Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, a wave of New Regionalism can be observed in various parts of the world. Surprisingly, many regional integration schemes emerged in the southern hemisphere among developing countries although the preconditions for successful integration are allegedly less favourable compared to the developed ‘North’. While regionalism in the ‘South’ has nevertheless come into existence, the dynamics of establishing, maintaining and deepening institutionalised regional cooperation seem to be unstable in several integration schemes despite an unchanged regional environment. Against the structural background of relatively weak intra-regional and strong, asymmetric extra-regional (economic) interdependence of most southern countries, external actors are likely to wield influence on regional integration projects in the ‘South’ by affecting their member states’ preferences and the institutions’ effectiveness. Referring to cooperation theory and the situation-structural approach, this paper explains in a theory-driven manner the dynamics and (non)success of institutionalised regional cooperation in the ‘South’ by taking additionally the potential positive/ negative impact of extra-regional actors into account. In Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a promising example of South-South regionalism that focuses besides the economic realm particularly on regional security cooperation. SADC does not only undertake confidence-building measures on regional level but has also become involved in regional conflict mediation. In the empirical part, reference is made to short case studies focussing on military exercises, conflict management in Lesotho (1998) and Madagascar (2009), and the SADC Standby Force. The paper argues that the various degree of success of institutionalised regional security cooperation in SADC depends not only on South Africa as the regional hegemon but also on the support of major extra-regional actors such as particularly the European Union as chief donor.

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1. **Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War and in the course of globalisation, a wave of New Regionalism (Hettne, 1999; Robson, 1993) has given rise to the birth and revival of regional organisations in various parts of the world. Many of these organisations were created among developing countries in the southern hemisphere (e.g. ASEAN, COMESA, ECOWAS, Mercosur, and SADC) and most put a focus on regional market integration and security cooperation as measures to cope the challenges of globalisation and foster socio-economic development.

In Africa, the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) is probably one of the most constant, realistic and promising examples of this New Regionalism (Mair and Peters-Berries, 2001; Weiland, 2006). Founded in 1992, SADC is the successor organisation of the *Southern African Development Coordination Conference* (SADCC) which historically roots back to the *Front Line States* (FLS)\(^1\) alliance. Both of SADC’s predecessor organisations, established by black majority-ruled countries in 1980 respectively 1974, aimed to reduce economic dependence from South Africa and coordinate security policies\(^2\), infrastructure projects and the inflow of international donors’ money in their struggle against the belligerent Apartheid regime(s). The FLS alliance, though rather weakly institutionalised, can be regarded as nucleus for any subsequent regional security cooperation arrangements in Southern Africa (Khadiagala, 2007).

Today, SADC consists of 15 member states\(^3\) and covers an area of about 10 million km\(^2\) with a population of ca. 250 million inhabitants. Most members – despite Botswana, Mauritius, the Seychelles and South Africa – are classified as least or less developed countries. The Republic of South Africa (RSA), joining SADC in 1994, is the only substantially industrialised nation and the regional economic powerhouse. In 2001, institutional reforms shifted the rather inefficient decentralised character of the organisation gradually towards more centralisation as the dispersed Sector Coordination Units were bundled into four directorates\(^4\) and located at the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone (Oosthuizen, 2006; Vogt, 2006).

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1. The FLS alliance formed in 1976 and dissolved after the demise of Apartheid in South Africa in 1994. To the end, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe were members to this weakly institutionalised organisation (Khadiagala, 2007; Malan, 1998: 2).
2. While the author recognises the debate on the definition and scope of security (Owen, 2004), this paper explicitly takes a state-centric perspective and focuses on state-security. This does not mean to neglect aspects of human security but seems to be adequate for this theory-driven analysis of SADC since the organisation and its member states traditionally focussed on state-security (Hammerstad, 2003; Hentz, 2009).
3. These are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, Madagascar is currently suspended from the organisation due to the recent military putsch.
4. These are namely the *Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment* (TIFI), the *Infrastructure and Service* (IS), the *Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources* (FANR) and the *Social and Human Development and Special Programmes* (SHDSP) directory (Oosthuizen, 2006: 200-204).
2007). These recent dynamics seem to justify SADC’s claim to be the most important and vibrant regional integration scheme in Southern Africa.

With regard to regional security cooperation, which will be in the focus of this work as one facet of a comprehensive approach to regional integration, SADC has shown a process of formalisation and considerable institutional dynamics. The Organisation made particularly progress by creating an *Organ on Politics, Defence and Security* (OPDS) in 1996, adopting a *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation* and reforming the OPDS in 2001, and approving the guidelines of the *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ* (SIPO) in 2004. While confidence building measures and common military exercises of SADC can be judged as major success, the organisation’s regional military interventions, conflict mediation efforts show rather a mixed picture of performance (Cawthra, 2010; Ngoma, 2005). With regard to the envisaged training and deployment of the *SADC Standby Force* (SSF), the initially promising progress has even turned into gradual paralysis (van Nieuwkerk, 2011: 182).

The institutional dynamics, deadlock and varying degrees of success of institutionalised regional security cooperation in SADC are quite surprising, because the overall security situation within southern Africa does not seem to have significantly changed since 1994. The paper aims to address this puzzle by addressing the following questions: What explains progress, effectiveness and disturbance of institutionalised regional security cooperation in SADC? If regional circumstances remain the same, do perhaps external actors have a positive or negative impact in this respect?

Building on illustrative case studies referring to military exercises, conflict management efforts in Lesotho (1998) and Madagascar (2009), and the SADC Standby Force, the paper analyses in a theory-driven manner the progress and effectiveness of central parts of SADC’s institutionalised regional security cooperation by taking the impact of external actors explicitly into account. The author argues that the success of regional cooperation efforts is not only dependent on preferences of South Africa as the region’s powerhouse, but to a significant degree additionally influenced by important external actors, particularly the *European Union* (EU).

2. **Theorising Regionalism and Security Cooperation**

The recent debate on regionalism in comparison and regional integration outside Europe was mainly pursued against the background of New Regionalism theory, interregionalism and the varying mechanisms of diffusion. While these contributions and insights were particularly fruitful with regard to the aspects of external facilitation of regional integration organisations
(e.g. Börzel, 2009a; Weiland, 2006), they nevertheless did not focus on the potentially disturbing effects of external actors to this process. This paper aims to expand the scope of research on regionalisms by centring upon the issue area of regional security cooperation and taking the influence of extra-regional actors explicitly into account.

2.1. The Situation Structural Approach and Regional Security Cooperation

Regionalism, Cooperation Theory and Security

Regions can be understood as supranational subsystems within the international system, whose constituents are states that are geographically close and share some degree of interdependence (Hettne, 2005: 544). Narrowing the scope to the issue area of security, this implies the prevalence of significant security relations among the states in the specific regional setting, i.e. a security complex (Buzan, 1992: 168). Following this understanding, regionalism\(^5\) can be interpreted as a planned, multilateral, and state-led organisation of interdependence within a confined regional space that gives rise to a cluster of various, multidimensional, or specific regional cooperation projects and accompanying institutions (Bach, 2003: 22).

Regional organisations represent the superstructure of those formal institutions, which are composed of the member states and bound by their territorial dimensions. The demand for international and regional cooperation is caused by the structure of the international system and inherent cooperation problems, which arise from complex interdependence between states. International institutions provide a solution in this respect and help to overcome cooperation problems by various means (Keohane, 1982, 1984; Müller, 1993). Rational utility-maximising actors will refrain from unilateral behaviour and are incited to engage in institutionalised mutual cooperation, provided that (expected) related benefits surpass the payoff of an uncoordinated \textit{status quo} (Hurrell, 1995a; Keohane, 1984: 15). In case of their effectiveness, the regulative elements of a regional integration scheme’s institutions may add to the welfare, stability, peace and security – i.e. development in the broader sense – of the region and its member states (Rittberger and Zürn, 1990: 90-91).

