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**Developing a 'Comprehensive Approach' to International Security:
Institutional Learning and the European Security and Defence Policy**

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The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has become one of the most active EU policy domains in recent years, and has launched over 20 foreign operations since 2003. However, as the EU treaties are fairly limited in describing ESDP functionality, the EU has had to engage in a fairly high degree of institutional improvisation in this area. In addition, with these missions the EU has shown a growing capacity to innovate in security affairs, using a unique civilian crisis management (CCM) capacity linked to security sector reform and other EU policy tools. These changes demand further examination in light of not only the growing ambitions of the EU itself but also in terms of the increasing demands for security assistance placed on the UN, NATO, and the OSCE. This paper examines these processes, especially in terms of the various factors that determine whether organizations such as the EU can develop capacities for self-awareness and endogenous organizational change. To do so, the paper pays close attention to several key ESDP operations that involve a complex mix of civilian and military tools; this type of integrated or 'comprehensive approach' is rapidly becoming a hallmark of EU ESDP operations and may yield useful lessons for other attempts at crisis intervention and state-building.

The European Union (EU) defies easy explanation as a global actor. It exhibits features of an international organization, a collective security arrangement, a common market, a great power concert, an international regime, a federal polity, and a nation-state, thus presenting a major challenge to analysts of foreign policy and world politics (White 1999; Hill and Smith 2005). Moreover, since the end of the Cold War the EU has made dramatic advances in terms of its global presence, not least in the area of foreign and security policy. After a decade of limited attempts to resolve conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere in the 1990s, the EU has embarked on a major initiative to handle foreign security-related problems, largely involving a new institutional framework: the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).[1] The ESDP has launched more than 20 foreign security assistance missions of various types since 2003, spanning a range of geographical areas and functional problems. Taken together, these operations arguably represent the most ambitious foreign/security policy initiatives in the history of European integration, and they have been undertaken instigated with remarkably little public discord (Giegerich and Wallace 2004).

Many knowledgeable observers of the EU doubted this capacity was even possible in light of the EU's experience in the Balkans (Gordon 1997/98; Hoffman 2000); these doubts increased further with the EU's divisions over the current war in Iraq and related challenges, such as the unprecedented scope of the 2004-07 EU enlargements (Kagan 2003). And despite the long history of European foreign policy (EFP) cooperation under the rubric of European Political Cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, and its successor the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the 1990s, the EU had always found it difficult if not impossible to consider the deployment of military/policing forces on behalf of the EU. A final puzzle involves the EU's growing ability to serve as not just a provider of security services, but as an innovator as well, particularly in terms of its unique role in security sector

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[1]Since the Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP is referred to as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

reform and civilian crisis management (Cawthra and Luckham 2003), approaches that are lacking in most other international institutions. Thus, as the global demand for various forms of international security assistance has increased recently (Chopra 1998; Shawcross 2000; Jeong 2005), the EU has started to adapt itself to meet those demands.

These efforts have provoked a great deal of interest in academic and policy circles, yet there is little consensus on an explanation of why the EU is developing this capacity, and what it means for regional and international security. Much of the attention, in fact, has involved a more general question: whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is better equipped than Europe in dealing with new problems of global security (Glaser 1993; Art 1996), not whether the EU can make its own unique contribution in this area. In a related vein, some scholars have argued that the EU was merely engaging in "soft balancing" against US hegemony in general and the policies of the George W. Bush administration in particular. In other words, exogenous balance-of-power dynamics, not endogenous European norms and values, are the key explanation for recent ESDP activities; the EU is only attempting to constrain or control American dominance (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Posen 2006; Jones 2007).

A contrasting view, however, sees much of this effort as a form what Roy Ginsberg has called "self-styled" actions on the part of the EU (Ginsberg 1989): they involve a desire among Europeans to play a greater role on the world stage in line with European values and interests and are not merely an "automatic" response to the pressures of aggressive American unilateralism. Related work in this area focuses on the construction of a European global identity, which now manifests itself as involvement in security affairs and other forms of global governance in the same way the EU has long been involved in global trade, monetary, environmental, and development affairs (among others, see Whitman 1998; Magone 2006; McCormick 2006; Sjursen 2006). However, if the EU really is acting in a "self-styled" manner owing primarily (or at least partly) to endogenous dynamics, values, and related

factors, then we need to understand how these dynamics work, how they impact the outside world, and what they might teach us about forms of international cooperation based on institutional self-reflection, consensus-building, and collective norms and values.

This paper attempts to explain these changes, and to assess their specific implications for future conflict resolution and security operations, through the conceptual lens of institutional theory. Specifically, I argue that a fairly high degree of institutional learning has been taking place within the context of the EU's foreign/security policy; this learning is also consistent with a range of generally accepted concepts derived from organization theory, political science, and sociology. This learning has been especially prominent in the ESDP policy domain, specifically since the launch of formal ESDP missions since 2003. And where the CFSP touched upon various foreign *security-related* problems (Smith 2003), it did not involve complex *security-providing* missions of the type covered by the ESDP, and it did not involve a military component.[2] Conversely, under the ESDP the EU has committed troops and police forces into conflict situations and has engaged in combat with local forces, a new capacity whose implications have not been fully explored in the literature. Indeed, studies of this topic tend to examine the general emergence of the ESDP (Anderson and Seitz 2006; Howorth 2007) rather than explore the two-way relationship between institutional change and the full range of actual operations, although case studies of individual operations are starting to appear (Osland 2004; Ulriksen et al 2004; Penska 2006; Piana 2002; Diez et al 2006).

