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State-building without a strategy? The European Union and the conflicts in Darfur.

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Abstract:

This article evaluates the European Union's record in the conflicts in Darfur (2003–2010) by using a framework of analysis that contrasts the competing conceptualizations of 'peace-building' and 'state-building', the former defined as normative and the latter defined as either strategic or non-strategic. The extent to which the use of military force is part of a coherent strategy to impose a political solution, or more an instrument that comes to be relied upon by hazard, is one of the key distinguishing features of contrasting visions of state-building. During 2007–9, the EU acted as a non-strategic state-builder, but its overall approach fits the 'normative peace-building' model.

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the specific nature of the EU's contribution to the resolution of conflicts in Darfur. To achieve this objective, the article briefly synthesizes some of the normative and strategic assumptions present in the peace-building and state-building literatures. One of the distinguishing features of the competing definitions between peace-building and state-building relies on the extent to which diplomacy aims to maintain a neutral balance between belligerent parties or whether it seeks to impose a particular political solution through military means. Another distinguishing feature is that peace-building's policies are more focused on supporting human rights, civil society and local institutions, whereas state-building's focus on security and the maintenance of 'shared' sovereignty. Within the critical literature, there are two conceptualizations of state-building: one emphasizes that the imposition of political and military solutions can be defined as a return to the practices of neo-colonialism, whereas another stresses that the specificity of the current use of coercive means on the part of Western governments, although an attempt to seek to regulate, does not result in a traditional 'neo-colonial' form of imposition of rule but rather in a form of external rule that promotes self-help and self-improvement and leads to 'shared' sovereignty. The former definition could be classified as 'strategic state-building', the latter as 'non-strategic state-building'. The former is strategic because it assumes that Western powers can achieve a common understanding of how the use of military means can be deployed to achieve specific political objectives, as colonial powers at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did. The latter is non-strategic because military means are not deployed in the context of a

clear understanding of the overall political objectives to be achieved, but rather in an ad-hoc manner. At the same time, some theorists argue that there is a third framework of analysis that shapes the Western approach, defined as 'normative/liberal peace-building', which is different from the traditional form of peace-building. Normative peace-building promotes the superiority of Western norms through policies that support human rights, civil society and institutions, whereas peace-building is an activity that is focused on 'sustainable' peace, often understood as grassroots and locally-owned. Normative/liberal peace-building stands in a tense relationship vis-à-vis non-strategic and strategic state-building.

Aspects of these four models of 'peace-building', 'normative peace-building', 'strategic state-building and 'non-strategic state-building' are also present in the key assumptions of contrasting theories or framework of analysis of the EU's external role. Until recently, EU engagements in conflict zones have in fact been conceptualized as 'peace-building' because of the EC/EU tendency to privilege soft power, normative power, humanitarian aid and non-coercive means. More recently, some authors have argued that the EU could support state-building by default because of its tendency to privilege human rights over geo-strategic objectives or because of the specificity of its internal nature, which prevents it from being able to take decisions that are based on shared common values. Others maintain that the EU is driven to pursue state-building either because of the role that traditional colonial powers play in shaping EU policies or because the EU has its own specific geo-strategic and security objectives.

The paper is subdivided into two parts: we first synthesize the framework from the peace-building and state-building literatures with those concerned with explaining the dynamics driving EU external action. We then provide an analysis of how EU policies towards Darfur (2003–2010) seem to relate to some of the assumptions contained in the different models.

Part 1

Peace-building versus state-building: competing conceptualization

Among critical scholars, there are competing definitions of the terms 'peace-building' and 'state-building'. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisks define peace-building as 'post-conflict peace-building' and argue that state-building can be conceptualized as a subcomponent of peace-building. As they explain: 'state-building is a particular approach to peace-building, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil wars partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions.'[1] Post-conflict peace-building is defined as a wider range of external engagements directed at civil society and citizens. They are careful to emphasise that state-building is not an attempt to replace peace-building. As they argue, 'Support for post-war state-building should not be misconstrued as an attempt to supplant peace-building, but rather, as a call for paying greater attention to strengthening or constructing effective and legitimate governmental institutions as an important element of peace-building.'[2] In contrast, Oliver Richmond argues that Paris and Sisk problematically combine the two concepts, despite attempts at keeping them as distinct. They conflate state-building with liberal peace-building and the latter is quite different from 'peace-building'.[3] As Richmond explains, 'rather than being focused on grassroots, human needs, civil society and sustainability emanating from the most marginalized and their problems..., liberal peace-building focuses on insti-

tutions in liberal-democratic markets and rule of law modes.'[4] In Richmond's view, Paris and Sisk are attempting to connect peace-building to state-building and it would be more useful to rethink critically the state-building and liberal peace-building literatures and practices to develop new form of political organization. To simplify, it could be argued that Richmond conceptualized the existence of three different models: 'peace-building', 'liberal/normative peace-building' and 'state-building'. Whereas the peace-building model, also defined as the 'emancipatory model', allows for ownership of processes from below and focuses on achieving consent between external and local players, as well as being strongly concerned with social justice, state-building is a top-down approach, more influenced by hegemony and what Richmond defines as a 'victor's peace' and 'orthodox model' of the 'liberal peace'.[5]

