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Governance networks in the external dimension of the EU migration policy: Europeanisation through the grapevine?

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1.0 Introduction

This paper provides some preliminary insights of a PhD project under the same title. The overall objective of this project is to explore the meaning of Europeanisation in the European Union's (EU) cooperation with non-member states in the area of migration policy. Since the Europeanisation of non-member states can hardly be analysed via macro-level analysis for these relations, the focus will be set on the meso-level of interorganisational networks that make up the governance of the external dimension of the EU migration policy. Governance networks in this particular policy field are marked by complex interdependence of actors. Europeanisation is the process which is influenced by the dynamics inherent in these networks that is centred on the implementation of programmes and projects in the policy field of migration.

Such an approach responds to queries that Europeanisation is "'something to be explained' not 'something that explains'" (Radaelli, 2004: 2). The project is furthermore conducive to putting flesh on the bones of the often used but little explained metaphor of networks in public policy making and implementation. The notion is here that governance networks are the stabilised relations of included actors in policy implementation. The stabilised relations correspond to Boudieu's notion of the political field and its dynamics of in- and exclusion of actors based on symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991). These dynamics take place within the larger organisational field, that is the totality of all relevant actors in the field of migration policy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). In order to understand how networks function and how the process of Europeanisation takes place we need to tackle the questions: What are organisations doing? With whom are they interacting? And why are they doing it the way they are? Based on a critique of functional-rationalist approaches to understanding governance networks, sociological insights about path-dependence, isomorphism, dynamics of inclusion and exclusion and organisational beliefs constitute helpful lenses to understand dynamics in governance networks.

The analysed case here is the implementation of the external dimension of the EU migration and asylum policy in non-member states. In order to properly delineate the area of research two questions need to be answered. What is meant by implementation? And what is the external dimension of the EU migration policy? The

external dimension of the EU migration policy could entail at least three different meanings:

- effects of EU internal policies on migratory flows from non-member states (mostly unintended)
- effects of EU internal migration policies on non-member states (intended and/or unintended)
- explicit external policy towards non-member states in the area of migration (intended)

The focus here will be laid only on the last aspect in order to understand how implementation is taking place. The focus will be therefore on the policy output (i.e. the projects and programmes that are meant to translate set EU policy objectives into action in non-member states) and not on the policy outcome (that is the intended and unintended consequences on the migratory flows and the like).

Although the implementation literature has mostly followed a top-down approach where decisions taken at an earlier stage are consequently translated into action to fulfil those objectives, the focus here is somewhat different. In order to understand governance networks in a legally non-binding setting such as between EU and non-member states with complex interdependence of actors, it seems more useful to understand implementation as a policy-action relationship. Following Barret and Fudge (1981: 4), implementation "needs to be regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends". After having clarified my understanding of implementation and EU migration policy, the term Europeanisation deserves scrutiny.

2.0 Exploring the concept of Europeanisation

The influence of European integration on domestic settings through the institutionalisation of formal and informal rules at EU-level has been conceptualised as Europeanisation. Following a standard definition "Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies" (Radaelli, 2000).

The theoretical insights from implementation studies stress the importance of looking at interorganisational dynamics to understand the implementation process taking place between the EU and non-member states. It has been noted that understanding implementation processes is in fact analogous to the question of whether and how Europeanisation processes take shape. In order to explore Europeanisation processes, some conceptual clarifications will be introduced to delineate it from other potential sources of influence.

Some insights from Europeanisation studies which take a stronger top-down perspective highlight aspects that may affect the way in which actors interact with each other and impact on the relations between them. Two different approaches are presented in this section and it is argued that both display a leaning towards a top-down understanding revealing a gap for an understanding of interorganisational dynamics. This gap is best dealt with by employing a governance approach.

The Europeanisation literature has cautioned to take the policy type ("mode of governance" (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) or "mechanism of Europeanisation" (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999)) into account which impacts on the way in which policy transfer is taking place. Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) distinguish between negotiation (vertical uploading), hierarchy in form of positive integration (vertical downloading) and negative integration (horizontal market making) as well as facilitated coordination (horizontal coordination). Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) note that policy instruments can either prescribe an institutional model, change the opportunity structure of actors or influence the beliefs and expectations of actors. In a complex policy field like migration, it should not be assumed that different policy types or modes are so neatly distinguishable. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that not all policy types have similar effects on the implementation of policy. Therefore, it is to be assumed that different types of approaches will have repercussions on the way in which organisations interact during implementation.