In the rest of this paper, I examine processes of institutional learning within the context of European foreign (EFP) in general and the ESDP/CSDP in particular. I first examine the types of new experiences upon which the ESDP/CSDP institutional

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[2]The CFSP was permitted to draw upon the military resources of the Western European Union during the 1990s, but failed to do so largely because of a lack of political will within the EU.

infrastructure has based its lessons. In the second section, I examine the specific learning

processes that the EU has developed within this policy domain. In the third section, I

examine the primary "target goal" of these various learning processes: the development of a

"comprehensive approach" to international conflict resolution/crisis management tasks. In

the fourth and final section, I examine some of the limits and challenges associated with the

EU's pursuit of learning-based institutional change, particularly in light of the current

implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon (or Reform Treaty), which specifies a number of

institutional changes regarding EFP processes.

Learning-by-doing in the ESDP

There is no doubt that the EU has changed its foreign policy outputs in various ways

since the ratification of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties starting over a decade ago.

Specifically, the EU has changed in terms of both its institutions (new CFSP/ESDP

competencies) and its policies (new ESDP operations). Yet does this change reflect mere

adaptation to circumstances or actual *learning* on the part of the EU (Levitt and March 1988;

Haas 1990; Levy 1994)? Where adaptation does not involve changes in institutional values

or purposes, learning can be conceptualized as a process of deliberate reform, consisting of:

1) regularly benchmarking the existing EU rules/values/purposes in a policy domain; 2)

actively generating possible lessons as a result of new missions; 3) deliberately transforming

lessons into knowledge through feedback/monitoring/evaluation processes; and 4)

institutionalizing new knowledge for application to future operations. This new knowledge

may represent a fundamental change in how the EU sees its role in the world, as well as

involve the creation new foreign/security policy doctrines or even a new strategic culture for

the ESDP (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Solana 2003; Meyer 2005). Moreover, if EU

institutional learning is taking place we may be witnessing the emergence of new forms of

regional integration, global governance, and international security beyond traditional state-centric or formal alliance-based approaches. As the EU deliberately attempts to "export" its own norms and procedures as part of its foreign policy agenda, its new cooperative efforts in the realm of conflict resolution may provide important lessons for conflict-prone areas of the world. Yet we currently lack such a comprehensive analysis of these efforts.

Experiential learning obviously also requires new experiences in order to start the learning process, and there has been no shortage of such experiences over the past decade. My focus on actual ESDP missions as the primary source of empirical material also helps focus the project on actual lessons as determined by EU institutional actors rather than approaches to learning based on vague "lessons of history" or analogical reasoning (Jervis 1976; Etheredge 1985; Neustadt and May 1986; Breslauer 1987; Breslauer and Tetlock 1991) that have received some criticism in the literature (Levy 1994). In my use of the concept, institutional learning is deliberate, pro-active, transparent, collective/social, policy-relevant, and progressive. My approach also differs from ideational approaches to foreign policy and international relations (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Yee 1996), which often do not explain why one policy-relevant idea gets chosen over other, equally plausible, ideas. Based on my previous work (Smith 2003), I have also found that one must also explain how new ideas or lessons are *institutionalized*, hence my specific focus on social-institutional-organizational, rather than merely personal or cognitive, learning. And since learning typically involves changes over time, we need some type of benchmark or reference point to determine the extent to which new lessons or ideas differ from an institution's earlier approach to a specific policy domain.

Some of the major examples of new ESDP experiences are discussed in the rest of this section; these experiences provide much of the "raw material" for institutional

discussions within the EU regarding how to draw lessons from actual problems on the ground.

The first-ever ESDP mission involved a police mission (known as <u>EUPM</u>) in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) intended to succeed the UN International Police Task Force in 2003. Its 500+ police officers and civilian staff members came from 33 EU and non-member states. The purposes of EUPM have been to maintain local stability in BiH by providing assistance to establish an effective, independent, and accountable police force, as well as the institutions and capacities to sustain it to fight organized crime and corruption; strengthen police administration and monitor performance; support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (which includes powers of detention); and support a wide variety of other police training, border patrol, and criminal justice programs. The EUPM has helped transform the BiH Police Agency into one with enhanced powers and has helped foster major new state agencies. As we shall see in more detail below, police missions are a particularly interesting aspect of EU conflict resolution operations as they draw upon a long tradition of gendarmerie forces in various EU member states, a tradition not shared by the US.

With <u>Operation Concordia</u>, the EU deployed a military force to help oversee the implementation of the EU/NATO co-sponsored cease-fire between the government and rebel forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The EU mission succeeded NATO's UN-authorized Operation Allied Harmony in 2003. The EU force, which consisted of armed personnel from twenty-six countries, patrolled FYROM's frontiers, engaged in surveillance and reconnaissance, and thus helped secure the ceasefire agreement. A number of ESDP "firsts" are important for lesson-taking here: this was the EU's first-ever ESDP *military* operation; it was also the first test of the Berlin Plus arrangement for resource-sharing between NATO and the EU, an arrangement whose implications have not been fully

explored.[3] The EU also launched a police mission to FYROM, Operation Proxima, at the request of its government in 2003. Proxima's objectives were to monitor, mentor, and reform the police; promote sound policing standards; fight organized crime; help create a border police; and support the overall political environment in that country. As the EU viewed this mission as a success, it ended operations in December 2005 (although limited police affairs cooperation continued into 2006). Today Macedonia is a candidate for EU membership.

