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Europeanization of Foreign Policy and World Culture: Turkey's Cyprus policy

Abstract

The re/definition of national interests is a dialectical process that involves not only internal dynamics and domestic interests but also explanatory factors transcending national level, such as the European-level and global-level stimuli. Accordingly, the study offers four alternative explanantia for Turkey's preferences on Cyprus question: EU's constraining stimuli, EU's constitutive stimuli, global-level constraining stimuli, global-level constitutive stimuli. The original empirical data support that it is the in/congruence between the 'EU-level constraining stimuli' and the 'global-level constitutive stimuli' that predicts Turkish perceptions on national interests and thus, Turkish attitudes towards the EU-led reform on Cyprus policy.

Introduction

Europeanization of national foreign policy has been a fertile ground for realists to claim that Europeanization – defined as cultural change- has its natural limits. From such perspective, the foreign policy domain –a *domain réservé*, strictly related to 'national interests' in a 'zero-sum game'- is falsely described to be immune from exogenous pressures. Accordingly, (crude) realist arguments fall short of explaining substantial foreign policy changes such as the adoption of antimilitarism in Japan and Germany after the Second World War (see Katzenstein 1996). In fact, national interests are not fixed. They are prone to change. Moreover, the re/definition of national interests is a dialectical process that involves not only internal dynamics and domestic interests but also explanatory factors transcending national level, such as the European-level and global-level stimuli.

The academic interest on European-level stimuli is developing as there are more and more studies on the Europeanization of national foreign policy. However, foreign policy studies on global-level stimuli are scarce. Furthermore, the existing few research on foreign policy that take global factors into account, limit their focus merely to global strategic context. They thus limit their focus to the bipolar structure of the Cold War era, the constraining role of the American superpower or the 'balance of power' arrangements. In those studies, global factors are merely strategic constraints on sovereign states. An alternative way of studying the impact of global factors on national foreign policy is to take global factors more seriously and consider cultural standards, norms and practices that are globally acceptable and institutionalized. Accordingly, the researcher's focus shifts from the constraining impact of global factors to their constitutive effects on national foreign policy. This will be useful to uncover systemic patterns underlying the constant re/definition of national interests.

The selected case, Turkey's Cyprus policy, demonstrates how individual perceptions of Turkey's national interests in Cyprus question reflect exogenous factors, i.e. both European-level and global-level stimuli. Turkey is an official EU candidate since 1999 and is expected to open its harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus by expanding customs union to new EU members in order to continue accession negotiations with the EU. However, there is a strong Turkish resistance to reform in this domain because the Cyprus conflict is deemed a "national cause". Nevertheless, Turkish government has been remarkably more compromising than previous governments over the issue since 2002 but expanding Customs Union to Greek Cyprus is still widely interpreted as de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration, thus a substantial political concession. Consequently, there is a stalemate in Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU as well as in peace negotiations on Cyprus.

By embracing constructivist ontology, the study assumes that European and global factors have not only constraining but also constitutive effects on foreign policy preferences. Accordingly, the study offers four alternative explanantia for Turkey's preferences on Cyprus question: EU's constraining stimuli, EU's constitutive stimuli, global-level constraining stimuli, global-level constitutive stimuli. Here, 'EU's constraining stimuli' largely implies the EU's membership conditionality and its sanctioning power. If Turkey does not comply with it, it is aware that it would lose the opportunity to become an EU member as well as the benefits associated with the EU membership. The constitutive effect of the EU stimuli relies upon Turkey's compliance with the EU's normative, cultural, and cognitive standards. Hence, certain domestic preferences become illegitimate or 'unthinkable' because they are incompatible with the EU's 'spirit' or culture. Constitutive effects are less visible than constraining ones. Hence, it is easier to demonstrate constraining global stimuli than constitutive global stimuli. For instance, if Turkey calculates how its social, economic, political relations with other countries and organizations in the world (not merely European ones) would be affected had it taken a course of action, it is thus constrained by global stimuli. On the other hand, if Turkish emphasis is upon the resonance of the reform with the prevailing global norms, standards and definitions –advanced mainly by INGOs and the UN agencies-, global stimuli are of constitutive character.