The nexus between the issue area of security and the aforementioned theoretical considerations becomes evident if one takes an institutionalist’s point of view. Firstly, security problems in international relations are based on security interdependence and can be interpreted as ‘problematic situations’ in accordance with the situation structural approach

\(^5\) The term \textit{regional integration} will be applied in a similar manner as \textit{regionalism} although it can either refer to a static or dynamic state of affairs (Bach, 2003: 22; Hurrell, 1995b: 334).
and its typology (Wallander et al., 1999: 6-8; Zürn, 1992, 1993). Most prominent and extensively discussed is the concept of the security dilemma in this respect (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978, 1982). It reminds of a classical prisoners’ dilemma and describes a situation where states face a constant military threat – or at least security risks – due to uncertainty and mutual lack of information about the military capabilities and intentions of others. A costly arms race or even an unwanted armed conflict could be the consequence (Wallander and Keohane, 1999: 25-29).

Although realists hold the view that international cooperation in security matters – an assumed issue area of ‘high politics’ – will only materialise in the form of ad hoc alliances or as a result of hegemonic coercion in an international self-help system (Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1980; Kindleberger, 1981), proponents of institutionalist theory argue that security problems referring to threat or risk are rather collective action or coordination problems which generate common interest and can be solved with the help of institutions. Similar to international regimes based on norms, principles and rules (Krasner, 1976), security arrangements and security management institutions can reduce uncertainty by providing transparency and information (Jervis, 1982). They help to extend the ‘shadow of the future’, offer an arena and framework for consultations, facilitate policy coordination and ideally promote and reward cooperative behaviour among its members. Thus, regional security institutions can help to achieve Pareto-superior outcomes for all regional actors involved (Müller, 1993: Chap. 6; Rittberger and Zürn, 1991; Wallander and Keohane, 1999).

The Situation Structural Approach – in due Consideration of External Actors

Drawing on game and cooperation theory (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993; Taylor, 1987), this paper adopts a situation structural approach as analytical tool to explain the emergence of non-hierarchic, institutionalised international cooperation (Zürn, 1992, 1993). This theoretical framework suits perfectly for the analysis of regionalism beyond the Europe because it can easily claim universal validity. In contrast to mainstream integration theories like Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) or Neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958), the situation structural approach was not designed against the background of the European integration process and consequently has no inherent Euro-centric bias.

According to Zürn, a problematic situation, i.e. a cooperation problem, in international relations is the necessary precondition for states to engage in mutually benefiting institutionalised cooperation that leads to Pareto-improvement. The situation structural approach distinguishes several ideal types of problematic situations that imply various
degrees of conduciveness to institutionalised cooperation: Cooperation is comparably easy to achieve in situations corresponding to coordination and insurance games, while it is more difficult in dilemma-type situations and most difficult in so-called ‘Rambo’ games. The structure of the underlying cooperation problem principally determines whether regional cooperation is feasible and how strong the demand for regulative institutions will eventually become (Zürn, 1992, 1993).

Against this background, the situation structural model additionally assumes that (intervening) context variables can have an effect on the likeliness that institutionalised regional cooperation will occur. They are particularly meaningful in mixed motives games, such as dilemma, or ‘Rambo’ type situations, because these collective action problems have no salient solutions and rational utility-maximising actors are highly unlikely to follow a cooperative strategy ab initio. Among many, ‘power’ is probably the most pivotal context variable since it is not least a key aspect in international relations. It will consequently deserve exclusive consideration in this paper’s analysis (Zürn, 1993: 70-71).

Relative power distribution among actors can significantly influence the occurrence and character of institutionalised cooperation. It particularly comes into effect in actors’ negotiations over second-order problems, resembling to coordination games with distributional effect (Zangl, 1994: 284-287). Power distribution can be deduced from the character of overall – and especially issue-area specific – asymmetric interdependence between the actors involved. This structural aspect determines the bargaining power of negotiators because it indicates their plausibility of ‘threat of non-agreement’ based on the availability of attractive unilateral policy alternatives and exit-options (Hirschmann, 1945: 16) (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Referring to international relations on regional level, states in a central position – i.e. to which others are dependent on – will have a relatively strong power position and consequently will be essential cornerstones in any regional organisation; they can foster or inhibit the process of regional integration and may hinge their willingness to cooperate on compromises and concessions of their weaker regional partners (Gehring, 1994: 216; Zürn, 1993: 70).

According to the aforementioned assumptions, one could argue that regional security cooperation in the so-called South⁶ basically follows the same logic and faces similar constraints as in the developed northern hemisphere – e.g. Europe. However, this is only

⁶ The term ‘South’ encompasses regions with predominantly developing, non-industrialised countries in the southern hemisphere. In an outdated diction it would refer to all countries of the so-called Third World. Today several emerging powers are surely amongst them. In this paper, the usage of the term ‘South’ has no normative connotation and does not refer to system or dependency theories (Söderbaum and Stålgren, 2010: 2).
partially true, because it would mean to neglect distinct structural conditions to which many countries and regions in the South – southern Africa in particular – are exposed to. It is not only the specific structure of economic interdependence, where southern countries generally exhibit substantial asymmetric extra-regional economic relations to third actors, which obviously distinguishes the South from the North (Krapohl and Muntschick, 2009; Muntschick, 2009). A similar pattern can often be observed in the issue area of security and with regard to military and security interdependence. States and organisations in the northern hemisphere, particularly (consisting of) Western great powers, are generally considered to be by far more powerful than their less developed southern counterparts when it comes to *inter alia* strength of armed forces, absolute military capabilities and defence spending. The relational aspect of this asymmetry becomes even more obvious if one takes the one-sided military aid flows, presence and strongholds of external forces, and related (institutionalised) external strategic interests between former (northern) colonial masters and their formerly colonised (southern) dependencies into account (Crocker, 1974; Gregory, 2000; Keohane, 1990: 38). Be it a legacy of colonialism or not, this structural ‘background variable’ is in any case assumed to have significant impact on the character and dynamics of institutionalised regional cooperation and integration in the South (Young, 1969: 727).

Apparently, countries in the global South are in a range of issue areas more likely to approach their genuine regional problematic situations against a shadow of strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence:

With regard to economic issue area, political economists argue that this structural pattern will stimulate block-building and regional integration efforts among developing countries with respect to their economies in order to reduce dependency and cope with global markets (Schirm, 2002; Winters, 1999). While this assumption is certainly correct to some degree, it is nevertheless only half of the story: In case of prevalence of the assumed asymmetric character of economic interdependence between the South and the North, actors in the latter region will occupy a position that allows them to exert influence on the nature and dynamics of regional economic cooperation in their ‘dependent’ southern counterparts. This can potentially have an interfering – or even negative – impact on the process of regional integration in the South as *inter alia* the example of the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and SADC’s stalled plans to form a customs union has given proof of (Muntschick, 2010).

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7 All risks and threats to national security have the common feature that states are interdependent so that any unit can cause negative security externalities that affect others. Security interdependence is primarily based on (reciprocal) perceptions of rivalry, threat and fear that are intensified by uncertainty (Buzan, 1992: 170).
A similar logic can be assumed with regard to the issue area of security. Extra-regional threat and a strong asymmetric imbalance in security relations towards a powerful and potentially hostile third actor can be conducive to the formation of regional security institutions – particularly defence alliances – among assumingly weaker countries. External support to regional institution building by financial or logistic means can produce similar effect and facilitate regional security cooperation amongst actors who are unsure about cooperative gains and consequently back off from initial costs – or simply cannot afford them (Klingebiel, 2005). However, similar to the field of economy, a prevalence of strong asymmetric interdependence between countries in a southern region and more powerful extra-regional actors is likely to provide the latter with a potential influence on regional security affairs and the nature and dynamics of accompanying institutions. Similarly, this can have an interfering – or even negative – impact on the process of regional security cooperation in the South. The stumbling process of European security integration gives a convincing example of the latter logic: The EU’s efforts to form a profound and operational common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are probably not successful as long as most countries regard defence cooperation within NATO, i.e. the USA in a broader sense, more beneficial than a purely regional, i.e. European, institution (Howorth, 2007: Chap. 5). The readiness of Poland and the Czech Republic in permitting the US to build facilities of a missile defence shield on their territories against the will of the EU furthermore highlights the meaning of external actors and attractive bilateral cooperation in this context.

