Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author’s permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

www.uaces.org
Is the European Union Acting as “One” in Africa?

Fredrik Söderbaum

School of Global Studies,
University of Gothenburg, Sweden,
& United Nations University,
Institute for Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Bruges,
Belgium
E-mail: fredrik.soderbaum@globalstudies.gu.se

WORK IN PROGRESS WORK IN PROGRESS

Introduction

The overarching question addressed in this chapter is to what extent and under what circumstances the European Union (EU) should be seen as “one” in its relations with Africa. More specifically, is the EU best understood as a single or many actors, or even no actor at all in its relations with Africa? Is there variation across different policy areas? What explains the outcome?

A point of departure of this chapter, which also explains the comparative focus on the three policy areas (trade, development cooperation, and security), is the following: Whereas the EU often speaks with one voice, for instance in commercial policy, the EU’s policies toward the outside world is often regarded as more ambiguous and pluralistic in other policy areas, such as development cooperation and security policy, where decision-making is either “shared” between EU institutions and EU member states, or based on national and intergovernmental policies. Key policymakers, especially from the European Commission or the Council, but sometimes also from the EU member states, claim that the making of the EU as an efficient and legitimate global actor across all areas of foreign policy depend on a
strengthening of the EU’s central institutions, instruments, and policies, where the Commission or the Council must, so the argument goes, play a leading role (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Such attempts at centralization and communitarization of decision-making and policy are contested, and there is a real need to analyze the tensions and paradoxes between the EU’s central institutions and those of the individual EU member states. This chapter explores the fact that this “coordination game” varies across and between different policy areas. The policy areas of trade, development cooperation and security are particularly interesting because the varied political, legal and institutional conditions.

The chapter is structured as follows. The next section seeks to conceptualise the EU as “one”, with special focus on regional actorness. Then follows an overview of recent trends in the development of EU-Africa relations, especially the Cotonou partnership agreement and the development of the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES). The following three sections constitute the core of the chapter and focus on the EU’s trade, development cooperation and security policies with Africa, respectively. The final section compares the three policy areas and draws conclusions regarding this pattern.

**Conceptualising the EU as “One”**

Any inquiry of EU’s role in Africa depends on our conceptualisation of the EU as “one”. Although the EU is, to an increasing extent, referred to as one of the two superpowers of the world, it is not a “state.” Skeptics argue that the EU has diffuse and ineffective foreign policies, and that it is divided between the interests of its member states, implying that the EU is seen merely as a potential actor in world politics. In recent years however there has been an explosion of literature on the EU as a global and international actor and about the logic behind its external relations.

Regional agency is a new and underresearched phenomenon, which has come to life due to the transformation of the EU and its global role. The EU can act as a collective actor in international affairs and be seen as “one” by outsiders, for instance, when signing a trade agreement or when disbursing aid. Being a global actor is more demanding, however, than simply being a regional organization or a region. That is, the fact that the European Commission does “something” (e.g. disbursing aid) is not enough for a claim to actorness (purposive capacity to act).

Actorness for a region is not necessarily the same as for nation-states, although there are of course certain similarities. Yet, parts of the discussion about the EU’s role as an actor is implicitly or explicitly framed within rather conventional state-centric notions about world politics. The unique feature of regional actorness, compared with nation-states, is that it must be created by voluntary processes and therefore depends more on dialogue and consensus-building than on coercion.
Regional actoriness brings attention to the close relationship between the EU’s internal development and its external policies. This link is evident in the EU’s official policy documents and treaties, which repeatedly stress that without a unified, coherent, consistent and coordinated external policy, the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor will be called into question. External action thus depends on internal cohesiveness, which among other things includes identity as an important but hard-to-define component. Identity is what brings people together to form a “we”. If there is a consolidated internal actor identity, some sort of external actoriness should also follow. A key distinction here is between presence and actoriness.

Europe as an external actor is more than the EU’s foreign policy, and more even than the aggregate of the EU’s policies across all areas of its activity. Simply by existing, and due to its relative weight (demographically, economically, militarily and ideologically), the Union has an impact on the rest of the world. Its footprints are seen everywhere. It is the largest donor in the world and the size of its economy is comparable to that of the US. It is also building a military capacity meant to be used outside the region. This provokes reactions and creates expectations from the outside. The concept of “presence” is often used to signify this phenomenon, constituting the bridge between endogenous and exogenous factors (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). A stronger presence implies a greater capacity to act, unless we are dealing with a sleeping giant. The actor must be subjectively conscious about its presence and prepared to make use of it in order to achieve actoriness. In the “near abroad” presence is particularly strong, and can develop into the outright absorption of new territory (enlargement). To the extent that an enlarged region can retain the same level of actoriness, its presence will increase because of its sheer size. The original European Economic Community (EEC) had a population of 185 million, compared with today’s number in excess of 450 million. Presence is a complex and comprehensive material variable, depending on the size of the actor, the scope of its external activities, the relative importance of different issue areas, and the relative dependence of various regions upon the European market. A stronger presence means more repercussions and reactions and thereby a pressure to act. In the absence of such action, presence itself will diminish. The crucial question is to what extent the EU’s strong international presence is actually transformed into a purposive capacity to shape the external environment by influencing in the world: in this case Africa.

