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Dialogue Russia-EU: how we could act together now

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Abstract:

Relations between Russia and the EU can be defined as incomprehensible and inadequate. Apart from rhetorical confrontation and political situation there is a whole range of reasons explaining the state-of-the-art. What is mainly important – the partners has become rather different.

Why can't we get our act together? The Europe has done great things: creation of the largest union in the history, building of the largest market; whereas there are a numerous of weak points in the European external policy. And time is not on our side. As powers such as China and India rise, the relative power of Europe inevitably decreases.

Partnership between Russia and the EU should start with not such difficult aspects as energy dialogue or European security, we have to work at «solidarite de fait», that once became a basic principle of European building. The force of Russia consists of natural resources and extraordinary supply of oil and gas. But at the same time, it is a weakness, Russia has to develop the competitive industry, which is able to make Russia-EU relations more balanced. In fact, unlike some other areas of the overall EU-Russia relationship, we have no outstanding or vexing problems to solve in the area of research cooperation, but only a positive agenda to move forward. Such an enhanced cooperation in a strategic area will contribute to shaping a more positive EU-Russia relationship. It's important to realize how to move gradually to the directions indicated, how «regarder ensemble dans la meme direction», how to become strategic allies and how to find our «l'entente cordiale».

*For 19 years, the West (America and Europe) has been putting off answering a critical strategic question: what role should post-Soviet Russia actually play globally and in the European order? Should it be treated as a difficult partner or a strategic adversary?*¹

Joschka Fischer, January 2009

I'd like to start my reflections about actual stage of Russia-EU relationship by a very blue dilemma, expressed by German politician in one of his recent article, the politician which opinion I highly appreciate. So, who is Russia for the West and the West for Russia? Joschka Fischer gives a very realistic reply, unfortunately "the West didn't provide a conclusive answer to this question. If you follow most East Europeans, the United Kingdom and the Bush administration, the answer is "strategic adversary." But most West Europeans prefer "difficult partner." These seemingly mutually exclusive alternatives have one thing in common: neither of them has been thought through to the end. ()"²

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev seems more optimistic, in his interview before summit EU-Russia at November 2008 in Nice he said: "Russia is more than ready. We have always told our European friends and partners that we are ready to discuss every possible option. Strictly speaking, from a legal point of view, the talks were never frozen but were simply halted for a time to give Europe the chance to collect its thoughts. This has been done now and we are ready to continue the talks straight away, right from tomorrow"³.

The discussion about future relationship between Russia and the EU has been continued after a pause provoked by conflict in the Georgia in August 2008. The chain and outcome of the talk are more difficult to predict but none of the partner has an adequate alternative to a new agreement, the vision of strategic partnership and new basic paper are very different. The parties show fundamentally different approaches to new agreement. Russia proposes a compact detailed framework document that would contain the main principles and goals of relations with the European Union, which should be completed with sectoral ones, whereas the EU is more liable to sign an extended minute agreement, new version of the current Partnership and Cooperation agreement.

What is a reason for such "lost in translation"? This situation is alarming and its reasons and consequences should be thoroughly examined. I remember one article of Yuri Borko, Russian expert in European studies, president of the Russian Association for European Studies, head of the European Integration Studies Department of the Institute for Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The article with the title "Russia and Europe: is the partnership to be?"⁴ was published in 1996, 13 years ago, when current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement had not come into force yet. It was the time of enthusiasm so to speak in Russia-EU relations. Professor Borko proposed a few scenarios of relations with the EU. There is a large spectrum: from integration, strategic union, partnership to "cold" peace and confrontation. It's so regretful to see how the forecast of Professor Borko comes true now. "Relations between Russia and the European Union will develop to sinusoid from partnership to "cold" peace" and back"⁵

Let's see the dynamics of Russia and the EU relations for the last 5 years.