While most of the Europeanization scholars would expect the predominant factor to be 'EU-level constraining stimuli', a macro-sociological approach called Stanford School on Sociological Institutionalism (Meyer et al. 1997; for a review, see Drori & Krucken 2009) would emphasize 'global-level constitutive stimuli'. This study shows that it is the in/congruence between the 'EU-level constraining stimuli' and the 'global-level constitutive

stimuli' that predicts Turkish perceptions on national interests and thus, Turkish attitudes towards the EU-led reform on Cyprus policy. Overall, the paper aims to highlight the significance of the global cultural structure that informs and legitimates Turkish responses towards the EU's pressures on the Cyprus conflict. Rather than reform, EU conditionality on Cyprus provokes Turkish resistance because the EU seems to have been deviated from the global standardized approach to conflict resolution implying the primary role of the United Nations and the international community's 'common sense'.

The empirical findings are derived from an e-mail survey the author conducted with 261 Turkish experts on Turkey's foreign/EU affairs between January and April 2010. Accordingly, 71 % of the 117 Turkish public servants and 64 % of the private category (N=144, that includes academics, trade experts, NGO members, and lawyers) oppose the reform on Turkey's Cyprus policy, i.e. the opening of Turkish harbours and airspace to Greek Cypriot vessels and aeroplanes. It is notable that individual responses vary in terms of both the level and the logic of justification. Accordingly, the survey investigates whether the emphasis is upon global and/or European-level factors in determining national attitudes. Additionally, it studies whether constraining effect (domestic cost-benefit calculus) or constitutive effect (in/appropriateness and il/legitimacy of the reform) of exogenous stimuli explain domestic attitudes. The survey findings are complemented by follow-up elite interviews with 16 Turkish parliamentarians who are leading members of the Turkish Parliamentary committees on External Relations and Harmonization with the EU as well as three anonymous bureaucrats, the political advisor to Turkey's chief Negotiator to the EU, the head of the EU section in Ankara Bar Association, an academic affiliated with EU research centre in Ankara University, and the founding leader of the NGO ('Turkey Association of

Committees for Monitoring Parliament and Elected Officials' TUMIKOM) specialized in monitoring Turkish parliamentarians since 2004.

The survey and interview findings show that according to Turkish experts, the Europeanization of Turkey's foreign policy regarding Cyprus issue remains limited despite the threat of interrupting membership negotiations. The major tendency is to emphasize exogenous factors that are constitutive of foreign policy preferences rather than constraining factors such as the costs and benefits of an action. Accordingly, the main explanatory factors are advanced as the 'EU's double-standards' and the global standards on foreign policy (*quid pro quo* principle) and on conflict resolution (esp. the primacy of the UN-led talks). This does not mean that Turkish experts ignore domestic interests or constraining factors. It rather shows that national interests are re/defined in congruence with the exogenous standards. As regards the differentiation between EU-level and global-level standards, the paper concludes that if the EU-level stimuli are perceived as inconsistent with the global standards, Turkish experts are likely to follow global standards.

The Context: The role of the EU in the Cyprus peace process

The conflict on the eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus is generally defined as a sovereignty conflict between two different ethnic communities (Markides 1977). Since 1964, the United Nations (UN) has maintained a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus in order to prevent violence and has become a facilitator of intercommunal talks on reunification (See UNFICYP official website). With the end of the Cold War, a new international 'actor' – the European Union (EU) - has emerged and following the Greek Cypriot administration's

membership application in 1990, the EU claimed a 'catalytic' function in bringing long-lasting peace to the island. Hence, the EU accepted the Greek Cypriot candidacy on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), which had been de facto non-existent since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983.

The conception of the EU as a 'catalyst' in Cyprus has generated much debate in both academic and political circles (Christou 2002, Zervakis 2004). Initially, a general optimism prevailed; there was a widely-held belief that the key actors of the conflict, Cypriot communities and Turkey, would agree to an UN-led solution in order to become EU members. Accordingly, in 2002 the UN submitted a reunification plan – known as 'Annan Plan' after the name of the UN Secretary General of the time- officially backed by the EU. The general expectation was that the Annan Plan would be embraced by the conflicting parties until May 2004, the official date of the EU membership for Cyprus.

The results of the Greek Cypriot referendum were disappointing for both the UN and the EU: under a campaign of "no" led by the Greek Cypriot leader, 75.83% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the reunification plan, whereas 64.91% of the Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. Subsequently, (Greek) Cyprus became an EU member on 1 May 2004 without the resolution of the political problem and northern Cyprus was left out of the EU. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunther Verheugen accused the Greek Cypriot leader for having 'deceived' the EU and missing a historical opportunity to end the Cyprus problem (Picchia and Haenel 2003: 26-27). Nevertheless, Papadopoulos announced that he would not support new intercommunal negotiations on the UN Plan without at least 25 substantial amendments, including two conditions that were unacceptable for Turkish parties: the total withdrawal of

Turkish soldiers from Northern Cyprus and the annulment of Turkey's guarantorship (Radikal 15 July 2005).