As a reflection of its success with the EUPM and Concordia, in December 2004 the EU increased its commitment to state-building in BiH with Operation Althea, a peace mission involving nearly 7,000 troops from twenty-four EU and ten non-EU member states acting under a UN mandate. This was the EU's third, and largest, military operation to date. The primary purposes of Althea are to ensure compliance with the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords; maintain a secure and safe environment; strengthen border controls; support local authorities in combating organized crime; contribute to defense reform; and support the UN/EU High Representative. Another purpose is to strengthen border controls given concerns over the movement of terrorists into Europe through BiH. As with Concordia, Althea was another test of the Berlin Plus arrangement with NATO, and the EU and NATO cooperated to make the transition from the NATO SFOR mission to Althea as trouble-free as possible. And while there is no certainty that the EU would be able to handle a resumption of ethnic hostilities on a large scale in the country as occurred in the 1990s, the EU is much better equipped to handle such problems than it was just a decade ago. For the first time, the EU in BiH is able to draw on all instruments of foreign and security policy to achieve desired outcomes.

From June - September 2003, the EU led a second military mission, Operation Artemis, in the unstable Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the

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[3]The "Berlin Plus" arrangement allows for "assured access" to NATO planning capabilities, a "presumption of availability" to the EU of NATO assets, and NATO European command support for EU-led operations. Berlin Plus discussions began in June 1996 but were not completed (and thus made operational) until December 2002.

request of the UN. The mission's objective was to provide security and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia until a larger UN force could be deployed. Here EU troops helped displaced persons return to their homes, helped re-open markets, protected refugee camps, secured the airport, and ensured the safety of civilians, UN employees, and humanitarian aid workers. Since the operation included troops from several non-EU states, the EU again demonstrated its ability to lead foreign troops in a military operation as it had done in Macedonia. Equally importantly, the EU also demonstrated for the first time its willingness and ability to initiate, plan, and execute a military operation *completely autonomously of NATO*. This act defied America's preference to allow NATO (i.e., the US) to vet all ESDP military operations, even those that did not require access to NATO assets or did not involve NATO's area of responsibility. Perhaps even more importantly, EU forces engaged in several firefights with local militias and killed a couple of dozen militiamen. This fact demonstrates the EU's ability to not just threaten but actually use deadly force, and to do so with the support of some of its supposedly neutral member states, such as Sweden.

Artemis was also an important test-case for the EU in terms of its great distance from the European theater and in terms of setting a precedent for future EU military operations organized independently of NATO. A follow-on ESDP mission, EUFOR RD-Congo, was deployed in 2006 using EU rapid reaction forces to assist UN forces with providing security during the DRC's presidential and legislative elections. As with Artemis, this was an action done autonomously of NATO and thus independent of the Berlin Plus arrangement. EUFOR RD-Congo is also noteworthy as it involved a troop contribution from Turkey, the only non-EU member state to join this mission. The EU also led a follow-on police mission, EUPOL-Kinshasa, in 2005 to assist the DRC to establish effective police programs; this was then supported by a smaller technical mission (the DRC mission) to assist the Ministry of Defense in reforming its administration and payments system and in integrating twelve brigades of the

newly established Congolese army. Here EU officials were actually posted within the DRC administration itself, demonstrating a high degree of trust, and active teaching-learning processes, regarding the DRC government and the EU.

Finally, the EU has made several contributions to the Middle East peace process through its support for the Palestinian Authority (PA), among other efforts. The EU's police force in the PA region (EUPOL-COPPS) in 2005 aimed to help the PA establish an effective, modern, civilian police force through advising, mentoring, and training police and judicial officials. This mission may reflect a growing demand for EU police missions from foreign governments; it also plays to the EU's strengths as it draws upon a European tradition of state constabulary forces. Here the EU may have an important niche to fill in international security in ways complementary to other security providers involved in the Middle East peace process. Also in 2005 the EU agreed, in response to an invitation from Israel and the PA, to dispatch a monitoring mission to provide a third-party presence at Rafah (EU BAM-Rafah) to monitor the PA's performance, to contribute to the Palestinian capacity to monitor border control and customs, and to contribute to the liaison between PA, Israeli, and Egyptian authorities. This support allowed the PA its first experience with managing external borders.

Several other, smaller-scale, ESDP operations have provided additional experiences for the EU draw upon. These include rule of law missions (to establish independent judiciaries), monitoring missions (to oversee a ceasefire or border crossing), and technical aid missions (to establish effective police and military forces requested by foreign governments or international institutions). These missions demonstrate increasing confidence on the part of the EU, and on the part of those seeking assistance, in the EU's ability to provide a range of innovative security services.

For example, the EU has deployed two rule of law missions, one to the Republic of Georgia (EUJUST Themis) in 2004 and one for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) in 2005. These

missions were created in responses to requests from the Georgian and Iraqi governments.

