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The Performance of Regional Organizations

in Security Governance *

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Introduction

As the number and scope of regional organizations has spread over the last twenty years (Tavares 2009), the way regional organizations (collectively) perform their collective duties has become a focus of attention. Of particular concern has been the extent to which regional organizations engage in or effectively perform functions of collective security governance. This concern has been taken forward on three levels. First, work has been undertaken on the goals and principles of regional organizations and their institutional mechanisms and autonomy (Tavares 2009; Laursen 2010; Acharya and Johnston 2007). Specific questions have dealt with the perception of threats by regional organizations and the means or instrument chosen to respond to the perceived threats (Kirchner and Sperling 2002; 2007). Second, studies have taken place on the extent to which regional organizations perform security functions. i.e., whether they cover the full range of policies of prevention, assurance, protection and compellence, or concentrate on one or a few security aspects (Kirchner and Sperling 2007). Third, analysis has been put forward on whether member states contribute equally in terms of resources or manpower to the collective performance of security or defence functions or do so unevenly. In their seminal study on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966) found that smaller NATO member states were contributing unevenly to the collective good. This study was further complemented by Todd Sandler and colleagues with the conceptual tool of public supply technologies and the notion of 'publicness' (Sandler 1977; Sandler and Murdoch 2000; Sandler and Hartley 2001; Shizumu and Sandler 2002). In contrast to the 'exploitation thesis' identified by Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966), Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009) found that in European Union (EU) security governance smaller states contributed evenly on a

number of functions (policies of prevention and assurance) and that 'free-riding' did not pose a serious problem to the provision of EU collective security goods (*ibid*.: 808).

Whilst, with few exceptions (e.g., Tavares 2009), research on these three levels has been devoted to individual regional organizations, the task of the foregoing chapters has been to undertake a comparative study of ten regional organizations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America. The benefits of such a comparative and empirical study are that they will allow identification of patterns of convergence and divergence among regional organizations on each of the three levels of examination. The following is an assessment of the findings from these ten regional organizations. As with the research of the individual contributions to this volume, the assessment will make use of the concept of security governance. Security governance provides a framework for analysing policy-making and policy implementation in the security field. It alerts us to the multiple actors and levels of security engagement and assumes that norms, rules and ideas are, besides interests, also influential in the shaping of security policies (Webber *et al.* 2004). The strength of security governance lies in conceptualizing the coordination, management and regulation (including forms of institutionalization and routinization) of regional security (Kirchner 2006: 965). The application of the security governance framework to the ten regional organizations reveals a pattern of multifaceted security concerns and in which regional organizations have accordingly adopted a variety of instruments to ameliorate emerging and current threats. There are general trends, but also nuances and peculiarities that are unique to each regional organization, as captured by the preceding chapters. This concluding chapter focuses on exploring the converging and diverging developments while simultaneously threading together the general trends

The evaluation will start with an examination of the rationale, principles and goals of the ten organizations, and turn next to an examination of the institutional innovations of these organizations and their performance across the four policy dimensions. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the security governance exercised by the ten organizations by comparing their contextual base (economic and political conditions of their member states), their level of institutionalization, and their compliance with the norms of the system of governance.

Rationale, goals and principles in regional security governance

The foundational treaties and subsequent declarations of the regional organizations reveal a variety of security perceptions. Thus, unsurprisingly, regional organizations have developed different objectives to provide security based upon their distinct historical and geopolitical backgrounds. Some of the general differences of these organizations can be observed in terms of their rationale, principles and goals.

The identification of rationales, principles and goals helps to understand not only the existential reasons of regional organizations, but also the orientation and scope of their policies as well as the expectations of their performance. The rationale informs about the purpose or reason for formation, entailing the broad motives of promoting members' peace, stability, integrity and prosperity. The principles indicate the standards, norms and values which organizations espouse and to which members have to adjust and adhere, or which members seek to preserve in cooperation with others. The goals signal how the organizations intend to meet short and medium-term problems or threats, or seek to undertake collective

action. They also indicate how organizations adjust core aspects of their original purpose or rationale.

Rationale

While the basic rationale tenets (promotion of peace, stability, integrity and prosperity) of organizations persist over time, adjustments in threat perception take place under changing circumstances. The changing circumstances are most apparent with organizations of longevity. This can be seen in the case of NATO (created in 1949), predominantly a defence organization which, after 1990, had to alter its original rationale defined by Lord Ismay, its first Secretary General, as 'keeping the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down'.[i] As inter-state or inter-polar threats declined and intra-state threats began to rise, NATO adjusted its military strategy which included the adoption of 'out-of-area' interventions, like in the Western Balkans and in Afghanistan. The growing instability in former Yugoslavia resulted in EU (founded in 1957) attempts to shed its 'civilian power' image and to engage increasingly as a responsible and effective external security actor.[ii] It also precipitated significant changes in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) rationale, renaming the CSCE (1973) as the OSCE in 1995 and adding a number of conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation measures. For the Organization of American States (OAS) (1948), another organization of longevity, the arrival of new security threats in the last twenty years in the shape of rebel conflicts, drug trafficking and organized crime has added an additional layer to the persistent rationale of avoiding or overcoming border conflicts among its members.[iii]

There have also been transitions in the rationale of organizations created in later periods. This applies to the African Union (AU) which superseded the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) (1963) in 2002. In its Constitutive Act, the AU seeks to reinforce its role as a security provider in unstable areas. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created in 1993 in order to produce a stable distribution of power, disseminate norms among member states and advance security cooperation beyond the ASEAN membership. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (1973) has demonstrated some adaptability with the revision of the foundational documents (revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in 2001). The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) (1969) revisited its objectives in 1996, when it changed from the Andean Pact to the Andean Community of Nations. While the Western Hemispheric organizations of CAN, CARICOM and Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) (1991) were initially focused on economic integration, they have added security elements to their agendas since the early 1990s. The purpose of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (2001) is more complex, but predominantly reflects Chinese and Russian concerns about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism from Central Asia, and also US encroachment in Central Asia and South East Asia. Energy issues, though for different reasons, also featured in the foundation motives of both countries, as did geopolitical considerations.

One of the common features in regional organizations is the perception of the United States as a stabilizing or threatening force. The United States has been an important actor not only where it holds membership, but also in other organizations, where it exerts leverage as external actor. Four types of reactions can be observed. First, Latin American members of the OAS have consistently sought formulas to balance the power of the United States; in NATO, some European members have actually attempted to develop a European arm free of US presence; in the case of the OSCE, the role of the United States seems to be more diffused,

with the membership of Russia. Second, the United States has been an external variable and, often, an incentive for strengthening domestic structures of regional organizations; this is the case of the EU, ASEAN-ARF, the SCO and CARICOM. Third, the AU actually stipulates more cooperation with the United States. Fourth, the United States does not play a significant role in certain international organizations such as MERCOSUR.

