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# The Europeanization of Protest Politics

A comparative study of EU and non-EU member states

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## **Abstract**

Political contestation has lately entered the world of European integration studies. Apart from public opinion, voting behaviour, and party competition, scholars interested in the politicization of Europe have also studied whether and how European integration has restructured protest politics. However, research on the Europeanization of protest is still rare as compared to studies on more institutionalized forms of participation and mobilization. Furthermore, the literature seems divided: While a few quantitative protest event studies exist that mainly focus on the volume and development of Europeanized protests, researchers relying on case studies or other strategies of data collection have paid close attention to different forms of Europeanized protests. The present paper attempts to bridge this gap by exploring both the extent and the forms of protest in three West European countries for the period 1995 to 2010. To do so, we rely on a new in-depth selection and coding of quality press articles on Europeanized protest events. The three countries covered in this paper include a founding member of the EU (Germany), a member-country since 1995 (Austria), and a non-member (Switzerland). This sample allows us to test whether the volume and the form of Europeanized protest politics depend on a country's level of integration.

## 1. Introduction

European integration, once primarily the business of bureaucrats and ministries of foreign affairs, has become a major topic of political contestation in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Hooghe and Marks' (2009) recently formulated 'post-functionalist theory of European integration' can be interpreted as a direct reaction to this real-world development. Especially the concept of 'politicization' has become increasingly popular in research on European integration during the last years (for a review, see de Wilde 2011). Drawing on closely related concepts, researchers have explored the consequences of European integration for electoral politics both at the national and the European level (e.g. Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a; b; van der Brug and van der Eijk 2007), as well as the role of public opinion – especially when it comes to referenda on a country's membership or on further steps of integration (e.g. Hug 2002; Kaufmann and Waters 2004; Wagschal 2007). The question how Europe actually affects party competition and electoral behaviour has been answered differently so far: ranging from Mair's (2000) reserved notion of a 'limited impact' to metaphors of a 'sleeping giant' who is just about to awake (de Vries 2007; Green-Pedersen 2012; van der Eijk and Franklin 2007).

Most research on the contestation over European integration is restricted to *institutionalized* political arenas. However, a concept such as politicization clearly implies a "societal understanding of politics" (de Wilde 2011, 566) that transcends the realm of such institutionalized modes of political participation and mobilization. Therefore, researchers should also explore the consequences of European integration for the *arena of social movements and protest politics* (see Eising 2008). This is an important topic, among other things, because modes of participation once classified as 'rare' and 'unconventional' have become an integral part of contemporary politics in all established democracies (e.g. Barnes and Kaase 1979; Jenkins et al. 2008; Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

Drawing on the concept of political opportunity structures, Marks and McAdams (1996; 1999) were amongst the first who discussed the consequences of European integration for less institutionalized forms of political mobilization and participation, respectively. These authors built the theoretical fundament for several research efforts dealing with political protest related to Europe. Simply stated, they expected that the upward shift of authoritative decision-making provides new opportunities but also constraints for protest mobilization in Europe. While studies on the Europeanization of protest politics are still rare as compared to electoral politics, Marks and McAdams' (1996; 1999) works has been followed by some quantitative

studies (relying mainly on protest event analysis) and several qualitative case studies (e.g. Balme and Chabanet 2008; Balme et al. 2002; della Porta and Caiani 2007; 2009; Imig 2004; Imig and Tarrow 2001a; McCauley 2011; Trif and Imig 2003; Uba and Ugglá 2011).

In this paper, we build upon these studies and trace the Europeanization of protest politics based on a new dataset of protest events related to European integration. Following Vink and Graziano (2008, 7), we understand Europeanization broadly as “the domestic adaptation to European regional integration.” From a methodological point of view, our research is deliberately placed in the ‘quantitative tradition’ using the method of protest event analysis. However, we also aim at a more fine-grained analysis of various features of Europeanized protest events (e.g., organizational background, the specific thematic claims as well as justifications articulated by the protesters). Such features have been primarily considered by qualitative research approaches so far. Furthermore, our method allows for tracing country-specific differences that have been neglected by most quantitative studies, too (but see, for example, Reising 1999).

Apart from presenting our new approach, this paper focuses on two aspects of the Europeanization of protest politics: its volume and its forms. *First*, we consider the most fundamental question of the volume of Europeanized protests both with respect to the number of events as well as the number of citizens mobilized.<sup>1</sup> Can we actually observe an increasing volume of protests related to European integration? *Second*, we focus on the transnational character of the protest events related to European integration. What forms of Europeanization prevail and can we observe some shifts over time? More specifically, we take up a typology proposed by Imig and Tarrow (2001c) that combines the targets of and the actors involved in protest events (see also della Porta and Caiani 2007; 2009). In this paper, we combine the addressee (or target) of protests as well as three organizational aspects: the participation of foreign citizens, the organization of an event as part of a transnational campaign, and the involvement of transnational organizations.

The volume and the form of protest events will be considered both with respect to temporal developments from 1995 to 2010 and with respect to country differences. More specifically, we compare three countries that differ regarding their level of integration: Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Germany is a founding member of the EU, Austria joined in 1995, while

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<sup>1</sup> The number of participants is a further aspect that has been mostly neglected so far in the literature.

Switzerland is still a non-EU member. This allows us to see whether Europeanization within EU member states differs from the one outside the EU.

Regarding the *volume* of protests over European integration, our results indicate no clear trend towards higher (or lower) levels of Europeanization over time and mixed results regarding country differences. Considering the *forms*, we demonstrate that differences related to the countries' level of integration shape the politics of protest and that 'domestication', i.e. a type of protest in which national actors target national addressees, seems to be no longer the dominant form of protest events related to European matters.