The UN Secretary-General advised the EU to support the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community (Secretary-General's Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus to The UN Security Council, 28 May 2004). In line with the recommendation, the EU decided to grant the promised amount of 259 million Euros to the Turkish Cypriot community. The legislative elections of 20 February 2005 in Northern Cyprus demonstrated a still-increasing support for the pro-EU party of Talat, who one month later was elected President of the TRNC. As regards Turkey, under the EU membership process, traditional "domain réservé" such as Cyprus had been opened to negotiation in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey fulfilled the political condition of supporting the UN efforts in Cyprus. Hence, upon the recommendation by the Commission (Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards accession, 6 October 2004), the European Council of Brussels decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 (European Council of Brussels, 16-17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions). However, the opening of the negotiations was conditional upon the expansion of the customs union agreement to the new EU member states, including (Greek) Cyprus.

In this context, on 29 July 2005 the Turkish government signed the additional protocol expanding the customs union to all EU member states but included an annex stating that Turkey does not recognize Cyprus. The EU responded with a counter-declaration stating that Turkey's annexed declaration had no legal effect on its obligations to recognize Cyprus and normalize its bilateral relations with it (Declaration by the European Community and its Member States, 21 September 2005). As a reaction to Turkey's refusal, on 11 December 2006

the EU decided to suspend negotiations on eight chapters - namely the free movement of goods, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport policy, customs union, and external relations - and not to close any of the remaining chapters until Turkey has fulfilled its commitments under the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and removed the restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus (General Affairs and External Relations 2770th Council Meeting, Brussels, 11 December 2006, endorsed by the European Council of 15 December 2006, presidency conclusions). This shows that at the end of the third phase, the EU has returned to the discourse of exclusion towards Turkey by adopting a threatening discourse and emphasising the possibility of suspending all bilateral relations. Turkey's reaction was merely negative. Not only opposition to EU-led reform on Cyprus but also euroscepticism have risen to a significant level in Turkish public. The following section benefits from the survey and interview findings in order to demonstrate the prevailing arguments regarding the EU's conditionality on Turkey's Cyprus policy. It largely shows that the EU's constitutive stimuli and global constitutive stimuli are advanced as the main arguments.

Attitudes towards the reform: Empirical Results

The survey asked: "In your opinion, should Turkey open its harbours and airports to (Greek) Cyprus even though the Cyprus problem has not reached a conclusion?". The responses show that the majority of the Turkish experts (70.9 % of the public category and 63.9 % of the private category) oppose the reform. Only 19.7% of the public and 28.5% of the private

category support the reform on Cyprus. The rest (8.5 % of the public and 6.9 % of the private category) is undecided.

When asked why they oppose the reform on Cyprus (see Figure 1 below), the majority of the respondents (43.6 % of the public and 36.1 % of the private category) agree with the statement that **“Due to its cultural affinity with Greek Cyprus, the EU has imposed double-standards against Turkey”**. Secondly, the statement **“Such conflicts in the world are resolved under the aegis of the United Nations, rather than that of the EU”** gathers almost equally strong support (41.9 % of the public and 34 % of the private category). Thirdly, 33.3 % of the public and 32.6 % of the private category emphasize that **“For Turkey, the Cyprus problem is more important than the EU membership. So, opening harbours and airspace to Cyprus would mean political concessions and would be incompatible with Turkey’s national interests”**. Finally, only a small portion of the respondents (11.1 % of the public and 7.6 % of the private category) approve that **“The international community is aware that Turkey is right in this matter. So, there are no world pressures against Turkey”**.




Figure 1- Why do respondents resist the opening of Turkish harbours and airspace to Greek Cypriot vessels and aeroplanes? (public sector N=117, nonresponse=0; private sector N=144, nonresponse=1) Note: Respondents were free to give more than one answer.

As observed in the responses, the greatest emphasis is upon the illegitimacy of the EU's conditional pressures on Turkey's Cyprus policy. The EU is perceived as being pro-Greek due to its affinity with Greek culture. In other words, according to the informants, the EU lacks a standardized approach to the question at hand. The word 'double standard' is frequently used in order to qualify the EU's attitude towards Turkey on this matter. This implies that respondents value and expect objectivity and standardization at the EU level. If they perceive the EU as confused, incoherent or biased, they refuse to comply with the EU-led reform. In this context, respondents do not focus on the EU's constraining power, i.e. EU's incentives and sanctions. They rather determine their stance depending on the EU's standards or lack thereof. In this sense, the resistance to Cyprus reform in Turkey is largely explained by the *EU's constitutive stimuli*.

