

New Frontiers in European Studies

Guildford, 30 June - 1 July 2011

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

www.uaces.org

Paper presented at UACES Student Forum Conference, 30 June-01 July, University of Surrey

Learning New Roles and Changing Beliefs: Turkish Strategic Culture in Transition

Kadri Kaan Renda

kadri.renda@kcl.ac.uk

Introduction:

In this paper, I argue that Turkish strategic culture has been transforming during the EU accession process. Even though normative and cultural change refers to a deeper level transformation in the psyche and strategic thinking of politicians (Mufti 1998; Karaosmanoğlu 2000; Kosebalan 2002; Oguzlu 2002; Bilgin 2005; Oğuzlu and Kibaroglu 2008; Mufti 2009), I will argue that the EU by being a source of political pressure, social influence and normative suasion (Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005) wields a “transformative power” (Diez et al. 2006) on candidate states’ strategic culture. However, I maintain that even though the EU is the source of different ideas and norms that are to be adopted by candidate states, the adoption process is more complicated since EU norms are challenged by other norms at the international level but also are susceptible to political contestation and re-interpretation at the domestic level (Wiener 2009). Thus, domestic political actors through their discursive practices are able to set the pace and scope of cultural change. Their ability to promote new norms while defying the old ones significantly paves the way for cultural change through the internalization of new norms.

This paper is organized in two parts. In the next part, I will look into the literature on normative Europeanization and change in strategic culture in order to set the theoretical basis on which I build my arguments. In the remainder of the paper, I will probe into the new discourses of Turkish political actors and elaborate mainly their narratives of history, i.e. narrating the end of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of Turkish Republic with references to the Treaty of Sevres and uses of geographical representations with reference to re-interpretation of Turkey’s geopolitical location and its neighbourhood.

Theoretical Framework: Cultural Change and Europeanization

Normative Europeanization:

In the realm of foreign policy, it is difficult to give a definition of Europeanization. Of those numerous attempts to define Europeanization in national foreign policies, I draw on Ben Tonra's definition. According to Tonra (2000:229), Europeanization of member states' foreign policy refers to the:

transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy-making.

Adoption of the EU acquis, compliance with the EU declarations and statements with regard to the common security and defence policy, constitutional changes with regard to the civil-military relations can be considered as an instrumental or superficial change in procedures that happens overnight (Wong 2008:324). In this thesis, rather than such compliance type of Europeanization that focus on the adoption of EU rules at the national level and aligning policies with the EU at the international level, I focus on the normative and ideational change in Turkish foreign policy, which I analyze within the concept of strategic culture. Hence, Europeanization is understood as cultural transformation and convergence of norms, beliefs, values about security and defence through learning and socialization (Checkel 2001; Major 2005:186; Wong 2008:333; Brommenson 2010:228).

Having become the candidate state for full membership of the EU, Turkey has become a subject matter of many studies in IR. The literature on Turkish foreign policy abounds with many studies that have elaborated on the effect of the EU concerning the issues that Turkey has long been sensitive to any changes such as the Cyprus question, Greek-Turkish relations, and the future of Northern Iraq (Oğuzlu 2004; Tekin 2005; Tocci 2005; Aydın and Açıkmеше 2007; Ulusoy 2009; Müftüler-Bac and Gürsoy 2010). However, most of these studies do not distinguish the influence of the EU from the role of state elites, and thus they fall short to explain the normative change that occurs in elite discourses (for an example, see Taniyıcı 2010). On the other hand, some other studies attempt to identify and distinguish the EU impact from other factors by emphasizing the

concepts revolving around socialization and strategic action alongside the conditionality principle employed by the EU (see Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Ruacan 2008). Of these studies, some of them put emphasis on the efficient use of conditionality principle by the EU, whereas some others highlight the normative suasion and social influence in the form of political dialogue, communication and social influence through the approval and disapproval of Turkey's foreign policies. This paper falls into this strand of research owing to its elaboration of the normative change in Turkish foreign policy during the EU accession process.

By triggering and supporting the change in Turkish domestic politics and by recognizing – or at least not forthrightly expressing any objection – new narratives about the past and new geopolitical thinking, the EU more or less legitimizes the transformation of Turkish strategic culture. In addition, the EU functions as a security valve for third party countries in Turkey's neighbourhood against their concerns about the revival of aggressive and imperialist policies of Turkey. Nonetheless, main purpose of this paper is to explain the changing discourses about Turkey's own past and its environs in Turkish strategic culture, therefore, the EU effect on this change will not be elaborated.

Strategic Culture

Given the fact that there are several definitions and different applications of strategic culture (Synder 1977; Johnston 1995; Gray 1999; Macmillan et al. 1999; Meyer 2006), this paper refrains from putting forward a new definition of strategic culture. Throughout this paper strategic culture generally refers to beliefs, norms and values about security and defence. Policy-makers rule in or rule out some strategies owing to their strategic culture alongside the material capabilities and political opportunities they have. Strategic culture is the consciousness as well as the willingness of a state, which give meanings not only to national interests and material capabilities of a state but also to the opportunities and challenges emanated from the international political environment.

I argue that strategic culture consists of the lessons drawn from the past, perceptions of threat and risk, and the roles and positions crafted for a political community and shared by the most influential actors and social groups within that particular political community. Thereby, I analyze the change in Turkish strategic culture

by doing a discourse analysis in three issue areas; these are i) new narratives of history and representations of geography and the renewed use of geopolitics in debates about security and defence, ii) change in threat perceptions, iii) adoption of new roles and values. Nonetheless, in this paper, I only focus on the change in the narratives of history and the representations of geography within the discourse of Turkish politicians. The main unit of analysis is the discourses of state elites which include top statesmen such as presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers as well as foreign policy bureaucracy and the military. I analyze the speeches given by these actors and I also conduct interviews with some parliamentarians from both ruling and opposition party.