In short, while all organizations have adopted stability, peace and security as key rationales of security governance, the purpose for doing so varies, and also varies over time, reflecting either more concerns with the internal stability among its members or the threat from outside to the members, or a combination of both internal and external threats. In contrast to the EU and NATO, whose rationales relate to all four security dimensions, the other eight organizations largely see their existence in two security dimensions—policies of prevention and protection—reflecting primarily a concern with the proliferation and resilience of organized crime and terrorist acts. However, the AU and the OAS also seek, at least to some extent, to engage in policies of assurance and compellence; though in the OAS the compellence instruments remain at the declaratory level. The way these concerns are articulated or translated into action depends on the principles organizations have adopted, in which norms and values play an important role.

Principles

Among the core principles which organizations espouse and to which members have to adjust and adhere are the pursuit of democracy, mutual respect, equal partnership, solidarity, regionalism and multilateralism. Explicit democratic conditions for membership are stipulated by the EU, NATO and MERCOSUR. In the ARF, the OSCE and CARICOM, the

membership requirements are less stringent, but also aim at strengthening democracy and the rule of law, *inter alia*, while the SCO averts discussions on democracy. There have also been cases where membership has been suspended, such as in the AU (Eritrea, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger), due to coups d'état or flagrant disruptions of constitutional order. In the ARF, the SCO, the OSCE and the four Western Hemispheric organizations the principles of regionalism and multilateralism are tempered by the countervailing principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. The exceptions are the EU, where cooperation has reached a high degree of density among its members, NATO, which relies on collective security, in particular Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the AU, which exercises some autonomy in terms of peacekeeping operations. Some organizations allow for forms of conflict resolution or dispute settlements among its members such as the ARF, the EU, CARICOM and the OAS. However, the use of force in the settlement of internal disputes or outside intervention of a peace-making or peacekeeping kind is deemed unacceptable by most organizations. The exception is NATO. The EU, according to the 2003 European Security Strategy allows the use of force only as a 'last resort'.

Goals

The way rationales and principles are implemented is through the setting of goals, which determine the short to medium perspective of organizations and alter, where necessary, some aspects of the rationale or principles of organizations. It is here that the changing nature of security threats is most relevant and that organizations set the stage for appropriate action or direction. Instances of these are the EU's stance on the conflict in the Western Balkans, particularly from 2000 onward, which paved the way for a more proactive engagement in peacekeeping and peace building terms (*policies of assurance*), not only for this region but

for EU external actions generally, the goals which were put forward on *policies of protection* in the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, and the conflict prevention aims which were specified in the Göteborg European Council of 2001 *(policies of prevention)* and the European Security Strategy of 2003 *(policies of compellence)*. Of a similar importance are the changes of NATO's military doctrines in 1999 and 2010 (covering *policies of compellence, protection and assurance*), and the adoption of the Partnership for Peace programme, relating to *policies of prevention*.

While democracy flourished in the Western Hemisphere in the 1990s, economic disparity remains one of the unresolved problems in the region. Consequently, the goals of the regional organizations emphasize policies of prevention and protection; to a lesser extent assurance, and hardly compellence. The OAS, with a comprehensive membership, seeks to strengthen democracy, mediate in conflict resolution, include human security in the national agendas and fight on transnational threats like drug trafficking, terrorism, and the traffic in arms and persons. In different forms, sub-regional organizations adopt the main goals of the OAS, but emphasize particular areas of concern closer to their specific milieus. CARICOM's, CAN's and MERCOSUR's primary goal is to achieve economic integration; yet, the intertwined nature of the regionalization of the threats have made CARICOM and CAN pay more attention to the goals of combating drug trafficking and developing regional institutions to protect their societies from natural disasters. In Asia, both the ARF and the SCO have set the main goal of developing confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). Nonetheless, the SCO tends to direct CSBMs to intra-state ethnic cleavages and conflicts—Central Asia's common scourge, while the ARF seeks to develop a comprehensive engagement and political dialogue, also known as the 'ASEAN way'. In Africa, the Constitutive Act of the AU in 2002

sets the main goal of promoting peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda.

Whether specified goals remain as intentions or are implemented, and if so, to what degree, depends on the availability of appropriate institutional mechanisms. This aspect will be dealt with next.

Institutions and innovations

How the ten organizations have developed different structures in response to threat perceptions can be demonstrated with a breakdown of the four different security dimensions.

Assurance. Specific instruments in policies of assurance are held mostly by the EU, the OSCE and the OAS, but only the EU has policy instruments aimed at both its neighbourhood and beyond, relying on the Stabilization and Association Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Common and Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian missions in the European context, and mostly on CSDP civilian missions beyond Europe. The OSCE employs civilian peace building missions and monitors general elections in post-conflict countries. NATO created the Trusts Funds, the ISAF Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund, the Advisory Team in Pristina as well as the Training and Equipment Coordination Group. As the guarantor of the 1942 Rio Protocol, the OAS remains the most significant actor in the Western Hemisphere in terms of policies of assurance, monitoring post-conflict situation such as the case of Ecuador/Colombia, and employing a Peace Fund to support the resolution of disputes. The other three sub-regional organizations of that continent maintain subsidiary assurance mechanisms such as the High-Level Group on

Security and Confidence Building Measures that CAN has created and the Council of Foreign and Community Relations established by CARICOM. The AU is beginning to develop instruments in this policy sector, and has established a Peace Fund facility. The ARF and the SCO have so far relied more on declarations and normative statements than actual institutional innovations in this area. The fact that several of the examined organisations manifest a lack of specific instruments in this policy sector is reflected in the low level of recognition these organizations attribute to policies of assurance in their rationale, principles and goals (see above).

Prevention. Several mechanisms have been set in motion, though with different degrees of intensity, by the ten organizations to prevent conflicts from occurring. The EU has taken a lead in this policy sector by introducing a number of well funded aid and technical assistance programmes aimed at stabilizing the countries which surround it geographically through the European Neighbourhood Policy and geared towards the elimination of root causes of conflict in the wider international context. An important instrument in the prevention of conflict is NATO's Partnership for Peace programme as well as the special dialogues with countries and regions such as Russia or the Mediterranean. The main OSCE instruments in this sector are the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Forum for Security Cooperation, and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM). The work on the ground is carried out by OSCE Missions and their field offices throughout the countries in which the missions are deployed. Both the EU and the AU have developed Early Warning Systems. In the case of democracy promotion, electoral observation missions are regularly held by the EU, the OSCE, OAS and CARICOM. MERCOSUR has created a Democracy Observatory. The AU has established the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. CARICOM,

through the Court of Justice and the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), mediates in post-electoral conflicts and in border disputes.

Protection. All organizations, in one form or another, have introduced mechanisms intended to deal with matters of organized crime, the combat of international terrorism, the control of illegal immigration, and the occurrence of natural disasters and pandemics, though some organizations engage more in certain of these aspects than in others. The scope and depth of instruments introduced in this field is particularly prevalent in the EU, with such major instruments as EU's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), European Police Office (Europol), the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX), and the Extradition Warrant. For NATO, while Article 5 provides the main basis for the protection of its member states, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRC), the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion (CBRN) and the Cooperative *Cyber Defence* Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) perform activities of protection. The OAS has created various conventions in the field of protection, and CARICOM works through the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS), the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre, and the Intelligence Sharing Network (CISNET). Both the OAS and CAN have introduced measures to eradicate illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. ASEAN has introduced programmes in disaster relief and climate related issues through the Inter Sessional Meetings. In a similar effort CAN has created the Committee for Disaster Prevention and Relief (CAPRADE).