This top-down perspective has been challenged by the "goodness of fit"-approach (Börzel and Risse, 2000, Cowles et al., 2001) which cautions towards more domestic circumstances in which Europeanisation takes place. Such mediating factors are the number of veto points in the process of institutional change; mediating formal institutions that can contribute resources, channel influence or hinder policy transfer; political and organisational cultures relating to appropriate normative understandings; the changes in opportunity structures that emerge through an

attempted policy transfer by means of Europeanisation; and learning with effect on actors' interests and ideas (Cowles et al., 2001: 6-12).

Apart from their compatibility with the belief systems of involved actors, different policy programmes and policy types also play a role as they allow for greater or lesser inclusiveness of organisations that are implementing policy. These avenues of inclusiveness can impact on the way in which negotiations are introduced already at an earlier stage of the policy formation than the transposition of a given decision into action.

The administrative capacities of an organisation play a role in the way that it can fulfil the tasks that are delegated onto it or whether it can exert discretion, creatively exploit opportunity structures and modify a project in case of incongruence of organisational beliefs of the actors involved. Although cooperation may be induced by pressure, the difficulties to implement the EU migration policy in third countries make the willingness and capabilities of the implementing actors in non-member states crucial for output oriented cooperation.

Although "goodness of fit" approaches caution more towards the particular domestic circumstances in which change is induced, Europeanisation is still often seen from a top-down perspective that tries to distil the strength of adaptational pressures on the domestic level. This reveals a gap for a bottom-up understanding of Europeanisation which can be complimented by the introduction of implementation and governance literature. This allows appreciating the influence of manifold actors on policy output and an appreciation of interorganisational dynamics in governance networks that shape Europeanisation processes.

Although processes of policy change are taking place within the realm of institutional settings in which EU actors are playing an important and often initiating role, it should be kept in mind that not everything that is taking place within these fora is taking place because of EU influence. Instead of assuming a principle-agent relationship in a hierarchical implementation chain, EU implementation partners and local authorities in third countries are not simply decision-takers but shape policy output direct or indirectly via their actions. Although Europeanisation is a particular form of policy transfer (Bache and Jordan, 2006, Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Bache, 2003, Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004), important modifications to top-down Europeanisation approaches need to be introduced to accommodate for a dynamic

and non-unidirectional understanding of implementation as a political process. The points that need to be considered when discussing Europeanisation are therefore:

- the importance of non-EU specific influences on policy output
- the influence of interorganisational dynamics such as the role of privileged interlocutors like implementation partners and member states
- feed back loops that undermine the notion of the EU being the sole source of policy input
- domestic obstacles and sources of change with their influence on policy output

After these brief elaborations on Europeanisation in implementation processes, our attention needs to turn to the interorganisational dimension of governance networks that allows for the policy implementation of EU migration policy in non-member states.

3.0 Governance networks and implementation: a meso-level approach to understand Europeanisation processes

3.1 Macro- versus meso-level of analysis

At the base of the argument is that a macro-level approach to the analysis of external governance of the EU is too simplistic. In this understanding the influence of the EU's migration policy on third countries would boil down to the general foreign policy relations between the two and the argument whether a membership perspective exists or is absent. This omits considerations of the complex interdependence at the sector level of migration policy and at the implementation stage. Actors from countries of origin and transit can be assumed to be active shapers of migration policy and not just decision-takers from the EU (Brand, 2006). The suggestion here is that processes of policy transfer can be best explored by looking at meso-level interactions between the EU and non-member states. The form of interaction and the types of actors in governance networks are likely to differ between policy fields leading to the influence of different norms, organisational beliefs and different forms of interdependence. This fits well with assessments that characterise the European Neighbourhood Policy as a "composite policy" in which sectoral dynamics are only loosely coupled to foreign policy objectives rather than amounting to a unified and coherent approach (Sedelmeier, 2002). A governance perspective can provide such

a meso-level of analysis and should focus particularly on the organisational interaction during implementation processes from a bottom-up perspective.