Actoriness implies a scope of action and room for manoeuvre, in some cases even a legal personality, which is however rare in the case of regions. It suggests a growing capacity to act that follows from the strengthened presence of the regional unit in different contexts, as well as from the actions that follow the interaction between the actor and its external environment, but it is also an outcome of a dialectic process between endogenous and exogenous forces. In the case of EU, actoriness is closely related to the controversial issue of “competencies” (who has the right to decide what?), which is ultimately determined by the Member States.
Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 30) identify four requirements for actorness with reference to the EU:

1. Shared commitment to a set of overarching shared values and principles;
2. Domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy;
3. The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies, which is captured by the concepts of consistency and coherence (consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of the Member States and the EU’s own institutions; coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies, for instance aid and trade); and
4. The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments (diplomacy, economic tools and military means).

Obviously, these requirements are fulfilled to different degrees in different EU foreign policy relations and in different foreign policy areas: from the “near abroad” to far away regions (e.g. Africa); and from the areas of trade (in which the EU by definition is seen as “one”) to security (where the competence given to the EU is contested and highly controversial). In other words, actorness is shifting over time, depending on counterpart and policy areas. This has to do with the peculiar nature of the EU as an actor and the complexity of its foreign policy machinery.

**Recent trends in the EU’s policy towards Africa**

Historically, the EU’s partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries has emphasized humanitarian issues and trading relationships with former colonies, but it is now being redefined in a variety of ways. The EU-ACP relations are now being described by EU policy-makers in more symmetric terms, as “partnerships”, and as cooperation between equal partners, trying to achieve a common agenda. There is also a stronger emphasis on, for example, reciprocal trade, supporting regional based economic cooperation and integration, human rights, democracy and good governance. We are facing a major transformation of a historical pattern, although the outcome still lacks concrete shape.

The EU’s official policy with Africa, through the Cotonou Agreement and the more recent Joint Africa-EU Strategy, is designed to promote Africa’s development and to eradicate poverty on the African continent (European Union 2005). The Cotonou Agreement has three pillars: development cooperation, economic and trade cooperation, and the political dimension. The Cotonou Agreement differs from earlier cooperation frameworks at least in terms of the following (Brolin 2007):

More emphasis on political dialogue, including on matters such as conflict and peace building, human rights, good governance and rule of law;
A more participatory approach, searching to include civil society and private sector actors in dialogue and implementation to a larger extent;

A strengthened focus on poverty reduction;

A new framework for economic trade cooperation, through the regional negotiation of Partnership Agreements with increasing emphasis on reciprocity and the full integration of ACP countries into the world economy in conformity with WTO provisions;

A reform of financial cooperation, decentralising parts of the administrative and financial responsibilities towards the receiving countries, and introducing performance-based criteria into development cooperation.

The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main funding instrument for development cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement, although ACP states are also eligible for thematic funding. The EDF is in turn funded by the EU Member States (it is not “budgetised” within the European Community). The 10th EDF covers the 2008-2013 period, with a total of €22.7 million (a substantial increase compared with the 9th EDF, with its initial allocation of €13.8 for 2000-2007).

Over the last few years, intercontinental dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the AU have become increasingly important. An important step in this development was the EU’s own Strategy for Africa (CEC 2005d). This strategy was criticised for its European bias by African leaders, who were concerned that they had not been properly consulted on it. This led to the initiation in February 2007 of talks on a joint strategy, to be developed and owned by both continents. The resulting JAES was adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007, and now serves as the overarching policy framework for intercontinental relations, complementing rather than replacing other frameworks such as the CPA and the Union for the Mediterranean (former Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The AU and its commission has a central role in the strategy, and this is the first time that the EU takes part to a framework dealing with Africa as a single continent.

The JAES is, in terms of declared principles, based on a shared vision, aiming to “move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterised by equality and the pursuit of common objectives” (point 9a). The JAES is significant in its intention to create a more overtly political relationship between the two continents. The strategy focuses on eight thematic so-called strategic partnerships, which reach well beyond the traditional spheres of aid and development. These are:

- Peace and Security;
- Democratic Governance and Human Rights;
- Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure;
- Millennium Development Goals;
- Energy;
- Climate Change;
• Migration, Mobility and Employment; and
• Science, Information Society and Space.

