

UACES 38th Annual Conference

Edinburgh, 1-3 September 2008

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The EU – A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World?

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Paper for Presentation and the UACES Annual/ Research Conference

University of Edinburgh

September 1-3, 2008

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Abstract

Regions and regionalism are playing an increasingly significant role within the emerging global multilevel governance framework. In this context the European Union (EU), which has been a pioneer of post-World War Two regionalism, are worthy of study.

Due to its longevity and the historical idiosyncrasies of the integration process, European integration has developed a distinct institutional design combining supranational and intergovernmental features, political and economic integration. European studies has long been involved with questions regarding the extent to which regions such as the EU are capable of becoming coherent actors in the global governance complex, raising important questions about what constitutes 'actorness' in contemporary international relations. Can regional entities such as the EU emerge as significant actors in world politics? And if so, how can we conceptualise such actors? While there is a rich literature on the EU as an international actor, comparatively little work has been devoted to outline and to define such actorness. This paper aims to contribute to these discussions by putting forward a framework for the assessment of actorness in international relations by looking at the case of the EU.

Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed a renewed interest in global governance and regionalism among academics and practioners alike. This has opened up room for a reassessment of actorness beyond the traditional Westphalian state in international relations. In this context European regionalism offers some interesting possibilities for the study of actorness and governance. Due to this longevity and the historical idiosyncrasies of the European integration process, being set up in the aftermath of the cataclysmic disaster that was World War Two, European integration has developed a distinct institutional design combining supranational and intergovernmental features, political and economic integration. European studies has long been involved in raising important questions about what constitutes 'actorness' in contemporary international relations. Can regional entities such as the European Union (EU) emerge as significant actors in world politics? And if so, how can we conceptualise such actors?

This paper aims to contribute to these discussions by putting forward a framework for the assessment of actorness in international relations and by systematically applying it to the EU.

The paper will proceed by briefly outlining three interrelated dynamics and processes – the end of the Cold War, globalisation and regionalism – that have triggered the renewed interest in global governance before outlining the key features of the emerging global governance complex. A key theme will be the changing face of the Westphalian state system especially with regard to the concept of actorness in international relations. This provides a conceptual entry into the subject matter and offers a broad overview of some of the relevant literatures on global governance, globalisation and the new regionalism. Traditional international relations based approaches tend to ultimately confuse actorness with statehood and sovereignty. Yet, conceptions of sovereignty are changing and so are conceptions of actorness. Thus, the second part of the paper is turning towards introducing and testing a framework for the assessment of the actorness of the EU within contemporary world politics. The discussion concludes that the EU is indeed an international actor. More than that, at its core it constitutes a normative model not only for regional governance but also for global governance in a neo-Westphalian world.

Global Governance and International Relations

The last two decades have witnessed a renewed interest in global governance among academics and practitioners alike. There are at least three interrelated processes and dynamics that have been driving this recent reassessment of international relations:

the end of the Cold War, the acceleration of globalisation and the revival of regionalism (the so-called new regionalism).

First, the sudden end of the Cold War heralded a new optimism regarding the future organisation of world politics. The end of the Cold War marked the end of the East-West dichotomy that had dominated world politics for forty years. It significantly altered the structure of international relations with bipolarity rapidly becoming a topic for historians. However, while everyone agreed that the superpower geopolitics had come to an end a new academic divide was emerging regarding the future of the international system. Scholars such as Francis Fukuyama actively celebrated the demise of the last effective challenger to political and economic liberalism. In his seminal volume *The End of History*, Fukuyama summed up his conviction that end of the Cold War heralded the end of progression of human history understood as dialectical clash of opposing ideologies.¹ The ideological evolution of mankind had come to an end:

[...] humanity has found its preferred form of political, economic and social governance after a long period of experimentation. At the end of the Cold War, capitalism and liberal democracy have proved to be superior to any other form of political and economic organization. Indeed, with the demise of Communism, capitalism and liberal democracy lost their last credible challenger.²

Thus, Fukuyama foresaw the imminent emergence of a new world order dominated by liberal principles. Others were less sanguine about that prospect. Samuel Huntington took issue with Fukuyama. Rather than witnessing the imminent emergence of a new world order dominated by liberal principles, Huntington's thesis

posited that we are entering a new phase of international relations in which new forms of rivalry and conflict will endure driven by primarily civilisational as opposed to economic or ideological forces.³ A clash of civilisation defined by cultural, ideational and religious factors would constitute the battle lines of the post-Cold War world. With the demise of the superpower overlay, the processes and dynamics of globalisation would be given a much freer reign. However, from Huntington's perspective globalisation is increasing the frictions between different civilisational blocs. Globalisation facilitates '... the heightening cross-civilizational interactions will serve to enhance identity issues, while at the same time undermining the nation state as the main source of identity'.⁴ Huntington's views, although subject to substantial criticism, have lodged themselves into the contemporary public mind as a consequence of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the subsequent 'War on Terrorism', which is resorting to semi-religious imagery.

Scholars and proponents of the neorealist school of thought have also been rather cautious regarding post-Cold War international order. John Mearsheimer, drawing on Kenneth Waltz, argued that the Cold War bipolar structure was preferable to the emerging multi-polar post-Cold War world because it provided greater stability and better security.⁵ Mearsheimer, by focusing on post-Cold War Europe, arrived at the pessimistic conclusion that without the superpowers war and major crisis in Europe was likely to return. Indeed, regarding European integration as a Cold War project, Mearsheimer predicted that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a multipolar world would pose severe problems for the future of European integration:

Without the Soviet threat or an American night watchman, Western European states will do what they have done for centuries before the onset of the Cold War, look upon another with

suspicion [...] Cooperation in this new order will be more difficult than it was during the Cold War. Conflict will be more likely.⁶

From Mearsheimer's point of view then, the retreat of the superpowers and their respective nuclear arsenals from Europe would remove the preconditions for European stability, generating the revival of the crisis-driven multipolar Concert of Europe. With the pacifying implications of the superpower conflict gone, old rivalries and conflict would flare up once again, leading to greater frequency of crisis and possibly even war. While the violence in the Balkans following the break-up of Yugoslavia seemed to confirm the pessimism of neorealist scholars, this line of argument fails to account for the new impetus given to regionalism in Western Europe following the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty.⁷ The enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the end of the Cold War also seem to contradict the neorealist understanding of post-Cold War geopolitics.⁸

Thus, the end of the Cold War triggered a renewal of the debate as to how world politics should be governed. The academic divide is pitching state-centric conceptions of international relations, general being rather sceptical regarding the break with traditional geopolitical modes for international order, against non-state-centric theories, being generally more optimistic concerning the emergence of a new era of global governance. Even within state-centric international relations theory a divide has emerged most visibly between the proponents of neoliberal institutionalism, arguing that international governance and multilateral cooperation is endemic in current world politics, and neorealists, stating that contemporary modes of global governance are still contingent to geopolitics and the interest of powerful states. The

present global economic and political order and, indeed, some of the most important international institutions such as NATO, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB) are, so the argument goes, expressions of the structural power of the US and are ultimately products of American global hegemony.

