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**The HCNM and Norm Entrepreneurship:
Evaluating Security Management and Desecuritization
'Among the Subjects'¹**

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Introduction

The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was created by the OSCE in 1992 as an instrument of early warning and conflict prevention in response to the domestic securitization of minority / majority identities in post-Communist Europe (Jackson Preece, 1999) (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012). The HCNM's intended role was to work with governments to reduce tensions in accordance with a fundamental respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states. Normative strategies to ameliorate exclusive identity narratives and in so doing gradually desecuritize minority / majority relations were not the declared objective in 1992. Nevertheless, over the past twenty-years, norm influence in the form of both country-specific and general thematic recommendations has emerged as a central activity of the office. It is against this background that the key question discussed here arises: has the HCNM evolved beyond the original security management role envisioned by the 1992 mandate to acquire a desecuritizing potential? This paper will argue that the HCNM operates as a 'norm entrepreneur' and through a process of norm influence '*among* the subjects' is capable of not only managing securitized minority majority / relations in the short and medium term but also of transforming them in the long-term.

Norm entrepreneurs and securitization

Both the norm entrepreneur model and the securitization model emerge out of a constructivist approach to the study of international politics. In this perspective, 'shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about behaviour are what give the world structure, order and stability' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894). When a social constructivist attempts to explain change, s/he 'looks for evidence of idea shifts and norm shifts as the main vehicles for system transformation'

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(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894). Since the human condition is one of normative pluralism, individuals must compete to get their voices heard and their ideas recognized. Whereas political acts by individuals are 'personal attempts at distinguishing oneself, at inserting oneself in the unfolding of history, at doing great deeds', political processes are 'a collective attempt at finding or creating meaning in the social, in making the right policy' (Weaver, 1990: 21-22).

This general approach is shared by the securitization model and the norm entrepreneur model. In both models, actors call attention to or create issues by using discursive strategies to name, interpret and dramatize them – a process often referred to as “framing” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897).

The construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of both political acts and political processes, since when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897).

In the securitization model, security is understood as a 'speech act' that moves a particular issue beyond the realm of ordinary politics to that of emergency politics where extraordinary measures are justified (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde: 1998: 23). 'Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects' (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 25). Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) are therefore careful to distinguish securitizing moves (in which an actor discursively presents something as an existential threat) from successful securitization; the latter will only exist if and when the target audience accepts the securitizing move (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 25).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) are similarly nuanced in their characterization of norm influence. The process of norm influence begins when norm entrepreneurs attempt to persuade a specific target audience; if this first stage is successful, the norm cascades through the rest of the population; the process is complete when the norm acquires a taken-for-granted quality and is no longer a matter of broad public debate (internalization). Just as with securitization, a successful outcome of norm internalization is by no means inevitable. Many emergent norms fail to complete the 'norm life cycle'.

Moreover, in both cases of securitization and norm influence, success is apparent only retrospectively. 'Generally speaking, successful securitization is determined in hindsight if security logic is ex post facto apparent' (Roe, 2004: 281). 'Only afterwards can we

investigate how well a certain initiative succeeded in the existing web of human relations' (Jutila: 2006: 182).

Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators.

The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde: 1998: 25).

Similarly, 'because norms prompt justification for action' they 'leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892).

Yet, despite these notable similarities, securitization and norm entrepreneurship have hitherto been regarded as distinct discursive processes with correspondingly separate academic literatures. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), following a more positivist methodology, distinguish norms from 'other motivations for political action' such as interests and threats (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892). This framing of norms as a separate category distinct from interests and threats would seem to suggest that securitization, which is fundamentally concerned with the characterisation of existential threat, should not be understood in terms of 'norm influence' or 'norm entrepreneurship'. This is in keeping with Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) who regard security as 'the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics'. Securitization according to Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) thus seems to suggest a realm of action 'beyond norms'.

However, other scholars writing on securitization challenge this category distinction between normal and emergency politics. Jef Huysmans, for example, points out that 'securitisation does not simply call into being an emergency action, but also the exceptional condition in which normal, that is, rule-determined, politics come into being. Moreover, 'it is by calling upon the exception that the rules are confirmed' (Huysmans, 1998: 580). This paper goes one step further to argue that both 'rules' and 'exceptions to rules' should be understood as norms. 'Rules' and 'exceptions to rules' embody intersubjective standards of 'appropriate behaviour' that limit the range of choice and constrain actions - the definition of a 'norm' as employed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Both 'talking security' and 'not talking security' invoke public narratives of identity, community and belonging / non-belonging. For this reason, securitization and the policy responses intended to ameliorate it are underscored by fundamental norms of the good and right way of life within a community (Huysmans, 1998: 573). This generalization holds irrespective of whether we chose to frame such response in terms of security or desecuritization understood as the 'unmaking of securitization' (Huysmans, 1998: 570).

When agents of securitization and agents of desecuritization 'frame issues' to reconstruct the public perception of 'threat' they are effectively acting as norm entrepreneurs with respect to a 'particular organisation of the political' (Huysmans, 1998: 574). The norm entrepreneur model as developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) may thus provide additional insight into the concomitant processes of securitization and desecuritization. A focus on norms, as distinct from threat, is particularly pertinent for desecuritization since it offers a means of escaping the securitisation 'problematique' that 'locks people into talking in terms of 'security'' (Weaver as quoted in Huysmans, 1998: 573) and thereby hinders efforts aimed at transforming minority / majority relations.

The HCNM as a norm entrepreneur

The purpose of the HCNM as envisioned in 1992 was not one of standard setting or advocacy aimed at norm influence and persuasion but one of diplomacy in response to domestic securitization. The HCNM's intended role was to work with governments to reduce tensions in accordance with a fundamental respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states. The carefully negotiated mandate agreed at Helsinki in 1992 authorizes the HCNM to:

provide "early warning" and, as appropriate, "early action" at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States (OSCE Helsinki Document, 1992: chapter II para 3).