Richmond defines the 'conservative model' of the 'liberal peace' as being characterized by the imposition of rule via coercive means, including the use of military force, an emphasis on prioritising the building of state institutions from above, and a strong concern for security. The second model, 'the orthodox model', is more wary and sensitive to local ownership and culture but Western powers are still determined to transfer their methodologies, objectives and norms into the new governance framework. According to Richmond, the emergence of a focus on governance and state-building captures the contradictions inherent in the 'liberal peace' – meaning social contract, welfare, and civil society. The contemporary 'liberal peace' is a form of liberal hybrid that brings together aspects of liberalism, with a 'constitutional institutional' and 'civil society' conceptualization of peace that also includes elements of the 'victor's peace' approach. [6] In fact, in his view, in the contemporary implementation of the 'liberal peace' there is a trend towards seeking to impose a universal blueprint of what liberal norms might mean. Although internationals deny this publicly, they accept it privately. This trend points towards liberal peace-building becoming increasingly involved in governance – based on external, rather than citizens' consent and legitimacy – which might be viewed as neo-colonial or part of a neo-liberal peace, a 'peace as governance', understood as a modified form of hegemony.[7]

In addition, Richmond argues that the recent focus on the reform of governance, a key feature of state-building, fails to come to terms with the experiences of individuals, their needs in everyday life, their welfare, culture and traditions. The interventions in Afghanistan (2001–) and in Iraq (2003–) are the best examples of a change in the conceptualization of peace from liberal to neo-liberal, from being dominated by a liberal peace-building to a neo-liberal state-building approach.[8] As Richmond explains, 'the state-building agenda is focused on political, economic and security architecture and determines its outcomes as neo-liberal, sovereign and territorial state',[9] whereas a 'peace-building' approach will be more influenced by a grassroots bottom-up process in which a local consensus leads to a positive peace. For Richmond, the issue of ownership and consent is a key concept in identifying whether a Western intervention in 'fragile states' is part of a peace-building or state-building approach. Hence, Richmond adopts the concept of a 'post-liberal peace' and his emphasis is on concepts such as local-liberal hybridity, critical agency, etc.

A slightly different conceptualization of 'state-building' is provided by the work of David Chandler. In his view, the current dominant trend in international relations is that of international state-building, which has become a key concern of Western elites, not so much because of the real 'threat' that these conflicts pose to Western societies, but rather because the collapse of the Third World has gone hand in hand with a change within the West in terms of relations between the state and society. This change can be conceptualized as a form of 'post-liberal governance' order – and not as a 'liberal peace'– where the responsibilities of liberalism and governance have been reneged upon by the international community. In his

analysis, scholars who adopt the concept of the 'liberal peace' assume that it is an adequate description of the policy framework devised and implemented in international intervention and external state-building approaches since the end of the cold war. In Chandler's view, the problem is that such writers use the concept of liberalism promiscuously and with very different outcomes. From his perspective, the Western approach is not shaped by the value of liberalism but rather by an attempt at regulation that seeks to contain the aspirations for democracy and liberal freedoms. The West is promoting mechanisms of governance in 'fragile states' that remove substantive self-political autonomy.

Whereas Richmond and other writers who use the 'framework of the liberal peace' argue that the 'liberal peace' can lead to 'state-building' and that failed policies and the dynamics for these developments are intrinsic in the liberal tradition, Chandler maintains that Western policies, at present, are shaped by an internal inability to impose a 'conservative type of model' on a traditional neo-colonial basis. It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into a detailed analysis of the genealogy of these different understandings of the drivers behind Western policies towards fragile states; suffice it to say that, according to the authors that subscribe to the 'liberal peace' model, there is a dominant 'liberalism' that drives Western policies towards 'fragile states'. In contrast, for Chandler, it is not so much 'liberalism' but rather a break from such a tradition.[10] As a consequence of this differential understanding of the framework shaping Western policies, Richmond's conceptualisation of the 'victor's peace' approach assumes that Western powers are capable of developing successful strategies for the imposition of a neo-colonial type of rule in fragile states. In contrast, according to Chandler, despite a willingness to dominate, Western powers are unable to form coherent strategies for the classical imposition of rule; rather, they prefer to displace their own responsibilities for action at the international level by relying on the involvement of regional or international organisations.[11]

Theories of EU external action vis-à-vis models of peace-building and state-building

In this section we examine how theories of EU external policies fit the competing models mentioned above.