The intensification of the globalisation process represents a second set of dynamics supporting the new wave of scholarship on global governance. Indeed, as David Held and Anthony McGrew observed, ‘any discussion of global governance must start with and understanding of the changing fabric of international society. Woven into this are the complex processes known as globalization’.⁹ Globalisation, the all-in-one catchphrase of our times, therefore needs to be looked at much closer when discussing the emergence of a multilevel global governance framework. It is intriguing to note that despite the everyday usage of the term ‘globalisation’ we are still far away from a consensus as how to define globalisation let alone what constitutes genuine globalisation (and what does not) or its social, political and economic implications. However, despite the amazing (and still growing) variety of definitions a cluster of similar ideas is identifiable:

Among the terms usually included in the definitions offered were, in order of frequency, speed and time (accelerating, rapidly developing etc.), processes and flows, space (encompassing ever greater amounts of it), and increasing integration and interconnectivity. A composite definition, therefore, might be: Globalization is an accelerating set of processes involving flows that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world’s spaces and that lead to increasing integration and interconnectivity among those spaces.¹⁰

A much-cited definition by David Held states in that context that globalisation ‘denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organisation and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power’.¹¹ Contemporary globalisation has led to an increasing demand for more international cooperation, transnational coordination, multilateralism and the setting of increasingly global standards to ensure economic, social and environmental stability. A whole new complex and multilayered infrastructure of overlapping modes of sub-national, national, regional and global regulation is evolving reaching into more and more areas that previously were the exclusive domain of national policy-making. Here as well, the academic debate has become polarised between hyperglobalisers such as Kenichi Ohmae who pronounced the dawn of a ‘borderless world’ and the continuous decline of the sovereign nation-state as a reference point for the political, economic and social organisation of human activity, and their detractors.¹² Accordingly, national governments are becoming more and more sidelined by the power of global market and global capital, slowly being transformed into ‘market states’ reduced to the provision of a legal framework for market forces to operate more effectively.¹³ Globalisation is also pronouncing transnational problems such as environmental degradation (i.e. pollution, exploitation of the global fisheries, global warming), transnational pandemics (i.e. SARS and HIV), transnational crime (i.e. human trafficking and the drugs trade) and new transnational security issues (i.e. refugee movements and international terrorism) that are beyond the scope and scale of individual territorial states to deal with effectively.

Others, however, are highlighting the importance of politics and states in unleashing and effectively steering the economic forces that characterise economic

globalisation.¹⁴ Rather than being a ‘force of nature’, contemporary globalisation is the outcome of a political project that has created a framework for economic neoliberalism to flourish.¹⁵ Or as Hay would have it, it were states such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), that were instrumental in putting in place the current neoliberal infrastructure that facilitates economic globalisation.¹⁶ And states remain in a key position in international relations. To date, there is no other entity being able to organise social, political and economic energies in the way national governments still can do by enforcing their authority, generating loyalty and appealing to a sense of share identity.¹⁷ Hyperglobalisers often seem to overlook that states retain a primacy and significance in international relations, including in international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation, the IMF, the UN or the EU. Far from being passive recipients of economic globalisation, national governments have, for their own purposes, actively fostered an international climate propagating a neoliberal agenda.¹⁸

Furthermore, it needs to be recognised that much of the literature highlighting the so-called decline of the nation-state is working with an unrealistic premise, namely that at some point in the (near mystical) past the state possessed levels of nearly complete authority and dominance over domestic and international forces that have now been lost due to the influence of several overlapping transnational processes and dynamics commonly known as globalisation. Such a reading, of course, represents a grossly over-simplified understanding of the contemporary nation-state and is based on a very wrong conception of the historical evolution of the Westphalian state-system. The modern nation-state consists of a range of different institutions, fulfilling various functions, providing the highest level of authority over a specific territory and a

particular population. Not being able to practise a traditional function, such as trade protection, should not be confused with a structural decline of the power of the state: 'Changing function, or indeed a net reduction of function, does not logically equal overall decline unless one takes a narrow and strictly functional definition of the state'.¹⁹ It needs to be recognised that while restraining the functions of state in some areas, globalisation has also provided the state with the opportunities to enhance its powers in others. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the sphere of domestic security. Here, globalisation has not diminished state power at all but, on the contrary, it has been a clear source of strengthening of state capacity.²⁰

Having refuted the hyperglobalisation thesis of the decline of the state it is important to recognise that globalisation is changing the environment in which states find themselves in. Globalisation is putting pressure on the normative foundation of the Westphalian state-system: it is changing traditional conceptions of territorial sovereignty. In an international environment characterised by the transnational and global flows and dynamics, states find it increasingly necessary to share competencies and decision-making powers with actors above and below the national level. One indicator for this is the expansion authoritative functions of international regulative regimes and international organisations. Another feature is the transfer of decision-making power from the central government to the municipal and the provincial levels as the result of devolutionary pressures from ethnic- and identity-based groups below state level. Sovereignty is also under pressure as being the primary principle of international order. International law and evolving human rights norms increasingly conflict with the norm of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of nation-states. Behind this is a normative struggle in contemporary international relations between

communitarian and cosmopolitan philosophies, between a Westphalian and post-Westphalian world politics, the former pronouncing the centrality of sovereignty as the foundational norm of international relations, the latter tempering notions of exclusive sovereignty by placing certain restrictions and responsibilities on state behaviour (including its domestic affairs). Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in the discourse on the rights and wrongs of humanitarian intervention.

Thus, globalisation is fostering the emergence of a neo-Westphalian international order, where sovereignty and governance are increasingly dispersed and shared among various actors such as municipal and local authorities, government actors and international organisations. Private actors such as civil society organisations, business associations and multinational companies have also increasingly access to the global governance complex.²¹ Additionally, globalisation has led to an increase in direct transborder links between subnational authorities, political elites, government officials, business and civil society actors.

Taken together, global and regional governance and subnational governance tend to break to formal institutional framework of the nation-state and exclusive national sovereignty, replacing it with a more fluid multilevel governance structure where governance is increasingly shared in many areas.²²

This, however, does not necessarily imply the decline of the state. Rather, in a changing environment, states are adapting and changing to advance their interests and to protect themselves.²³ The state continues to a core element of world politics but it is not the only actor of consequence anymore. Consequently a neo-Westphalian (rather than a post-Westphalian) system is slowly becoming established. In this

context, globalisation and new modes of global governance emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War 'allow for an expansion of actorness beyond the traditional state-centric model'.²⁴

This brings us to the third set of developments that has driven the recent interest in global governance – the phenomenon of the new regionalism. Since the Single European Act (SEA) and the subsequent revival of European integration in the late 1980s, the world has witnessed a resurgence of regionalisms around the world. Examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur (Comisión Sectorial para el Mercado Común del Sur) the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union, a new assertive ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the developing ASEAN Plus Three framework (including South Korea, Japan and China)²⁵, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).