The mandate implies a mostly static view of minority – majority relations within states and of international relations between states. The clear implication of the mandate is that the HCNM is intended to preserve and protect the territorial status quo from any war, mass migration, secession or irredentism that might otherwise follow on from 'aggressive nationalism' on the part of nationalising states, national minorities or their kin-states and in so doing threaten international peace and stability. The HCNM may collect and receive information, visit states, discuss relevant issues with the parties concerned and, where appropriate, promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between them (OSCE Helsinki Document, 1992: chapter II, para 11-12). If the HCNM concludes that there is a prima facie risk of potential conflict, s/he may issue an early warning to the OSCE Permanent Council (OSCE Helsinki Document, 1992: chapter II, para 13) and may recommend that he/she be

authorized to enter into further contact and closer consultations with the parties concerned with a view to possible solutions (OSCE Helsinki Document, 1992: chapter II, para 16).

However, if we look beyond the text of the original mandate to consider the ways in which the HCNM has evolved over the past twenty years, a more complex and dynamic approach to the domestic securitization of minority / majority relations becomes apparent. When the first HCNM Max van der Stoep assumed this office on 1 January 1993, there were only a few standard setting documents relevant to minorities, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR), and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The ICCPR, ICESR, and ECHR are in the main human rights focused and have therefore generated only a limited minority specific jurisprudence. The first dedicated European minority rights instrument since the interwar period – the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Framework Convention) was not agreed until 1995, and did not enter into effect until 1998. Moreover, the earliest states to complete the first monitoring cycle (e.g., Denmark, Italy, Malta) only did so in 2001. As a result, the practical application of the Framework Convention remained largely undetermined for most of the first decade of the HCNM mandate. This diffuse normative context meant that there was little practical guidance that the HCNM could call upon as he began his work to diffuse minority / majority tensions. Existing normative frameworks did not provide sufficient answers to concrete policy dilemmas much beyond the general requirement to ‘respect the rights of persons belonging to minorities’. Yet it was precisely this sort of specific policy guidance that the newly securitized domestic circumstances in the post-communist states required. The HCNM thus become a norm entrepreneur ‘not by design but out of necessity’ (Bloed, 2012).

Steven Ratner in his detailed study of the early years of the HCNM mandate, claims that five distinct but mutually reinforcing strategies of norm influence were almost immediately apparent: (1) the translation of existing normative standards into pragmatic policy proposals; (2) the elevation of existing norms to a more binding status; (3) the articulation of new norms; (4) the dissemination of norms; and (5) the mobilization of support for norms (Ratner, 1999/00: 623). The first two strategies – translation and elevation – are closest to the role envisioned in 1992. Both strategies take place in the context of visits to states of concern, according to paragraphs 23 and 24 of the mandate, albeit with less involvement by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE than was originally envisioned. The second two strategies – articulation and dissemination of norms in the form of general recommendations or guidelines - were not anticipated in 1992 but emerged subsequently in response to perceived

gaps in existing international standards. The final strategy – the mobilization of support for norms – is arguably the necessary enabling condition for successful implementation of all the other strategies; this caveat applies to all discursive models of transformation including both securitization / desecuritization and norm influence. Mobilization will be discussed more fully in the subsequent two sections.

During his country visits, the HCNM aims to identify the root causes of a conflict and to establish a dialogue between the parties concerned with a view to creating an atmosphere of understanding between them sufficient for a negotiated solution to the dispute. This is a classic mediation role albeit with a greater normative dimension than is usually envisioned in mediation.² After a visit, the HCNM may continue a normative dialogue with the state concerned through a process of 'quiet diplomacy'. Under Max van der Stoel (HCNM 1993-2001), most such exchanges with governments were subsequently released to the public. Regrettably, this practice was discontinued by Rolf Ekeus (HCNM 2001-2007) and Knut Vollebaek (HCNM 2007-2013)³.

The general recommendations and guidelines articulate 'best practice' in a particular thematic area drawing upon a combination of existing international standards and the HCNM's personal experience. The general recommendations and guidelines are typically drafted by independent experts at the request of the HCNM, according to the formula 'experts draw up, Commissioner endorses' (Drzewicki, 2005: 126). During the tenure of the first HCNM, Max van der Stoel, three general recommendations were issued: the Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998), and the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999). These general recommendations were not intended to merely restate the status quo; instead, Stoel's declared goal was 'to be bold and creative while remaining within the parameters of international human rights law' (Siemski and Packer, 1997: 348). This declared goal suggests that Stoel understood himself to be engaged in norm entrepreneurship and regarded this activity as a necessary and legitimate part of his mandate.

His successors have continued to act in this norm entrepreneurial capacity. Under Rolf Ekeus, the HCNM issued Guidelines on the Use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast Media (2003) as well as Recommendations on Policing Multi-Ethnic Societies (2006).

² Ratner has coined the term 'normative intermediary' to distinguish HCNM activities from more typical mediation exercises (Ratner, 1999/00).

³ No official explanation has been provided for this change of practice, but we may presume it follows on from the conviction that such publication is counterproductive to HCNM aims and objectives.

Following on from this, Knut Vollebaek initiated the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities and Interstate Relations (2008), and new Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies are expected later in 2012. Significantly, these various discursive interventions have been welcomed as legitimate and desirable contributions by OSCE member states and the wider human rights community (Heintze, 2006) (Philips, 2008) (Farahat, 2008) (Drzewicki, 2009) (Ghebali, 2009) (Altenhoener and Palermo, 2011).