A second factor that is equally emphasized is the *global constitutive stimuli*. It implies that respondents justify their attitude with the prevailing standards, norms, and institutions at the global level. Accordingly, the globally acceptable way of approaching the conflict resolution in Cyprus is "going through the UN". Consequently, the legitimacy of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus peace process is flawed in Turkish eyes. The constitutive factors are followed by the constraining ones. One third of the respondents emphasize the *EU's constraining stimuli*. They thus calculate the costs and benefits of the reform for Turkey and find that Turkey's strategic interests in Cyprus prevail over its EU membership. Finally, *global constraining stimuli* are the least emphasized factor. Therefore, for a small percentage of the Turkish experts, the global pressures on Turkey to change its Cyprus policy are negligible. In

other words, Turkey's non-compliance with the reform would not harm its economic, social, and political relations with other countries in the world. Overall, the opposition to the EU-led reform is mainly justified in terms of the standards both at the EU and global level. The calculus of the costs and benefits of complying with the EU comes only after the constitutive factors. Finally, global constraining factor is the least significant factor amongst others in determining opposition to reform on Cyprus policy.

When one looks at the reasons why the Turkish experts support the expansion of the customs union to Greek Cyprus (see Figure 2 below), the picture is very different. It is remarkable that informants from both the public and private categories highlight global-level factors more than European-level variables. Accordingly, 12 % of the public and 17.4 % of the private category emphasize the *global constraining factor* by claiming that **“With the Cyprus opening, Turkey could improve its diplomatic and trade relations with other countries in the world.”** Secondly, 11.1 % of the public and 15.3 % of the private category prioritize the *global constitutive stimuli* by agreeing that **“Turkey should demonstrate that it is a modern country by developing good neighbourly relations with Cyprus”**. Only 6 % of the public and 9.7 % of the private category informants state that **“This is a precondition for EU membership”** (*EU constraining stimuli*). Finally, 5.1 % of the public and 9.7 % of the private category support the opening of harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus because **“This is what is appropriate for Turkey's European identity”** (*European constitutive stimuli*). Accordingly, respondents embrace global-level explanations more strongly than the EU-level ones. Efficiency-based approach and appropriateness-based approach go hand in hand in terms of showing major tendencies among the supporters of the reform.




Figure 2- Why do respondents support the opening of Turkish harbours and airspace to Greek Cypriot vessels and aeroplanes? (public sector N=117, *nonresponse*=0; private sector N=144, *nonresponse*=1). Note: Respondents were free to give more than one answer.

The responses given to the ‘Other’ section of the questionnaire (6 from lawyers, 5 from trade experts, 11 from NGO-academia, and 17 from bureaucrats) show that both the supporters and the opponents of the reform on Turkey’s Cyprus policy emphasize the need to observe the principle of *quid pro quo* (i.e. a favour for a favour). Therefore, they expect Greek Cyprus and the EU to take further initiatives in order to deal with the Cyprus conflict. For instance, “The EU should provide further guarantees to Turkey that it would not only observe Greek and Greek Cypriot interests but also Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests in the resolution of the matter” (anonymous NGO member). Hence, the EU and Greek Cyprus should lift their veto over direct trade with Turkish Cyprus (ibid.). Otherwise, expanding customs union to Greek Cyprus would be a substantial concession to Greek Cyprus.

Many interviewees state that by supporting the Annan Plan, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots had clearly shown their political will to solve the Cyprus problem. However, the Greek Cypriot

veto over the plan prevented the reunification. Furthermore, the EU failed to consider Turkish interests in its interferences in the Cyprus question. It admitted Greek Cyprus as an EU member despite the perseverance of the conflict. This accelerated the conflict because the Greek Cypriot administration gained political advantages against Turkish parties. Besides, the EU's current pressures on Turkey to extend customs union to Greek Cyprus are seen as double-standards against Turkey. Moreover, the interviewees are afraid that if Turkey complies with the EU conditionality on Cyprus once, it will be asked to give other substantial concessions on its self-interests (for instance, in Turko-Greek conflicts over the Aegean). Finally, an anonymous bureaucrat argues that extending the customs union to Greek Cyprus would neither contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict nor to Turkey's EU membership. "Rather than a precondition, the reform should be seen as a natural function of Turkey's EU membership" (anonymous bureaucrat², Interview 2010).