Bringing implementation, governance and Europeanisation together provides synergy. Bringing a governance approach into the analysis of Europeanisation allows for a focus on interorganisational relations in a particular policy sector with a broad range of actors. It sensitises against simplifications of a centralised locus of power in the hands of 'government' which is often implicitly present in top-down Europeanisation approaches. Most Europeanisation research has left out the governance mode which structures the interaction between interdependent actors within the policy field with albeit a few notable exceptions (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). In addition, a governance approach acknowledges interdependence as a central feature of public policy making (Bache, 2003: 7f). Implementation literature in its top-down variant has struggled similarly with hindering factors and facilitating measures (Gunn, 1978) to explain and reduce 'implementation deficits' (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984) as has the Europeanisation literature with its focus on mediating factors of EU influence on domestic policies (Börzel and Risse, 2003). However, bottom-up approaches to implementation have gone beyond assessments of adaptational pressures and 'fit-misfit' (Cowles et al., 2001) and dismissed notions of implementers being mere tools in the hands of political actors (for a comprehensive overview see Hill and Hupe, 2002). They point to the active shaping of policies by implementers on the ground (Brunsson, 2000), the pressures and uncertainties they face and how they cope with these (Lipsky, 1971) as well as the influence of informal structured relations outside of the formal interorganisational framework (Hjern and Porter, 1981). "[Policy] is mediated by actors who may be operating with different assumptive worlds from those formulating the policy, and, inevitably, it undergoes interpretation and modification and, in some cases, subversion" (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 251). From a bottom-up perspective, policy implementation is hence understood as dynamic and as an *inherently political* process (Barrett, 2004: 253).

3.2 The meso-level: a governance approach to Europeanisation

A workable starting point for the elaboration of the governance approach employed here for the external dimension of the EU migration policy is a definition provided by Benz. Governance deals with the coordination of interdependencies between actors

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which usually transgress organisational boundaries in an institutionalised setting (2004: 25). Since the analysis of implementation processes demands particular attention to the interorganisational networks, in a first step, the focus will be set on the ideal typical characteristics of networked governance before venturing into the dynamics that can be found within them.

The basic characteristics of governance structures can be described by three components (Kenis and Schneider, 1991: 42):

- the relatively stable set of actors composing the structures

- the linkages or ties between them

- and the boundaries towards the outside

What needs to be kept in mind when analysing governance structures is the emphasis on relations between and the position of actors and not solely the actor's properties (Marin and Mayntz, 1991: 19).

Networked governance can be distinguished from other forms of governance based on the above criteria (compare Lavenex, 2008). Networked governance differs from ad-hoc cooperation and hierarchy mostly because there is persistent interdependence between actors around a policy object which brings about the formation of "a more (or less) stable pattern of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes" (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 155). The level of institutionalisation is weaker than in hierarchies because actors within these patterned relations are not primarily bound by formal relations and legal obligation. It is rather that the persistent need to interact with one another to implement policies in areas such as international migration creates regular interaction and a stabilisation of relationships. A more heterogeneous actors' constellation can be assumed than in hierarchy or ad-hoc cooperation because what matters to qualify for participation goes beyond formal or legal status or even functional necessity, as will be argued in the next section. The inherent vulnerability between actors arises from their reciprocal interdependence and stems from the constellation in which one organisation's action or inaction can impinge on others via intended or unintended consequences.

While governance networks ideal typically build on informality and horizontal linkages between actors, in reality, they never operate completely outside of power-dependence relations (Marin, 1990: 19-20, 56-58). Interdependence is unlikely to be fully symmetrical (or unidirectional) (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 9) producing vertically

directed flows of influence or representing formal authoritative relations between actors. This criss-cross of relations means that domestic agents can link up with their counterparts across state borders, NGOs and international organisations (IOs) in a potpourri of interorganisational relations.

3.3 Analysing real types of networked governance

In order to analyse the processes that are inherent in the interaction in governance networks two competing strands of the literature can be consulted: functional-rationalist approaches and sociological approaches of institutionalism. It will be argued that functional-rationalist approaches present a too narrow understanding of organisations and interorganisational settings and that sociological approaches are conducive to a better understanding of the dynamics within governance networks and of the process of Europeanisation.

3.3.1 A critique of functional rationalist approaches

Functional rational accounts of networks often centre on the idea that networks are based on resource interdependence. It is assumed that resource dependent relations in institutionalised interorganisational settings are based on norms of reciprocity which aim at indebtedness and entail economic considerations. Hereby it is the nature of the issue which shapes the emerging governance structures (Marin and Mayntz, 1991: 20). Lavenex elaborates for external governance structures in the ENP that a particular choice of institutional arrangement mirrors enforcement problems and distributive effects of cooperation within a given area (2008: 10). Such accounts can lead to an overly narrow understanding of resources which should also include symbolic factors such as legitimacy and organisational beliefs.