## **2. European integration and protest politics**

### **2.1 Theoretical and empirical considerations**

The politics of European integration has lost its once dominant character of inter-governmental cooperation in selected policy areas detached from the mass public's concerns many years ago. Both in 'hard' times such as the contemporary Euro-Crisis of 2011/2012 as well as in rather 'normal' periods, this system of multi-level-governance now directly affects the daily life of half a billion people – and these millions of Europeans are increasingly aware of the EU's impact on their individual welfare (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Up to the 1980s, by contrast, people's reactions towards European integration were of minor importance: Both politically, for controlling the integration process, and theoretically, for understanding its causes and dynamics. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) interpreted this classic arrangement as a 'permissive consensus' that enabled politicians to go on with rather minor steps of integration.

Several developments have definitely put an end to this specific period in the history of European integration: The membership of rather Eurosceptic countries such as Britain and Denmark (since 1973) or Austria (since 1995); debates on the integration process' legitimacy that led not only to the direct election of the European parliament (since 1979) but also to a wave of direct democratic decision making in the context of accessions or new treaties (e.g. Hug 2002; Kaufmann and Waters 2004; Wagschal 2007); important treaty reforms that resulted in major steps of integration (above all Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaty) or failed (Constitution); the conflict about Turkey's request for membership (e.g. McLaren 2007); and, most recently, the consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis (or Euro-Crisis).

Even though most of the literature on the conflict about Europe is focused on institutionalized political channels, this subject of contention is not restricted to those political arenas. It also has consequences for the protest arena and political actors such as social movements that primarily – but not exclusively – resort to ‘unconventional’ modes of participation and mobilization.

Based on the political process approach, a key theoretical concept in the field of social movement research (see Kriesi 2004), Marks and McAdam (1996; 1999) were the first to thoroughly reflect on the potential consequences of Europe as a multi-level polity for ‘unconventional’ mobilization. On the one hand, they argued that this new political system might provide more access points for challengers than many national political systems. Movement actors would therefore be confronted with quite favourable political opportunity structures – at least in some policy fields. On the other hand, they expected that Europeanization would also severely limit the mobilization efforts given, amongst others, the sheer geographical distances between EU-actors and challengers and the prevailing national attachment of political discourses (Marks and McAdam 1999, 103-104). Especially from a resource perspective (Edwards and McCarthy 2004), therefore, ‘unconventional’ mobilization in an European polity is thought to be severely limited (see also Beyers and Kerremans 2007).

Imig and Tarrow (2001c, 9), by contrast, expected a growth in the extent of mobilization as a direct consequence of an increasing transfer of competencies to the EU level. Such a perspective was also given by Rucht:

“Overall, we should expect that parallel to the growing weight of EU institutions, interest groups and movements invest more and more energies to directly influence EU policy-making by lobbying and/or protesting in Strasbourg, Luxembourg and, most importantly, in Brussels” (Rucht 2002, 165).

Quantitative research on European protest based on event analyses<sup>2</sup>, the first type of literature mentioned above, has so far been severely hindered by a lack of available data. No conclusive assessments of the above mentioned expectations therefore exist. Nevertheless, the existing results of studies mainly conducted in the 1990s point to a limited Europeanization of protest

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<sup>2</sup> Analysing protest behaviour related to Europe based on survey data is not possible as no survey with such a thematic focus exists. In general, protest research based on surveys is difficult when the focus is on specific issues.

politics. The protest event analysis conducted by Imig and Tarrow (2000; 2001a) was the first effort to focus on political contention with respect to Europe in the then twelve member countries. Covering fourteen years from 1984 to 1997, they found a total of 9,873 protest events. Only five per cent (490) of them, however, were defined as ‘Europrotest’ (Imig and Tarrow 2001b, 33-34). Reising (1998; 1999) collected data on European protests from 1980 to 1995 in Belgium, France, and Germany. He observed an increasing degree of Europeanization but also country-specific differences. Thus, according to Reising (1998; 1999), protesters “adapted” to the new political structures in Europe as they mobilize across borders or at least organize their protest simultaneously.

But ‘Europe’ was also part of protest event analyses that were conducted with a more general focus: For Germany, the major PRODAT project (Rucht 2001) identified only 23 out of 13,201 events from 1950 to 1994 with an issue-specific focus on (constitutive) aspects of European integration (Rucht 2000, 194; 2002, 181). In an earlier project on political conflict in six West European countries (Kriesi et al. 2012), the authors of the paper at hand found a low share of European protests, too. On average, only 0.4 per cent of events in the period from 1975 to 2005 have European integration (i.e., major reforms or enlargement processes) as their central focus. For the three countries covered here, the shares range from 1.0 per cent in Austria, to 0.5 per cent in Switzerland and 0.2 per cent in Germany (for the Austrian and Swiss cases, see also Dolezal and Hutter [2007] as well as Hutter and Giugni [2009]).

Only two research projects – to the best of our knowledge – aim at analysing also contemporary protest events: As part of his current dissertation project, Gläser<sup>3</sup> collects event data for all EU-member states from 2000 to 2009. The data recently presented by Uba and Ugglå (2011) cover the period 1992-2007. Based on their results, these two authors refute earlier expectations of an increasing Europeanization of protest as consequence of shifting authority structures. Using political claims data (that include a small share of protest events, too), della Porta and Caiani (2009, 47-54) confirm that civil society actors rarely target the EU. However, they find some increase over time when comparing the years 1990 and 1995 with the period from 2000 to 2002.