The interview findings resonate well with the survey responses. All of the interviewees report that they perceive the EU's interventions in the Cyprus question as disruptive both to the UN-led peace process and to EU-Turkey relations by imposing 'double-standards' on the Turkish part. Many interviewees argue that the EU's interference in the Cyprus process has been counter-productive in several ways. First, the EU's admission of Greek Cyprus as the official representative of the RoC has undermined the ongoing UN-led negotiations (Anonymous, Interview 2010). The Greek Cypriot administration has gained a political advantage over its Turkish Cypriot counterpart (an advantage that was unavailable under the UN aegis). Consequently, the Greek Cypriot leadership voted against the Annan plan in 2004. Nevertheless, despite the perseverance of the conflict, the EU admitted Greek Cyprus as an EU member and by doing so, it violated its own fundamental principle of not accepting countries with border problems (Interviews 2010: Aritman, Cerci, Kart).

Secondly, the EU is perceived as pro-Greek because it has not kept its promise of establishing direct trade and financial cooperation between Turkish Cyprus and the EU. Once an EU member, Greek Cyprus has vetoed the implementation of the EU directives aiming to improve communication with Turkish Cypriots (Anonymous bureaucrat1, Interview 2010). Ozturk (Interview 2010) explains that Turkish parliamentarians' meetings with their European counterparts on this matter resemble a 'dialogue of the deaf'. "Greek Cypriots take the floor but there is no one from Turkish Cyprus. There is no addressee. We feel obliged to fill the void and respond on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots." (Ozturk, Interview 2010).

Thirdly, The EU membership of Greek Cyprus has severely undermined Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU (Interviews 2010: Mercan, Caliskan). Although Turkey was reassured that the resolution of the Cyprus conflict would not be a precondition for EU membership, it has become an official obstacle under the threat of a Greek Cypriot veto (Aritman, Interview 2010). Then, the EU decided to halt the negotiations (eight chapters won't be opened and the remaining chapters won't be permanently closed) until Turkey opens its harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus. Although the conflict did not prevent the Greek Cypriot membership, it is now made an official obstacle against Turkish membership (Anonymous, Interview 2010). "When Turkey protests against the EU's double-standards, European MPs admit that they made a mistake by admitting Greek Cyprus as a member. Yet they immediately mention the principle of solidarity among the EU member states and say that they can do nothing about it [Greek Cypriot veto power]." (Anonymous bureaucrat1, Interview 2010).

In addition, Erbatur criticizes the EU for problematizing the presence of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus while turning a blind eye to the UK bases on the island. She also suspiciously questions why the EU had not asked Turkey to expand the customs union to new EU members after the enlargement waves that occurred before the entry of Greek Cyprus. Accordingly, the EU's conditionality on Cyprus is perceived as pro-Greek. Cerci and Pazarci state that Greek Cyprus took the EU hostage although it is only a small country with a population of 700 thousand people.

According to all of the interviewees, the main reason for the EU's pro-Greek attitude is the cultural affinity between Europeans and Greeks. 'Hellenistic culture is cherished by Europeans as the origin of the European culture' (Hacaloglu, Interview 2010). Ceylan and Ozturk highlight religion/Christianity as uniting Greek Cypriots and Europeans. However, Yazgan(Interview 2010) concludes that although religion might have been influential, it would be too reductionist to explain cultural affinity with Christianity. Similarly, Cerci (Interview 2010) argues that:

European culture is not homogenous. Europe hosts a diversity of voices, including democrats, conservatives, liberals, greens but also xenophobes. Remember that although they are passé now, racism, National Socialism, Hitler and Mussolini came from within Europe. We should admit that Christianity could be at the origins of the European culture. However, it would be wrong and narrow-minded to claim that Europe is a 'Christian Club'. There is an important Muslim population living in Europe and Islamic societies contributed significantly to the European civilization. I really do not know whether Greek Cyprus was admitted for religious reasons. You should ask to those who decided to accept Greek Cyprus as an EU member. If that was the case, we have nothing to say anymore.

Apart from cultural affinity, some interviewees (Ceylan, Mercan, Erbatur, anonymous bureaucrat, Yazgan) argue that Greece played an important role in supporting Greek Cyprus' accession to the EU. By threatening the EU to use its veto against the eastern enlargement, Greece convinced the EU to include Greek Cyprus as a new member in May 2004 despite the continuation of the Cyprus conflict. Apart from Greek lobbies, it is also important that Greek Cyprus had technically fulfilled the EU membership criteria. So, there was no technical reason to reject its membership (Interviews 2010: Anonymous bureaucrat1, Yazgan). Finally, Aksoy (Interview 2010) argues that the EU membership of Greek Cyprus was European Turko-skeptics' plot to impede Turkey's accession to the EU. Similarly, Yakis (Interview 2010) concludes that the Greek threat to veto eastern enlargement had Greek Cyprus not admitted as an EU member, was only a pretext. The real agenda behind the Greek Cypriot membership seems to prevent Turkish entry to the EU. Anonymous bureaucrat1 (Interview 2010) agrees: "by using the 'Cyprus card', the EU is avoiding the 'moment of truth' and is dragging its feet on the question of Turkey's membership".