The EU: Peace-building, 'liberal peace-building' versus non-strategic state-building

The assumption that the EU has a tendency to act as a 'peace-builder' – that is to be able to foster reconciliation from below, to use 'soft power' and to promote social democratic values – is present among scholars who emphasize the 'civilian' nature of the European integration process. These authors stress the EU's reliance on the instrument of diplomacy, development and humanitarian aid, despite the recent emergence of a military component in EU external action, captured in the development of the 'European Security and Defence Policy' and the development of a 'European security strategy'.[12] A more nuanced approach that reflects some of the assumptions inherent in both 'normative peace-building' and 'non-strategic state-building', is to be found among analysts of EU external action who debate the relationship between geo-strategic and human rights objectives.[13] According to Manners, the EU will have a tendency to act normatively, rather than in a classical geo-strategic fashion, and there will be a tendency to impinge on state sovereignty and intervene in the absence of obvious material gains; this tendency is situated in the specific past 'civilian' nature of the EU.[14]

In contrast, according to Zielonka, the EU has a tendency to act without a strategic long-term vision because of its internal 'medieval nature', which prevents it from formulating policies beyond the lowest common denominator. This will lead the EU to become engaged

externally because of the policy of major colonial powers. In other words, EU policies will remain subservient to the interests of former colonial powers.[15]

The EU as a strategic state-builder

Some of the assumptions present in the model of 'strategic state-building' can be found among analysts of EU policies in sub-Saharan Africa. It is argued that the EU policy in this region has been 'captured' by the geo-strategic interests of former colonial powers and also by the internal dynamics of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. From this perspective, the EU seeks to impose its military and political solution towards certain conflicts because of an internal evaluation of its own geo-strategic and military interests.[16] Similarly, other authors, strongly influenced by a specific reading of the Marxist tradition, maintain that the EU acts as a strategic state-builder because it is able to identify and act on its own geo-strategic needs – being commercial-, energy- or security-related – and today has military means at its disposal that it can adopt to achieve such objectives.[17]

In summary, we can combine aspects of the theoretical frameworks shaping the debate about peace-building and state-building with assumptions present in the EU theory of external relations in the following ways:

Model 1: Peace-building

External players prioritize the deployment of diplomatic and humanitarian tools in a way to foster reconciliation and allow grassroots organizations to be part of the process. They will reject the use of military means in conflict resolution.

Model 2: Normative peace-building

External players seek to impose a political solution by emphasizing forms of political conditionality while at the same time promoting basic forms of ownership of the conflict resolution process. There will be a tendency to privilege a human rights perspective in a way that will not automatically exclude the use of military means.

Model 3: Strategic state-building

External players privilege strong political conditionality and military means. They have a long-term, commonly agreed plan about how these objectives could be achieved given changing responses by local and regional players.

Model 4: Non-strategic state-building

External players privilege military means without having agreed overall policies about its political objectives. Their policies would be influenced by the doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) and use of force would be ad-hoc and would not result in an ability to impose a 'colonial' type of rule, despite the use of violent instruments.

Part 2

Case Study: the EU policies towards the conflicts in Darfur

Because of word limitation, we can only provide here an overview of the dynamics shaping the Darfur conflicts and the case study focuses on a discussion of key evidence identifiable for the models above mentioned.

Overview of the Darfur conflicts: 2003–2010

The conflict in Darfur has a long history.[18] Contrary to the widespread view that the war in Darfur is a 'civil war' that has its roots either in an antagonism between 'Arabs' and 'Africans', or an antagonism between north and south, the dynamics of the conflict lie elsewhere. The division between 'Arabs' and 'Africans' is a by-product of long-standing national and international dynamics and has only become adopted by sections of the population because of specific contexts.[19] In fact, the divisions are as much between Arabs as between 'Arabs' and 'Africans'. The key dynamics stem partly from the colonial legacy: the establishment of an exploitive relationship between the centralizing power of the state and its hinterlands or peripheries, as well as inequalities equalities in the economic, educational and political development of the colonial and post-colonial state in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which often build on earlier patterns.[20] They also stem from the re-emergence of militant Islam as a major political and economic force in the post-Cold War period and the limitations that this has placed on the rights of non-Muslim citizens in Sudan, and from the nature of Sudan's economic place in the international political economy, along with the specific role that post-independence Khartoum elites have played as a link in this chain of exploitative national and international economic and social relations.[21] In addition, there have been regional dynamics: the spill-over of the civil war in Chad (1960–2003) and Qaddafi's use of Darfur as a backyard for his annexation strategies vis-a-vis Chad (1980s and 1990s), along with a process of desertification that heightened competition over scarce resources.[22] The Darfur conflict was also shaped by Western attempts to find a resolution to the conflict between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which had lasted since Sudan obtained independence in 1956 and which, in 2005, lead to the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the CPA.[23]