The new regionalism is obviously very closely linked to the other two factors influencing the emergence of a global governance framework – the end of the Cold War and the processes of globalisation.²⁶ In line with the empirical developments a whole new line of analytical enquiry has evolved and with it a new academic divide pitting new advances in the field of European studies against a growing body of so-called new literature which is more at home in the academic field of international relations and international political economy.²⁷ In recent years deliberate attempts have been made to overcome this intellectual divide between both bodies of literature.²⁸

These three inter-related dynamics then – the geopolitical change triggered by the end of the Cold War power struggle, the acceleration of various overlapping processes commonly identified as globalisation and a worldwide resurgence of regionalist projects – are dominating contemporary international relations and have mapped the contours of the many discussions on global governance. But what does global governance actually mean, what does it entail? Very broadly conceived, global governance refers to governance without the existence of an overarching sovereign authority. Beyond that there is little consensus on the definition of global governance.²⁹ There are several similarities, though, connecting the different perspectives and approaches in the global governance literature.³⁰ To start with, the growing body of literature on global governance and globalisation has moved beyond the state-centric model of world politics effectively broadening the analysis to include other actors at the global stage such as international institutions, non-governmental organisations, multinational companies, transnational advocacy networks, civil society and regional institutions. In addition, global governance scholars tend to focus on a broader range of issues rather than traditional security concerns, including capital and financial flows, patterns of international trade, environmental issues, international regimes, international law, migration movements and human rights to name but a few.

The emerging global governance system, therefore, moves beyond state-centrism in international relations, move from a Westphalian to a neo-Westphalian world politics. This neo-Westphalian world is increasingly characterised by five features. First, it is a multilayered multilevel system where decision-making power is dispersed between the global level (through organisations such as the UN or the WTO), the wider international level (through organisations such as the OECD), the regional level

(through regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN or Mercosur), the transnational level (through civil society actors, business networks, advocacy networks, political elites etc.), the national level (through governmental authorities) and the substate level (through municipal and community authorities, city council, subnational regions).³¹ Second, it constitutes the development of a more cooperative international system. Although sovereignty remains one of the key norms of this system it is tempered by other liberal principles such as a commitment to some form of democracy and free market principles and, perhaps even more importantly, an emerging consensus on the centrality of human rights principles. Third, it is a multiple actor system. States, while still being central actors, are no longer the only international actors of consequence. Fourth, and related to the previous point, the system 'is structurally complex, being composed of diverse agencies and networks with overlapping (functional and/ or spatial) jurisdictions, not to mention differential power resources and competencies.'³² And, last but not least, regions are becoming integral parts of and independent actors in the complex multilevel and multi-actor framework of global governance.

It is evident that neither the EU nor European integration general can be viewed as autonomous projects and in isolation from the emergence of the neo-Westphalian world. They are ultimately embedded in the global governance structure, driven by geopolitical change and globalisation. As stated at the beginning of this article, the EU offers a particularly intriguing case, not only for students of European integration but also for international relations scholars. While the nation-state remains in a pre-eminent position within the EU and the global governance complex alike, it has to share this space increasingly with other actors. This opens up a long overdue re-

definition of the concept of actorness in international relations as an academic subject. As we will see soon, this has long been a topic of interest within the European studies community. There is, of course, one fundamental problem that has always inhibited such an intellectual exercise: the notion of what constitutes an international actor is ultimately wedded to the concept of the nation-state. This state-centrism creates a certain conceptual straight-jacket: Most of our thinking in international relations takes, either explicitly or implicitly, the Westphalian nation-state as a fundamental feature of international life.³³ Indeed, even the founding fathers of the European project, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, envisioned the creation of a European federal ‘supra-state’ as the outcome of a lengthy functional integration process. However, as the next section proceeds to outline, the EU has managed to emerge as an actor in its own right. More than that, the following elaborations will introduce a framework for the analysis of (regional) actorness in contemporary international relations that breaks with the intellectual strictures of implicit and explicit state-centrism in international relations.

The EU as an International Actor – Defining Regions in the Global Multilevel Governance Framework

There is a rich literature focusing on the EU as an international actor. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to outline and to define such ‘actorness’. There are a few notable exceptions including the works of Sjosted, Hill, Jupille and Caporaso.³⁴ According to Hill, for instance, the ‘actorness’ of the EU touches upon the distinctiveness of the EU from other political entities, the autonomy it enjoys in making its own laws and possessing a variety of actor capabilities. This leads to ‘presence’, the impact the EU has on the global system.³⁵ David Allen and Mike

Smith talk about the EU's presence in the international arena in terms of both, its external behaviour, and the way it is perceived by other international actors.³⁶ One of the most well-known proponents of the new regionalism approach, Björn Hettne, has also written extensively on this issue.³⁷ Hettne concludes, that regions are not merely geographical or administrative objects of international relations. They are more than the sum of their constituent parts – they can become 'subjects (actors) in the making' in international relations.³⁸ Accordingly, the agency or actorness of regions such as the EU can be understood as the result of a dynamic process between three factors: regioness, presence and purposive actorness.³⁹ *Regioness*, as defined by Hettne, offers an indication of the relative cohesion of the region in question. *Presence* refers to an expression of the impact of the region on its external environment while *purposive actorness* requires an active element: the conscious effort to influence international order in accordance with ones own values and interests. Therefore, actorness is the 'outcome of a dialectic process between endogenous and exogenous forces'.⁴⁰

Building on these various literatures, this paper suggests that regional actorness can be approached from two perspectives: through the perception of external actors/ outsiders of the geographical space in question as a distinct and relatively coherent entity in international relations and by its internal/ regional conception of itself.⁴¹ External perception in this context is closely linked to international recognition. In the current system, even nation-states find their recognition as *de jure* states only in the face of other states.⁴² The internal dimension, regional self-perception, is pointing to a set of explicit and implicit norms, institutions, regimes, procedures, principles, values and self-imagery defining the actor/ region in question and providing a regional identity or what Hurrell describes as 'regional cohesion'.⁴³ In addition, this paper

argues that some form of institutionalisation is imperative. Institutionalisation is an important marker for the existence of a relatively coherent international actor. The need for institutionalisation derives directly from the requirements for international recognition and regional identity. The establishment of institutional structures enables regions (and other actors) to be recognised as subjects by others at the global level. In addition, through institutionalisation regions internalise their identities among their constitutive members.