Security management, desecuritization and normative change

The original 1992 conception of HCNM involvement as reflected in the HCNM's on-going normative mediation role is very much in keeping with Roe's (2004) understanding of 'management' as the preferred response to domestic securitization involving minority / majority relations. In a 'management' response, the focus is on mitigating or ameliorating security dilemmas involving minority / majority relations, not transforming them (Roe, 2004: 293). Indeed, Roe considers a transformation to be inappropriate for minority circumstances since these are predicated upon a desire to preserve and promote a distinct identity within the state. The goal of management is to move from a situation of insecurity to one of security (Roe, 2004: 293) but not so far as a security; in other words, minorities and majorities continue to be imagined as separate categories of belonging in which the potential for conflict remains even while it is being managed.

Norm entrepreneurship understood as the deliberate attempt to change values and their concomitant identities is arguably just as integral to a management response as it is to a desecuritizing response. The transition from a condition of insecurity to a condition of security within a bifurcated and potentially oppositional minority / majority identity construct as envisioned by Roe itself requires normative change. This is the case precisely because securitization is a discursive model; 'to talk of a situation as characterized by security means that a threat is articulated but that sufficient counter-measures are felt to be available' (Weaver, 1998: 81 as quoted in Roe (2004: 285)). Managing a situation of insecurity thus hinges upon 'talking' about the securitised problematique using the language of security to preserve the minority / majority relationship within the state and thus reduce the immediate perception of existential threat. Management therefore involves replacing a discourse of minority / majority confrontation with a discourse of minority / majority coexistence. This crucial norm entrepreneurial dynamic which Roe mostly ignores explains why the HCNM's mediative role is also a normative role.

The country specific correspondence made publicly available by Max van der Stoel during his time as HCNM provides ample evidence of norm translation and elevation as key components of his mediation efforts. Although researchers do not have open access to the subsequent correspondence of Ekeus and Vollebaek, it is reasonable to assume a degree of discursive continuity within the office of the HCNM as a result of institutional culture and organizational learning based on inherited practices. The discursive strategies evident in the Stoel letters, to the extent that they are the origins of an on-going evaluative and reflective process internal to the office of the HCNM, may thus be taken as generally indicative of HCNM methods.

In the first quarter of 1993, van der Stoel paid a visit to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. This Baltic trip took place in the context of increasing international concern regarding draft citizenship legislation that threatened to permanently exclude large segments of the Russian minority which remained in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These country visits were among the first conducted by an HCNM. The manner of discursive engagement begun here thus established a pattern for the future. As predicted by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998: 32), the discursive frames employed by Stoel 'are about the future, about alternative futures – always hypothetical – and about counterfactuals.'

In a letter dated 1 April 1993 and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, Stoel makes clear that 'such a policy would scarcely be compatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of various international obligations' (Stoel 1993). 'Taking into account article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', Stoel recommends 'that Estonia proceed to reduce the number of stateless persons permanently residing on its territory' (Stoel 1993). Stoel then goes on to identify a number of policy provisions that Estonia should implement to achieve this inclusive objective. For example, 'taking into account article 3, paragraph 6, of the Estonian Citizenship Act, Article 24, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child', Stoel advises that 'children born in Estonia who would otherwise become stateless should be granted Estonian citizenship' (Stoel 1993).

This manner of discursive engagement is constant across the communications from Stoel's eight year tenure as HCNM. In all his various letters, speeches, and other communiqués, Stoel is careful to embed his mediation efforts within existing international standards while at the same time elaborating policy measures that are consistent with them. Stoel's correspondence is replete with the language of minority / majority coexistence. Again, returning to the circumstances pertaining in Estonia in early 1993, Stoel is careful to point out

that 'the policy I advocate does not only require an effort on the part of the Estonian Government, but equally a contribution on the part of the non-Estonian population'.

But, at the same time, there is a noticeable undercurrent of 'danger' associated with noncompliance. Stoel frames noncompliance in a vocabulary of fear to dramatize both the importance of his advice and the risks incumbent upon those states who choose to ignore it. According to Stoel, to continue along the path of exclusive citizenship involves 'a considerable risk of increasing tensions with the non-Estonian population', a 'strongly negative effect on relations between Estonia and the Russian Federation', and 'could lead to the destabilization of the country as a whole' (Stoel 1993). In marked contrast to this invoked doomsday scenario, Stoel is quick to point out that his 'policy would greatly reduce the danger of destabilization' (Stoel 1993).

This vocabulary of fear is confined to the country specific correspondence and advice, presumably because such a framing is most effective in direct personal communications. Equally, it would be both incongruous and inappropriate to use a danger discourse within formal international standard setting documents. But the same cannot be said of the vocabulary of coexistence; this framing remains pertinent in many of the general thematic recommendations and guidelines.

Coexistence norms are most prominent in those recommendations or guidelines that address structures of governance, e.g., the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities and Interstate Relations (2008), the Recommendations on Policing in Multi-ethnic Societies (2006), and the Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998). Governmental structures such as the judiciary, the police, local government, autonomy regimes and the like, to the extent that they recognize minority / majority identities, unavoidably also reify these social constructs. This reification effect explains why state recognition confers a degree of social permanence. For this reason, 'the minority can feel secure when certain provisions / legislations / mechanisms are put in place that will guarantee its existence (in identity terms), while similarly the majority can also feel secure in the knowledge that the minority will thus work (politically, economically, and also societally) within the existing framework of the state' (Roe, 2004: 293).

Roe (2004) is correct to regard such recognition measures as a viable means of managing security dilemmas involving minority / majority relations. Coexistence in a continued condition of security is possible, and there may well be situations where coexistence is the best that can be achieved, at least for the present. For this reason, security management is the preferred short / medium-range strategy of the HCNM. This management strategy was

anticipated in the 1992 mandate and continues to be reflected in the on-going mediation activities of the HCNM.

But it would be wrong to conclude, as Roe does, that this management strategy results from an intrinsic minority / majority dynamic that makes the 'desecuritization of minority rights' 'logically impossible' (Roe, 2004: 290). Securityness is fundamentally 'a qualitative question':

Actors [like the HCNM] can choose to handle a major challenge in other ways and thus not securitize it. The use of a specific conceptualization is always a choice... (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 32).