Since this paper is primarily interested in the change in Turkish strategic culture, I now turn to the factors and dynamics behind cultural change. The concept of culture intrinsically possesses an expectation of continuity and endurance rather than change. It is chiefly because many features of culture are resilient to change since people strongly believe in them; hence culture generally restrains the adoption of new norms and values by acting like a filter. Notwithstanding the assumption that culture permeates deep into the individual and collective mind, there is always a good possibility for a change in the cultural characteristics of a state no matter how deeply they are ingrained. Change can happen either incrementally over time due to learning and socialization processes or suddenly because of external shocks and traumatic events that cause cognitive dissonance (Lantis 2002:11-112).

According to Farrell and Terriff (2002:8-9), another crucial method of change is executed by norm entrepreneurs such as the military and political elites in a planned manner. The authors argue that although cultural change is deliberate and “engineered to suit elite interests”, it is not necessarily a superficial change because change may reveal the true beliefs of elites, and thus, elites may be not able to be in full control of the process as they may possibly be entrapped by their own rhetoric (Farrell and Terriff 2002:8; see Schimmelfennig 2001). Among many important actors within a political community, the military and political elites are primary norm entrepreneurs who play significant role in the transformation of strategic culture. They might either execute the change intentionally or they advocate such change and foster the process even if at the end of the process the outcome is not what they envisage. Farrell (2005:9) stresses that

“an actor may follow a norm both because it is the appropriate thing to do and because there is utility in doing so. Indeed, actors are not “cultural dupes” (Longhurst 2004:20), in fact they can be “skilled users of culture” and may seek to promote norms that give them material advantages as well as social and discursive influence.

Culture certainly provides some order, regularity and predictability in social behaviour, but this does not necessarily create static and fixed beliefs. In order to account for change in strategic culture, I argue that the long-standing assumption about order and regularity in domestic politics should be relaxed. Such an approach enables to explain the change in strategic culture through an account of domestic structures and implications of international factors. This is why, this study decomposes the notion of a single, overarching strategic culture into rival patterns and sub-cultures. In this sense, I agree, to a certain extent, with Thomas Berger’s (1998) notion that (strategic) culture is a form of “negotiated reality.” This negotiated reality account of strategic culture is, however, static and fails to capture the contending and continuous dynamics of change in strategic culture. Where my argument differs from Berger’s is that (strategic) culture is defined – borrowing from Jeffrey Tulis (1987) – as a “layered text” and “multiple discourses” created by “new policies, institutional arrangements, or ideological paradigms [that] do not replace the old but are layered atop prior patterns” (Lieberman 2002:702). Nonetheless, these layered prior patterns are not like piled up texts. Better imagine them as a collage work that is made of several materials and built on different patterns but still makes sense as a whole.

Various understandings of reality and thus multiple discourses exist within a political community. For instance, lessons of the past are important aspects of culture; nevertheless, it is not the facts about the past but the different narratives of the past told by political groups comprise the culture. Therefore, a struggle among several discourses within a culture is the starting point of understanding change. I argue that strategic culture is initially a *contested reality* in the sense that various cultures compete with each other to mould the foreign policy into something that is compatible with their discourses. The contestation is the initial phase of change in strategic culture (see Wiener 2009:176). Without a challenge to the credibility and legitimacy of established cultural norms and values change may never occur. Subsequently, when a challenge is posed to the dominant

strategic culture a negotiation phase begins. This negotiation phase does not necessarily imply an explicit negotiation, it is rather like an tacit/unspoken negotiation among elites. Negotiation can be one of the ways to determine the salience of one culture/discourse over others. Seldom in the domestic politics is there explicit negotiation among the political elites taken place. When the political contestation is tough and elite polarization is sharp, it is hard to talk about culture as a negotiated reality since there is little room for negotiating and mediating positions. Either the political contestation among elites or the emergence of dissenting voices of different political actors, may it be domestic or international ones, exerts paramount impact on the change in strategic culture. The outcome of negotiation tilts between the imposition of new norms and beliefs by one group of political actors and the resistance of other political actors and persistence of old norms and beliefs. Therefore, an important dynamic of negotiation is how much support one discourse can gain at the national and international level. In this sense, the authoritative power of one group is not enough to make their discourse dominant but also their ability to build an advocacy coalition for their discourses increase the salience of their norms and values and facilitates change in strategic culture.

Let us now explain the crucial role of discursive practices of norm entrepreneurs at the national level in changing strategic culture of Turkey.

Historical and Geographical Representations:

According to Dunn, “Representations are inventions based on language, but they are not neutral or innocuous signifiers. Because they enable actors to ‘know’ the object and to act upon what they ‘know,’ representations have very real political implications” (Dunn 2006: 371). In the rest of the paper, changing narratives about the past and new representations about the environment and geography are mainly illustrated with references to the ideas of İsmail Cem, former minister of foreign affairs between 1997-2001 and Ahmet Davutoğlu’s, incumbent minister of foreign affairs, efforts to re-conceptualize Turkish foreign policy.

Narratives¹ are frames used to understand history and tell a story about the past (Bevir 2006:285; Barnett 1999:8). Narratives are a way of telling a story in its very broader literary meaning and a narrator is somebody who tells the story. It is important to analyze how politicians frame the past to gain support for their policies and justify them. Thus politicians are as much narrators as norm entrepreneurs. Narratives are not necessarily representatives of the truth about the past. They do not provide real experiences of the individuals. What narratives do is establishing a reasonable link between the past and the present of a collective identity through writing a different plot or life-story (Car 1986:74) so as to “provide an account of where they [nations] have been and where they [nations] should be going” (Barnett 1999:8). In this sense, narratives are full of beliefs, values about the past as well as expectations from the future. Narratives can establish discursive parameters that mould the content of the foreign policies into a historically consistent form and eventually render them discursively coherent and politically acceptable at the present. From a constructivist standpoint, there is no one history but there are several histories and thus narratives are the discursive practices to talk about the past. Thereby, interpretations of history, or rather narratives about the past are the primary element of constructivist application of history in IR.