Partnership envisaged commitment to common political principles and moral statutes, concurrence of strategic interests in economy and geopolitics, high level of understanding and confidence, intensity and sustainability of systematic coordination of actions on all levels. The officially declared goal of Russian-EU relations is a strategic partnership, and it is noted in the official documents of Russian Federation and of the EU.

In the new "Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation" (12 June 2008, which already changed one of 2000) in the IV part as Regional Priorities there are: "The Russian Federation is interested in the strengthening of the European Union, development of its capacity to present

agreed positions in trade, economic, humanitarian, foreign policy and security areas. The Russian Federation will develop its relations with the European Union, which is a major trade, economic and foreign-policy partner, will promote strengthening in every possible way the interaction mechanisms, including through establishment of common spaces in economy, external and internal security, education, science and culture. From the long-term perspective, it is in the interests of Russia to agree with the European Union on a strategic partnership treaty setting special, most advanced forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation with the European Union in all spheres with a view to establishing a visafree regime⁶

The same objectives from EU side – in “The Country Strategy Paper for Russian Federation 2007-2013” as the objectives of EU cooperation with Russia we see “EU cooperation with Russia is conceived in terms of, and is designed to strengthen, a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values. The main interests of the EU in Russia lie in fostering the political and economic stability of the Federation; in maintaining a stable supply of energy; in further co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the environment and nuclear safety in order to combat ‘soft’ security threats; and in stepping up cooperation with Russia in the Southern Caucasus and the Western NIS for the geopolitical stability of the CIS region⁷

So the objectives are strongly determined, but the real politics shows us another thing...We can speak about partnership in 2004-2005, summit EU-Russia in Moscow at 2005 and the adoption of the four “Road Maps” to give a little hope to possible movement to real strategic partnership, to longing these framework documents by real content, including detailed programs, financial instruments etc). It was viewed as a new phase in Russia-EU relations. Unfortunately, in fact “Road Maps” only covered up problems and offered nothing to move forward and we have to admit the fact that it has been almost forgotten.

For the past several years, Russia and the European Union have accumulated considerable experience on a majority of fields. However, the actual crisis renders the perspective of partnership rather dim, even deadlocks it. A little effort will suffice to remember a long story with getting a mandate of the European Commission for the negotiations on a new Agreement, the conflict in the Caucasus, the gas war with Ukraine, lost in energy dialogue, new Russian terms to join the World Trade Organisation. On 9 July Vladimir Putin announced Russian entry WTO within a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus whereas two weeks ago the question of independent Russian entry had been discussed under EU-Russia summit. Medvedev raised a point of speedy completion of all procedures related to Russia's accession to the WTO at the Russia-EU summit in Khabarovsk.

New divergence was evoked by new European initiative - EU launched a common strategy concerning the six eastern European countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus), encompassed by the European Neighborhood Policy, in order to achieve substantial and lasting results in the implementation of the new Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy. The idea for the “Eastern Partnership” (EaP) came from a Polish-Swedish initiative last summer. Surprisingly that by EU standards it has been rushed through on a very fast track. The new initiative is tailored exclusively for the region to the east from Union – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – and is designed to complement the European Neighborhood Policy. It has few new resources and a limited budget for technical projects (€600 million over four years for six countries). The idea is that the EaP will change the manner in which the region is discussed in the EU, and slowly help them to pull into the EU's orbit.

Russia is not a member of the EU's Eastern Partnership programme, which involves Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and a number of other countries. At the summit Russia-EU Medvedev gave his comments about Eastern Partnership: “Russia worried about attempts by certain nations in Eastern Europe to use the European Union's Eastern Partnership program against Russia. We, for our part would not like this Eastern Partnership to turn into a partnership against Russia... As far as Eastern Partnership is concerned, it is not yet totally clear to us in what forms all this

will proceed...If Eastern Partnership becomes a project of "normal economic cooperation, we naturally have no objections to it"⁸

So partnership... which partnership?

