UACES 40th Annual Conference

Bruges, 6-8 September 2010

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

www.uaces.org

Steven Robinson, PhD Candidate – Newcastle University

Assessing the Europeanisation of Portuguese Foreign and Security Policy

UACES Annual Conference, College of Europe, Bruges, 6–8 September 2010

Introduction

Following the Carnation Revolution in 1974, Portugal has shifted its principal foreign policy focus away from the Atlantic and Africa and towards Europe. Now Portugal has successfully pursued the 'European option' and renewed its national domestic politics by integrating with continental Europe, it can now look to use its membership of international organisations (particularly the European Union, NATO and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries) to rejuvenate its foreign policy. Portugal can bring the asset of its traditional historical links with the Atlantic and Africa to the EU as it tries to build a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, formerly ESDP) to strengthen its role in world affairs.

By using EU membership as a way of 'rescuing the nation state' (see Milward, 2000 and Major, 2005), and rejuvenating its foreign policy following the decolonisation process of the 1970s, Portuguese foreign policy can speak with a louder voice on the world stage. The Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy is one aspect of the broader multilateralisation and internationalisation of Portuguese foreign policy since 1974. Nonetheless, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy and adapting national foreign policy priorities to reflect the EU's global reach and its recent emergence onto the world stage, has a knock-on effect on Portugal's role in other international organisations.

Assessing the overall Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy, requires a focus on the broad priorities and rationale of Portuguese foreign policy today, in the EU context, as well as how elites involved in the process behave and contextualise themselves in the contemporary global and European order. Does the

‘Europeanisation’ of Portuguese foreign policy represent marked shifts in priorities or can Portugal pursue traditional interests through new European structures? And if so, how does it go about this? How central is the EU to the rejuvenation of Portuguese national foreign policy? And to what extent are policy-makers reconstructing Portuguese national foreign policy interests in light of European integration? In order to think in terms of the ‘Europeanisation’ processes at work in Portugal, it will be necessary to consider the complex nature of the concept and examine its applicability to studying the Portuguese case.

Conceptualising Europeanisation

‘Europeanisation’ is a useful but sometimes problematic concept to apply practically to explain transformations in the politics, policies and polities of the EU. There is no common agreement on quite what the scope of Europeanisation as a force for change is and how this can be consistently measured and analysed. Great care needs to be taken in defining Europeanisation in the first place. As Featherstone (2003) argues, Europeanisation “…is not a simple synonym for European regional integration or convergence…”, but encompasses these aspects together with a less specific notion of a “…response [by political actors, not just Member States] to the policies of the European Union…” (Featherstone, 2003: 1).

Radaelli finds that, broadly speaking, studies at the macro-level have uncovered low levels of Europeanisation. Whereas, at the policy level, Europeanisation is observed to have had a more consistent impact. Whether Europeanisation produces substantial convergence in public policy, he argues, remains to be seen. However, the Europeanisation literature raises important questions about how the EU impacts upon its Member States. An important final consideration is that most studies on Europeanisation do not, rigorously, consider alternative explanations of causality, such as domestic influences or globalisation (Radaelli, 2000: 25–26). Radaelli’s contribution is important because it highlights the conceptual weaknesses of Europeanisation, the inconsistencies in how Europeanisation is applied, and sets up a research agenda to gather more empirical evidence to examine the true effects of Europeanisation on various policy areas and national case studies.

Both Radaelli's and Featherstone's contributions to the literature seeking to clarify Europeanisation as a conceptual device are useful but Börzel's (2002) work made a significant contribution by presenting Europeanisation as a two-way process. She outlines the two dimensions of Europeanisation as: 'bottom-up' ('uploading'), where the Member States set the parameters for the new European level institutions, and 'top-down' ('downloading'), which refers to the domestic impact of the European level institutions. "Member States have an incentive to 'upload' their policies to the European level to minimize the costs in 'downloading' them at the domestic level" (Börzel, 2002: 193). This two-dimensional conceptualisation recognises that Member States both shape and adapt to policy at the European level and have a vested interest in projecting key national ideas and interests onto the emerging European ones (Börzel, 2002: 194). This conception has considerable utility when applying Europeanisation to Member States' foreign policy and demonstrating that processes of Member State Europeanisation can occur beyond 'Community' policy areas.

Major and Pomorska (2005) examine the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and add a third dimension. For them, Europeanisation is an ongoing process of change between the increasingly interwoven national and European levels. They break this down into three complementary dimensions: 'uploading' – the projection of national preferences onto the EU level, 'downloading' – the acceptance of EU norms at the national level and 'crossloading' – the mutual exchange of ideas and 'ways of doing things' between the EU and the Member State. This three-dimensional conceptualisation goes beyond Börzel's (2002) two-dimensional approach and reflects the influence of new institutionalist and social constructivist thinking in European integration studies. This visualisation emphasises the dialectical nature of the relationship between actors and the system, Member States and the EU (Major and Pomorska, 2005: 1–2).