Like the survey participants, interviewees are also in favour of a peace process led by the UN rather than the EU. Yazgan (Interview 2010) argues that the UN is more credible than the EU in the eyes of the Turkish public. Hacıoğlu (Interview 2010) explains that "the UN is a more suitable platform because it applies universal rules while always taking particularity of the conflict into consideration." Tanrikulu (Interview 2010) is concerned that Turkey might lose ground by letting the EU to take over the UN's role as facilitator in Cyprus peace process "because the EU has not played a constructive role in the Cyprus question so far and the UN is a more experienced and legitimate institution for conflict resolution." Caliskan (Interview 2010) agrees that the Cyprus question is not an EU matter.

While Greece and Greek Cyprus are EU members, the interests of Turkey and Turkish Cyprus are not represented in the EU (Kart, Interview 2010). Hence, unless Turkey and Turkish Cyprus are admitted in the EU, the EU would not be considered as a legitimate facilitator in the Cyprus peace process (Interviews 2010: Aksoy, Yakis). An anonymous bureaucrat (Interview 2010) uses the metaphor of a soccer game and argues that ‘The EU cannot simultaneously be both an arbiter and a player’. Nevertheless, interviewees do not oppose completely EU’s involvement in Cyprus peace process. On the contrary, Cerci, Aritman, and an anonymous bureaucrat state that it would be very difficult, if not impossible to find a viable solution to the conflict without the EU’s assistance. They expect the EU to pro-actively support the UN-led initiatives and convince the Greek Cypriot administration to be more willing to compromise. Some interviewees are more optimistic about the EU’s role in conflict resolution in the near future. Dagi (Interview 2010), Ozturk (Interview 2010), Dilek (Interview 2010), and Catalpinar (Interview 2010) think that if the EU could contribute to the just resolution of the conflict, it could even legitimately replace the UN as the main facilitator. Erbatur (Interview 2010) thinks that the UN is fed up with the conflict and might readily leave its responsibility to the EU over time. Hence, the EU would have to think more seriously about ‘what went wrong’ in Cyprus issue (ibid.).

Interviewees also provide interest-based accounts showing that they calculate costs and benefits of domestic compliance with the EU conditionality on Cyprus. This shows us how they perceive the *EU’s constraining stimuli*. Both government and opposition MPs highlight that due to its geographical proximity and a shared historical past, Turkey has strategic interests in Cyprus. When asked whether they would prioritize Turkey’s interests in Cyprus over the EU membership, the majority of the interviewees protest such comparison. Erbatur

(Interview 2010) says that “we are exactly at that critical point [in our negotiations with the EU] and this is unacceptable.” “Turkey would neither forego its interests in Cyprus for the sake of EU membership nor would choose Cyprus over the EU.” (Anonymous bureaucrat1, Interview 2010). These are generally thought as two different issues and should be considered independently from each other. Hacaloglu (Interview 2010) argues that a trade off between Turkey’s interests in Cyprus and Turkey’s EU membership is not logical and it only results from the EU’s reluctance to accept Turkey as a member. In other words, rather than admitting that it is not ready to ‘absorb’ Turkey -which still suffers from major limitations in democratization and regional economic disparities-, the EU reinforces such problematic link between Turkey’s EU membership and the Cyprus conflict (ibid.).

Tanrikulu (Interview 2010) explains that this question was discussed in Inter-Parliamentary Committee meetings and concludes that nobody could openly state that the EU membership is more important than Turkey’s interests in Cyprus for fear of contradicting the Turkish public opinion. Similarly, Pazarci (Interview 2010) thinks that any Turkish government which would ‘sacrifice’ Cyprus for the sake of Turkey’s EU membership would pay a severe price. It would not only lose in the following elections but would also lead Turkey to chaos (Pazarci, Interview 2010).