There is a conceptual vacuum in Russia-EU relations. The parties do not have a clear vision of strategic goals for their interaction. There is degeneration of the Russian-EU agenda, "zero-sum game" logic. Relations between Russia and EU are getting worse and we move to "cold" peace stage.

"Cold" peace is distinguished by stability various in its forms mainly economic and cultural with common trend to gradually extend though swinging. There are differences in quality of relations, credibility, cooperation overbalance, interest conflict, international discord.

It is emerged even in details. Russia was eager to demonstrate its "grandeur" when chose the ultimately Asian city for a European summit. They chose the far eastern city of Khabarovsk, 25km from the Chinese border and nine time zones from Brussels. "I've lost the sense of day and night," said a western diplomat at about 8pm – or 11am Brussels time. The summit itself was held in Khabarovsk's Musical Comedy Theatre, just off the main drag of Karl Marx Prospekt. In the context of the modest achievements of past EU-Russia summits, which takes place twice a year, EU officials advise member states to scale back the meetings to just once a year in future, if Russia agrees.

Apart from rhetoric confrontation and political situation there is a range of deep reasons for the current state. Nature of links between Russia and Europe performs intertwining of both common and different genetic roots, as well as combination of commonality and singularity of historical development ways. Ultimately divergence of views was specified by which contradictory feature of Russia-Europe links was currently dominating.

We are united by a common culture, history and religious roots. Historical link between Russia and Europe lies in geopolitical and civilisation aspects, Russia is a part of Europe geographically and politically, it has been one of the most important actors of international policy life since the 15th century. Europe is one of the main sources of Russian civilization and identity as well as Russian social and cultural modernization. For the current EU Russia is the largest and the only additional external resource of geopolitical influence and economic and political subject in the future world.

Meanwhile, Russian society is dramatically different from the Western one in social light having different principles of person-state interactions. Russia has traditionally had a strong state, and this compensated for its historical backwardness. Russia has tended to resemble an "inverted pyramid", with the state forming the basis of society rather than the other way round as in most European countries. The Russians (71%) do not consider themselves Europeans according to the recent survey by Levada Centre⁹.

Relating to the present stage we can observe significant transformations both in Russia and the EU. Factors outlining the European policy of Russia can be described as alteration of Russian post-USSR geopolitical situation and its efforts to reset the former positions, inappropriateness of policy in the light of changed Russian geopolitical situation in Europe, reversion to the borders of the 17th century with the population of 20% more than in 1913.

Russia has changed, the limbo of the 1990s is over and economically and politically waning state has disappeared. We observe significant economic growth of the last years which is unfortunately based on unprecedented rising of energy carriers prices. When in the early 2000s the oil price had been 15 dollars per barrel, it increased to 150 dollars to the end of the second Putin's presidency. The present crisis shows how vague this fuel groundwork. Putin's claim to great-power status and his great-power policies are structurally very vulnerable. This is especially true at times where the price of oil has fallen below \$40 per barrel. Demographically, Russia is in a dramatic nose-dive; it remains economically and socially backward; its

infrastructure is underdeveloped, as are its investments in education and vocational training. Due to the decline in the global prices of energy, which constitute around 70% of Russian exports, exports in the first half of 2009 have fallen by 47%. The stock market, which suffered a disastrous decline in 2008, has recovered, and the ruble has held steady, but the hard currency reserves are melting and the future does not look promising: the latest statistics indicate that Russia's GDP this year will fall by 7%. Ex-French Ambassador in Russia Stanislas de Laboulaye said in his Interview to weekly «Itogi»: «...The force of Russia consists of natural resources and *extraordinaire* reserve of petrol and gas. But in the same times, it is a weakness... I think it is a challenge for Russia to develop the industry competitive... which can make Russia-EU relation more balanced. And we Europeans, have to do our impact in Russian modernisation. Otherwise, our relations will keep always *desequilibrium*, the kind of neo-colonial relations»¹⁰