It is still early days for the JAES, and the initial priority has been to set up the joint structures necessary to make the strategy work. It remains to see to what extent it will deliver. The strategy also remains underfunded, and as long as this is the case key institutions remain reluctant to prioritise it. Furthermore, the JAES is funded by previously existing instruments that were not set up for this specific purpose, which creates a complex institutional structure and also give rise to synergy problems.¹

Each of the eight partnerships in the JAES has a European and an African Implementation Team (IT). In Europe, one member state is normally designated as the “lead EU country” for a specific partnership, and is to coordinate the implementation efforts, working together with other interested EU countries and the Presidency (see Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009). For the sensitive (second pillar) Peace and Security Partnership, the Council serves as lead institution, whereas the European Commission is the leader of the Trade and Regional Integration. The ITs from the two continents come together in so-called Joint Expert Groups (JEG), which are informal forums where experts can discuss the implementation and financing of the JAES priority actions.

The institutional architecture of the JAES is designed to involve a wide range of stakeholders (parliaments, civil society and the private sector) on both continents in its governance and implementation, although there remains substantial lack of clarity as regards the exact modalities of their engagement. Some observers have argued that there is a risk of a downward spiral, with actors waiting to for the JAES to deliver before they make a serious commitment to it, thereby impeding progress (Tywushik and Sherriff 2009).

The EU member states are of course also engaging with Africa on a bilateral basis, which has to be considered in any analysis of the EU as a whole. Many member states have developed rather comprehensive Africa policies, which cover most relevant policy areas (e.g. Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, UK and XXX). These Africa policies are first and foremost national policies, but they are also designed to be reinforced through common or shared EU policies/instruments. Two EU member states in particular, the United Kingdom and France, have strategic interests and comprehensive policies with Africa (Söderbaum and Tavares 2008).

The British policy stance towards Africa is fairly similar to EU’s stance, and at least to some extent it has, at least on a general level, become significantly Europeanized in relation to: 1) the ideological and political context of contemporary foreign policy; 2) the

¹ Since January 2008, ECDPM is closely following the implementation and monitoring process of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy providing up-to-date news and resources, organising events related to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and contributing to the debate. See http://europafrika.net/jointstrategy/#financing
mechanics of making foreign policy; and 3) the actual content of foreign policy (Williams, 2002). That said, these Europeanizing trends do not subsume British foreign policy and nor were they intended to. In fact, the UK will keep devoting special attention to security policies, development cooperation, energy policy, maritime strategy, English language promotion, maintenance of colonial ties and cultural preservation. As the case of Zimbabwe demonstrates, the Europeanization of British foreign policy has not prevented the government from pursuing bilateral or alternative multilateral policies with regard to specific issues. Distinctly “British” and “European” foreign policies are thus not mutually exclusive activities. Rather, in relation to Zimbabwe, the British government has drawn upon its increasingly close relationship with the EU to supplement its own bilateral (and other multilateral) efforts to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

France also plays a significant role in Africa, especially in its former colonies, through extensive aid programs, commercial activities, military agreements, and cultural impact. In those former colonies where the French presence remains important, France contributes to political, military, and social stability. Others have criticized the relationship as neocolonialism under the name Françafrique, stressing France’s support of various dictatorships, among others: Omar Bongo, Idriss Déby, and Denis Sassou Nguesso. France is very active in peace and security operations in its former colonies. Of 12,000 French troops engaged in peacekeeping operations around the world, nearly half are deployed in Africa in both military and advisory capacities, according to the French Ministry of Defence. There are three main French bases in Africa. The largest is at Djibouti, with smaller forces at Dakar in Senegal and Libreville in Gabon. Their purpose is to promote regional security, though the base in Djibouti allows France to exercise a measure of military influence in the Middle East. Moreover, France conducts joint maneuvers and peacekeeping training through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) program and its Peacekeeping School (EMP) in Mali, which has trained over 800 African officers. These institutions intended to support the African Standby Force (ASF), a 20,000 strong rapid-response peacekeeping force under the APSA. Despite these contributions to peacekeeping operations, France’s economic and political influence in Africa is likely to continue to decline, particularly in light of Africa’s growing ties with, for example, China (Touati, 2007).

