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**Is resource dependence an appropriate framework to describe the influence of
pro-migrant groups on EU policy-makers?**

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Abstract

In the 1970s, US economists discovered that organisations, rather than being self-sufficient, rely on their environment. They recognised that organisations were interdependent, especially when one actor was not in complete control of all the conditions necessary for the achievement of its goal. Furthermore, they argued that interdependence also affected the relationships between organisations. This was particularly evident when a resource that was critical to one organisation's existence was controlled by another organisation. This resource dependence theory has previously been tested empirically in large-n studies to analyse relationships between companies and the government.

In this conference paper, resource dependence theory is adapted to examine the relationships between EU policy-makers and interest groups. More precisely, this paper will analyse the resources both EU policy-makers and pro-migrant groups rely on. This paper is split into three sections. Firstly, the paper will summarise the major characteristics of the resource dependence theory. Secondly, the resource dependence structures between EU policy-makers and pro-migrant groups are theoretically depicted. Thirdly, based on in-depth expert interviews with EU policy-makers and interest representatives, the actual resource dependencies of these actors are examined in detail. In so doing, the theory's applicability to the relationships of EU institutions and pro-migrant groups is tested empirically.

Introduction

In the past century, EU member states evolved from net emigration countries to net immigration ones. Consequently, intergovernmental cooperation in asylum and migration issues has increased and so has the academic interest in both policy areas. While in early works the cause factors of the changing migration patterns were analysed (Freeman 1995; Jahn & Straubhaar 1998; Miles 1993; Overbeek 1995; Portes et al. 1997; Thränhardt & Miles 1995; Zolberg 1989), in more recent scientific contributions the harmonisation endeavours in the areas of asylum and migration at EU level are critically scrutinised (Boswell 2003; Brinkmann 2004; Chou 2006; De Haas 2007; Geddes 2008; Lavanex 2008; Lindstrøm 2005; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Skeldon 2008; Stetter 2000; Ter Steeg 2006; Thielemans & Dewan 2006).

In addition to that, several scientific articles on the interest representation of migrants and asylum-seekers, for instance analysing the factors that affect the emergence of pro-migrant groups, have been published. While some authors name the globalisation of the political economy and rising international legal standards as factors that facilitate their development (Favell & Geddes 1999; Portes 1996; Sassen 1991; Soysal 1997), other authors refer to political opportunity structures as the pivotal factor that decides about the emergence of a pro-migrant group (Eggert & Giugni 2010; Giugni & Passy 2004; Koopmans 2004; Kriesi 1995; Schrover & Vermeulen 2005). Further differentiations are made regarding the mission of such groups. Moya (2005), for instance, differentiates between aid organisations, religious associations, and political groups, whereby the latter either address the reception country or the country of origin (see also Grains et al. 2004; Lancelot 2001; Schrover & Vermeulen 2005; Smith 1998).

This scientific debate illustrates that pro-migrant groups can be composed of differently and can pursue various objectives. For this conference paper, pro-migrant groups, firstly, are defined as groups that advocate in the interest of asylum-seekers and migrants. Groups organised by asylum-seekers or migrants are excluded from the scope from the conference paper. Secondly, only those groups whose intention it is to influence policy outcomes at EU level are considered. Thus, only those groups with liaison offices in Brussels or those that otherwise seek to approach EU policy-makers are taken into consideration.

Based on the resource dependence theory, this paper is intended to analyse the resources both EU policy-makers and pro-migrant groups rely on. First, the paper will summarise the major characteristics of the resource dependence theory. Second, the resource dependence structures between EU policy-makers and pro-migrant groups are theoretically depicted. Third, based on in-depth expert interviews with EU policy-makers and interest representatives, the actual resource dependencies of these actors are examined in detail.

Theoretical Framework

The resource dependence theory was developed by Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), and White (1974) and describes the interdependency between organisations and their environment. Their analysis is intended to explain the interrelation of organisations and private actors. According to the authors, organisations are not capable of generating all the resources needed for the maintenance of their duties. To overcome their shortcomings, they have to cooperate

with private actors which control the demanded resources. The demand of resources and the provision with resources determine whether a cooperation between the organisation and an actor from the environment takes place and, consequently, affects the influence of an actor. In other words, the more resources an organisation requires, the more receptive it is towards external actors. The better an external actor can respond to the demand of resources, the higher its chances are to influence the organisation. On the contrary, a low level of resource dependency limits the external actors' chance to exert influence. White (1974: 367) lists skills, information and customers as resources organisations may require.