Amplifying the scope of the present theoretical and analytical framework, the following additional assumptions on institutionalised regional security cooperation and integration in the South unfold:

Firstly, strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence between one or more regional parties and third, external actors can change the inherent structure of a genuine regional problematic situation towards a more cooperation aversive situation and thus impede the solution of a regional collective action problem. This is e.g. the case if a genuine dilemma-type situation is transformed into a ‘Rambo’-type structure with those actors being the uncooperative ‘Rambos’ on regional level who have attractive extra-regional alternatives at their disposal (Axline, 1994: 26). In practice, this can be the case when regional actors with strong extra-regional relations prefer to cooperate with promising external parties instead of initiating, maintaining, or intensifying integration within their less promising region.

The presence of strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence, however, can principally also become conducive to the formation of regional cooperation projects if third
parties are acting altruistically and assist to overcome collective action problems by e.g. providing side payments, increasing cooperative payoffs, reducing costs of implementation and compliance, and improving institutional functionality (Axline, 1994: 24-25; Burns and Buckley, 1974). A genuine dilemma-type or even ‘Rambo’-type situation can thus be mitigated to a more conducive situation, i.e. coordination game with distributive conflict, with external inflows constituting a common pool resource. In practice, this can be the case when external actors make the provision of financial or logistical resources conditional on the existence of regional cooperation efforts or the existence of regional institutions or organisations. Regional actors become thus enticed to cooperate because cooperation gains are significantly fuelled from outside the region.

Secondly, strong extra-regional interdependence between one or more regional parties and external actors can alter the conditions of interaction on the problem solving level during regional interstate negotiations. Strong extra-regional relations can improve a state’s regional bargaining power position, since this implies that additional alternative policy strategies and plausible exit-options beyond the scope of the region could be available. However, the potential impact of extra-regional actors on genuine regional issues is most notably amplified by their influence permeating to the level of second-order problems. In practice, this is the case when regional actors take positions in regional interstate negotiations that are significantly motivated by external actors and their means of pressuring or enticing.

2.2. Synopsis: Assumptions and Hypotheses

Against the background of the theoretical framework, the major assumptions on regional security cooperation in the South unfold as follows:

- Institutionalised regional security cooperation is likely if the structure of the genuine regional problematic situation is reminiscent of a dilemma-type, assurance- or even coordination game. Cooperation and the emergence of regional institutions are not likely in situations resembling to the ‘Rambo’ type.
- In case of a prevailing strong asymmetric intraregional interdependence among the involved states on regional level, the state in a relative power position will be able to influence the design and fortune of the regional integration project.

In a nutshell: The emergence, design, and dynamics of regional integration in general – and regional security cooperation in particular – in the South will basically follow the same logic as in other parts of the world as long as (potentially prevailing) extra-regional relations do not
become relevant. Derived from the assumptions outlined above, the core hypothesis from what I call the internal line of the argument consequently reads as follows:

- Regional integration in the South is the more likely and successful, the more the underlying cooperation problem resembles a dilemma-type, assurance- or even coordination game and the more it is in the interest and promoted by a regional power.

However, states in the South often exhibit a structural characteristic of strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence which would put external actors in a position to potentially exert influence on regional integration efforts in southern regions. Consequently, this characteristic has to be considered: Taking it as intervening context variable – similar to the aspect of power (Zürn, 1992) – into account, the following assumptions on regional security cooperation in the South can be added:

- A prevalence of strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence between southern countries and extra-regional actors will make institutionalised regional cooperation in the South in general less likely, because the structure of genuine regional problematic situations is more likely to show characteristics of ‘Rambo’ games.
- The stronger the asymmetric extra-regional interdependence attributed to the involved southern actors, the less a state in a southern country in a relative regional power position will be able to influence the process of institutionalisation of a regional integration project in the South.

In a nutshell: The emergence, design, and dynamics of regional integration in general – and regional security cooperation in particular – in the South is assumingly subject to external influence and more difficult to achieve in case southern states exhibit strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence. Derived from the assumptions outlined above, the core hypotheses from what I call the external line of the argument consequently read as follows:

- Regional integration in the South is principally exposed to an (interfering) influence of external actors and consequently less likely to be successful, if southern states exhibit the structural characteristic of strong asymmetric extra-regional interdependence.
- In case of an overlapping or conflicting parallelism of strong (asymmetric) intraregional and strong (asymmetric) extra-regional interdependence associated with southern states involved, the institutionalisation and fortune of regional integration will depend on the regional actors’ payoffs: Success is likely if the regional actors’ benefits attributed to the regional club-good will outweigh those of available extra-regional arrangements; it is less likely to be successful in case of the opposite.

The principal demand for regional security cooperation will be generally deduced from structural characteristics of security interdependence within the SADC region and furthermore highlighted on the basis of official documents and expert interviews.

Before the mid-1990s, black majority-ruled states in southern Africa were facing a problematic security situation reminding of an assurance game: commitment, i.e. mutual (military) assistance, had to be ensured and coordinated among FLS/SADCC members in case that the common enemy, the Apartheid regime of South Africa, conducted sabotage or armed attacks on a fellow country in the course of its destabilising and devastating Total Strategy (Ngoma, 2005: 96). In line with the assumptions of the situation structural approach concerning problematic situations reminding of assurance games (Zürn, 1992) demand for regional security cooperation led to the creation of rather informal and loosely institutionalised bodies within the FLS and the SADCC, mainly the ISCDs and its subordinated committees (Khadiagala, 2007).

With the accession of South Africa to SADC after the demise of Apartheid in 1994, the character of regional security interdependence significantly changed because Pretoria was not anymore perceived as only and immediate threat to the rest of the countries in the region. Consequently, the problematic situation of an assurance game vanished and other reasons for the demand for regional security came to the fore. Remarkably enough, the changing security situation in southern Africa was consimilar to the situation in Europe and the West after the downfall of the Communist Block and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. With the omission of the external threat and common enemy, similarly NATO’s and European tasks changed and institutionalised cooperation focussed on other/new security challenges.

After the demise of Apartheid and militarised black-white antagonism in southern Africa, regional security was not primarily challenged from an ‘external’ actor anymore. Instead, internal threats accruing from inter-state tensions, border disputes, distrust, uncertainty and political instability gained importance (Ressler, 2007: 82-88). Furthermore, in the course of liberation struggles, decolonisation and civil wars, several SADC-states (i.e. Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe) were still rather militarised and had oversized armed forces at disposal. This fuelled uncertainty and caused anxiousness and negative security externalities – occasionally military build-up – among neighbours. Not last,
majority-ruled South Africa itself remained a proximate cause for regional insecurity due to its sheer size and advanced military power (Vale, 1996: 364-366).

Since states in southern Africa face similar threats and shared a common interest of joint survival and prosperity, the underlying problematic situation in terms of regional security reminds soonest of a prisoners’ dilemma, i.e. a classical security dilemma, past the demise of South African Apartheid in 1994. Despite the fact that regional security challenges are surely not only military in nature (van Nieuwkerk, 2011: 180-181), the pattern of security relations in the SADC region gives surely plausible reasons for rational actors to aim at regional cooperation and an establishment of corresponding institutions that can handle classical security issues.

3.1. The long Shadow of the Table Mountain: South Africa as Hegemon in SADC

The character of security and military relations within the SADC region reveals a clear picture of asymmetric intraregional interdependence. Since colonial times and during the time of Apartheid, South Africa was the most powerful country in the region and was in command of comparably large, well-trained and well-equipped armed forces. In the mid-1990s, South Africa had the second largest military forces in the region and was only surpassed by Angola – a country entangled in civil war by that time. Besides the DRC\(^8\), Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, most countries in the region did not have – and still do not have – sizable armies but rather small defence forces or militias.\(^9\)

Concerning the quality of equipment, firing power and drill of personal, South Africa and Angola are the only countries in the SADC region that have a comparably high degree of military capability. Furthermore, South Africa remains the only country with significant airlift capacity which adds to its status as supreme regional power because its troops are comparably mobile and easily deployable. A similar disparity applies with regard to South Africa’s and other SADC-members’ naval power and sphere of action. Zimbabwe, by the mid-1980s in command over a relatively huge, well equipped and modern military\(^10\) which was neither heavily engaged nor exhausted in civil wars, was the spearhead of the FLS/SADCC as the economical and military hegemon among the black-majority ruled nations in Southern Africa at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the country’s military strength has contracted during

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\(^8\) The significant strength of armed forces in 2011 is based on the mobilisation caused by the recent/partially ongoing civil war and not an expression of the regular army’s strength.

