UACES 41st Annual Conference

Cambridge, 5-7 September 2011

www.uaces.org

Developing a 'Comprehensive Approach' to International Security:
Institutional Learning and the CSDP

Professor Michael E. Smith
Department of Politics & International Relations
University of Aberdeen
m.e.smith@abdn.ac.uk

Forthcoming in
Constructing a Policy-Making State? Policy Dynamics in the European Union
Jeremy Richardson (ed.), Oxford University Press

The European Union (EU) has made dramatic advances in its global ambitions since the end of the Cold War, particularly in the area of foreign and security policy. These advances have proceeded erratically, as the EU struggled for nearly a decade throughout the 1990s to develop the means and will to resolve conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere. After NATO's military operation in Kosovo, however, where the Europeans once again played a subordinate role to that of the Americans, the EU embarked upon a major initiative to manage foreign security-related problems through a new institutional framework: the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).[1] The CSDP has launched more than 20 foreign security assistance missions of various types since 2003, spanning a range of geographical areas and functional problems. Taken together, these operations arguably represent the most ambitious foreign/security policy initiatives in the history of European integration, and they have been undertaken instigated with remarkably little public discord (Giegerich and Wallace 2004).

Many knowledgeable observers of the EU doubted this capacity was even possible in light of the EU's difficulties in finding a common approach to instability in the Balkans during the 1990s (Gordon 1997/98; Hoffman 2000); these doubts increased further with the EU's divisions over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq plus related challenges, such as the unprecedented scope of the 2004-07 EU enlargements (Kagan 2003). Despite the long history of European foreign policy (EFP) cooperation under the rubric of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s and 1980s, and its successor the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the 1990s, the EU had always found it difficult if not impossible to consider the deployment of military/policing forces on behalf of the EU. A final achievement involves the EU's growing ability to serve as not just a provider of security services, but as an innovator as well, particularly in terms of its role in security sector reform

---

[1]Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the CSDP was referred to as the European Security and Defence Policy; for the sake of consistency I use the term CSDP throughout this chapter.

and civilian crisis management (Cawthra and Luckham 2003), approaches that are lacking in most other international institutions. Thus, as the global demand for various forms of international security assistance has increased recently, the EU has started to adapt itself to meet those demands.

This chapter attempts to explain these changes, and to assess their specific implications for future conflict resolution and security operations, through the conceptual lens of institutional theory. Specifically, I argue that a high degree of institutional learning has been taking place within the context of EFP, and the CSDP domain in particular has emerged as an important locus of such learning since the launch of formal CSDP missions in 2003. Where the CFSP touched upon various foreign *security-related* problems (Smith 2003), it did not involve complex *security-providing* missions of the type covered by the CSDP, and it did not involve a military component.[2] Conversely, under the CSDP the EU has committed troops and police forces into conflict situations and has engaged in combat with local forces, a new capacity whose implications have not been fully explored in the literature. Indeed, studies of this topic tend to examine the general emergence of the CSDP (Anderson and Seitz 2006; Howorth 2007) rather than explore the two-way relationship between institutional change and the EU's operational experiences, although case studies of individual operations are starting to appear (Osland 2004; Ulriksen et al 2004; Penska 2006; Piana 2002; Diez et al 2006).

Europeanization and the CSDP

Europeanization in the CSDP field differs from that found in most EU socio-economic policy domains. Most importantly, it does not involve a shift from the national to EU level in the sense of formal delegation or a loss of member state authority, but rather the

---

[2]The CFSP was permitted to draw upon the military resources of the Western European Union during the 1990s, but failed to do so because of a lack of political will.

creation of a new public space or venue in which the inputs of EU member states and EU organizations are deliberately coordinated, on a case-by-case basis, to produce specific CSDP outputs: individual foreign security/peacekeeping operations. In addition, the 'inputs' from EU member states, which naturally involve foreign and defence ministries, have expanded dramatically in the past decade, as many national ministries with primarily domestic functions (particularly policing and justice) have become increasingly involved in the conduct of CSDP operations. This involvement builds upon the already existing involvement of more economic-oriented national inputs, such as development, trade, and humanitarian aid. The result is that any individual CSDP mission might involve national inputs from half a dozen or more different types of national government ministries from across (up to) 27 EU member states, plus inputs from the Commission and other EU-level bodies. Not surprisingly, the coordination of these inputs to produce one policy output – an CSDP mission - can be extremely convoluted and time-consuming.

This coordination, however, is not as decentralized as one might expect given its origins in the intergovernmental CFSP framework, and in the much looser EPC method of the 1970s and 1980s. There has been in fact a fairly high degree of institutional centralization in Brussels within the CFSP/CSDP domain, mainly in the form of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. As we shall see below, various offices within the General Secretariat claim some degree of authority over the CSDP, and they help to provide some institutional memory regarding this policy domain so that the EU does not have to invent each mission out of thin air. This tendency also has a cumulative aspect to it, as key actors involved in the CSDP at the EU and national levels do attempt to build upon their planning and operational experiences to improve CSDP policy-making in future operations. Finally, the CSDP does involve some degree of input by the EU's most important organizational actor, the European Commission, although not nearly as extensively as found in other areas of the CFSP.