Compellence. Policies of compellence are part of the agenda of four organizations: the EU, NATO, the AU and OAS. NATO and the EU are the two organizations with the most institutional innovations in the area of compellence policies, including military mission for

the purpose of making, enforcing or keeping peace in areas of conflict. Nonetheless, other organizations have also instruments dealing with compellence. The AU has established an African Standby Force (ASF), and the OAS has introduced the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB). CARICOM has participated in the institutional framework of the Regional Security System. The SCO has conducted modest joint military exercises.

Analysis of the decision making processes in the ten regional organizations reveals some of the limitations of collective action. While none of the regional organizations purely embrace a supranational method to act, which optimally would create a summation of the capabilities of the member states, the EU and NATO have reached relatively high levels of autonomy in terms of collective security interests. Nonetheless, the use of the supranational method varies in the four domains explored in this volume. The EU posses a much greater degree of freedom from its constituent states in the creation and execution of policies of prevention and assurance, while that freedom remains severely circumscribed or qualified when developing or implementing policies of compellence and protection. Similarly, as a consequence of Article 5, NATO exercises greater authority on policies of compellence than on the other three policy sectors. Although the EU is able to carry out some security functions through supranational means, it shares with the other nine regional organizations the practice of intergovernmentalism such as consensus or one-state-one-vote systems. While the intergovernmental method limits the optimal collective action, it does not preclude states to create institutions and policies to deal with security threats. However, to the extent to which organizations have developed relevant instruments and mechanisms, they exist more in policies of prevention and protection than in policies of assurance and compellence. The explanation lies in the fact that security cooperation is increasingly affected by the proliferation and resilience of organized and terrorist activities, and found a response in the

establishment of regional security cooperation. The EU and NATO are the only two organizations which engage extensively in all four policy dimensions.

How available institutional mechanisms, goals, principles and rationale aspects translate into the performance of the ten organizations will be examined in the following section.

Performance of regional organizations

To assess the performance (or more precisely the salient impact) of individual regional organizations in the four respective policy areas is difficult because of the involvement of a multitude of actors (state and non-state) in efforts, for example, to stop civil conflicts before they have emerged or to mitigate their savagery when they erupted. Given these problems, a more fruitful approach may be to explore whether a given regional organizations adds value to the security efforts of its member states, mitigates the collective action problem intrinsic to the four categories of security policy, and has achieved its programmatic objectives governing the behaviour of its member states. The rationales, principles and goals of the ten regional organizations respond to different security environments. Historical background, social and economic development, institutional political strength and security threats are some of the elements that shape the nature of response of regional organization. The analysis turns to assess whether regional organization are effective security providers under the benchmarks they have set themselves. The following will examine each of the four security dimensions.

Assurance

In the re-building of state and nation in conflict-torn societies, the examined regional organizations have focused their attention on four main categories: CSBMs, assistance in the establishment and strengthening of democratic structures, provisions for refugee settlements and infrastructural projects and the monitoring of democratic reforms.

The understanding of confidence building mechanisms varies among the organizations. Four organizations make explicit references to CSBMs. Besides conducting CSBMs in post-conflict areas, the OSCE is also providing, through the Vienna Declaration of 1999, a system of information-sharing, communication and crisis management. In Latin America, the OAS is the organization leading the implementation of CSBMs, such as between Colombia and Ecuador, and between Ecuador and Bolivia. It also conducts de-mining programmes. Further CSBMs are undertaken by CAN through the creation of Bi-national Border Services Centres (BBSCs) in Colombia and Ecuador and a temporary BBSC in the border between Bolivia and Peru. Some CSBMs have also been introduced by the AU, e.g., requiring Zimbabwe to involve the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in resolving its internal dispute. ARF seeks to build confidence among its member states by endorsing the principles of 'good neighbourliness' and by insisting on arms registers, disclosure of arms exports, high level visits among government officials, and the publication of Defence White Papers. Both the OAS and the AU have introduced Peace Funds in support of CSBMs.

With regard to the establishment and strengthening of democratic reforms, the EU and the OSCE have provided civilian missions to assist in the training of police officers, customs officials, judicial personnel and border guards. Efforts are particularly elaborate in the case of

the EU, which has deployed 19 CSDP civilian missions since 2003 in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The EU has also assisted the Western Balkans through the Stability and Association Process and has provided financial commitments to post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The OAS has sent civilian missions to promote democracy in post-conflicts in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Suriname and Haiti. It also has supported the demobilization of guerrilla groups and their families in Nicaragua and Guatemala. In contrast to these explicit efforts, several organizations, like ARF, the AU and CARICOM, rely more on statements in favour of democratization programmes than on actual measures. Some of these organizations, such as CARICOM and the AU actually rely on EU aid in their handling of democratization programmes and peace-building generally. MERCOSUR has not yet engaged in policies of assurance in which civilian missions have been employed.

Prevention

Action to prevent conflicts or threats depends heavily on the identification of potential conflicts and threats; in other words, to what extent threats are perceived as from outside or inside the region and whether threats are of an economic (poverty and inequality), cultural (Al Qaida) or military kind. All of the organizations examined explicitly state the vulnerabilities to threats from outside their own region. However, while the EU, NATO and the SCO perceive the threats in both regional (neighbourhood) and international terms, the other organizations confine this more narrowly to the respective region in which they operate (i.e., Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe and Latin America). Only the EU makes international-wide aid and cooperation contributions, geared largely for the eradication of the root causes of conflict in the shape of poverty and inequality elimination. Besides delivering large aid programmes directly (e.g., the Cotonou Convention), the EU makes significant

contributions to the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) Development Aid and Cooperation programme and the UN development programme, and also provides aid and technical assistance to other regional organizations and their member states such as CARICOM, CAN and the AU. For example, the inter-regional aid from the EU to CARICOM and CAN is intended for projects in the areas of social cohesion, regional economic integration, and combating the trade on illicit drugs. In addition, CARICOM and CAN have developed institutions (Caribbean Development Bank and Andean Development Corporation, respectively) to channel aid to its member states with its own resources and aid received from the EU and other international actors. Most organizations underscore the link between prevention policies and economic and political (democratization) development and human security. This includes anti-trafficking and anti-corruption efforts, the promotion of the rule of law and 'good governance' and the strengthening of civil society. In the case of the EU and NATO, specific programmes have been designed to promote these efforts, such as the EU's European Neighbourhood Programme and NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. The exception to these preventive efforts, at least to some extent, is the ASEAN-ARF, which works under the rationale of complementing the 'hub and spokes' network and maintaining the stability of the distribution of power in the region.