Drawing on these elaborations, this paper puts forward a framework for the identification of actorness in the emerging neo-Westphalian world. Based on internal and external perception and institutionalisation we can distinguish five requirements of actorness: (a) internal identity/ self-perception, (b) external recognition, (c) international presence, (d) some form of institutionalisation and (e) a set instruments and policy-making procedures. Let us now turn to each of these points and discuss how the EU may fulfil these criteria.

(a) *Internal Identity/ Self-Perception*

The concept of identity refers to processes of both identification and recognition. It relates to issues of self-image and self-perception as well as perception and recognition by others. Collective identities have played a significant role in the emergence of the Westphalian state system. Collective identities contain an external and an internal dimension. The internal side, which provides a sense of community and inclusion, leads us inevitably to the external side of identity, related to a sense of difference and exclusion. Questions of belonging such as ‘Who are we?’/ ‘Who

belongs?’ inevitably lead to questions such as ‘Who are we not?’ and ‘Who does not belong?’ Identity construction requires the existence/ construction of the ‘other’. The construction of such a community of belonging automatically leads to the creation of the ‘other’. It is pertinent to note that identities are context related and often issue-specific.

Identities form a crucial link between the structure of international order and the interests of actors and agents in international relations. According to Alexander Wendt, collective identities (of nation-states in this case) are composed of what he calls ‘corporate’ and ‘social’ identity.⁴⁴ Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic and self-organising qualities that make-up the individuality of an actor (e.g. its institutions, its shared norms, beliefs, values and principles providing the ‘we’ feeling), whereas social identity denotes a set of meanings that an actor attributes to itself in relations to others (referring to questions such as: Who are we? Who are we not?). Corporate identity gives birth to a variety of interests (such as physical security) and social identity defines how an actor is satisfying those interests, and which instruments are acceptable and which are not in the pursuit of those interests. Consequently, issues of identity inform the interests and actions of international actors in international relations and, ultimately, determine the structure of international order.

Identity should not be conceived as being static but as a dynamic and fluid concept. No identity is ever complete or stable. Furthermore, identities in general and national identities in particular are the outcome of long and deliberate construction processes. There is nothing ‘natural’ or predetermined about national identities. States have

produced entirely new forms of community together with their own history and their expected future. The outcome has been the creation of a new ‘we’, a people forged together by an imagined sense of a shared past and a common future. Strategies used for the construction of such identities include the fabrication of shared cultural backgrounds, shared historical experiences and a common heritage, common ethnicities, linguistic similarities, shared religious beliefs, norms, values and principles.

Where does this leave non-state entities such as the EU? Compared to national identities, a European identity appears to be an over-ambitious project given the amazing linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversities and the thriving nationalisms that characterise contemporary Europe. Yet, there is no reason why the creation of a European identity should be impossible. As highlighted above, national identities are the outcome of top-down processes: deliberate, elite-driven attempts at community creation. Shared myths, a great deal of symbolism and school curricula have played a substantial role here. And indeed, similar strategies have been applied to create a European identity. Attempts to foster a European identity have a long history. Early evidence of attempts includes the ‘Declaration on European Identity’, which was adopted in December 1973 at the Copenhagen Summit.⁴⁵ Over the years, the European Commission has worked actively in promoting certain symbols of the European Union, including the EC flag and the EC anthem. Actions aimed at cultural integration include a European passport, Europe Day, and the European cities and culture initiative.

As mentioned above, a sense of shared historical experience, religious ties and a common cultural heritage are often used to bolster particular national identities, and the European identity construction process has been no exception. Europe is often described as having a historical basis, which can be traced to a combination of Europe's Greek, Roman and Christian heritage. There are, however, serious problems with such a perspective. First of all, although Christianity is the dominant religion in Europe it is also very fragmented. Religious differences have been the reason for fierce intra-European conflict and, therefore, of division rather than unity.⁴⁶ Furthermore, there is evidence of a waning in the importance of religion as a defining feature of public and political life. This is especially true of countries such as Germany, the Netherlands or Italy.⁴⁷ Secular traditions such as the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution might be far more relevant as binding elements. According to some, however, this constitutes a shift in the institutionalisation of religion rather than secularisation.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, both Christianity and the Greco-Roman heritage provide raw material for the deliberate myth making which is typical of the formation of identities.⁴⁹

Another strategy has been employed perhaps more successfully – emphasising the lessons learned from recent history (rather than the Classical age) such as the folly of nationalism, the devastation of two world wars and the need for a common European-wide political culture broadly based on liberal norms to prevent a revival of this distressing past. European integration has to be seen in the context of the historical failures of nationalism and the Westphalian nation-state. To some extent the European project is an institutionalised attempt to rein in nationalism and to constrain sovereignty in Western Europe. The early debate on European integration is the best

indicator of this. Federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism are part of the liberal tradition of international relations, seeking to transcend the security dilemma inherent in the anarchical structure of a system based on sovereign nation-states. These ideas influenced the discourse on European integration and, ultimately, the founding fathers of the European project. Thus, they did shape the course and direction of the European integration process. Closely associated was the appeal to a pan-European political culture based on liberal values such as democracy, some form of free trade, transnational cooperation, transnational law and institutions and a respect for cosmopolitan human rights norms. To some extent then the EC/ EU emerged as a facilitator for the upholding and dissemination of these norms and principles among its member-states.

Thomas Risse-Kappen and other scholars have repeatedly emphasised the strong linkage between identities and underlying normative structures.⁵⁰ The EU as a political entity perceives itself as based on a certain political culture, certain norms, values and principles: 'EU membership implies the voluntary acceptance of a particular order as legitimate and entails the recognition of a set of rules and obligations as binding'.⁵¹ This shared normative structure finds its expression in the *aquis communautaire* and in the admission of new member-states.⁵² The Maastricht Treaty stated that the 'Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States'.⁵³ In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the EU laid out the political and economic norms for the accession of new members. These norms are, of course, not particular to the EU. What makes the EU distinctive is the way these norms and principles impact on the member-states, how

they form and shape their respective identities and interests, and how the EU presents itself as (and is perceived to be) a source of peace and stability for its member-states – a security community build on a strong supranational institutional and legal framework. The EU is a regionally-based political entity combining intergovernmental and supranational features and, therefore, does not merely express the combined wishes of its member-states. It restricts the range of political choices available to public and private actors and changes the way these actors, including the member-states, perceive themselves and formulate their (national) interests. Wayne Sandholtz brought this point to the fore when he stated that ‘EU membership matters’.⁵⁴ EU member-states define their identities, national interests and foreign policies increasingly by their EU membership.