The practical implications of this quasi-centralized and partially-Europeanized system can be extremely complex on a day-to-day basis. From a theoretical perspective, it can be difficult to determine what constitutes an 'EU level' input or process. As no single issue or problem dominates CSDP affairs, agenda-setting within the CSDP can involve any number of institutional actors or EU member states, so there is no easy way to determine where national interests of various EU member states end and the 'EU interest' begins. In fact, the 'EU interest' itself is not determined by any single factor, such as an external crisis or security threat to the EU. Instead, the EU interest in undertaking CSDP missions tends to involve a general need for capacity-building in foreign/security policy (i.e., the EU wants to 'prove itself' as a competent global actor), plus more specific factors depending on the problem at hand, such as a request for assistance by the UN, a regional international organization, or a non-EU member state. Moreover, even though the EU has attempted to provide a more consistent source of institutional leadership over European foreign policy in the form of the 'High Representative for the CFSP' and (since Lisbon) the 'High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy', these officials still must compete with national governments when attempting to initiate an CSDP mission. Finally, any EU member state can easily block an CSDP-related decision as this domain still largely rests upon consensus, although EU rules do permit the use of coalitions of the willing (or 'enhanced cooperation'). These acute problems of agenda-setting/leadership, coordination, and consensus-building, in fact, are three primary motivations behind the learning processes discussed later in this chapter. This tradition of using informal socialization/learning methods rather than formal voting rules or explicit delegation to the Commission has a long history in EFP, and the Lisbon Treaty does not change that fundamental fact.

Experiential institutional learning in the CSDP

There is no doubt that the EU has expanded its foreign/security policy ambitions in fundamental ways since the ratification of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties starting over a decade ago. Specifically, the EU has changed in terms of both its institutions (new CFSP/CSDP competencies) and its policy outputs (new CSDP operations). These changes have provoked a great deal of interest in academic and policy circles, yet there is little consensus on an explanation of why and how the EU is developing this capacity. Much of the attention, in fact, has involved a more general question: whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is better equipped than Europe in dealing with new problems of global security (Glaser 1993; Art 1996), not whether the EU can make its own unique contribution in this area. In a related vein, some scholars have argued that the EU was merely engaging in 'soft balancing' against US hegemony in general and the policies of the George W. Bush administration in particular. In other words, exogenous balance-of-power dynamics, not endogenous European norms, processes, and values, are the key explanation for recent CSDP activities; the EU is only attempting to constrain or control American dominance (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Posen 2006; Jones 2007).

A contrasting view, however, sees much of this effort as a form what Roy Ginsberg has called 'self-styled' actions on the part of the EU (Ginsberg 1989): they involve a desire among Europeans to play a greater role on the world stage in line with European values and interests and are not merely an 'automatic' response to the pressures of aggressive American unilateralism. Related work in this area focuses on the construction of a European global identity, which now manifests itself as involvement in security affairs and other forms of global governance in the same way the EU has long been involved in global trade, monetary, environmental, and development affairs (among others, see Whitman 1998; Magone 2006; McCormick 2006; Sjursen 2006). However, if the EU really is acting in a 'self-styled'

manner owing primarily (or at least partly) to endogenous dynamics, values, and related factors, then we need to understand how these dynamics work and what they might teach us about forms of international cooperation based on institutional self-reflection, consensus-building, and collective norms and values.

As suggested above, I argue that the institutional limitations imposed on the CSDP by formal treaty rules have compelled EU policy elites to pursue other avenues to improve the EU's standing as a global political actor/security provider. Rather than delegate authority to a powerful bureaucracy or adopt the use of majoritarian voting rules in the Council, EU policy elites have attempted to use social mechanisms, which can be framed in terms of institutional learning processes. These processes are largely endogenous to the EU, and do not involve exogenous factors such as power balancing, responses to major security threats to the EU, or crisis-induced decision-making. Instead, they involve the generation and consolidation of ideas regarding what role the EU can play in international security affairs based on its resources and experiences, as well as the demonstration effects (both negative and positive) of competing global actors such as the UN, NATO, and the US in particular. In addition, these processes are not driven by a 'bottom up' demand for more EU action requested by European citizens or interest groups. Consistent with the history of EPC and the CFSP, CSDP missions tend not to attract much attention by such groups, and EU policy elites are therefore generally free of such constraints when taking their decisions. Thus, as with the development of the CFSP more generally (Smith 2003), we see here the same kind of elite, internalised, and professionalised policy-making with relatively few private interests mobilised and little or no public participation.

Thus, the single most important factor behind these institutional learning processes is the steady accumulation of new CSDP operational experiences since 2003, coupled with intensive and deliberate reflection by EFP professionals on the EU's performance in these

operations. In the CSDP, Europeanization therefore is really about the collective mind-set or value system being developed, and perpetuated, by EU policy elites in light of various collective experiences. Prior to 2003, much of this thinking was hypothetical or speculative in nature, as the EU had never undertaken its own peacekeeping/conflict resolution operations; since then, however, it is increasingly based on actual operational experiences that have grown increasingly ambitious in their goals, wide in their geographic scope, and complex in terms of their logistical requirements.