The role of narrative is to put the self in a “temporal background” (Carr 1986:32-33) by re-aligning the past to the present and the future so that the experiences of the self can make sense while defining its present identity (Ricoeur 1984 cited in Browning 2008:48). Identities are not atemporal, in fact they retain a large baggage of past experiences. However, experiences are not only comprised of what really happened. Rather than actual experiences, remembered experiences do play a crucial role in constructing and re-constructing the self. Therefore, narratives give us the sense of where we stand in the present vis-à-vis the past. This is why, a narrator aims to produce a coherent narrative by emphasizing some historical events while ignoring or dismissing some others (Carr 1986:59). This tendency to produce a coherent narrative does not mean that narrator makes up stories and creates a fictional story. On the contrary, narratives are

¹ At this point, it should be noted that any scientific analysis of an historical event is a narrative on its own. Those kinds of narratives can be descriptive as well as explanatory (see Suganami 2008). Explanatory narratives are widely used in process-tracing method to unveil causal mechanisms between effects and causes. However, in this paper narratives are first and foremost considered as the stories of the past told by politicians in order to justify their policies by linking them to the past.

not necessarily fictional, there can be non-fictional narratives since individuals need narratives about their “life-story,” i.e. things they have done and places they have been so far (Carr 1986:74), in order to create a cognitively ordered temporal background against which her own identity can be constructed (Carr 1986:65). For this reason, forgetting, concealing or renouncing some certain events is an essential element of narratives as much as remembering, disclosing or emphasizing some others. Such ways of narrating are used frequently by politicians to tell different stories about the past so that they can re-construct the identity of their state and eventually they will be able to envisage a different future, or rather a different strategy for their country in international politics.

In foreign policy-making history, geography and cultural characteristics of states are usually taken as granted and static by politicians. In fact, as mentioned above different narratives and different representations of geography are possible. Therefore, the questions as to how the past is narrated and how geography is imagined in the discourse of politicians should be the main concern of discourse analytical understanding of the change in strategic culture. In the remainder of this paper, new narratives about the history of Turkey and different geographical representations about Turkey’s political landscape are explained.

In my quest for emerging narratives in Turkish strategic culture I primarily focus on two different legacies inherited from the past. The first one is the Ottoman legacy which was manifested in Turkish traditional strategic culture as the so called Sevres Syndrome dates back to the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the prevalent opinion about backwardness and the degradation of the Ottoman order and inferiority of the East in general and the Arabs in particular. Secondly, I analyze how the Cold War is narrated and how its implications on Turkish foreign policy are perceived today. As for the representations of geography, I focus on two issues again. The first issue is the role of geopolitics in Turkish foreign policy. The often mentioned exceptional geographical location of Turkey between three continents and on the trade routes from East to West as well as from North to South resonates with the very essentialism in the political discourse of Turkish elite. In order to comprehend whether this essentialist aspect of geography is still dominant in Turkish strategic culture I will unfold the representations of geography and elaborate on the renewed application of geopolitics in Turkish foreign policy. In

relation with this geographical exceptionalism of Turkey, the second issue deals with the representation of neighbours within Turkish strategic culture. The processes of attributing meanings to neighbours and being a neighbour or hailing foreign countries as friends or foes of Turkey illuminate the self-categorization and practices of othering within the political discourse of Turkish political elite.

Narrating History: Ottoman Legacy, Sevres Syndrome and the Cold War

History is of great importance in Turkish foreign policymaking, albeit not necessarily in a good way. Robins (2003:93) points out the ideological significance of history for Turkish state, since “history in Turkey is so much more than simply the disparate, collected views of the past. History helps to legitimise the creation and existence of the state; it helps ideologically to orientate the state; it tells a story which embodies the myths, ideas and values which give meaning to political life within the state.”

The historical legacy of the end of the Ottoman Empire is embodied in the term, *the Sevres-phobia* or *Sevres Syndrome*, which evokes “the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide up Turkey” (Kirişçi 1998 quoted in Mufti 1998:42). The fears emanated from Sevr Syndrome have been shaping Turkey’s relations with her neighbours as well as with the Western powers since its foundation. The concept of *Sevres-phobia* has connotations of

fear of Russian expansionism southwards, and frustration at the disappointing consequences of the Turkish expansionism northwards; concern about Armenian territorial ambitions in eastern Anatolia, and Greek territorial ambitions in western Anatolia; dismay at the Arabs for joining the anti-Turkish coalition during World War I; and for Syria’s unsuccessful claim to the province of Hatay as well as Iraq’s successful claim to Mosul; and suspicion that the western powers might at any point be ready to sacrifice Turkish interests in pursuit of their own strategic objectives (Mufti 198:41).

Those fears have been haunting Turkish politicians and casting doubt about the intentions of the Western states on Turkish land for quite a long time.

Davutoğlu defines the Sevres treaty as the “bottleneck” which the founders of Turkish Republic had to go through. According to Davutoğlu, this bottleneck had happened at one point and had already been overcome and there is no need to live with

the paranoia of Sevres, yet no falling into lethargy of defeating the West and forgetting the severe lessons learnt under either (Davutoğlu 2001:61). He continues:

Remembering the Sevres and *knowing* what happened at the time is meaningful, if it enables us to assess with a common sense our weaknesses and mistakes throughout the course of events that culminated in the Treaty of Sevres; otherwise, if it pacifies us and engenders a sense of mental submissiveness at the psychological level that causes a defensive attitude, it certainly hinders our power and paves the way for new Sevres-like treaties (Davutoğlu 2001:61, my translation and my emphases).

Abdullah Gül, former foreign minister between 2003-2007, also stressed the difference between remembering and living with the lessons from the Treaty of Sevres in one of his addresses to the TBMM:

Surely, we have to be poised to act against the secret schemes on the destiny of our country. I'm not implying that we should ignore such schemes; but I would like to underline that it is unfair for Turkey as a great country to be forced to live with a syndrome like that (Gül TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.105 Session.38 2005:37).

The Treaty of Sevres has long been viewed by many Turks as the ultimate epitome of the Western countries true intentions about Turkey. One of my interviewees objected to the conceptualization of Sevres as a paranoia or a syndrome for that Sevres was a reality rather than paranoia permeated into Turkish strategic mentality.² He also noted that when someone reads the minutes of the Treaty of Lausanne the traces of the Sevres mentality can virtually be found in every remarks and interventions made by the Western delegates. One can conclude that Sevres is seen by Turkish elite as a historical fact not because it was actually signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers rather because it is generally considered as the utmost codified text of Western plans on Turkey that resonates with the Eastern Question of the 19th century. The diplomats I interviewed have a common conviction that Sevres and Lausanne are two sides of the coin; however, they added that one should draw lessons from Sevres but never let the past determine today's foreign policy.³ All of the diplomats I had an interview with underlined that the influence of Sevres in today's foreign policy is minimum, if not nil.