In 2002 Bouwen, for the first time, applied the resource dependence theory to the political system of the EU. In his article, he describes how the demand of resources and the provision with resources affects the ability of interest groups to access the EU institutions. As resources Bouwen defines expertise, information about European encompassing interests, and information about domestic encompassing interests. Furthermore, he elaborates that the European Commission (Commission), the European Parliament (Parliament), and the Council of the European Union (Council) rely on the provision with these three resource in the course of the political decision-making process (Bouwen 2002: 379 et seqq.). Princen and Kerremans (2008: 1134) also acknowledge that the EU institutions do not possess all the information they need to make their decisions. Thereby, the extent to which EU institutions rely on interest groups and the capability of interest groups to provide them with the required information determine the relationship between them. According to Princen and Kerremans, their relationship is most durable when both actors can offer something of value to one another.

Subsequent to the original ideas of the resource dependence theory and its adaptation to the political system of the EU, the resource dependence structures between the EU institutions and pro-migrant groups are elaborated. Hence, the following subsections present theoretical assumptions about the resource dependence structures of the various actors. Whether these assumptions hold true in reality is tested empirically in a further section of this conference paper. What is new about this approach is the idea that resource dependency does not only affect the ability of pro-migrant groups to access the EU institutions but also to exert influence on them assuming that access is the prerequisite for influence. Thereby, the EU institutions' resource dependence structures are derived from their respective functions and institutional shortcomings. Based on this characterisation, it is sought to derive which external resources an institution requires. Moreover, it is analysed which resource pro-

migrant groups rely on. Despite Bouwen's categorisation of resources, new categories are introduced; namely, expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy that are required by the EU institutions as well as access on which pro-migrant groups rely on.

Resource dependency of the European Commission

With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the majority of asylum and migration policies are now being negotiated under co-decision. Thus, Commission, Parliament, and Council share legislative power, whereby, Parliament and Council jointly decide about the legislative initiatives of the Commission. That means the Commission holds the right to initiate legislation (Art. 294 TFEU) and to amend legislation (Art. 293 (2) TFEU). Within the Commission, the Directorate-General Home Affairs (DG Home) is responsible for asylum and migration matters. Usually, the Head of Unit or an official who is similarly experienced is in charge of drafting the legislative initiative (Nugent 2001: 242). The Director-General of DG Home and her substitute always are kept informed about the drafting process. After the Legal Service scrutinised the draft, it is forwarded to the other DGs which then can suggest amendments. Potential political controversies are discussed in the Cabinet of the respective Commissioner (Donnelly 1993: 77). The drafting process is not finalised unless all Commissioners have agreed on the draft legislative and it has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union (Nugent 2001: 251). In the further course of the policy-making process, the Commission functions as an observer and mediator between Parliament and Council. Thereby, the Commission is represented by the drafter of the file or an official of the General Secretariat (Nugent 2001: 253).

From its role as legislative initiator three different resource dependencies can be derived: the Commission is dependent on expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy. Its demand for expert knowledge results from its limited personnel capacity (Donnelly 1993: 79; Kohler-Koch 1997: 3; Mazey & Richardson 2001: 3; Nugent 2001: 241), as the number of staff working with the Commission is not sufficient for the detailed coverage of each policy area. To ensure that its legislative initiatives are technically correct, the Commission needs to cooperate with external information provider (Downs 1967: 2). In addition, the Commission relies on the external actors that support its ideas in public and in meetings with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and national civil servants (Donnelly 1993: 81; Mazey & Richardson 2001: 3 et seq.; Nugent 2001: 241; Quittkat & Kohler-Koch 2011: 78). This resource dependency is the result of the political system of the EU itself: as the Commission is only one of three legislative institutions, it needs to

ensure that its initiatives are not totally watered down by the Parliament or the Council. The Commission's need for legitimacy, finally, results from the fact that the Commission is not a directly elected body (Hüller 2010: 76; Judge & Earnshaw 2003: 86; Mazey & Richardson 2001: 3). In order to guarantee that its legislative initiatives, nevertheless, take into consideration the concerns of all stakeholders, the Commission shall consult them during the drafting phase. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H 1: The Commission is dependent on pro-migrant groups for the provision with expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy.