Functional rational accounts on the origin of cooperative structures in the face of complex interdependence are built on the assumption of hierarchical and non-conflicting preference structures, perfect information in institutional settings, the weighing of pros and cons and decision-taking based on optimal expected outcome (Haas, 1982: 212f, Rosamond, 2000: 54-58). This makes assumptions about rationality which do not match empirical observations that organisations may actually be rational by not following such 'rationalist' forms of decision-taking and action (Brunsson, 2000). Functional-rationalist approaches have therefore been rebuffed by sociological neo-institutionalist theorists and empirical analysis for being ahistorical

and not taking sociological influences into account as will be explained in this and following sections (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

While it seems reasonable to assume functionality is one source of influence on a developing governance structure, it is by far not the only influence which needs to be taken into account. Functional accounts assume the creation of the most effective structure in order to achieve a preferred output in the most efficient way of resource allocation. However, such theorising has the shortcoming that it cannot explain arrangements within an organisational field burdened by previous institutional relations and considerations than by the imminent will to contribute to a favoured output (Pierson, 2000, Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, Brunsson, 1989). This means that there are not only exogeneous factors of functionality and interdependence stemming from the policy object which influence the emerging structures (Marin and Mayntz, 1991: 18) but also endogeneous factors like already established interorganisational relations, 'ways of seeing' and 'ways of doing things' (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999, Pierson, 2000, Berger, 1977). These insights have been supported by empirical research on peace-keeping forces and international regimes (Lipson, 2001), on IOs in the economic, political and human rights spheres (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and on the educational sector (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Hence, organisational structures need to be unpacked to understand the underlying dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of actors from governance structures. This leads away from more rationalist accounts of interorganisational relations to greater sensitivity to sociological and historical institutionalist accounts.

3.3.2 Sociological institutionalist insights to interorganisational networks

Based on the above critique of functional-rationalist approaches, it is suggested that path-dependence, isomorphism and organisational belief systems impact on the dynamics in interorganisational networks.

Established ways of doing things and previous institutional arrangements within the organisational field (IOs, member states, EU and the non-member states) are likely to have an impact on the composition of actors and their practices within the governance network. Once organisations have established standard operating procedures that include particular forms of interactions and relations with other organisations, then it is unlikely that these forms will be changed easily without considerable cost, rather incrementally and maybe rather by profound crisis. Path dependence therefore restrains the spectrum of policy alternatives via established

(and possibly self-reinforcing) organisational perspectives and makes the establishment of new institutional relations relatively more troublesome than to maintain already existing relations with other organisations or the latter may suffer (Pierson, 2004). Path dependence has been empirically observed in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Kelley, 2006, Bicchi, 2006, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2006) and may also likely to be found in the external dimension of the EU migration policy.

EU policy attempts to cooperate with non-member states in the area of migration policy are also relatively recent (Tampere Conclusions of the European Council 1999). Non-member states along the EU's outer border may not have previous institutional arrangements internally or external obligations and interorganisational relations stemming from international law. Under these circumstances, migration policy could be a new issue for these countries. The combination of these two factors leads to an opposing assumption to path dependence. The degree of institutionalisation of governance networks in the external dimension of the EU's migration policy may be relatively low. This means that the network structures may still be quite malleable, the actors' composition unsettled and an experimental air about the approaches that are put forward in programmes and projects.

Isomorphism is the phenomenon whereby similar environmental conditions restrain developmental possibilities of organisations and bring about similar organisational structures. Isomorphism can be based on coercive pressure, particular norms that regulate 'ways of doing things' and the copying of organisational setups and approaches of organisations that are seen as successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

Deeper underlying aspects of these phenomena can be better understood by applying Pierre Bourdieu's notions of political representation (Bourdieu, 1991). Political actors represent social conflicts in the larger social world but also follow rules of behaviour that are more specific to the political field which leads them to play a (possibly subconscious) "double game" (Bourdieu, 1991: 180). On the one hand, they need to position themselves in relation to other political actors in a constant struggle over influence and ideas to ensure their own survival and continued inclusion in the field. On the other hand they are concerned with maintaining strict rules of access to the political field in the first place. Those actors who want to establish themselves in

the political field then need a particular level of 'symbolic capital' by accommodating to these rules and practices to qualify for inclusion. If they don't, they are in breach of accepted norms and will fail to gain acceptance which makes exclusion likely. Since interorganisational interaction in the field of migration policy is highly political with conflicting ideas and practices, such a political double game is likely to be found with a relative homogeneity of practices, forms and standards on the inside. Therefore, governance structures are unlikely to embrace the whole organisational field, that is the totality of all actors within a policy domain (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148), but only parts of it and within these structures there may be competition and conflict. Those with the least degree of symbolic capital are likely to be excluded or marginalised – ironically in the area of migration policy these are the international migrants themselves – while those who are established or comply with particular standards such as forms of organisation and practices promote themselves for inclusion. The area of EU migration policy arguably constitutes such an organisational field with underlying dynamics within the political field as outlined above (Favell, 2000).