One last point that needs to be mentioned in the context of this discussion is the establishment of EU citizenship. Citizenship explicitly defines in- and outsiders in a community.⁵⁵ As there are different forms of community there are also different forms of citizenship. Citizenship itself can be defined as a legal status associated with certain rights and responsibilities.⁵⁶ However, it is also an identity, an expression of one’s belonging to a political community. The development of the concept of a European citizenship has been a deliberate effort to foster a collective European identity.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty formally introduced EU citizenship as a legal status into the treaty framework of the EU.⁵⁷ EU citizenship is based on the legal status of a person: ‘The term ‘European citizenship’ is perceived as a condition by which people from different nations have similar rights vis-à-vis the European public courts and

public officials.⁵⁸ It entails the right of free movement within the territory of the EU, the right to address the European Parliament and to appeal to the European Ombudsman, the right to participate in municipal and European elections in every member-state and the right to get support outside the EU by any diplomatic service of another EU member-state.⁵⁹ The common denominator for such a citizenship is not necessarily found in cultural or ethnic similarities but rather in a shared political culture.⁶⁰ Thus, EU citizenship is cosmopolitan derived notion of transnational law, granting individuals certain rights that are enforceable even against their own governments.

(b) *External Recognition*

The previous elaborations have highlighted that the EU has managed to establish an identity as a relatively coherent region/ entity despite assertions to the contrary. Yet, the general sense of belonging in the EU does not run very deep. Various opinion polls bear witness to the lack of a wider European identity. Loyalties are still very much oriented towards the national level. The transfer of loyalties from the national level to the supranational level as heralded by neofunctionalist thought may have occurred to a certain extent among small parts of national elites, businessmen, some European studies academics and Brussels-oriented transnational interest and lobby groups. But it remains largely superficial and has not affected the general populace. It needs to be mentioned in the same breath that this does not necessarily impede on the identity of the EU in international relations or its actorness. We need to divert our focus from the ultimately unfruitful questions of belonging and loyalty. At the same time, it is imperative to bear in mind that contemporary expressions of national

identity are the outcome of long and deliberate state-building processes. They are neither 'natural' nor bottom-up processes. If identity building succeeded at national level there is reason to assume that similar processes at the regional level might turn out to be successful. The question remains as to what type of identity ought to be constructed. The unhelpful comparison to national identities betrays once more the conceptual constraints of state-centric thinking. In order to transcend these limitations, we have to further explore the character of the actor that is the EU and go beyond the rather obvious conclusion that it is neither a state nor, necessarily, a state in the making. And these are the primary intentions of these elaborations.

The next point to discuss is the recognition of the EU as an international actor. At first glance, *de jure* recognition in the international system appears to be difficult to achieve for any non-state actor. It is impossible for the EU to have a seat in the United Nations or to enter official diplomatic relations with other states. Furthermore, the EU member-states remain sovereign actors and the capacity of the EU to vote in international organisations or to sign international agreements is restricted. However, despite the fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, the EU has managed to establish itself as a recognised actor alongside nation-states in many areas of international relations such as economic diplomacy and development policy. Its membership in international organisations and its international relations probably best highlight this point. Interaction with the EU presupposes some form of identification of it and confers recognition upon it. The EU has relations with a wide-ranging network of international organisations including NATO and at the regional/ European level. At the global level, the EU is a full member in its own right of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as are its member-states. It has observer status in the UN, is a

member of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and has delegations in many countries around the world. The membership of the EU in international organisations such as the WTO fosters the recognition and the identification of the EU as an international presence, an international actor and a relatively coherent region.

The EU has also developed a series of bilateral relations with countries such as the US, Russia, Mexico, Canada, China, Japan, India and South Africa. It has established partnerships with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. The EU has managed to reinforce its own identity and recognition by influencing rules of 'appropriate' behaviour, not only for dealings among its own members but also for other international actors. Furthermore, the EU is reinforcing its identity at the international level through the construction of regional 'others'. According to Julie Gilson a region may feel its regioness 'through the interaction with other regions'.⁶¹ The EU is conducting dialogues and cultivating relations with other regional organisations. In particular, the ASEAN-EU relationship deserves to be highlighted in this context.⁶² It developed into a political dialogue characterised by regular meetings centring on information exchange and cooperation in specific fields. It is based on a relatively low level of institutionalisation, respecting the preferences of the ASEAN side, usually at ministerial, ambassadorial and senior official levels, supplemented by expert working groups. This inter-regional relationship has been beneficial for both parties since it proved to be an important stepping-stone in their respective identity construction processes and helped both regions, but especially the EU, to develop a distinctive regional identity and status as collective international actors.

(c) *International Presence*

We now need to turn our attention to a related issue to identity and recognition, that of its international presence, referring to the capacity of actively influencing the external environment. Agenda setting in international organisations serves as a good indicator here. Thus, let us come back to the WTO: The agenda of the WTO has been to a great extent influenced by the EU, extending into new areas of international trade such as public procurement, trade and investment, social and environmental issues.⁶³ In other words, the EU has been instrumental in the creation of norms and principles governing areas of international relations. Thus, it can be argued that the EU has been an active participant in shaping elements of the global governance framework. The example of the EU in the WTO is indicative of its institutional presence and its regional cohesion. Within the WTO, the EU acts as a coherent organisation on behalf of its member-states but also side by side with them. The Commission has managed to establish itself as the EU's single negotiating voice. Clearly, especially in the WTO and in international economic negotiations, the EU has been able to play a role that is greater than the sum of its parts. Put differently, none of the member-states of the EU acting alone could possibly hope to achieve the same bargaining outcomes and assert the same influence in the global political economy that the EU can assert.

The network of inter-regional dialogues that has been established by the EU such as the Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM) or the Europe-Africa Summit hints 'at new forms of global politics'.⁶⁴ The EU has, therefore, taken a proactive role in promoting regionalism globally.⁶⁵ Hence, not only is the EU actively shaping and forming

international relations, it is also active in transforming international relations from a Westphalian to a neo-Westphalian system.

(d) Institutionalisation

As a direct result of its evolution, the EU has created structures, institutions and policy-making processes that are as unique as they are complex. The current organisation of the Union, as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), is the outcome of a complicated compromise between state-centric and supranational ideas. As a result, governance within the EU is divided between the so-called Community method and intergovernmental cooperation.⁶⁶ Community policy-making refers to the competencies of the EC. This policy mode is encapsulated in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and other parts of the Treaty of Rome dealing with the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements.⁶⁷ Community competence is expressed through the dominance of the European Commission in the policy- and decision-making processes within this area.⁶⁸ Union policy-making, on the other hand, describes the extensive coordination of the national policies among the member-states.⁶⁹ European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the CFSP are two examples. The dividing line between both tiers of policy-making is not always as clear as it might seem. An increasingly complex international environment demands the combination of instruments from both frameworks.⁷⁰ For instance, any decision regarding Central and Eastern Europe is automatically a responsibility of CFSP. However, financial aid and economic assistance are also elements of security policy but fall within the competencies of the EC.