Phases of the Darfur Conflict

Phase I: 2003–2006

The Darfur war can be characterized by three phases. In the first, the highest level of casualties occurred and there was a deepening of the Chad-Sudan dimension and the first failed attempts at mediation. The conflict erupted into a major war in late 2003 and early 2004 after armed rebel groups, which were an alliance between the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked government military posts. This led the elites in Khartoum to unleash a counter-insurgency strategy involving air bombardments of civilian villages and the deployment of the Janjaweed militias, who killed and raped their way across Darfur. By 2005, an estimated 280,000 to 310,000 people had died in Darfur, almost two million people had been driven out of their villages and into overcrowded and unsanitary camps inside Darfur and a further 200,000 had sought refuge in Chad. A Western sponsored negotiation deal, the 'Darfur Peace Agreement' (DPA) was signed on 5 May 2006 but it collapsed because it only included two main parties in the conflict: the Government of Sudan (GoS) and one of the factions in the SLM, led by Minni Arkoi Minawi. The deal was rejected by the other main rebel armed group, JEM, and by one of the other factions in the SLM/A led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour. Indeed, soon after the DPA was signed, fighting erupted and the SLM/A split into separate factions in favour and against the DPA.[24]

From late 2004 onwards, the Darfur war was also shaped by a process defined by scholars as the 'Chadisation' of the Darfur conflict.[25] To simplify, Chad's involvement in the Darfur war lies in the fact that the Darfurian rebels included members of Chadian President Déby's own

ethnic group: the Zaghawa. When the GoS responded to the Darfurian rebel attacks by unleashing a major counteroffensive, the Zaghawa contingent of the Chadian national army revolted and insisted that Chadian President Déby replace the chief of staff and the head of the security force with Zaghawas sympathetic to the rebellion in Darfur. Thus, by mid 2005, President Déby's government began to back some of the rebels in Darfur, particularly the JEM, and President Déby reneged on a political agreement that he had entered into with President Al-Bashir in the 1990s not to become involved in the internal affairs of Sudan. These events prompted the GoS to retaliate by providing financial and intelligent assistance to some of the Chadian rebel groups that aimed to remove Déby from power. Thus, by late 2005, the governments of Chad and Darfur were unofficially at war with one another.

In this phase, the international response was characterized by a series of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions that, amongst other, imposed an armed embargo on the GoS and strongly condemned its counterinsurgency strategies. The UN sponsored diplomatic negotiations, as well as providing substantial humanitarian aid. It created an African Union monitoring mission, AMIS, and, under pressure from the British and US governments, as well as the Safe Darfur Campaign, agreed to consider the accusation that the GoS had committed 'genocide' in Darfur.

Phase II: 2007–2009

In this phase, there was an intensification of Western involvement in the conflict. The failure of the DPA and the rise of demands for military intervention, as well as a changed French policy towards the region (examined in detailed below), pushed the UN to take a tougher military stance. This resulted in the transformation of AMIS into the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR and the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Moreover, on 14 July 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) sought the issue of an arrest warrant for Al Bashir, the President of Sudan, for alleged genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Darfur region. Then on 4 March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Al Bashir for two counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity but not for genocide, due to lack of sufficient evidence.

In this period, although there were some attempts at further negotiations, fighting continued. The armed rebel groups splintered further and the GoS lost control over the Janjaweed, who began to side with different Darfuri groups for material reasons. Although the Darfur conflict was influenced by these internal dynamics, it was also strongly shaped by the consequences of the West's decision to become militarily engaged in Chad. This decision led to an intensification of the inter-state war and indirectly to the strengthening of the military position of one of the Darfuri rebel groups, the JEM. In January 2008, the GoS and the Chadian armed rebels collaborated in launching an attack on Chad's capital, N'Djamena. President Déby, with the support of France and the JEM, managed to defeat the rebellion, which led to thousands of civilian casualties, and gave the Chadian President an excuse to brutally execute some of his civilian opponents and torture others into passive submission.[26] In revenge for the rebel offensive of January 2008, Déby backed the JEM's launch of a spectacular attack on Khartoum in May 2008, which aimed to overthrow the Sudanese government. The assault was successfully repelled, causing hundreds of casualties.

Phase III: 2010–

By early 2010, thanks to a set of changed circumstances, which included the ending of the EU military operation in Chad, the withdrawal of MINURCAT and the impact of external pressure on the GoS to ensure that it held national elections and undertook a referendum for the independence of South Sudan, President Déby and President Al-Bashir signed a peace agreement. This agreement stipulated the end of their support for the rebels and of the joint border monitoring force. The AU and the UNSC agreed to allow their diplomats to restart formal negotiations between the GoS and the Darfuri armed rebel groups, while at the same time supporting a Darfur peace process that involved local civilian players. However, while these negotiations were ongoing, fighting between Darfuri rebels and the GoS continued.