Economically, it mainly relies on energy and commodity exports, and in its modernization efforts, it is largely dependent on the West, particularly Europe. Now there has been skewness in our economic cooperation still. Trade with the EU represent about - 52.6% of Russia's total, while for the EU the import 9,1%, and 5,3% export. We have very asymmetric structure of our economic cooperation. The main Russian exports are natural resources: petroleum: 49%, gas: 13%, metals: 17%, etc.¹¹

One more serious problem appears a complicated task which Russia tries to simultaneously fulfill under the foreign policy: strategic cooperation with the EU policy and recover of influence on former Soviet Union.¹² Combining these tasks requires subtle and balanced policy. At the time being the failures are obvious at all directions. What is up to the CIS: conflict with Georgia, refusal to cooperate with Saakashvili, Georgia officially ended its membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); gas conflict with Ukraine; on 11 August Dmitry Medvedev posted a new entry on his video blog to report sending a letter to his Ukrainian counterpart where he called Ukraine's policy under President Yushchenko a divergence from the principle of developing friendship and partnership with Russia. Medvedev also added that he decided to refrain from sending a new Russian ambassador to Ukraine. There was a conflict even with traditionally friendly Belarus caused by milk delivery and participation in the Eastern Partnership. Then Kirgizia was provided with a 2 million-dollar-credit and 150-million-dollar-financial aid in substitution of closing air facility Manas which was consequently denounced in the end of July.

In this context Russia is very sensitive about the EU eastern policy, its evident asynchronism in comparison with policy towards Russia. Eastern Partnership Initiative versus vacuum in relation to Russia. In Russian analytics this initiative see as anti-Russian, "policy of encircling Russia the "grey zone" to Europe's east – the six countries that now lie between the EU and Russia. Aspiration of the EU to enforce its influence on former Soviet Union is regarded as intervention into the sphere of traditional geopolitical interests.

The European Union is the biggest international actor. Europe launched a recklessly rapid expansion of the European Union. French political expert Thierry de Montbrial says about two pieces of weakness of the EU – of cultural and institutional nature¹³. The first – cultural – if diversity borders with heterogeneity there is unity under a risk to disappear. Lost of European ideals of the first times of the EU building and its replacement with pragmatism national interests. Europe has to make foreign policy according to "the lowest common denominator", namely Lithuanian and Polish. We are observing new European members parading their national interests, efforts to manipulate with consensus for resolution of their own problems.

Turning to failure of institutional issues what is obvious is management crisis and weakness of European institutions primarily the European Commission, this leads to growth of euroscepticism which has been recently shown by election to the European Parliament. Nobody can be sure that recognition of Lisbon Treaty could change the situation. Especially in the light of today headlines among the EU chief executives – Barroso is fighting for a second term as

president of the European Commission. Tony Blair, has emerged as the front-runner for the yet-to-be-created post as the first permanent president of the European Council. This duet cannot be thought as a “dream team” for the EU in crisis, whereas fully suits the EU as unity under a risk to disappear against the background of narrow national interests.

European influence is weak that is mainly caused by its extension, and as a consequence by demoting role of France, Germany and Italy in the EU policy-making; existing and time-proved tools won't work any more (e.g., Franco-German couple). I'd like to quote again Joschka Fischer “It has become clear that the Franco-German engine, which is crucial to the EU acting in unison, is momentarily blocked. In nearly all strategic aspects of EU crisis management, Germany and France are blocking each other – although ironically, both are doing virtually the same thing. They are thinking first and foremost of themselves, not of Europe, which is thus effectively without leadership”¹⁴.

The most evidently the EU goes soft at fulfillment the most problematic issue, namely foreign policy. This caused Europe to focus still more on itself and further complicated and delayed the possibility of conducting a common foreign policy. It leads to decrease in “the EU mobility in foreign policy” and profound difficulties in decision-making process. Europe continued to lose its foreign-policy influence. In one of the interviews the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland Alexander Stubb (former MEP), said that there should have been redirected more funds European foreign policy through reducing farm subsidies and steering more money to innovations in technology and especially in foreign policy and security. He noted that in the EU budget for 2010, foreign policy and security have only 282 million euros of the total 138 billion. The minister considers it an area where the EU is very useful on the world stage.