² Interview with Ercan Çitlioğlu, İstanbul, 14.03.2011.

³ Interviews with a senior official at Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Ankara, 11.05.2010, and a senior official at the Turkish Embassy in Belgium, Brussels, 13.09.2010.

Nonetheless, the Sevres Syndrome is still alive even though its influence is lingering. One CHP deputy highlighted that Turkey has to be vigilant about any initiatives that is against the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne since Lausanne is the only treaty that remains valid despite the fact that other war ending treaties such as the Treaty of Versailles had never been entirely implemented and had to be abolished by the Second World War.⁴ On the other hand, a few interviewees stressed that the Sevres Syndrome is either an emotional reaction that hinders the development of a Turkish foreign policy that is cognizant of today's realities rather than being obsessed with the past;⁵ or it is a political concept commonly used and continuously reproduced in domestic politics by elites to accuse each other of either pursuing allegedly submissive and naïve policies towards the West or securitizing and de-politicizing foreign policy issues in order to silence the opposition.⁶ For some others, Turkey is more self-confident than ever enough to overcome such fears and do not let unpleasant memories to distort Turkey's renewed international image.⁷

All in all, the Sevres syndrome is a reification of not only the fears, suspicion and dislike about the Western great powers but also the sense of inferiority, defeat, and submissiveness vis-à-vis Western superiority and success. As put by one of the interviewees, Turkish political culture has long been oscillating between two extreme types of Occidentalism: Euro-scepticism and pro-Europeanism.⁸ The roots of Turkish Occidentalism can be found in the dichotomy of admiration and loathing of everything about the West since the initiation of the Tanzimat reforms as well as within the trauma occurred in elites' psyche due to the protracted collapse of the Ottoman Empire that lasted more than a century. The more lengthy the collapse the deeper and wider those fears ingrained into the strategic thinking.⁹

⁴ Interview with CHP deputy Oğuz Oyan, Ankara, 20.04.2010.

⁵ Interview with independent deputy Hüseyin Pazarcı, Ankara, 16.04.2010. Note that Pazarcı joined the CHP in the summer of 2010.

⁶ Interviews with retired ambassador Yalım Eralp, İstanbul, 15.03.2011, and an AKP deputy Suat Kınıklıoğlu, Ankara, 06.05.2010.

⁷ Interviews with AKP deputies Ruhi Açıkgöz, Ankara, 15.04.2010, Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu, Ankara, 16.04.2010, Nursuna Memecan, Ankara, 04.05.2010.

⁸ Interview with Çiğdem Tunç, an expert at The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), Ankara, 07.05.2010.

⁹ Interview with a senior official at the Secretariat General for EU affairs, Ankara, 11.05.2010.

İsmail Cem, as a political thinker, in his book about Turkey and relations with the EU dismisses the mistrust for the West and criticizes the prevalent paranoia among Turkish politicians about great powers' true intentions. He, then, asserts that the main problem is the conflict of interests between Turkey and the West rather than the past experiences, and thus the relations with the West must rely on mutual interests rather than paranoia about or obsession with the West (Cem 2009:76-77).

Cem points out the lack of emphasis on history in Turkey's traditional foreign policy. He was concerned about pursuing a foreign policy "that was alienated from its own roots, cut off from its own assets, indeed divorced from the very elements that could nourish and sustain it. In this foreign policy's perception of the world and of itself, history was nonexistent. It was as if the historical experiences of centuries, as well as, their civilizational assets and relationships, had never existed" (Cem 2001:3). He believes that history has a significant impact on Turkish foreign policy (Cem 2001:5). For Cem, Turkey being in denial of its history is not able to adapt to the new circumstances in the post-Cold War. He raised this issue of being in denial of the Ottoman legacy on several occasions. In his address to the TBMM, Cem stated that: "We, as Turkey, are about to witness a new era of progress in Turkish foreign policy as long as we are able to embrace ourselves, our history, our personality, and our identity" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.40, Session.32, 1997:90).

In an interview in 1997, İsmail Cem, the then foreign minister of Turkey, underlined the undeniable link between the history of Turkey and the history of its vicinity. When answering a question as to how Turkey could develop cooperation with her neighbours Cem stressed the role of historical and geographical ties:

Turkey will, of course, pay special attention to her relations with the peoples with whom she lived through history together. [...] What shouldn't be done is to regard our historical and geostrategic environment with disdain, even if we are having troubles with some of the countries in our historical and geostrategic environment. Historical and strategic context, nonetheless, provides chances and opportunities for us too. What must be done is to pave the way for better relations with the countries in our vicinity by capitalizing on those opportunities presented to us by history and geostrategy (Cem 2009:20, my translation).

According to Cem, throughout the Cold War, Turkey's traditional foreign policy decried its history and squeezed itself into a-historical container made of Cold War

concerns at the international and regional levels (Cem 2003:3). By defining Turkey's traditional foreign policy with references to its Cold War experiences Cem not only defied traditional state elite's negligence of Turkey's historical geography, but also constructed his own narrative about Turkey's historical geography. By this way, narrators like Cem, draws a line between his narrative and the traditional narrative to achieve first and foremost a coherent narrative of their own and ultimately a narrative that is meaningful with other narratives and also compatible with the present and appropriate for the future expectations and purposes. In this sense, by emphasizing the Ottoman legacy and the common history between Turkey and her neighbours Cem condemned the cynical view about the Arabs and Islamic world and renounces negative policies of traditional state elite towards Turkey's Arab neighbours. Cem harshly criticizes the dichotomous understandings persistent in traditional foreign policy which as a result juxtapose Islam against secularism, and the East against West. These dichotomies are so wrong and misleading that they not only create fault-lines in Turkey's domestic politics but also hinder her foreign policy initiatives at the regional level since for Cem foreign policy-making must be done in grey zones (Cem 2001:15).