Evaluating EU policies towards the conflicts in Darfur

In this section we argue that, while in the period 2003–2006, EU policies vacillated between the model of normative peace-building and non-strategic state-building, the EU fully embraced non-strategic state-building for a very short period in 2007–2009.

The emergence of 'normative peace-building' in EU policies towards Darfur: 2003–2006

Between 2003 and 2006, EU policies[27] towards the conflict in Darfur vacillated between the model of 'normative peace-building' and non-strategic state-building for a number of reasons. Although by mid-2004, the EU provided vital humanitarian assistance for the victims of the conflict and agreed to finance AMIS with an initial budget of over €242 million, it failed to use its resources to steer EU and AU diplomatic engagements towards fostering reconciliations among the major factions. Instead, it allowed its overall approach to be shaped by the policies of the United States and Britain, as well as the lobbying strategies of the Save Darfur Campaign, which, by calling for the labelling of the conflict as an act of 'genocide' on the part of the GoS and for military intervention, contributed to promoting the belief among some Darfuri armed rebel groups that the West would come to their military rescue.

In fact, during 2004–2007, pro-Darfurian lobbyists – who included sections of the Western media and a variety of multi-faith US civil society groups – voiced the view that the conflict in Darfur was 'Arabs' versus 'Africans', characterized by a 'genocide' committed by the GoS against the Darfurians, and what was required to resolve it was Western military intervention in the name of the doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). This view found strong support among sections of the US and British governments, as well as among Members of the European Parliament (EP). The argument that the conflict was 'genocide' was pursued through a set of steps: first, in July 2004, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution declaring Darfur was a 'genocide' and asked President Bush to consider intervening; on 9 September 2004, after reviewing the findings of the United States' own internal investigation by the Atrocities Documentation Team, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared the violence against civilians in Darfur to be 'genocide'; one week later, the UN passed Resolution 1564, which established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the atrocities in Darfur and The EP also passed a similar resolution, by a vote of 566 to 6. Yet, the evidence for the definition of the war in Darfur as 'genocide' remained controversial and the UN International Commission of Enquiry on Darfur in October 2004 did not support the argument of 'genocide' but rather of 'crimes against humanity'.[28]

The UN's decision to consider the charges of 'genocide' against the GoS heightened expectations among the Darfuri armed rebel groups about finding international backing for

their political and military objectives. Already, during the first diplomatic discussion, which resulted in the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement of 8 April 2004, it became apparent that the Darfuri rebels wanted to internationalize the conflict.[29] However, at the time, the UNSC was split on the issue of the extent of the political and military assistance to be given to the Darfuri rebels. Some members feared that by openly embracing their demands, the whole North-South deal in Sudan, captured in the Navaisha peace process - which then led to the CPA - would be jeopardized.[30] Hence, sections of the international community pushed for a military solution through a piecemeal strategy. This can be noticed in the conduct of the Abjuia peace talks – despite the complexity of the issues involved, British and US negotiators not only rushed through the talks and excluded key Arab groups, but also privileged discussions about aspects of an international military presence, even though there was no durable peace to keep on the ground.[31] During the negotiations, Europeans also continued to demand a military solution through, for example, the imposition of a no-fly zone.

In this period, EU policies leant towards features of normative peace-building and a non-strategic state-building model, partly because the EU allowed external forces to dominate its overall approach and partly because of an internal inability to openly discuss the consequences of advocating a strengthening of a UN military role in Darfur without a durable cease-fire. In fact, both within the UNSC and the EU, politicians were divided on the extent to which to adopt the R2P doctrine to deal with the conflict in Darfur. The British government, under Tony Blair, was a key promoter of the R2P as a policy in Darfur. However, because of its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, it could not take a military lead; instead, it drafted Security Council Resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.[32] In Washington, the Bush administration was split between the pro-humanitarian military interventionist position of members of the State Department and the opposite view held by officials in the Pentagon, who did not want to fully alienate the elites in Khartoum because of ongoing negotiations of the CPA. In addition, they did not want to jeopardize cooperation with Khartoum because of the need to obtain intelligence in order to fight the Al-Qaida network.[33] Next to these divisions and constraints there was also reluctance on the part of two UN Council Members, China and Russia, following Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, to support any wording in the UNSC resolution that would have legitimized the 'R2P' by sending UN forces into the region without the consent of the GoS.[34]

The EU and non-strategic state-building in Darfur: 2007–2009

From 2007 until the winter of 2009 the EU approach moved into the realm of the model of non-strategic state-building. Evidence for this can be found in its decisions to support the establishment of EUFOR Chad/CAR and MINURCAT, which were originally intended to reinforce substantially the military capabilities of UNAMID, and also in its decision to seek to implement the ICC Court ruling at a time of sensitive diplomatic negotiations between GoS, the leadership of South Sudan and Chad. These approaches seem to have been adopted without sufficient consideration of their impact on the dynamics of the conflicts. The lack of strategic reflection led the EU and the UN by 2009 to retrench from military engagement in Chad and rethink their strategies towards Darfur. Let us examine evidence for these arguments in some detail.