Yakis (Interview 2010) argues that geographically and historically, Cyprus will always be on Turkey’s agenda whereas not only Turkey’s EU membership prospects but also the very future of the EU is rather uncertain. Aksoy (Interview 2010) states that Turkey would lose a great deal of prestige in the world if it gives substantial concessions to Greek Cyprus. In that case, “even Turkey’s EU membership would not remedy such loss of prestige” (ibid.). Mercan (Interview 2010) says that Turkey’s interests in Cyprus outweigh the benefits of the

EU membership. Moreover, some parliamentarians (Interviews 2010: Erbatur, Tanrikulu, Yakis) argue that the opening of Turkish harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus would not contribute to the resolution of the problem because 1) Greek Cyprus would not be satisfied and continue to demand further concessions from Turkey, and 2) the EU clearly stated that opening harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus would not guarantee Turkey's EU membership.

Only two interviewees, an anonymous EU expert from a Turkish ministry and an academic, Hatice Yazgan, say that they prioritize the EU membership over Turkey's interests in Cyprus. Nevertheless, like the other interviewees, they do not want Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus without receiving anything in return. Yazgan (Interview 2010) explains that although she prioritizes Turkey's EU membership, she would disagree with giving unilateral concessions on Cyprus. For his/her part, the anonymous expert argues that Turkey's interests in Cyprus might have become obsolete over time. However, s/he accuses the EU of being inconsiderate to Turkish interests in the Cyprus process.

Besides, an NGO leader (Durna, Interview 2010) emphasizes that "in foreign policy you cannot give without taking". An overwhelming majority of the interviewees use the word 'reciprocity' at least once in order to highlight that in return for Turkish reform on Cyprus, the EU and Greek Cyprus should start to consider Turkish interests and lift the embargoes against Turkish Cyprus (Interviews 2010: Ceylan, Cerci, Mercan, Ozturk, Dilek, Aksoy, Yakis, Pazarci, Erbatur, Uras, Yazgan, Durna, Catalpinar). Otherwise, Turkish public opinion would react negatively to the reform. Pazarci (Interview, 2010) argues that Turkey's EU membership could appease Turkish segments who currently perceive the EU as pro-Greek. Similarly,

Erbatur (Interview, 2010) says that a viable solution could be found when Turkey becomes an EU member and thus, able to negotiate on equal terms with Greek Cyprus and Greece.

Finally, like the survey participants, interviewees perceive *global-level constraining pressures* on Turkey as feeble. Mainly the UN, the USA, and the EU are reported as pressurizing Turkey to reform its Cyprus policy. As discussed above, the UN is perceived as the legitimate source of pressure whereas the EU is often accused to be pro-Greek. The pressures from the American superpower are explained as a result of the US' willingness to see Turkey as an EU member (Erbatur, Interview 2010). Furthermore, it is known that the US is willing to end all potential conflicts between its Turkish and Greek ally in NATO.

Aksoy (Interview 2010) and Catalpinar (Interview 2010) mention the European Court of Human Rights as another source of pressure on Turkey's Cyprus policy. They are critical of the Court's decisions for relegating a protracted political conflict to merely technical issues such as property rights. Yakis (Interview 2010) explains that there are certain international nongovernmental campaigns on the preservation of churches in Turkish Cyprus and the question of missing persons during the Cyprus conflict. However, there have been no well-known INGO pressures on Turkish government to open Turkish harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus. An anonymous bureaucrat explains this with a general lack of interest from the international community. "The issue is either deemed as an internal affair of the EU or simply as unimportant." (anonymous bureaucrat2, Interview 2010).

Another explanation is about the nature of foreign policy. Foreign policy is different than human rights domain, where active interventions by international community are more frequent and legitimate (Anonymous, Interview 2010). Sovereign states are legitimately

entitled to pursue their strategic interests in the international political arena. Even though one is universalist, this does not keep him/her from admitting the priority of strategic interests in foreign policy domain (Hacaloglu, Interview 2010). Hence no exogenous pressures -except those of the UN Secretary General- would be deemed to be legitimate (Ozturk, Interview 2010). In addition, the international community lacks legitimate tools to coerce Turkey to change its Cyprus policy. “No one can threaten Turkey to annul its UN membership if it does not compromise on its Cyprus policy” (Anonymous bureaucrat1, Interview 2010).

Furthermore confusion prevails over the righteousness of the actors in the Cyprus conflict. The UN tends to treat Cypriot communities equally rather than admitting Greek Cypriot leadership as the government and Turkish Cypriot community as a minority. Moreover, it is not clear whether Turkey’s interventions on the island have been legitimate or not given Turkey’s constitutional guarantorship. In this context, there is no powerful international lobby about the Cyprus question (Hacaloglu, Interview 2010). According to some interviewees (Dagi, Erbatur, Dilek, Aksoy, Yakis, Caliskan, Anonymous bureaucrat1), international community perceives Turkey as being ‘right’ on this matter. They state that as a guarantor power under the London-Zurich agreements of 1960, Turkey used its legitimate right to intervene in Cyprus in order to end the civil war in 1974 and Turkish soldiers have been present on the island to prevent possible clashes between two Cypriot communities. Moreover, in their opinion, Turkey’s support for the Annan Plan showed to the world that Turkey was genuinely willing to solve the problem. On the other hand, by rejecting the Annan plan, Greek Cypriots proved their intransigence.