For far too long, Turkey's own views and understandings of herself have misled the West in its assessments. We've become a country that deifies the West and thus becomes neurotic about it. Here, the psychological dimension is particularly relevant: 'The West is superior to us,' 'The West is better than we are,' 'We're no good,' etc. Turkey conditioned herself to believe this nonsense. At the same time, and again for far too long, Turkey has segregated her present from the past (Cem 2001: 27).

In Cem words, a foreign policy trapped into an 'either-or' issue could not cope with contemporary realities of the world politics; therefore, the 'either-or' fallacy should be replaced by a 'both-and' perspective (Cem 2001:19-20).

While acknowledging the negative memories about the Ottoman rule that some nations are haunted by, Cem, in an interview given in December 1999, praised the Ottoman Empire for maintaining a peaceful, secure, tolerant, and decentralized order across the Ottoman land that lasted for centuries (Cem 2009:241). Rather than putting the blame on the out-dated characteristics of Ottoman rule and the serious corruption within the Ottoman bureaucracy that became endemic in the 18th and 19th centuries, Cem sees a

close correlation between the rise of nationalist movements against the Ottoman rule and the increase in covert and overt plans of the Western great powers upon the Ottoman territorial integrity and unity (Cem 2009:241).

In his speech given at a Turkish university prior to the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Cem clarified his interpretation of the Ottoman rule and its legacy in the Balkans:

“[...] we could not see the added value which could be brought into contemporary foreign policy by fully appreciating the idea that the rule of the Ottomans in the Balkans was not the outcome of oppression based on coercive power, rather that it had got a civilizational dimension, and that we had evolved together with the peoples of the Balkans for six hundred years” (Cem 2009:143, my translation).

Cem continued his appraisal of the Ottoman era and cherished the Ottoman legacy by stressing the civilizing role of the Ottoman rule in a speech given on 8 December 1999:

Starting from the 14th and 15th centuries up until the 18th century, we, as the embodiment of a more equalitarian, libertarian and humanitarian order at the time, conveyed our [political] dynamics to the West and East where and when feudalism, suzerainty were prevalent, ill-treatment of the grassroots, exploitation of religious beliefs, oppression, insecurities were overwhelmingly present (Cem 2009:151, my translation).

The controversy and incoherence within Cem’s narrative about the Ottoman Empire becomes more obvious when Cem tries to bridge the gap between the wholesale disregard of the Ottoman rule that was pervasive in the discourse of the founders of Turkish Republic and his reassessment of the Ottoman era. For Cem (2001:28), breaking up with the Ottoman past and even rendering it as the other of new-born Republic was a “revolutionary necessity” and a “rational choice” for the founding fathers at the time. Cem (2009:247), in an interview given in 1999, defended Atatürk’s policies of defining Ottoman past as the temporal other of the Turkish Republic by drawing attention to the possible repercussions that Turks would have to face in the case of the failure of Atatürk to found a nation-state on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire:

Atatürk is the leader who thwarted Western Europeans opening up an unwanted trajectory in Turkey’s long journey through history and causing an irreversible rupture in the history of Turkey, and who united Turkey’s history and present times. During and after the First World War, the primary objective of Western

Europeans was to condemn Turkey to the dustbin of history by invading Turkish land and implementing the Treaty of Sevres (Cem 2009:247).

Nevertheless, this choice made by the founders turned out to be a flawed logic in today's world, which resulted in a political "abnormality" when it comes to relations with the West (Cem 2001:28). For this reason, Cem (2001:28) argues that retaining the past and emphasizing the cultural characteristics of Turkey should not be rejected on the grounds that it is reactionary (*irticaci*). By pointing out the alternative past that Turks would have gone through, Cem, in fact, tries to justify the policies of early Republican politicians not only on the grounds of revolutionary necessities but also on the grounds of a danger of likely Western partition of Turkey after the First World War. Narrating the history through 'What if' questions is one way of creating temporal others. Temporal others such as an imaginary Turkey dismembered and colonized by the West did, and perhaps will never exist. However, such imaginary 'what if' type of others enables the narrator to establish a coherent storyline for his/her narratives.

İsmail Cem is not alone in criticizing the traditional political elite, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the incumbent foreign minister since 2009, condemns the traditional policies which have halted back Turkey from developing her relations with her environs. Davutoğlu describes those elites as risk-averse, short-sighted individuals suffering an identity crisis, for whom the history is full of bad lessons rather positive memories, and the geography is a valuable resource/asset as long as one can benefit it in the game of great powers (Davutoğlu 2001:34).

By criticizing the Kemalist ideology for being inefficient and failed to seize the opportunities due to its paranoid cautiousness, Davutoğlu envisages active engagement with all regions, establishment of good neighbourly relations, pursuit of multi-dimensional foreign policy based on commercial, political and cultural relations with the states all around the world. In Davutoğlu's doctrine the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire is a "strategic fortune" and Turkey's geography is her "strategic richness". Even though Davutoğlu puts emphasis on the historical and geographical richness of a country, history and geography are taken by him as constant variables which have to be used wisely and strategically in the making of foreign policy and defence strategy (Davutoğlu 2001: 38). Thereby, Davutoğlu thinks that Turkey, in the new century, should embrace its

centuries old history and its extended environment where Turks and other nations and communities lived side by side. According to Davutoğlu (2001:47), ideological preferences and geopolitical concerns of the Cold war era ruled out the strategic and dynamic use of Turkey's historical legacy and geographical richness. Nonetheless, any strategic use of history and geography is in itself a different kind of discursive practice that includes new narratives and new interpretations of geography and its role in foreign policy. Regardless of being strategic and dynamic first and foremost every reference to the history and geography in foreign policy is on its own a discursive practice and unveils political orientation of the narrators.