Yet does this change reflect mere *adaptation* to circumstances or actual *learning* on the part of the EU (Levitt and March 1988; Haas 1990; Levy 1994)? Where adaptation does not involve changes in institutional values or purposes, learning can be conceptualized as a process of deliberate reform, consisting of: 1) regularly benchmarking the existing EU rules/values/purposes in a policy domain; 2) actively generating policy-relevant lessons as a result of new missions; 3) deliberately transforming those lessons into cumulative knowledge through feedback/monitoring/evaluation processes; and 4) institutionalizing and disseminating that knowledge for application to future operations. This new knowledge may represent a fundamental change in how the EU sees its role in the world, as well as involve the creation new foreign/security policy doctrines or even a new strategic culture for the CSDP (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Solana 2003; Meyer 2005; Smith 2011a). It would be going too far, however, to frame this activity as the creation of a new epistemic community given the lack of more institutionalized shared knowledge (as of yet) across *multiple* CSDP networks targeting *multiple* security issues, such as those devoted to civilian versus military problems.

Experiential learning obviously also requires new experiences in order to start the learning process, and there has been no shortage of such experiences over the past decade. Focusing on actual CSDP missions as the primary source of empirical material helps us to

analyze tangible lessons as determined by EU institutional actors rather than examine learning in terms of vague 'lessons of history' or other types of analogical reasoning that have received some criticism in the literature (Levy 1994). In my use of the concept, institutional learning is deliberate, pro-active, transparent, collective/social, policy-relevant, and progressive. My approach also differs from ideational approaches to foreign policy and international relations (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Yee 1996), which often do not explain why one policy-relevant idea gets chosen over other, equally plausible, ideas. Based on my previous work (Smith 2003), I have also found that one must also explain how new ideas or lessons are *institutionalized*, hence my specific focus on social-institutional-organizational, rather than merely personal or cognitive, learning.

Some of the major examples of new CSDP experiences are discussed in the rest of this section; these experiences provide much of the 'raw material' for institutional discussions within the EU regarding how to draw lessons from actual problems on the ground.

The first-ever CSDP mission involved a police mission (known as EUPM) in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) intended to succeed the UN International Police Task Force in 2003. Among other stabilization and policing tasks, the EUPM has helped transform the BiH Police Agency into one with enhanced powers and has helped foster major new state agencies. As we shall see in more detail below, police missions are a particularly interesting aspect of EU conflict resolution operations as they draw upon a long tradition of gendarmerie forces in various EU member states, a tradition not shared by the US. This mission was very soon followed by the EU's first-ever military operation: Operation Concordia. In this case, the EU deployed a military force to help oversee the implementation of the EU/NATO co-sponsored cease-fire between the government and rebel forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The EU force patrolled FYROM's frontiers, engaged in surveillance and reconnaissance, and thus helped secure the ceasefire agreement. Concordia was also the

first test of the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement for resource-sharing between NATO and the EU.[3]

The EU also launched a police mission to FYROM, Operation Proxima, at the request of its government in 2003. Proxima's objectives were to monitor, mentor, and reform the police; promote sound policing standards; fight organized crime; help create a border police; and support the overall political environment in that country. As the EU viewed this mission as a success, it ended operations in December 2005 (although limited police affairs cooperation continued into 2006).

As a reflection of its success with the EUPM and Concordia, in December 2004 the EU increased its commitment to state-building in BiH with Operation Althea, a peace mission involving nearly 7,000 troops from twenty-four EU and ten non-EU member states acting under a UN mandate. This was the EU's third, and largest, military operation to date. As with Concordia, Althea was another test of the Berlin Plus arrangement with NATO, and while there is no certainty that the EU would be able to handle a resumption of ethnic hostilities on a large scale in the country as occurred in the 1990s, the EU is much better equipped to handle such problems than it was just a decade ago. For the first time, the EU in BiH was able to draw on all instruments of foreign and security policy to achieve desired outcomes.

From June - September 2003, the EU led a second military mission, Operation Artemis, in the unstable Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the request of the UN. Here EU troops helped displaced persons return to their homes, helped re-open markets, protected refugee camps, secured the airport, and ensured the safety of civilians, UN employees, and humanitarian aid workers. Since the operation included troops from several non-EU states, the EU again demonstrated its ability to lead foreign troops in a

---

[3]The 'Berlin Plus' arrangement allows for 'assured access' to NATO planning capabilities, a 'presumption of availability' to the EU of NATO assets, and NATO European command support for EU-led operations. Berlin Plus discussions began in June 1996 but were not completed (and thus made operational) until December 2002.

military operation as it had done in Macedonia. Equally importantly, the EU also demonstrated for the first time its willingness and ability to initiate, plan, and execute a military operation *completely autonomously of NATO*. Perhaps even more importantly, EU forces engaged in several firefights with local militias and killed a couple of dozen militiamen. This fact demonstrates the EU's ability to not just threaten but to actually use deadly force, and to do so with the support of some of its supposedly neutral member states, such as Sweden.