In addition to medium or long-term efforts of counteracting the root causes of conflicts (basically through financial and technical means), some of the regional organizations engage in crisis management to avoid growing or potential conflicts resulting in violence. Among the instruments used are CSBMs (OSCE and ARF), dispute settlement mechanisms and 'good office' provisions[iv] (CARICOM, OAS), election observation missions (OSCE and OAS), anti-arms programmes (OAS and NATO), and the use of economic and political sanctions

(EU and AU). MERCOSUR has relied primarily on the peaceful resolution of inter-state (border) disputes through diplomatic means.

Protection

The ten regional organizations have focused their attention on protection policies in four main areas: organized crime, corruption and judicial cooperation; border control and police cooperation; terrorism; and natural disasters and pandemics.

Information sharing and judicial cooperation are key instruments for the effective implementation of protection policies While protection from all forms of organized crime has been one of the main concerns of regional organizations, not all organizations have translated this concern into concrete action. The EU presents the most developed system of judicial cooperation; it has been able to harmonize judicial and penal law within the EU and created legal instruments valid throughout Europe. Among these instruments are the European arrest warrant, the guaranteed mutual access to a standardized criminal data base, Eurojust and the Police Chiefs' Task Force. Beyond the confines of Europe, other experiences of judicial cooperation have been implemented in CARICOM with the use of bilateral agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition, particularly with the United Kingdom, Netherlands and the United States. As to NATO, it has actively supported the Afghan government in implementing anti drug-trafficking policies. In Latin America, the OAS established a Technical Group on Transnational Organized Crime and the related Inter-American Convention, which seek to combat organized crime, drug and people trafficking and the trade of small arms and light weapons. At the sub-regional level, through the Regional Security System, CARICOM has conducted a counter-narcotics operations. Its RTFCS has made 113

recommendations on interdictions and enforcement measures and on socio-economic policies to combat crime and security threats between 2001 and 2004. In CAN, the adoption of the Regulation for the Control of Chemical Substances used in the Illegal manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances has been an important pillar for cooperation. Also, CAN has developed regional counter-drug intelligence schools as well as plans to combat the trade of small arms and light weapons. Support efforts on judicial cooperation exist in NATO and the OSCE, but they are not as widespread as in the EU, the OAS, CAN and CARICOM. The same is the case with the ARF, the AU, the SCO and MERCOSUR where discussions and plans have not been translated into concrete action.

In the area of border security, the EU has made the most inroads of all the organizations in establishing common approaches to face a common border. The Schengen space provides the EU with free travel and/or no visa restrictions, but also entails the development of an *acquis* whereby countries cooperate in areas of policing the common external border (FRONTEX) The EU has also implemented the Prüm Convention, in which some EU states participate, in order to intensify and accelerate cross-border police cooperation. The OSCE conducts border cooperation objectives through its Border Security and Management Concept and the Border Management Staff College. In the Caribbean, CARICOM has widened the partnerships on police cooperation to include Interpol, India, South Africa, Brazil and Colombia. The ARF, the SCO, the OAS and the AU have discussions and plans on these matters but little on concrete action.

While most organizations recognise the severity of international terrorism, only a few have taken concrete measures to respond to this threat. The EU has introduced a host of measures to improve intelligence gathering and sharing, to combat money laundering, and to speed up

the prosecution of alleged terrorists through the establishment of the extradition warrant. The OAS has created the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism. CARICOM can draw on police cooperation with Interpol, India, South Africa, Brazil and Colombia. The AU has facilitated extradition requests by some of its member states. On the other hand, organizations like ASEAN, CAN and MERCOSUR have only taken tentative anti-terrorism measures so far.

Measures to deal with environmental disasters and pandemics have been also part of protection policies. In CARICOM, a region vulnerable to hurricanes, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency has been central in coordinating and training personnel to respond to natural disasters. CAN has created the Andean Committee for Disaster Prevention and Relief. It has received support by the European Commission to train more than 8,500 people in risk management between 2004 and 2009 and has created the Andean University Network in Risk Management and Climate Change with the participation of 32 academic institutions and the construction of seven risk mitigation demonstration projects. The OAS works through the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance. In the case of NATO, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre guided consequence management efforts in more than 45 natural emergencies from 2002 to 2010. In Asia, the ARF has developed Desktop Exercises on Disaster Relief and has also held seminars to develop cooperation in energy security. In contrast, the AU, MERCOSUR and the SCO have not yet developed specific programmes or actions in this area.

Compellence

With the exception of the EU, NATO and the AU, member states in the ten regional organizations have been reluctant to develop military cooperation at the regional level. Contributions of regional organizations with military personnel to peacekeeping in post-conflict environments are most common in the EU. CSDP missions have not only expanded in numbers (six military missions), but also in scope (Europe and Africa) since 2003. In addition, the EU decided in 2004 to establish 13 national multinational battlegroups, each comprising 1,500 personnel. NATO has implemented several compellence policies in different situations, as seen through its involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. As of 2010, roughly 70,000 military personnel were engaged in NATO missions around the world, most of them in Afghanistan, managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment. In Africa, the AU deployed its first peacekeeping missions to the post-conflict environment in Burundi in January 2003. Ever since, the AU has also set up peacekeeping forces missions in Sudan in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I and II). Initially, the PSC approved the deployment of 60 military observers in June 2004, which was increased to 80 personnel a month later, to merely monitor the ceasefire in the Darfur region. By October 2004, AMIS had a 564-strong force from 10 African countries in Darfur, which was expanded to 7,000 personnel. In the Western Hemisphere, CARICOM contributed to the Multinational Force in Haiti in 1994 with the Caribbean Battalion, which has been the only time CARICOM deployed forces. The OAS and the SCO have conducted some joint military exercises, but there are no indications that this will develop into permanent and deployable military bodies. In the case of the ARF, the organization has discussed since 2007 the possibility of creating peacekeeping forces with training centres in Japan but, in early

2011, this was still under discussion. MERCOSUR has not engaged in policies of compellence and, in any case, lacks the means to engage in this field.

One of the main challenges in the ten cases is the reluctance of member states to sacrifice some sovereign prerogatives in order to achieve the common goal of executing policies of compellence. This area of hard security remains the closest to the strict Westphalian view of limited cooperation derived from the security dilemma. Even though the EU has conducted peace-making and peacekeeping operations, these interventions remain hedged and depend upon the good offices of the major member states. The EU member states have not pledged themselves to collective defence, the solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding. Despite the progress made towards the operational integration of the member state armed forces, the EU at present remains a coordinating mechanism for formulating and executing policies of compellence.

Having examined the performance of the ten organizations in the respective four security dimensions, the following section will attempt to assess the factors which facilitate or impede the security governance task of these organizations.