EU institutions, such as the Commission, the European Parliament, the relatively young European Central Bank, the European Court of Justice and the Council have managed to establish a distinct profile for themselves and have created ‘identifying markers’ for EU actorness. Franz Mayer and Jan Palmowski have found, despite common assertions to the contrary, that EU institutions are facing relatively high rates of public approval and popular acceptance, serving as a reference point for European identity.⁷¹

(e) *Policy Instruments and Decision-Making Procedures*

Closely related to institutionalisation are instruments and decision-making procedures that enable an international actor to engage in external relations. International relations theory mentions several different techniques which individual or group actors such as regions might employ in order to assert influence on this external environment and on other international actors.⁷² For a long time, both liberal and realist approaches did not recognise the EU as an international actor *sui generis* since it lacked certain instruments, such as the use of military force, to exert influence in international relations. However, military capabilities are not the only way of projecting power at the international level. In the current global structure trade and economic cooperation arrangements, as well as aid and association agreements are becoming increasingly important.

Due to the idiosyncrasies of the EU, the instruments used in its external relations are primarily of an economic and diplomatic character. The spectrum within these categories ranges from persuasion to coercion. Persuasion implies a great deal of

cooperation with extra-regional actors in order to induce the desired outcome, while coercion involves the threat or use of punishment for non-compliance. In this specific case this would involve non-violent measures such as sanctions or embargoes. However, two striking features seem to limit the external capabilities of the EU. First, the structural framework of the EU is divided and so are its international competencies. Economic foreign policy measures fall under the authority of the EC while common and foreign security policy measures are subject to intergovernmental cooperation. There is no central institution responsible for a coherent foreign policy and the member-states are often divided over foreign policy issues. And second, the EU so far lacks the means of an efficient and capable military force.⁷³ The dissonance between the EU's 'soft policy' measures compared to its CFSP was underlined by the crises in former Yugoslavia. The Maastricht Treaty introduced a CFSP into the EU framework and raised expectations which the EU for several reasons cannot yet satisfy.⁷⁴

Therefore, as a direct result of its institutional set-up, EU decision-making processes are divided between the Community method and intergovernmentalism depending on the policy area in question. Under the Community method much policy is being processed through the formal rules of the EC. These policy-making procedures are well-known to the various actors (public and private) and interest-groups involved in EU governance and have helped to strengthen identification of certain policy areas with the EU rather than with the nation-state. The supranational legal system also deserves to be mentioned in this context. The European integration has created a well-defined supranational legal structure that reins in nation-states and guarantees several basic rights to the citizens of the EU. Thus, EC law conferred rights on individuals as

well as on nation-states.⁷⁵ This is radically different from conventional international law which imposes rights and obligations only on the signatory states but not on individuals. Supranational law, therefore grants individuals specific rights above state-level. These rights are enforceable through the European Court of Justice.⁷⁶

It is, perhaps, pertinent to note here that the requirements of international actorness (internal identity/ self-perception, external recognition, international presence, some form of institutionalisation and a set instruments and policy-making procedures) are highly interwoven. Policy-making procedures and policy instruments are connected to the institutional set-up of the EU which again influences and determines the way the EU can make its presence felt in international relations. This again affects international recognition. The underlying feature connecting and linking all the various elements of EU actorness are identity issues, self-perception and recognition by internal and external actors.

It becomes evident from these elaborations that the EU has indeed managed to emerge as an international actor in its own right in the global multilevel governance complex. It is clearly identified as such by the various subnational, national and transnational actors in and outside the EU alike. In addressing actorness and identity in such a way we divert attention from questions of statehood and loyalty. Traditional international relations based approaches tend to ultimately confuse actorness with statehood. This ultimately limits any analysis of an increasingly complex and multilayered global arena. While states remain important international actors they are not alone in this position any more. We need to differentiate between different sorts of international actors: state and non-state actors. Having done so it is imperative to develop two

different sets of criteria to assess the actorness within both categories. The lack of sovereignty and credible military capabilities does not necessarily imply a lack of international actorness/ identity.⁷⁷ In addition, conceptions of sovereignty are changing and so are conceptions of actorness and of international order. In such a world, the EU represents a neo-Westphalian actor. However, it is much more than that: European integration does also constitute a model for global post-Westphalian governance. This will be the topic for our last section.

Conclusion: European Integration – A Model for a Post-Westphalian World?

At the core of the European process is a liberal project, aiming to change the normative structure of world politics and to overcome the constraints of the Westphalian state system. Thus, from its very beginnings, European integration has been a deliberate challenge to the Westphalian state, beginning with the transfer of a limited amount of sovereignty from the national to the regional level, the creation of technical agencies with supranational powers, the management of the interactions between member-states and the socialisation of behavioural norms along the lines of liberal thinking. The European project has become identified with peace and prosperity among its members.

These processes have been complimented by challenges to European states from below. Over the last decades, Western Europe has witnessed not only a transfer of competencies and governance from the national to the supranational level but also a transfer from the central domestic level to the subnational level. Various devolutionary processes have evolved within the member-states of the EU, the UK

being a prime example here, giving room for a variety of different actors to participate in political and governance processes.⁷⁸ These processes have been actively encouraged by the EU, for instance through the provision of the necessary financial, legislative and communications infrastructure.⁷⁹

Subsequently, European integration has facilitated the creation of an entirely new politics. Sovereignty has been transferred and is being shared and international governance is not the exclusive domain of nation-states any more (not that of politicians or diplomats). Other actors such as interest and lobby groups, regional and municipal authorities, and the representatives of supranational institutions such as the Commission participate alongside nation-states and their respective representatives in governance processes. Thus, European governments are sharing more and more authority, governance and regulatory responsibilities with subnational and supranational actors and institutions. Governance and policy-making has become, as a direct consequence, increasingly decentralised and fragmented. At the regional level, while not entirely uncontested, a post-Westphalian international order has taken a firm hold.

The EU can be regarded as an entirely new, a post-Westphalian actor in a neo-Westphalian world. It encompasses a post-Westphalian order and, as such, a model not only for regional integration but also for the emerging global multilevel governance complex, offering a real alternative to the Westphalian system. First, European integration has enshrined the idea of limited/ shared sovereignty. Governance and decision-making power is dispersed across several levels of policy-making, involving a wide range of actors beside nation-states and their respective

representatives. This has helped to entrench restrictions, the unbundling and sharing of sovereignty – a crucial factor in the evolution of a post-Westphalian international system. Second, European integration has resulted in the development of a complex system of multilayered regional governance. Policy-making processes include not only national authorities but also other entities (such as supranational institutions, municipal and regional authorities, transnational interest and advocacy groups, technical experts, multinational enterprises etc.). This has resulted in the decentralisation of governance, creating new loci of policy-making. Thus, while the state survives and continues to prosper in certain areas it has certainly lost its claim to supreme and ultimate rule. Third, transnational actors such as multinational enterprises, transnational business and lobby networks, non-governmental actors and even subnational authorities (such as councils and regional assemblies) have shifted their focus and loyalty (in certain areas) from the national level to take advantage of the new loci of governance. Fourth, European integration has established a strong supranational legal framework further constraining the EU member-states and granting certain rights to individuals superceding state level. Fifth, European integration has utterly transformed international relations between the member-states. True to the aims of the founding fathers, former enemies have been socialised into peaceful cooperation and competition. Indeed, the use of force to settle intra-EU disputes between individual member-states has become unthinkable (if not entirely impossible). And, sixth, it is important to note that this transformation from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian order has been created by voluntary processes, depending more on dialogue and consensus rather than on coercion.⁸⁰