In August 2006, following the failure of the DPA and renewed fighting, the UN called for the establishment of UNAMID but Al-Bashir, with the backing of China and Russia, remained opposed to the deployment. A key factor that boosted efforts to attempt to create the force was the change in the French perspective towards Chad and Darfur. Influential figures in the

French establishment responsible for shaping African policy were taken by surprise by the ability of the Chadian rebels in April 2006 to nearly defeat the force of President Déby (indeed, Déby survived mainly because of French's military backing through Operation Epervier).[35] They were aware that the Chadian rebels had obtained logistical and intelligence support from the GoS in retaliation for President Déby's decision to support the Darfurian rebels. However, the French government told the world a slightly different story by emphasizing the plight of refugees in the East of Chad and Darfur.[36]

In fact, officials in Paris embarked on a policy to seek to internationalize France's military presence in Chad in order to contribute to defeating the Chadian rebels, who were perceived to be acting as proxies for the GoS. Officials in Paris argued that President Déby needed to be militarily supported because, if the rebels were to come into power, they would act as puppets for Sudanese and Chinese interests. This alleged potential strengthening of Chinese and Sudanese influence in Chad was presented as a threat to all Western interests in the region.[37] The US government and some EU powers went along with this perspective. Thus, from 2006 onwards, the French government decided to push for the concept of a military deployment on the border between Chad and Sudan. Paris also lobbied the UN and persuaded the Department for Peacekeeping Operations in the UN (DPKO) to formulate policy options that would be amenable to President Déby, who feared Western troops on his own soil. In this endeavour, the French government relied on the skills of its Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, who could mobilize pro-Darfuri lobbyists because he was a leading exponent of the movement. In fact, Kouchner had been a close friend of the SLM leader, Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur and supported the organizations of meetings with 'Urgent Darfur' and French government officials. [38]

Thanks to this coupling of French geo-strategic perceptions and the influence of pro-Darfurian lobbyists in US, British and European circles, as well as the specific nature of the way in which security and defence decisions are taken within the EU, the EU agreed to send a military operation to Chad and the Central African Republic in the summer of 2007. The initial vision – shared among French government officials and an UN inner circle around DPKO –was that it would be *a bridging operation* that would reinforce the AU-UN hybrid operation.[39] In fact, within the French government and with the support of the DPKO, as well as some British diplomats, the vision was that the EU would take over some key military components of UNAMID through the deployment of a 'rear force', i.e. an EU rapid-reaction force: the EU Battle Groups.[40] However, this vision did not materialize. [41]

Nevertheless, the EU did behave as a non-strategic state-builder because it gave substantial political and financial backing, albeit at times reluctantly, to President Déby, based on the wishes of France. Thus, for example, during the negotiations that took place between 2007–2009 between the civilian and armed opposition and President Déby, the EU agreed with officials in Paris and in N'Djamena that no direct talks should be held between the civilian and armed opposition and that no deals should be made with the armed rebel groups; rather, they should be defeated militarily.[42] The EU also provided financial support for the training of Chadian security forces and financed with hundreds of millions of Euros the preparation for Chadian legislative and local elections between 2008 and 2011, despite extensive fraud taking place and despite the government's involvement in extensive human rights abuses.[43] In addition, it signed programmes to finance the training of the Chadian police and gendarmerie forces, despite past failures by other international organisations in implementing such programmes.[44]

The non-strategic nature of the EU state-building strategies in this period is demonstrated by the fact that, although the EU initially supported the one-sided French view that the causes of the conflict in Chad were purely due to Sudanese interference in Chadian domestic affairs and the 'spill-over' of the conflict in Darfur, after the rebel attack of February 2008 and the actions taken by President Déby and Paris to repress the rebellion, some sections of the EU became more acutely aware of the impact of their military involvement on the dynamics of the conflict. Embarrassed by the mistake in the level of assessment of the risks involved and concerned about the issue of neutrality and impartiality, some European officials sought to maintain formal neutrality in subsequent fighting among Chadian armed rebels and Chadian military forces. At the same time, European officials became aware and worried that France's support for President Déby was resulting in a strengthening of the military capabilities of JEM, which was contributing to a widening of the fighting in Darfur. Moreover, since the leader of JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, had close links with the radical Islamists in Khartoum based around Hassan al-Turabi, many European officials became nervous about backing such a force.