CONCLUSION

The paper dealt with the Turkish responses towards the EU conditionality on Turkey's Cyprus policy, i.e. opening of Turkish harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus in order to extend customs union to new EU members. Turkey does not officially recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as the official representative of the Republic of Cyprus. Hence, it considers the opening of borders to Greek Cyprus as a *de facto* recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration. This would not only reinforce the perception of the Turkish military presence on the island as an invasion but also relegate the Turkish Cypriot community into the status of minority. The UN does neither officially condemn Turkish interventions as illegitimate nor claim that Greek Cypriot leadership represents the Republic of Cyprus.

In this sense, although the Turkish government has been more liberal than the previous ones on the Cyprus issue, the EU-Turkey accession negotiations have been partially halted due to the Turkish resistance to reform Turkey's Cyprus policy. This paper aimed at showing the main arguments advanced by Turkish experts on EU and external affairs. It concluded that the opponents of the reform emphasize constitutive factors more than constraining factors. In other words, they look at the world and European standards (or lack thereof) in order to justify their opposition. According to the survey and interview findings, the EU-level constitutive factor seems slightly more important than the global-level constitutive factor. The respondents argue that the EU lacks a standardized approach on the issue and imposes double-standards on the Turkish parties. Then, they almost equally support the UN's involvement as the globally legitimate way of resolving conflicts. The cost-benefit analysis on reforming Turkey's Cyprus policy comes only the third in the individual accounts. Moreover, many respondents abstain

from selecting one issue over the other, claiming that Cyprus issue and the EU membership are separate questions.

A smaller portion of the respondents support the reform and they justify their support in terms of global-level factors. First, they mention the efficiency of the reform in improving Turkey's relations with the other countries in the world. Second, they argue that the reform would make Turkey a more legitimate actor in the world arena, as a modern and democratic country that observes good neighbourly relations. It is interesting to see that global constraining factors do play a major role in the account of the pro-reformists while it was negligible in the accounts of contra-reformists.

In sum, the opponents of the reform advance constitutive factors both at the EU and global level while the proponents emphasize global constraining and constitutive factors before the EU-level variables. It is thus, crucial to note that Europeanization studies focusing on the EU-level constraining factors, miss an important part of the story. They not only overlook the global factors but also the exogenous constitution/legitimation of national interests. Both the opponents and the proponents of the reform tend to assess the legitimacy and efficiency of the reform in congruence with the external world (the culture of conflict resolution, the nature of foreign policy etc). Accordingly, the EU's conditional pressures lead to domestic resistance (instead of compliance) in candidate countries when the EU's conditionality looks incompatible with the global standards. Hence, Stanford School contributes to the Europeanization studies in a substantial way. It introduces global-level constitutive factors, which helps uncover how national interests are defined and redefined under the EU conditionality.

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SURVEY PARTICIPANTS

117 state officials from various state institutions in Turkey, including Ministries, Undersecretariats affiliated with the Prime Ministry, as well as the Secretariat General for EU affairs, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), Turkish Broadcasting Agency (TRT), and Turkish Employment Organization (İŞ-KUR). 46 NGO members including academics, 63 lawyers from EU/International Relations section of Bar associations, 27 foreign trade experts from several Chambers of Commerce in Turkey, 5 respondents from the Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 1 member of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, 1 European Commission official as well as the leader of the Turkish Liberal Democratic Party.

INTERVIEWEES

Parliamentarians (surname-alphabetical order): Taha Aksoy, Canan Arıtman, Mehmet Ceylan (vice-chair, External Relations Committee), Abdullah Çalışkan, Mehmet Çerçi, Zeynep Dağı, Mehmet Sait Dilek, Nevin Gaye Erbatur, Algan Hacalođlu, Atilla Kart, Murat Mercan (chair, External Relations Committee), Mustafa Öztürk, Hüseyin Pazarıcı, Ahmet Kenan Tanrıkulu, Ufuk Uras, and Yaşar Yakış (chair, EU Harmonization Committee). **Others:** Mustafa Durna (NGO leader), Hatice Yazgan (academic), 3 anonymous bureaucrats, Serkan Catalpınar (lawyer).