The Fathers of Europe dreamed of the United States of Europe. General de Gaulle had clearly stated in the 1960s, that the only perspective for Europe was to achieve strategic independence from Washington. On March, 26 the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly (503 votes for, 51 against and 10 abstentions) in favour of a resolution “on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2008/2199(INI)), virtually each clause of which declares a clear orientation on the USA in the foreign policy conducting. For example, “it convinced that the EU-US relationship is the most important strategic partnership for the EU; believes that EU-US coordinated action on tackling global challenges while respecting international law and strengthening multilateralism is of fundamental importance for the international community; urges the Czech Presidency of the Council and the Commission to establish with the new US administration a common agenda of short and long-term goals with regard to both bilateral matters and global and regional issues and conflicts”¹⁵ Today generation of European politicians is now advocating “the United States in Europe.”¹⁶

After the period of mutual hopes and expectations both European and Russian interests painted in grey. The sinusoid of Russia- EU relations moves to down, and how could we act together now to change the status quo? We need to go further and start thinking about it just now – especially during the crisis.

There is a need in new quality of relations – dialogue of two European partners Russia and EU, and on this stage it's not so critical what legal documents this will lead to. I completely share the opinion of Russian political analyst, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy Sergey Karaganov that the partners are not prepared to start work on a brand new agreement «in a situation like this, work on a new strategic agreement with the EU may largely prove to be premature and may do more harm than good. Russia and the European Union must strive not for a strategic partnership in their relations, but for a strategic alliance”.¹⁷ Alliance presupposed a long way of transformations, narrowing of economic and cultural gap, growth of mutual trust and accumulating experience of real cooperation.

I believe, at the time being this pause urges to be used to develop constructive cooperation in various fields on the base of sector agreements avoiding redundant politicization of the collaboration. If we recollect the initial stages of the EU building and difficulties in search for

compromise under the Treaty of Rome that were overcome by creation of the Spaak Committee including independent experts at different sectors to develop balanced pragmatic project free of political rhetorics. It is possible to set up Russia-EU expert groups for promoting specific sector agreements with the aim to specify the existing road map, to enrich them by short- medium- and long-term programmes including joint funding, initiating joint ambitious programmes accessible to the Eastern neighbors.

To this extent I would like to focus on the field of scientific and technological cooperation, which is currently undeservingly beyond our attention. It is the less argumentative sphere whereas its promoting influence on the whole range of relationships could not be overestimated. It covers creation of lasting cooperation and such fields as economy, politics, climate change, health, international security. While the sides are not ready for open dialogue embracing the whole agenda, the previous summits cannot be viewed efficient additionally to arguments about energy issues it's high time to turn to the scientific field and efficiently work in this direction.

The implementation of the 4th Common Space for Research is the most advanced and the least controversial of the four spaces. In fact, unlike some other areas of the overall EU-Russia relationship, we have no outstanding or vexing problems to solve in the area of research cooperation, but only a positive agenda to move forward.

Russia possesses significant scientific capacities. There are more than 3500 R&D organisations and about 390 000 researchers in Russia. A great number of researchers in Russia (391 121) is quite comparable in indicator per 10 thousands of employed: Russia – 72, Germany - 69, France - 77, Norway 92, Denmark 95, and is even superior in comparison with such countries as the Netherlands - 45, Poland - 45 Italy – 29¹⁸. For 8 years allocations to research has increased twice in comparable prices, in 2007 Ministry of Education and Science of Russia in charge of an overall budget of approx. €8.3 billion, 1,3% of GDP¹⁹.