Trade

There is agreement among scholars that the EU is a strong and recognized economic actor, which is reinforced by the fact that the EU speaks with one single voice towards the outside world through the common external trade policy. Indeed, many of the EU member states have subordinated themselves to the EU’s common economic and trading agenda
through “the community method”. Yet, it is still an open question who or what groups of countries are most active in shaping this external trading agenda, and for what reason.

The EU’s trade policy in Africa is shaped by the fact that the EU is trying to establish the much talked about Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with geographically more focused regions and regional organizations. The EU claims to be combining trade and aid in a new way under the new EPAs. According to the EU’s official policy, “The idea is to help the ACP countries integrate with their regional neighbours as a step towards global integration, and to help them build institutional capacities and apply principles of good governance. At the same time, the EU will continue to open its markets to products from the ACP group, and other developing countries’ (European Commission, 2004: 10). A closer integration of the African countries and regions into the global economy is, according to the EU’s official rhetoric, seen as the way for future trading relations as well as a development strategy, which is of mutual gain, both for the EU and for the weaker partner regions (European Commission, 2004: 3).

The effects and underlying purposes of this trade policy is contested, however, both in academia, among policy makers and in civil society. One point of criticism is that the EU’s approach to African regionalism has been somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the EU provides economic and political support to regional economic integration and the creation of viable regional institutions on the continent. On the other hand, the EU has been criticised for undermining African regional integration and cooperation, for example through its insistence on negotiating the EPAs with regional groupings that do not match Africa’s existing regional economic trading schemes or regional organizations.

This is closely linked to the underlying purposes of the EU’s revised strategy. Mary Farrell argues that contrary to official rhetoric, the EU’s partnership strategy and the Cotonou Agreement reflects neoliberal goals and the extension of economic liberalization in the self-interests of the EU rather than the normative agenda so often stated in the official discourse. According to Farrell, this represents “a triumph of realism over idealism” (Farrell, 2006). In another study with Björn Hettne, this was referred to as the dominance of “soft imperialism” over the EU’s much-talked about “civilian power” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006). In another of Farrell’s studies, she shows that although norms and issues such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance were mentioned in earlier agreements, they are now reinserted much more strongly into the new Cotonou Agreement. The important point is that these are more or less imposed on the African countries and there are much stronger political conditionalities attached, and violations of these norms can be used for hegemonic control by the EU (Farrell, 2005: 271). A similar conclusion is reached by Hurt, who argue that the new EU-ACP Agreement has shifted the relationship further from one of cooperation to one of coercion, which needs to be understood within the context of the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism within political elites (Hurt, 2003).
Although the EU is highly committed to free trade in its official rhetoric, and also speaks with one voice, the EU's trading agenda is often shaped by vested (national) interests within the EU. This is most evident in cases where trade and commercial policies intersect with other policy areas, such as for instance agriculture—resulting in high nontariff barriers for agricultural products from Africa and elsewhere. This pattern is of course noteworthy because it is in agricultural products where the weaker African partners would otherwise have the most to gain. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and occasional concessions to “national” commercial interests within the EU highlight the complex linkages between the internal and external dimension of the EU’s relations with the outside world.

As just noted, trade agreements with partners in the Africa are increasingly linked to a series of political concerns and conditionalities (good governance, human rights, the environment). It is important that many of these conditionalities may be falling outside of “community competence”, and they are therefore shaped by other decision-making procedures within the EU. Yet, during the last two decades we have seen a homogenisation of EU trade policy objectives. For instance, the trade policies of the Nordic countries were at least partly shaped by solidarity with Africa until one or two decades ago, However, hand in hand with the EU membership the solidarity motive has disappeared from for instance the Swedish trade agenda.

Development Cooperation

Rooted in the historical colonial relations of its member states, development policy was formally introduced as an area with (shared or complementary) EU competence with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The dialogue within the EU since the early 1990s over a more coordinated and common development policy have been manifested particularly in the Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission in April 2000 and in the more recent European Consensus on Development from 2005. Attempts to move toward a coordinated and coherent EU development policy in Africa need to be understood within the context of a more general discussion of coherence of aid and aid effectiveness in the larger donor community. A number of mechanisms for aid coordination in Africa are already in place, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Paris Agenda, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and a variety of budget support mechanisms and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs).

The European Commission’s official brief is to systematically and constructively exploit the potential for complementarity and synergy within the EU and to assist the member states in developing their own aid systems and the Union’s joint position in the multilateral aid architecture. The EU’s coordination arrangements should include a common framework for aid delivery, including analytical work, planning, and implementation (European
Commission 2004; European Union 2000, 2005). The debate over the common EU development policy carries a particular emphasis on the delineation of roles between the EU and member states. The so-called “value added” of the EU and the European Commission is an important, but also contested, element in the discussion about the EU’s development policy. According to the Commission, “Community action is more neutral than action by the Member States, which have their own history and are bound by a specific legal system. Community solidarity and the Community’s integrated approach to cooperation are undoubtedly major assets” (European Commission 2000b: 4). Moreover, the size of Community aid provides leverage to increase coherence between disparate policy areas, such as humanitarian aid, trade, and security. The Commission also claims to provide “added value” through its ability to formulate and defend a common European position globally (European Commission 2004c: 7).