The implications of this re-discovery of the past and geography are twofold. Firstly, the concepts of friend and foe are re-defined in accordance with the new historical representations and geographical imaginaries. For instance, in his one of the addresses to the TBMM, Davutoğlu coined a new concept and defined communities in Turkey's vicinity as Turkey's *tarihdaş*, with whom Turks lived through the history together and shared common experiences. The paragraph where Davutoğlu mentions the term reads as follows:

All these lands, all these regions are our *tarihdaş*. As the state of Turkish republic we are obliged to protect the rights of our citizens, as a nation preserving the past ties with our *tarihdaş* is our historical mission. In this context, regardless of their ethnic and sectarian origins, we are determined to embrace all of our *tarihdaş* and eliminate all the existing barriers between us and our *tarihdaş*; this is why, we are pursuing region-wide policies; this is why, we are establishing trilateral and multilateral mechanisms; and this is why, we are in pursuit of new initiatives within our bilateral relations (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.87, Session.37, 2011:58, my emphasis).

This quote, in my opinion, captures the essence of Davutoğlu's purpose to substantiate geography with the history. *Tarih* means history in Turkish and the suffix –*daş* is similar to the prefix *co-* in English implying partnership, togetherness and association. Thus, *tarihdaş* refers to the idea of living together throughout the history. Furthermore, the concept implies a historical friendship between Turkey and its environs or at least being associated in one way or another at one point in the past. Davutoğlu not only digs up history deep to discover old friendships but also re-interprets the history by

emphasizing commonalities rather divergences between Turkey and her neighbours. Coining new concepts, albeit ambiguous, helps him to challenge the old concepts of traditional strategic culture and ultimately consolidate his discourse as these new concepts become wide-spread in elites discourse. Such concepts give elites a discursive leverage in their struggle to gain the upper-hand vis-à-vis other contending discourses. Hence, looking at the neighbourhood through a historical prism Davutoğlu aims to adapt Turkish strategic culture to the new circumstances in the regional and international level.

The second implication can be observed in the re-conceptualization of geostrategy in accordance with the different geographical representations and new geopolitical thinking. In relation to the temporal re-configurations (narratives) in Turkish strategic culture, I now turn to the spatial re-configurations and geographical representations.

Re-imagining Geography: Boundaries, Neighbours and Geopolitics

Expounding on the different representations of geography and the use of geopolitical references within the discourses of political elites enables me to comprehend the change in the spatial dimension of Turkish strategic culture as I have done above for illustrating the temporal dimension of Turkish strategic culture by elucidating new narratives.

The traditional conceptualization of geopolitics attributes a determining role to the environment and the geostrategic location of a country while explaining its foreign policy. In other words, geopolitics is considered as the key conceptual tool for designing defence and security strategy since geography is apparently one of the most acknowledged, visible, stable and easy-to-grasped factor that needs to be incorporated into the strategic calculations of state elites. The theories of geopolitics has enjoyed a reputation for being scientific, objective and a-political owing to its emphasis on the enduring advantages and disadvantages of the natural world that are bestowed upon a country by its geography. Of these advantages and disadvantages the natural resources and human resources (population) that belong to the state, the geographical features and complexities of the country that is under the jurisprudence of the state, such as being surrounded by many neighbours, being located in a naturally unfortified and difficult to defend land are believed to be the most important factors that guide foreign policy. Geopolitics has been described as “the domain of hard truths, material realities and

irrepressible natural facts” (O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992:192). For geopolitical thinkers, these are vital possessions of a country which can be blessing or curse depending on the strategic ability of state elites to protect them against external threats and use them for their country’s advantage in the international arena. O’Tuathail and Agnew criticize such apolitical and static notion of geopolitics and hence they posit that geopolitics is “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (1992:192). O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992:191) argue that traditional understanding of geography is anti-geographical because it is one dimensional as it disregards the cultural and historical dynamics that render geography a fluid, flexible and an organic phenomenon.

The oft-cited belief that Turkey is surrounded by enemies and threats and Turkey is neighbouring with several countries that overtly or covertly display hostility towards Turkey has long been the very simple but formidable story told by Turkish politicians about Turkey’s neighbourhood. Yet, these convictions can be traced back to the rise of geopolitics and geopolitical thinking during the Cold War (Bilgin 2007:742). The menacing Soviet demands on Turkish soil and Turkish straits at the very early years of the Cold War urged the Turks to re-design their defence strategy in accordance with the realities of the bipolar world. In addition to the Soviet threat, Turkish policy-makers were highly concerned not only about the number of their neighbours but also about their political regime such as Bulgaria, Greece and Syria. Policymakers used to justify their defence spending on the basis that Turkey resembles an inland country surrounded by several unfriendly countries.

Ottoman geography has long been disregarded as an alien territory and was generally described by the traditional elites as a swamp where only bad can come to Turkey. Hence, Turkey should never be part of that geography, let alone show any interest in the region. İsmail Cem objected this traditional view about the Middle East in particular and Islamic societies in general.

It was a foreign policy that turned its back on centuries of experience, a foreign policy that stubbornly persisted in regarding itself as an alien in its own historical context. This mindset manifested itself in many ways. For example, the attitude of ‘Oh let’s do keep out of Arab affairs,’ every time someone uttered the phrase

Middle East; together with fond hopes that the more Turkey distanced herself from Islamic societies or alienated herself from her own past, the more the West will 'like' her (Cem 2001:4).

The indifference of Turkey to its environs during the Cold War and its heavy-handed security-first policies in the 1990s does not mean that Turkey never got involved in the regional politics. It did involve but without making any effort to empathize and sympathize with the region. Turkish politicians were aware of the fact that they had Middle Eastern neighbours but they were not locating Turkey in the Middle East. Politically as well as mentally, Turkey was distant from its environs. This is why, Turkey had been seen as a Western satellite in the Middle East or a "frontier outpost" of the West throughout the Cold War (see Cem 2001:32).

Davutoğlu goes beyond renouncing traditional (mis)-perceptions about Turkey's environs and formulates a new geostrategy through the re-conceptualization of geopolitical thinking. For Davutoğlu (2001:117), the old conceptualization of geopolitics is ill-suited for comprehending new circumstances Turkey is facing at regional and international level. At the regional level there are geopolitical vacuums produced in the aftermath of the Cold War, while at the international level there is the quest for a new political order as well as the economic competition among various states. Insofar as Turkey's geopolitical location had become a crucial asset for Turkey's international role in the post-Cold War, Turkish politicians aimed to design their very own policies and strategies clustering around the new perception of its geostrategic importance. AKP deputy Mehmet Dülger mentioned this point in his address to the TBMM: "Turkey, within the new world order, will hardly seize its place on the basis of its geopolitical location but on its own capabilities to design new policies" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.10 Session. 56. 2003:15).