Assessment

Assessing and comparing the role of organizations as security providers requires the application of some common denominators. Part of this has been done in the preceding section through the deployment of organizational characteristics (rationale, principles, goals and institutional innovations) and four security policy dimensions (assurance, prevention, protection and compellence). The remaining part of the assessment will involve Webber's

(2007) suggestion that security governance as a system was marked by three aspects: the nature and contestation of the region; the level of institutionalization; and the compliance of the actors with the norms of the system of governance. In the following these three aspects will be applied.

a)   Nature and contestation of the region

The way organizations perform in relation to the four security dimensions is contingent on the way peace and stability has developed or is contested in a given region. Contestation relates *inter alia* to the nature of strife in that region (e.g., ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts), the level of economic and political development (e.g., rule of law, human rights and tolerance), and the role of global and regional powers in the region (e.g., the role of the United States in Latin America, and that of China and Japan in Asia).

In order to illustrate the nature of contestation in each region, Table 1 provides a summary of nine indicators in economic, political and security areas. One indicator is provided by the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2009). According to this data, a total of 365 political conflicts occurred with various levels of intensity in 2009. The highest number of conflicts within an organization was recorded in the ARF (120), followed by the AU (93) and the OSCE (76). The five degrees of intensity of such conflicts present a more precise picture about the nature of the political tensions and in some cases violence worldwide; i.e., while the EU and MERCOSUR are the only two organizations in which there were no disputes classified as war (level 5 and higher of the Conflict Barometer index) or severe crisis (level 4), war (level 5) erupted three times within in the territory of the ARF and once in the AU. Thus, the map of the Conflict Barometer in

2009 reveals that a) all the regional organizations experienced some form of conflict although the level of intensity is different for each of them; b) the ARF and the AU are the two organizations with the highest number of conflicts and level of intensity (levels 4 and 5 combined), and c) situations of severe crisis (level 4) were witnessed in the OSCE (three cases), OAS (three cases), CAN (two cases) and NATO (one case).

[Table 1 about here]

The organizations with the highest number of conflicts and highest level of violence are also organizations with the highest number of states on 'alert' situations in the *Failed State Index*, in which demographic pressures, group grievances, the arbitrary use of force, economic decline and in some cases eroded legitimacy, *inter alia*, hamper the ability of states to deal with conflicts and eventually can exacerbate them. Out of the top 20 countries ranked in 'alert' situations (more than 90 points in a maximum scale of 120), 12 are AU members, three ARF members and one OAS-CARICOM member. By aggregating the member states in the ten organizations and obtaining the average of *Failed State Index* for each regional organization, the rank indicates that six organizations are in the 'warning' zone (AU, 87.4; SCO, 83.8; CAN 82.9, ARF 70.6, CARICOM 69.2, OAS 67.6) and four in the 'monitoring' zone (MERCOSUR 56.7, OSCE 52.9, NATO 42.8 and EU 40.3). The level and intensity of violence is also directly related to the incapacity of the states and thus the organizations to respond to crisis. This incapacity gap varies from 40.3 in the EU member states to 87.4 in the AU.

The data reveals that while Europe, after the violent outbreaks of conflict in the Western Balkans, is experiencing an atmosphere of peace and stability, the same cannot be said for

other regions. As described in the chapters on the Western Hemisphere, bi-lateral relations among some of the countries, such as those of CAN, are often tense and have been the cause of relatively recent border military escalations. A similar situation prevails in the ASEAN region where, according to Acharya (2003:170), 'persisting bilateral tensions, territorial disputes [and] militarization' are a prevailing factor in the region. Ethnic strife and territorial disputes are also much in evidence on the African continent, especially in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan. By contrast, the prevailing post-Westphalian characteristics of the European Union have largely resulted in peaceful coexistence between member states rather than conflict or war. This enables EU security governance policy to be directed towards areas outside the immediate core of the Union; the stress is on milieu goals (neighbourhood stability).

Another element in the nature of the contestations of the regions is their political development. As indicated in the introduction of this volume, scholarly work argues that international organizations comprised of democratic states are more effective security providers (Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Hansen *et al*. 2008). Based on the 2007 Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy (EIU)[v] (Kekic 2007), the comparison of the average levels of democracy of the member states in the ten organizations under analysis indicates the following: the EU and NATO score the highest averages (8.19 and 7.99, respectively, on a 10 point scale) and the SCO and the AU the lowest (3.2 and 3.3, respectively). A closer look at the four categories provided by the EIU Index of Democracy, namely, full and flawed democracies and hybrid and authoritarian regimes, suggests that the OSCE, ARF and AU comprise member states in all the four categories (e.g., in the ARF New Zealand scores 9.19 and Burma 1.77), which reflect a large spectrum of democratic practices that can eventually form obstacles for acting collectively within the framework of regional organizations.

Regional organizations with the highest number of members in one of the four categories are ranked as follows: in the full democracy regime is the EU (20 out of 27 members), NATO (15 out of 28) and the OSCE (21 out of 56); and in the flawed democracy regime the OAS (18 out of 35), CAN and MERCOSUR (3 out of 4 members in each). While there are no regional organizations with the majority of members in the category of hybrid regime, the SCO (4 out of 6 members) and the AU (23 out of 53) are dominated by authoritarian regimes. The occurrence of conflict or 'fragile' levels of democratic development makes organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America more focused on either preserving power and stability, or strengthening the democratic institutions of its members, rather than on exporting democracy as is the case of European and transatlantic organizations. Similar characteristics to those of the Democracy Index can be found in the Corruption Perception Index, with the EU and NATO having the best scores (8.19 and 7.99 respectively) and the AU and the SCO the worst scores (2.93 and 2.37 respectively).

Peace and stability in regional organizations can also be linked with human development. The argument of economic integration as a mechanism to set conditions for functional cooperation and the eventual reduction of violence among member states has been explored elsewhere (Nye 1971: 16-18 & 187-199; Tavares and Schulz 2006). For instance, the average of the national Human Development Index (UNDP 2010) of the member states in each one of the ten organizations points out that three regional organizations have very high human development (EU and NATO, 0.83; OSCE, 0.79), two have high human development (MERCOSUR, 0.72; OAS 0.7), four have medium (CAN, 0.69; CARICOM 0.67; SCO 0.65; ASEAN-RF 0.64), and one has low human development (AU, 0.44). While the link between economic integration and peace is more complex, trade prevails as a recurrent indicator. The intraregional trade share partially reinforces the trends in six regional organizations presented

above. In the transatlantic area, intraregional trade in the EU and NATO remains high—62.28 and 58.36 per cent—while in conflicting regions this indicator is low: CARICOM, 14.24; AU, 12.5; SCO, 8.74 and CAN, 7.64 (RISK Platform 2010). Nonetheless, in three cases where there are security concerns, the intra-regional trade share is high: OSCE, 70.67; ARF, 53.62; and OAS, 47.5. These scores can be explained by the high number of member states in such organizations, the proliferation of trade agreements and the concentration of trade in two or more economic powers such as the United States or China. MERCOSUR (16.15) is the only case where both the levels of conflict and intra-trade share is low.