Resource dependency of the European Parliament

Unlike the Commission, the Parliament's main responsibility is not related to drafting an initiative but to decide about the policy draft. Within the Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) is in charge of the Parliament's internal positioning on asylum and migration issues. The members of LIBE, in turn, appoint one rapporteur who is responsible for the drafting of the Parliament's position on a certain file. In her work, the rapporteur is supported by the secretariat of her political group. The other political groups appoint shadow rapporteurs whose responsibility it is to observe the formulation process and ensure that their own political groups' concerns are considered in the Parliament's position (Art. 294 (3) TFEU). Apart from that, MEPs try to exert influence on the rapporteur's report by means of intergroup meetings where MEPs from different political groups come together to discuss remaining issues on a certain file. The intergroup in which asylum and migration issues can be addressed is the one on 'Anti-racism and Diversity'. After the rapporteur has drafted its report, it is voted on in plenary.

From the Parliament's internal structure and responsibilities, the following resource dependencies can be derived. Firstly, in order to be able to vote on a certain file, MEPs rely on the provision with expert information that highlights potential consequences for the MEPs' electorates. Due to the high technicality of Commission proposals, the workload and time constraints of MEPs, and the general deficit in personnel, MEPs appear to be reliant on external information providers (Judge & Earnshaw 2003: 105; Kohler-Koch 1997: 6). Secondly, the Parliament depends on external actors when it comes to the support of its ideas in public and towards Council members and national civil servants. This support is particularly important as the Parliament needs to ensure that the Council does not oppose its position totally in the further course of the co-decision procedure (Judge & Earnshaw (2003: 110 ff; Kohler-Koch 1997:5). Thirdly, the Parliament seems to rely on legitimacy

provided by external actors although it is the only EU institution that is directly elected by EU citizens. As an argument for the Parliament's need for further legitimacy, Judge and Earnshaw (2003: 76, 80-85) point to low turnouts of European elections, to election campaigns that usually do not focus on European issues, and to the fact that there are no European parties EU citizens can vote for but national representatives. From the Parliament's internal structure and duties, the following hypothesis is derived:

H2: The Parliament is dependent on pro-migrant groups for the provision with expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy.

Resource dependency of the Council of the European Union

As co-legislator of the Parliament, the Council decides about files negotiated under co-decision. Although it is a unitary body, the Council consists of different configurations – currently 10 – on different policies. Responsible for asylum and migration is the configuration on ‘Justice and Home Affairs’. Each configuration, in turn, comprises various working parties and committees that are in charge of the preparatory work for the response of the Council to the Commission's proposal or the Parliament's position (Council 2010). These are the working group on ‘Integration, Migration, and Expulsion’, the ‘Visa working group’, the ‘Asylum working group’, and the ‘Frontiers working group’. Due to the specificity and technicality of the Commission's proposals, more than 80% of all Council decisions are decided upon in working groups (Nilsson 2004: 131). In case national disputes cannot be resolved at working group level, they are delegated to the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum or to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The Permanent Representations of the member states to the EU, in turn, function as the interface between working groups and the national ministries. They inform the national experts in the capitals about the state of the negotiations and are instructed to mediate potential national concerns in COREPER meetings to assure that national interests are not overruled by the other Council members (Westlake & Galloway 2004: 209-213). Legal acts that were agreed upon at working group or COREPER level are adopted in Council meetings without debate. Highly controversial legal acts, however, are either delegated back to the respective working groups or are discussed in Council meeting to resolve any remaining disputes (Bostock 2002: 219 et seq.). Voting in the Council meetings is prepared by COREPER and is observed by permanent representatives who, again, notify their ministries of potential stumbling blocks and possible suggestions for compromises (Westlake & Galloway 2004: 215).

From the structure and mode of operation of the Council, it becomes evident that it is less dependent on external resources than the Commission and the Parliament are. Given that the Council represents the member states, their interests need to be taken into consideration when it comes to decision-making. For the impact assessment for each member state, however, the Council, rather than relying on interest groups, it can refer to national experts of COREPER and the ministries. Besides, the Council cannot count on pro-migrant groups as regards the support of its position in public and towards the Parliament because especially in asylum and migration matters, their interests vary. Council members rather approach MEPs from their member state to inform them about national concerns and provide them with concrete voting lists (Judge & Earnshaw 2003: 110 et seqq.). As regards the Council's legitimacy, it has to be kept in mind that member states, from the very beginning of the European Community, held legislative authority. The Commission and the Parliament, on the contrary, have gradually expanded their authority and, therefore, are dependent on in-put legitimacy. The member states, however, have always been the 'masters of the treaties'; consequently, the Council does not require any further legitimacy. Thus, the following hypothesis is inferred:

H3: While the Council depends on pro-migrant groups for the provision with external knowledge to some extent, it does not require their support and legitimisation.