There is a reasonable and at times relatively sophisticated degree of coordination in the donor community on the country level in Africa. This type of coordination is above all taking place within multilateral frameworks such as the Paris Agenda, the PRS and it occurs mainly on a sectoral and thematic basis. There is some success, especially in budget support in several countries in Africa, and certain sectors, where we witness a division of labour and specialisation with “lead donors” as centres of coordination.

However, in contrast to official rhetoric, the EU is, by and large, not functioning as a platform for coordination between the EU member states. There is some success of coordination when it comes to policy-making/discussion in Brussels, but the EU is not a viable coordination mechanism in the field in Africa. The European Consensus on Development is, as one interviewee put it, “ice thin.” Since aid and development policy is one of the areas of EU action subject to shared competence, individual EU member states can and do continue to conduct international development policy according to national priorities and preferences. A complete communitarization of international development cooperation is not politically desirable for many EU member states and would presumably be of questionable value for a number of developing countries (Grimm, 2010).

Furthermore, on the ground in Africa, the European Commission is “just another donor”, or simply acts as “the twenty-eighth” member state, conducting its own aid policies, rather than serving as the hub for donor coordination within the EU as a whole. Thus, the EU demonstrates weak actorness in this policy field, and it can hardly be said to be acting s “one” (Söderbaum and Stålgren, 2010b).

It appears that the EU’s ambition for being a coordination mechanism in the field of aid is first and foremost tied to its self-serving ambition to manifest its identity as an actor in the international system. A senior policy advisor of a EU member state concurred: “Development policy is a tool for the Commission to build the EU as a global actor” (Interview, Stockholm January 2007). The Commission’s failure to be a coordination
mechanism within the EU reflects its inability to present to member states its comparative advantage and a coherent “value added” proposition relative to other coordination mechanisms and regional programs. Indeed, it is not clear what the EU can do more effectively than the individual EU member states, nor in what way it enhances aid effectiveness.

The failure of the EU to act as “one” in development cooperation is also related to competing “identity claims” in the donor community. Development cooperation remains a scene for the manifestation of international identities, not only for the European Commission, but also for the individual EU member states. The attempts for a centralised and common European Aid policy with the Commission in the driver’s seat compete with other identity-driven ambitions of bilateral donors, such as France and UK, but also countries such as Sweden and Denmark, which are generally considered to be a role models in the field. To the extent that development policy is driven by the ambition to manifest one donor’s identity, these efforts can be seen as a threat to other donors’ identities. Coordination efforts under the banner of a common donor identity, such as the EU, limit the visibility of the individual donors and member states. As one donor official put it “A donor who does not give is not a donor” (Interview in Harare, 2001). Applied to the dynamic of identity formation, it could be said that “a donor who is not seen to be giving is not a donor”.

Hence, the identity variable may not be compatible with donor coordination and “aid effectiveness”. But there are links. To some extent, the identity motive can explain the particular type of policy coordination known as ”lead donor”, which is a kind of division of labour where one particular donor is given responsibility for leading a particular sector and the other donors are followers. Being a “lead donor” enables a donor to manifest its own identity for the sector it is in charge of. Similarly, it appears that donor identities are not challenged as much in the multilateral mechanisms for donor coordination as they appear to be within the EU framework. This may very well be related to the very strong ambitions of the European Commission to control the process, which the national donor agencies are not accepting.

The competing identity claims are even more important in the making of donor policies when it comes to development programmes directed towards regions and regional organizations in Africa (a type of aid which is gradually increasing). The EU is clearly the largest and most important “region-builder” and region-supporter in the world. This ambition is clearly visible in Africa, even if the World Bank and other bilateral donors such as Sweden and Germany also engage in region-building and regional development cooperation. A key point is however that in contrast to trends regarding donor coordination on the country level, there is a general lack of donor coordination as far as regional aid programmes are concerned. There are at least two main explanations for this lack of coordination: (1) Identity: Identity motives are strong in donors’ regional programmes. In the process of donor coordination
especially on the country level where the functional logic and aid effectiveness dominates) the identity and visibility of each donor is reduced, which explains why they tend to engage and create regional programmes which can be seen as “their own” and where they can strengthen their own identity and visibility as donors. In essence, the identity motive prevents donor policy coordination. (2) Coherence prevents coordination: since regional programmes are often comprehensive, multisectoral, each donor tries to enhance coherence (within their own programme), which is at the expense of donor coordination.