\(^9\) Annex: Figure 2).

\(^10\) Zimbabwe had an immense military power at independence in 1980 as the Defence Force had strength of about 130,000 men. To the end of the 1980s it was reduced to 50,000 soldiers but remained by the largest army in the region (Adar and Onyango, 2002: 268, 275, 277).
the past years of economic crisis and it ranks today among countries with rather limited military capabilities (Meinken, 2005; Ressler, 2007: 101-106).

Looking at military expenditures in absolute terms, the picture of intraregional asymmetry in terms of military capability becomes consolidated. In the mid-1990s, South Africa defence budget was with 3,251.0 million US-$ in the regional lead and more then three times larger than Angola’s, which had the second biggest with about 963 million US-$. Besides Zimbabwe, virtually all other countries in the SADC region had comparably small defence budgets at that time. In 2009, South Africa remains the country with most absolute military expenditures in the region although Angola’s defence budget has become nearly as large as Pretoria’s. In general, all other SADC countries exhibit same as in 1995 comparably insignificant military expenditures although virtually all budgets have slightly increased. The outstanding exception is Zimbabwe, where economic crisis is likely to have led to a strong decrease of the defence budget. Data on military expenditures as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are comparably less informative but reveal that particularly Zimbabwe and Angola dedicated large amounts of their national budget to their military and defence forces in 1995. In 2009, all countries spend less than 5 percent of their GDP for their armed forces but Angola is still in the lead with 4.2 %. In sum, particularly absolute military expenditure corresponds to the force levels and capabilities of states’ armies and can be regarded as casual factor for the operational capability and overall strength.11

Against the background of the selected criteria and indicators, the asymmetric character of military and security interdependence in the SADC region clarifies a monocentric pattern of relative power distribution in this issue area with the RSA undisputedly at the centre of gravity: Pretoria was and remains today the military great power in regional terms.12 This observation is underpinned by the fact that South Africa is the only SADC country with a technologically advanced and modern arms industry which provides a certain degree of autarky (Ressler, 2007). It even allowed the country to temporarily become a nuclear power (Venter, 2008). Zimbabwe and Angola can be regarded as regional middle powers with decreasing respectively increasing military capabilities in regional terms.

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11 Annex: Figures 3).
12 South Africa’s hegemonic position in the region becomes more evident if one takes the intraregional asymmetry in the economic issue area into account: Roughly half of SADC states’ intraregional trade share exceeds the volumes traded with extra-regional actors (Muntschick, 2009), Annex: Figure 1). Considering foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, the situation is similar: Pretoria provides the major share of FDI to the entire region and was the top foreign investor in seven SADC countries between 1994 and 2003. In a nutshell, intraregional economic relations in the SADC are highly asymmetric and the pattern is of ‘hub-and-spoke’ character with South Africa – as regional economic powerhouse – in the centre (McCarthy, 1998: 79).
3.2. The long Shadow of the Alps: The EU as noteworthy Donor for some of SADC’s Regional Security Cooperation Projects

After the successful liberation struggles and the following decolonisation of southern Africa, the newly independent countries in the region do not exhibit notable security relations, military linkages or (bilateral) defence agreements to former colonial powers or other extra-regional actors. Furthermore, an absence of extra-regional powers’ military or bases distinguishes the countries in southern Africa from e.g. some of their counterparts in West Africa where France continues to maintain bilateral military cooperation agreements and is suspected to occasionally interfere in national affairs (Gregory, 2000). Thus, regional security cooperation efforts in the SADC region are supposedly not to be directly affected – particularly not negatively or interfered – by member countries’ institutionalised security or military relations with third, extra-regional actors.

However, the old SADCC and today’s SADC have traditionally strong relations to extra-regional donor countries. SADCC was very successful in attracting and coordinating donors’ funds and its projects were nearly entirely financed by extra-regional actors. After the organisation’s transformation, about 80% of the costs of total internal SADC projects were financed by external donors between the years 1992 and 2002 (Odén, 2000: 255, 261). In 2006/07, nearly 60% of SADC’s whole budget of about 46 million US-$ was financed by external actors, namely the through EU and Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs) of individual EU member countries. The rest was procured by SADC members, to the most part South Africa (Tjønneland, 2006: 2). In general, Europe has taken a favourable position on regional integration efforts in the South. The EU is keen to spread its own model of political stability and socioeconomic prosperity (Börzel and Risse, 2009b; Börzel and Risse, 2009a) and strongly supports regionalism in SADC politically and financially.

In 2004, the EU has additionally established the African Peace Facility (APF) in response to the African Union’s (AU) creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The later designates the AU’s mandated regional organisations, inter alia SADC, as pillars and key components for the overall, continental security architecture. Altogether, about 440 m € were channelled through the APF for Peace Support Operations, capacity building and security cooperation in Africa under the 9th EDF – including AVCs – while 300 m € are earmarked in 2008 under the 10th EDF in total. However, funding dedicated to regional security cooperation projects of regional organisations are comparably limited: under the 10th

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13 On regional level, South Africa is the paymaster and is said to contribute roughly 20% to SADC’s budget (anonymous interview with a SADC official at SADC Headquarters, September 2010).
EDF, the APF contracted *inter alia* only 20 m € for regional standby brigades.\(^{14}\) Currently, the 10\(^{th}\) *European Development Fund* (EDF) 2008-2013 programme provides for the ‘Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean’\(^{15}\) 645 million € in total and for the SADC region 116 million € in particular. However, only 15 %, i.e. 17.4 million €, of this amount is destined to SADC to support regional political cooperation and the implementation of some projects of its agenda on peace and security cooperation.\(^{16}\) Notable AVCs for regional security cooperation in SADC originates at present time from Germany with 12 m € support for SADC’s RPTC over the 2010-2014 period.

In sum, neither individual countries in southern Africa nor SADC as an organisation do exhibit profound patterns of interdependence, institutionalised relations or alliances with extra-regional actors in the issue area of defence and security at present time. However, SADC as an organisation is strongly dependent on extra-regional donors’ funds which are predominantly provided by the EU and its member states.\(^{17}\) Although financial means for regional security cooperation and related projects in SADC are to a large part covered by member states\(^{18}\), some projects – *inter alia* the SADC Standby Force and adjunct bodies – are strongly financially and politically supported by extra-regional actors.

### 3.3. Assumptions on the Institutionalisation and Progress of Regional Security Cooperation in SADC: A Synopsis

Against the structural background of a security dilemma in southern Africa, institutionalised regional cooperation in this issue area is likely because SADC states’ (expected) absolute benefits of engaging in a security regime are assumed to not only surpass costs of collective action and institutionalisation but also potential benefits of unilateral action or defection. The pattern of intraregional security relations is characterised by a strong asymmetry with South Africa being a regional hegemon with by far outstanding military capabilities. Due to its


\(^{17}\) The importance of external actors becomes more evident if one takes the economic issue area into account: The EU is the major extra-regional trading partner and export destination for the entire SADC region, for South Africa as the region’s economic powerhouse, and for about half of SADC’s member states. This pattern of strong and asymmetric interregional economic interdependence reflects a traditional trade relationship between former colonial masters and their less developed ‘dependencies’. This impression is reinforced by the pattern of unidirectional North-South flows of FDI (Muntschick, 2011; Sidiropoulos, 2002). Annex: Figure 1).

\(^{18}\) Interview with Tankie J. Mothae (Director of the OPDS), September 2010.
distinct power position in this issue area and in general, Pretoria can be recognised as key-country that is assumed to have most influence on the establishment, shape and effectiveness of regional security institutions. Against the background of SADC member countries’ weak (institutionalised) security relations with third, extra-regional actors, the process of regional security cooperation in the region is assumingly not likely to be disturbed from outside. In case of a provision of external funding and support, SADC’s regional security framework and projects are likely to improve and become more effective.

