

**UACES 38<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference**

**Edinburgh, 1-3 September 2008**

Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).

**[www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)**



Europa Institute

## Mitchell Working Paper Series

**The Consequences of Europe:**

**Multilateralism and the**

**New Security Agenda**

John Peterson, Mark Aspinwall,

Chad Damro, Christina Boswell

3/2008



## The Consequences of Europe: Multilateralism and the New Security Agenda

*John Peterson, Mark Aspinwall, Chad Damro, Christina Boswell\**

*What are the consequences of Europe for global politics? What do the EU and its Member States contribute to security – broadly defined – in the international system? Is Europe succeeding or failing in its stated aim of promoting 'effective multilateralism'? This paper focuses on the role the EU plays in the wider international system. We begin with a review of the current state of the art in the study of Europe as an international actor. We use it as a platform to propose an integrated research programme on the international consequences of Europe generally, and the EU's contribution to multilateralism specifically.*

Analysts of the modern, post-9/11, and post-Iraq War world often seem fixated on military force, terrorism and 'hard power'. There are good reasons why: the so-called war on terrorism, the problems of post-war Iraq, instability in Pakistan, and nuclear ambitions of North Korea pose grave threats to international security. The response to these challenges has sometimes pushed in the direction of a militarization of security, as when United States (US) President George W. Bush branded Iran, Iraq and North Korea an 'axis of evil', or declared that the world was either 'with us or against us' in the wake of 9/11.

Yet, the European Union (EU) has changed forever the way we understand international relations. Europe is no longer a Hobbesian cauldron of power-jealous states. Rather, it is the region of the world where it is easiest to conceive of a secure, lasting peace built on the foundations of durable multilateralism and strong international organizations. What is less easy to conceive of is a Europe that is able effectively to 'export' its own habits of peaceful cooperation to other regions of the world through concerted, purposive, single-minded action.

This paper focuses on the role the EU plays in the wider international system. We begin with a review of the current state of the art in the study of Europe as an international actor. We use it as a platform to propose an integrated research programme which focuses on a set of basic questions:

***What are the consequences of Europe for global politics? What do the EU and its member states contribute to security – broadly defined – in the international system? Is Europe succeeding or failing in its stated aim of promoting 'effective multilateralism'? Is the EU a new kind of superpower, or an accidental (and often ineffective) hegemon?***

---

\* The first author is Professor of International Politics. The other three are Senior Lecturers in Politics and International Relations. All are at the University of Edinburgh.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the roles of the EU in international affairs as both an ‘actor’ and the ‘model’. We suggest a research agenda by which these different conceptions of Europe’s role can be linked to one another and applied to the study of the EU as an international actor. A particular goal of this research agenda is to add to our knowledge of what constitutes ‘effective’ multilateralism, and precisely how and how effectively Europe promotes it, with what consequences for international security.

There exists no single, accepted definition of multilateralism. But all interpretations stress two main dimensions: the importance of rules and institutionalised cooperation; and inclusiveness in terms of the states involved/affected (Ruggie 1993; Brenner 1994; Krause and Knight 1995; Cox 1997; Gill 1997; Wilkinson 2000; European Communities 2004; Keohane 2006).<sup>1</sup> Cooperation based on rules and institutionalised procedure is contrasted with cooperation based on coercion or imposition, or agreed on an *ad hoc* basis. Inclusiveness implies that these rules are applied (usually) consistently and equally to all participating states. Thus, multilateralism is distinctive from its alternatives: unilateralism, bilateralism and inter-regionalism.

Perhaps surprisingly, in light of recent events, by one interpretation a ‘new multilateralism’ is emerging. It is more demanding of states because it is more binding. It features fewer provisions for opt-outs, weighted voting, or veto rights than did the ‘old’ multilateralism. The International Criminal Court is a prime example of an international institution that would have been unimaginable in earlier eras. The new multilateralism means that the United States, as the world’s only superpower, simply has ‘more opportunities to look unilateral today than in the past’ (Ikenberry 2006: 254).

Whether or not today’s multilateralism is different from earlier versions, there is no doubt that **demand** for multilateralism is on the rise. Globalisation means that trade, capital, ideas, people, technology, information, weapons, diseases and crime all flow more freely. Patterns of interaction between world regions are changing. New powers are emerging. Modern sources of conflict, over global warming, migration and resource scarcity, create profound collective action problems. The member states of the EU repeatedly have agreed that the logical response to new global challenges is more multilateralism. This consensus is reflected in both the 2007 Lisbon Treaty and 2003 European Security Strategy:

---

<sup>1</sup> The preamble to the UN Charter implies that multilateralism means ‘establish[ing] conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained’.

.. in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system (emphasis added; European Union 2003).

It is plausible to claim that the EU has done more than most of its partners to acknowledge new challenges and pursue ‘effective multilateralism’. Its own positions can become focal points for international negotiations that aim to resolve conflict (Tocci 2007). Looking ahead, the Union might be well-placed to broker new multilateral agreements when a global ‘constitutional moment’ arrives in ten years or more (see Gnesotto and Grevi 2006; Ortega 2007), on issues including UN Security Council reform, institution-building in the Middle East, more effective peacekeeping, fossil fuel depletion, climate change, and Africa.

Yet the EU has conflicting strategies and priorities. It embraces inter-regional dialogue. It seeks strategic partnerships with great powers. It vigorously defends European interests within international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation. Its member states do not share a single understanding of, or approach to, multilateralism (see Aspinwall 2007). In fact, they do not share a common global perspective more generally. Despite the EU’s recent embrace of a more explicitly normative posture in international affairs (*Journal of European Public Policy* 2006), the Union lacks clear, agreed, normative priorities. Arguably, given the recent, severe difficulties the United States has had in imposing its will through its use of ‘hard power’, the EU needs to agree a global perspective far more than it needs to upgrade its military power to be an effective global actor (Laïdi 2008).

We seek a research programme that allows us to assess the ‘consequences of Europe’ by specifying how such a global perspective might focus on a quest for more, and more effective, multilateralism. A first step is to elaborate and clarify forms of multilateralism. A second is to develop specific theses about the European Union’s contribution to multilateralism, and test them in line with best scientific practice. The primary research questions of such a programme would be:

- 1) *how should we understand multilateralism, both historically and in contemporary terms?*
- 2) *does the EU live up to its ambitions to contribute to effective multilateralism globally?*
- 3) *what policy lessons can be drawn from Europe’s experience of promoting multilateralism?*

We seek to define and understand multilateralism in the context of the EU and regionalism more widely. Our primary focus is on the identification and perception of ‘soft security’ threats, as well as the application of multilateral instruments designed to deal with them. Potential threats to developed countries are (mostly) non-military in nature and include: migration, energy dependency, trans-border crime, climate change.

Of course, in many cases it is difficult to distinguish between soft and hard security threats, and there may be a continuum of escalation from environmental problems or scarce resources (root causes) to violent conflict (ultimate effects). Moreover, it is controversial to classify problems that arise as externalities from multilateral cooperation (such as migration) as security threats at all. Likewise, military instruments may be applied to address soft threats: if we are examining EU responses to soft security threats, we would in principle be including (for instance) naval patrols of the Mediterranean that seek to curb illegal migration.