Rucht (2002, 186-188) explained the absence of such kind of mobilization in the case of Germany with the prevalence of national governments in the decision making process which

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makes targeting them a more efficient strategy for challengers. EU policy-making, he further argued, is extremely complex, making the identification of (potential) allies and (potential) adversaries much more difficult than on the national level. And also Rucht referred to practical problems of language and logistics as well as to the absence of a genuine European public sphere (see also Eising 2008, 171-173). In an earlier contribution, also Opp (1994) expected low levels of ‘unconventional’ participation or “voice”, as he called it by referring to Hirschman (1970). Apart from the complexity and abstractness of EU-issues, Opp referred to their low saliency and the high costs for organizing protest. And, interestingly at least from a contemporary perspective, he also mentioned the general public’s *low* discontent with the EU (Opp 1994, 393-395).

Apart from the sheer volume of protest related to European integration, researchers have also dealt with its various forms. Especially qualitative studies have looked at such organizational features (e.g. Balme and Chabanet 2008), but also quantitatively oriented explorations have provided some assessments. In this context, Imig and Tarrow (2001c, 17) developed a widely used typology of European protest that differentiates two types of actors and targets, respectively. The target of protest – or the ‘addressee’ – is either domestic, for example the national government, or European, for instance the European commission. With respect to the actors involved in the protest event, Imig and Tarrow differentiate national and transnational participants and/or mobilizing organizations.

While their original typology was meant to distinguish purely domestic protests (i.e., domestic actors protesting against a domestic issue and addressing domestic targets) from transnational protests, it has mainly been used to study protests that deal with a transnational (or European) issue (e.g. della Porta and Caiani 2007; 2009; Imig and Tarrow 2001b). This is also what we do in this paper which is why we use the adapted typology presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: Forms of Europeanized protests: An adaptation of Imig and Tarrow’s typology**

		Target of Protest	
		<i>Domestic</i>	<i>European</i>
Actors in Protest	<i>Domestic</i>	Domestication	Externalization
	<i>European</i>	Transnational Pressure	Supranationalization

Source: della Porta and Caiani (2007, 7; 2009, 52)

Combining the two dimensions (i.e., actors and target), one ends up with four types of Europeanized protests that della Porta and Caiani (2007, 7; 2009, 52) describe as domestication, externalization, transnational pressure, and supranationalization (Table 1). *Domesticated* protests focus on a ‘European’ issue but are organized by domestic actors that target domestic institutions or bodies. *Externalized* protests, by contrast, are organized by domestic actors that target an institution or body beyond the national level. Protest events within the category of *transnational pressure* are organized in parallel but aim on different national targets, while protest actions termed *supranationalization* are organized across national borders against common European targets. The latter category corresponds to what della Porta and Tarrow (2005b) called “transnational collective action” and whose rise they regard as the most important trend when it comes to the transnationalization of protest mobilization in general. Since we assume that organizing protests across borders is more demanding than just addressing a transnational target, we regard supranationalization as the strongest form of Europeanized protests, followed by transnational pressure, externalization, and domestication.

Based on their data for the period 1984 to 1997, Imig and Tarrow (2001b) show that domestication is by far the most prominent form of Europeanized protest. More than 80 per cent of all events covered by their data are examples of this type of Europeanization. Furthermore, they find no shifts when comparing the period before and after the Maastricht treaty (1992). In their study of farmers’ protests from 1992 to 1997, Bush and Simi (2001, 102-103) confirm the predominance of domesticated protests. While Uba and Ugglå (2011, 386) do not present detailed analyses, their results also hint at the fact that supranational protests are rare and that their share is not increasing over time.

Using their claims-making data and selected case studies, della Porta and Caiani (2009, 81) take issue with this observation. While acknowledging that “Europeanization from below [...] predominantly takes the form of ‘domestication’”, they observe an increase in the other forms of Europeanization from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Similarly, the rich case studies presented by Balme and Chabanet (2008, 247) indicate the recent “development of significant protest movements on a European scale.”

## **2.2 General and country-specific hypotheses**

After reviewing several aspects of research on Europeanized protest, we can now formulate the hypotheses we want to test with our new data on protest events in three West European countries. Given that political participation and mobilization still primarily occurs at the national level – for example also in the context of European elections – we will explore whether country specific differences still matter for the Europeanization of protest. Following Przeworski and Teune 's famous advice, we hereby aim at substituting “names of variables for the names of social systems” (1970, 8). In this paper, we are interested in whether the level of a country’s integration in the EU affects the volume and the forms of Europeanized protests.

Such a focus on the level of integration’s impact is possible given the otherwise pronounced similarities between the three countries compared. All three are post-industrial societies and belong to the richest countries world-wide. They share a strong tradition of federalism and various elements of power sharing (e.g. coalition governments in Germany and Austria, all-party governments in Switzerland, corporatism especially in Austria but also in Germany, direct democracy in Switzerland) and in all three countries political challengers are confronted with quite favourable political opportunity structures. Federalism gives them more points of access than strong and centralized states provide and the countries’ electoral systems facilitate parliamentary representation also for smaller political forces such as the Greens (represented in all three countries since the 1980s) or the radical right (represented in Austria and Switzerland). As regards the issue of European integration, Eurosceptic parties are represented in all three national parliaments (the Linke in Germany, the SVP in Switzerland, and the FPÖ and the BZÖ in Austria). At least since the early 2000s there is also a comparable amount of protest mobilization in general because especially Austria, where the volume of