4. SADC’s Security Architecture: South Africa Taking the Lead – with EU Support

In the course of its transformation in 1992, SADC prepared for the likely joining of the RSA. However, the organisation did not have a new, specialised institutional body for regional security and defence matters yet. At best the very informal *Interstate Committee for Defence and Security* (ISDCS), being a relict of the FLS, could be regarded as responsible institution within SADC’s broader framework at that time (Ngoma, 2005: 124-130; Schleicher, 2006: 7).

*The SADC Treaty (1992) and the ‘old’ OPDS (1996)*

Negotiations on the new SADC Treaty did not lead to significant change in the issue area of security cooperation and member states only agreed on very general contents and weak institutionalisation. According to the Treaty, SADC’ major principles are “solidarity, peace and security (Article 4, b) and “peaceful settlement of disputes” (Article 4, e) and a major objective is to “promote peace and security” (Article 5, c). Later on, the Treaty explicitly mentions “politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security” (Article 21, g) as areas of regional cooperation. The character of these unspecified and vague contents reflects the fact that conflicting preferences on overall security issues and cooperation did not prevail and hence no worth mentioning inter-state bargaining took place (yet).

After South Africa’s accession to SADC in 1994, demand for a new framework for institutionalised regional security cooperation was notably proposed and fostered by South Africa. The country was aware of the regional security dilemma and recognised its own responsibility for this situation. Furthermore, it was apprehensive of the whole region sliding to chaos due to a lack of political stability and looming (civil) wars. A destabilising regional

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19 This assumption has been corroborated by a recent survey of experts who overwhelmingly argue that external influence on issues of regional security cooperation in SADC is comparably marginal (Jaspert, 2010: 337).
20 The ISDSC had several sub-bodies and standing or ad hoc committees where particularly defence and intelligence matters were shared, discussed and coordinated (Oosthuizen, 2006: 84).
21 SADC (1992): Declaration and Treaty of SADC.
environment was neither in the interest of the new government nor the regionally cross-linked economy of the rainbow nation (Ngoma, 2005: 154-169; Oosthuizen, 2006: 84).

Subsequent negotiations between member states concerned firstly, whether a new institutional body should be created or whether one should keep to SADC’s traditional, decentralised sector approach of Sector Coordination Units and assign the responsibility for ‘regional security’ to a single member state. This debate was quickly decided in favour for the creation of a new institutional body as no country wished to see a single state being responsible for the sensitive issue area (Vogt, 2007: 156-157). The second, more serious debate was about whether the new institution should be independent from SADC or report to its Summit and therefore be part of SADC’s institutional framework as a kind of sub-body. Tensions on the institutional design arose particularly between Zimbabwe and South Africa because Harare had a vital interest in preserving the existing, independent ISDSC body which had been under its influence since the anti-Apartheid struggle of the 1980s. In contrast, Pretoria advocated institutionalising the issue area of security cooperation directly under SADC’s umbrella in order to strengthen the organisation and avoid costly institutional double-tracking (Nathan, 2006; Ngoma, 2005: 151-153).

In June 1996, an agreement was reached and SADC Summit approved the creation of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS, or simply ‘Organ’) as specific institution dealing with regional security cooperation. It was declared that the OPDS is the “appropriate institutional framework by which SADC countries would coordinate their policies and activities in the area of politics, defence and security”\textsuperscript{22}. As a compromise to the conflicting interests mentioned above, it was furthermore decided that the ISDSC should become an institutional body with secretariat-function to the new Organ. However, the June 1996 SADC Summit Communiqué did not explicitly specify whether the OPDS was a SADC body or not: It states that the Organ “shall operate at the Summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structure.”\textsuperscript{23} Highly intergovernmental in its character and little formalised, the Organ of 1996 was a can be judged as an interim solution of the regional security architecture (Fisher and Ngoma, 2005; Ngoma, 2005: 150-170). The Organ’s unspecified and weak institutional setup does not only reflect a sluggish compromise between particularly Zimbabwean and South African preferences but also an apparent lack of internal and external support for this institution. Its institutional weakness and apparent inoperability (Malan, 1998) became clear during the conflicts in the Lesotho and the DRC (1998).


The recent and most incisive dynamics with regard to the institutionalisation of regional security cooperation took place shortly after the millennium, although prior consultations and negotiations among SADC members already took place from 1999 onwards. Regional demand for institutional change and a further elaboration and specification of regional security cooperation rooted in the fragmentation and failure of SADC to adequately react to the crises in DRC and Lesotho (1998). While there was common interest in reform, conflicting interests on the institutional embodiment and design of the ‘new’ Organ arose particularly between South Africa and Zimbabwe – again. Harare preferred the Organ to remain an independent institution outside the SADC framework (Berman and Sams, 2000: 165). Pretoria argued again for further centralisation and incorporation into the organisation’s institutional framework in order to avoid one country having too much control on this decisive body. Interstate negotiations that firstly “began as an exercise to restructure the OPDS had clearly developed into a slugging match between two combatants – South Africa and Zimbabwe” (Ngoma, 2005: 153). Heavy bargaining is said to have culminated in former President Mandela threatening to exit SADC if Mugabe would not end his refusal to incorporate the OPDS into SADC (Vogt, 2007: 157). In the end, South Africa was successful to assert its position.

The turning points for SADC’s regional security structure were the Extraordinary Summit in Windhoek and the Council of Ministers Meeting and Summit in Blantyre in March resp. August 2001. An agreement of the procedures of decision-making, the allocation of power and clear delimitation of competences of the OPDS was reached and norms, principles and rules were casted in a legislative and legally binding mold in order to avoid future ambiguities and inoperability. The SADC Treaty was amended to take these institutional changes into account. In addition, the Summit signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation which formalised the Organ, specified its modus operandi and confirmed SADC’s principles and objectives regarding conflict management and regional peace, security and defence cooperation.

The adoption of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 2001 represented a breakthrough: It particularly specifies that the SADC Secretariat is the

24 The 1996 OPDS was often disparagingly referred to as ‘Mugabe Organ’ (Fisher and Ngoma, 2005: 1).
Secretariat of the Organ which has the task of inter alia “implementation of decisions of the Summit, Troika of the Summit, Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.” More decisive – and a novelty – is the distinct regulation that the Organ “should report to the SADC Summit and be part of SADC.” Thus, the OPDS truly has become an institution of SADC with the SADC Summit being the overall supreme policy-making institution with far-reaching influence on the OPDS in particular and regional security and defence cooperation in general.

Furthermore, the Protocol determines a Troika to head the new OPDS instead of a single chairperson. This brought Zimbabwe’s formerly dominant status as established chair of the Organ de facto to an end. While the actual chairperson has a supreme position and the responsibility regarding the policies and objectives of the OPDS, consultancy and coordination with the other Troika members is prescribed in order to prevent unilateral comments or action. Under the Chair and the Troika is the Ministerial Committee (MC) comprised of the SADC ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security. Major sub-bodies are the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) which is composed of the ministers responsible for foreign affairs and the ISDSC comprising of ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security. Both sub-bodies concentrate on supporting the Organ in matters of politics, diplomacy, defence and security in order to achieve the overall objectives of regional security cooperation.

Apart from the reform of the Organ as major SADC institution in matters of security, regional cooperation was further enhanced in 2003 with the adoption of a SADC Mutual Defence Pact. It provides for non-aggression and for mutual defence against an attack on a member state from a third party or by internal threat. However, the Mutual Defence Pact does not demand automatic mutual defence but rather provides that “each state party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate.” Overall guidelines for political and security cooperation in SADC with special focus on implementation are laid down in the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and were approved by the Summit in 2003 (Hammerstad, 2003: 5; Ngoma, 2005: 195). According to SIPO, a central objective of regional security cooperation is “to protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order,

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29 The OPDS-Troika consists of the former, the present and the incoming chairperson of the Organ. All of them have to be a Head of State of a SADC member and are not allowed to be part of the SADC-Troika.
intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression.” SIPO’s contents and objectives correspond with the relevant passages of the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation but its guidelines are more policy oriented and seek to identify strategies and activities to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, they aim to align SADC’s regional security cooperation efforts and with the AU’s demands on regional peacekeeping capability (van Nieuwkerk, 2011: 181). Altogether, however, SIPO’s agenda is rather a toolbox of advises because its recommendations are not mandatory.