When the HCNM or indeed anyone else chooses to speak of 'minorities' and 'majorities' as discrete and unitary actors in order to 'manage' security in the short or medium term, they are choosing to accord these groups a coherent and fixed status while their social reality may be very different.

Individual identities are now understood to be multiple, multi-layered, contextual and dynamic (Calhoun, 1994). Where freedom exists, diversity quickly becomes a reality of society as a whole and the multiplicity of groups comprising it. The normative advantages of pluralism have long been recognized by liberal political theorists (Barker, 1951) as have the normative disadvantages of totalitarianism (Arendt, 1951). It is the existence of diversity which makes desecuritization possible. To 'shift from a position of societal security to one of societal asecurity' is not 'in essence to stop talking about group distinctiveness' as Roe claims (Roe, 2004: 290), but rather to choose to stop *only* talking about specific groups and their distinctiveness. In a desecuritized polity, 'minorities' and 'majorities' continue to exist but their points of reference are no longer fixed; the same individual will belong to the 'minority' in some circumstances and the 'majority' in others such that it is no longer possible to immediately 'know' a minority 'when you see one'. To move beyond the 'us / them' dualism inherent in securitized minority / majority relations is to embrace a plural narrative where individual and collective 'stories' intersect at multiple locations, protagonists are constantly shifting and the final chapter remains forever incomplete. This goal is not dependent upon an objective constitutional project, although it may be accompanied by one in some cases, but on an altogether more subjective redefinition of 'the public, political sphere in terms of the complexity and plurality of daily human practices' (Huysmans, 1998: 588).

'...[D]esecuritization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as "threats against which we have counter-measures" but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere' (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998:29). The general recommendations and guidelines suggest that desecuritization has

become the HCNM's long-range strategy. Desecuritization is not something that can be achieved through a restructuring of the state; instead, desecuritization also requires a change in the public narrative. Thus, it is in those general recommendations where the emphasis is on public narrative as much as structure that this long-range desecuritizing agenda is most apparent.

The Hague Recommendations on the Education Rights of National Minorities are a case in point. Educational policy has long been regarded as a means of socializing future citizens into a particular public narrative. Precisely because education endorses and transmits such a narrative, education related controversies are a recurring feature of the HCNM's work. The Hague recommendations envision educational policy formulation as an open and shared process in which minorities 'participate in a meaningful way' in the 'development and implementation' of 'minority education' (HCNM Hague Recommendations, 1996: article 6). Education itself is understood to be 'intercultural' and best practice is characterized as a compulsory curriculum that includes the history, cultures and traditions of both minorities and majorities in the context of mutual bilingualism (HCNM Hague Recommendations, 1996: article 19). The goal of education is thus to 'contribute to the strengthening of tolerance and multiculturalism within the State' (HCNM Hague Recommendations, 1996: article 19). Similarly, the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities (1999) are premised on the general principle that 'individuals identify themselves in numerous ways in addition to their identity as members of a national minority' (HCNM Lund Recommendations, 1999: article 4). Although the Lund Recommendations include numerous references to state structures including the organization of central government, electoral systems, and territorial and non-territorial self-government, they also emphasize that process is just as important as substance in peaceful and democratic societies and call upon states to 'foster intercultural understanding' (HCNM Lund Recommendations, 1999: article 5). It is expected, given their thematic focus, that the forthcoming Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (due to be released by the end of 2012) will also endorse a plural public narrative.

The existence of HCNM norm entrepreneurship with an apparently desecuritizing discourse adds credibility to the theoretical claims of Huysmans (1998) and Jutila (2006). The HCNM is usually presented as a classic instrument of security and conflict prevention. Thus, when the HCNM chooses to speak a language of plurality and process indicative of a long-range strategy of desecuritization, this is a significant rebuttal to those like Roe who argue that the language of security cannot be removed from the issue of minority rights.

'Speaking' desecuritization: on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?

In order to assess the empirical evidence of HCNM-led desecuritization, a nuanced depiction of the process of desecuritization that parallels Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde's (1998) characterization of the process of securitization is required. In other words, researchers should arguably return to the key questions identified by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998: 27) and transpose them onto a desecuritizing scenario: who can 'do' or 'speak' desecuritization successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?

The presence of a long-range desecuritizing agenda, does not, in and of itself, tell us much about the HCNM's desecuritizing capabilities. When the HCNM speaks the language of desecuritization, his relevance may be limited to those situations where minority / majority relations have yet to be securitized. In this case, the HCNM's potential for desecuritization would be preventative rather than transformative. Such an outcome would be consistent with Galbreath and McEvoy's (2012) contention that 'the OSCE as a whole is not a transformative institution but rather a 'confidence-and-security-building institution' (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012: 274). But it would nevertheless refute their additional claim that the OSCE/HCNM 'performs this role by maintaining the status quo amongst states and peoples' (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012: 274).

The essence of desecuritization is the reconstruction of public narratives of membership and belonging. Thus both preventative and transformative desecuritization would transcend the 'status quo amongst states and peoples'. The putative distinction between preventative desecuritization and transformative desecuritization does not reflect a differential effect upon the status quo but rather the point at which such a discursive intervention occurs in the process of securitization. Preventative desecuritization would presumably occur after initial securitizing moves had taken place but before the process of securitization was complete. This contrasts with transformative desecuritization (the use of desecuritization employed by Huysmans (1998) and Jutila (2006)) which would presumably occur after successful securitization had been achieved.

The initial premise in any empirical assessment of HCNM discursive activity must be that in neither the preventative nor transformative scenario is a successful desecuritization

outcome inevitable. In principle, successful desecuritization, just like its opposite securitization, must be contingent upon social and contextual conditions. Similarly, we can assume that some actors may be better positioned to make successful discursive interventions of this kind, and that some issues may be easier to desecuritize than others.