‘unconventional’ political participation was traditionally low, has become more similar to other West European countries.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, for the present research question, we argue that the *level of integration* is the key feature distinguishing the three countries. With respect to this factor an assessment should be based on two aspects: a temporal dimension and – given the increasing differentiation between the EU-members (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012) – a dimension of degree. The longer a country is a member of the EU and the less it opts-out from integration in various EU-policies, the higher is the individual country’s level of integration. Considering these two dimensions, the three countries analysed can be easily ranked as follows: Germany is a founding member of the Community (since 1952/1958) and definitely part of ‘Core Europe’ as all German governments – backed by almost all relevant political actors as well as public opinion – have always fully participated in all steps of integration so far (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2010). As a consequence of its neutral status, Austria became a member state only in 1995. Despite a comparatively high level of Euroscepticism in the general public but also in parts of the (political) elite (Fallend 2008; Pelinka 2004) Austria soon became part of the EU’s Core group, too.<sup>5</sup> All governments so far have supported further steps of integration – even the Euro-sceptic FPÖ/BZÖ did not oppose actual decisions when it governed together with the ÖVP from 2000 to 2006. Switzerland, finally, is not a member of the EU but its level of integration is far from negligible. As a consequence of the bilateral treaties it fully participates in the single market and it also signed, amongst others, the Schengen Agreement – contrary to Ireland and the UK, two EU-members. Switzerland might therefore be conceived of as a kind of “quasi-member” (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 186-189). However, of the three countries compared, it is definitely the least integrated.

The first subject we will deal with is the most fundamental one and considers the amount of protest related to Europe – especially whether there is a positive trend over time as expected by Imig and Tarrow (1999, 124-125). Given the far reaching treaty reforms after Maastricht, first of all the Lisbon Treaty but also the failed Constitution, and following the logic of Imig and Tarrow’s argument we would expect an increase in our period under observation (see also

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<sup>4</sup> According to results of the ESS (based on data from three or five rounds per country), about 8.5 per cent of the Germans took part in demonstrations in the 2000s. In Switzerland this share was 7.1, in Austria it was 6.8 per cent.

<sup>5</sup> Because of its – at least formally – still existing status as a neutral state, the only exception is Austria’s reservation about military cooperation.

Balme and Chabanet 2008; della Porta and Caiani 2009). The more power shifts to the European level and the more this is publicly contested, the more likely protesters are to address European issues and actors. Rational actors should react to the changing political opportunity structures and increasingly address European actors which have become more powerful. In a historical perspective such a development might be reminiscent of the shift from local to national mobilization in the era of nation building (see Tilly 2004). We therefore formulate the following two hypotheses, one with respect to the temporal development and one with respect to country-differences:

*Hypothesis 1a:* Further steps of the EU-integration process give rise to an increasing volume of Europeanized protest.

*Hypothesis 1b:* The higher a country's level of integration, the higher the volume of Europeanized protest.

Apart from the overall *salience* of Europe in the protest arena, we are especially interested in the *forms* of those events where we focus on their transnational character. Drawing on Imig and Tarrow's (2001c) typology, we expect a rise of more demanding forms of transnationalization over time and, again, country specific differences with regard to a country's level of integration. Thus, European institutions or actors should not only become the targets of protest events but protestors should also be more likely to organize protests across national borders. Although organizing transnational protest events is challenging, we expect such cross-national mobilization to become more likely due to the increasing power of the European institutions and since only a few such supranational events might lead to the establishment of transnational contacts and networks that, in the mid- to long-run, make transnational cooperation more likely. Thus, in a long-time perspective, challengers should be able to respond to changing political opportunities in a newly emerging polity and adapt their strategies. And this should be the case especially in countries with a high level of integration where these changing opportunities should be experienced more directly. We therefore propose the two following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 2a:* Further steps of the EU-integration process change the form of Europeanized protest towards more demanding forms of transnationalization.

*Hypothesis 2b:* The higher a country's level of integration, the more transnational are the forms of protest events.

### 3. Method and Data

#### 3.1 Protest Event Analysis: Definitions, sources, and sampling strategy

Following earlier studies on political protest as well as own research conducted in a previous project (see Kriesi et al. 2012), this analysis of protest actions related to European integration is based on a quantitative content analysis of quality newspapers.<sup>6</sup> Such a protest event analysis (PEA) has become an established method in social movement research (e.g. Ekiert and Kubik 1998; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 2001; Tarrow 1989). Contrary to other research strategies, for example mass surveys (e.g. Barnes and Kaase 1979), on-site or protest surveys (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011), or participant observation (Lichterman 2002), a PEA allows researchers to observe various kinds of manifest protest activity in large territories as well as over longer periods of time (Koopmans and Rucht 2002, 231).

By conducting a PEA researchers collect data on variables describing several features of a protest event, which is the unit of analysis. For each study based on a PEA, researchers have to make at least three crucial decisions in advance: 1) the definition of a protest event, 2) the sources for the PEA, and 3) the sampling strategy.

With respect to the *definition of protest events* we were only interested in protest actions related to European integration. Considering the first attribute of our subject of investigation (protest action), our study does not follow any sophisticated definition but is based on observable types of behaviour that are related to political protest, i.e. various modes of ‘unconventional’ participation such as petitions, demonstrations, strikes, but also violent forms (e.g. hostage-taking).

The second attribute of the events we are interested in (European integration) is even more difficult to define. Of course, every protest event of interest for our study has to refer to European integration. However, contrary to other research efforts we discussed above we do not restrict this linkage to the issues (or claims) articulated in the event alone but also integrate an actor-orientation as well as elements of justification coming from discourse analysis. This means that every protest event was assessed as being relevant – and therefore subsequently

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<sup>6</sup> The coding was done by the two authors and student assistants but the latter’s coding of events was cross-checked by the two researchers. Due to limited resources, no parallel coding and the subsequent calculation of reliability scores was possible. However, it should be noted that the selection of relevant articles was the more demanding part of the data production and these decisions were made after intense discussions between the student assistants and the authors.

coded – whenever it fulfilled at least one of the three following criteria: (a) the issue of the protest event is related to aspects of European integration, either to ‘constitutive’ issues such as deepening or enlargement or to ‘normal’, day-to-day subjects such as quarrels about subsidies for farmers (see Bartolini 2005, 310); (b) the addressee (or ‘target’) of the protest event is a European institution or actor (e.g. the European Parliament or the Commission), or (c) the justification protesters use to defend their claim is related to European integration. Based on these criteria we can classify the events into different categories that also allow for comparing our data with earlier, strictly issue-focused approaches.