Wong (2008) builds on Major and Pomorska's (2005) three-dimensional conceptualisations of foreign policy Europeanisation. The first dimension, 'Adaptation and Policy Convergence' ('downloading'), includes the 'top-down' elements of Europeanisation, particularly national convergence, harmonisation of policies, and increased emphasis on common foreign policy outputs. The second dimension, 'National Projection' ('uploading') explains how Member States can

maintain their traditional foreign policy interests but need to redefine them into the new CFSP framework. This is characterised by Member States using the EU foreign policy mechanisms as a "cover" for maintaining traditional foreign policies. The third dimension, 'Identity Reconstruction' ('crossloading'), is the result of the previous two dimensions and explains the development of shared European and national interests and the emergence of norms among foreign policy-making elites (Wong, 2008: 326).

Wong's conceptualisation is helpful for three reasons. Firstly, it updates Europeanisation as a concept and demonstrates its potential in explaining the power of European integration on the sacred national '*domaine réservé*' of foreign policy (Wong, 2008: 321). Secondly, it presents the complex nature of separating national and European interests and paints a picture of national interests being redefined to reflect emerging European norms. This means that 'uploading' challenges the established liberal intergovernmentalist understanding of national preference formation and inter-state bargaining processes outlined by Moravcsik (1993). Thirdly, it shows how small states in particular have adapted to developments at the EU level and used the EU as a portal through which to pursue traditional national foreign policy priorities but amplified (Wong, 2008: 325).

At the same time, Wong's conceptualisation of foreign policy Europeanisation is problematic and presents some important challenges. Firstly, it is an elegant model of Europeanisation dynamics and illustrates the simultaneous impact on Member States and EU institutions, but is perhaps a little too simplistic. While there is nuance and a lack of clarity of the precise directions the pressures of Europeanisation travel in, the third direction is too imprecise and only occupies a vague space between bottom-up and top-down Europeanisation. In practice, Europeanisation could be considered to be an aspect of both, but this is not precisely presented. Secondly, it is unclear whether Wong's conceptualisation of Europeanisation regards it primarily as a cause, effect or process (Wong, 2008: 328). Thirdly, Wong hints at the eventual convergence of national foreign policies and likens this to integration in 'Community' policy areas. While a broader European interest may emerge over time, at the moment the EU's foreign policy armoury is more of a *patchwork* of different Member States bringing with them different historical and geographic relations with different parts of the world. Maintaining national legacies in the EU context is what drives and defines a

common European foreign policy and gives it scope, but at the same time will mean total convergence of the EU27's individual national foreign policies will be impossible. This further illustrates the strength of intergovernmental decision-making in the EU and how foreign policy still remains at the heart of national interests.

The application of Europeanisation, particularly the multi-directional power dynamics, to foreign policy has been a significant development in the past decade. In addition to conceptual clarification there has been a growth in studies seeking to apply Europeanisation as a concept to analyse European foreign policies in transition. This exercise in subjecting Europeanisation to rigorous empirical case study testing will help to build a more utilisable and robust conception of Europeanisation for the future. The reality is that the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy is a complicated business and the aim of this research is to challenge theoretical models on the grounds of being incomplete or too simplistic to be representative of what is happening in European Union Member States' foreign policies.

The more constructivist foundations, upon which many notions of Europeanisation are built, lend themselves to a more institutional focus of Member State adaptation to Europe. In practice, the contributions of historical institutionalist and sociological institutionalist studies of Member State Europeanisation offer a more rounded view of the processes at work and can help improve Europeanisation as a theoretical and methodological device. The institutional focus helps to get at the social relations which govern how Member States, especially political and bureaucratic elites, behave in the European context. The historical institutionalist perspective sheds light on national institutional adaptation (and resistance) to pressures from the European level and the 'stickiness' of national political organisations.

Bulmer and Burch (2009) set out to analyse how domestic political actors have taken EU business "in their stride" by finding "translator devices" which enable them to enact European norms or policies within existing national norms and routines (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 21). In the British context, Whitehall could be Europeanised in three ways: *absorption*, *accommodation*, and *transformation*. *Absorption* represents the most minimalist response where Brussels is responded to within the parameters of existing structures. *Accommodation* is a less modest form of adaptation where

national structures become geared towards playing an active role in the EU, but remain largely governed by the same procedural norms as before. *Transformation* would, however, involve considerable reform and the rejection of embedded national norms in favour of new European ways of doing things. In addition to these, Bulmer and Burch forward two more terms which capture the responses of the UK government to European integration, namely *reception* and *projection* (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 26).