After thus subdividing the social, external speech-act conditions into actor authority and threat [or non-threat] related, we can sum up the facilitating conditions as follows: (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security [or desecurity], (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing [or desecuritizing] actor – that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing [or desecuritizing] attempt, and (3) features of the alleged threats [or non-threats] that either facilitate or impede securitization (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 33).

These assumptions would seem to suggest that it is the ability to influence the target audience which is the key to securitization / desecuritization. This conclusion resonates with Jutila's (2006) insistence that 'researchers should focus more on the part 'accepted by the relevant target audience' (Jutila, 2006: 174). To paraphrase Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998: 31), desecuritization is not decided by the desecuritizing actor but by the target audience. Thus, desecurity 'ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but *among* [italics in the original] the subjects' (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 31).

But how precisely should researchers go about focusing on the target audience? The securitization model as developed by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) does not address the complexity of influence and therefore offers limited guidance on how to analyze persuasion and mobilization '*among* the subjects'. It is at this point that it becomes necessary to draw upon other constructivist explanations of transformation. The norm entrepreneur model developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provides a much fuller depiction of the process of influence. Thus, by extrapolating from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), we may gain further insight into the conditions for and characteristics of influence necessary to create securitization and its concomitant desecuritization.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), norm influence may be understood as a three-stage process: (1) norm emergence characterized by persuasion; (2) norm cascade characterized by socialization; and (3) norm internalization characterized by habituation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895-898). If we apply this model to securitization / desecuritization, a more detailed and nuanced process of persuasion and mobilization '*among* the subjects' emerges. In the first stage, securitizing actors attempt to convince a critical mass of security leaders to accept a new existential threat; desecuritizing actors would need to do

the reverse and convince a critical mass of security leaders that no such threat exists based on a normative reframing of the public narrative. In the second stage, and for both processes of securitization and desecuritization, a dynamic of imitation is present in which security leaders attempt to mobilize subjects to share in that threat or non-threat. The exact motivation for 'cascade' in the second stage may vary across cases, but we can assume, following Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), that social pressure for conformity combined with an individual desire for self-esteem and acceptance are likely to facilitate this process of wider social acceptance of the presence or absence of threat. Internalization occurs at the far end of cascade when the threat or non-threat becomes an habitualized part of the public narrative of daily life 'among the subjects' and therefore ceases to be an issue of existential contestation.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that in order to be effective, norm entrepreneurs require an organisational platform from and through which they are able to mobilize support for their norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 899). I would suggest that both securitizing and desecuritizing actors have similar mobilizing requirements. This suggestion resonates with Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde's (1998) claim that 'the existential threat has to be argued and...gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures' (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 25). In some cases, organisational platforms may be constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting an existential threat or non-threat. Both the British National Party and Migration Watch UK arguably function as dedicated organizational platforms to promote migration as an existential threat to the United Kingdom, while the Migrant Rights Network promotes the opposite existential view. Frequently, however, securitizing / desecuritizing actors will operate from organizations that were created for other purposes and projects. Thus, the HCNM operates from within an international organization, the OSCE, that has an explicit security agenda. This may, at least in part, explain why the original 1992 mandate reflects a management response to the domestic securitization of minority / majority relations rather than a desecuritization response.

The platform from which a securitizing / desecuritizing actor operates will also influence the resources and leverage securitizing / desecuritizing actors are able to utilize in their attempts at persuasion and mobilization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 900). For example, NGOs may exercise comparative moral advantage that facilitates persuasion and mobilization through discursive claims to integrity, truth, and empathy. Meanwhile, international organizations and domestic governing bodies may possess financial resources

and political leverage that facilitate persuasion and mobilization by increased access to the media and to decision-makers.

The organizational platform afforded by the OSCE gives the HCNM access to both international and domestic security leaders whose support is crucial for persuasion and mobilization '*among* the subjects', but only limited financial and human resources and no direct powers of enforcement. As Knut Vollebaek notes:

I can conduct on-site visits and engage in preventive diplomacy, in theory even without the consent of the state concerned. However, I cannot function properly without the political support of the participating States. In practice, therefore, I carry out my tasks in close consultation with them. Only with their backing can I make a meaningful contribution. (Vollebaek, 2007:3).

As a result, each HCNM must compensate for these institutional limitations by drawing upon personal resources— most notably integrity, diplomatic experience, and professional networks – in order to succeed at persuasion and mobilization.

Usually, for an existential threat / non-threat to reach the second stage and begin to 'cascade' through the target audience, it must become institutionalized in specific rules or administrative bodies (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 900). Admittedly, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) do not 'push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted' for securitization to exist (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: p. 25). Nevertheless, when securitization is understood as consisting in three components (or steps) - existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde: p. 26) - and 'if a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized' (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 27). Persistent or recurrent desecuritization is likely to involve a similar institutional dimension as securitized threats, actions and effects are replaced with desecuritized equivalents. In both scenarios, institutionalization will presumably contribute strongly to persuasion and mobilization '*among* the subjects' by clarifying the content of the threat / non-threat, as well as what constitutes its expression and required response.

The HCNM possesses a considerable advantage with respect to institutionalization because any general recommendation or guideline his office produces will have this outcome. This effect explains why each successive HCNM has undertaken to produce general thematic recommendations and guidelines. Through these general guidelines, the HCNM is able to institutionalize his policy recommendations. But Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) caution that institutionalization is not a necessary condition for progression to the second stage. They also

acknowledge the possibility that, in some cases, institutionalization may follow rather than precede 'cascade' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 900). To the extent that norm influence and securitization / desecuritization are similar discursive processes, we should keep these caveats in mind when assessing the latter.

