tasman migration explicitly. The party launched its 2008 billboard campaign with the billboard that appears at the beginning of this paper (National Party of New Zealand, 2008). That election ended with a change to a National-led government.

Between the 2008 and 2011 elections the National Party attempted to use trans-Tasman migration to mobilize support for its policy agenda. In 2009 it created

'2025 Taskforce' under former Reserve Bank chairman and former National Party leader, Don Brash. The Task Force was directed to investigate ways 'to close the gap with Australia by 2025' (New Zealand Treasury, 2009). The 2025 Taskforce's first report again drew a link between trans-Tasman income gaps and migration.

The gap matters. Being poorer means those of us living here have fewer choices than our peers in Australia do. And more and more of our friends and families have chosen to leave New Zealand for the better opportunities, higher incomes and richer range of choices abroad—a net 260,000 New Zealanders have left in the last 10 years alone, mostly to Australia. (New Zealand Treasury 2009, p.3)

The cause of this gap, the report's authors argue, is that New Zealand 'made serious economic policy mistakes for decades' (New Zealand Treasury 2009, p.4). To remedy the incomes gap and stem trans-Tasman migration the report prescribes the conventional remedies of 'supply-side' economic policies: cutting public expenditures and tax rates and selling public assets (New Zealand Treasury, p.6). With the 2025 Taskforce, the National Party Government sought to use trans-Tasman migration to mobilize popular support in a standard Left-Right conflict over economic policy and distribution. However, as the number of New Zealanders departing for Australia moved up again in 2010 and 2011, the government muted its rhetoric about the 2025 Taskforce, the income gap with Australia and trans-Tasman migration. The Labour Party opposition, on the other hand, did not.

By the 2011 election campaign, electoral manipulation of the trans-Tasman migration statistics had travelled full circle. Days before the 26 November election, Statistics New Zealand issued its monthly report observing 'a net loss of 35,000 people to Australia....only just below the highest recorded net loss to Australia (35,400 people in the December 2008 year)' (Statistics New Zealand 2011, p. 6). The leader of the opposition Labour Party, Phil Goff, seized the number and announced that

John Key has been given a resounding vote of no confidence with one hundred Kiwis leaving New Zealand for a 'brighter future' in Australia each day.... In 2008 John Key said the exodus to Australia was a 'vote of no confidence' in Labour's management of the economy. Today the shoe is surely on the other foot.' (Goff 2011).

Once again a government found itself hoisted with the same petard it had used against its predecessor. In 2012 the National Government attempted to back away from politicization of migration numbers with little effect and the opposition continues to labour the point (New Zealand Department of Labour 2012, Trevett 2012).

Trans-Tasman migration features prominently on the agenda of New Zealand's electoral politics. It plays a less important role in Australia. It is important to recognize how migration came onto the agenda in New Zealand as well as what did not happen. Opposition politicians in both major parties saw an opportunity to link a statistic with a visceral impact for many New Zealanders, permanent and long term migration of New Zealanders to Australia, to the economic policies of governments. For electoral purposes they turned statistics about migration

into an indicator of governments' economic competence. From a comparative perspective what failed to happen is equally interesting. Politicians did not build electorally salient links between movements of people, threats to national identity, loss of national sovereignty and integration of national economies. The issues that, according to 'postfunctionalist' accounts, brought the EU onto the agenda of mass politics and transformed the processes of European integration have not done so in Australia and New Zealand. Movement of people, a cornerstone of trans-Tasman integration, has remained separated from other elite-driven efforts to construct a Single Economic Market. To this day, trans-Tasman economic integration continues to move forward as a process that takes place almost entirely within 'elite' arenas.

## Conclusion

It is important to be clear about what this paper does and does not do. It explains why trans-Tasman integration has not followed the path of European integration to mass politicization. It does not explain why trans-Tasman integration has not been politicized. This observation has important implications for 'postfunctionalist' theories of integration.