The Georgia mission - designed to assist the government to reform and improve the criminal justice and law enforcement systems - was completed in 2005. The Iraqi mission is the largest rule-of-law mission ever organized by the EU, and is currently training over 700 Iraqi judges, senior police, and prison officers to manage the criminal justice system. The mission comprises 520 judges from the EU. With the Aceh Monitoring Mission the EU monitors compliance with the cease-fire in Banda Aceh, following a UN-facilitated (and EU-financed) peace agreement in 2005. The Indonesian Government, supported by the Free Aceh Movement, invited the EU to undertake this mission in close cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – another first for this type of EU activity. The EU ensures that the parties meet their targets for decommissioning and destroying weapons belonging to the Aceh rebels, demobilizing and integrating Aceh rebel members, and withdrawing Indonesian troops and police units from the Aceh region. The mission also observes the human rights situation in Banda Aceh. For the EU, the mission is important as a confidence-building exercise in an area of the world where the EU has limited political influence, and has set a precedent for future security cooperation with ASEAN. In the EU Border Assistance Mission, the EU provides police and customs officials on the border between Moldova and Ukraine to help prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud. In 2005 the EU deployed a technical support mission to Sudan, which provides a program of support to African Union (AU) peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Darfur, including training, technical, and logistical support and equipment for the policing effort of the AU peacekeepers. The EU assists in the lifting of African battalions in Darfur, provides training in aerial observation, and offers financial assistance to support the salaries and insurance for AU troops.

More recently, the EU has attempted its first-ever ESDP naval operation, <u>Operation</u> <u>Atalanta</u>, to combat piracy and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa. Atalanta (or EU NAVFOR) therefore is another critical new experience for the ESDP and the mission offers key lessons regarding the EU's role in regional and international security. Atalanta has a mandate to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and robbery at sea, including within Somali territorial waters. These goals indicate that the operation goes well beyond the traditional Petersberg-type ESDP tasks that originally helped to justify an independent EU military capability in the 1990s.[4] Petersberg tasks consist of humanitarian or rescue operations, peace operations, and combat missions for crisis resolution, including peacemaking operations. Atalanta, however, exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence on the high seas and within another state's territorial waters in order to protect the EU's and its member states' *own* interests (maritime trade), in addition to protecting the population of the state in question through the delivery of humanitarian aid (Germond and Smith 2009).

Learning processes and lessons

Given this wide range of ESDP "firsts" since 2003, it would indeed be surprising of the EU did not engage in some degree of learning based on these experiences. However, this learning can vary widely, from "accidental" lesson-drawing on an *ad hoc* basis to more deliberate and formalized processes for improving performance through learning processes. Such a formalized "lessons-learned" process is actually part of the political culture of various EU member states, such as those in Scandinavia, and they have attempted to "export" this view to the rest of the EU. Based on the EU's performance since the first ESDP mission in 2003, we can state quite conclusively that EFP in general, and the ESDP in particular, are

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[4]Defined in 1992 by the Western European Union (WEU), these missions are now included in article 17 of the Treaty on the EU (Nice Treaty).

developing a far more formalized approach to learning, although the degree of such formality still varies across EU organizations. By using 2003 as a baseline starting point, we can also demonstrate the creation of new procedures and institutional roles involving learning processes devoted to the improvement of ESDP functionality.

For the purposes of this paper, I define "institutional learning" as changes in an institution's functions, resource base, and skill set as a result of new information, observation, or experience. More specifically, such learning can be measured in terms of institutional changes across three major dimensions: responsibilities, rules, and resources. *Responsibilities* refers to the EU's own conception of its place in the world and the specific types of foreign/security policy missions that might reflect or advance its role. *Rules* refers to the institutional rules and organizational structures, both formal (treaty-based) and informal (customs and "rules of thumb") that govern a particular policy domain, in this case the ESDP and related EU policy domains (CFSP, ENP, etc.). Finally, *resources* refers to both material and non-material assets the EU makes available to the ESDP as a policy tool. Material resources might include financing, personnel, and equipment provided by the EU or its member states; non-material resources might include the provision of best practices, progress reports, data sets, and other pools of knowledge relevant to the functioning of the ESDP.

Given the expansion and close involvement of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in several major ESDP operations since 2003, it is appropriate to begin our discussion with this body. The EUMS in fact has developed one of most sophisticated lessons-learned systems within all EU institutions involved in the ESDP. This system involves regular lessons-learned meetings among the key principals involved in every ESDP operation, as well as new organizational roles and responsibilities to oversee the lessons-learned processes. The EU's mission to support African Union (AU) peacekeeping in Darfur (the AMIS mission), for example, led to a two-day workshop in Brussels devoted to lessons-learned; it involved EU

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staff from the civilian and military parts of the system. This effort has been repeated with all other ESDP missions over the past few years, meaning that a post-mission lessons-learned debriefing process has been institutionalized within the EUMS. The EU's experience with the Artemis mission in the DRC also led it to create a "Battlegroup concept", which provides a system of ready-response European multinational forces in various permutations.[5]

This finding is supported by the fact that many of the specific lessons or best practices draw from these efforts are then incorporated into an increasingly sophisticated EUMS database, the "Lessons Management Application" (LMA). The LMA has become a real knowledge base for information produced during specific ESDP operations to be applied to future tasks. It has generated well over 1,000 specific lessons for the EUMS, and is regularly updated with new data. In light of this information, the EUMS has improved its planning procedures to anticipate, rather than merely wait for, the kinds of ESDP missions that might be required in the short to medium term; this process also involves the generation of "watch lists" for potential hotspots around the globe that might require an EU response. The watch lists are created by a body created after 2006, the Single Integrated Analytical Capability, which then transforms the lists into "dossiers" for potential ESDP operations. This information is then coordinated with analysis generated by the EU's Situation Centre, another post-2003 innovation. With these mechanisms the EUMS does not initiate or suggest ESDP operations, but offers advice on what the EUMS could contribute to handling a certain problem. This need to engage in planning much earlier in the process was a direct result of the Artemis operation in the DRC, which involved a very short timeline relative to most other ESDP missions (i.e., instigated in days/weeks rather than months).