In Davutoğlu's conceptualization, Turkey's geopolitical location is conceived as an asset that Turkey needs to benefit from in order to enhance its activism at the regional level and consolidate its place at the international level. In other words, Turkey's geopolitical location must be turned into a dynamic factor that guides Turkish international role rather than a means at great powers' disposal. Davutoğlu's geopolitical thinking stresses the fact that artificial differences between boundaries of contemporary states and their centuries old geopolitical frontiers is the main dynamic within regional geopolitics (Davutoğlu 2001:19). Davutoğlu, looking from the lenses of theories of

geopolitics, draws the blueprints of new foreign policy. Insofar as Davutoğlu is a theorician of geopolitics the main pillars of his geopolitics rests on the boundary-frontier (*sinir-hat*) contradiction (Davutoğlu 2001:19).

The long-established idea of defending Turkey within its own territory along its borders apparently dates back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire which was retreating from its imperial geography spanning the Balkans, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Middle East into Anatolian peninsula where it was born. According to Davutoğlu, the repercussions of this retreat can be found in Turkish strategic culture as the adoption of a static defensive attitude which rests on a flawed strategy oscillating between two extreme ideas: ‘absolute sovereignty’ or ‘total withdrawal’ (Davutoğlu 2001: 52-53). Davutoğlu further explains what should have been done instead of opting for one of these choices:

The territories over which [Ottoman] sovereignty was forfeited were also abandoned immediately in a hurry to defend the rest within new borders. This [total withdrawal] hindered the development of auxiliary tactical formulas such as creating spheres of influence within the territories that were in-between absolute sovereignty and total withdrawal, defending the borders through trans-boundary diplomatic initiatives, forming coalitions around its own strategy, leaving behind collaborators in the lost territories, and exploiting the conflict of interests among great powers in order to gain more room for tactical manoeuvres (Davutoğlu 2001:53, my translation).

Thereby, Davutoğlu (2001:41) asserts that Turkey, who was founded on the historical and geopolitical terrain of the Ottoman Empire and inherited the Ottoman legacy, should not adopt a defence strategy that is confined to the defence of her national boundaries. The defence of national boundaries should begin at their geopolitical and geocultural frontiers not at national borders. In his own words, “The defence of Eastern Thrace and Istanbul begins at the Adriatic Sea and Sarajevo, the defence of Eastern Anatolia and Erzurum begins at North Caucasus and Groznyy” (Davutoğlu 2001:56).

At the end of the 20th century Turkey had to face with the implications geopolitical and geocultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire. As Davutoğlu makes it clear, the main problem is the missing overlap between political boundaries and historical, cultural and economical frontiers. He suggests that Turkey should transcend her

boundaries and establish spheres of influence along its historical, cultural and economical frontiers. Several AKP deputies and foreign ministers emphasized this point as such:

We need to overcome the mental orientation that “we are surrounded by enemies,” and instead must embrace a healthier psychology that rests on the belief that “we are a major actor in forming cooperation and dialogue with our environs (Abdullah Gül TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.36 Session.34 2003:30).

Since the foundation of the Republic, we have been promoting peace and stability in our vicinity in accordance with the motto of “Peace at home, Peace in the world.” While maintaining the homeland security, we also pay great attention to have good relations with our neighbours; we’re not remaining indifferent to our problems, but we are trying to resolve them. (Ali Aydın Dumanoglu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.70 Session.34 2004:11).

[...] a great country is not only responsible for its own interests but also responsible to its region and neighbours. [...] In this sense, we put great importance to the stability, welfare and peace in our region and we, as a great country, are taking the lead in this direction (Abdullah Gül TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.70 Session.34 2004:33).

The re-integration with our near abroad does actually mean treating an abnormality that is inherited from the Cold War and also enhancing Turkey’s security (Suat Kınıklioğlu TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.36 Session.35 2008:93).

[...]Turkey, being in the centre of Afro-Eurasia (*Afroavrsya*) of international politics, has been facing serious risks; nevertheless, she can gain much advantage from them if she uses her geography and historical legacy. Because our near abroad, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are full of crises there are serious risks [facing Turkey]. However, these crises can be turned into advantage if we display an earnest aspiration – which we do – to contribute to the resolution of these crises (Ahmet Davutoğlu TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.56 Session.35 2009:101).

Given these quotes from AKP deputies, one can argue that geopolitics as an offshoot of hard power politics, that is geographical realities determine whether state’s behaviour should be defensive or offensive, has been replaced by a non-aggressive and amalgamating notion of new geopolitical thinking. In this geopolitical thinking Turkey aims to solve prolonged problems with its neighbours. This new thinking is formulated by Davutoğlu as a “zero problem policy with neighbours.” In line with this policy, Davutoğlu searches for new connections between Turkey and her environs in order to

denounce the misperceptions originated from Turkey's traditional strategic culture and consolidate the emerging strategic culture. The denunciation of previous conceptions of neighbours as threats and foes is one of the ways to transform the friend/foe dilemma. In order for geographical realities to coalesce with the cultural and historical legacies, transforming friend/foe dilemma is perceived as the only way to go beyond the national boundaries.

Nevertheless, Davutoğlu's zero problem policy has been subjected to serious academic and political criticisms. For instance, CHP deputy Onur Öymen and MHP deputy Ahmet Deniz Bölükbaşı criticized AKP's policies for being submissive to the American interests and giving unnecessary one-sided concessions to solve problems. Öymen argues that one should not expect to solve problems by giving one-sided concessions (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol. 70 Session.34 2004:21); while Bölükbaşı describes AKP's zero problem policy as naïve and against the interests of Turkey (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Vol.36 Session.35 2008:82). On the other hand, AKP's defence for zero problem policy is constructed along the line that it is not about choosing one policy over another one; it is about choosing AKP's zero problem policy over conflict-driven and isolationist policy of traditional state elites.