First, this paper raises a criticism of 'post-functional' approaches that is analogous to an earlier criticism that 'new' regional approaches leveled at neo-functional and intergovernmental theories of integration: context matters. Justly or unjustly, observers of 'new' regionalisms criticized earlier explanations of European integration for ignoring, in particular, the impact of the international system on European development. European integration began in a peculiar postwar international system. The conditions generated by the international system for European integration have not been replicated in other regions. The argument of this paper is similar. Circumstances in Australia and New Zealand resemble those in EU member states closely. Cleavage structures and political institutions are similar. The level and scope of trans-Tasman integration resembles that of European integration. What distinguishes the two cases are the historical sequence of integration and the impact of geography. A shared colonial history and peculiar geography permitted free movement across the Tasman to become politically, socially and culturally entrenched before the emergence of a *gal-tan* cleavage and, indeed, before the consolidation of Australian and New Zealand nation states. Trans-Tasman integration has taken place in a very peculiar context that has shaped the course of politicization. Is the trans-Tasman context any more peculiar than the context in which politicization of European integration has occurred?

Still, the peculiarities of the trans-Tasman context do not explain why integration and loss of national sovereignty have not made it on to the agenda of mass politics in Australia and New Zealand. While entrenchment of free movement across the Tasman has pre-empted political entrepreneurs' use of the issue to mobilize people around national sovereignty and integration, other issues might precipitate such conflicts. As Geoffrey Palmer indicated in his letter to the Australian Prime Minister, anything approaching federalism was 'off limits' from

the perspective of New Zealanders. Introduction of a common currency might provoke resistance. The conflicts that arose around the first, unsuccessful attempt to introduce a trans-Tasman Therapeutic Products Authority touched on issues of New Zealand sovereignty and identity (von Tigerstrom 2007). So far, however, none of these issues has erupted in such a way as to draw popular attention to the very deep and on-going process of integration between the two countries.

The trans-Tasman relationship's relative immunity to popular scrutiny raises another question about 'postfunctionalist' theories of integration and how they characterize 'demand' for mass politicization of integration. Because they observe a single case, European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2008b) give the impression (intentionally or unintentionally) that something like a threshold of mobilization exists: if elite-driven policies push integration policies beyond a certain point, entrepreneurs can mobilize masses around identity, sovereignty and integration. The experience of trans-Tasman integration presents a problem for this perspective. While social cleavages, *level* and *scope* of integration in Australia and New Zealand resemble conditions in EU member states, there seems to be less potential for mass mobilization. The World Value Survey offers a possible explanation for this lower potential. It indicates that values of Australians and New Zealanders are closer to each other, and Britons, than any other societies measured. Interestingly, Britons are among the most skeptical Europeans when it comes to integration (Eurobarometer). This suggests that similar *levels* and *scope* of integration may have different meanings in trans-Tasman and European contexts. This is interesting because it indicates that the potential for mass politicization is not related to some absolute measure of the *level* and *scope* of integration so much as it is to perceived gaps between particular trans-nationally coordinated policies and preferred national policies in the same issue areas. The gaps between policies that coordinate two national communities (and ten jurisdictions) and the preferred options of each of those communities is likely to be smaller than the gaps between EU policies and the preferred options of (many of the) 27 member-state communities. In short, this explanation unpacks the rather obvious observation that it is easier to coordinate policies between two communities than 27. It also creates two hypotheses for investigation. First, plotted on the same scale, choices about coordinated policies in a particular issue area should differ in important ways between trans-Tasman and European integration. Second, there should be less distance between national and coordinated policy positions, in general, in the trans-Tasman relationship than in the EU.

Investigation of these possibilities should be the focus of future research. Unfortunately, very little data has been collected on public opinion in Australia and New Zealand regarding trans-Tasman integration. Collection of such data will have to precede comparison of potentials for mass mobilization in Europe and the trans-Tasman relationship. The hope of this paper's authors is that they have demonstrated the potential value of such comparison.

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