In sum, SADC’s institutionalised regional security cooperation past 2001 has improved compared to the situation before. Particularly the adoption of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the decision to reform regional security institutions by transferring the OPDS firmly under control of SADC was a major breakthrough and prerequisite for clear-cut competences and transparent decision-making. As expected, the RSA influenced the shape this ‘new’ institutional design most significantly and asserted herself particularly with regard to the OPDS against the preferences of Zimbabwe.

The Establishment of a SADC Standby Force (2007)

The need for establishing a regional contingent armed force, later known as, SADC Brigade or SADC Standby Force (SSF), is not likely to have only originated from the region’s structural security dilemma since confidence-building measures and other (existing) regional institutions are able to contribute to overcome this problematic situation. In fact, demand for creating a regional standby brigade in SADC stems from the AU and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The latter asks all of its ‘regional building-blocks’ to establish regional standby-brigades by 2010 in order to provide rapid regional reaction capability to counter crises and facilitate peace. Additionally, as mentioned before, the EU provides issue- and project-related funding to parts of SADC’s agenda on regional security cooperation via the EDF and particularly the APF. In this way, extra-regional (in this case even interregional) relations of SADC to the EU provide financial and logistical resources which can be obtained by SADC states by means of regional cooperation. Thus, the underlying ‘problematic situation’ reminds more of a coordination game with distributive effect with the funding provided and supplied by external actors being the major incentive and cooperative gain.

Considerations on how to organise and institutionalise a SADC standby-brigade took place at ISDSC meetings in 2004 and continued with the Summit’s statement that it had

“initiated the conceptualisation of the SADC Standby Force.” Interstate negotiations on the details of the project were not controversial although discussion between South African and Zimbabwe emerged on the character of standards and future harmonisation of procedures (Salomon, 2009: 216). However, South Africa was in general very active in the conceptualisation and formation of the brigade which corresponds with its goal to become the lead nation in Africa’s Peace Support Operations (Mandrup, 2009: 18). Finally, on the 16th of August 2007, SADC countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that led to the creation of the SADC-Brigade, later known as SSF. According to the MoU, primarily functions of the brigade “shall be to participate in missions as envisaged in Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU” and it “shall only be deployed on the authority of the SADC Summit […] on a SADC, AU or UN mandate.”

The standby brigade should comprise of a mobile Headquarter, three infantry battalions, intelligence and logistics company, naval- and air force capabilities and a police and civil component. As it is not conceptualised as standing army, member countries are asked to contribute contingents of personal and material to a ‘standby pool’ according to their means. In case of a mission, the brigade will be composed of forces available from the pool (Mandrup, 2009: 18; Salomon, 2009: 216). Additionally, the MoU led to the establishment of a Planning Element (PLANELM) at the SADC Headquarters whose task is to manage the SADC standby system. Furthermore, a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) for education, training and preparation for SADC operations, i.e. military and political capacity building, was established in Harare. By 2010, the SSF should be fully operational.

In sum, the establishment of the SSF is probably not a measure to overcome security dilemma inherent to the SADC region but rather a cooperation project encouraged from external stimulus. Although South Africa was most prominently engaged in its institutionalisation and build-up as regional lead nation and most significant contributor of personal and material, the SSF and related bodies were – and remain – to a large part fostered by extra-regional actors, namely the AU (institutionally) and the EU (financially).

34 SADC (2004): Record of the Summit. Grand Baie, 16th-17th August. Article 5.10.1
5. Effectiveness of Regional Security Cooperation in SADC: A mixed Picture

5.1. Driven by a Regional Actors: SADC’s multinational military Exercises

Since about two decades, multinational military exercises have become a pillar of regional security cooperation in SADC. So far, member states undertook several major manoeuvres which highlight the countries’ intention to adapt confidence-building measures on regional level, facilitate the coordination of military and logistic capabilities, and become capable of acting together in multinational peacekeeping operations. Besides being rather inward-oriented rather functional in a security regime’s sense of consolidating and enhancing security on regional level, the routinely SADC military exercises give in addition utterance to the states’ and organisation’s intention to become visible and capable as a regional actor (Salomon, 2009: 215-225).

As example, the first military exercise, called Blue Hungwe, took place in Zimbabwe in April 1997. This operation sounded the bell for a new era of regional military cooperation because it was not beforehand aimed against a certain pariah country in the region. Ten SADC members participated in Blue Hungwe which lasted for three weeks and involved roughly 1,500 soldiers of the various defence forces. The exercise aimed to enhance cooperation, skills and interoperability of armed forces particularly by means of coordinating and harmonising communication procedures and tactics. With awareness of potential future military and peacekeeping operations, the participants conducted pre-deployment training of troops and developed standard operating procedures (Berman and Sams, 2000: 170). In political and military respect, regional and external security experts widely recognised exercise Blue Hungwe as success. Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe remarked after the manoeuvre that “an exercise of this nature removes suspicion, increases transparency and builds confidence, mutual trust and understanding, among participating defence forces” (cited in Nyambua, 1998). While the major part of organising and financing of Blue Hungwe was provided by SADC states and particularly Zimbabwe, the exercise received additionally 500,000 US-$ of external funding from Great Britain (de Coning, 1999).

Operation Blue Crane was the follow-up exercise to Blue Hungwe. It took place in South Africa for three weeks in April 1999 and was hosted by Pretoria. The manoeuvre was conducted by 12 SADC members and involved close to 5,000 troops, i.e. brigade level, which made it by that time the biggest field exercise ever held in Africa. In addition, Blue Crane had a land and maritime component and thus covered two branches of military services. The purpose of the operation was similar to the previous exercise but particularly aimed to
strengthen and coordinate SADC states’ capabilities in command and control routines (Bestbier, 2000: 34; de Coning, 1999). External funding and support to the operation was provided by Scandinavian states and particularly a contribution of about 500,000 US-$ from Germany (Salomon, 2009: 222).

Similar military exercises, e.g. Operation Tanzanite (2002 in Tanzania), Operation Blue Angel (2003 in Zambia), Operation Thokgamo (2005 in Botswana), Operation Blue Ruvuma (2006 in Tanzania) and Operation Golfinho (2009 in South Africa), were undertaken in the following years. They dealt with similar tasks and had similar purposes and were attended by most SADC states. While going into details on every military exercise would go beyond the scope of this paper, all military exercises were judged as successful and important with regard to confidence-building SADC level. Additionally, coordination of military and logistic capabilities was improved in the course of the manoeuvres and the organisation increasingly became capable to appear and act as one actor in multinational (regional) peacekeeping operation (Salomon, 2009: 220-225).

In sum, effectiveness of SADC regional security cooperation regarding confidence building and military exercises is surely given. While SADC countries themselves, especially South Africa, contributed a major part to financing and organising of the exercises (Mandrup, 2009: 17), extra-regional financial and logistical support, particularly from the EU and selected member states, fostered these regional security cooperation projects additionally and thus enhanced their effectiveness.


In 1998, Lesotho was shocked by political tensions – again after 1994 – as the monarch clashed with the major opposition party and some members of the military. In September of the same year, the legitimate government finally asked SADC for help and support as a coup threatened to destabilise the whole country (Neethling, 1999). The regional organisation was addressed because regional security cooperation was institutionalised since 1996 and two of the Organ’s major principles were to “safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order” and to “cooperate fully in regional security and defense through conflict prevention management and resolution”.