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[5]The EU's battlegroup concept is also a way to rationalize the proliferation of European multinational brigades dating back to 1973 (Lindstrom 2007). A battlegroup is a form of rapid-response capacity-building, each one consisting of around 1,500 troops reinforced with combat support elements, including relevant air and naval capabilities, which can be launched on the ground within ten days after the EU decides to act. More than a dozen such groups have been organized with various groupings of EU member states.

The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, particularly various offices within Directorate General E (DG-E) for External and Political/Military Affairs, as well as the personal office of the High Representative for the CFSP,[6] has also developed its own lessons-learned procedures, although these are not as institutionalized and centralized as those found in the EUMS, even though the EUMS is organizationally part of the Council of the EU. As DG-E directs civilian ESDP missions, it has had to adopt feedback mechanisms and standard operating procedures to avoid creating each new mission from scratch. Its approach to such missions is now far more systematic as opposed to the more *ad hoc* approach during 2003-05, and it is using a database of lessons similar to that adopted by the EUMS. The Council also coordinates its learning efforts with those of other EU actors; these procedures are reviewed on a six-month basis in light of lessons-learned reports and post-mission reports delivered by relevant participants in each ESDP mission. Finally, the creation of two new bodies in the Council – the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) mechanism and (later) the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) – were a direct result of the EU's growing experience in planning and executing various civilian ESDP operations, a capacity that grew on almost an "accidental" basis since 2003 and thus required new structures to oversee it.

In addition to institutionalized lesson-learned procedures and organizational reforms, both the Council of the EU and the EUMS have conducted various exercises to improve their performance; these involve both military and civilian/policing tasks.[7] Crisis management exercises involving planning capacities in Brussels have been instigated, partly to determine how much support individual EU member states could be willing to provide to a given problem. Policing exercises involve a "rapid deployment of police elements" planning concept, followed by a training exercise to prepare the police officials who volunteer for

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[6]Or since Lisbon, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU.
[7]Such as the Common Effort (2002) and MILEX (2005) exercises, among others.

ESDP operations. These efforts have produced better coordination with the military during such operations, especially in light of the EU's considerable experience in the Balkans. These exercises also give individual EU member states some degree of experience in leading a mission; as various ESDP missions have been led by a range of EU member states, any efforts to develop such experience could improve the EU's response capacity in the longer term. Moreover, the leadership candidates include not just the "usual suspects" (i.e., the larger EU member states); they have included smaller states such as Lithuania (in the Georgia rule of law mission) and Finland/Sweden (in the Aceh monitoring mission). The involvement of "officially" neutral EU member states in military ESDP operations (as with Swedish special forces operating in Artemis in the DRC) is similarly useful for providing foreign military experience to non-NATO EU member states.

These specific lessons generated by these new procedures and institutions are far too numerous to list in the scope of a single paper, and many are actually classified. We can however report that they cover a wide range of operational tasks at all levels of analysis during a specific ESDP mission. For example, as with all ESDP operations, the EU has gained experience in negotiating Status of Forces Agreements and Host Nation Support Arrangements with the authorities where the ESDP operates, both of which can be delicate political issues for fragile host nations. More parochial lessons have involved the provision of medical care, evacuation procedures, food supplies for mission staff, and other logistical issues; this effort is partly due to the EU's experience of difficulties in relying on other organizations (such as the AU) for the overall chain-of-command in certain operations. This latter issue even led EU staff to change their own military ranks to gain the required level of cooperation from host country authorities (i.e., claiming that one is a colonel rather than a major), a clear example of learning and improvisation on the ground by EU mission personnel.

At the more organizational level, various ESDP missions have given the EU valuable experience in managing a security operation through the coordination of its pillar one (European Community) and pillar two (CFSP/ESDP) policy tools and the establishment of best policing and rule of law standards for future missions. As some of these operations have involved non-EU member states, the EU has become more adept at convincing third states to participate in its ESDP operations. One important side effect of these learning and leadership efforts involves the EU's constant, even vigilant, desire to distinguish itself from other major players in international security, particularly the US. In fact, the demonstration effects of America's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have played an important role in how the EU thinks about, and plans for, its own ESDP operations. As more than one EU official put it, Europeans do not want to repeat the mistakes of others in developing this capability.

Towards the "comprehensive approach"

The discussion above clearly indicates that formal learning procedures are in place, and that a wide range of "lessons" are being generated. But is this activity actually improving the functionality of the ESDP? And if so, do these lessons then improve perceptions of the EU's effectiveness and legitimacy with each new mission?