**Security**

Literature in this area frequently posits the view of the EU as an economic giant (high presence) but a political dwarf (low actorness), with the conclusion that its security policy is weak. The EU has nevertheless begun to demonstrate a considerable amount of activity in the security field (Grimm 2010). One reason for this lies in the contemporary conceptualization of security, which goes well beyond conventional large-scale military presence to include, for example, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and state fragility. In the face of the multiplicity of new threats, the EU member states have been able to overcome some of their internal differences, which has led to a consolidation of the EU as a global actor.

The Peace and Security Partnership with Africa (within the JAES) has three priority actions. The first is to “reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally” (JAES 2007 p. 30). This is expected to result in deepened common understanding of cases and resolution of conflicts; strengthened cooperation on conflict prevention, management and resolution, including long-term reconstruction and peace building; improved coordination of initiatives; and increased EU-Africa cooperation and influence in international and global fora.

The second JAES priority action is the full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Engel and Porto, 2010). The creation of the APSA was formally authorized through the adoption of the 2002 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Its set of institutions are central to the efforts of the AU and the RECs to increase coordination and harmonization in the field of peace and security at the continental level.

A challenge for the RECs and the continent as a whole remains the overlapping memberships and responsibilities of the different organizations (somewhat similar to the field of economic regionalism). The APSA is aiming to improve this situation, dealing with prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts, integrating continent-wide efforts under the auspices of the AU with the work of the RECs and the member states (Engel and Porto, 2010). Its political decision-making body is the 15-member AU Peace and Security
Council (PSC), which legitimizes and coordinates the actions of all other elements of the APSA. The PSC is supported by an under-staffed Secretariat within the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU Commission. The PSC is, among other things, to decide on the deployment of the African Standby Force (ASF), a key component of the APSA. This rapid response capacity is to be composed of five regional brigades (3,500-5,000 troops each, plus a civilian component), and is to be available by 2010. The PSC is to rely on a Continental Early Warning System (EWS), which is to integrate information from five regional early warning systems. It is also in control of the Peace Fund, which is inherited from the OAU, and which will function as a pool fund where donors can make resources available in addition to the AU’s regular budget. There is also a so-called Panel of the Wise, which is a consultative body composed of five highly respected individuals appointed for a 3-year period. The PoW is to provide opinions to the PSC on peace and security matters, and promote conflict prevention and resolution across the continent.

The third priority action is predictable funding for Africa-led peace and security operations (PSOs). The African Peace Facility (APF) is the main EU instrument for supporting African efforts in this field (Pirozzi 2009). It was established in 2004, following a request from AU leaders at their Maputo summit in 2003 for additional funding for Africa-led PSOs and capacity-building, rechanneling parts of 9th EDF funding for ACP states. The initial APF allocation was €250 million for the period 2000-2007, which raised to €440 million by 2007.

90 percent of the APF funds under the 9th EDF were used for the financing of African-led PSOs, with the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2007 receiving the bulk of resources (€305.6 million). With its 7,500 peacekeepers AMIS was the largest PSO undertaking of the AU to date. The rest was allocated to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, €15 million), the CEMAC Mission to the Central African Republic (FOMUC, €33.4 million) and the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMISEC, €5 million), for a total of €349.5 million (Pirozzi 2009). For the period 2008-2010, the APF has been extended, with €300 million assigned under the Intra-ACP Indicative Programme of the 10th EDF.

The remaining 10 percent of APF funds (about €34.5 million) was allocated to capacity building efforts. However, out of these, only some 10 percent has been used so far. There are major absorption difficulties both within the AU and the RECs (Pirozzi 2009), which risk leading to a funding deadlock for the JAES, since EU donors become more reluctant to commit additional funds in light of the difficulties to make use of the ones already available.

The APF has made the European Commission the largest donor to African PSOs. The fact that the European Commission by virtue of this is such an important player in a CFSP-related field is sometimes a source of legal and inter-institutional tension within the EU. For example, in 2004, when South Africa suggested that €7.7 million be reallocated from the
development cooperation budget to finance capacity building under the APF, the Council argued that the Commission does not have the legal power to use budget appropriations for development co-operation to fund peace-support objectives. Although a one-off solution was eventually found, no further mechanisms along this line are envisaged (Pirozzi 2009). The fact that the APF is funded by the EDF thus implies constraints, both geographically and in regard to how money is spent. In terms of geography, neither South Africa nor the North African countries are parties to the Cotonou Agreement and thus not eligible for EDF funding. Legal obstacles prevent these countries from contributing the APF-funded efforts, and make it difficult to combine EDF funds with funds from other instruments, such as ENPI or DCI. And, most crucially: while EDF resources can be used to fund costs related to African-led PSOs such as allowances, communication equipment, peace keepers’ per diem, medical facilities, civilian equipment, transport and logistics, must under no circumstances be used for anything with lethal implications, such as any form of military hardware or training (CEC 2008f).