We resist the suggestion that Europe faces fundamentally different threats or challenges compared with other states and regions. Rather, we contend that its approach to them and Europe's 'value-added' may be demonstrably different. This view reflects the conclusion, widely-shared in the research literature, that Europe contributes relatively little to 'hard' or military security, although more than its harshest critics contend (Lindley-French 2002; Kagan 2003).

We also are not unaware of charges that Europe's instinctive affinity for 'an international order based on effective multilateralism' (European Union 2003) is an excuse for inaction, a cover-up for (military) weakness, or a tactic for containing American power (Lindberg 2005; Chamorel 2006). Nevertheless, our proposed research programme is based on our shared conviction that questions about Europe's contribution to soft security are both more difficult to answer and, potentially, more important than questions about defence spending and military burden-sharing.<sup>2</sup>

In short, we seek to make an intellectual case for a new approach to the study of Europe's place in the world. We argue that the EU has a qualitatively different impact on international politics – stemming from its institutional configuration, its variable policy capabilities, its norms, and its size – than has any other major international player.

We proceed in four steps below. First, we consider how two analytical approaches – studying the EU as a model or as an actor – might be profitably merged. Second, we review the state of the art in our understanding of Europe's impact on international affairs. Third, we consider how multiple strands of literature on the international consequences of Europe might speak to one another and be liberated from their current status as islands in a stream. Finally, we consider specific ways in which the research agenda we propose could have academic added value for our understanding of Europe in the world, before offering a short conclusion.

---

<sup>2</sup> A sense for how much more difficult it is to calculate non-military than military burden-sharing (in this case, between the US and EU) may be gleaned from (Lindstrom 2005).

## 1. Model and Actor

A point of departure for the research programme we propose is that it has become analytically indefensible to study Europe either as a *model* or an *actor* in isolation from the other. There are two basic reasons why we make this claim:

- First, the EU's 'presence' – 'outside perceptions of the [EU] and the significant effects it has on...third parties' (Hill 1993: 309; see also Allen and Smith 1990; Hill 1998) – is now increasingly *determined* by the Union's 'actorness': its ability to act as a delimited, autonomous, and endowed (with a legal personality, diplomatic corps, and so on) agent in international politics (Sjöstedt 1977). By the same token, its actorness in a world where (other) great powers face grave problems of legitimacy is increasingly determined by its presence.
- Second, the new security environment (potentially, at least) highlights the importance of its policy role (actual or potential) over border security, migration, counterterrorism, energy dependency, trans-border crime (Rees 2005; Bitterlich 2006). It also means that the EU offers a template for other regions seeking to reconcile economic free movement and human rights protection with adequate security controls.

A holistic inquest into the consequences of Europe should assess its impact on international politics both because of what it *is* – a model for other regions of the world – as well as what it *does*. Because it is doing more (or at least trying to do more) than ever internationally, and shows signs of defending its interests more aggressively, it is no longer safe to conclude that the EU influences international politics more because it attracts than because it interacts with other regions.

It is perhaps difficult to conceive (or imagine) a robust, stable, multilateral international system based on strong regional institutions, resembling the EU, in regions beyond the European continent. Yet, the goal of extending Europe's Kantian peace (Oneal and Russett 1999) to other regions comes as close as any project to uniting the EU's political class and institutions on a mission, in what often seems like a post-visionary epoch in European integration. One of the goals to which the EU's soft power – its power to get others to want what it wants for them – is most clearly directed is encouraging other regions to embrace European-style integration. The most hopeful scenario is that 'the new regionalism, with EU support, could represent an open "post-modern" model of a "renewed international system"' (K.E. Smith 2003: 95).

In practice, there remains huge diversity both between regional institutions beyond Europe and in the EU's relative success at fostering region-to-region relations (Fawcett and Hurrell 1996; Telo 2001; Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). The architects of other regional organizations – ASEAN, Mercosur, NAFTA, and so on – do not always think as highly of the European model as its Old World

promoters. To other region-builders, the European model can seem overly institutionalized and bureaucratic, extravagantly protectionist, and dangerously predatory of state sovereignty.

Yet the European Union remains the ‘essential’, archetypal regional organization. One of the most effective mechanisms by which the EU model is spread is by obliging new and aspirant member states – as well as near neighbours with whom the EU has special agreements – to adopt most or all of its *acquis*. The Union offers a template – despite its institutional complexity – for other regions which seek to reconcile free economic movement and respect for human rights with adequate security controls.

*In short, the EU is a model for other regions: not universally admired or exportable, but still the most successful experiment in regional cooperation in modern history.*

The Union has also developed high ambitions in the policy area – foreign policy (broadly defined<sup>3</sup>) – where its institutions are, ironically, weakest. The aspiration creating of new and stronger foreign policy institutions seemed stalled by popular rejection of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Yet, the same institutions – the (reconstituted and renamed) High Representative, an EU external action service, more flexible provisions for ‘coalitions of the willing’ – reappeared more or less as originally proposed in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Regardless of the Treaty’s fate, there is widespread agreement amongst European political classes that the need to match aspirations with capabilities has become more, perhaps increasingly, urgent.

One of the most salient features of the post-9/11 world is new security threats that cast doubt on the assumption that rising interdependence necessarily equates to increased stability and security. A combination of factors – the EU’s enlargement, policy differences with the US, and a general sense that the Union needed to become more proactive – led to agreement on the closest thing the EU has ever had to a ‘doctrine’ for its foreign policy: the European Security Strategy (ESS; European Union 2003). The actual impact of the ESS is a matter of considerable debate (see Dannreuther and Peterson 2006). Still, there is no doubt that EU member states and institutions have taken seriously its injunctions to promote ‘effective multilateralism’ *and* form ‘strategic partnerships’ with major powers, including China, India, Russia and the US, but also with other regions.

Enlargement to 27 Member States has made it more difficult to act coherently or strategically in foreign policy. When it manages to agree on policy goals, they tend increasingly to be pursued through ad hoc, improvised institutional fixes, such as the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) on nuclear

---

<sup>3</sup> Our use of the term ‘European foreign policy’ follows the convention established by Hill (1998: 18) of making the EU a ‘starting point’ but also using the term to refer to ‘the sum of what the EU and its Member States do in international relations’, including via economic policy.



diplomacy with Iran or the so-called ‘G6’ formation of the EU’s most populous states on counterterrorism. Meanwhile, problems of external border control, irregular migration and the rise in asylum seekers have enhanced the political salience of EU cooperation on immigration and asylum, and led to a focus on the ‘external dimension’ of such cooperation (see Lavenex and Ucarer, 2002, 2004; Lavenex 2006; Monar 2004; Boswell 2003, 2007; Rees 2005; 2006). In short, despite the emergence of what often seems to be a post-visionary era of European integration, the EU’s foreign policy ambitions seem largely undiminished and in fact an area where Europe is united in its determination both to do more and do it better.