When comparing the ten regional organizations across the nine indicators provided in Table 12.1, the EU and NATO have top level rankings in 8 of the 9 indicators, followed by the OSCE with one top level ranking and five third place rankings. The AU and the SCO rank at the bottom with, respectively, four and three of the nine worst level indicators, followed by CAN with one worst and two second worst level indicators.

A final factor affecting peace and stability in regions relates to the role of and perceived threat from big powers. This applies particularly to the United States which, in some cases, adopts the leadership of the regional organization (NATO), in others strongly influences the regional agenda either as external (CARICOM) or internal (OAS) actor while in some other cases its interests are attenuated by the active role of other members (OSCE). As suggested by Chanona, Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico have consistently sought formulas and strategies to counterbalance the political influence of the US in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, perceived threats from the US in Asia are seemingly a main factor for the cooperation between China and Russia in the SCO, both regional powers using the SCO as a 'gate-keeping' strategy to limit the presence of the USA. According to Hussain, 'only

when the United States is removed from the equation can a true assessment of SCO's identity emerge' (chapter 10). That such interfering factors are not solely confined to the US is evidenced in complaints by ASEAN members about the heavy-handed way China was asserting a claim over the South China Sea.[vi] On the other hand, emerging powers like China, Brazil and India seek to enhance their global agenda by promoting a bilateral approach with the United States, which can be at the expense of regional cooperation and may inhibit further security governance developments within regional organization (Prys 2010; Goh 2004). Such an implication has been particularly noted with regard to the ARF and on the future development of ASEAN in economic, political and security terms (Breslin 2010: 728).

b)   *Level of institutionalization within the region*

The institutionalization of regional security governance policies allows regional organizations to translate the rationale, goals and principles of the regional entity into strategic plans, policies and actions that in turn affect the provision of regional security. In the process of institutionalization, the delegation of authority to regional organizations is of paramount importance; delegation or transfer of authority has been defined as the 'conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former' (Hawkins *et al*. 2006) and entails the authority to implement, interpret, and apply rules (Abbott *et al*. 2000). The analysis of the ten regional organizations indicates that—partly due to scarcity of resources, but mainly for reasons of different threat perceptions and appropriate responses—the transfer of authority of member states to central institutions varies among organizations across the four policy dimensions and within single policy dimension. Thus, an assessment of institutionalization can be viewed from two distinct approaches: the first is by looking at the delegation of functions to regional organization from monitoring to

enforcement; and the second by analyzing how regional organizations transfer authority in each one of the four policy dimensions of security governance presented in this volume.

The first approach relating to the international delegation of authority indicates some common denominators in the ten cases. Contrary to the assumption that sovereignty is indivisible, the member states of various international organizations have voluntarily embraced numerous constrains (Lake 2007; Krasner 1999; Slaughter 2004) through the delegation of authority to regional security organizations, which includes both non-formal-legal foundations of legitimacy and non-violent means of enforcement, and reveals multiple forms of global governance (Lake 2010: 596). National security cultures in turn influence the member states' decision to endow regional institutions with the autonomy to deal with collective security concerns (Kirchner and Sperling 2010). In the initial stage, the process may be depicted as 'inside-out' where the practices of the member states converge or an effort is made to find a consensus to shape the nature and structure of regional security organizations. Once regional organizations come into existence, they may also begin to influence member states based upon the practices and norms agreed and developed at the regional level in an 'outside in' process (Ross 2009). Observation of the delegation of authority in the ten cases reveals four degrees or stages based on the functions that regional organizations perform.

In the first stage, the main function of the regional organization is limited to acting as a setting for multilateral discussion, in which, through general deliberations, the regional organization facilitates side negotiations and may legitimize policies (Hurd 2011). The main instrument is non-binding declarations; while this type of functional delegation represents the minimum denominator of any regional organization and is pervasive to all the ten cases, the

SCO and ARF prefer to centre their activities on this stage of delegation, where sovereignty remains intact. The second stage of delegation is when regional organizations have been given some degree of authority to coordinate regional policies, to follow up on the decisions made by member states, facilitate the information sharing between them and make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of policy goals. The most tangible instruments are plans and programmes with specific goals and the creation of agencies to socialize policy makers and build confidence among the member states. All the organizations in this volume perform some form of policy coordination. The third stage of delegation is when regional organizations manage policies by creating economic and political instruments to mediate conflicts, provide monitoring and policing missions and deliver aid. The OSCE, the EU, NATO and OAS are salient in this domain. The fourth function is less common among the regional organizations and is the enforcement of compliance. Most states are still reluctant to accept this function because it reflects the erosion of sovereignty despite the fact that some of the regional organizations already have instruments to suspend membership (OAS, AU), enact sanctions (EU) or use force to restore or keep peace (NATO).

The second approach to assessing the performance of the regional organizations is to focus on delegation in the four security governance dimensions. With the exception of NATO, the examined organizations delegate greater authority to policies of prevention and assurance than to those of protection and compellence. However, the degree of delegated powers in policies of prevention and assurance differs among these organizations, with the EU achieving a relatively high degree of autonomy/institutionalization,[vii] followed by the OSCE and the AU, while a much lesser degree of autonomy is recorded in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the SCO; CARICOM, CAN and the OAS fall in between these two groups. The importance of regional organizations in these two policy areas may be attributed to their

ability to resolve collective action problems facing the individual member states particularly when it pertains to the exercise of civilian instruments of statecraft towards achieving stability and state building. However, the suggestion by Dorussen *et al.* (2010) that post-Westphalian states, found predominantly within the EU, mitigate the collective action problem, whilst Westphalian states, found in the AU, ASEAN, the SCO and the four Western Hemispheric organizations, exacerbate the problem, could not be confirmed. In part this is due to the fact that the latter organizations have significantly lower levels of activity and resource allocations in prevention and especially in assurance, and therefore give little scope for assessment. On the other hand, as also found in Dorussen *et al.* (2010), on policies of prevention, the behaviour of post-Westphalian and Westphalian states becomes less distinct.

NATO, due to its collective security arrangements, has been granted substantial authority by its member states in policies of compellence and, to some extent, in the policies of prevention, assurance and protection. In the other nine organizations, to different degrees, states remain largely autonomous from regional organizations' interference in the enforcement of decisions and programmes, focusing on areas affecting the social contract or political culture (penal law and judicial processes) or on the expenditure on military interventions to keep, enforce or make peace in civil conflicts. Hence, member states of these nine organizations have a pronounced normative preference that subordinates military force to the economic and diplomatic instruments of persuasion and dissuasion. The sovereignty principle still performs a residual and fundamental barrier to defence and political integration, and demonstrates the dominance of intergovernmental bargaining in the two most important security arenas, compellence and protection. It is interesting to note that, in the area of peacekeeping operations, the member states in some regional organizations prefer to be actively involved with UN operations rather than developing regional collective mechanisms

of compellence. Thus, out of 99,245 personnel deployed in UN operations in 2010, individual members of the ARF contributed 39,372 personnel and the AU 18,303. In the case of NATO, its individual members contributed with 7,712 personnel to UN operations.