Organisations enquire about their environment and obtain information about it. What they do not know is whether the information is actually providing them with *the* answer that *explains* to them the complexity of social reality nor whether the question that they asked was actually an adequate one in the first place. In addition, even if organisations obtained 'good' information, how would they know that it is *the* answer and would they have the capacities to make sense of it? Underlying these observations and rhetorical questions is the understanding that 'sensemaking' is a "symbolic process through which reality is created and sustained" (Weick, 2001: 11). Sensemaking is particularly important in interorganisational environments as organisational action is carefully scrutinised by other organisations and the public and is therefore not easily undone in its consequences, i.e. the impression that it leaves on others and in their effect on the policy object obliges organisations to justify their actions (Weick, 2001: 7, Brunsson, 1989). Organisations need to relate their past decisions and actions in some way to their original statute or to previous interpretations they had created in order to build up or rather defend their symbolic capital in competition towards other organisations (Bourdieu, 2001: 51, 88) and at least symbolically justify their position to their environment even if this is achieved by means of 'decoupling' from their daily practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

Empirical research has confirmed the importance of belief systems in complex interorganisational settings. Students of these phenomena within the member states and the European Commission have identified the impact of "administrative cultures" as the "institutional subconscious" (Cini, 1997: 88), of the "identity" of an organisation (McDonald, 1997: 51) and the "political and organisational cultures" (Cowles et al., 2001: 10) on how they relate to other organisations. If these factors exert an influence within an organisational framework such as the European Commission, they are also likely to exert influence in cross-boundary cooperation with actors that can be assumed to introduce an even broader range of interests and ideas into the governance structure. There are indications that organisational "identities" and belief systems are influenced by administrative capacity, competence in the policy process, size of budget, political support for its subject area and frequency of relations with other organisations (McDonald, 1997: 51).

4.0 Some preliminary empirical insights

In order to allocate funding for policy interventions in its external policies, the Commission has three different approaches: budget, sector and project approach. While the budget approach means the conditional transfer of money into the state budget of the receiving country to the disposition of national authorities, the sector approach is providing funding to fill in a policy plan targeting a specific policy area in a third country. Conditions for a sector approach are similar to those of the budget approach based on administrative capacities, monitoring, donor coordination and medium-term financial planning.[1] The project approach in contrast to the above follows a piece-meal approach of specific small scale policy interventions of a maximum duration of two years and a maximum budget size of about 2mEuro. Projects are implemented by implementation partners sometimes in cooperation with national administrations of third countries.

4.1 Migration: A policy sector for interventions?

The following example will show how the existence of these three approaches impacts on the allocation of EU funding in the external dimension of migration

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[1] European Commission: Support for Sector Programmes. Covering the three financing modalities: Sector Budget Support, Pool Funding and EC project procedures, Short Version, Tools and Methods Series, 2007 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/sector-approach/documents/europeaid_adm_guidelines_support_to_sector_prog_sep07_short_en.pdf

favouring border management and building asylum systems over other approaches in dealing with migratory phenomena. Apart from different degrees of involvement of governmental and non-governmental actors in these three approaches, the categorisation provides the lenses with which the Commission looks at the policy field to plan interventions. The very understanding of the issue area of migration and the framework of the policy instruments it has at hands, impact on the imaginative world of the Commission which decides on the 'type' of approach to be taken.

The norm for the allocation of external funding in the Commission is to apply the sector approach. This is also supported by the political guideline to build a "*comprehensive approach to migration* addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit" (European Council, 1999: 3) (my emphasis). Given the type of approaches that the Commission has at hand, this seems to be best fulfilled under a sector wide take on migration issues. One of the difficulties concerning a 'sector approach' to migration in the EU's external dimension is the difficulty to establish what a sector 'migration' could possibly mean. Difficulties to establish a migration sector have two reasons: 1) the specific institutionalisation of migration within the EU framework and 2) the organisational boundaries of the organisational field of migration policy.

The institutional framework of the EU restricts the Commission's scope of action. For most of its existence, EU migration issues were formed by intergovernmental cooperation in sheltered decision-making arenas behind closed doors. Only the Hague-Programme in 2004 and the subsequent decision the Council brought about the move towards co-decision making with the EP, qualified majority voting, participation of the ECJ and an exclusive right for proposals by the Commission (European Council, 2004, Annex 1: 17). Although some areas of migration policy have been 'communitarised', the European Council excluded legal migration[2] from this change to co-decision making which would proceed to be treated exclusively and under unanimity in the Council. The persistent hesitation of the member states to allow for a comprehensive approach to dealing with migration in non-member states including labour migration hence limits the way in which the Commission can target migration in its programming towards non-member states in a 'sector approach'.