However, we have the negative tendency, despite increase in funding for 8 years there was a decrease in some indicators. There is decrease of a number of research institutions in 500 - 2000 there were 4099; in 2005 – 3566; decrease of a number of researchers in 130 000 (1995 there were 518, in 2005- 390). The number of publications decreased from 18 thousands to 14 thousand annually. Share of Russian publications in global scientific press is - 2,4%, but according to index of citation our position is lower - 0,85%. Next, decrease of R&D appeal. Today, the average age of Russian scientists is 55; only 3 percent of those who receive an undergraduate degree plan to work in science, according to the Ministry of Education and Science²⁰.

Then, commercialization of research outcomes. Russian share in global hi-tech export remains rather small – less than one percent (0,13%) (for comparison – the EU – 19,7%; the USA – 28,5%; Japan – 26,5%), at present "the absolute value of the national hi-tech export reaches 2,5-3 billion of dollars last years". In 2005 Russia exported this production almost three times less than Philippines, four and a half times less than Thailand, 10 times less than Mexico, 13 times less than Malaysia and China and 17,5 Malaysia and the South Korea²¹. The content of export has not changed for 10 years and consists of crude oil for one third.

Changes in the present situation are driven by roadmaps for Creating Common Space of Research and Education (the EU-Russia Summit in 2005). The main objectives of creation of "EU-Russia Common Space of Research" are structuring a knowledge-based society in Russia and the EU; promoting a high rate of competitiveness and sustainable and equitable economic growth by the modernisation of our economies for the benefit and the well-being of our citizens; and jointly addressing global challenges²².

In fact, Common Space for Research is the most advanced and the least controversial of the four spaces. We have no outstanding or vexing problems to solve in the area of research cooperation, but only a positive agenda to move forward²³. The Russia has a very close S&T cooperation with EU, on the level of the European Community and as well on the level of the

individual member states. The legal basis of EU-Russia cooperation is formed by Agreement on Scientific & Technological Cooperation between the EC and Russia, signed in 2000, (valid till 2009), concept of Four Common Spaces, including the Fourth Common Space on Science, Education and Culture. The political basis is formed by EU-Russia cooperation in the field of science and technology (Steering Bodies), Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) in Science (Ministerial level) (the first meeting was held in Ljubljana on 26 May 2008), Joint EU-Russia S&T Cooperation Committee (S&T Agreement Steering Body), Joint EU-Russia Thematic Working Groups (WG) in priority areas (DG Directorate level), Frequent meetings on expert level (EU & Russian scientists & specialists).

A major element in the full realisation of the 4th Common Space are the numerous bilateral cooperation programmes and activities of the EU member states with Russia which would need to be more coordinated or put in synergy with a view to strengthen our EU research cooperation with Russia. Now Russia has been the most successful third-country in the Sixth Framework Programme for Research & Technological Development, having participated in some 300 projects. The benefits of participation in FPs are clear, over and above the obvious scientific and financial benefits. But level of Russian institutions in the EU FPs does not correspond with its scientific capacities. Russia participated in around 330 FP6 signed contracts (in comparison Germany participated - 4100 contacts, to UK - 8000 signed contracts, to French participants - 3500)²⁴.

One of the latest developments which strongly influence the overall climate of EU-Russia S&T cooperation is the launch of the Federal Targeted programme (2007) which significant financial resources (roughly 1 BEuro per year until 2012) in the same time that FP7. The programme is open for international cooperation and will co-fund the Russian participation in FP7.

The joint permanent working groups in common priority areas such as health; food, agriculture & biotechnology; nanotechnologies, aeronautics, energy, mobility, space research, and nuclear fission energy research, meet on a regular basis and ensure Russian participation in the consultative process for the preparation of Framework Programme activities. Definitely, they have strongly contributed to the success of our cooperation. In concrete terms, the EU and Russia have started to synchronize their research programmes and activities with a view to defining a more common and more ambitious research agenda through a joint decision-shaping process.