Finnemore and Sikkink contend that until a 'tipping point' is reached, change only occurs with support from 'significant domestic movements' (1990: 902). But once this 'tipping point' has been reached, a different dynamic begins. More states adopt the new norm more rapidly even absent domestic pressure for change. However, this contention is less relevant and potentially inappropriate when applied to securitization / desecuritization. Because securitization / desecuritization involve the reconstruction of the prevailing public narrative, both remain contingent upon significant support 'among the subjects'. Ultimately, the target audience (subjects) in securitization / desecuritization is domestic. International praise or censure may facilitate domestic change (although we can also imagine scenarios where the reverse is more likely to be the case), but it is not itself sufficient to guarantee successful influence 'among the subjects'. 'People inside the 'us' are in most cases better positioned to start new ontological narratives...' (Jutila, 2006: 181). This intrinsic discursive limitation may explain the variable results achieved by international minority rights conditionality as instruments of desecuritization.

An authentic public narrative must be seen to have a popular authorship and corresponding ownership. For this reason a more effective way of promoting the public acceptance of new narratives is likely to be through procedural changes that create new political processes 'among the subjects':

frequent interactions among people... would ultimately create predictability, stability and habits of trust. As trust becomes habitual, it would become internalized, and internalized trust would, in turn, change affect.... Changed affect meant changed identity and changed norms as empathy and identification with others shifted (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1990: 905).

This characterization suggests that the process of influence leading to securitization / desecuritization is likely to be gradual, incremental, and uncertain. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that securitizing / desecuritizing moves may occur but with varying results. Securitizing / desecuritizing moves may take place but fail to gain any acceptance from the target audience. Alternatively, securitization / desecuritization may succeed in changing the prevailing public narrative. At this extreme end of 'cascade', securitization / desecuritization should be so widely accepted that it achieves a 'taken for granted' quality (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904). In other words, subjects would perceive the narrative of

threat or non-threat as 'real'. Accordingly, their actions would automatically reflect and in so doing reinforce this social 'reality'. Because these narratives are no longer controversial, actors would not seriously consider or discuss them. For this reason, 'success' may be harder to discern than 'failure'; whereas the latter would imply a continued political debate and thus greater 'discursive evidence', the former belies a pervasive 'nothingness'.

But these two success / fail scenarios are not the only possible outcomes of securitizing / desecuritizing moves. There is likely to be a much larger *in between* category of cases that exhibit an altogether more contingent quality of *becoming*: a particular issue may be securitized / desecuritized while the overarching minority / majority construct remains unchanged in the public imagination. In situations of *becoming*, securitization / desecuritization 'among the subjects' would be partial but still incomplete. Researchers are likely to 'see' politics *becoming* securitized and securitization *becoming* desecuritized with the benefit of hindsight. Our modus operandi should be to look for qualitative changes in the contested character of minority / majority debates across a broad spectrum of more or less securitization / desecuritization.

Becoming desecuritized

The first HCNM assumed office at the start of 1993, so researchers now have the benefit of almost twenty years of accumulated discursive activity to evaluate. During this time, the HCNM has been active in many former communist states, including Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. In all these states, as documented by Minority Rights Group, the various opinions of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention, and a wide variety of other sources, not least the office of HCNM itself, minority / majority issues continue to be framed in the language of existential threat. Evidence of successful securitization of minority / majority relations therefore abounds. Crucially, however, violent conflict between minorities / majorities has been far less than was anticipated when the HCNM was created in 1992; instead, violence has been sporadic and limited to a handful of cases (e.g., Georgia, Kyrgistan, Kosovo, Macedonia) such that most former communist states are, at least, stable. These circumstances suggest the HCNM's short / medium-range strategy of security management is, for the most part, effective. Nevertheless, it is also reasonable to conclude based on this same body of evidence that there are currently no cases of successful preventative desecuritization. The evidence of pervasive and persistent

minority / majority controversy, albeit mostly in a condition of stability, also indicates that there are, as yet, no cases of successful transformative desecuritization either.

The critical question thus becomes: is there evidence of partial transformative desecuritization 'among the subjects' in those states where the HCNM has been discursively engaged? The problem which confronts researchers endeavouring to answer this more nuanced question is not the pervasive silence anticipated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) but a cacophony of debate that make moments of relative quiet difficult to discern. Yet it is precisely these 'quiet moments' that may reveal specific issues where desecuritizing moves initiated by the HCNM have succeeded in changing the perceptions of the target audience.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) conceptualize change as a gradual process of norm influence. This privileging of process resonates with Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde's emphasis on what takes place 'among the subjects' (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 31). Crucially, it also fits the ideal of desecuritization as a reconstruction of the public narrative of everyday espoused by Huysmans (1998) and Jutila (2006). A process based approach is apparent in both the norm mediation and norm articulation roles of the HCNM. The HCNM's country specific mediation efforts involve the initiation of dialogue between minority and majority representatives in the form of roundtables, conferences and similar discursive activities as part of the short / medium-range security management strategy. Following on from this, the general thematic recommendations and guidelines emphasize process as a necessary corollary of structure. I would suggest that process is most apparent in those HCNM country specific and general thematic guidelines concerning education and participation. Accordingly, if Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) Huysmans (1998) and Jutila (2006) are correct, we are most likely to discover evidence of more or less securitization / desecuritization in cases concerning education and participation. Consequently, researchers assessing the HCNM as a potential agent of transformative desecuritization would do best to concentrate their attention in these policy areas.

Controversies surrounding minority education and participation are prevalent and persistent in the context of minority / majority securitization / desecuritization. There is insufficient scope within this paper to provide a comprehensive evaluation of desecuritization moves by the HCNM in both these policy areas. Since the goal here is to identify what the key characteristics of *becoming* desecuritization might be, I will limit myself to consideration of a few HCNM projects directed at minority language education.