Resource dependency of pro-migrant groups

Unlike the resource dependency of the EU institutions, the one of pro-migrant groups is limited to one good – access. In order to exert influence on policy outcomes, pro-migrant groups need to gain access to policy-makers. This resource dependency appears to be undisputed. How pro-migrant groups get access to policy-makers, however, is a more comprehensive research question. First of all, pro-migrant groups need to be in the position to provide the EU institutions with the resources they require; namely, expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy. They are only capable of providing expert knowledge if they have sufficient means and personnel for the observance of intra- and inter-institutional decision-making processes and to find out which institution requires what information. Furthermore, pro-migrant groups need to be able to adapt to the political situation in order to successfully sell their ideas. This kind of flexibility can only be guaranteed if the internal organisation of the group allows for fast and flexible decisions (Nugent 2001: 241). In addition, pro-migrant groups can only produce high quality information if their personnel are trained accordingly to do so (Slim 2002:5).

The provision of EU policy-makers with support premises a certain political consensus between the policy-makers, on the one hand, and pro-migrants, on the other hand, as regards their ideas of what a common asylum and migration policy shall look like. As the Commission's and the Parliament's ideas of a common asylum and migration system appear to be similar to those of pro-migrant groups, it is more likely that pro-migrant groups can provide support for these two institutions. Cooperation between the Council and pro-migrant groups, on the contrary, seems unlikely because the member states are anxious to keep the transposition costs for harmonising legislation low. As a consequence, pro-migrant groups' objectives go beyond what member states seem to be willing to approve. To support one institution's opinion towards the others, pro-migrant groups, again, require sufficient financial and personnel resources; only then are they able to access the respective policy-makers and to pursue their lobbying strategies.

As regards the generation of expert knowledge and the provision with support, it becomes clear that financial resources are indispensable for a sufficient number of staff and the maintenance of a liaison office in Brussels. Reviewing the literature (Beyers 2002; Beyers et al. 2008; Dür 2008), cause groups such as pro-migrant groups, however, are presented as underfunded because they basically rely on their members and donations or subsidisations from the Commission. Nevertheless, rather than saying that all pro-migrant groups lack financial resources, it is assumed that those that are underfunded find it more difficult to provide the EU institutions with expert knowledge and support.

Regarding the provision with legitimacy, the pro-migrant groups own legitimacy is crucial. As most of the pro-migrant groups active in Brussels are not organised by refugees or migrants but rather advocate in their name, they appear to lack legitimacy themselves. Fazi and Smith (2006: 20) and Slim (2002: 7et seq.), nevertheless, argue that pro-migrant groups can strengthen their own legitimacy by referring to international human rights when asking for the support of asylum-seekers and migrants. Moreover, they bring forward the argument that the support from public foundations and volunteers may help strengthening their legitimacy. Thus, those groups that are in the position to demonstrate their own legitimacy may also be capable of providing the EU institutions with the required legitimacy. For pro-migrant groups the following hypothesis is derived:

H4: In order to exert influence, pro-migrant groups require access to EU policy-makers.

Research design

Based on the theoretical framework that has been developed in the previous section, this conference paper is intended to present preliminary findings on whether there exists a resource interdependency between the EU institutions and pro-migrant groups and whether this resource interdependency affects the influence of pro-migrant groups. For this analysis, a comparative embedded case study design is applied. Four different directives were selected as case studies – the Long-term Residents Directive (LTR Directive), the Qualification Directive, and their respective recast. Within these case studies it is examined whether resource dependencies exist between the EU institutions and pro-migrant groups that form the units of the research design.

The pro-migrant groups that actively lobbied on the selected directives have been identified by screening those stakeholders that contributed to the Commission's online consultation on the 2007 Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System. As this Green Paper reflects on those directives that had already been adopted in the area of asylum and migration, it appears to be an expedient starting point for sampling. Out of the 66 non-governmental organisations that responded to the online consultation, ten groups were identified as having lobbied on the selected directives:

- Amnesty International EU office (AI Europe)
- Caritas Europa
- Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME)
- Jesuit Refugee Service Europe (JSR Europe)
- European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)
- European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
- European Women's Lobby (EWL)
- Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA)
- International Federation Terre des Hommes (International TDH)
- Red Cross EU Office (Red Cross).

From a thorough document analysis and asking interest representatives of the mentioned groups about other pro-migrant groups that were active in the field, four further groups have been identified:

- International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA)
- Migration Policy Group (MPG)

- Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law
- Starting Line Group.