The EU plays an important role in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. But the institutional complexity (and ineffectiveness) is so profound that the EU’s role as a peace and security actor is negatively effected by inter-institutional conflict and rivalries, within the Council (between different missions, especially EUSEC and EUPOL); between the responsibilities and activities of the Council and European Commission; and between the EU as a whole and the particular interests of the member states (especially France and Belgium) (Lurweg 2010; Smis and Kingah 2010).

The role of France is particularly important. Since 1997, France has run the Reinforcing of African Peacekeeping Capacities Initiative (RECAMP). It started out as a 10-year military cooperation project between France and ECOWAS, offering training support at an individual and operational level, as well as equipment support. This initiative has now been europeanised, functioning as a framework for cooperation between the EU and Africa to offer both civilian and military strategic training in view of the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. The ongoing intense EURORECAMP training cycle is known as AMANI AFRICA and was launched in November 2008, with France as the framework nation on the EU side, funded mainly by the APF and EU member states. The Cycle is to culminate in a continental level Command Post Exercise (CPX) by March 2010. The AMANI AFRICA cycle is, in terms of declared principles, “an African project supported by EU and its partners rather than an European project given to Africa” (Gonnet 2008), but in practice, the project still bears a distinctly French and European mark.² (More important with MONUC)

Apart from lack of coherence and coordination within the EU’s foreign policy complex, there is a major problem with the EU’s role in peace and security in Africa in terms

---

of the content of its peace/security policy, and that it seeks to contribute to “African solutions to African problems”. According to EU guidelines, “each operation to be financed from the Peace Facility will have to be initiated by the AU and/or the sub-regional organizations (...). As a general rule, when a sub-regional organization takes an initiative, this initiative shall have the political approval of the AU.” This stance of African solutions to African problems is mainly built on the politically correct vision about African homegrown solution to its own problems. It is true that the AU is much more relevant than its predecessor OAU in dealing with so-called “new wars”: that is, the civil wars and complex humanitarian emergencies that are developing in the context of globalization and after the end of the Cold War. However, two fundamental problems with such developments imply a need for greater engagement beyond Africa itself.

The first obstacle is the lack of resources that African leaders are prepared to commit to joint security affairs. The AU possesses neither enough physical nor qualified human resources to meet the challenges. Intimately related to this, AU’s operational capacity in peace and security is almost fully dependent on external resources. Second, the AU cannot disassociate itself from national political interests. Often, the organization is “manipulated” by governments seeking to camouflage and legitimize their individual regime interests, jeopardizing, in this way, the regional agenda. That is, distrust and prevarication mark most African initiatives regarding security matters, as exemplified by the Darfur crisis in Sudan.

Although “African solutions for African problems” is the current watchword, the APSA and AU are not developed enough to deal with these problems — and the EU and UN and external powers must take a greater responsibility. Two explanations for this: (1) the African solutions is naïve; and the European politicians and policy makers do not understand the challenges needed to ensure African peace and security (instead they tend to believe in “follow the EU example”). The other reason, which is probably more important, is that of withdrawal, it is about deliberate “retreat” from Africa, whereby the EU only seek presence and visibility, rather than agency and actorness.

Conclusion

This chapter suggests a significant variation in the way the EU can be seen as “one” in its policies towards Africa. The EU often speaks with one voice, and is acting as “one” in the field of trade. While the level of trade is, it itself, only signifying presence, trade policy constitutes an instrument for boosting actorness. The EU is very visible and also active as a

---

3 Paragraph 7.2.2. of the Financing Proposal. AIDCO/12/04-EN (Rev.2), page 13.
single trade actor in Africa, and there has been a europeanisation and homogenization within the EU in this policy field. Yet, the EU’s trade policy is to a large extent determined by the great powers and/or vested interests within the EU (and the Eu’s trade policy with Africa is contested by European civil society).

Although the European Consensus on Development is an important development which strengthens a EU coherence, and the Cotonou Agreement as well as the JAES, the EU is not acting as one in this policy field. Indeed, in spite of rhetorical claims, the EU is not functioning as coordination mechanism, and the Commission can be seen as the 28th member state. This is very much a consequence of the shared responsibility in this policy field, and the ambiguity surrounding the value added of the EU compared to bilateral as well as multilateral aid.