An additional feature of our method is related to the geography of the protest events: Here, we did not only select events that took place in the country observed but also all those events where citizens (or organizations) of the respective country participated. In contrast to previous approaches, we take the involvement of ‘domestic’ participants as the defining element for our comparative study. Given the multi-layered or even ‘cosmopolitan’ (Beck and Grande 2004) character of the European Union, a strict focus on national territories might no longer be an appropriate research design.

As *source* for the protest event analysis we rely on articles in one quality newspaper for each country. Newspapers are still the primary source for PEAs. Contrary to police archives, the most important alternative, they have several advantages with respect to access, the sources’ selectivity, reliability, continuity over time, and ease of coding (Rucht and Neidhardt 1998, 71). In particular, newspapers “report on a regular basis, are kept in public archives, and – at least regarding quality newspapers – need to maintain their credibility by covering events accurately” (Hutter 2010, 122). And newspapers have an additional, practical advantage: At least since the mid-1990s they are electronically available which facilitates the organization of coding and is especially important with respect to sampling decisions (see below). For Austria, the PEA is based on articles in *Die Presse*, for Germany we took the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and for Switzerland the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. These crucial decisions had to be made with respect to several criteria, amongst others to allow for comparisons with an existing data set on protest events on all thematic aspects covering the time period since 1975 (Dolezal and Hutter 2007; Hutter and Giugni 2009; Hutter 2010; Kriesi et al. 2012). With respect to Austria this is the main reason why the conservative *Die Presse* instead of the rather liberal and slightly higher circulated *Der Standard* was selected as the latter was founded only in 1988.

Even though we are interested in the relative importance of Europeanized protest, it was not possible to select *all* protest events with and without a link to ‘Europe’. Given the amount of

newspaper articles that had to be manually de-selected for false positive hits, this would have been impossible to do. All statements on the extent of Europeanized protest events have therefore to be based on absolute numbers.<sup>7</sup>

With respect to the third crucial decision, the *sampling strategy*, our PEA is limited to only one newspaper for each country but it is based on all issues of the selected newspapers within the observed time period of 16 years. As electronic archives facilitate the selection process enormously it is no longer necessary to restrict the selection on specific issues such as the Monday edition, a traditional sampling strategy used in earlier projects (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 2001).<sup>8</sup>

The key methodological question of a PEA based on newspaper data – or any other source – is the problem of *selection bias*. There is no doubt that newspapers do not cover the universe of all protest events, especially on a nationwide basis. But given that we are interested in the societal and political consequences of European integration, it is of less interest that newspapers do not cover all kinds of protest as most citizens – and politicians – learn about them only by media. However, it is necessary to understand the selection criteria of a newspaper to interpret a PEA's results.

Earl et al. (2004) emphasize three sets of factors that increase the “news value” of any given protest event and therefore the chance of being reported: event characteristics, news agency characteristics, and issue characteristics. With respect to *event characteristics*, protest events are being reported with a higher chance when they are large or violent, when they take place near to the newspaper's headquarters, whenever counterdemonstrators or police forces are present, and when formal and significant, i.e. widely known actors organize the event. *News agency characteristics*, the second set of factors, refer to differences between local and national media as well as (extreme) left vs. conservative outlets, which is why these aspects are less relevant for our study as we coded only one newspaper per country. It is, however, extremely important to stick to a newspaper that has once been selected. Considering *issue*

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<sup>7</sup> In addition, we can also use our general protest data set for the years 1975 to 2005 (Kriesi et al. 2012). At the moment, we are updating these data to cover the period up to 2011.

<sup>8</sup> Electronic archives are therefore an additional advantage of newspapers compared to police archives as the latter are not always electronically available – if accessible at all. The selection of articles was done automatically for the whole period using online databases such as *Factiva* and *Wiso Presse Praxis* depending on the newspaper and on time periods. A list of truncated protest keywords (e.g. ‘demonstr\*’) was combined with a (short) list of very general keywords related to European integration (‘EU or EC or europ\*’). As always in such kind of analysis, the major part of the workload was the de-selection of false positive hits, i.e. irrelevant articles.

*characteristics*, protest events related to more general concerns are more likely to be reported than contention on rather peripheral subjects. In the study at hand, however, this aspect is less a variable than a constant.

Summing up the debate on newspapers as sources for a PEA there is no doubt that problems exist, though the critical assessment by Ortiz et al. (2005) – we think – is too pessimistic. Earl et al. (2004), by contrast, rightly stress that standards of a PEA are not worse than other methods of social science research. We therefore side with Koopmans (1995, 253) who argued that „it is the poverty of the alternatives that makes newspapers so attractive“.

Newspapers are an especially well suited source for researchers who want to analyse country differences because also protests in smaller countries are well covered. Reports by news agencies, which have also been widely used to study Europeanized protest events (Imig and Tarrow 2001b; Reising 1998; 1999), by contrast, often focus on events in bigger countries and/or on events near the agency’s seat. This bias is also a major problem when researchers do not use the politics or internal affairs section of national newspapers but refer to their foreign affairs rubric to find events abroad. The data recently presented by Uba and Ugglå (2011), for example, are based not only on news agency releases but also on some national newspapers. However, these authors did not include at least one newspaper for each country they analyse which casts severe doubts on any comparative results. Our data set, by contrast, is based on a major quality newspaper for each country we observe.