With 7 out of those 14 pro-migrant groups interviews have already been conducted. In addition, 19 officials of the Commission, the Parliament, the Council, and Permanent Representations have been interviewed. Based on the assumption that pro-migrant groups can only access and thus exert influence on EU policy-makers if they are capable of providing them with the resources they require, the groups and EU policy-makers were asked to comment on their cooperation with each other and on the resources they think EU institutions rely on. The preliminary findings gathered from those interviews are illustrated in the subsequent section.

Results

The EU institutions' dependence on expert knowledge

Most of the interest representatives that have been interviewed on the EU institutions' dependence structures are convinced that all three of them rely on the provision with expert knowledge. A representative of JSR Europe replied that the crucial reason for the EU institutions' dependence on expert knowledge lack sufficient staff capacities to gather this knowledge themselves (Interview conducted with interest representative of JSR Europe). Red Cross and MPG, however, take a more differentiated stand on this resource dependency. Their interest representatives stress that it is rather the Commission and the Parliament that are understaffed compared to their increasing scope of duties. Therefore, they seem to be more reliant on the provision with expert information (Interview conducted with interest representatives of MPG and Red Cross). A representative of CCME, in turn, commented that the Parliament and the Council would not need to be reliant on external expert information if they cooperated with each other and exchanged their own information. As long as they maintain seeing each other as institutional competitors, however, there are as reliant on external expert information just as the Commission is (Interview conducted with interest representative of CCME). As regards the sort of information the EU institutions depend on, the interest representatives are concordant that it is predominantly on the ground information, comparative reports, and case studies of individuals that EU institutions cannot gather themselves (Interview conducted with interest representatives of Caritas Europa, ENAR, JSR Europe, MPG, Red Cross).

From the interviews with Commission officials it became clear that they appreciate the information pro-migrant groups provide. One official stressed the importance of this external expert information for the first asylum and migration directives that were negotiated at the beginning of the 21st century against the background that the Commission at that time did not have adequate capacities and expertise to cover these policy areas. Another Commission official pointed to the role of pro-migrant groups as monitors of the transposition process – a task that the Commission cannot perform on the ground and for which it relies on the help of pro-migrant groups (Interview conducted with Commission officials). Within the Parliament, MEPs across the different political groups appear to be accordant that they rely on the provision with expert information. As reasons for this resource dependency they name time constraints, shortcoming in and high turnover of personnel, and lack of expertise in asylum and migration matters. In order to be on a par with the Council that can rely on national experts and ministries for its daily work, the interviewed MEPs highlight the importance of pro-migrant groups as information providers (Interviews conducted with GUE/NGL, Greens/EFL, ALDE, EPP MEPs¹). In an interview with two administrators of the Council General Secretariat, they argued that it is rather the member states, and particular the smaller ones, that are dependent on the provision with expert knowledge. The Council General Secretariat, on the contrary, refers to national experts and to the UNHCR rather than to pro-migrant groups for the provision with required information (Interview conducted with administrators of the Council General Secretariat). Out of nine interviews conducted with representatives of Permanent Representations, only four acknowledged that the information provided by pro-migrant groups can add value to the political debate and the position-finding process in the capitals (Interview conducted with representatives of the Permanent Representations of Finland, Hungary, Poland, and the UK). Especially for asylum statistics and figures as well as reports on the situation on the spot, according to the Finnish and Polish representatives, Permanent Representations rely on pro-migrant groups. The other representatives interviewed on this matter replied that the Permanent Representation can refer to their national ministries and the UNHCR for expert information required to find the national position on a certain file and to negotiate it with the other member states (Interview conducted with representatives of the Permanent Representations of Austria, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands). As cross reference, the representative of the Netherlands confirmed that the Commission and the Parliament are more reliant on the provision with expert

¹ GUE/NGL: European United Left/Nordic Green Left; Greens: The Greens/European Free Alliance; ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; EPP: European People's Party

information because they lack personnel and therefore welcome ready-made solutions to ease their workload.