By placing Europeanisation in the long-term context, Bulmer and Burch draw heavily upon new institutionalism. Historical and sociological institutionalism are particularly consistent with Europeanisation and the implied constructivist assumptions upon which it is based. Combining historical institutionalism and Europeanisation is interesting as the latter is concerned primarily with change and adaptation, and the former is concerned with resistance to change and continuity of behaviour because of embedded norms, lock-in and path-dependence. Where change does occur it tends to be fundamental upheaval, which does not reflect the gradual incremental change represented by the Europeanisation of national bureaucratic structures over many years (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 27–28).

Many studies of European integration have paid insufficient attention to the importance of social interactions in shaping political actors' behaviour (Wiener, 2006: 35). Börzel and Risse (2000) argue that sociological institutionalism provides two explanations for domestic adaptation in response to Europeanisation. Firstly, 'institutional isomorphism', the gradual homogenisation of national and European political structures, becomes increasingly widespread as institutions interact more frequently. Secondly, actors are socialised into new 'European' norms and social learning leads to redefined national interests in light of European integration (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8). Investigating Europeanisation from a sociological institutionalist perspective is all about understanding how norms, ideas, organisational cultures and discourses are reconstructed in light of European integration. Does socialisation change the behaviour of national political elites? (Bulmer, 2008: 50–51).

'Sedimentation' is a useful way of thinking about how the institutionalisation of new practices and beliefs has varying degrees of impact within the organisation. For

instance, older members of an organisation may be more culturally resistant to changes because of their historical experiences. Other groups may be more involved in socialisation processes and thus mould their beliefs accordingly. In other words, some people have dissolved into the institutional solution, others remain undissolved as sediment and cloud what exactly the institution stands for. There are, therefore, identifiable strata of different beliefs within an organisation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996: 184; Peters, 1999: 104). Cultural persistence is central to conceptions of institutions, and is generally based upon shared norms (Zucker, 1991: 84).

An institution needs, therefore, to be understood as a whole, where beliefs and norms are shared and define the institution's goals (either formally or informally) and how, over prolonged periods, dominant beliefs can evolve or be influenced by external factors (particularly with reference to 'others' in defining themselves). In the European context, political institutions are actively involved in forging and reinforcing notions of national (or indeed *supranational*) interest and identity over time. Assessing the Europeanisation of national foreign policies is fundamentally an exercise in mapping and understanding the norms and belief systems in play in national and EU-level policy-making institutions and understanding how social relations within decision-making networks interact and influence one another.

Denca's (2009) study of the Europeanisation of Hungary's, Romania's and Slovakia's foreign policies laid particular emphasis on elite socialisation and how national and European norms and preferences are fluid and subject to change and modification according to the social context of day-to-day foreign policy-making. While the study provides rich empirical data on three new EU Member States, the decision to focus only on 'top-down' Europeanisation and exclude 'bottom-up' dynamics is a shame (Denca, 2009: 390). Denca argues that 'bottom-up' Europeanisation is problematic because it "conflates…Europeanisation…and intergovernmentalism" (Denca, 2009: 393). While 'bottom-up' processes complicate the Europeanisation narrative, and have a certain similarity with liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of Member State participation in the EU, it is the role of Member States and their ability to colour EU foreign policy and leave their own imprint on the emerging EU level that is most interesting.

By using Portugal as a case study it will be possible to examine the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy from both the 'bottom-up' as well as the 'top-down'. In contrast to Denca's case studies of Hungary, Romania and Slovakia who have not been EU Member States for many years, Portugal has held the EU Council Presidency on three occasions since signing the Accession Treaty over twenty-five years ago. While Denca accepts that the Hungarian, Romanian and Slovakian case studies mean that it would be more "fruitful" to chart the Europeanisation of their foreign policies from a 'top-down' perspective (Denca, 2009: 393), rather than including 'bottom-up' factors, the Portuguese case offers more to work with in applying both 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' processes to understanding the Europeanisation of national foreign policies.