*In short, the Union continues to try to be more proactive as a global actor, and seeks what no other regional organisation has ever had before – a common foreign policy.*

In this broad context, we argue that studying the international consequences of Europe means generally adopting an approach that conceives of the EU as both model and actor, and specifically assessing Europe’s contribution to the pursuit of effective multilateralism. The research programme that arises involves the framing and posing of very ‘large’ questions. They include: how does the EU promote multilateralism? Does the promotion of regional cooperation and interaction with key strategic actors such as the US and China undermine multilateralism? Does the EU embrace effective multilateralism because of internal configurations of institutional and policy competence, or some calculation of European interests? How much is the EU’s international appeal as a model for other regions determined by its effectiveness as a foreign policy actor? Can the EU’s international presence be detected, even measured, through the study of multilateralism at a global level and in other regions?

Answering these questions means gauging the EU’s potential and actual contribution to effective multilateralism through the use of ‘soft’ policy instruments: institutions and rules to regulate economic cooperation, environmental protection, migration and refugee protection, human rights, development, and so on. Arguably, these are policy areas where the EU enjoys a comparative advantage in contributing to the sort of regional security needed for effective multilateralism. Potentially, at least, it is capable of exporting ‘good practice’.

We think these questions remain mostly unanswered. We think we know why: because most existing work employs an overly narrow conceptual focus, exploring either the determinants of EU policies that promote multilateralism and regionalism (that is, determinants of EU as an actor), **or** the impact of these policies on other regions (the impacts of the EU’s presence). This separation of actorness and presence precludes the possibility of exploring:

- the unintended consequences of EU policies: where the stated goal of EU policy produces undesired/counterproductive effects from the point of view of promoting multilateralism or regional integration;
- institutional decoupling: cases of other regions merely adopting the trappings of regional cooperation (to secure resources or internal legitimacy);
- mimetic isomorphism: the achievement of conformity through imitation – that the EU does not intend; or, conversely, rejection of the EU model because it is seen as an example of bad practice, or because other regions want to assert their cultural distinctiveness.

In short, there is a range of possible ways in which the EU may influence multilateral or regional cooperation that are not captured by an exclusive focus on either its intended policies (which obscures unintended outcomes), or the implications of its presence (which precludes comparison of EU's intentions and outcomes). We cannot know whether the EU actually has such influence, or how effective it is, unless we adopt a broader, more holistic, analytical focus.

## 2. State of the Art.

The EU undertakes a diverse range of ambitious external policy tasks. They range *inter alia* from enhancing the legitimacy and efficiency of its Neighbourhood Policy<sup>4</sup> to improving (especially trade) relations with China<sup>5</sup> to devising a strategy for Africa that stresses development and reform.<sup>6</sup> Yet, existing work is mostly silent on the EU's contribution to multilateralism.

A first-order research priority is to conceptualise different forms of multilateralism. A second is to analyse them as open-ended processes as demand for multilateralism encourages attempts to increase supply (see table 1). In **institutionalised** multilateralism, rules-based international organisations are established (such as the World Trade Organisation for global trade). In **crystallising** multilateralism, new international rules and international organisations are emerging (such as judicial intervention and the International Criminal Court or cooperation on global warming in the post-Kyoto era). In **aspirant** multilateralism, norms inform foreign policy behaviour in the absence of any formally-codified rules or even the prospect of establishing them (such as on child labour or foreign investment).

---

<sup>4</sup> European Commission (2006), *On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy*, COM (2006) 726 final.

<sup>5</sup> European Commission (2006), *EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities*, COM(2006) 631 final. The Commission will publish a new communication on cooperation with China in 2008.

<sup>6</sup> European Commission (2005), *EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's Development*, COM(2005) 489 final.

Table 1: Categories of Multilateralism

	<b>Institutionalised</b>	<b>Crystallising</b>	<b>Aspirant</b>
<i>Characteristics</i>	rules-based international organisations are established	new international rules and organisations are in the process of being established	norms inform foreign policy behaviour in the absence of any formally-codified rules
<i>Examples</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WTO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• judicial intervention and the ICC</li> <li>• climate change post-Kyoto</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• child labour</li> <li>• foreign investment</li> </ul>

A third priority is to broaden multilateralism conceptually to ‘capture’, analytically, a regional actor comprised of sovereign states. An important research objective is to assess the effect on the multilateral system of the EU’s engagement with other regions (inter-regionalism) or strategic partners, as well as its use of multilateral instruments to pursue EU interests and strategic objectives.

Another is to pinpoint the consequences of EU external relations for the functioning and legitimacy of multilateral organisations. Consensus is growing that the traditional state-based legitimacy of international institutions needs to be reconsidered. The research agenda that we propose seeks to specify how the EU can play a role in, or serve as a model for, efforts to reform global institutions. One means for doing so is to measure the effectiveness and impact of EU policies through comparative studies. How does the EU help (or coerce) other states to implement and honour the rules of global institutions? When it conditions aid or trade or cooperation agreements on the basis of standards or norms, how effective is it?

#### *Multilateralism in the academic literature*

A large body of work exists on multilateralism as a concept. Much of it still reflects the original meaning of multilateral as the opposite of unilateral or bilateral. Its empirical focus is often on the United Nations (UN) or WTO. The most theoretically developed international relations (IR) scholarship on multilateralism probes the utility of multilateral norms or organisations, and how it varies according to the type of cooperation problem states confront (Martin 1992; Ruggie 1993; 1998). Multilateralism is usually viewed as effective in solving problems of *coordination* between states on which transaction costs are high and states are mostly indifferent to actual outcomes (such as on international telephony or river transport). On the other hand, it is hypothesised that multilateralism rarely solves *collaboration* problems, such as those of collective security (see Dannreuther 2007). Powerful states choose institutions that serve their interests. But multilateral arrangements may become more attractive even to them as the future is valued more highly.

It is often argued that ‘only a hegemon can ensure that states will cooperate with each other and not defect from [multilateral] agreements’ (Laatikainen and Smith 2006: 7). Even for powerful states, ‘unilateralism is a costly way to manage the international system’ (Dannreuther 2004: 215). Equally, multilateral institutions are usually expected to be more stable in circumstances of changing distributions of power than conditions of strong and stable hierarchy.

Yet, multilateralism as a concept remains ill-defined and poorly understood. The term is used in different ways by political actors, often to serve narrow national interests or purposes. To illustrate the point, ‘effective multilateralism’ has been used within the George W. Bush Administration to describe US strategy (Bush and Blair 2003; Semmel 2005). This apparent anomaly in the face of what is often described as America’s ‘new unilateralism’ in the IR literature might be explained as a product of a global shift towards ‘new’ forms of multilateralism, which ‘fewer opportunities for the United States to exercise political control over others and fewer ways to escape the binding obligations of past multilateral agreements’ (Ikenberry 2006: 247). Still, a basic lack of clarity persists about what multilateralism means, let alone how it can be ‘effective’. In the face of a rapidly changing global political environment, our need to probe the meaning of multilateralism is clear. Specifically, we need to make clear how an international order featuring one or more strong regional actors might achieve effective multilateralism. Thus, we propose pushing forward the state of the art by:

- comprehensively defining multilateralism, considering geographic and temporal variations;
- specifying the implications for multilateralism of regions-as-actors;
- considering what makes multilateralism ‘effective’, and how its terms can be enforced through alternative forms of hegemony, including ones based on ‘soft power’.