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[2] 'Legal migration' refers to family reunion, long term residency of TCN, student and labour migration excluding visa policy.

The second point to be made about the difficulties to establish a sector approach to migration is the blurry organisational boundaries of the policy field. The point is that even if the EU framework allowed for the inclusion of 'labour migration' into a 'comprehensive approach' to migration, the Commission would still struggle to determine which actors are part of the field and which interventions are possibly relevant for migration policy. Examples of what EU institutions understand under a 'sector' can be found in evaluation reports of interventions in non-member states amongst which there are 'agriculture', 'transport', 'energy', 'education', 'environment' and 'trade' but also more blurry subject areas such as 'civil society' and 'good governance/democracy'.[3] Two characteristics of these sectors come to mind: their level of institutionalisation and their organisational delineation. The first group of sectors represents established state policy areas in most modern states (like education, transport etc.). This means that these organisational fields and ideas that surround them are relatively established and have been subject to targeted action by an established set of organisations. For example, concerning the health sector has a clear set of organisations involved like the health ministry, the public and private medical sector, health services, doctors', nurses' and patients' associations and pharmaceutical companies. Concerning more blurry areas such as civil society and good governance, these are less established policy areas. Notwithstanding, the EU can draw from a set of codified norms in EU treaties and on experience in these areas in the accession of post-dictatorial states since the 1980s.

In contrast to the above, the boundaries of the organisational field of migration are rather fuzzy. It cuts across a multitude of established 'sectors' and overlaps with security issues, labour market concerns of business associations and trade unions, social security systems, diplomatic relations, issues of development policy, social questions of national identity and the like. The set of organisations that are hence working explicitly or tangentially on migration issues is broad. The migration 'sector' is still very malleable. However, there seem to be two clear exceptions. Asylum and border management seem to be relatively easy 'sectors' to target. These sectors find both the support of the member states on the one hand and an organisational framework and understanding within the Commission on the other that allow identifying a clear set of actors and approaches for EU funding in these areas. This

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[3] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/documents/sectors_cov_en.pdf

shared understanding may contribute to the emphasis on financial assistance to the areas of border and asylum management over others in the area of migration policy.

This section showed the influence of perceptual factors on the imaginative world of organisations. The constellation of the organisational field favours or hinders particular policy approaches within the migration policy area. A clearly identifiable set of actors and approaches contributes to the funding of policy interventions because it is easier to delineate them in the organisational field. The Europeanisation of policies is hence influenced by the constellation of actors' and approaches of the organisational field in which action is to take place.

4.2 The project approach: open participation for everyone?

In order to exemplify interorganisational dynamics of inclusion and exclusion from governance networks around the implementation of EU migration policy in non-member states, the focus will be set on budget lines that provide funding under the project approach. There have been three successive budget lines that provide funding for projects in the area of migration and asylum: B7-667 with a budget of 42.5mEuro (2001-2003), AENEAS with a budget of 120mEuro (2004-2006) and the Thematic Programme with 205mEuro (2007-2010). Eligible for funding are project proposals from IOs, governmental agencies and NGOs from both inside and outside the Union. The funding is attributed via calls for proposals that introduce competition between the applicants. However, the success of these three actor groups to secure EU funding under thematic budget lines has differed widely (figure 1). EC standard operating procedures have the unintended consequence of working against certain groups of actors. Furthermore, actors creatively use the opportunity structures provided by EU funding. They expand their organisational mandates, create perceptions of problems and offer solutions. Since IOs are better located in the organisational field than NGOs this also helps them to gain more EU funding and to shape the agenda of EU policy interventions in the area of migration.

Figure 1: Actor Group Distribution of EU Funding of Budget Lines B7-667 and AENEAS 2001-2005

Based on Figure 1, we can appreciate the initial and continuing success of IOs in the bidding process for EU funding. Governmental actors have shown initial and then declining interest under B7-667 and then came back on the scene under AENEAS. For NGOs, in general, the trend of participation has been facing upwards. However, given the overall number of NGOs in comparison to IOs in the area, the continuing dominance of the latter is nevertheless striking. There are also striking geographical limitations in the application of funding. Out of the thirteen projects secured by NGOs under B7-667 only four were from a non-member state and none of the participating governmental bodies originated outside of the EU. Why is it that IOs were so relatively more successful than particularly NGOs in the process?