In addition to this, the Portuguese case study offers an insight into the behaviour of small and medium-sized powers and, because Portugal has undergone a recent transition to democracy, offers further clues as to how the recent accession countries (not least Denca's case studies of Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) may behave in the EU context in the coming years. However, given the institutional changes set out in the Treaty of Lisbon, neither Hungary, Romania nor Slovakia will enjoy the freedom that the three Portuguese EU Council Presidencies had in setting the EU foreign policy agenda. Before the Treaty of Lisbon created the post of elected European Council President and made Baroness Ashton the EU's foreign affairs supremo, national Presidencies often approached their term with 'priority' issues which reflected their national foreign policy interests, for example, Finland paid considerable attention to the Nordic dimension and Spain was always interested in Latin America (Cameron, 2007: 47). Therefore, it is clear that national priority issues will not have the same platform as they did previous to the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Nonetheless, given Portugal's experience in the EU, it is reasonable to assume that as countries like Hungary, Romania and Slovakia became increasingly self-confident in Council meetings they will be able to use Europeanisation to mould the EU in their own image as well as bowing to top-down pressures.

Portuguese Foreign Policy-Making in the European Context

The Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy, whether by 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' pressures, *is* occurring. Europeanisation is a difficult concept to isolate, but the developments in Portuguese foreign policy over the past twenty years are the result of policy-makers firmly anchoring themselves in Europe and placing national foreign policy priorities firmly in the context of EU membership. Firstly, by reflecting on Portugal's ability, in Wong's terms, to 'upload' its priorities during the EU Council Presidencies, it will be clear to see how Portuguese national interests have become intertwined with the broader European ones. Secondly, by exploring the opportunities for foreign policy-making elites (officials and politicians) to become socialised and involved in European norm-building, it will be possible to see how pervasive 'European' ways of doing things are in changing Portuguese ways of doing things (Wong's 'Identity Reconstruction' and 'Adaptation and Policy Convergence').

Projecting National Foreign Policy Priorities: Portugal's EU Council Presidencies

It is apparent that the blurring of the European and the national can be used by Member States to influence the EU. In particular, the 'uploading' of national foreign policy priorities and the externalisation of relations between Member States and parts of the world with which they might enjoy special historical or geographic ties can be to the benefit of the emerging EU common foreign policy mechanisms. In Portugal's case, its great strength lies in its ability to "mobilise" its national foreign policy interests, particularly relations with Africa and Latin America, to the advantage of the wider European Union. This "value-added" that Portugal and its historical and cultural links with Africa and Brazil offers the EU is of paramount importance to Portuguese foreign policy-makers and is a means of enhancing Portugal's position within the EU. It also works the other way, in that the global reach of the EU, combined with its obvious strategic interests in developing better relations with emerging economies, such as Brazil, helps give credibility and direction to Portugal's foreign policy credentials within the CFSP system (Interview 1, 2010).

Portugal's successes in projecting its national priorities and its enthusiasm to put the "privileged relations" it has between Brazil and Africa at the "service of the EU" have

played a major role in Portugal's Presidencies of the EU Council in 1992, 2000 and 2007 (Interview 1, 2010). Upon accession in 1986, Portugal could have held the Presidency soon after, but because of a lack of knowledge and preparedness deferred until 1992. In between 1986 and 1992 Portugal gradually came to embrace the EPC foreign policy framework and took the Presidency in the first half of 1992 at a turbulent time in Europe's history, both within the Community with the Maastricht Treaty ratification process, and in wider Europe with the outbreak of war in The Balkans (Magone, 1997: 165–166; Matos Correia, 2002: 202).

The 2000 Presidency was again marked by internal reforms and a developing EU foreign policy competence. The Extraordinary European Council in Lisbon was concerned with economic reforms, and the process of institutional reform continued under this Portuguese Presidency. In external relations Portugal began to make its mark, with the EU-Africa summit in Cairo and continued dialogue between the EU and Latin America (Magone, 2004: 207). In addition to taking the helm in EU-Mercosul relations, the 2000 Presidency also prioritised the enlargement of the Union (de Vasconcelos, 2000: 25–26).

It was clear from the speeches made by the Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates that the third Portuguese Council Presidency, in the second half of 2007, would yet again prioritise external relations. As President of the European Council, Sócrates outlined three key issues for the Portuguese Presidency of 2007 to address in order to create 'a stronger Union for a better world'. Firstly, to reform the Treaties following the demise of the European Constitution. Secondly, to develop an agenda for modernising Europe's economies and societies. And thirdly, to use the Portuguese Presidency to strengthen Europe's place in the world (Sócrates, 2007: 10). This was mainly achieved by Portugal hosting the first EU-Brazil Summit and the second EU-Africa Summit.

During these three Presidencies, Portugal has been successful in 'uploading' Africa and Latin America onto the EU foreign policy agenda. The agenda-setting powers of the Presidency meant that Portugal was well-placed to inject an African and Latin American 'flavour' to Europe's foreign policy interests, while at the same time, with increasing coherence in external relations and the development of the CFSP, address

foreign policy matters which are of wider interest to the Union as a whole. Nonetheless, presenting Portuguese national priorities as being important challenges and priorities for the wider European Union was a successful tactic for Portugal although it helped further blur the difference between national and European priorities.