### *External relations of the EU*

The literature on the external relations of the EU has expanded – even exploded – in recent years (see for example (Carlsnaes et al. 2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Hill and Smith 2005; Marsh and Mackenstein 2005; Morgan 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; McCormick 2006; Keukelaire and MacNaughtan 2008). Methodologically sophisticated research has been done, especially by Ginsberg (2001), to try to specify the ‘consequences of Europe’ for international affairs. But it is difficult to think of any major contribution to the study of European foreign policy that is primarily, or even secondarily, concerned with the EU’s contribution to multilateralism (an exception is Laatikainen and Smith 2006).

By the same token, research on multilateralism itself rarely focuses on the EU or other regional organisations. The EU tends to feature only as a potential exporter of multilateral agreements (Devuyst 2000; Damro 2006), an actor within other international organisations (Laatikainen and Smith 2006), or a case contrasting to unilateral America (Pollack 2003). Multilateralism is sometimes connected to

regionalism in economic work that asks whether regional integration is a stumbling block or building block to wider multilateral agreements. Meunier and Nicolaïdis' (2005; 2006) work on the EU as a trade power explores whether the Union's region-to-region relations (with ASEAN for example) undermine multilateralism, or whether its neighbourhood policy signals a shift in the direction of state-specific agreements in the pursuit of the EU's strategic interests. Tsoukalis (2005: 236) starkly concludes that 'the EC/EU has been one of the worst...offenders against the principle of multilateralism in international trade because of the large number of preferential agreements signed with other, mostly developing countries'.

The idea of inter-regionalism as both a goal and a platform for EU external relations has emerged as a significant new approach (Hänggi 2006). It has been developed particularly by scholars specialising on EU-Asian relations (see Gilson 2002).<sup>7</sup> The approach can be traced back to the 1990s with the first studies of region-to-region relations (Edwards and Regelsberger 1991). Is inter-regionalism, however, an appropriate heuristic device? Or is asymmetrical bilateralism a more appropriate descriptor given the extraordinary disparity between the EU's level of institutionalisation and that which exists elsewhere (Camroux 2006)?

Increasingly, research on EU external relations considers multilateralism as an EU-specific approach towards international security. It reflects Europe's commitment to international law and organisations, as well as the emergence of a European 'strategic culture' (Bailes 2005; Cornish and Edwards 2005). Multilateralism has become a focal point for analysing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (although more in a normative than analytical sense; see Eide 2004; Ojanen 2003). Effective multilateralism acquires a particular meaning insofar as the United Nations is viewed as the key source of legitimacy for EU action in crisis management (Eide 2004; Ortega 2005). Current research focuses largely (and narrowly) on its normative and vindicatory relevance for the ESDP.

Yet, little investigation has been done on the implications of designating effective multilateralism as a guiding principle of EU foreign policy in non-security policy areas. Moreover, the literature is mostly quiet on the Union's interactions with other regional organisations, such as NATO or the OSCE. No single work explicitly answers the question: 'What is the EU's contribution to effective multilateralism?'

Of course, one answer is soft power (Nye 2004). In the 'European' debate, Europe is often portrayed as a normative power (Manners 2002, 2006; Laidi 2005). But more research is needed that connects, conceptually, two separate ideas:

1. multilateralism as a doctrinal guide for EU external policy choices;

---

<sup>7</sup> A related literature on new regionalism considers the reasons for the rise in the number of regional agreements following the end of the Cold War, and seeks to understand how regionalism differs from the older European-centric model (see Fawcett 2004).

2. effective multilateralism as a normative objective for the wider international order.

The research agenda that we propose explicitly seeks to examine the ways and means by which the EU as a whole, and its individual member states, deploy normative or soft power to try to further effective multilateralism. Logically, it must gauge, according to specific metrics, the extent to which European strategic interests are compromised or cultivated in the pursuit of multilateralism, and with what effects on the international order.

We thus propose three basic paths towards advancing our understanding of EU external relations:

- investigating, broadly and holistically, the impact of the EU in the international system;
- interrogating systematically the relationship between the multilateral aspirations of the EU and its strategic interests;
- advancing these and other analytical objectives by considering a wider range of cases than have previously been investigated on the EU's attempts to contribute to effective multilateralism.

### **3. Presence Meets Actorness**

Thus far, we have reviewed what we consider to be the state(s) of the art(s) in the study multilateralism, regionalism and EU external relations. Our summary reveals that these strands of research remain mostly disconnected. There has been little investigation of how the EU's presence and actorness are mutually constituted, and with what implications for multilateralism. In this section, we provide something of a map for the way ahead.

The EU has foreign policy capabilities that vary according to sector and domestic interests. The EU also has values and norms that it carries into the international realm, such as the notion of 'civilian power' and desire to promote 'effective multilateralism' (see Whitman 1998; Lucarelli and Manners 2006). It can provide rewards, including membership, market access and financial transfers. And it has multiple tools of foreign policy, including diplomacy and sanctions as well as cultural exchanges and other 'soft power' instruments. Strikingly, the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Union 2003: 10) notes that:

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the boundaries of international society...It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be willing to provide assistance. Those that are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

In the fragmented yet globalized post-Cold War world, states seek security in the widest possible sense. Part of this process may involve states looking for models of security-enhancing cooperation from which they might cherry-pick according to their own preferences, capabilities, powers and cultures (Allison 2004). Far from being passive in this process, the EU provides incentives to regionalize. Through inter-regional dialogue it tries to reinforce the presence of other regions. However, it also interacts with major regional powers (states) both to solve specific problems and to attempt to build its own presence *vis-à-vis* these states.<sup>8</sup> Whether this engagement contributes to ‘effective multilateralism’, or undermines it, is an important question.

Legal capabilities and leadership are both essential qualities of ‘actorness’. The EU is, uniquely amongst international organisations, endowed with legal capabilities. On one hand, it is likely always to suffer from a ‘leadership deficit’ (Peterson 2008). On the other, a growing body of work on international leadership suggests that the EU may be pioneering a new, ‘post-modern’, non-state based form of political agency (see Deese 2008) that involves exporting internal cooperative agreements, or ‘uploading’ them to the level of the international system).