### **3.2 Key variables**

Our content analysis of newspaper articles for Austria, Germany, and Switzerland yielded a total number of 540 protest events related to European integration for the 16 years observed. A total of 58 variables in the data set describe several features of these events. In the following, we introduce the variables that we use for the subsequent analyses.

The *number of participants* is based on two variables, as we coded a ‘low’ as well as a ‘high’ estimation reported in the article. Typically, higher estimates come from the organizers of the protest events, whereas the police or sometimes the journalists themselves tend to provide lower numbers. However, only for 6.9 per cent of the events (n=37), we actually have two estimates whereas for 44.3 per cent of the events (n=239) we have no numbers at all. For the

latter events we therefore estimate the numbers of participants based on the median number of participants for other events with the same action repertoire in the same country.<sup>9</sup>

Considering the form of the events, especially their transnational character, we use four types of information: addressee, participants, campaign, and organization. First, we examine the *level of the addressee* or ‘target’ of the protest event, i.e. his location in the multi-level system of European governance. For the following analyses, we differentiate those events that target national or subnational addressees from those that target addressees beyond the national level. As protesters very often attack or criticize more than one addressee, we always coded up to two. In fact, a second addressee was coded in 35.6 per cent of the cases (n=192). No information on the addressee of the protest event we have just in 3.2 per cent of the cases (n=17).<sup>10</sup>

Second, the variable *transnational participants* records the presence of foreigners taking part in the protest event. This variable obviously comes close to what can actually be analysed by a PEA because newspaper articles (or other sources) do not and cannot always provide specific information on the background of the protesters. However, they do provide reliable information with respect to “hard news” such as the place of the event, the numbers of protesters etc. (see Danzger 1975). The participation of foreigners might also be part of these “hard news” which is why we assume that this information is reliable, too. In any case, the share of protests with transnational participants is certainly underestimated as such an assessment primarily depends on larger groups – less on individual participants that are rather invisible.

Third, we use a variable that informs whether a given event is part of a broader campaign, i.e. connected to other events. In the coding phase we distinguished between national, European, and international campaigns (plus ‘no campaign’ which we coded for 48.3 per cent of the events). For the purpose of the present analysis we are only interested in whether an event is part of a *transnational campaign*. Hence, we summarize the two categories of ‘European’ and ‘international’ and compare them with all other cases.

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<sup>9</sup> Our data on protest events differentiate 37 forms of protest behaviour, amongst others strikes, demonstrations, but also several violent modes such as hostage-taking. We only calculate the number of participants based on those events that took place in the country where the newspaper selected has its seat.

<sup>10</sup> It is important to understand that our sources not only provide us with the information about the individual events but also identify them. We therefore did not combine several sources to account for missing information such as the type of the addressee. However, missing information was actually a problem only with respect to the numbers of participants for which – as explained above – we have calculated estimations by imputing data.

Fourth, and finally, we also use information on the types of actors that organized the observed protest events. While we have collected detailed information on all (mentioned) organizations, we will use mostly their organizational level for the present analysis. Again, we differentiate *transnational organizations* (e.g. the European Trade Union Confederation) from all others, i.e. several types of actors organized at the national or subnational level of governance. Very often a single protest event is organized by several groups. We therefore coded up to seven organizations (and their corresponding levels). In 20.4 per cent of the cases (n=110) we have no information with respect to the mobilizing actors.

#### 4. Analysis and Discussion


To begin with, we compare the number of protest events and participants in the three countries over the whole period from 1995 to 2010 (*Hypotheses 1a* and *1b*). Here, we systematically differentiate rather moderate forms (petitions) from stronger forms of political protest (demonstrative, confrontational or even violent events). Petitions are a moderate form of political protest as their ‘challenging’ character is much smaller (if existing at all). They are also a less clear example of genuine collective action as this term implies a combined effort of various people at the same time and the same place.

The results are mixed for our hypothesis that the volume of Europeanized protest increases with a country’s level of integration (*Hypothesis 1b*). On the one hand, both measures (events and participants) indicate the lowest volume of Europeanized protest in Switzerland. On the other hand, the differences are rather small – at least when based on all protest forms. From 1995 to 2010, we coded 381 Europeanized protest events for Germany, 103 for Austria, and 56 for Switzerland (Figure 1a). However, the *absolute* number of coded events (as well as of participants, see below) is not well suited for cross-national comparisons since it depends very much on the size of a given country. Therefore, we relate our new findings to our older dataset covering protests over any given political issue for the period 1995 to 2005 so that we can also assess the *relative* amount of protest related to the EU. Focusing just on these data, the relative salience of Europeanized events as compared to the number of all protests found in the respective countries ranges from 5.2 per cent in Austria to 2.6 per cent in Switzerland.


The German value comes closer to the Swiss one with 3.2 per cent of events being in some way related to European integration.<sup>11</sup>

**Figure 1: Volume of Europeanized protest, 1995-2010**

*a) Total number of protest events*



*b) Total number of participants (per million inhabitants)*




Note: The number of participants is based on the events taking place on the national territory of a given state only. Furthermore, it has been divided by the number of inhabitants in millions in 2005 (source: EUROSTAT).

<sup>11</sup> The dataset of Kriesi et al. (2012) covers all types of protest issues but is based on a Monday sample of newspapers articles only.


Coming back to our new data, the numbers of participants involved in Europeanized protest events, which we standardize by the number of inhabitants, are quite similar, too (Figure 1b). Around 61,000 Austrian and German protestors per million inhabitants were reported, while this number is only ten per cent lower in Switzerland (around 54,000 participants). However, these differences are more pronounced when we exclude petitions from the analysis. As can be seen in Figure 1b, the number of people taking part in demonstrative and even more radical action forms is by far highest in Germany (around 33,000 ‘standardized’ participants), followed by Austria (24,000) and Switzerland (15,000).