The EU institutions' dependence on support from pro-migrant groups

As regards the EU institutions' dependence on support from pro-migrant groups, interest groups' opinions diverge. While the representative of the Red Cross affirmed that she was never approached by EU policy-makers who asked her to support their ideas, a representative of ECRE believes that ECRE's argumentation is used by EU policy-makers to put more weight on their own opinion. However, she does not think that EU policy-makers would name the groups from which they have taken the argumentation (Interview conducted with interest representatives of Red Cross and ECRE). On the contrary, interest representatives of MPG, CCME, and JSR Europe are convinced that the Commission in particular relies on external support and thus uses pro-migrant groups in that way. As a reason for this resource dependence, an interest representative of CCME refers to the exclusion of the Commission from directly intervening in the negotiations between Council and Parliament. To ensure that its ideas are not watered down too much, the Commission provides pro-migrant groups with information on the negotiations that they would not get otherwise. In return, the Commission expects the pro-migrant groups to approach those actors that appear to jeopardise the Commission's proposal for directive (Interview conducted with interest representatives of CCME). Apart from that, an interest representative of JSR Europe reported that the Commission also uses the critical attitude of pro-migrant groups towards the member states' attempts to water down a directive for its own means. By pointing out to them that the voices of civil society are going to get louder and louder, the Commission tries to up the pressure on those member states (Interview conducted with interest representatives of JSR Europe).

A response received from a Commission official, confirms the dependency on support illustrated by the interest representatives above. Although this official asserted that the cooperation between the Commission and pro-migrant groups is not that strategic and secret, she verified the Commission's tendency to inform pro-migrant groups about what the Commission seeks to achieve and what is negotiated between the institutions. Nevertheless, she also alluded to the fact that it is not only the Commission that benefits from the external support of the pro-migrant groups but also the groups themselves which by supporting the Commission also get closer to the realisation of their own objectives (Interview conducted with Commission official). The opinions about the Parliament's dependence on support, on the contrary, varies among the political groups. An ALDE MEP, for

instance, stated that in general she would like to get support from pro-migrant groups in intra-parliamentary debates but has not experienced it yet (Interview conducted with ALDE MEP). A MEP of the Greens, in turn, also acknowledges her dependence on support to convince other MEPs of her opinion and also confirms that this kind of cooperation exists between MEPs and interest groups (Interview conducted with Greens MEP). A GUE MEP, although he prefers to personally talk to other MEPs, regards the cooperation with pro-migrant groups as an alternative to get support (Interview conducted with GUE MEP). The assistant to an EPP MEP who was interviewed on this question, however, negated EPP's dependence on support in asylum and migration matters because EPP's views on these matters differ too much from those of pro-migrant groups. She, however, believes, that rapporteurs in particular seek support from pro-migrant groups in order to convince other MEPs of their draft reports (Interview conducted with EPP MEP). In an interview with two administrators of the Council General Secretariat, on the contrary, it was reported that rather than using pro-migrant groups as indirect supporters of their national position, member states approach MEPs directly. They argued that this kind of resource dependence is more crucial for the Commission and the Parliament (Interview conducted with administrators of the Council General Secretariat). A Finish representative said that she would refer to interest groups for support but not as regards asylum and migration policies because there is nothing at stake for Finland (Interview conducted with Finish representative). A British representative also denied her dependency on support from pro-migrant groups because she knows that they support more progressive and liberal views on asylum and migration issues than her national government does (Interview conducted with British representative). A Dutch representative, on the contrary, confirmed that he does give information to pro-migrant groups to help them identifying those member states that oppose their views. As such, he does not only benefit from the pro-migrants groups' support but also assists them in achieving their goals (Interview conducted with Dutch representative). Finally, in an interview with a Latvian representative, the Commission's dependence of external supporters was cross referenced by confirming that the Commission does refer to the argumentation of pro-migrant groups in negotiations with the Council in order to make its point and convince the Council of its ideas (Interview conducted with Latvian representative).

The EU institutions' dependence on legitimacy from pro-migrant groups

Whether the EU institutions are reliant on input legitimacy from pro-migrant groups appears to be the most controversial resource dependence structure discussed in this paper. Even among the pro-migrant groups themselves there is no consensus on this issue. While an interest representative of

ENAR clarified that it is not the purpose of the organised civil society to legitimise EU policy because they only advocate for a fraction of the society, the other pro-migrant groups that have been interviewed do not contradict their ability of providing EU institutions with legitimacy (Interview conducted with interest representatives of ENAR). On the extent to which EU institutions rely on input legitimacy, however, their opinions diverge. An interest representative of ECRE claimed that all EU institutions are dependent on input legitimacy and that pro-migrant groups, if consulted, can be beneficial to their legitimacy as EU legislators (Interview conducted with interest representatives of ECRE). Another person representing CCME, on the contrary, differentiates saying that MEPs do not rely on further input legitimacy because they are already legitimised through direct elections (Interview conducted with interest representatives of CCME). An interest representative of Caritas Europa, however, questions this per se legitimacy and argues that because of their mandate, MEPs even more rely on further legitimacy because they need to demonstrate that they are responsive to their electorates. Thus, by consulting pro-migrant groups they can prove that they care about issues that are important to their constituencies. Moreover, according to him, the Commission also requires input legitimacy, whereas the Council is less reliant on legitimacy from pro-migrant groups because the decisions of the member states are guided by what is best for its citizens (Interview conducted with interest representatives of Caritas Europa).