Conclusion:

My concern in this paper was not to assess the success or failure of Turkey's foreign policy or give an answer to whether the choices in international politics were strategically wise. Instead, I focused on the question how those choices are discursively made available and how it became possible at the cultural level for Turkey to pursue those policies politically. Hence, there is no right or wrong narrative or representation of geography, but there are various contending narratives and representations among which one of them generally becomes dominant owing to its reasonableness and appropriateness within the new circumstances not due to its rationality or correctness.

In conclusion, this paper has shed light on some of the discursive practices and contradictions in today's Turkish foreign policy. It is reasonable to argue that there is a change in narratives about the Sevres Syndrome and the Ottoman legacy as well as a change in geopolitical thinking and geographical representations within Turkish strategic

culture. Instead of defining Turkey's identity against its neighbours in terms of the historical experiences and threats emanating from its geography, Turkish politicians define Turkey's identity against the Cold War experience and the ideological orientations of traditional elites, or rather Kemalist establishment.

References:

- Aydin, M. and S. A. Acikmese (2007). "Europeanization through EU conditionality: A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9(3): 263-274.
- Barnett, M. (1999). "Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo." *European Journal of International Relations* 5(1): 5-36.
- Berger, T. U. (1998). *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bevir, M. (2006). How Narratives Explain. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea (eds). Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe.
- Bilgin, P. (2005). "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." *European Journal of Political Research* 44(1): 175-201.
- Bilgin, P. (2007). "'Only strong states can survive in Turkey's geography': The uses of 'geopolitical truths' in Turkey." *Political Geography* 26(7): 740-756.
- Brommesson, D. (2010). "Normative Europeanization: The case of Swedish foreign policy reorientation." *Cooperation and Conflict* 45(2): 224-244.
- Carr, D. (1986). *Time, Narrative, and History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Cem, İ. (2001). *Turkey in the New Century: Speeches and Texts Presented at International Fora (1995-2001)* Mersin and Nicosia: Rüstem Publishing Expanded 2nd Edition.
- Cem, İ. (2009). *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya: Avrupa'nın "Birliği" ve Türkiye [Turkey, Europe, Eurasia: Europe's "Union" and Turkey]*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Checkel, J. T. (2001). "Why comply? Social learning and European identity change." *International Organization* 55(3): 553-588.
- Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth]*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları
- Dunn, K. C. (2006). "Examining historical representations." *International Studies Review* 8(2): 370-381.
- Farrell, T. (2005). *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict*. Boulder, Colo. ; London: Lynne Rienner
- Farrell, T. and T. Terriff (2002). *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. Boulder ; London: Lynne Rienner.
- Gray, C. S. (1999). "Strategic culture as context: The first generation of theory strikes back." *Review of International Studies* 25(1): 49-69.
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Johnston, A. I. (1995). "Thinking about strategic culture." *International Security* 19(4): 32-64.

- Karaosmanoglu, A. L. (2000). "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey." *Journal of International Affairs* 54(1): 199-216.
- Kösebalaban, H. (2002). "Turkey's EU membership: A clash of security cultures." *Middle East Policy* 9(2): 130-146.
- Lantis, J. S. (2002). "Strategic culture and national security policy." *International Studies Review* 4(3): 87-114.
- Lieberman, R. C. (2002). "Ideas, institutions, and political order: explaining political change." *American Political Science Review* 96(4): 697-712.
- Longhurst, K. A. (2004). *Germany and the use of force*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Macmillan, A., et al. (1999). Strategic culture *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*. K. Booth and R. B. Trood (eds). Basingstoke: Macmillan: pp.3-26.
- Major, C. (2005). "Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy- Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?" *Politics* 25(3): 175-190.
- Meyer, C. O. (2006). *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. New York Palgrave Macmillan
- Mufti, M. (1998). "Daring and caution in Turkish foreign policy." *Middle East Journal* 52(1): 32-50.
- Mufti, M. (2009). *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic At Sea*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Müftüler-Bac, M. and Y. Gürsoy (2010). "Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates." *Turkish Studies* 11(3).
- Ó Tuathail, G. and J. Agnew (1992). "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy." *Political Geography* 11(2): 190-204.
- Oguzlu, H. T. (2002). "The clash of security identities: The question of Turkey's membership in the European Union." *International Journal* 57(4): 579-603.
- Oguzlu, T. (2004). "The impact of 'democratization in the context of the EU accession process' on Turkish foreign policy." *Mediterranean Politics* 9(1): 94-113.
- Oguzlu, T. and M. Kibaroglu (2008). "Incompatibilities in Turkish and European Security Cultures Diminish Turkey's Prospects for EU Membership" *Middle Eastern Studies* 44(6): 945-962.
- Ruacan, I. (2008). "A Study in State Socialization: Turkey's EU Accession and CFSP." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7(4): 573-590.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization* 55(1): 47-80.
- Schimmelfennig, F., et al. (2003). "Costs, commitment and compliance: The impact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41(3): 495-518.
- Schimmelfennig, F., et al. (2006). *International socialization in Europe: European organizations, political conditionality and democratic change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Snyder, J. (1977). *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

- Suganami, H. (2008). "Narrative explanation and international relations: Back to basics." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37(2): 327-356.
- Taniyici, Ş. (2010). "Europeanization of political elite discourses in Turkey: A content analysis of parliamentary debates 1994-2002." *Turkish Studies* 11(2): 181-195.
- Tekin, A. (2005). The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Impact of Europeanization. *Paper prepared for Workshop on EU-Turkey Relations- Opportunities, Challenges and Unknowns*. University of Pittsburgh.
- Tocci, N. (2005). "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?" *South European Society and Politics* 10(1): 73-83.
- Tonra, B. (2000). Denmark and Ireland. *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. I. Manners and R. G. Whitman (eds). Manchester: Manchester University Press: pp.224-242.
- Ulusoy, K. (2009). "Europeanization and Political Change: The Case of Cyprus." *Turkish Studies* 10(3): 393-408.
- Wiener, A. (2009). "Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international relations." *Review of International Studies* 35(1): 175-193.
- Wong, R. (2008). Foreign policy *Europeanization: New research agendas*. P. Graziano and M. P. Vink (eds). Basingstoke: Palgrave.