Responding to European Norms: Elite Socialisation and Portuguese Foreign Policy

The importance ascribed to Portugal's EU Council Presidencies meant that the Portuguese government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, was committed to supplying the best people to help prepare and run the term. Those with experience of a previous Presidency were often drafted into running the Presidency when it came around again. In 2007, Portugal could draw upon talented individuals who had experienced the previous Presidency in 2000 and who were familiar with how Brussels works. Recognising that it is "…not possible to run a [successful] Presidency from the [national] capital", Lisbon gave those in Brussels a certain degree of freedom to rely on their knowledge and experience and to explore pre-existing social networks and informal relations built up during the previous Presidency (Interview 2, 2010).

The EU Council is a forum where political and bureaucratic elites from the governments of the 27 Member States of the EU meet regularly, and consequently opportunities to build meaningful social relations are aplenty. Often, because of the many competences of EU decision-making and the fact that governments are united by EU-level policy-making, politicians and officials are forced to co-operate at the intergovernmental level to discuss matters of mutual interest. While the majority of interactions within the EU are on a multilateral basis, bilateral relations between EU Member States are becoming increasingly located in the EU context as this is not only far-reaching in terms of political scope but is also the sphere in which elite social interactions take place. The 'EU-isation' of bilateral relations between Portugal and the other 26 EU Member States in recent years is testament to the EU's development as an international actor and its expansion across the European continent. Equally, if it were not for the EU, Portugal would not have any reason to build any sort of bilateral relations with countries such as Estonia and Romania. They are united in their

common interests as EU Member States, but this also constitutes a foundation upon which Portugal can forge meaningful bilateral ties with countries, such as these, in Central and Eastern Europe (Interview 3, 2010).

The EU-isation of Portugal's bilateral relations with the EU26 requires domestic foreign policy-makers to approach European affairs holistically, as it is impossible to separate a country from its status as an EU Member State. Bilateral and EU affairs are increasingly intertwined and, as such, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has adapted to reflect this and, in 2006, moved bilateral relations with EU Member States into the department which co-ordinates EU affairs (Decree Law 204/2006 of 27 October, Art. 27, Nº. 3b). European integration has also enhanced Luso-Spanish bilateral relations, locating bilateral co-operation between the two Iberian states firmly in the EU context (Interview 3, 2010).

While other organisations, particularly NATO, are fora for discussing security and defence issues, matters of 'high' politics have infiltrated EU interactions between Member States on both a formal and informal basis. Formal discussion takes place through the EU's CFSP and CSDP and the discussion of foreign affairs in COREPER, the Council of Ministers and the European Council. Informal discussions on a multi- and bilateral basis frequently occur in the shadows of Council meetings and at informal ministerial gatherings and lunches. Officials brought together to discuss day-to-day EU business with their counterparts from other countries can take this opportunity to discuss matters of bilateral interest also.

Europe has left its mark on many notable Portuguese politicians and statesmen since achieving democracy. On the socialist side, former Prime Ministers Mário Soares and António Guterres had strong personal convictions about the importance of Europe to Portugal. Soares in particular, from his years in exile, could call upon personal connections with socialist parties in other European countries, particularly in France, to help secure Portugal's accession to the European Community (Gonzaga Ferreira, 2001: 330). Clearly, Europeanisation, elite socialisation and networking have shaped Portugal's relations with Europe since the 1970s. The Portuguese centre-right also, eventually, became more enthusiastic towards Europe. This is evident from assessing the behaviour of Aníbal Cavaco Silva during his decade as Prime Minister (1985–

1995). By the end of the decade of *Cavaquismo*, Goucha Soares argues, the Europeanisation of the Portuguese centre-right was complete and this fostered a renewed enthusiasm for the European project, particularly during the 1992 Portuguese Presidency (Goucha Soares, 2007: 465–466). The intense learning by doing of running the Presidency, and the socialisation processes going on as Portugal's looked to conform to logics of appropriateness in how it conducted itself in the EU context, must have underpinned this gradual change.

It is clear that politicians and officials involved in Portuguese foreign policy have become increasing comfortable operating within the European context. While it is unclear just how much socialisation processes have forced Portuguese foreign policy to change its objectives and methods, it is clear that networking and social relations at the European level (between politicians, advisors and diplomats) help to better contextualise Portuguese foreign policy and keep those involved in the policy-making process better informed through formal and informal communications networks and by establishing important social contacts with counterparts from other Member States and the EU institutions. The Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy, therefore, rests upon the ability of individuals and policy-making institutions to respond and adapt to the changing circumstances brought about by Portugal's participation in the European integration process in order to maximise the effectiveness of national foreign policy priorities.