Artemis was also an important test-case for the EU in terms of its great distance from the European theater and in terms of setting a precedent for future EU military operations organized independently of NATO. A follow-on CSDP mission, <u>EUFOR RD-Congo</u>, was deployed in 2006 using EU rapid reaction forces to provide security during the DRC's presidential and legislative elections. As with Artemis, this was an action done autonomously of NATO and thus independent of the Berlin Plus arrangement. The EU also led a follow-on police mission, <u>EUPOL-Kinshasa</u>, in 2005 to assist the DRC with establishing effective police programs; this was then supported by a smaller technical mission (the <u>DRC mission</u>) to assist the Ministry of Defense in reforming its administration and payments system and in integrating twelve brigades of the newly established Congolese army.

Finally, the EU has made several contributions to the Middle East peace process through its support for the Palestinian Authority (PA), among other efforts. The EU's police force in the PA region (<u>EUPOL-COPPS</u>) in 2005 aimed to help the PA establish an effective and modern civilian police force through advising, mentoring, and training police and judicial officials. Here the EU may have an important niche to fill in international security in ways complementary to other security providers involved in the Middle East peace process. Also in 2005 the EU agreed, in response to an invitation from Israel and the PA, to dispatch a

monitoring mission to provide a third-party presence at Rafah (EU BAM-Rafah) to monitor

the PA's performance, to contribute to the Palestinian capacity to monitor border control and

customs, and to contribute to the liaison between PA, Israeli, and Egyptian authorities.

Several other, smaller-scale, CSDP operations have provided additional experiences

for the EU draw upon. These include rule-of-law missions (to establish independent

judiciaries), monitoring missions (to oversee a ceasefire or border crossing), and technical aid

missions (to establish effective police and military forces). These missions, which have taken

place in Georgia, Iraq, Indonesia, Moldova, Sudan, and Ukraine, demonstrate increasing

confidence on the part of the EU, and on the part of those seeking assistance, in the EU's

ability to provide a range of security services. More recently, the EU has attempted its first-

ever CSDP naval operation, Operation Atalanta, to combat piracy and facilitate the delivery

of humanitarian aid in the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa. Atalanta (or EU NAVFOR)

has a mandate to deter and repress acts of piracy and robbery at sea, including within Somali

territorial waters. These goals indicate that the operation goes well beyond the traditional

Petersberg-type CSDP tasks (i.e.. humanitarian/rescue missions and peace operations) that

originally helped to justify an independent EU military capability in the 1990s, as Atalanta is

authorized to use violence on the high seas and within Somalia's territorial waters in order to

protect the EU's and its member states' own interests (maritime trade), in addition to

protecting the Somali population through the delivery of humanitarian aid (Germond and

Smith 2009).

Learning processes and lessons

Given this wide range of CSDP 'firsts' since 2003, it would indeed be surprising of

the EU did not engage in some degree of learning based on these experiences. However, this

commitment to learning can vary widely, from 'accidental' lesson-drawing on an *ad hoc*

basis to far more deliberate and formalized processes for improving performance. Based on the EU's functioning since the first CSDP mission in 2003, we can state quite conclusively that EFP elites in general, and CSDP personnel in particular, are developing a far more formalized approach to learning, although the degree of such formality still varies across EU organizations. By using 2003 as a baseline starting point, we can also demonstrate the creation of new procedures and institutional roles involving learning processes devoted to the improvement of CSDP functionality.

For the purposes of this chapter, I define 'institutional learning' as changes in an institution's functions, resource base, and skill set as a result of new information, observation, or experience. More specifically, such learning can be measured in terms of institutional changes across three major dimensions: responsibilities, rules, and resources. *Responsibilities* refers to the EU's own conception of its place in the world and the specific types of foreign/security policy missions that might reflect or advance its role. *Rules* refers to the institutional rules and organizational structures that govern a particular policy domain, in this case the CSDP. Finally, *resources* refers to both material and non-material assets the EU makes available to the CSDP as a policy tool. Material resources might include financing, personnel, and equipment provided by the EU or its member states; non-material resources might include the provision of best practices, progress reports, data sets, and other sources of knowledge relevant to the functioning of the CSDP.

Given the expansion and close involvement of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in several major CSDP operations since 2003, it is appropriate to begin our discussion with this body. The EUMS in fact has developed one of most sophisticated lessons-learned systems within all EU institutions involved in the CSDP. This system involves regular lessons-learned meetings among the key principals involved in every CSDP operation, as well as new organizational roles and responsibilities to oversee the lessons-learned processes. Further,

these individuals are not politicians or bureaucrats but tend to be well-trained professional experts with extensive experience in legal, policing, or military affairs. This experience also tends to involve some degree of familiarity in dealing with multilateral international cooperation (for example, past service in the UN system or NATO), and these individuals are keen to improve their skill sets to make the CSDP function better. The EU's mission to support African Union (AU) peacekeeping in Darfur (the AMIS mission), for example, led to a workshop in Brussels devoted to lessons-learned; it involved EU staff from the civilian and military parts of the system. This effort has been repeated with all other CSDP missions over the past few years, meaning that a post-mission lessons-learned debriefing process has been institutionalized within the EUMS and related offices in the Commission and Council General Secretariat. The EU's experience with the Artemis mission in the DRC also led it to create a 'Battlegroup concept', which provides a system of ready-response European multinational forces in various permutations.[4]