When the EU deploys both in tandem, it helps make real the Union’s presence. But much depends on how well it uses and coordinates its resources of leadership and capabilities. The EU’s presence can reinforce its capabilities to act. This mutual constitution – if and when it occurs – would accord with constructivist approaches to understanding international relations (see Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Yet it remains largely unexplored. The result is that a large number of interesting questions about Europe in the world remain unanswered, and will remain so in the absence of a holistic analytical investigation of the consequences of Europe. Such an investigation would focus on:

*A. How the **EU as actor** contributes to effective multilateralism:*

- A first set of questions concerns capabilities and how they are used. The existence of capability creates pressures for action (not just ‘reaction’). Put simply, the EU wishes to show the world that multilateralism  $\neq$  inaction/stalemate. Capability also reinforces the emergence of Brussels as international political capital. The EU has no policies that are solely ‘internal’; outsiders inevitably seek to make sure the external implications of ‘internal’ policies and their own interests are considered in EU policy debates. A variety of questions thus arise. How effective is the EU as an active agent? How and how effectively does it use its capabilities to promote multilateralism? What are the effects of institutional and policy variability, and variable interests and ideas, on multilateral

---

<sup>8</sup> One example of the latter is the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme, through which EU experts from EU member states engaged in teaching and curriculum-building on the EU within Chinese universities.

and bilateral cooperation? Is the Union a truly responsible global actor insofar as it takes account of external impacts when it makes ‘internal’ policies?

- A second set of questions concerns inter-regional dialogue. The EU avowedly seeks to spur regionalism globally by engaging in region-to-region dialogue (see K.E. Smith 2003). It has sought to regionalize North Africa and the Middle East – largely unsuccessfully. Do the EU’s efforts to network and create inter-regional dialog lead to expanded regional capacities to act elsewhere? Or do they strain existing alliances, both because national capitals are bypassed and EU positions can become more rigid? Are the EU’s efforts to ‘clone itself’ truly compatible with its mission to promote ‘effective multilateralism’?
- A third area of investigation is the Europeanization of foreign policies. How does EU foreign policy activity intensify Europeanization, especially of areas (such as defence, many areas of Justice and Home Affairs) where it was previously absent (Wong 2005)? What are the implications for the Union’s actorness?

*B. How the **EU as model** contributes to multilateralism and global security:*

- First, we know little about how other regions ‘use’ the EU model. How far can we observe convergence/replication of EU-like patterns of economic and political cooperation in other regions (especially in terms of soft security instruments)? Is convergence the result of parallel path development (that is, responses shaped by exposure to similar conditions, such as economic globalization or new security challenges), similar constructions of policy problems and responses due to shared cultural values, or isomorphism: conscious observation and duplication of features of the EU model, whether coercive or mimetic? Is the Union an exporter of its policies on development, with the EU model of market access and transfers embraced elsewhere as development tools? Are other regions as committed as Europe (at least rhetorically) is to ‘effective multilateralism’?
- Second, what have other regions learned from the EU from its enlargement and neighbourhood policies? In comparison to the Union, how do other regions create incentives and establish criteria for membership? What effect do other regions have on their member states?
- Third, how much is the EU’s institutional trajectory driven by its foreign policy ambitions. The most radical institutional reforms in its last 4 treaties (Amsterdam, Nice (on JHA), the



Constitutional Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty) have all been on matters of foreign or external policy. Does EU foreign policy (increasingly) drive the institutional trajectory?

#### 4. Academic Added Value

Our research programme focuses on the *consequences* of the EU for multilateral cooperation and security. We aim to add value to the existing *acquis academique* on Europe in international relations by encouraging research on European foreign policy to become less of ‘an archipelago’ (Jørgensen 2006: 507) and to connect more closely to wider debates about the nature of the modern international order. Specifically, we seek to connect the EU’s presence as a regional institution and its actorness as a foreign policy player to academic debates about multilateralism. All of the specific areas of investigation that we propose will link to broader macro-political questions about:

- 1) *global v. European patterns of causation* – to what extent does the impact of the EU depend on:
  - a. The effect on other regions and actors of global political or economic developments?
  - b. The perceived need for multilateral as opposed to regional or bilateral solutions to emerging problems?
  - c. Perceptions about the EU’s own success or failure?
  
- 2) *presence v. actorness* – to what extent is the EU’s impact a consequence of:
  - a. Its ‘passive’ existence as a model that is available for ‘import’?
  - b. The degree to which it actively seeks to ‘export’ its own brand of regional cooperation?
  
- 3) *EU v. ‘local’ institutional choices* – to what extent is the impact of the EU a consequence of:
  - a. Non-European cultural frames for institutional choice?
  - b. Choices the EU makes about its own institutional evolution?
  - c. Variability in EU institutional power and policy competence?

Here, it may be profitable to deploy concepts familiar to students of European integration – such as spillover, Europeanization, or multi-level governance – to see if they can shed light on developments in other regions. Equally, concepts used to study both the EU and regionalism and explain the rise of regional cooperation – especially those associated with social constructivism – need to be applied in a more general way to the development of regionalism and its constituting effects. Social constructivism

to our knowledge has not been used to examine how regions constitute and justify their existence vis-à-vis other regions.

Ultimately, we are concerned with the EU's impact on the global order: does the experience and history of the EU as a successful means of managing cooperation between rival states matter? How much? Would regionalism be so prolific without the learning, mimicking and persuasion of other regions, derived from the EU experience? The creation of the nation-state and the isomorphic pressures felt by nascent states from the early modern period onward might form a point of historical comparison (Tilly 1975). Various pressures to regionalize may be felt in an analogous contemporary context. There may be pressures of emulation, mimicking, coercion, persuasion. There may be differing levels of voluntarism associated with them. Do they add up to a new form of colonialism, with Europe providing the organizational template for a new political form?

Whether these pressures are isomorphic depends on several factors. States wishing to join a regional organization may be required to adapt, as those inside are required to do. The Europeanization literature on the effects of European integration on its member states has addressed this phenomenon. But there is little evidence that the various regions themselves are beginning to resemble each other. Far from it – they may be as different now as they ever were.

What are the mechanisms by which pressures are felt to build regional competence, and in turn resisted? Are they pressures of legitimacy, through which measures of accountability and transparency may be created? Are they responses to external or internal crises, including financial? How real are these changes – how many are simply trappings designed to project a veneer of appropriate structure or process? And do the architects of regional integration projects actually calculate the implications of regional integration for 'effective multilateralism'?

#### *Avenues of investigation*

We see this research taking several directions. The first concerns ***competing definitions of multilateralism***. Multilateralism may be understood as a system of interaction combining rules, institutionalised cooperation and inclusiveness. More specifically, it is a distinct form of interaction in international relations, rooted in voluntary decisions taken by the participants, involving a plurality of actors, and based upon the recognition of norms and/or standards rather than ad hoc or asymmetrical arrangements. Beyond this definition, a number of features and dimensions of multilateralism remain contested and ambiguous, opening space for debate.

We propose an analysis of the evolution of the concept and practice of multilateralism, including multilateralism in historical and comparative perspective, and the forms, models and cases of multilateralism. The aim is to categorise multilateralism in theoretical and conceptual terms, and thus to

develop distinct theoretical propositions that can be rigorously tested. The historical evolution of understanding(s) of multilateralism – whether as a norm, a strategy, a model or a process – should be elaborated in detail.