The security partnership with Africa has developed and become stronger, and the EU is increasingly seen as one (there is increasing europeanisation). The JAES and the peace and security partnership has strengthened this trend. The EU’s effectiveness as an actor is severely affected by inter-institutional synchronisation between first and second pillar (Commission and first pillar is involved in security and peacebuilding, which is also focus of the Council in second pillar). Another problem is linked to the content of the strategy whereby EU is selective in it peacebuilding strategy or retreating as actor and handing over responsibility to African institutions (although there is not enough African capacities or resources).

[Förbättra] In some ways, the EU is certainly a coherent actor (especially in trade). But, in many other ways the EU is not capable of pursuing a coherent and coordinated policy, and there are too may diverging interests (the EU as an institutional machinery is too complicated and contains too many diverging interests and policies). The Lisbon treaty improves the situation, but to the extent that behaviour will be based on geostratic interests (or simply ineffective), the EU’s policies will be contested both internally within the union and by its counterparts. Hence, when the EU’s aid is competing with national aid, and although the EU’s actorness in the field of peace and security has increased, the EU’s incoherent actor (interinstitutional rivalry) or having a rather low profile (weak actorness) by trying to have African solutions to African problems or only being one of many actors, hence taking a rather selective stance (NAVFOR) in the Horn or in Darfur (leaving it to UN and AU to solve it).

It follows from above above that it is important to analyse and assess the EU’s agency and interests (in many ways the unity/disunity of the Union explains its agency and actorness). Since the EU remains a moving target there can be no definite answer to this question. The analysis conducted in this chapter draws attention to three main explanations for EU agency/interest, which say something about the underlying causes of the unity and actorness of the EU (and its long-term vitality).

First, many of the official statements and proclamations released by the European Commission underline the liberal and idealist underpinnings of the EU. The EU’s external
relations objectives, with a strong emphasis on the “human” benefits of economic interdependence, democracy, human rights and the principles of sustainable and participatory development, are often referred to as a “liberal internationalist” approach to international relations (Smith 2003: 240). This explains much of its trading agenda, its support of peace operations. Liberal internationalism thus helps to explain the general trend toward donor coordination as part of the Paris Agenda for aid effectiveness and donor coordination around the MDGs. It also prevails in much of the policy discourse around the European Consensus on Development, particularly in the search for comparative advantage by the Commission and the EU member states.

This chapter suggest however that it is necessary to go beyond the EU’s official strategies and policy statements, which invariably contain a strong, but perhaps misleading, egalitarian flavor. Two other explanations are provided in this chapter: The EU is strongly concerned with establishing itself as a global actor and with gaining political power in a realist sense. Regarding the first aspect, much of what the Commission does is ultimately aimed at consolidating the EU as a global actor, establishing presence and building actorness. This is most evident in the field of development cooperation. A senior policy adviser of an EU member state concurred: “Development policy is a tool for the Commission to build the EU as a global actor”. As noted above, the fundamental problem for the EU is that it is not effective as a donor coordination mechanism, and therefore not unified or acting as “one”.

This chapter has revealed that normative power may be a cover for more cynical designs. But the European real interests are not always even hidden in rhetoric, though. According to a statement from the Commission: “the EU can commit itself to supporting only economic and social organization models which contribute to the objectives of its cooperation policy and which comply with the political and social values which it means to promote”. Some would call this a kind of imperialism (“soft imperialism”) as well. This chapter suggested that the EU’s stated intention to connect the ACP to the global arena of liberal economic and democratic interactions in order to promote development may also be seen as a means of hegemonic control. It is rather obvious that the policies have failed to instil confidence in the partners, which is seen in the very controversial debate around Economic Partnership Agreements in the field of trade. A long-term stable policy can hardly be based on dialogue unless it is a two-way traffic. And a policy based on soft imperialism will undermine EU acting as one — because such policy will meet resistance form within the EU as well as from partners, and in contrast to a more centralised nation-state, the EU is not suited to pursue such strategy.

---

4 The Commission’s Agenda 2000, quoted in Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit., p.129.
Bibliography (not finished)


European Commission 2004c


European Union (2000), The European Community’s Development Policy, Statement by the Council and the Commission, Brussels, 10 November.

Farrell (2006)

Gomet (2008)


Lurweg, Meike (2010)

OECD/DAC (2005b), Survey on Harmonisation and Alignment—Progress in Implementing Harmonisation and Alignment in 14 Partner Countries, Fourth Draft: OECD/DAC.