Many of the specific lessons or best practices drawn from these efforts are then incorporated into an increasingly sophisticated EUMS database, the 'Lessons Management Application' (LMA). The LMA has become a real knowledge base for information produced during specific CSDP operations to be applied to future tasks. It has generated well over 1,000 specific lessons for the EUMS, and is regularly updated with new data. In light of this information, the EUMS has improved its planning procedures to anticipate, rather than merely wait for, the kinds of CSDP missions that might be required in the short to medium term; this process also involves the generation of 'watch lists' for potential hotspots around the globe that might require an EU response. The watch lists are generated by a body created after 2006, the Single Integrated Analytical Capability, which then transforms the lists into

---

[4]A battlegroup is a form of rapid-response capacity-building, each one consisting of around 1,500 troops reinforced with combat support elements, including relevant air and naval capabilities, which can be launched on the ground within ten days after the EU decides to act.

'dossiers' for potential CSDP operations. This information is then coordinated with analysis generated by the EU's Situation Centre, another post-2003 innovation. With these mechanisms, all of which are dominated by intelligence professionals, the EUMS does not initiate or suggest CSDP operations, but offers advice on what the EUMS could contribute to handling a certain problem. This need to engage in planning much earlier in the process was a direct result of the Artemis operation in the DRC, which involved a very short timeline relative to most other CSDP missions (i.e., instigated in days/weeks rather than months).

The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, particularly various offices within Directorate General E (DG-E) for External and Political/Military Affairs, as well as the personal office of the High Representative, has also developed its own lessons-learned procedures. These however are not as institutionalized and centralized as those found in the EUMS, even though the EUMS is organizationally part of the Council of the EU. As DG-E directs civilian CSDP missions, it has had to adopt feedback mechanisms and standard operating procedures to avoid creating each new mission from scratch. Its approach to such missions is now far more systematic as opposed to the more *ad hoc* approach during 2003-05, and it is using a database of lessons similar to that adopted by the EUMS. The Council also coordinates its learning efforts with those of other EU actors; these procedures are reviewed on a six-month basis in light of lessons-learned reports and post-mission reports delivered by relevant participants in each CSDP mission. Finally, the creation of two new bodies in the Council – the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) mechanism and (later) the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) – were a direct result of the EU's growing experience in planning and executing various civilian CSDP operations, a capacity that grew on almost an 'accidental' basis since 2003 and required new structures to oversee it.

In addition to institutionalized lesson-learned procedures and organizational reforms, both the Council of the EU and the EUMS have conducted various exercises to improve their

performance; these involve both military and civilian/policing tasks.[5] Crisis management exercises involving planning capacities in Brussels have been instigated, partly to determine how much support individual EU member states could provide to a given problem. Policing exercises involve a 'rapid deployment of police elements' planning concept, followed by a training exercise to prepare the police officials who volunteer for CSDP operations. These efforts have produced better coordination with the military during such operations, especially in light of the EU's considerable experience in the Balkans. These exercises also give individual EU member states experience in leading a mission; as various CSDP missions have been led by a range of EU member states, any efforts to develop such experience could improve the EU's response capacity in the longer term. Moreover, the leadership candidates include not just the 'usual suspects' (i.e., the larger EU member states); they have included smaller states such as Lithuania (in the Georgia rule of law mission) and Finland/Sweden (in the Aceh monitoring mission). The involvement of 'officially' neutral EU member states in military CSDP operations (as with Swedish special forces operating in Artemis in the DRC) is similarly useful for providing foreign military experience to non-NATO EU member states.

The specific lessons generated by these new procedures and institutions are far too numerous to list in the scope of a single chapter, and many are actually classified. We can however report that they cover a wide range of operational tasks at all levels of analysis during a specific CSDP mission. For example, as with all CSDP operations, the EU has gained experience in negotiating Status of Forces Agreements and Host Nation Support Arrangements with the authorities where the CSDP operates, both of which can be delicate political issues for fragile host nations. More parochial lessons have involved the provision of medical care, evacuation procedures, and food supplies for mission staff, plus other

---

[5]Such as the Common Effort (2002) and MILEX (2005) exercises, among others.

logistical issues; this effort is partly due to the EU's experience of difficulties in relying on other organizations (such as the AU) for the overall chain-of-command in certain operations.

At the more organizational level, various CSDP missions have given the EU valuable experience in managing a security operation through the coordination of its European Community and CFSP/CSDP policy tools and the establishment of best policing and rule of law standards for future missions. As some of these operations have involved non-EU member states, the EU has become more adept at convincing third states to participate in its CSDP operations. One important side-effect of these learning and leadership efforts involves the EU's constant, even vigilant, desire to distinguish itself from other major players in international security, particularly the US. In fact, the demonstration effects of America's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have played an important role in how the EU thinks about, and plans for, its own CSDP operations. As more than one EU official put it, Europeans do not want to repeat the mistakes of others in developing this capability.