We also propose examining economic understandings of multilateralism, and particularly the assumptions they make about regionalism. Research should evaluate spatial differences in our understanding(s) of multilateralism, both within Europe and beyond, situating our current understanding of multilateralism in the pantheon of theories of international relations. Research should bring in non-Western perspectives, perhaps by conducting a comparison of three ideal-type competitive diplomatic styles – (US) selective unilateralism based on power, (EU) multilateralism based on law, and (China) pluralism based on sovereignty.

We believe it is important to identify the essential elements of a ‘European way’ of multilateralism. Doing so would involve examining the historical development of EU doctrine on multilateralism (from both political science and international law perspectives), including the relationship between role models of the EU (civilian power, normative power, hegemonic power) and strategic choices in external relations. It is important to consider the normative justification for adopting multilateralism and the consequences of doing so, and to examine and compare discourses on multilateralism in different national European settings, political institutions, and arenas of civil society. Research must gauge the EU’s potential contribution to effective multilateralism through the use of ‘soft’ policy instruments, including institutions and rules to regulate economic cooperation, environmental protection, migration and refugee protection, human rights and development.

Moreover, consideration should be given to critical junctures or turning points, such as the collapse of communism in 1989, or the aftermath of 9/11, with likely future foreign policy scenarios outlined. Is effective multilateralism compatible with its stated policy of promoting inter-regional dialogue, or the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’? How do EU and national officials employ the concept of multilateralism? Is it used as a normative or strategic device, or as a form of leadership? We must determine the extent to which an EU identity and set of interests is constructed by European officials’ understanding of the nature of external challenges and threats. Potential *working hypotheses* include:

- multilateralism has become a method for exporting EU values and standards;
- the EU’s affinity for multilateralism is an excuse for inaction and weak leadership or a cover-up for (military) weakness;
- multilateralism has developed into an instrument of hegemonic influence-seeking, or a tactic for containing American power (see Chamorel 2006).

A second stream of research needs to examine the *structural framework of EU external relations*, including constitutional (treaty), institutional and policy change at the EU level. This stream would evaluate evolving interactions between the EU and its member states, and consider the causes and dynamics of externalisation of EU policy. The aim is to elaborate how the institutional machinery works to produce external policy, and how well-equipped the EU is to act externally in the context of multilateral frameworks. The key question would be: which theoretically inspired models of multilateralism seem best suited to explain the EU system of external relations and the way it shapes its multilateral policies?

Research needs to be focused on recent institutional and constitutional changes, especially as contained in the Lisbon Treaty (assuming its ratification). It also needs to consider new strategic priorities in external relations (particularly after the troubles of the Doha Round and the ‘rediscovery’ of strategic bilateralism). There are several levels to this approach.

First, the ‘legal constitution’ of EU external policy-making needs to be analysed to identify where the Union is most capable of promoting effective multilateralism. This investigation must extend to internal policy areas that have developed an increasingly important international dimension.

Second, the practices and procedures of policy-making in the EU’s ‘living constitution’ need to be mapped and evaluated. In particular, the application and use of Treaty provisions and policy instruments for external action should be analysed with a view to how far they are guided by multilateral commitments and constraints (such as reference to WTO rules, UN resolutions, ECE (European Community equivalent) standards, international conventions and agreements). This analysis could start with the assumption that different modes of EU policy-making and external representation have different implications for multilateralism.

Third, research could focus on the impact of different formal and informal modes and practices of multilateralism on specific cases of EU action. Do competing modes of multilateralism, rooted in different values, ideas and interests within the EU institutions and in key member states, present problems for relations between member states and with third countries? Initiatives outside the formal EU framework have allowed member states to engage in specific policy areas, creating a *variable geometry* of external action.

Specific areas ripe for study would include the intersection of legal and political spheres in justice and home affairs, located between the relevant EC/EU Treaty provisions, the Prüm Convention (including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain) and the G6 (France, Italy, Poland, Germany, Spain, and the UK). Another would be how the EU deals with multilateralism within the variety of forms of Mediterranean cooperation, including its own ‘Barcelona

Process', NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and several forms of variable geometry initiated by member countries.

A further area of research would be externalisation of internal EU policies – understood as attempts to encourage or coerce third countries to adopt norms and approaches already embraced by the EU, for example in the areas of immigration and asylum policy, or single market policies. How does the EU attempt to 'upload' its preferences on regulatory standards, by making use of or establishing multilateral standards and fora? Under what conditions does externalisation take the form of multilateralism, and when (instead) does it take the form of more coercive norm diffusion? Is it more often negotiated with a strategic partner or a select group of states?

What domestic and international conditions prompt policy externalisation, and how are they internalised and adopted in third countries? Do the EU's externalisation efforts conform to the 'ideal type' of multilateralism – codified, voluntary and universal? Identifying key cases in areas such as the externalisation of EU single market policies (such as climate change, competition policy, data protection, fisheries, health and labour) and the externalisation of EU immigration and asylum policy (extending to border control and readmission agreements) would yield important insights.

A third direction for research would focus in detail on *EU relations with the European Neighbourhood, Africa, and Asia* – critically-important regions and partners both in terms of global order and in terms of EU interests. It would introduce political economy analyses to complement international relations and legal approaches. The overarching question is: how much do these relationships contribute to the aim of promoting effective multilateralism? How does multilateralism 'square' with inter-regional relations and strategic partnerships? What determines the variation in the EU's leverage with these partners?

The EU has limited resources and clear strategic interests in its neighbourhood, not least in the areas of energy and migration. Security concerns and energy dependence may affect the EU's mission to promote democracy, rule of law, and human rights in these states. If the EU must be selective in seeking geopolitical influence, then questions arise about whether it bases its interaction on the achievement of multilateral goals or on the pursuit of EU interests. Does multilateralism as an objective compete with or complement the pursuit of EU interests? What instruments (such as conditionality) might be applied to bring about desired outcomes? According to the EU, the promotion of domestic political reform and good governance leads to effective multilateralism. But it remains unclear whether region-building in the neighbourhood is a means for promoting reform, and whether it encourages marginal states to play a more constructive role in the international system.

Other essential questions arise. Does the EU treat the neighbourhood 'regions' – east and south – as though they are distinct regional entities? What are the implications of the progress of WTO

negotiations for EU-ENP negotiations? Future research needs to investigate the institutional arrangements required to govern EU-ENP relations, and their political bases, as well as the involvement of civil society groups, future governance structures, and how new institutional arrangements would be made relevant to the citizens of ENP states. The role played by new EU member states would be an important focus.

Other cases could address EU external relations with regions and partners in Africa and Asia. The purpose would be to compare and contrast instances of inter-regional relations, region-building and strategic partnerships to improve our understanding of their impact on multilateralism. For example, what is the EU's role in post-accession compliance monitoring in the case of China's membership of the WTO? In the entry negotiations, what reforms did the EU insist on and why? How was EU influence felt? Did the actions of the EU contribute to strengthening multilateral rules or was the Union acting in defence of EU interests? Most research has focussed on the conditions placed on China by the US; the EU role in post-accession monitoring of China's trade policy has been understudied.