The Commission's dependence on legitimacy attested by most of the interviewed pro-migrant groups, was not confirmed by Commission officials themselves who clarified that the purpose of the Commission's consultation is not to legitimise its policy drafts but to get input and weigh the standpoints of different stakeholders (Interviews conducted with Commission officials). With a view to the Parliament, it becomes clear that while all the MEPs that have been interviewed agree on the fact that it is important to include the voices of civil society by consulting NGOs, only one MEP of GUE acknowledged that consultation also helps shortening the distance between the Parliament and the citizens and, thus, strengthens the Parliament's legitimacy as a legislator. This way, MEPs can demonstrate that they are accountable to their electorates not only during election campaigns but also in their everyday business (Interview conducted with GUE MEP). MEPs of the Greens and ALDE, on the contrary, insisted that the legitimacy MEPs receive through direct elections is sufficient to justify their authority as legislators (Interviews conducted with EPP and Greens MEPs). A MEP of the EPP, in addition, pointed to the issue that pro-migrant only represent a small fraction of society and no majority opinion. Consequently, pro-migrant groups are not even in the position to provide MEPs with legitimacy (Interview conducted with EPP MEP). In the

interview with administrators of the Council General Secretariat, the interviewees neglected the Council's dependence on legitimacy. They referred to the European Asylum Support Office that has just recently been established and whose purpose, amongst others, it is to consult stakeholders on new policy initiatives. Moreover, they clarified that it is the Commission that conducts consultations to strengthen its legitimacy (Interview conducted with administrators of the Council General Secretariat). Representatives of Greece and Poland have a similar opinion about the dependence on legitimacy. While the Polish representative stated that the Council does not need further legitimacy from pro-migrant groups, the Greek representative stressed that productivity is more important than the consultation of all potential stakeholders. Hence, in his view there is not only a need for legitimacy but also no time for consultation (Interviews conducted with Polish and Greek representatives). A Latvian representative who was interviewed on this matter replied that at the moment Latvian pro-migrant groups cannot add any further legitimacy to governmental decisions because of the low numbers of asylum-seekers and migrants in Latvia and the lack of expertise of national interest groups resulting from this situation (Interview conducted with Latvian representative). On the contrary, Finnish and British representatives acknowledge the need for legitimising governmental decisions. Yet, they do not think that the Council requires input legitimacy. Legitimising takes place in the member states by means of consulting national interest groups which according to them is the meaning of democracy (Interviews conducted with Finnish and British representatives). A German and a Dutch representative took a weaker position saying that consultation is important for legitimisation of governmental decisions. Nevertheless, the extent to which those contributions are considered in national positions varies tremendously (Interviews conducted with German and Dutch representatives).

Pro-migrant groups' dependence on access to the EU institutions

After the pro-migrant groups' and the EU policy-makers' assessment of the EU institutions' resource dependence structures has been pictured in the previous subsections, now the resource dependency of pro-migrant groups is illustrated. All interest representatives that have been interviewed appear to be accordant that the resource pro-migrant groups rely on most is access to the EU institutions. Access, according to them, is the crucial factor that affects a group's lobbying channels and, thus, its actual influence. In this context, all interest representatives agreed that factors that do limit their advocacy work are insufficient resources, personnel deficits, and time constraints. Caritas Europa and MPG, in particular, referred to these factors as reasons for not lobbying, or not having lobbied, the Parliament (Interviews conducted with interest representatives

of Caritas Europa and MPG). An interest representative of JSR Europe shares their view explaining that he only goes to see EU officials in person if there is something at stake for the persons JSR Europe represents (Interview conducted with interest representative of JSR Europe). Interest representatives of CCME and the Red Cross add to the list of limiting factors the high turnover of staff that complicates the maintenance of a close and durable contact to EU policy-makers (Interviews conducted with interest representatives of CCME and the Red Cross). An interest representative of ECRE, in addition, refers to a group's internal structure that may decide about its success. For ECRE, for instance, it appears to be difficult to provide on the ground information and case studies in the short time frame scheduled by EU policy-makers (Interview conducted with interest representative of ECRE). ENAR's interest representative confirms this problem explaining that ENAR is dependent on its national members regarding the collection of expert knowledge. For its member organisation, however, a two weeks time frame is just too short to gather the information required by the EU institutions (Interview conducted with interest representative of ENAR). They also attach great importance to the representativeness a group needs to have. According to them, this can either be reached by organising in networks of various groups from different member states or by means of a comprehensive internal structure including member organisations from different member states (Interviews conducted with interest representatives of Caritas, ECRE, ENAR, JSR).