**Figure 2:** The development of the protest volume, 1995-2010 (4-year periods)

a) Total number of protest events



b) Total number of participants (per million inhabitants)



Note: see Note for Figure 1b.

In Figure 2, we do not differentiate between the two forms of protest action but look at their overall temporal development. As the number of cases per year is very small, we do not present yearly data but aggregate them into four 4-years-periods. Again, our results do not consistently support the sweeping argument that the latest integration steps should have brought about a boost in Europeanized protest events (*Hypothesis 1a*). Only the strong increase in the number of protest participants in Austria and Germany during the most recent period supports this expectation (see Figure 2b). All other results are less clear-cut since we observe quite pronounced fluctuations and cross-national differences.

In addition to the graphical presentation, we also calculated simple correlation coefficients between the yearly numbers of events and participants, on the hand, and the year, on the other hand (N=16). Again, the results do not show systematic upward trends in the volume of Europeanized protest. While the number of participants observed for Germany increases significantly over time ( $r=0.47^*$ ), the correlations coefficients for Austria ( $r=0.23$ ) and Switzerland ( $r=0.26$ ) show only a weak positive trend. Regarding the number of events, on the contrary, we find either no trend at all in Austria and Germany ( $r=0.02$  and  $-0.03$ , respectively) or even a clearly negative one in Switzerland ( $r=-0.57^{**}$ ).

Apart from exploring the sheer numbers of protest events and participants we are especially interested in their form (*Hypotheses 2a* and *2b*). In this context, we examine the transnational character of European protest events with respect to the addressee as well as the actors involved. Table 2 reports the results considering the addressee of the protest events. With respect to the share of European actors as addressee we expect an increasing trend over time as well as country-differences related to their degree of integration. To assess the temporal dimensions, the 16 years are again grouped into four periods.

**Table 2: The share of transnational addressees (percentages)**


	Germany	Austria	Switzerland
1995-1998	63.1	70.4	26.3
(N)	(84)	(27)	(19)
1999-2002	78.1	76.0	68.4
(N)	(96)	(25)	(19)
2003-2006	56.9	85.0	33.3
(N)	(116)	(20)	(12)
2007-2010	83.1	53.6	50.0
(N)	(71)	(28)	(6)
<i>Overall</i>	<i>70.0</i>	<i>68.9</i>	<i>44.6</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>(367)</i>	<i>(100)</i>	<i>(56)</i>

Note: In the coding process up to two addressees could be recorded. Whenever at least one addressee was a European actor (or a third country or an international organization), the event was interpreted as ‘transnational’. As explained in the main text, information on the level of the addressee is missing in 17 cases.

Starting with country differences, as proposed by *Hypothesis 2b*, it is obvious that the degree of integration has consequences for the target of the protesters: In Switzerland, the non-member in the country sample, the share of European addressees is the lowest (44.6 per cent). In Germany and Austria, two full EU-members, more than two thirds of all Europeanized protest events address a European actor or institution. In contrast to these clear country differences, we cannot observe any temporal trend – neither towards more transnationalization, nor towards less.

A second aspect of transnationalization refers to organizational characteristics of protest events. Here, we refer to Imig and Tarrow’s (2001a) typology which we discussed above in section two. Apart from the level of the addressees, where we differentiate domestic from European, we use three organizational variables: the presence of foreign participants, the involvement of transnational organizations, and the question whether the protest event is part of a transnational campaign. Whenever at least one of these characteristics is given, we interpret the actors of the event as transnational. Figure 3 displays the country differences based on this four-fold typology.

**Figure 3: Imig and Tarrow's Types of European Protest (percentages)**




Focusing on the share of domesticated protests (i.e., protests by domestic actors targeting domestic addressees) our results indicate that a country's level of integration affects the forms of Europeanized protests as proposed by our *Hypothesis 2b* (Figure 3). While less than thirty per cent of all events coded for Germany and Austria belong to this category, around 54 per cent of all Swiss events are domesticated ones. As can be seen in Figure 3, the higher share of domesticated protests in Switzerland is related to a lower share of 'externalization'. Thus, in the non-EU member state, domestic actors are far less likely to address their Europeanized claims towards a European institution or body. At the same time, the relative share of events in which domestic actors (either individuals or organizations) join forces with actors from other countries to protest against common European targets is similar across the three countries under scrutiny.

In the following, we focus on the development of the most demanding form of Europeanized protest, i.e. on supranational protests. Can we really observe an increasing trend over time as suggested by della Porta and Tarrow (2005)? Once again, our data do not support such a strong claim which we formulated in *Hypothesis 2a*. For example, in Germany and Switzerland, the share of supranational protests is almost the same at the end of the 2000s as compared to the mid-1990s. The absolute number of supranational protests does also not linearly increase within the three countries. The absolute shifts are rather similar to the relative ones

shown in Figure 4. For example, Germany and Switzerland experienced the most supranational protests in the period 1999 to 2002 (N=42).

**Figure 4:** *The development of supranational protests, 1995-2010 (4-year periods; percentages of all supranational protests)*



As there is no clear over-time trend in the share of supranational protest events, we finally turn to some other factors that might explain the form of a given protest event. Most importantly, we are interested in whether the issues raised as well as the types of organizations supporting a given event make a difference. To do so, we performed logistic regressions using single protest events as our cases (for similar strategies, see Soule and Davenport 2009; van Dyke et al. 2004; Walker et al. 2008). In addition, we included dummy variables to account for country and time effects. With respect to the issues articulated by the protesters we built six categories, as regards the actors we take account of the presence of social movement organisations (SMOs), unions, and political parties.<sup>12</sup> Table 3 on the following page compares three of the four protest types identified before. For the fourth type (transnational pressure) we have too few cases for any meaningful analysis.