Historically, the promotion of an official language through the educational curriculum has been central to the creation of homogeneous and frequently securitized national

narratives (Jackson-Preece, 2006). The right of minorities to establish separate schools is a classic management response to securitization which dates back to the interwar system of minority guarantees (Jackson-Preece, 1999). In contrast, *becoming* desecuritization suggests a less homogeneous national paradigm of education. 'This implies not only multicultural education in terms of content, but also inter-cultural education in terms of approach and process' (Ekeus, 2003: 7). A *becoming* desecuritized educational curriculum would arguably facilitate the retention and acquisition of both minority and majority languages for all students alongside the inclusion of diverse histories and cultures.⁴

Integrated education is not only about putting children of various ethnic groups in one classroom. It is about democratic school governance. It is about interesting and inclusive textbooks. It is about creating joint activities. Equally important is the depolarization of curriculum and textbook development (Vollebaek, 2009a: 4).

In a *becoming* desecuritized educational context, teachers lead a process of cultural exchange rather than national conformity.⁵

We see evidence of a desecuritizing approach to education in the Hague Recommendations that were drafted under the direction of Max van der Stoep. Subsequent HCNMs have continued to refine this desecuritizing paradigm of education. Educational programmes initiated by Rolf Ekeus emphasized that 'education in a multi-ethnic context should be concerned with the teaching of different languages but it should also involve teaching the history and culture of the diversity of ethnic communities within the state, not just that of the national majority' (Ekeus, 2003: 8). Knut Vollebaek has continued this focus on integrated education as an 'education system that does not assimilate or separate pupils, but rather tries to reconcile the two goals...[of] societal cohesion and individual identity, by providing a space for children to meet and learn how to understand and respect different cultures, languages and traditions' (Vollebaek, 2006: 4).

HCNM efforts at desecuritizing national education frameworks are mostly to be found in Southeastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Altenhoener, 2009: 589). The HCNM goal in pursuing these projects is arguably twofold: to ensure opportunities exist for instruction in minority languages while also guaranteeing proficiency in the official state (majority) language. In all cases, the HCNM has sought to balance requirements geared to the preservation of distinct minority languages with the promotion of minimum levels of

⁴ This conceptualization of desecuritization corresponds to current international guidelines on intercultural education. See, for example, UNESCO Guidelines on Intercultural Education (2006).

⁵ This view recalls Council of Europe recommendations on intercultural education. See, for example, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (84) 18 on the training of teachers in education for intercultural understanding, notably in a context of migration.

majority language fluency necessary for full social, economic and political participation by minorities (Altenhoener, 2009: 589). Accordingly, such programmes should be regarded as examples of multilingual / multicultural integrative education rather than minority language education. The long-range objective of such projects is arguably the creation of a plural public narrative. These multilingual, multicultural and ultimately integrative education programmes may reasonably be categorized as transformative desecuritizing moves.

The controversy in Macedonia concerning tertiary education in Albanian is relevant to consider in this context of *becoming* more or less desecuritized. In 1994, Albanian academics from the former Albanian language faculty at Pristina University in Kosovo announced the creation of a 'University of Tetovo' in Macedonia's largest Albanian majority city. The Albanian minority claimed this Albanian university was necessary both to compensate for lower admission rates of Albanians to the University of Skopje and to provide a complete Albanian language education for the Albanian community. The Macedonian government refused to fund the university or to recognise its diplomas.

Through his public and private communications, HCNM Stoel translated the general language provisions of the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Framework Convention into immediate policy guidance relevant to the securitization of higher education in Macedonia (Ratner, 1999/00, p. 627). Stoel's communiqués show that he made clear these normative undertakings gave minorities the right to establish education institutions in their own language but equally that this right did not extend to an automatic requirement for public funding or recognition (Packer, 1999, pp. 173-74). These initial managing moves created a space for compromise that enabled the parties involved to shift 'from clashes regarding rights to consideration of practical possibilities' (Ratner, 1999/00, p. 628).

At this point, Stoel initiated a series of programmes with a long-range transformative desecuritizing agenda. In 1997, with financial support from the Netherlands, Stoel introduced a 'transition year programme' to improve ethnic Albanian opportunities to gain admission to the Macedonian state universities at Skopje and Bitola. Saturday classes in Macedonian taught by teams of both ethnic Albanian and Macedonian instructors were offered to students approaching the end of secondary studies. A handbook was also produced for teaching Macedonian to non-Macedonian students. By 2003, 80% of the 1200 students enrolled in the 'transition year programme' passed the university entrance exams (Ekeus, 2004: 22).

Stoel also sought to elevate what might be construed as 'soft law provisions' of the Framework Convention by arguing that the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia permitted private educational institutions not funded by the state. From here, Stoel effectively

mobilized international support for the 2001 creation of a South East European University (SEEU) in Tetovo backed by external funding. The SEEU was not created as an exclusively Albanian institution but 'was planned to be open to all as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual university' (Dafflon, 2006, p. 11). The long-range transformative desecuritizing goal here was 'to encourage students to learn to communicate effectively in both local languages of the region as well as in English and / or other international languages' (Dafflon, 2006, p. 11). In 2004, an OECD report concluded that the SEEU had 'exceeded its stated aims of contributing significantly to the solution of the problem of higher education in the Albanian language.... and of providing a multicultural approach to education' (OECD, 2004: p. 9). 'Mainly due to pressure from the international community and following the success of SEEU (Dafflon, 2006, p. 11), the University of Tetovo was officially recognized by the Government of Macedonia in 2004. Most recently, the 2005-2015 National Educational Development Programme for Macedonia has placed particular emphasis on multicultural and intercultural education (Civic Initiatives and the King Baudouin Foundation, 2007: 54).