Towards the 'comprehensive approach'

The discussion above clearly indicates that formal learning procedures are in place, and that many institutional 'lessons' are being generated. But is this activity actually improving the functionality of the CSDP? And if so, do these lessons then improve perceptions of the EU's effectiveness and legitimacy with each new mission? Finally, is it possible to speak now of a 'Europeanization' of the CSDP policy domain, and/or a 'European approach' to conflict resolution and crisis management?

The evidence that the EU has been attempting to apply various lessons can be seen in terms of changes in responsibilities, rules, and resources as noted above. Regarding responsibilities, for example, the EU has taken a strong interest in stopping organized crime and corruption as a result of its CSDP experience. It has also attempted to improve the

16

coordination of its civil and military responsibilities during such operations, hence the

explicit combination of military and police forces within certain CSDP missions. Many

aspects of CSDP missions also involve teaching European standards to soldiers, police, and

legal officials, which requires some degree of self-reflection about what those standards are.

Regarding institutional rules, and in addition to the learning processes noted above, the EU

learned from early CSDP missions (particularly Concordia and Artemis) that it needed to

streamline its CSDP funding procedures where common-pool resources (that is, those not

funded by the Community budget) had to be devised; this realization directly led to the

institutionalization of the 'Athena' funding mechanism.[6] It was first applied in Operation

Althea in BiH, and was later followed by an additional mechanism, the Instrument for

Stability (IFS).[7]

Finally, regarding resources, the EU has improved its ideational inputs to the

development of the CSDP, as through the EU Institute for Security Studies, an EU think-tank

of independent policy experts which provides analysis and recommendations regarding the

EU's new security capabilities.[8] In addition to reports and working papers, the Institute

produces a regular 'CSDP Newsletter' and other publicly-available publications, which are

circulated among CSDP policy experts and which often document specific lessons drawn

from CSDP missions. The creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA) was similarly

intended to improve the EU's military resource base for CSDP missions by reducing

---

[6]As the EU budget cannot be used to fund military operations, the Athena facility (Council decision 2004/197/CFSP) provides for a common pool of financial and other resources supplied by EU member states. It speeds up the disbursement of funds and, critically, allows for contracts to be signed with sub-contractors and other suppliers of mission resources.

[7]Unlike the Athena mechanism, which involves intergovernmental contrictions, the IFS is a new Community budget line that helps to speed up the disbursement of funds controlled by the Commission in situations involving crisis management, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding.

[8]Formerly the WEU Institute for Security Studies; the EU assumed control of this Paris-based agency in January 2002.

duplicated efforts and facilitating joint research and procurement projects. The EU Satellite Center and related cooperation in intelligence-sharing further add to the EU's resources for CSDP operations. In what is another first for the EU, the creation of an 'CSDP College' helps to not only institutionalize the lessons learned regarding the EU's security capabilities, it also aids in the teaching of those lessons to both EU and non-EU nationals. In this sense the EU is already attempting to export its security-related knowledge to non-EU states in the form of a CSDP curriculum.

These changes can also be considered within the context of what the EU is now striving towards: not just a more active and effective CSDP, but rather something known as the 'comprehensive approach'. This involves a stress on preventative action using a full range of EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem. These tools would include military, policing, law, human rights, and economic development resources. One example of such an approach is the EU's mission in Eastern Chad/Central African Republic: <u>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</u>, the most multinational EU operation in Africa to-date, involving 3,700 troops. As many as 23 EU member states were represented in the operational headquarters (OHQ), while 16 EU member states were represented at the mission level in the theatre, and three non-EU member states participated. EUFOR Tchad worked not only to protect civilians and UN personnel but also to deliver humanitarian aid, build up the Africa Union as a regional security provider, support the return of refugees, and foster long-term political and economic development.

The comprehensive approach is therefore not just about improving functionality; it also has much to do with the EU's conception of itself as a responsible global actor. As more than one EU official put it, the EU is the 'acceptable face of Europe' in a manner unlike NATO (which is seen as too American and too aggressive), and the comprehensive (or 'European approach') to conflict resolution/crisis management problems is becoming the

EU's 'trademark' in international politics. EU insiders who have also worked for NATO (particularly those in the EUMS) also note a distinct difference between the two organizations: the EU simply engages in far more reflection and feedback about its global role as compared to NATO. The EU is also more developed in its support of policing/rule of law missions, which may be more important than military force for securing many troubled states. To develop this capacity, the EU has created a civilian crisis management capability[9] and a formal European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). [10] This is another capacity that the UN and NATO cannot readily provide.[11]

In this manner, the EU is able to provide a distinct 'rule of law covenant' to govern its missions in third countries, so that the entire process is subject to formal legal rules and some degree of democratic accountability. Police forces, in other words, are far more answerable to the legal jurisdictions in which they operate, whereas military forces can often invent or impose their own rules of engagement for a specific host country. Thus, and although military missions often receive the most attention by outside observers (including academics), the EU's comprehensive approach is likely to involve more policing and judicial resources rather than hard military power, and various weak or failing states have been looking to the EU for assistance in these areas. For example, gendarmerie forces are especially good for

---

[9]As decided by the Feira European Council in June 2000; also see the Council of the European Union, "Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference 2006," ministerial declaration (Brussels: 13 November 2006).