Conclusion

In the course of this paper, it has been elaborated that, beyond dispute, there exist dependence structures between the EU institutions and pro-migrant groups. What resources the individual actors depend on and to what extent they are reliant on each other, however, remains controversial among political scientist. To encounter these issues in the area of asylum and migration, potential resource dependence structures have been tested empirically. 26 interviewees from pro-migrant groups and EU institutions have been asked to comment on the authors assumptions about resource interdependences. Their responses present preliminary findings and are going to be complemented by data from additional interviews. The author's assumptions and the responses gathered from the interviews are briefly compared in the following.

For the Commission it was predicted that it is reliant on pro-migrant groups for the provision with expert information to compensate its personnel capacity, with external support to ensure that its ideas are not watered down by the Parliament or the Council, and with legitimacy in order to be

able to justify its policy initiatives. While the Commission's dependence on expert information was confirmed by pro-migrant groups and Commission officials working in the area of asylum and migration, their opinion about the Commission's reliance on external support diverge. Some of the interviewed pro-migrant groups confirmed the assumption that the Commission uses pro-migrant groups for the support of its ideas in the negotiations with the Parliament and the Council, whereas others did not experience such cooperation in practice but regard it as desirable. One Commission official, in turn, acknowledged that this type of cooperation takes place but also stressed that it is beneficial to both the Commission and pro-migrant groups. Asking the interest representatives to comment on the Commission's need for legitimacy confirms the hypothesis that the Commission also cooperates with pro-migrant groups to encounter legitimacy deficits. The Commission officials, on the contrary, clearly denied this dependence structure. Hence, the data gathered from the interviews affirms the assumptions that the Commission requires expert knowledge and support. Its dependence on input legitimacy, however, was not confirmed by most of the Commission officials.

With a view to the Parliament's resource dependence, it was assumed that MEPs require expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy from pro-migrant groups. Regarding the dependence on expert knowledge, interest representatives and MEPs are accordant that the Parliament relies on expert knowledge because MEPs lack time and capacity to cover every policy issue in detail. While the Parliament's reliance on external support for its position has not been confirmed by pro-migrant groups, MEPs of ALDE, GUE, and the Greens attested that this kind of cooperation is desirable and sometimes takes place. The interviewed EPP MEP, however, denied such cooperation because of the difference of her political group's position and pro-migrant groups' objectives regarding asylum and migration matters. As regards the need for legitimacy, only two of the interviewed interest representatives stated that MEPs are dependent on additional legitimacy from pro-migrant groups. The same impression became evident from the interviews with MEPs. Only the GUE MEP acknowledged that besides the legitimisation gained from direct elections MEPs need to consult pro-migrant groups to further legitimise their decisions. Thus, only the Parliament's dependence on expert knowledge has been approved through the data gathered from the interviews. The MEPs' reliance on external support could only partially be confirmed, whereas the Parliament's dependence on legitimacy could not be proven empirically.

For the Council it was assumed that it requires some additional expert knowledge from pro-migrant groups but is not reliant on their support and legitimisation. While the Council's dependence on expert knowledge has been confirmed by most of the interviewed interest representatives, only a minority of the national representatives that had been interviewed claimed that pro-migrant groups can add value to the information Permanent Representations get from national experts and ministries. As regards the need for external support for the Council's position, all interviewed interest representatives and the majority of the national representatives and Council officials denied such a dependence structure because the Council's position on asylum and migration issues differs too much from the one of pro-migrant groups. The Council's dependence on input legitimacy from pro-migrant groups, in addition, was also negated by most of the interviewed interest representatives, Council officials, and national representatives. Thus, the author's assumption that the Council is not reliant on pro-migrant groups for support and legitimacy is confirmed by the data gathered from the interviews. On the contrary, its dependence on external expert information could only be affirmed in parts.

Finally, as regards the pro-migrant groups' resource dependence structure, the responses by the interviewees confirmed the author's hypothesis that pro-migrant groups rely on access to the EU policy-makers. As factors that hamper a group's ability to access the EU institutions, the interviewed interest representatives list insufficient resources, personnel deficits, time constraints, high turnover of staff, an inflexible internal organisation, and a group's insufficient representativeness.

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