The evidence that the EU has been attempting to apply various lessons can be seen in terms of changes in responsibilities, rules, and resources as noted above. Regarding responsibilities, for example, the EU has taken a strong interest in stopping organized crime and corruption as a result of its ESDP experience. It has also attempted to improve the coordination of its civil and military responsibilities during such operations, hence the explicit combination of military and police forces within certain ESDP missions. Many aspects of ESDP missions also involve teaching *European* (not international or American) standards to soldiers, police, and legal officials, which requires some degree of self-reflection

about what those standards are. Regarding institutional rules, and in addition to the learning processes noted above, the EU learned from early ESDP missions (particularly Concordia and Artemis) that it needed to streamline its ESDP funding procedures where common-pool resources (that is, those not funded by the EC budget) had to be devised; this realization directly led to the institutionalization of the "Athena" funding mechanism.[8] It was first applied in Operation Althea in BiH, and was later followed by an additional mechanism, the Instrument for Stability (IFS).[9]

Finally, regarding resources, the EU has improved its ideational inputs to the development of the ESDP, as through the EU Institute for Security Studies, which provides analysis and recommendations regarding the EU's new security capabilities.[10] In addition to reports and working papers, the Institute produces a regular "ESDP Newsletter", which often documents specific lessons drawn from ESDP missions. The creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA) was similarly intended to improve the EU's military resource base for ESDP missions by reducing duplicated efforts and facilitating joint research and procurement projects. The EDA also took the lead in launching an effort to improve air-to-air refueling capabilities in light of experience with ESDP missions. The EU Satellite Center and related cooperation in intelligence-sharing further add to the EU's resources for ESDP operations. And in what is a first for the EU, the creation of a "virtual" ESDP College helps to not only institutionalize the lessons learned regarding the EU's security capabilities, it also

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[8]As the EU budget cannot be used to fund military operations, the Athena facility (codified in Council decision 2004/197/CFSP on 1 March 2004) provides for a common pool of financial and other resources supplied by, and drawn upon, EU member states who participate in an ESDP military operation. It thus speeds up disbursement of funds and, critically, allows for contracts to be signed with sub-contractors and other suppliers of mission resources.

[9]Unlike the Athena mechanism, which involves intergovernmental contrications, the IFS is a new Community budget line that helps to speed up the disbursement of funds controlled by the Commission in situations involving crisis management, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding.

[10]Formerly the WEU Institute for Security Studies; the EU assumed control of this Paris-based agency in January 2002.

aids in the teaching of those lessons to both EU and non-EU nationals. In this sense the EU is already attempting to export its security-related knowledge to non-EU states in the form of an ESDP curriculum.

These changes can also be considered within the context of what the EU is now striving towards: not just a more active and effective ESDP, but something now known as the "comprehensive approach." This involves preventative action using a full range of EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem. These tools would include military, policing, law, human rights, and economic development resources. One example of such an approach is the EU's mission in Eastern Chad/Central African Republic. This mission, <u>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</u>, has been the largest, most multinational EU operation in Africa to-date, involving 3,700 troops. As many as 23 EU member states were represented in the operational headquarters (OHQ), while 16 EU member states were represented at the mission level in the theatre, and three non-EU member states participated. EUFOR Tchad worked not only to protect civilians and UN personnel but also to deliver humanitarian aid, build up the Africa Union as a regional security provider, support the return of refugees, and foster long-term political and economic development.

The comprehensive approach is also not just about improving functionality; it has much to do with the EU's conception of itself as a responsible global actor. As more than one EU official put it, the EU is the "acceptable face of Europe" in a manner unlike NATO (which is seen as too American and too aggressive), and the comprehensive (or "European approach") to conflict resolution/crisis management problems is becoming the EU's "trademark" in international politics. EU insiders who have also worked for NATO (particularly those in the EUMS) also note a distinct difference between the two organizations: the EU simply engages in far more reflection and feedback about its global role as compared to NATO. The EU is also more developed in its support of policing/rule of

law missions, which may be more important for international security in many troubled regions than military force. To develop this capacity, the EU has created a civilian crisis management capability[11] and later a formal European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). [12] This is another capacity that the UN and NATO cannot provide.[13]

In this manner, the EU is able to provide a distinct "rule of law covenant" to govern its missions in third countries, so that the entire process is subject to legal rules and some degree of accountability. Police forces, in other words, are far more answerable to the legal jurisdictions in which they operate, whereas military forces can often invent or impose their own rules of engagement for a specific host country. Thus, and although military missions often receive the most attention by outside observers (including academics), the EU's comprehensive approach is likely to involve more policing and judicial resources rather than classical hard military power, and various weak or failing states have been looking to the EU for assistance in these areas. For example, gendarmerie forces are especially good for crowd control problems, which have the potential to escalate into more serious and violent acts if not handled with just the right amount of authority. And if a situation does grow out of control for policing forces, gendarmes can be quickly put under military control in the form of a more traditional peace enforcement operation.

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[11]As decided by the Feira European Council in June 2000; also see the Council of the European Union, "Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference 2006," ministerial declaration (Brussels: 13 November 2006).

[12]While the EGF is currently comprised of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, it is open to all EU member states who possess police forces with military status. It is also clearly designed to be primarily at the disposal of the EU, with a mandate to perform all kinds of police functions in crisis management operations under either civilian or military chain of command. The force will normally consist of up to 800 gendarmes (though up to 2,300 personnel with reinforcements) capable of deploying within 30 days. It opened its headquarters in Vicenza, Italy in January 2006.