In contrast to 1994, this time multilateral military action followed. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) intervened together with a small contingent of troops from

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Botswana in an operation called ‘Boleas’ in Lesotho and was able to restore order and pacify the country after knocking out mutinous armed forces (Neethling, 1999). While the outcome of this military intervention in Lesotho was surely effective in terms that law and order were restored, political chaos avoided and peace secured, the question remains whether the mission really was a result of SADC’s regional security cooperation mechanisms or simply an ad hoc ‘coalition of the willing’. While South Africa and Botswana as provider of troops were self-evidently involved into policy coordination and planning prior to the intervention in Lesotho, only Zimbabwe and Mozambique belonged to the inner circle of SADC states that actively took part in the decision-making process and were able to actively exert influence. Most member states, however, were only involved by participation at the Summit Level (Ngoma, 2005: 167). Up until today, it seems unclear which legal procedure or decision-making process exactly laid the ground for the intervention and whether the OPDS explicitly authorised the decision and mandated South Africa and Botswana with the execution of the task (Malan, 1998; Williams, 1999).

According to official SADC diction of the 1999 Summit in Maputo, the attempted coup in Lesotho failed “as result of SADC military intervention in the form of Botswana and South African forces, in response to a request from the Lesotho government.”39 This statement corroborates the regional character of mission ‘Boleas’ and emphasises the role of SADC as an organisation. However, due to the unclear role of the Organ and presumable non-involvement of a number of member states, some experts argue that the intervention in Lesotho was less a SADC initiative but rather unilateral action of South Africa (and Botswana). This illation seems plausible, because Pretoria obviously not only had most interest in Lesotho’s political stability due to geographic circumstances but also was the major troop provider and consequently took most of the mission’s costs and risk.

In sum, the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho was successful with regard to the outcome. However, the circumstances of regional security cooperation give a rather mixed picture: It remains questionable if it was a mission deliberated and deployed by SADC as an organisation or whether it was a South African led ‘coalition of the willing’. In the case of Lesotho, SADC’s institutional mechanisms of regional security cooperation, particularly the OPDS, proved weak and thus allowed Pretoria to take the lead. Despite the fact that the organisation was to a certain degree internally fragmented on the Lesotho intervention, mission ‘Boleas’ was nevertheless (ex-post) declared as SADC intervention and thus covered by a ‘SADC-fig leaf’ (Ngoma, 2005: 167-168).

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5.3. Strong by Unity: SADC’s Suspension of Madagascar after the Coup D’état

Crisis in Madagascar broke out in March 2009 at latest after tensions between ruling and opposition parties were culminating. Civil protest and uprising against acting President Ravalomanana made him loose the support of the security forces and lead to a transition of power to the military. However, the armed forces quickly delegated power to Andry Rajoelina, who had become a successful politician during the past years and was the former President’s key political opponent, and designated him to become the legitimate leader of the country on the basis of popular support. Ravalomanana went into exile. The unconstitutional seizure of power by Rajoelina and the overthrow of the legitimate government was regionally and internationally condemned as coup d’état and lead wide protest. With political turmoil and military rule in Madagascar, the country became not only internally instable but also a threat to the SADC region due to its potentially destabilising effects (Cawthra, 2010: 13-17).

SADC’s first measure to the looming Madagascan crisis led only to the dispatch of a preliminary taskforce for assessment purposes in February 2009. However, the organisation’s reaction to the unconstitutional regime change in the neighbouring country was unevenly tougher and came promptly: On March 19th 2009, the Troika of the OPDS met for an Extraordinary Summit in Swaziland and stated that SADC “condemns in the strongest terms the unconstitutional actions that have led to the illegal ousting of the democratically elected President of a SADC Member State” and thus “cannot recognize Mr Rajoelina as President of Madagascar.” The Organ justified its position particularly by referring to Rajoelina’s violation of “the core principles and Treaty of SADC, the African Union and the United Nations Charters” and threatened to impose sanctions on the island state in order to restore law and order. However, the issue of the nature of sanctions was controversially discussed among SADC members with Swaziland and Angola even considering a military intervention of the organisation (Cawthra, 2010: 20).

SADC firstly opted for diplomatic punishment: On 30th March 2009, an Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of States met in Swaziland. It confirmed the statement of the Organ and expressed the support for a reinstatement of the former President Ravalomanana. Most importantly, it “suspended Madagascar from all Community’s institutions and organs until the

return of the Country to constitutional normalcy with immediate effect”\textsuperscript{43} and “urged SADC to stand united and firm against the illegal removal of the democratically elected Government of Madagascar by the Military and their allies.”\textsuperscript{44} With the suspension of Madagascar, SADC not only executed its probably most severe diplomatic sanction on a member state but depicted itself as an unitary actor with functioning institutions and a coordinated (foreign) policy on regional security matters (van Nieuwkerk, 2010).

Despite diplomatic sanctions, SADC was keen to take a proactive role in the settlement of the Madagascan crisis and engaged in conflict management and mediation. An Extraordinary SADC Summit held in June 2009 paved the way and underscored the organisation’s self-conception as guarantor of regional security. It appointed “H.E. Joaquim A. Chissano, former President of Mozambique, assisted by a high level team of mediators to lead and coordinate the all party dialogue in Madagascar”\textsuperscript{45} and emphasised its willingness to closely cooperate with the AU, the UN and the international community. At the same time, SADC dismissed any idea of military intervention (Cawthra, 2010: 20)

In sum, institutional SADC regional security cooperation in the Madagascan crisis proved to be fairly successful – at least with regard to the central aspect of state-security. It is widely recognised that the organisation took a leading role as a mediator although this finally took place within a broader AU-framework and thus was institutionally supported by an extra-regional actors. Although former President Ravalomanana has not returned to office, political and socio-economic chaos or civil war have been have been prevented and the potentially destabilising effects of Madagascar are contained so far (Cawthra, 2010: 21-23).

5.4. Fostered and disturbed by extra-regional Actors: The SADC Standby Force and its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre

Planning and institutionalisation of the SSF can be regarded as success so far although aspirations are high and several weaknesses are still in place. While the institutional framework has been successfully adopted by SADC member states, implementation has not been completed and the full operation capability and deployability of the SSF is still questionable. While SADC states have officially contributed their troop contingents to the ‘standby pool’, it remains unclear whether or to what degree they actually available, mounted

\textsuperscript{44} SADC (2009): Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government. Communiqué. Lozitha Royal Palace, 30\textsuperscript{th} March 2009. Article 22.
and deployable on demand. So far, the SSF has only partially met the total of 5,000 troops that have to be made available by member states. In general, South Africa as country with outstanding military capability in regional terms will deliver personal and equipment other SADC states are unable to contribute. Pretoria has pledged the lion-share of personal and *inter alia* “a parachute battalion, engineering capability, sanitation (including a field hospital), harbour patrol boats, signal capacity, divers, naval support vessel and air transport” (Mandrup, 2009: 19) which emphasises the importance of the regional key country.

With regard to benchmarks evaluating the SSF’s current status and readiness, framework documents, the MoU, PLANLEM, pledged units, Centres of Excellence and the Police component are in place while the establishment of civilian components is still in progress. The Brigade’s Headquarters and Logistic Depot are not in place yet and the whole SSF is regarded as not fully operational and deployable yet. Shortfalls in the SSF are due to delays in implementation and especially shortage of resources. Logistics and a logistics depot will be not easy to maintain and probably require leadership and externals’ donor assistance (Mandrup, 2009: 16-17). Despite South Africa’s important role, donors – especially the EU through the EDFs and APÜF – still play a significant role in sustaining relevant SADC and SSF institutions as mentioned earlier.

The ambivalent impact of external donors to SADC’s regional security cooperation institutions becomes very clear with regard to the SSF’s *Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre* (RPTC). In 1996, the ISDSC tasked Zimbabwe to coordinate regional peace training and Harare shortly afterwards established the RPTC. Strongly supported by external funding from Britain and particularly Denmark (since 1997), the RPTC became very active during 1997-2001 and hosted hundreds of workshops, training sessions, peace keeping operations courses and supported many regional military exercises and capacity building for the SSF. Over time, the RPTC became a truly multinational body since mostly SADC representatives participated. However, Denmark’s funding was abruptly cut down in January 2002 as a consequence to political crisis and increasingly autocratic rule in Zimbabwe.