Likewise, what is the nature of the EU's interaction with the African Union (AU) and Asia (ASEM/ASEAN)? Rhetorically, at least, both ASEAN and the AU have declared that they draw on the EU model. There is much more to be learned about the practical prospects for regional integration in Africa, from regional economic communities (RECs) to the idea of the 'United States of Africa'. How does the EU encourage such integration? Is the EU a viable and realistic model for African integration, or is reference to the EU model mainly rhetorical? Do pan-African projects and RECs in fact have in a zero-sum relationship? What recommendations can be identified for the EU and the AU so as to foster durable integration on the African continent?

Further work could focus on African development, conflict resolution, and inter-regionalism. The strategy of the EU has shifted from a developmental agenda based on preferential treatment and development aid to a multi-faceted approach that emphasises the importance of trade liberalisation, partnership and the inclusion of Africa into the world economy (via the imposition of conditionality and standards). What are the risks and opportunities of the new EU-Africa strategy as well as the implications of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)?

Likewise, EU peacekeeping and conflict resolution strategies in Chad and Darfur, for example, interplay with the initiatives of other actors (including the UN, the US and China). Research must disentangle the influence of numerous actors. China is being socialised to attach conditionalities to its official assistance to Sudan, but it remains unclear how to account for this important development. Case study research is needed to explain why. Similar research would also investigate African perceptions of the EU's influence in the field of peace-keeping.

A fourth direction for research would focus on *the role of the EU in both formal and informal institutional settings*, examining whether and how the Union contributes to effective multilateralism through these fora. The EU has sought membership and influence in formal global organisations, becoming an important actor in some cases, despite the fact that enlargement to an EU of 27 has often made it more difficult to act coherently or strategically within these multilateral settings.

What is the EU's leadership role in formal multilateral organisations? What is its role as a source of ideas and its capacity to act? While the Union is committed to multilateralism in principle, it also has an obligation to defend the EU's interests. What are the dynamics of the interaction between the EU and the UN as two multilateral security actors? Does the participation of the EU in the UN collective security system reinforce the EU's internal coordination on security matters? Does the EU's contribution promote the consolidation of a multilateral security culture within the UN?

Case studies could profitably address the WTO agricultural negotiations (both in context of liberalisation and of setting standards). The suspension of the Doha round provides a critical juncture from which to study the evolution of EU multilateralism. One issue concerns internal EU dynamics in trade negotiations, with member states adhering to different philosophies and approaches (see Peterson and Young 2007). A key question concerns internal divisions in the EU over reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. In what ways does the Union's internal division undermine its contribution to effective multilateralism in farm trade? To answer this question, research should focus on the effect of post-Doha policy toward Africa. What is the effect of the EU's agricultural policy on Africa in the wake of Doha?

Likewise, the interaction between the EU and the UN on the definition and implementation of 'collective security' is essential. How does the EU participation in the UN collective security system affect its internal security identity – particularly in generating internal consensus in the EU on security issues and in shaping the nature and the objectives of its international security actorness? What is the concrete output of the EU in the UN collective security system – especially with reference to the identification of security issues, the reform of the UN security architecture, and the contribution of EU operational capabilities? The goal of research that seeks to answer these questions would be to assess whether and how the EU promotes the consolidation of a collective security culture within the UN framework.

Other efforts might examine EU and African cooperation on UN reform, given the partial congruence of interests over changes to the UN Security Council (UNSC). The AU states have adopted the position that the continent should be allocated two permanent seats, as Africa features disproportionately on the agenda of the Council. With two of its member states already on the UNSC

(and a third vying for the same status) the EU will also be crucially affected, and this case might profitably examine the extent to which there is scope for a strategic EU/AU partnership.

Finally, we suggest that a fifth direction for research would consider *the role of the EU in ad hoc, informal or unconventional forms of multilateralism*. The purpose would be to determine what role the EU plays in developing the emerging rules of these organisations. This could focus on *crystallising* and *aspirant* forms of organisation (in which international cooperation is not fully-institutionalised). To what extent does the Union promote multilateralism through its capacity for leadership, persuasion, generation of ideas, and potential as a rallying point for other actors? Is the Union pushing multilateral cooperation from ‘aspirant’ toward ‘institutionalised’ forms? Is it thereby contributing to effective multilateralism, or are forms of aspirant multilateralism simply providing a cover for a unilateral pursuit of interests unrestricted by codified rules of action?

Case studies (to cite two examples) might include in-depth examinations of the EU’s role in 1) the Middle East Quartet and 2) the Heiligendamm Process emerging from the 2007 summit, whereby the G8 pledged to engage in dialogue with the most important developing economies. Such studies would logically investigate the EU’s contribution to common conflict resolution standards in both mediation strategy and procedures to reach a solution, the substantive principles underpinning possible future settlements, and the institutionalisation of dialogue between developed and developing countries. They would focus on whether and how the EU uses its influence to shape views and strategies adopted by the Quartet and by the G8 in their respective roles, for example in promoting the Middle East Peace Process and promoting dialogue between the G8 and the Global South. The overarching conceptual task would be to assess whether the EU’s role contributes to the transformation of aspirant multilateralism into a more durable and effective form of multilateralism.

## 5. Conclusion: Research with Policy Implications

We began by arguing that the EU’s importance both as a model and actor is growing. We also suggested that the EU’s presence and actorness are, as never before, mutually constituted. We examined the available literatures and found them wanting, mostly because they rarely speak to one another. One consequence is that the need to gauge the consequences of Europe for international politics remains mostly unmet.

We should be clear that we do not start with the assumption that the EU is necessarily becoming more *powerful*. By many measures – economic, demographic, military – it actually may be losing ground relative to other major powers, particularly China and India. Our argument is rather that, increasingly, both political leaders and ordinary citizens look to the EU as one model – the leading



model – of organising cooperation between states and people. More states and their citizens are affected in some way by EU ambitions and activism in foreign policy than ever before.

The ways in which the EU uses its tools and instruments in the international system has a tangible, lasting effect that is demonstrably different from a ‘normal’ superpower. This outcome arises not simply because Europe is committed to different values – the EU presents itself to the world as a normative superpower rather than a coercive one – but because its own powers are variable. It does not have the same range of powers as a state.

If we are right, the need for fresh research with policy relevance should be clear. If the EU’s policy of promoting effective multilateralism is to be effective, Europeans need to understand how the EU model is perceived and received in other regions of the world. In particular, they need to understand the calculations of policy-makers who may strive to emulate European successes and avoid its failures, particularly given very different cultural frames that surround choices about institutions beyond Europe.

By the same token, European foreign policy-makers need to know what determines whether or not they accomplish their goals, particularly when conflict resolution is sought through soft security measures. Is success most directly linked to institutional choices? Or strategic or policy coherence? Or investing in strategic partnerships? Or through multilateral initiatives establishing collective rules? Or through enticements such as market access, resource transfers and membership? Or other factors?

Our basic argument is that these and many other questions about the consequences of Europe for international relations remain unanswered. It is time that we, and others, designed a research programme that seeks to answer them.