Portugal's Foreign Policy-Making Institutions: Europeanisation at Home and Abroad?

Portugal's accession to the European Community in 1986 brought about considerable reforms in the foreign policy-making process in Portugal. Full membership also resulted in the Portuguese Mission to the Communities in Brussels becoming the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU (REPER). The institutional reforms which came into force the day before Portugal and Spain acceded to the bloc, founded the Directorate-General for the European Communities (which later became the DGAE – Directorate-General for European Affairs) as a body distinct from the more general foreign policy bureaucracy (Matos Correia, 2002: 195; Decree Law 526/85 of

31 December). This first response to European integration sort to organise and co-ordinate all aspects of Portugal's membership and, together with the REPER in Brussels, constitutes the link between the EU's institutions and Member States and the various government departments in Lisbon and the governments of the Autonomous Regions of the Madeira and Azores archipelagos (Decree Law 204/2006 of 27 October, Art. 12, Nº. 3).

Today, the DGAE is structured in such a way so that it is "mirrored" in Brussels at REPER and is concerned with the various policy briefs of the EU (from agriculture to external affairs) as well as managing Lisbon's relationship with the EU institutions. The institutional affairs and bilateral relations unit is the only unit comprising mostly of career diplomats rather than technicians and policy experts (Interview 4, 2010). Using long-serving technical experts means that officials in the DGAE can become exposed to long-term socialisation processes and can evolve Portugal's broader national position to converge with the emerging European one. There is also a certain amount of institutional memory already built up in the DGAE organisation, because of the permanence of many of its staff. While national positions and interests are important, it is clear that officials here see themselves as being firmly Europeans (Interview 5, 2010).

Officials in Lisbon, particularly in the DGAE, are in constant contact with REPER in Brussels. The constant stream of communications and the occasional secondments mean that the Lisbon and Brussels arms of Portuguese foreign policy are well connected. The REPER, although acting with some autonomy where matters are fast-developing, largely advises the Portuguese government in Lisbon and acts on instructions from Lisbon and then negotiates accordingly. To fully understand what freedom the REPER team have, and to analyse the scope for ignoring or modifying instructions from Lisbon, it will be necessary to spend some time in Brussels and to interview officials who work there. However, it should be emphasised that, with modern communications flows, the distance between the DGAE in Lisbon and the REPER in Brussels is in reality not a huge factor. REPER officials are available immediately via email, and on the telephone, they are only a four-digit extension away, i.e. an international dialling code is not required to communicate with Brussels (Interview 3, 2010).

The training of new Portuguese diplomats includes a considerable European component which contributes to the broader socialisation of Portuguese diplomats and the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy more generally. All new Portuguese diplomats get, as part of their training, a trip to Brussels to take a course on the EU institutions. New recruits to REPER have to undergo their own internal training programme (and placements in Brussels are done through the DGAE). In general, the training programmes for Portuguese diplomats vary over time and are designed on an *ad hoc* basis. This flexibility means that Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is able to respond well to changes in policies and institutions at the European level (Interview 6, 2010).

The Europeanisation of the training of Portuguese diplomats occurs less through the imposing of norms of behaviour on Member States from the supranational institutions but is instead driven by the Member States and how they communicate and exchange information along intergovernmental lines. The European Diplomatic Programme (EDP), although overseen by the Commission, is driven by the Member States who set the priorities and direction of the training programme. Every six months Portuguese officials meet with their European counterparts to discuss the programme, however in reality the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs enjoys good relations with its equivalents in other Member States and there is a constant flow of ideas and information between national governments (Interview 6, 2010). An integral part of the EDP is the Council decision-making simulation; this further underlines the focus on understanding the day-to-day functioning of the EU institutions from the perspective of national governments interacting through intergovernmental negotiations.

While the DGAE handles most aspects of Portugal's relations with the EU, the Directorate-General for External Policy (DGPE – *Direcção-Geral de Política Externa*), as Portugal's main foreign policy-making institution, retains control over the foreign, security and defence policy areas. The '*Direcções de Serviços*' DSD and PESC (concerned with Security and Defence and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy respectively) handle Portugal's security relations with the EU and NATO and liaise with the Ministry of National Defence and Portugal's delegations in Brussels (REPER and DELNATO).