[10]While the EGF is currently comprised of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, it is open to all EU member states who possess police forces with military status. It is also clearly designed to be primarily at the disposal of the EU, with a mandate to perform police functions in crisis management operations under either civilian or military chain of command. The force will normally consist of up to 800 gendarmes (though up to 2,300 personnel with reinforcements) capable of deploying within 30 days. It opened its headquarters in Vicenza, Italy in January 2006.

[11]The US has conducted various exercises regarding closer civilian-military coordination in multinational peacekeeping operations (the Multinational Experiment exercises); however, its ability to project paramilitary or gendarmerie forces pales in comparison to that of the EU, even though it possesses a similar such force in the form of the US National Guard, which is commanded (during peacetime) by the governors of individual US states.

crowd control problems, which have the potential to escalate into more serious and violent acts if not handled with just the right amount of authority. And if a situation does grow out of control for policing forces, gendarmes can be quickly put under military control in the form of a more traditional peace enforcement operation. Police forces are also very useful for controlling organized crime groups, which often proliferate in weak or conflict-prone states.

Although various EU officials throughout the bureaucracy speak of the comprehensive approach, it does not (as of yet) involve a single model or 'one size fits all' approach. There is still a considerable degree of flexibility when individual CSDP missions go from the planning to the execution stages. Still, as the EU gains experience with working out the complex details of these operations, such as negotiating Status of Forces Agreements with host countries, it increasingly attempts to institutionalize and formalize these tasks to make them more consistent and streamlined. These efforts even extend to requiring more and more legal oversight of such arrangements, involving legal advice from both the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Legal officials in both bodies confirm that the drafting of CSDP documents has become easier and more consistent compared to the situation just a few years ago; for example, the drafting of the Aceh agreement was much more streamlined compared to the earlier CSDP missions in BiH. The Council legal service has similarly undertaken the use of 'preparatory measures' to quicken the planning/financing process; these measures can be implemented even before a final CSDP mission has been agreed.

Conclusion

Since 2003, the EU clearly has gained many new experiences in the CSDP, has made active efforts to draw lessons from its experiences, has catalogued various lessons, and has attempted to apply some of these lessons to ongoing CSDP missions. If we use 2003 as a

baseline year for comparison against CSDP performance in recent years, there is no doubt that a high degree of institutional learning has been occurring within EFP in general and the CSDP in particular. Thus, as measured against past performance during the 1980s and 1990s, the EU has come a *very* long way in terms of its foreign policy performance and its learning processes in this domain. In fact, it could be argued that there has been more dynamism and institutional innovation in this domain than in any other EU policy area in the past decade. Moreover, various EU insiders across the system consistently report their support for keeping the EU in the business of international security/crisis management; they also clearly believe that the EU can bring a unique capability to this domain despite the best efforts of the UN, NATO, and other international organizations.

However, when compared to other EU policy domains, the degree of Europeanization in the CSDP is still somewhat difficult to measure. If 'Europeanization' simply means a shift in the locus of policy-making from individual EU member states to Brussels-based EU organizations, then the CSDP is quite Europeanized, perhaps a score of seven or eight on a scale from one to ten. However, if one measures Europeanization primarily in terms of policy delegation to a supranational body (the Commission), the use of some form of majority voting within the Council, and reliance on the European Court of Justice to resolve disputes, then the Europeanization of the CSDP is still extremely limited – perhaps a score of two or three at best. In addition, EU member states are unlikely to pursue *any* of these three options when reforming CSDP decision-making procedures in the near future, so EU policy elites will have to increasingly resort to other consensus-building mechanisms, such as networking and learning, to improve CSDP performance. These methods have their limitations, as can be seen with various implementation problems in the conduct of CSDP operations, such as a lack of adequate resources, failure to use Battlegroups for CSDP missions, ongoing problems with civilian-military coordination, bureaucratic disputes over

lines of authority in the CSDP, and the failure to develop a stronger OHQ in Brussels to oversee CSDP operations (among other problems). The Treaty of Lisbon is supposed to solve some of these problems, but at present the Treaty seems only to have fanned the flames of inter-institutional conflict as various EU bureaucracies work out their roles in the new CFSP/CSDP architecture. This situation, it seems, has now produced a kind of 'holding pattern' for the CSDP while the bugs are worked out of the new system, which is likely to require several years (Smith 2011b).