On 26 May 2008 in Ljubljana was held the first meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Research Creation of PPC on Research is a result of long collaborative activities and tremendous efforts from the side of DG Research and Russian Ministry of Science and Education.

The main objectives of meeting have been the discussion of new approaches in our partnership for the full implementation of the road-map of the 4th EU-Russia Common Space in Research the EU and Russia to achieve some of the objectives of our S&T cooperation, to implement in some measures the 2005 Summit Decision and to start realising the "EU-Russia Common Space of Research", namely discussion of prolongation of the current EC-Russia Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement as well as exchange of views on Russia's interest to join the FP7 an associate member.

Not long before the meeting of the EU-Russia PPC on Research, Russia had made another major choice in making long-term priority in scientific cooperation - Russian Government's official request to start negotiations on an Association Agreement for the Framework Programmes. Overall political and strategic importance of a possible association to the Framework Programmes is clear, over and above the obvious scientific and financial benefits which it would entail. The possible association of Russia and the EU in a Common Space for Research carries a great potential and highlights the strategic perspective of this cooperation, based on the exchange and joint production of knowledge for the benefit of our societies and on the same view on the role of science which Russia and the EU as world powers have to address

global issues in a responsible fashion. In the Joint Statement of EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Science highlight; that, “the participants expressed their conviction that, building on the impressive achievements attained to date, there is scope for further enhancing EU-Russia science cooperation. In this respect, they noted that possible association of the Russian Federation to the 7th Framework Programme on Research and Technological Development would take Russia-EU scientific and technological cooperation to a new qualitative level. They stated that the European Research Area would be enriched and strengthened by Russia also becoming a full part of it”²⁵. Such an enhanced cooperation in a strategic area of our Partnership will contribute to shaping a more positive EU-Russia relationship.

No doubt, the association of Russia to the Framework Programme would make more tangible and more visible success story. Russia in her turn should take serious steps to developing infrastructure of scientific and technological cooperation and create a multilevel S&T support infrastructure: in federal, regional and local levels (like German or Austrian).

Unfortunately, we should admit that S&T cooperation field is getting rather politically loaded. In spite of the unanimous decision of the EU in Ljubljana to consider immediately the inquiry of Russia, negotiation of an association Agreement to the FP7 has not got start even a year later. Association agreement is considered in the framework of negotiations on PCA, that is a strategic error and leads to indefinite prolongation of talks, specially now in crisis period when Russian economy needs restructuring. The Agreement on Scientific & Technological Cooperation between the EC and Russia has expired in February 2009 but a new treaty has not signed yet, though the issues relating its signature were agreed in May 2008 through the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Research and a month later – June 2008 – in Moscow at Joint EU-Russia S&T Cooperation Committee. There are a lot of ambiguous issues in this so-called «the most advanced and the least controversial of the four spaces». What is the real schedule to restart official discussion of possible association after a year of silence? Traditionally S&T cooperation has ever been the less politicized sphere, and on the contrary has contributed to reinforcement of general cooperation. How could we explain such transformation? Who is interested in such politicization? Why should such corporations as BP or Shell define policy in Russia but not the Lisbon strategy alpha and omega of political and economic success?

Much more efficiently is cooperation with individual EU countries. As the most successful example we can observe cooperation with Germany. Joining the goal of Lisbon strategy to increase the expenditure on research by 3% of GDP in 2010 the German government believed this measure insufficient. Under the economic crisis Germany proposes its own quite ingenious way of recovery: to permanently increase expenditure on research and education and to provide new public and business investments into S/T field. The so-called «Initiative of increase in quality for Germany», which was presented by the Federal Chancellor and the heads of federal lands in October 2008, establishes quite an ambitious aim: to increase the expenditure on research by 10% of GDP by 2015²⁶.