Governmental actors

In order to explain the low participation of governmental actors from member states certain phenomena became apparent in interviews held in Brussels. To differing degrees, governmental actors from member states:

- are more concerned with decision-taking than action-making to fill in the agreed frameworks for action.
- have interministerial coordination problems so that action was agreed in one Council forum that was unheard of in another.

- suffered from hampered information flows between Brussels and national capitals about funding opportunities and objectives.

These phenomena hardly follows a functional-rationalist logic to organisational action.

International organisations

The two most established IOs in the area of migration are dominating the political field (International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and carry the lion share of 80.4 percent of all EU funding under thematic instruments between 2001 and 2005. Another apparent dynamic is that other IOs are crowding into the political field whose subject area is only indirectly related to migration issues such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Bank (table 1).

Table 1: Number of successful proposals of international organisations for EU funding under thematic instruments B7-667 and AENEAS (2001-2005)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	in percent
IOM	3	6	5	5	7	26	46.4%
UNHCR	3	2	6	3	5	19	33.9%
ICMPD	3	-	1	-	1	5	8.9%
ILO	-	1	-	1	2	4	7.2%
IFAD	-	-	-	1	-	1	1.8%
World Bank	-	-	-	1	-	1	1.8%
total	9	9	12	11	15	56	100.0%

Source: European Commission

Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cooperates with the EU on migration issues under the argument that "Migration is too important to be left out of a country's plans for development".[4] While this generalising truth claim seems to follow a logical albeit expansionist line of thought, the actual programmes that have gained EU funding over the years go far beyond the claimed expertise of the organisation. UNDP has managed to secure 74.9mEuro of EU funding for border management operations between 2002 and 2007. Interestingly, while UNDP interprets these activities as 'Crisis prevention and recovery' this is contrasted by the EU's interpretation as a part of its 'Global Approach to Migration'. This shows the different interpretations of the same action by different organisations. Furthermore,

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[4] http://www.undp.org/poverty/migration.htm

organisations try to justify organisational action by constructing narratives that fit into their wider agenda. The aim is to uphold the image of legitimacy of action towards the organisation itself and the wider world.

IOs and to a lesser degree NGO platforms have a wide-spread network of representations. This helps them to build contacts on the ground, be informed about local dynamics but also point out funding opportunities to local authorities and NGOs. Especially IOs draw from a wide range of approaches to dealing with particular migratory phenomena and from worldwide experience in implementing those. Via formal and informal consultation with EU institutions they spread their experience and also import those in project proposals to fill in EU objectives. This has an influence on the particular shape that EU policy interventions take in non-member states. Far from being reactive in filling in EU objectives, IOs also promote the perception of problems and offer solutions in dealing with them.

One example may portrait this dynamic. Exploring the migration development nexus, the effective use of remittances and links with the Moldovan Diaspora, IOM Moldova held continuous seminars in which concrete institutional proposals were made to the local authorities such as the installation of a 'Ministry of Diaspora'.[5] IOM then drafted a project with the authorities based on such proposals that attracted EU funding under the AENEAS framework partially under the interest in getting part of the Diaspora back into Moldova.[6]

Procedural dynamics to the detriment of NGOs

It is not only strategic action that influences the exclusion or inclusion of particular actors in projects under EU funding but also procedural norms in the Commission. Under the reform project of the Santer Commission to introduce more efficient and transparent procedures in the Commission, the RELEX Reform started in 2000. Its aim was greater accountability and effectiveness and it was seen as a "'flagship' for the overall Commission reform process" (European Commission, 2000: 8).[7] The experience of mismanagement and allegations of corruption and inefficiency preceding the RELEX reform created a set of rules that "are so complex that few

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[5] See http://www.iom.md/materials/press_060628.html and http://www.iom.md/materials/13_diaspora_seminar_recommend_eng.pdf pointing out institutional frameworks to Moldovan government officials that are meant to be conducive to more effective links with Moldovan Diaspora to foster development in the country.
[6] http://www.iom.md/materials/press/press_release_03_07_2008_eng.pdf
[7] European Commission: Communication to the Commission on the Reform of the Management of External Assistance, 16/5/2000

Commission officials properly understand them, and different units and departments interpret them differently" (Raik, 2006: 19). Some of the norms and introduced procedures had unintended effects which contributed to the discrimination of NGOs in the allocation of EU funding. The EU obsession with accountability and efficiency therefore went to the detriment of the objectives of projects and programmes. After the project notes are handed in, the Commission staff runs a pre-screening of applications. Only those applications pass the screening of which the Commission believes that the applying organisation can comply with its administrative procedures and that has got the necessary expertise (symbolic capital).