Other evidence of the non-strategic nature of EU state-building strategies in this period lies in the fact that, once the EU agreed on the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR and MINURCAT, some of its member states did not want to close their eyes to the human rights abuses committed by Chadian forces and thus put pressure on Déby to reform his army and end the practice of child soldiers. But the policies of reforming the Chadian army according to human rights principles were strongly resisted by President Déby, who criticized some instances of EUFOR's neutrality and called for an end to MINURCAT's mandate, so as to strengthen his nationalist Arab credential and re-establish bridges with the Islamist leadership in Khartoum.[45]

By 2010, EU policies in Darfur seem to have retrenched to the key features of 'normative state-building' because, while it continued to call for the implementation of the ICC ruling against Al-Bashir, offered extensive humanitarian aid for the victims and financial support for UNAMID, it not only ended its military engagement in Chad and financial support for MINURCAT, but behind the scenes backed renewed diplomatic efforts led by the UN, AU and US, – without playing a leadership role.[46]

Conclusions

What does this case study of EU policies towards the conflicts in Darfur tell us about the competing assumptions present in the peace-building and state-building models previously outlined? During 2003–2006, the EU assumed an approach that vacillated between a commitment towards 'normative peace-building' and 'non-strategic state-building'. But, by 2007, the EU fully endorsed a 'non-strategic state-building approach' because it seems that EU policy-makers had not fully worked out the consequences of supporting the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR, MINURCAT and UNAMID in the region. The decision to deploy these forces came about as a result of a combination of French geo-strategic vision in the region and the influence of the 'Responsibility to Protect' in British, US and EU policy-making circles. Evidence for the non-strategic nature can be found in the manner in which the EUFOR Chad/CAR was agreed, prior to any serious military planning having taken place, in the failure to fully prepare for counter-insurgency tactics on the part of local armed rebel groups, and in the failure the implication of supporting the axis of President Déby and the JEM armed group in the context of a diplomatic settlement for Chad and the whole of Sudan. It is hoped that the EU will learn a lesson from this – only by resisting the moral imperative that 'some-

thing must be done militarily to protect the victims' can strategies be deployed that foster a sustainable peace.

Acknowledgments

NOTES

[1] Roland Paris and Timothy S. Sisk, 'Understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding'. In Roland, Paris and Timothy S. Sisk (eds) *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations.* Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group*,* 2008, p.1.

[2] Ibid, p.14.

[3] Oliver P. Richmond, 'Between Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Between social engineering and post-colonialism' *Civil Wars*, Vol.12, March–June 2010, Nos 1–2, pp.167–175.

[4] Ibid, pp.169–170.

[5] Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.The conceptualisation of the 'liberal peace' posits that the international structure of Western societies, its reliance on the rule of law, on democracy, play a crucial role in determining their relations with the others. Richmond's use of this concept represents a utilisation, but also a critique, of this concept that is best captured in its original form in the work of the Democratic Peace Theorists, such as Michael W. Doyle and the Kantian tradition.

[6] Oliver P. Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, Oxford: Routledge, 2008, pp.103, 110

[7] Ibid. For a definition of 'peace as governance' see Oliver Richmond, 'The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'', *Conflict, security and development*, 6 October 2006, pp.291–314.

[8] Richmond, (see n.6 above) pp.107–108

[9] Jason Franks and Oliver P. Richmond, '*Liberal Peace Transitions: between statebuilding and peacebuilding*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

[10] David Chandler, *International Statebuilding*, Oxon: Routledge 2010, pp. 68–73.

[11] David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*. London: Pluto Press, 2006. p.19. David Chandler, 'Back to the future? The limits of neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting democracy', *Review of International Studies*, 32, July 2006, pp.475–494.

[12] Richard Whitman, 'De-civilizing through the EU's security strategy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol 11, 2006, pp.1–15; Mario Telo, *Europe: a civilian power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005.

[13] Thomas Diez, 'Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering 'normative power Europe', *Millenium: Journal of International Relations*, Vol.33, No.3, pp.613–636.

[14] Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.40, No.2, 2002, pp235–258. Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads.', *Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol.13, No.2, March 2006, pp182–199.

[15] Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

[16] See, for example, Gorm Rye Olsen, 'The EU and military conflict management in Africa: for the good of Africa or Europe?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2, April 2009, pp.245–260.

[17] Elmar Altvater and Birgit Mahnkopf, *Konkurrenzfuer das Empire*, Muenster: Verlag Westfaelisches Dampfboot, 2007.

[18] Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: the Ambiguous Genocide*, London: Hurst & Company, 2005, pp.108–109; Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: a short history of a long war*, London and New York: Zed

Books, 2005; Robin O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

[19]Alex de Waal 'Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement.', *African Affairs,*Vol.104, No.415, 2005, pp.181–205.

[20]Douglas Johnson, *The root causes of Sudan's civil war*, Oxford: James Currey, 2003.

[21]Ibid. Alison J. Ayers, 'Sudan's uncivil war: the global-historical constitution of political violence.' *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol.37, June 2010, pp.153–171.

[22] Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, London, New York: Verso, 2009. (See Part II); J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster*, Princenton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006. (Examines in detail the connections between the conflicts in Chad and Darfur and the involvement of Libya in Darfur).