## References

- Abbott, F. (2000) ‘NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study,’ International Organization, 54 (3): 519-547.
- Alecu de Flers, N. and E. Regelsberger (2005) ‘The EU and inter-regional cooperation’, in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds). International Relations and the European Union. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.
- Allen, D. and M. Smith (1990) ‘Western Europe's presence in the contemporary international arena’, Review of International Studies 16 (1): 19-38.
- Allison, R. (2004) ‘Regionalism, regional structures and security management,’ International Affairs 80 (3): 463-483.
- Bitterlich, J. (2006) ‘Pour une Haute Autorité européenne de l’énergie,’ retrieved 23 October, 2006, from [http://www.robert-schuman.org/supplement/questions\\_europe33.htm](http://www.robert-schuman.org/supplement/questions_europe33.htm).
- Boswell, C. (2003) ‘The "external dimension" of EU immigration and asylum policy,’ International Affairs 79 (3): 619-38.
- Boswell, C. (2007) ‘Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (3): 589-610.
- Brenner, M. J. (1994) Multilateralism and Western Strategy. Basingstoke: Macmillan,

- Bretherton, C. and J. Vogler (2006) The European Union as a Global Actor. London and New York, Routledge, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.
- Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjørnsen and B. White, Eds. (2004). Contemporary European Foreign Policy. London and Thousand Oaks CA, Sage.
- Chamorel, P. (2006) 'Anti-Europeanism and Euroskepticism in the United States' in T. L. Ilgen (ed) Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations. Aldershot and Burlington VT: Ashgate.
- Cox, R. W. (1997) The New Realism: Perspectives On Multilateralism And World Order. Basingstoke, Macmillan and United Nations University Press.
- Damro, C. (2006) 'Transatlantic competition policy: domestic and international sources of EU-US cooperation,' European Journal of International Relations 12 (2): 171-96.
- Dannreuther, R. (2004) 'Conclusion: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy' in R. Dannreuther (ed) European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy. London and New York: Routledge.
- Dannreuther, R. and J. Peterson (2006) (eds) Security Strategy and the Transatlantic Alliance. London and New York, Routledge.
- Deese, D. A. (2008) World Trade Politics: Power, Principles and Leadership, London and New York: Routledge.
- Devuyst, Y. (2000) 'Toward a Multilateral Competition Policy Regime?' Global Governance 6 (2): 319-338.
- European Communities (2004) The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter. Luxembourg.
- European Union (2003) 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy'. Brussels.
- Fawcett, L. (2004) 'Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism', International Affairs 80 (3): 429-446.
- Fawcett, L. and A. Hurrell (1996) (eds) Regionalism in World Politics. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.
- Gill, S. (1997) Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Ginsberg, R. (2001) The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, Boulder CO and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield,
- Hill, C. (1993) 'The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role,' Journal of Common Market Studies 31(3): 305-28.
- Hill, C. (1998) 'Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?' in J. Peterson and H. Sjørnsen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP. London and New York, Routledge.
- Hill, C. and M. Smith (2005) (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2006) Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition. London and Malden MA: Polity Press.
- Jørgensen, K. E. (2006) Overview: the European Union and the world' in K. E. Jørgensen, M. A. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds) Handbook of European Union Politics, London and Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.
- Journal of European Public Policy, special issue on 'Normative Power' (2006), 13, 2.
- Kagan, R. (2003) Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York, Knopf.
- Keohane, R. (2006) 'The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism', Garnet Working Paper, 09 (06), September, [http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working\\_papers/0906.pdf](http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/0906.pdf) (accessed 28 February 2008).
- Keukelaire, S. and J. MacNaughtan (2008) The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Krause, K. and W. A. Knight (1995) State, Society and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism, Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press.

- Läidi, Z. (2008) 'The Normative Empire: the Unintended Consequences of European Power', Garnet Policy Brief 6, February, Paris.
- Lavenex, S. (2006) 'Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control', West European Politics, 29 (2): 329 – 350.
- Lavenex, S. and E.M. Ucarer (2004) 'The External Dimension of Europeanization; The Case of Immigration Policies', Cooperation and Conflict, 39 (4): 417-443.
- Lavenex, S. and E. M. Uçarer (2002) Migration and the Externalities of European Integration. Lanham, Md., Lexington Books.
- Lindberg, T. (2005) (ed) Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership. New York and Abingdon, Routledge.
- Lindley-French, J. (2002) 'In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing', International Affairs 78 (4): 813-30.
- Lindstrom, G. (2005) EU-US Burden-Sharing: Who Does What? Paris, Institute for Security Studies.
- Lucarelli, S. and Manners, I. (2006) (eds) Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy. London and New York, Routledge.
- Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2): 235-58.
- Manners, I. (2006) 'Normative Power Europe Reconsidered', Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2): 182-99.
- Marsh, S. and H. Mackenstien (2005) The International Relations of the European Union, Harlow: Pearson Longman.
- Martin, L. L. (1992) 'Interests, Power and Multilateralism', International Organization 46 (4): 765-92.
- McCormick, J. (2006) The European Superpower, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (2005) 'The European Union as a Trade Power' in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (2006) 'The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power', Journal of European Public Policy 13 (6): 906-25.
- Monar, J. (2004) 'The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of Justice and Home Affairs.' European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2): 395-415.
- Morgan, G. (2005) The Idea of a European Superstate, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Oneal, J. R. and B. Russett (1999) 'The Kantian peace: the pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992.' World Politics 52 (3): 1-37.
- Peterson, J. (2008) 'Institutional leadership' in. E. Best, T. Christiansen and P. Settembri (eds) Deepening: Constitutional and Institutional Change in the European Union. Cheltenham and Northampton MA: Edward Elgar.
- Peterson, J. and Young, A. R (2007) (eds) The European Union and the New Trade Politics. London and New York, Routledge.
- Pollack, M. A. (2003) 'Unilateral America, multilateral Europe?' in J. Peterson and M. A. Pollack (eds) Europe, America, Bush. London and New York, Routledge,
- Rees, W. (2005) 'The External Face of Internal Security' in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.
- Rees, W. (2006) Transatlantic Counter-terrorism Cooperation: the New Imperative. London and New York, Routledge.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1993) Multilateralism Matters: the Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York, N.Y: Columbia University Press.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. London and New York, Routledge.
- Sjöstedt, G. (1977) The External Role of the European Community. Farnborough, Saxon House.

- Smith, K. E. (2003) European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Oxford and New York, Polity.
- Telo, M. (2001) (ed) European Union and the New Regionalism. Aldershot and Burlington, VT, Ashgate.
- Tilly, C., Ed. (1975) The Formation of National States in Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tonra, B. and T. Christiansen (2004) (eds) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press.
- Tsoukalis, L. (2005) 'Managing Interdependence: the EU in the World Economy' in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.
- Whitman, R. G. (1998) From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave.
- Wilkinson, R. (2000) Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation: the Architecture and Extension of International Trade Regulation, London, Routledge.
- Wong, R. (2005) 'The Europeanization of Foreign Policy' in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.