However, the post-Westphalian characteristics of EU states allow the EU to make important inroads in the two policy areas of compellence and protection through the conduct of CSDP missions and instruments like Europol, Eurojust and FRONTEX respectively. In contrast, regional organizations with a predominantly Westphalian setting, as found in the African, Asian and Latin American context, rely on factors which have traditionally stifled the prospects for regional security cooperation. Entrenched as they are within a Westphalian, *viz.*, inter-state system, it is not entirely clear to policymakers of regional organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America what modalities of security provision are appropriate or adequate (issues of capacity notwithstanding) in dealing with 'threats' that can variously emanate from and affect domestic and transborder contexts in equal measure. As a consequence of this lack of clarity, regional security mainly concerns mutual non-interference, avoiding confrontation with regional powers and adherence to the strategy of non-alignment, as in the case of ARF-ASEAN. The temptation is thus to fall back on the familiar; that is, state modalities of security provision, as in the Latin American case with the Inter-American system and international legal mechanisms.[viii] Hence, as found in the chapter on the OAS, 'while the need is recognized to cooperate in order to address common threats, national security and defence considerations prevail over hemispheric ones, and no intentions exist to advance mechanisms that imply greater levels of coordination and cooperation'. Furthermore, the Western Hemispheric organizations lack crisis management mechanisms and post-conflict peacekeeping and peace building missions.

Resource deficiencies and capability limitations are other factors which inhibit regional cooperation and affect the working of institutional mechanisms. Regional organizations are quasi-autonomous actors and depend on upon the acquiescence and resources of its member states in the formulation and execution of security policy. The EU maintains access to funding and capabilities superior to comparable regional organizations. The EU has allocated 243 million Euro for its CSDP operations for the 2007-13 period (Gya 2009). In comparison, just for the year 2010, the OAS budgeted 23 million Euro for supporting its activities on multidimensional security (OAS 2009: 13) and the OSCE 98 Euro million for all its field operations (OSCE 2009). The AU amassed 38 million Euro toward its Peace Fund between June 1999 to July 2003 (Williams 2009: 618) but which is overwhelmingly funded by external support from the EU, USA, Canada and others (Hardt 2009: 393). Still smaller security budgets exist for CARICOM which, according to Byron in this volume, suffers from 'perennial issue of resource shortages—financial, technological, infrastructural and human resources'. With regard to the AU, Babarinde suggests that if member states are unable to generate the requisite funds for their initiatives, they should slim down their ambitious collective security governance agendas to more manageable undertakings. However, the advantages gained from cooperation with other regional organizations can be both financially and politically important, as the case of the EU demonstrates with the borrowing of military assets from NATO for its military CSDP operations.

Resources also affect whether states in each of the ten organizations contribute evenly to the collective goods of the four policy dimensions (when assessed according to population size and wealth). However, due to a lack of data sources from the respective regional organizations, only the EU and NATO could be assessed. The case of the EU (Dorussen *et al*. 2009: 807) shows that smaller countries contribute more to assurance and protection policy

areas, on the one hand, and that wealthier countries contribute more to prevention and compellence policies, on the other. These findings contrast with those for NATO, where the small NATO member states contribute unevenly (or 'free ride') with regard to the larger member states (Olsen and Zeckhauser 1966). The EU findings also demonstrate that the different aggregation technologies that apply for the four security areas—summation for assurance and prevention, best-shot for compellence, and weakest link for protection[ix]—do not pose insurmountable barriers to the optimal supply of public goods. While there are *prima facie* indications that some of the other eight organizations manifest similar behaviour characteristics, the data is inconclusive and requires further investigation.

c) *Compliance of the actors with the norms of the system of governance.*

While memories linger of inter-state enmities, disputes, escalations and militarized conflict in Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere, cooperation in security and compliance by actors with the norms of the system of governance is nonetheless in evidence in these regional settings. This demonstrates that collective action can be inspired by a variety of means ranging from 'primitive' balance of power to highly institutionalized security communities. The nature of threats within each region, the responses of states and the institutionalization of security policies interplay at the regional level to produce different security governance systems. Four elements are of particular importance in this context: the security reference, the degree of institutionalization, the level of governance and the context of interaction (Dorussen *et al*. 2010).

The security reference identifies the target of the security arrangement and the main sources of threat, which can be external, internal or in the regional milieu. The degree of

institutionalization presents the functions delegated to the regional organization ranging from multilateral forum to capacity to enforce compliance. The level of governance captures the exercise of state authority with accountability and responsibility and ranges from good to bad (Thakur and Van Langenhove 2008). The context of interaction embraces the way the regional system deals with the security dilemma and the relational orientations with the range between enmity and amity. (For an overview of these four elements see Table 2.) According to these elements, the ten organizations can be grouped into four different security governance systems.

[Table 2 about here]

The first security governance system is *concert* and epitomizes the SCO and the ARF. The predominant security referent is the great powers and the sources of threats emerge from within the security arrangement such as terrorism, separatism or extremism in the case of the SCO. The functional delegation to the regional organizations remains low and is limited to multilateral consultation and managed balance of power. In this system there is a variety of levels of governance, with countries such as Uzbekistan in the SCO or Burma in the ARF ranking low, to good governance in New Zealand or Japan in the ARF. There is a conditional amity among the member states and the security dilemma is mildly mitigated.

The second security governance system is *cooperative security*. While the predominant security referent and source of threat is within the group as in the concert system, the delegation of authority to the regional organization is reflected in the functions of coordination, management and in some cases the enforcement of compliance. In this system the levels of governance of the member states tend to be similar oscillating between medium

to low. There is amity among the member states derived from common standards and the security dilemma is mitigated. Most of the regional organizations respond, to a greater or lesser extent, to characteristics of this system, particularly the OAS, OSCE, AU, CARICOM and CAN.

The third security governance system is *collective defence* and is embraced by NATO. The predominant security referent and source of threat is outside the group. Delegation to the regional organization is high in the area of compellence, but also relevant in terms of coordination and management functions in prevention and protection. In this system, the levels of governance of the member states are similar and high, which facilitates the conditions for cooperation. There is amity among the member states derived of common standards set in the conditions of membership, and the security dilemma is largely dissipated.

The EU has developed the *fused security community* system of governance. While security threats are mostly outside the group, the security reference to the regional milieu is of paramount relevance. The use of both the supranational and inter-governmental methods have made it possible to advance the delegation of authority to the EU, in which voluntary compliance is extensive and judicial sovereignty is largely eroded. In this system, the levels of governance of the member states are similar and high, which facilitates the conditions for cooperation. There is deep amity derived from collective identity where the regional norms have been internalized and the security dilemma has been superseded.