Nevertheless, minority / majority relations in Macedonia remain securitized, and controversies concerning education persist. According to the 2006 FCNM advisory report, conditions in many Albanian schools continue to be poor. There are few qualified teachers and facilities are often inadequate (Civic Initiatives and the King Baudouin Foundation, 2007: 55). In 2010, the Macedonian Government adopted a Strategy on Integrated Education to facilitate comprehensive educational reforms but progress towards implementation has been slow (Vollebaek, 2011: 6). HCNM Vollebaek has voiced his concern that 'ten years after the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, we are still witnessing interethnic clashes in schools where students from different background study in shifts' (Vollebaek, 2011: p. 3). HCNM discursive engagement towards Macedonia *becoming* desecuritized continues.

A similar pattern of education *becoming* more or less desecuritized within a general context of persistent securitization of minority / majority relations appears widespread across the HCNM's discursive activity in Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In all cases, the mobilization of support within the target audience is the crucial enabling condition for change. The HCNM is only as effective an agent of desecuritization as he is allowed to be by the subjects involved. The following are a few examples which support these generalizations:

- Romania - HCNM initiatives (1999-2000) concerning Romanian and Hungarian education within a multicultural context at the Babes-Bolyai University were effective

(Horvath, 2002: 107-122). But HCNM recommendations (1998) for a similarly multicultural Hungarian-German university, to be symbolically named the Petofi-Schiller University after the great Hungarian and German poets, were never implemented (Brubaker, 2006: p. 149-152);

- Georgia - An HCNM initiated pilot programme (2006-8) on multilingual education involving 97 teachers and 560 pupils in non-Georgian language public schools was carried out (Mekhuzla and Roache, 2009: 17-18). Following on from this, the Georgian Government developed a multilingual education strategy (2009) (Mekhuzla and Roache, 2009: 18). However, the government 'still needs to support this initiative with more substantive content and a sustainable financial contribution' (Vollebaek, 2011: 4).
- Serbia – In 2009, the HCNM and the Serbian Government jointly commissioned a feasibility study to consider plans for a multilingual higher education institution in southern Serbia. The study concluded that such an institution would be a positive step towards inter-ethnic integration in the region. Initially, a number of administrative obstacles relating to the establishment of this institution 'caused worrying delays and confusion' (Vollebaek, 2011: 6). But a new university department of economics was finally opened in Bujanovac in the autumn of 2011. The department currently offers courses in marketing and economics in both the Serbian and Albanian languages. It is officially accredited and all students receive public funding. The present student body is approximately 50% ethnic Albanian and 50% ethnic Serbian (Pirota, 2012: p. 24-25). However, other issues regarding Albanian access to education remain, mostly due to a continued shortage of qualified Albanian language teachers, controversy over the use of Serbian textbooks, and persistent difficulties with the recognition of university diplomas from Kosovo (Balkan Insight, 2011).
- Bosnia – The HCNM assisted in the (2009) development of a 'Student Workbook on the Culture, Origins and Traditions of the National Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Vollebaek, 2009b: 2). This textbook is used 'on a voluntary basis in selected schools' (Vollebaek, 2009b: 2). But the education system in Bosnia remains 'highly divided along ethnic lines' and the 'political elite has no incentive or mechanism to address the root causes of the existing divisions through systemic reforms' (Vollebaek, 2011: 7).

By recognizing a wider range of possibilities for *becoming* more or less desecuritized across these various examples, Galbreath and McEvoy's bold assertion that the HCNM's approach has resulted in an overall 'failure to transform interethnic relations' (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012: 281) is tempered by a more nuanced picture of partial transformation. Further in depth and comparative case studies of HCNM involvement in education and participation are needed to confirm these initial findings.

Conclusion

Security, like politics, is a fundamentally contingent normative activity undertaken in a context of uncertainty. Actors choose to speak 'security' or 'desecurity'. In making that choice, they are effectively engaged in a process of norm influence '*among* the subjects' with respect to a particular conception of identity, community and belonging / non-belonging. All securitizing / desecuritizing actors are in this crucial respect 'norm entrepreneurs' within a 'discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm' of *becoming* (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde: 1998: 31).

The HCNM has chosen a short / medium-range strategy of security management and a long-range strategy of transformative desecuritization. The latter strategy was not anticipated by the 1992 mandate; it is a discursive innovation begun by the first HCNM, Max van der Stoel, and carried forward by his successors, Rolf Ekeus and Knut Vollebaek. The HCNM's short / medium-range strategy of security management is, for the most part, effective. Evidence of effective desecuritization is both less obvious and more difficult to analyse because that persuasion and mobilization '*among* the subjects' upon which it depends is insufficiently theorized within the existing securitization literature.

By extrapolating from the norm entrepreneur model, this paper has provided a more complex and nuanced understanding of the process of norm influence integral to *becoming* more or less securitized / desecuritized. This fuller characterization of persuasion and mobilization '*among* the subjects' suggests that the process of influence leading to securitization / desecuritization is likely to be uncertain, incremental and varied. As a result, we should assume that securitizing / desecuritizing moves will produce contingent results that defy a certain classification of either 'success' or 'failure'. In a large category of cases, a particular issue will become more or less securitized / desecuritized while the overarching minority / majority construct remains unchanged in the public imagination. In such situations, securitization / desecuritization '*among* the subjects' will be partial but still incomplete.

A process based approach to minority / majority relations indicative of desecuritization is most apparent in HCNM discursive interventions regarding education and participation. By articulating norms, as distinct from threats, the HCNM is able to escape the securitization 'problematique' which 'locks people into talking in terms of 'security'' (Weaver as quoted in Huysmans, 1998: 573) and thereby create discursive opportunities for more or less desecuritization 'among the subjects'. A cursory review of minority education programmes in which desecuritizing moves were purposefully disaggregated from desecuritization per se suggests a generalizable pattern of *becoming* desecuritized. Accordingly, we can now 'answer' the key empirical questions identified by Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998: 31) with respect to the HCNM's desecuritizing potential: the HCNM 'speaks' desecuritization on issues concerning education and participation in conditions of more or less managed security and with a partial but still incomplete transformative effect.

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