On the 16th of July 2009 Russia and Germany concluded S/T cooperation agreement – the first-ever for contemporary Russian Federation.²⁷ This event is considered as quite significant and indicative while new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been still on the stage of development and approval. To coordinate activities relating to execution of the Agreement the partners agreed to set up a Joint Russian-German Commission for S/T cooperation which undertake consideration and approval of recommendations and proposals for Russian-German scientific cooperation. Then it includes analysis of its outcomes, tuning of priorities and review of measures targeted to ensure a higher efficiency.

To conclude my reflections I would like to quote a little comment made at the launch of FP6 in 2002 by Daniel Descoutures, policy officer DG Research, European Commission, who worked on international dimension of European S/T policy and particularly practical implementation of Russia-European Union Common Space of Research for a long time: “Clearly Europe will not

be able to create its own research area without drawing on external expertise. Also, some key questions for science and society - such as climate change - require a global response. Countries such as Russia, the United States, China - must be involved. These subjects require a joint scientific base²⁸.'

We have much more mutual interests and common global problems than internal partly artificially created contradictions. I'd like to believe that political wisdom will make strategic EU-Russia union historically inevitable. We'd better win together than lose separately.

1 Joschka Fischer An Answer to the Russian Challenge <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fischer34>

2 Joschka Fischer Op.cit.

3 Dmitry Medvedev Speech at EU-Russia Industrialists' Round Table and Replies to Questions November 13, 2008 Cannes, France

4 Yuri Borko Russia and Europe: will be partnership? // Free Thought, 1996. N3. P. 52-65.

5 Yuri Borko. Op.cit.

6 The Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, 2008

<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>

7 The Country Strategy Paper for Russian Federation 2007-2013

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/docs/2007-2013_en.pdf

⁸ *EU-Russia summit*, KHABAROVSK. May 22 2009 (Interfax)

⁹ <http://www.levada.ru/om2007.html>

¹⁰ <http://www.ambafrance-ru.org/spip.php?article2113>

¹¹ Facts and Figures EU-27 2006

¹² The Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, 2008

<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>

13 Thierry de Montbrial, RAMSES 2009, 2 septembre 2008 - 02/09/2008

¹⁴ Joschka Fischer Europe in Reverse <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fischer36>

15 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Report on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2008/2199(INI))

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5680102¬iceType=null&language=en>

¹⁶ *Edouard Husson*, The United States of Europe?, April 24, 2009

<http://original.antiwar.com/husson/2009/04/23/the-united-states-of-europe/>

17 Sergey Karaganov Towards a Union of Europe. Originally published in Russian in Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Federal Issue) №4786 of November 6, 2008

¹⁸ OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environment and Social Statistics – ISBN 92-64-04054-4 © OECD 2008

¹⁹ 30 novembre 2007, Conseil de la science, des technologies et de l'éducation

²⁰ Science indicators. Official Statistical Compendium, jointly published by Ministry of Education and Science, Federal Service of State Statistics and State University "Higher School of Economics", Moscow, 2006.- 320p.

²¹ <http://www.newsru.com/finance/10oct2006/hitecexport.html>

²² The Road Map for the Common Space on Research, Education, including cultural aspects

http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/images/pText_pict/494/road%20maps.pdf

²³ Daniel Descoutures EU-Russia cooperation in Science & Technology.// International Scientific Conference "Russia and EU: Prospects of Creating Common of Research and Education": Proceeding of the conference. – Voronezh, 2007.- P. 14-27.

²⁴ First FP7 Monitoring Report. Research Directorate General, February 2009

²⁵ Joint Statement of EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Science

http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/May/0526EU_Russia_Research_Joint_Statement.html

²⁶ Die Qualifizierungsinitiative für Deutschland

http://www.bmbf.de/pub/forschung_und_innovation_fuer_deutschland.pdf

²⁷ http://www.bmbf.de/pub/Abkommen_D_RUS_unterzeichnet.pdf

²⁸ Daniel Descoutures. Science and Diplomacy <http://ec.europa.eu/research/news-centre/en/pol/02-03-pol05.html>