The DSD directorate, which handles the EU's CSDP, as well as relations with NATO and disarmament and non-proliferation issues, has to gather information from various sources, co-ordinate the Portuguese position for CSDP matters and advise other actors, particularly those on the Political and Security Committee in Brussels, on what the official Portuguese line is. The DSD must liaise with other ministries, particularly Finance and Defence and must consult the regional desks in the DGPE to make sure that political and diplomatic aspects of security missions are handled with appropriate care and sensitivity, according to the specifics of the country in question. In practice, discussion of security matters between actors inside the Portuguese government occurs on three levels: the unit level; the director level; and the political level (Interview 7, 2010).

The PESC directorate of the DGPE is headed by the Ministry's European Correspondent who reports directly to Ambassador Nuno Brito. The responsibilities of the PESC directorate and the European Correspondent do not replicate those of DGAE officials as security matters fall firmly within the purview of the DGPE. Nonetheless the role of the European Correspondent helps sharpen the focus of Portuguese foreign policy-making on what is happening within Europe (i.e. the EU and NATO as the principal security actors) and reveals the importance of European institutions to Portuguese national security and foreign policy (Interview 1, 2010; Decree Law 204/2006 of 27 October, Art. 10).

Conclusion

The Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy can be said to be occurring, however this is dependent upon the overall reliability of the concept as an explanatory tool. Changes in the Portuguese state over the last few decades can be associated with a myriad of factors, not just European integration/Europeanisation. Globalisation, interdependence, modernisation and with every year since decolonisation and the end of Salazar's regime, Portuguese democracy becomes more robust and it is easier to engage with the former colonies on a more equal basis as the fear of re-colonisation diminishes year on year. Despite these qualifications, and without wanting to over-

generalise the power of Europeanisation as a significant force for change in Portugal, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy appears to be an observable reality. Europe is now the centre of Portuguese foreign policy and while Portugal has adapted to the realities of EU membership and its growing ambitions (i.e. top-down Europeanisation), Portugal has been successful in using Europe as a portal through which it can pursue crucial national foreign policy priorities (i.e. bottom-up Europeanisation).

At the domestic level, the Portuguese foreign policy-making process has had to adapt to the realities and pressures of EU Membership. To apply Bulmer and Burch's (2009) terminology, the Portuguese foreign policy-making process has not undergone radical *transformation* in recent years, but the changes which have been implemented reflect both the persistence of national ways of doing things and a willingness to embrace the European level, as part of the democratisation and modernisation processes the Portuguese state has undergone in the past thirty-six years. Therefore, *accommodation*, where national structures are geared towards playing an active part in European affairs, is the most suitable explanation. To illustrate this, the fact that a special section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created to co-ordinate policies emanating from Brussels (the DGAE), yet defence and security matters are still handled by the political office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the DGPE). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has done its best to adapt to the new realities, yet has not undergone major upheaval. What reforms have taken in place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been gradual and motivated as much by streamlining the national bureaucracy, and making it more efficient, than anything else. In addition to this, it is evident that playing an 'active role' in Europe is a two-way process. It is easier to play an active role if national priorities can be uploaded onto the EU system, so European priorities reflect national interests and capabilities.

The evidence of the Portuguese case broadly supports Wong's three-dimensional framework of foreign policy Europeanisation. However, Wong's model is in need of further modification and refinement if it is to be of greater utility to scholars of European integration. While evidence from the Portuguese case identifies certain changes at Member State level which would indicate the power of Europeanisation pressures to permeate through national foreign policy-making processes and force

change, there is still a danger of assigning direct causality to Europeanisation when other factors should be taken into account. A 'Europeanised' foreign policy, because of the role of bottom-up (uploading/national projection) processes can be coloured by national foreign policy priorities. In the Portuguese case this is clearly evident and highlights the benefits of evaluating top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation dynamics together. However, only after several years of EU membership and once national actors become firmly established in the EU context, is it practical to attempt a bi-directional Europeanisation analysis, especially on foreign policy matters.

Framing changes to the Portuguese foreign policy-making in recent years within the Europeanisation narrative appears, upon first glance, to be persuasive. However, it should be stressed that unravelling the effects of Europeanisation and assigning direct causality to Europeanisation factors, as opposed to other influences, in the Portuguese case, is made all the more complicated by the fact that Portugal sought to integrate with Europe at a critical juncture in its domestic politics and in the backdrop of considerable isolation in foreign affairs. In the Portuguese case, European integration (and the Europeanisation of the country's political institutions) went hand-in-hand with a process of democratisation, liberalisation and modernisation of all aspects of Portuguese life. Nonetheless, European ways of doing things gave Portugal something to aspire to towards and Europeanisation processes provided the blue-print for the democratisation and modernisation of the Portuguese state to become a reality rooted firmly in the European context. A worthwhile future research project would be to further tease out these intervening influences and examine their true potential as plausible rival explanations to the Europeanisation argument.