Aspects that play a role here are that

- the project size of 500.000Euro - 2.5mEuro is difficult to deal with for NGOs
- EU accounting principles are not easy to fulfil and even cause problems for IOs
- NGOs lack administrative staff for the lengthy application procedure of about 1 ½ years with a success rate of about 1:6 and project management under EC guidelines.
- co-funding requirements of at least 20% of the project cost make it more difficult for small NGOs to secure funding than better connected and more ostensibly 'credible' larger organisations.
- small projects create disproportional amounts of labour for the Commission to run the project management in DG AIDCO.
- personal liability of Commission project managers puts an emphasis on the fulfilment of administrative procedures rather than outcome oriented project management.
- possible liability charges of up to 20% of the project budget can be fatal for small organisations.

These difficulties create isomorphism of administrative practices between the Commission and larger organisations, in particular IOs. Following the signing of Financial and administrative framework agreements, the EC and IOs can run projects under 'joint management' which puts IOs in an advantageous position to gain financial support for their projects. Furthermore, IOs and larger NGOs open liaison offices in Brussels to exchange information, closely follow policy developments, procedures and build up informal networks. Smaller NGOs are often deterred by these above mentioned dynamics in the application and management process of

projects so that they do not even apply for funding in the first place. In contrast, IOs and NGO platforms with their higher symbolic power often apply for funding for a number of smaller NGOs with which they cooperate in running projects in non-member states. This puts the former in the position of a facilitator but also as a gatekeeper for EU funding and implementation information on the ground.

5.0 The benefits of the proposed governance approach to Europeanisation

Using a bottom-up understanding of implementation as a political process contributes to overcoming the limiting focus on whether national policies become Europeanised or not. On this base, Europeanisation can be understood as process to be explored. Rather than looking at the way in which policy input is handed down from EU institutions and implemented by national administrations, the focus shifts to the governance networks that shape policy outputs via negotiation. A functional-rationalist logic to organisational action cannot comprehend the multiple dynamics that we encounter in governance networks. Even more so than in implementation processes in national systems a wide variety of interests and ideas can be expected in implementation networks of the EU's external migration policy.

Other than expecting a line of command, implementation partners need have a certain degree of autonomy. In order to understand their influence on policy outputs, it is necessary to look at the opportunity structures provided by the EU for participation and inclusion into implementation networks. To understand dynamics of in- and exclusion from those networks, the wider organisational field needs to be scrutinised and the types of actors taken into account. Blurrier boundaries of the organisational field can contribute to competition between organisations for funding while more established organisations may have to defend their space against newcomers to the field.

Sociological insights into organisational action show that organisations may be more interested in decision-taking than following up those decisions with action. Interinstitutional struggle may hinder the flow of information and contribute to slow implementation. Organisational 'sensemaking' needs to be taken into account in order to comprehend the way in which organisations engage with their environment. For example, looking at the types of approaches of the European Commission to create frameworks for action in non-member states contributes to understanding why

certain interventions fit easier with these frameworks and may therefore be privileged over others in the policy area.

Demands for accountability and efficiency impact on standard operating procedures and influence the way in which implementing policy programmes is organised at EU level. The European Commission has developed a system for the implementation of projects that produces unintended consequences because it favours particular types of actors over others. IOs and widely spread NGOs have more symbolic capital accumulated to be accepted as implementation partners. Their widespread connections help them to develop projects and link up with local partners in non-member states. The more established their bureaucratic basis the easier it is for them to comply with the administrative requirements of the EC.

A flexible agenda may help organisations to reinvent themselves to qualify for inclusion in governance networks so that they can participate in implementation processes and to take on new activities. However, these actions need to be justified within the wider framework of ideas and practices of the organisation. At the same time that the organisations shape the process of Europeanisation they also suffer modifications from it.

Implementation partners not only fill in frameworks in a top-down fashion but also create the perception of problem constellations and offer solutions. By drawing on ideas that stem from wider experience beyond the European realm, we come to understand that Europeanisation may not be all that European. Privileged interlocutors can introduce new ideas but also provide feedback loops of their experience as implementation partners and of interests of third country authorities to programming at the Commission level. In this sense, implementation partners have leeway to a degree of autonomous action and influence on the shaping of policy outputs of the EU migration policy. Europeanisation is therefore not a unidirectional process. It rather provides opportunity structures to actors and inhibits some of their actions in a political process with constant negotiations and possible feedback loops.

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