With the major extra-regional incentive for regional cooperation being withdrawn, a major incentive for regional cooperation within this project was gone. Consequently, the RPTC had to quit its work and became paralysed for several years. The body was directly transferred under the SADC Secretariat in 2005 and is funded by SADC’s own financial contributions since then. However, member states are not willing or able to maintain the

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RPTC in a way it was done before 2002. Consequently, not only the RPTC became less effective but also the build-up of the SSF (Kinzel, 2007:5; Salomon, 2009: 226-227).

In sum on can say, that the readiness and ability of South Africa to take the lead position in the organisation and embodiment of the SSF confirms the assumption that regional powers will most notably shape and influence institutionalised regional cooperation projects as long as asymmetric interdependence of regional actors to extra-regional actors does not provide incentives for defection. Although the SSF is not fully operational yet, it has nevertheless the best military potential of all African regional standby brigades due to the comparably strong military, logistical and financial capabilities of South Africa according to experts (Salomon, 2009: 264-265). The case of the RPTC seems to corroborate the assumption that SADC’s institutionalised regional security cooperation with regard to the SSF and related bodies is not based on a genuine regional ‘problematic situation’ but rather induced from extra-regional actors: Similar to a coordination game with distributive conflict, the provision of external funding motivated SADC members to establish the RPTC and made it effective as long as (externally provided) cooperative gains were realisable. It is likely that the SSF would face a similar fate in case extra-regional funding would dry up – and South Africa would not compensate.

6. Conclusion

The paper provided a theory-driven analysis of institutionalised regional security cooperation in SADC against the background of major institutional arrangements, projects and actions. While the overall problematic situation in terms of regional security was an ‘assurance game’ between the FLS/SADCC members versus South Africa before the end of Apartheid, it reminds today soonest of a security dilemma. Today, states in SADC seek to cooperate and manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to silence this dilemma through both their own actions and institutional arrangements. Loose, informal institutions of the time of the FLS were not able to adequately address crises to regional security during the 1990s – e.g. in Lesotho (1998) – and thus became subject to reform and supplementation in 1996 and 2001.

With regard to structure, it has become clear that regional integration efforts in SADC take place against a ‘shadow’ of strong and asymmetric intra- and to a certain degree even extra-regional interdependence. In the issue area of security, the RSA is in the centre of asymmetric regional security relations. The Cape Republic exhibits relative superior military capabilities and is regarded as undisputed regional power. This specific structural characteristic, which becomes even more prominent if on looks only on the issue area of
economy, gave South Africa the room to exert significant influence on the institutionalisation of regional security cooperation in SADC. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the institutionalisation of the ‘new’ OPDS are the most prominent examples and highlight Pretoria’s assertiveness.

SADC countries’ security relations to extra-regional actors are negligible in terms of bilateral security agreements or the like. Nevertheless, particularly the EU has established itself as important source of funding for regional integration in general and to a lesser degree for regional security cooperation in particular. Europe took a rather supportive stand with regard to SADC’s efforts to establish institutions for regional security cooperation if one takes past and ongoing financial support and the manifold contributions via the EDF and the recent APF program into account. While SADC is very keen to independently control this very sensitive policy area, the EU nevertheless gains a position to influence the dynamics of regional security cooperation in SADC in those institutional settings or projects which are built upon – or heavily reliant of – extra-regional support. By this means, positive influence on regional security cooperation in SADC has manifested although the cancellation of external support has also caused regional institutions to decline.

The effectiveness of regional security cooperation in SADC corresponds to the character of the underlying problematic situations, the influence of regional and extra-regional powers and the institutional design. SADC’s common military exercises are examples for successful confidence building and creation of transparency under the security dilemma. Facing the crisis in Lesotho, the unsettled Organ of 1996 was not able to adequately react and a SADC intervention was probably rather a South African mission. The conflict management in case of Madagascar was more successful because the new Organ was better institutionalised – to the most part influenced by South Africa. So far, it seems that South Africa is creating a SADC regional security architecture dominated by itself, and basically sustained by its economic and, to some extent, military capacity. The situation is similar to other regional security institutions in other parts of the world. However, with regard to the SSF and the RPTC, the ambivalent influence of extra-regional actors becomes obvious: Reminding of a coordination game with distributive effects, the EU’s and its member states’ funding initially facilitated the institutionalisation and effectiveness of both projects. As long as the external resources – and thus the major cooperative gain – were provided, the RPTC remained effective. With the termination of funding, however, it became paralysed which also negatively affected the agenda for the establishment of the SSF. Thus, the case studies illustrated that regionalism in SADC takes place between regional and extra-regional powers.
Annex

Figure 1): Pattern of intra- and extra-regional trade flows of SADC member states in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trade Flow</th>
<th>total (in 1,000 US$)</th>
<th>SADC (in % of total)</th>
<th>EU (in % of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola*</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>9,544,361</td>
<td>7,37</td>
<td>37,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>28,147,325</td>
<td>1,31</td>
<td>7,88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>3,986,915</td>
<td>85,83</td>
<td>5,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>5,072,523</td>
<td>17,98</td>
<td>67,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo*</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1,760,690</td>
<td>29,89</td>
<td>38,89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>1,453,162</td>
<td>2,68</td>
<td>54,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho**</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1,399,393</td>
<td>78,28</td>
<td>2,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>968,402</td>
<td>18,10</td>
<td>9,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>2,445,461</td>
<td>10,06</td>
<td>23,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>1,339,648</td>
<td>3,71</td>
<td>62,92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>53,88</td>
<td>15,78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Exports</td>
<td>868,559</td>
<td>35,73</td>
<td>39,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>9,65</td>
<td>27,04</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>2,044,099</td>
<td>10,57</td>
<td>70,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>3,049,633</td>
<td>34,12</td>
<td>23,48</td>
</tr>
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<td>Exports</td>
<td>2,412,075</td>
<td>22,45</td>
<td>6,13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>4,024,623</td>
<td>79,30</td>
<td>10,43</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>4,040,273</td>
<td>37,99</td>
<td>44,71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>859,172</td>
<td>9,06</td>
<td>35,80</td>
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<td>Exports</td>
<td>360,132</td>
<td>0,71</td>
<td>53,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>79,872,556</td>
<td>4,69</td>
<td>33,72</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>63,649,023</td>
<td>10,14</td>
<td>33,22</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1,164,250</td>
<td>97,22</td>
<td>0,10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
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<td>78,45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>5,919,017</td>
<td>11,56</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>2,139,347</td>
<td>17,21</td>
<td>19,69</td>
</tr>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>57,05</td>
<td>16,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>4,618,583</td>
<td>23,24</td>
<td>5,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>3,594,356</td>
<td>67,65</td>
<td>8,30</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>3,310,184</td>
<td>66,52</td>
<td>16,49</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC (Σ)</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>126,868,050</td>
<td>17,09</td>
<td>28,95</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>121,505,636</td>
<td>12,43</td>
<td>27,83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Trade Data of Angola and the DR Congo from 2006.
** Trade Data of Lesotho from 2004.
All Trade Data – with the exception of Angola and the DR Congo – were obtained by the World Integrated Trade Data Solution (WITS) (http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb/default.aspx, 25/3/2009).
Trade Data of Angola and the DR Congo were obtained by SA Trade Map (http://www.tips.org.za/node/637, 25/3/2009) of the TIPS (Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies) Institute.
Figure 2): SADC member states’ Strength of Armed Forces (1994, 2011)

### Strength of regular Armed Forces in SADC region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2011</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>28,100</td>
<td>159,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>78,500</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>*3000</td>
<td>*3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>49,600</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>46,900</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Military expenditure in constant (2009) m US-$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>963.0</td>
<td>3,165.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>204.0</td>
<td>363.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>*98.5</td>
<td>122.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>**47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>**13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>300.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3,251.0</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>101.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>123.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>212.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>739.0</td>
<td>**107.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Military expenditure as % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>*1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>**1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>**0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>**2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data collected from various Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks.
* Data from 1996; ** Data from 2006.
**Figure 4):** SADC’s Organisational Chart after the institutional Reforms in 2001

![Organisational Chart](http://www.africa-union.org/recs/sadcprofile.pdf (04/07/2011)).
Bibliography