[13]The US has conducted various exercises regarding closer civilian-military coordination in multinational peacekeeping operations (the "Multinational Experiment' exercises); however, its ability to project paramilitary or gendarmerie forces pales in comparison to that of the EU, even though it possesses a similar such force in the form of the US National Guard, which is commanded (during peacetime) by the governors of individual US states.

Although various EU officials throughout the bureaucracy speak of the comprehensive approach, it does not (as of yet) involve a single model or "one size fits all" approach. There is still a considerable degree of flexibility when individual ESDP missions go from the planning to the execution stages. Still, as the EU gains experience with working out the complex details of these operations, such as negotiating Status-of-Forces Agreements with host countries, it increasingly attempts to institutionalize and formalize these tasks to make them more consistent and streamlined. These efforts even extend to requiring more and more legal oversight of such arrangements, involving legal advice from both the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Legal officials in both bodies confirm that the drafting of ESDP documents has become easier and more consistent compared to the situation just a few years ago; for example, the drafting of the Aceh agreement was much more streamlined compared to the earlier ESDP missions in BiH. The Council legal service has similarly undertaken the use of "preparatory measures" to quicken the planning/financing process; these measures can be implemented even before a final ESDP mission has been agreed.

The limits of learning

As I defined it above, institutional learning requires changes in responsibilities, rules, and resources; this has been demonstrated in all three areas but to varying degrees. There has been a high degree of change regarding responsibilities and rules, yet the provision of adequate resources for the ESDP (as well as the leadership efforts to marshal those resources) has often been marginalized. This larger problem stems from numerous smaller issues that must be resolved if EU institutional learning is to lead to a truly comprehensive approach to modern problems of international security.

One obvious limitation involves the stubborn persistence of both intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics help to inhibit learning and implementation of lessons. The ESDP is still conducted largely through consensus, and achieving this consensus often requires more time and effort than a more streamlined decision approach. The EU therefore has never actually used its own rules on "flexible" or "enhanced" cooperation in the ESDP, which would allow a smaller "coalition of the willing" to undertake an ESDP mission on behalf of the EU while many other EU member states simply opt out. Instead, all ESDP operations have involved a very high degree of consensus and, accordingly, a high degree of participation by a majority of EU member states (at a minimum). This approach also requires EU member states to agree to finance or support various ESDP missions on a case-by-case basis, which puts severe limitations on mission resources and creates uncertainty about the EU's actual commitment to a problem until the assets have actually been deployed.

Beyond these problems we still see evidence of bureaucratic politics among key EU organizations, particularly the Council of the EU, the EUMS, the Commission, and to a lesser extent, the European Parliament. These organizations still compete for influence and resources, which (as with intergovernmental politics) can inhibit the EU's ability to improve its performance based on various lessons learned. Problems here are too numerous to mention in detail; the key point is that EU insiders across the system can cite various examples of how petty disputes about institutional procedures or roles can easily interfere with the smooth planning and execution of an ESDP mission. As just one example, EUPOL Afghanistan has been very difficult according to various EU insiders; 20 points of deployment raised many logistical problems that took too much time and effort to coordinate. This mission (as with ESDP missions in Africa) also raised the question of evacuation procedures; in this case, conflict arose between the narrow military view (evacuation simply falls under "logistics") and the broader civilian view (evacuation is a mission-critical issue

across all support services). In this sense, mission support must be brought in to the lessons-learned process rather than simply focusing on the direct goals of an ESDP mission.

A related problem here is the EU's clear need for a better and permanent European OHQ for ESDP missions rather than relying on the goodwill of an EU member state to offer its own[14] and/or relying on NATO's own OHQ at SHAPE under the Berlin Plus arrangement. The EU does have, since 2007, its own small OHQ in Brussels to run missions of a limited size (around 2,000 personnel), but this has not been used to run an actual ESDP mission. Instead, each ESDP mission requires negotiations among EU member states about which OHQ will be used; EU member states who volunteer their OHQs for a mission must also agree to provide additional resources in case Brussels fails to do so. In a similar manner, the EU's Battlegroup concept also has not developed as hoped; it has become more of a capacity-building mechanism rather than a rapid response force. Despite several opportunities to deploy standing EU battlegroups on actual ESDP missions, various EU member states have opposed this approach in favour of organizing missions on a case-by-base basis.

The reluctance of some EU member states to permit a more effective and permanent OHQ in Brussels is related to a second problem: the need for greater civil-military coordination during ESDP missions. Despite the agreement on the EU's overall comprehensive approach noted above, there is still in fact some degree of suspicion between the civilian and military parts of the structure. This occurs not just between bodies such as the Commission and EUMS, but even within the Council of the EU itself (which houses the EUMS). For example, the "Civ-Mil Cell" organized by the EUMS to improve civilian-military coordination in the ESDP did not work as desired and resulted in the creation of redundant planning/coordination system in the General Secretariat of Council of the EU

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[14]Specifically, the French OHQ in Mont Valérien, Paris; the UK OHQ in Northwood; the German OHQ in Potsdam, Berlin; the Italian OHQ in Rome; and the Greek OHQ in Larissa.