The Portuguese case further highlights the importance of norms, socialisation and social learning processes and how national and European ways of doing things may conflict and converge over time. The formalisation and gradual institutionalisation of European ideas, interests, worldviews and ways of doing things at the EU level clearly impact upon the Member States' foreign policy-making structures. However, even small and medium-sized Member States, such as Portugal, are aware that there is room to upload key national interests and to mould the CFSP, CSDP and the new External Action Service in the image of existing national foreign policy interests. This is best done through a process of informal lobbying and building upon existing social

relations in the Brussels institutions. Portugal, through its unique historical links to Brazil and Africa is able to push for this patch to be sewn onto the EU foreign policy patchwork quilt for the benefits of the wider Union and its foreign policy aims and objectives in the coming decades.

By 'Europeanising' its foreign policy process and looking to influence the emergent common European agenda, i.e. by putting its place in the EU at the centre of its dealings with the Lusophone world and using the EU as a vehicle for mobilising its own foreign policy interests, Portugal has successfully renewed its foreign policy. 'Top-down' reforms and domestic administrative *accommodation* of EU norms have allowed for 'bottom-up' Europeanisation to be used to rejuvenate Portuguese foreign policy and 'rescue' the nation-state from international isolation and decline.

List of Interviews

1. Official in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGPE), Lisbon, 4/2/2010.
2. Officer in the Portuguese Army and former Advisor to the Minister for National Defence, Lisbon, 4/3/10.
3. Official in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGAE), Lisbon, 8/3/2010.
4. Official in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGAE), Lisbon, 9/2/2010.
5. Official in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGAE), Lisbon, 9/2/2010.
6. Officials in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Diplomatic Institute), Lisbon, 2/2/2010.
7. Official in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGPE), Lisbon, 2/3/2010.

Bibliography

Börzel, T.A. (2002) 'Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40, (2), 193–214.

Börzel, T.A. and T. Risse. (2000) 'When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change', *European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)*, 4, (15), (http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf accessed 2 August 2010).

Bulmer, S. and M. Burch. (2009) *The Europeanisation of Whitehall*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Cameron, F. (2007) *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, Abingdon, Routledge.

Denca, S.S. (2009) 'Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Empirical Findings From Hungary, Romania and Slovakia', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5, (3), 389–404.

Featherstone, K. (2003) 'Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe'', in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli, eds, *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3–26.

Gonzaga Ferreira, L. (2001) *Portugal e as Comunidades Europeias*, Lisbon, Vega.

Goucha Soares, A. (2007) 'Portugal and the European Union: The Ups and Downs in 20 Years of Membership', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8, (4), 460–475.

Magone, J.M. (1997) *European Portugal: The Difficult Road to Sustainable Democracy*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.

Magone, J.M. (2004) *The Developing Place of Portugal in the European Union*, New Brunswick (NJ), Transaction.

Major, C. (2005) 'Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?' *Politics*, 25, (3), 175–190.

Major, C. and K. Pomorska. (2005) 'Europeanisation: Framework or Fashion?' *Fornet CFSP Forum*, 3, (5), 1–3.

Matos Correia, J.M. (2002) 'Portugal', in B. Hocking and D. Spence, eds, *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 191–211.

Milward, A.S. (2000) *The European Rescue of the Nation-State – 2nd Edition*, Abingdon, Routledge.

Moravcsik, A. (1993) 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31, (4), 473–524.

Peters, B.G. (1999) *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'*, London, Pinter.

Radaelli, C.M. (2000) 'Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change', *European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)*, 4, (8), (http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-008.pdf accessed 2 August 2010).

Sócrates, J. (2007) 'Uma União mais forte para um mundo melhor', *Europa: Novas Fronteiras*, 21, 9–14.

Tolbert, P.S. and L.G. Zucker (1996) 'The Institutionalization of Institutional Theory', in S.R. Clegg, C. Hardy and W.R. Nord, eds, *Handbook of Organization Studies*, London, Sage, 175–190.

Wiener, A. (2006) 'Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism', in M. Cini and A.K. Bourne, eds, *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 35–55.

Wong, R. (2008) 'Foreign Policy', in P. Graziano and M.P. Vink, eds, *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 321–334.

de Vasconcelos, Á. (2000) 'Portugal 2000: The European Way', *Notre Europe Research and Policy Paper*, 9, 1–28.

Zucker, L.G. (1991) 'The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence', in W.W. Powell and P.J. DiMaggio, eds, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago (IL), The University of Chicago Press, 83–107.