The study of European integration has contributed significantly to our understanding not only of the working of regionalism but also of international relations and global governance in general. In many ways, however unique it may appear at the first glance, the example of European integration demonstrates that effective governance beyond the state is not only possible but also that the evolution of social, political and economic organisation has by no means reached a peak with the Westphalian nation-state system as sometimes depicted in state-centric international relations literature. The European integration process, therefore, has generated new ideas and new modes of international governance, new rules for international order, a new post-Westphalian international politics (on a regional basis) even. The European model of international relations is very much in line with some strands of liberal thought in international relations theory. Loosely based on Kantian thought, the condition of international anarchy has been identified as the primary problem of international relations. Enhanced and institutionalised cooperation, some forms of liberal economics and the promotion of liberal democracy have been at the heart of the so-called 'liberal reform programme' of international relations and of European integration alike. As such it is, perhaps, as close to Immanuel Kant's 'perpetual peace' as any international system can ever be.

References and Notes

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- ¹ See: F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History', in *National Interest*, vol. 16, 1989.
- ² U. Wunderlich and M. Warrier, *A Dictionary of Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 121.
- ³ S.P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993.
- ⁴ Wunderlich and Warrier, *Dictionary of Globalization*, p. 69.
- ⁵ J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After Cold War', in *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 4, 1990. See also K.W. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
- ⁶ Mearsheimer, *Back to the Future*, p. 40.
- ⁷ Also known as Treaty on European Union (TEU).
- ⁸ That should not lead to the conclusion that neorealism has no explanation for these events. Indeed, a large amount of contemporary realist/ neorealist scholarship is dedicated to the application of the realist/ neorealist schools of thought to the contemporary international environment. For an overview see R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 81. S.L. Lamy, 'Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neorealism and Neoliberalism', in J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp. 127.
- ⁹ D. Held and A. McGrew, 'Introduction', in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.), *Governing Globalization – Power, Authority and Global Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 1.

¹⁰ G. Ritzer, 'Introduction', in G. Ritzer (ed.) *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p. 1.

¹¹ D. Held, *Democracy and Globalisation*, MPIFG Working Paper 97/5 <<http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-5/wp97-5.html>> (accessed 19.09.2006), 1997, p. 3.

¹² See: K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (London: Harper-Collins, 1996).

¹³ See: S. Strange, *The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

¹⁴ It should also be mentioned that the thesis of the 'decline of the state' is nothing new. It can be traced back to the 19th century and the writings of Marx and Engels.

¹⁵ See: Wunderlich and Warrier, *Dictionary of Globalization*, p. 10.

¹⁶ C. Hay, 'What's Globalization got to do with it? Economic Interdependence and the Future of European Welfare States', in *Government and Opposition*, vol. 41, no. 1, 2006.

¹⁷ H.W. Maull, 'Governance in the Age of Globalisation: Implications for the ASEM Agenda', in Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation (ed.) *Strengthening International Order – The Role of Asia-Europe Co-operation* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000).

¹⁸ Naomi Klein's *Shock Doctrine* offers an illustrative account of these dynamics. See: N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine – The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Allen Lane: London, 2007).

¹⁹ N. Bisely, *Rethinking Globalization* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 65

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

²¹ Scholte speaks in this context of post-sovereign governance characterised by increasing levels of sub-state and supra-state governance alongside national governance. See: J.A. Scholte, 'The Globalization of World Politics', in S. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: OUP, 1997).

²² U. Wunderlich, *Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order – Europe and Southeast Asia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 47.

²³ The emergence of the modern state has been a dynamic process of adaptation to the changing character of warfare, economic structures and industrialisation. The state and sovereignty are dynamic concepts influenced by the historical social, economic, military and cultural forces.

²⁴ A.F. Cooper, C.W. Hughes and P. De Lombaerde, 'Introduction – Regionalisation and the Taming of Globalisation?', in A.F. Cooper, C.W. Hughes and P. De Lombaerde (eds.) *Regionalisation and Global Governance – The Taming of Globalisation?* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 1.

²⁵ Perhaps more aptly called 'Three Plus ASEAN', as Jones and Smith observed. See: D.M. Jones and M.L.R. Smith, 'Constructing Communities: The Curious Case of East Asian Regionalism', in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 33, 2007, p. 181.

²⁶ See: Wunderlich, *Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order*, p. 29.

²⁷ For a relatively recent overview of new advances in European studies see: M. Cini and A. Bourne, *Palgrave Advances in European Studies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). See also: B. Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). For the new regionalism see: T. Shaw and F. Söderbaum, *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). See also: S. Breslin, C.W. Hughes, N. Phillips and B.

Rosamond, *New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 2002).

²⁸ See: B. Hettne, 'The New Regionalism Revisited', in Breslin et al. (eds.) *New Regionalisms*. A. Warleigh, 'In Defence of Intra-Disciplinarity: 'European Studies' and the 'New Regionalism', and the Issue of Democratisation', in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 17, no. 2, 2004. A. Warleigh, 'Learning from Europe? EU Studies and the Re-Thinking of "International Relations"', in *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 12, no. 1, 31-51, 2006. A. Warleigh-Lack, 'Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: Bridging "New Regionalism" and "Integration Theory"', in *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 13, no. 5, 2006. Wunderlich, *Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order*, pp. 37.

²⁹ For a good overview of the finer subtleties and contestations surrounding the conceptualisation and definition of global governance see: M.J. Hoffmann and A.D. Ba, 'Introduction – Coherence and Contestation' in A. Ba and M.J. Hoffmann (eds.) *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 1.

³⁰ Examples of this global governance literature include: J.N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds.) *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), O. Young, *Governance in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), A. Cooper, J. English and R. Thakur (eds.) *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002), M. Behrens (ed.) *Global Governance: Probleme, Konzepte, Kritik* (Hagen: Fernuniversität, 2002) and Ba and Hoffmann, *Perspectives on Global Governance*.

³¹ See: J.A. Scholte, *Globalization – A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

³² Held and McGrew, *Introduction*, p. 9. For point one and three of the elaborations above also see *ibid.*

³³ The various conceptions of the EU as ‘civilian’ or ‘normative power’ are an indicator for this difficulty. Compared to the US or other influential states the EU appears to be weak and underdeveloped in its external policies. However, if the EU is not a state why should we expect it to fill criteria set up to assess the actorness of nation-states?