Despite these limitations, the EU clearly has shown a capacity to innovate in security affairs, in terms of the overall expansion of CSDP operations, the EU's evolving civilian crisis management capability, and the decision to develop mechanisms such the Athena facility, the IFS, an EGF, and others. By helping to fill the 'security gap' between major combat operations and the resumption of normal government operations in failing, war-torn, or crisis-prone states, these missions clearly have political impact on the host states and on other state and global security providers (Ginsberg and Smith 2007). The expansion of this capability, and its links with other EU policy tools, could be the EU's most important and unique contribution to international security affairs. The EU is thus filling a niche as a unique actor in the sense that its forces, always invited by the host government, mandated by the UN, or invited by another regional security organization, are viewed as a source of humanitarian aid and civil society building rather than as self-interested occupiers or invaders. Moreover, given that CSDP operations are not those of a single state, and given the EU's reputation as one of the world's leading democratic regional bodies, demand for CSDP missions is likely to increase thanks to the EU's own legitimacy and appeal in the eyes of those seeking security assistance.

Appendix of key dates

1970   Creation of EPC to facilitate consultation on foreign policy issues.

1973   Copenhagen Report on EPC allows coordination of common foreign policies.

1981   London Report on EPC allows discussion of 'political aspects' of security issues.

1986   Single European Act allows discussion of 'political and economic aspects' of security issues.

1991-93   CFSP replaces EPC and enters into force along with the rest of the Treaty on European Union; EU now able to discuss a wide range of security and defence issues.

1997-2000   Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice lay further groundwork for a CSDP capacity in the guise of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

2003   First ESDP mission (EUPM in BiH); first ESDP military mission/first test of the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement (Concordia).

2004   First ESDP rule-of-law mission (EUJUST Themis).

2005   First ESDP border monitoring mission (EUBAM Rafah).

2008   First ESDP naval mission (EUNAVFOR Atalanta).

2009   Treaty of Lisbon enters into force; ESDP re-named the CSDP; EU begins creating a European External Action Service.

Bibliography

Anderson, Stephanie and Thomas R. Seitz (2006). "European Security and Defense Policy Demystified," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 33.

Art, Robert J. (1996). "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111.

Cawthra, Gavin and Robin Luckham (eds)(2003). *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*. Zed Books.

Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards (2001). "Identifying the Development of an EU 'Strategic Culture,'" *International Affairs*, Vol. 77.

Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (2006). "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration," *International Organization*, Vol. 60.

Germond, Basil, and M.E. Smith (2009). "Re-thinking European security interests and the CSDP: Explaining the EU's anti-piracy operation," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30/3: 573-93.

Giegerich, Bastian, and William Wallace (2004). "Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces," *Survival*, Vol.46.

Ginsberg, Roy H. (1989). *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale*. Lynne Rienner.

Ginsberg, Roy H. and Michael E. Smith (2007). "Understanding the European Union as a global political actor: Theory, practice, And Impact," in Kate McNamara and Sophie Meunier (eds.), *The State of the European Union, Vol. 8*. Oxford University Press.

Glaser, Charles L. (1993). "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 18.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane (eds.)(1993). *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Cornell University Press.

Gordon, Philip H. (1997-98). "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 22.

Haas, Ernst B. (1990). *When Knowledge Is Power*. University of California Press.

Hoffman, Stanley (2000). "Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38.

Howorth, Jolyon (2007). *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. Palgrave.

Jones, Seth G. (2007). "The European Union and the Security Dilemma," *Security Studies*, Vol. 12.

Kagan, Robert (2003). *America vs. Europe in the New World Order.* Knopf.

Levitt, Barbara and James G. March (1988). "Organizational Learning," *Annual Review of Sociology* 14.

Levy, Jack S. (1994). "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization,* Vol. 48.

Magone, José M. (2006). *The New World Architecture: The Role of the European Union in the Making of Global Governance*. Transaction.

McCormick, John (2006). *The European Superpower*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Meyer, Christoph O. (2005). "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11.

Osland, Kari M. (2004). "The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11.

Pape, Robert A. (2005). "Soft Balancing Against the United States," *International Security*, Vol. 30.

Paul, T.V. (2005). "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," *International Security*, Vol. 30.

Penska, Susan E. (2006). "Mandates, Decisionmaking Structures, and Individuals: The Implementation of CSDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2003-2006," Centre for European Policy Studies Working Paper. Brussels.

Piana, Claire (2002). "The EU's Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7.

Posen, Barry R. (2006). "European Union Security and Defense Policy: A Response to Unipolarity?," *Security Studies*, Vol. 15.

Sjursen, Helene (2006). "What Kind of Power?," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13.

Smith, Michael E. (2011a). "A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose, and the EU's Changing Global Role," *Journal of European Public Policy*, forthcoming.

Smith, Michael E. (2011b). "Building the European External Action Service: Institutional Learning versus Intergovernmental and Bureaucratic Politics." Paper prepared

for delivery at the conference The Lisbon Treaty Evaluated: Impact and Consequences. London: 31 January-1 February 2011.

Smith, Michael E. (2003). *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*. Cambridge University Press.

Solana, Javier (2003). *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (EU Institute for Security Studies).

Ulriksen, Ståle, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace (2004). "Operation *Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?*," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11.

Whitman, Richard (1998). *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union*. Palgrave-Macmillan.

Yee, Albert S. (1996). "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies." *International Organization*, Vol. 50.