Complementing the role of security governance systems are socialization processes, often fostered in informal authority structures and CSBM procedures for dispute settlements. Although taking the form of a low level of security cooperation or 'soft security governance',

they have helped to encourage normative notions of good governance, to promote the dissipation of conflicts and to reduce existing security dilemmas. For example, low levels of security governance with MERCOSUR have helped to overcome historic inter-state rivalries between Argentina and Brazil and thus reduce the former security dilemma. Similarly, the AU's Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact together with its progressive institutionalization in peace-making and peacekeeping (Standby Force) and counter-terrorism may yet provide the kernel for broader regional security arrangements. Nonetheless, as in all of these 'soft' security governance mechanisms, the question arises as to whether they can succeed in their own rights and/or overcome countervailing norms, e.g., non-interference, sovereignty, and the consensus principle. As Weber so pointedly concludes in the chapter on ASEAN, 'whether the degree of socialization envisioned by ARF proponents can be achieved, and whether it will lead to peaceful relations, only time will tell.' Tensions between sovereignty and solidarity also affect more well-developed organizations such as the OSCE, which is likely to remain weak for as long as its members choose the principle of sovereignty over solidarity.

Conclusion

The analysis of regional organizations since the early 1960s informs of a tendency to embrace one of three positions. First, regional security governance processes are unique and hardly replicable, particularly those of the EU. Second, the EU is a model for the rest of the world to follow and a yardstick against which all other regional organizations measure their success or failure (Graeger and Novosseloff 2003: 89). Third, regional organizations should follow their own way in light of their challenges and circumstances (Acharya and Johnston 2007: 244-7). The study of the ten organizations shows that both these three propositions are intertwined

and their analysis explains only partially the organization's performance. Instead, the main challenge regional organizations face is how to deal effectively and collectively with security threats and how to overcome the reluctance of member states to cooperate and surpass the boundaries set by the principles of the Westphalian state. Overcoming these boundaries appears particularly difficult with the organizations outside Europe. Although contemporary sources of insecurity as perceived by African, Asian and Latin American organizations are similar, the operationalization of normative concerns and security conceptualisation is very different. Hence, while the organizations of these regions have a declared emphasis on collective defence, the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, shaped by historical legacies, impede progress on this aspect. This is somewhat surprising in the case of Latin America, which, although it has a long history of regionalism, lacks both the normative and substantive commitments for achieving, let alone sustaining, a regional modality for governance. There is hence a gap between rhetoric and operationalization/implementation. CARICOM, due to the fact that security there has always been transnational (ties with US and some European states) rather than purely inter-state (Hurrell 1995), make it somewhat a special case.

A 'broadened' understanding of security, a core aspect of the security governance perspective, which has been adopted in this research, is clearly evident in the regional security discourse in all of the organizations examined. This signifies, on the one hand, an expansion, particularly over the past ten years, from non-military to military concerns, as for the EU, the four Western Hemispheric organizations and ARF, and on the other hand, from military to non-military ones, as in the case of NATO. Examples are the OAS adoption in 2002 of a multidimensional concept of security in which threats are viewed as diverse and multidimensional. Security governance also helped to explore the way in which security

issues and discourses have been the subject to a variety of forms of institutionalization in the ten organizations. For most of the ten organizations, the key functions of security governance lie in the emphasis on conflict prevention and protection. This signifies a preference toward negotiated peace and security, but exposes the limitations to pursue tasks of conflict resolution and policies of assurance and compellence; areas where, with the exception of NATO and, to some extent, the EU, organizations lack both the political will to engage as well as capabilities to do so.

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Table 1 : *Indicators of membership cohesion in regional organizations*

	Economic			*Political*			*Security*		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
EU	0.83	69.57	62.28	8.19	6.3	40.3	3.3	4.02	23
NATO	0.83	69	58.36	7.99	6.03	42.8	3.5	4.2	35
OSCE	0.79	65.8	70.67	7.01	5.24	52.9	4.4	5.01	76
OAS	0.7	61.8	47.5	6.84	3.98	67.6	5.5	5.3	48
CARICOM	0.67	60	14.24	6.26	4.13	69.2	6.3	5.3	3
CAN	0.69	58	7.64	6.16	3.08	82.9	6.6	7.01	14
MERCOSUR	0.72	59.5	16.15	7.12	3.93	56.7	3.9	4.8	7
ARF	0.64	60.9	53.62	5.68	4.14	70.6	5.3	6.3	120
SCO	0.65	54	8.74	3.2	2.37	83.8	5.8	7.1	26
AU	0.44	52.96	12.5	3.3	2.93	87.4	7.7	6.59	93

Key:

Economic

1: Human Development Index 2010, UNDP (Index between 0 and 1) (UNDP 2010).

2: Index of Economic Freedom 2010, (Heritage Foundation 2010).

3: Intra-Regional Trade Share 2008 (RISK Platform 2010).

Political

4: Democracy Index 2007, EIU (Index between 1 and 10) (Kekic 2007).

5: Corruption Perception Index 2010, TI (index between 0 and 10) (Transparency International 2010).

Security

6: Failed State Index 2010, Fund for Peace (index between 0 and 112) (Fund for Peace 2010a).

7: External Intervention 2010, Fund for Peace (index between 1 and 10) (Fund for Peace 2010b).

8: Group grievance 2010, Fund for Peace (index between 1 and 10) (Fund for Peace 2010c).

9: Conflict Barometer 2009 (number of conflicts) (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2009).

Table 2 Regional security organizations and security governance systems

Security governance systems	Main sources of threats	Delegation to the regional organizations	System level of Governance	Context of interaction
Concert	Within the group	Multilateral consultation	Variety of levels within group, but predominantly low	Conditional amity; security dilemma mildly mitigated
Cooperative security	Within the group	Coordination and management; some compliance enforcement; consensus method	Oscillating between medium or low	Amity among the member states derived of common standards; security dilemma is mitigated
Collective defence	Outside the group	Strong compliance enforcement; some coordination and management	Dominantly high governance	Amity derived of common standards; security dilemma largely dissipated
Fused security community	Both within and outside the group; emphasis on the regional milieu	Coordination, management and a some compliance enforcement; supranational and intergovernmental methods	High governance	Deep amity, collective identity, internalization of norms and security dilemma superseded

[i] NATO changed its Strategic Concept in 1991, 1999 and 2010.

[ii] From the Shuman Declaration, which aimed to make war 'not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible,' (1950) to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU holds an extensive record of reforms and adaptations triggered by changes in the security milieu.

[iii] While most of the regional organizations studied in this volume have reformed the original treaties or charters, the OAS has kept intact some of the foundational documents such as the Rio Treaty.

[iv] An example of this were EU attempts (more specifically by France, Germany and the UK, known as the EU-3) to stop the uranium enrichment activities of Iran between 2005 and 2008.

[v] The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning government, political participation and political culture. This index covers 165 independent states and two territories. CARICOM is the only regional organization not included in the analysis because of information lacking in 10 out of 15 members.

[vi] See *The Economist* 2010.

[vii] The EU is seen as the most appropriate institutional model for other regional organizations that carry out peace building (Salmon 2002: 337; Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 223; Buzan and Waever 2003: 352).

[viii] For further details on the implications of Westphalian state characteristics on the security cooperation of regional organizations see Anthony Coates (2010).

[ix] For further explanation on the definition of aggregation technologies see chapter one of this volume.