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<sup>12</sup> With respect to the actors problems of endogeneity exist, as the type of actor is associated with the type of event. However, there is a clear causality as it is always the type of actor that influences the type of event – not vice versa.

**Table 3: Explaining the form of Europeanized protest events (binary logistic regressions)**

	Domestication	Externalization	Supranationalization
<i>Issues</i>			
Agriculture	0.64*	-0.80**	0.10
Economic/social	0.18	-0.93**	0.81**
Peace/foreign policy	-0.77	0.60	-0.05
Environment/energy	0.00	0.31	-0.48
Immigration	1.01**	-0.86*	-0.34
Institutional Reform (plus EU in general)	0.79*	-1.62***	0.48
<i>Actors</i>			
SMOs	-0.06	0.32	-0.46
Unions	-0.45	-0.47	0.66*
Political parties	0.33	0.46	-1.00**
<i>Countries (Reference: Germany)</i>			
Austria	-0.14	-0.13	0.44
Switzerland	1.03**	-1.24**	-0.06
<i>Time period (Reference: 1995-1998)</i>			
1999-2002	-0.70*	0.44	0.33
2003-2006	0.26	0.42	-0.72*
2007-2010	-0.57	0.20	0.31
Constant	-1.01**	-0.22	-1.05**
N	523	523	523
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.11	0.12

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Note: each type of protest is compared with all other events.

Overall, the four types of independent variables do not explain a lot of the differences in the forms of Europeanized protest as indicated by the rather low pseudo R-squares. Still, some of the significant variables are worth being emphasized. For example, our results indicate that protests over agriculture, immigration and European integration in general are most likely to take the form of domestication. For these issues, domestic actors address domestic targets to put forward their Europeanized claims. The same three issues plus claims related to economic and social policy-making are less likely to be raised by domestic actors that target European addressees (externalization). Interestingly, economic and social issues are most likely to be addressed to European institutions by actors from different states (supranationalization) whereas the issues related to the most Europeanized policy field (agriculture) primarily lead to domesticated protest forms.

Furthermore, Table 3 indicates that the type of organizations supporting a protest event significantly differs with respect to protest forms. As can be seen, events sponsored by political parties are the least likely to involve cross-national coalitions fighting against common European targets. This seems to be primarily the business of unions.

Finally, the regression analyses support our previous descriptive findings as regards country and time effects. In Switzerland, domesticated events are more likely than in Germany and Austria, while we find the opposite pattern for externalization. Furthermore, none of the three forms is more likely to occur at the end of the research period, thus after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force and once again raised the level of European integration.

## **5. Conclusion**

Political contestation over European integration is not confined to institutionalized political arenas such as national and European elections or referendums. The integration process also affects non-institutionalized modes of political participation. We think that without studying such forms of bottom-up mobilization in the arena of protest politics the recent debate on the ‘politicization of Europe’ is incomplete (de Wilde 2011; Hooghe and Marks 2009).

As regards the actual amount (or ‘volume’) as well as the form of Europeanized protest politics, the literature has so far provided both diverging expectations and results. From a theoretical perspective, some authors argue that European integration provides new access points for challengers and thus leads to more open political opportunity structures. The more authority is located on the European level, these authors argue, the more movement actors will focus their efforts on this political level (Imig and Tarrow 2001c). Other authors, by contrast, emphasize organizational problems movement actors are facing and also refer to prevailing national attachments that reduce actors’ ability to mobilize on a European level (Marks and McAdam 1999). Various quantitative analyses have indeed pointed to a dominance of ‘domesticated’ forms of protest where national actors address national targets. Several qualitative explorations, by contrast, stress an increasing salience of transnational forms of mobilization and participation (della Porta and Caiani 2009).

In this paper we aimed at exploring the contemporary volume of political protest related to the EU as well as its organizational forms. Based on a new protest event analysis of Europeanized protests from 1995 to 2010 in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland we examined whether the volume of EU-related protest has increased and whether its form has changed over time. With respect to the form of protest events, we used an adapted version of Imig and Tarrow’s typology that differentiates four types: domestication, externalization, transnational pressure, and supranationalization (della Porta and Caiani 2007; 2009; Imig and Tarrow 2001b). Fur-

themore, we examined whether a country's level of integration matters by comparing EU-members (Austria, Germany) and a non-member (Switzerland).

With respect to the four hypotheses that we formulated based on the theoretical considerations presented in section two, our results are as follows: First, we do not observe a clear increase in the volume of EU-related protest over time – neither with respect to the number of protest events nor with respect to the number of participants. We therefore cannot confirm that further steps of integration actually give rise to an increasing volume of Europeanized protest. Second, the three countries analysed display differences in the volume of protest mobilization but these differences are rather small. Third, our results do not support the expectation that further steps of the EU-integration process lead to a secular change in the form of Europeanized protest towards more demanding forms of transnationalization. Fourth, finally, we did find differences in the forms of Europeanized protest between the EU-members and the non-member in our sample of countries as in the former group domestication is no longer the dominant form of Europeanized protest politics.

In the light of these results we conclude that some interpretations in the literature on social movements and protest politics are too sweeping. There is no doubt that Europe has become a relevant aspect of protest politics but it has not become a dominant issue in this arena. And we also have found only weak indications that protest mobilization has indeed overcome national borders. Especially with respect to country differences, the present paper only provides very first results. The subsequent inclusion of three additional countries – Britain, France, and Sweden – will allow us to address questions related to cross-national differences more thoroughly.

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