(which became the CMPD; see below); one member of the CPCC even confessed that he had no clue as to the function of the Civ-Mil Cell. In addition, two major Council directorates-general involved in the ESDP – DG-8 for defence issues and DG-9 for civilian crisis management (both within DG-E for External and Political-Military Affairs) – have not always coordinated their responsibilities as effectively as they could have. Since the Lisbon Treaty, however, the entire DG-E has been reorganized along more geographic (rather than functional) lines, while a new "hybrid" of DG-8 and DG-9 has been created in the form of the CMPD.[15] This change provoked a great deal of conflict within the Council and even with related actors in other bodies, such as the Commission, and it is still too early to tell whether it will function as intended. Among other things, critics point out that the CMPD seems to be dominated by military planners while most ESDP operations have in fact been civilian in nature – yet another example of civilian-military suspicion.

In short, then, the EU still needs better overall consideration of the full range of resources that could be applied to a given problem, rather than the more negotiated approach, which is subject to intergovernmental negotiations among EU member states. In addition to the civil-military conflicts noted above, this "toolbox" problem typically takes the form of disputes between first pillar (European Community) instruments and those of the second pillar (the CFSP/ESDP). The result is often that the first pillar provides equipment and financing, while the second pillar actually conducts the ESDP missions. As these pillars are subject to their own oversight mechanisms, which differ considerably, an accountability/legitimacy gap can easily result. And beyond the coordination of various resources, the overall resource commitments of the EU for ESDP operations is not very stable, as each ESDP mission must rely on the contributions of individual EU member states. Various institutional mechanisms, such as the Athena facility and the Instrument for Stability,

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[15]The CMPD is more correctly known by its new French name, the *Direction Gestion de Crises et Planification*, as it is headed by a French national, Claude-France Arnould.

help to deal with this problem on a short-term basis, but they cannot overcome the EU's overall resource limitations as compared to other organizations, such as NATO.

The Treaty of Lisbon is supposed to solve some of these problems, but at present the Treaty seems only to have fanned the flames of inter-institutional conflict regarding the transformation of the ESDP into the CSDP. The most obvious evidence of this fact is that the EU almost completely ceased undertaking new ESDP missions once it became clear that Lisbon was going to be implemented along with its new European External Action Service. Simply put, those in charge of EFP are now far too busy with protecting their roles in the face of the Lisbon reforms to worry about taking on new ESDP missions. This situation, it seems, has now produced a kind of "holding pattern" for the EU/ESDP while the bugs are worked out of the new system, and may take at least another year or two (or more) to start working effectively.

Conclusion

Since 2003, the EU clearly has gained many new experiences in the ESDP, has made active efforts to draw lessons from its experiences, has catalogued various lessons, and has attempted to apply some of these lessons to ongoing ESDP missions. If we use 2003 as a baseline year for comparison against ESDP performance in recent years, there is no doubt that a high degree of institutional learning has been occurring within EFP in general and the ESDP in particular. Thus, as measured against past performance, as during the 1980s and 1990s, the EU has in fact come a very long way in terms of its foreign policy performance and its learning processes in this domain. In fact, it could be argued that there has been more dynamism and institutional innovation in this domain than in any other EU policy area in the past decade. Moreover, various EU insiders across the system consistently report their support for keeping the EU in the business of international security/crisis management; they

also clearly believe that the EU can bring a unique capability to this domain despite the best efforts of the UN, NATO, and other international organizations.

These operations, the EU's evolving civilian crisis management capability, and the decision to develop mechanisms such the Athena facility, the IFS, an EGF, and others, clearly demonstrate the EU's ability to innovate – and therefore learn - in security affairs beyond what the US typically offers. By helping to fill the "security gap" between major combat operations and the resumption of normal government operations in failing, war-torn, or crisis-prone states, these missions clearly have political impact on the host states and on other state and global security providers (Ginsberg and Smith 2007). When this gap is not filled effectively, as with the current reconstruction efforts in Iraq, widespread lawlessness and violence can result. The expansion of this capability, and its links with other EU policy tools, could be the EU's most important and unique contribution to international security affairs. In response to requests for security assistance, the EU is beginning to offer a full range of foreign and security policy services in ways not available before, and in areas in which NATO and the US do not specialize (Armitage and Moisan 2005). The EU is thus filling a niche as a unique actor in the sense that its forces, always invited by the host government, mandated by the UN, or invited by another regional security organization, are viewed as a source of humanitarian aid and civil society building rather than as self-interested occupiers or invaders. Moreover, given that ESDP operations are not those of a single state, and given the EU's reputation as one of the world's leading democratic regional bodies, demand for ESDP missions is likely to increase thanks to the EU's own legitimacy and appeal in the eyes of those seeking security assistance.

However, if measured by another set of benchmarks – i.e., whether the EU is actually becoming a more effective and prominent global actor – it is clear that the EU's "lessons learned" processes have their limits, and cannot by themselves substitute for more forceful

and consistent leadership. Despite the Lisbon Treaty reforms, there is still no clear "engine"

for the CFSP/ESDP similar to the role the Commission plays in the first pillar. The

decentralized nature of the ESDP institutional framework, which still involves various

bureaucracies among EU member states and in Brussels, means that turf battles and free-

riding will remain chronic features of the ESDP for the foreseeable future. The EU therefore

should pay as much attention to "unlearning" those institutional pathologies as it does to

drawing lessons from its increasingly wide range of ESDP experiences.

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