[23] Many scholars agree that the Darfuri political leadership felt excluded from the negotiations that lead to the CPA deal and hence they sought to repeat the strategy of the SPLM/A, which had taken up an armed struggle against the centre and then found military backing from the US and other regional players in the 1990s. See, for example, Jok Madut Jok: *Sudan: race, religion, and violence*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007.

[24]Laurie Nathan, 'The making and unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement' in Alex de Waal, (ed), *War in Darfur and the search for peace,* Harvard: Global Equity Initiative and Harvard University Press and Justice Africa, 2007, pp.245–266.

[25]Roland Marchal, 'Chad/Darfur: how two crises merge' *Review of African Political Economy*, No.109, 2006, pp.467–482; Roland Marchal, 'The Roots of the Darfur Conflict and the Chadian Civil War', *Public Culture*, Vol.20, No.3, 2008, pp.429–436; Patrick Berg, *The Dynamics of the Conflict in the tri-border region of Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, March 2008. Accessed at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05423.pdf; Marco Boggero, 'Darfur and Chad: A fragmented ethnic mosaic' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.27, No.1, January 2009, pp.21–35; Mamdani, (see n.22 above) pp.236–261.

[26]Giovanna Bono, 'The EU's military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: an operation to save lives?', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol.5, No.1, March 2011, pp.47–66.

[27]For an overview of EU policies see: Janvier, R. Yakemtchouk 'L'Union Européenne face à la crise du Darfour', *Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union Européenne,* January 2007, No.507, pp.33–40; Rory Keane and Asbjorn Wee, 'The European Union' in David R Black and Paul D Williams, (eds) *The International Politics of Mass Atrocities,* Routledge: London and New York, 2010, pp.119–133.

[28]Mamdani, (see n.22. above) pp.19–48.

[29] Jok, (see n.23. above) p.262.

[30] There is extensive evidence that the Darfuri armed rebels wanted to be included in the CPA but international mediators and the GoS resisted their demands.

[31] On this aspect see: Alex de Waal, 'The DPA and its national context', in *Peace by piece: addressing Sudan's conflict*, London: Conciliation Resources Accord, 2006, p.51; Laurie Nathan, 'The making and unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement' in Alex de Waal, (Ed), *War in Darfur and the search for peace,* Harvard: Global Equity Initiative and Harvard University Press and Justice Africa, 2007, pp.245–266.

[32] Paul D. William. 'The United Kingdom' in Black and Williams (eds) (see n.27 above), pp.195–211.

[33]Kevin Funk and Steven Fake, *Scramble for Africa: Darfur-Intervention and the USA*, Montreal/New York/London: Black Rose Books, 2009, especially Chapters 4–6.

[34]Luke Glanville, 'Darfur and the responsibilities of sovereignty', *The International Journal of Human Rights*,Vol.15, No.3, March 2011, 462–480.

[35]Epervier is a military operation run by France. In 2006/7 it had a military contingent composed of 1,100 military personnel, 6 Mirage F1 and transport aircrafts, which provide the Chadian army with logistical and intelligence support during military operations.

[36] Bruno Charbonneau, 'France' in Black and Williams (see n.27 above) p.213.

[37] François Lafargue, 'La France devant la présence chinoise en Afrique', *Défense nationale et sécurité collective*; Charbonneau, (see n.36 above) especially, pp.223–229.

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[38]Roland Marchal, 'Understanding French policy towards Chad and Sudan? A difficult task', *Sudan Tribune*, 8 June 2009.

[39] Confidential information; the idea was to link the planning of the launching of EUFOR Chad/CAR with the deployment of UNAMID and MINURCAT. This could have taken the form of having a rapid-reaction force (the EU Battle Groups) on stand-by for potential interventions also on the border with Darfur and command and control connections with the headquarters of the UNAMID.

[40] Confidential interview with EU officials, October 2007 and November 2010.

[41] Bono, (see n.26 above), pp.7-38.

[42]International Crisis Group (ICG), Tchad*: Un Nouveau Cadre de Résolution du Conflit*, Rapport Afrique No.144. Brussels: ICG, 24 September 2008, pp.11–13, 18–20. Confidential interviews with EU officials, November 2010 and May 2011.

[43] The extensive fraud undertaken during the elections was confirmed in a confidential interview with a European Ambassador and supported by interviews with journalists and civil society groups in confidential interviews held in N'Djamena, Chad in May 2011. For a review of human rights abuses see: United States State Department: *2009 Chad: Human Rights Report.* Accessed at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135945.htm

[44] Confidential interview with UN security sector official, May 2011.

[45] Confidential interviews with EU officials.

[46] During confidential interviews, EU officials argued that in 2010–2011 the EU was purely an observer at the Doha negotiations. Some doubts were expressed as to the political validity of calling for ICC court rulings in the midst of complex negotiations on the future implementation of the CPA.