³⁴ G. Sjostedt, *The External Role of the European Community* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977), C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, in S. Bulmer and A. Scott (eds.), *Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics in a Global Context* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), J. Jupille and J.A. Caporaso, ‘States, Agency and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics’, in C. Rhodes (ed.) *The European Union in the World Community* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

³⁵ Hill, *Capability-Expectations Gap*, p. 104.

³⁶ D. Allen and M. Smith, ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 1, no. 16, 1990.

³⁷ See B. Hettne, ‘Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia’, in T. Tanaka and T. Inoguchi (eds.) *Globalisation and Regionalism* (Hayama: United Nations University, 1996) <<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/globalism.html>> (accessed 04.02.2007). See also Hettne, *New Regionalism Revisited*.

³⁸ B. Hettne, 'Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models', in M. Telò (ed.) *European Union and New Regionalism - Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 110.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 110. Hettne is building his framework on an argument advanced by Bretherton and Vogler. See: C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 2006) second edition.

⁴⁰ Hettne, *Interregionalism and World Order*, p. 111.

⁴¹ See: Wunderlich, *Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order*, p. 50.

⁴² The example of Taiwan is the best case for the multitude of dilemmas facing a country displaying all the hallmarks of statehood but lacking international recognition as a sovereign state.

⁴³ A. Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics', in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21, 1995, p. 337.

⁴⁴ A. Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, p. 385.

⁴⁵ European Commission, 'Declaration on European Identity', in *Bulletin of the EC*, 22-1973.

⁴⁶ Unfortunately, this does not belong to times long gone. Sectarian violence is still with us as highlighted by the example of Northern Ireland. One might even wish to argue that religion is responsible for the deep divide of Europe into Western and Eastern Europe in the second century AD. At around this time Christianity was divided into a predominantly Catholic Western Roman Empire and the Orthodox Byzantine Empire in the Roman East. This split was reinforced by the introduction of Islam in the tenth century AD and the Muslim conquest of much of Eastern Europe.

The Iron Curtain, dividing East and Western Europe during the Cold War, only re-emphasised an already existing division.

⁴⁷ See D.D. Latin, *Culture and National Identity: 'The East' and European Integration*, EUI Working Paper RSC, no 3, 2000, European University Institute Florence.

⁴⁸ Grace Davie makes a distinction between 'belonging' and 'believing'. Thus, while traditional religious institutions have been losing influence in Western Europe, religious beliefs continue to be important features in the lives of many Europeans. See: G. Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002).

⁴⁹ It is, perhaps, a bit ironic to model a European identity on the basis of a shared Roman past. First, the Roman empire was built on conquest and subjugation – the opposite of what contemporary Europe aims to stand for. And, second, Rome's gravitational centre, even at the height of its power, remained firmly focused on the Mediterranean. Asia Minor, Egypt and New Carthage were of much more interest to the Empire than a barbarian-inhabited and uncivilised Central, Eastern and Northern Europe. Thus, the use of Rome as the foundation for European unity is as misconceived as the contemporary portrayal of the Spartans defence of Greek (and European) freedom and civilisation against the oncoming might of the Persian (Oriental) armies at the 'Hot Gates' (*Thermopylae*) during those three fateful days in August 480 BC. Using the Spartan 'Few' as a firm line of defence against the forces of oppression is a bit ironic given the fact that the Spartan state was based on the enslavement of a large part of its own population (the *helots*). History, while fascinating, is always to be used with caution!

⁵⁰ See: T. Risse-Kappen, 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO', in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁵¹ T. Risse, 'Social Constructivism and European Integration', in A. Wiener and T. Dietz (eds.) *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 163.

⁵² The *aquis communautaire* refers to the complete body of EU treaties, laws, directives and regulations. It includes rulings by the European Court of Justice and has to be accepted by every candidate for EU membership.

⁵³ Art. 6, Treaty on European Union (TEU).

⁵⁴ W. Sandholtz, 'Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3, 1996. The commitment to some form of liberal democracy and peaceful conflict resolution is a feature all EU member-states share. It is encoded within the EU principles and finds its expression in the external relations of the EU. The Eastern enlargement of the EU, for instance, can be interpreted as fostering and supporting the spread of liberal democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

⁵⁵ See J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), p. 1. Marshall has noted that citizenship is captured by full membership of a community. See T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (New York: Doubleday, 1964).

⁵⁶ P.B. Lehning, 'European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity', in *Law And Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2001.

⁵⁷ Preamble and Arts. 17 – 22 EC Treaty (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam).

⁵⁸ Lehning, *European Citizenship*.

⁵⁹ D. Jacobs and R. Maier, 'European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction', in M. Gastelaars and A. de Ruijter (eds.) *A United Europe – The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity* (Maastricht: Shaker, 1998).

⁶⁰ See: J. Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', in *Praxis International*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1992, pp. 3.

⁶¹ J. Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe – Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), p. 1.

⁶² Other examples in this context include the EU relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or with Mercosur.

⁶³ F. Cameron, 'The European Union as a Global Actor: Far from Pushing its Political Weight Around', in C. Rhodes (ed.) *The European Union in the World Community*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 22.

⁶⁴ E. Jørgensen and B. Rosamond, *Europe: Regional Laboratory for a Global Polity?*, CSGR Working Paper, no. 71, 2001, p. 16.

⁶⁵ L.V. Langenhove and A-C. Costea, *The EU as a Global Actor and the Emergence of 'Third Generation' Regionalism*, UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers, 0-2005/14, 2005, p. 6.

⁶⁶ This indicates that the external policies of the EU are based on a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational decisions. The Union itself lacks a clear authority on foreign policy issues. International competencies rest on a two-dimensional system: a division of decision-making powers between the EC and the Common Foreign and Security Pillar. Therefore, decision-making powers on international matters are divided between the institutions of the EU and its member-states.

⁶⁷ Art. 113, Title VII, EC Treaty (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam).

⁶⁸ M. Smith, 'The EU as an International Actor', in J. Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 257.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁷⁰ K.E. Smith, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy: The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy*, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/68, European University Institute, Florence, 1997, p. 2.

⁷¹ F.C. Mayer and J. Palmowski, 'European Identities and the EU – The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2004, pp. 585.

⁷² These may include methods like persuasion, the offer of rewards, the granting of rewards, the threat of punishment, the inflicting of non-violent punishment and the use of force.

⁷³ Although there are signs that this 'deficit' is being addressed.

⁷⁴ On the expectation-capability gap discussion see R.H. Ginsberg, 'Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap', in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 37, no. 3, 1999, pp. 429-454.

⁷⁵ The doctrine known as 'direct effect'.

⁷⁶ Also worth mentioning in this context is the principle of the supremacy of supranational over national law.

⁷⁷ Indeed, all EU member-states have transferred some degree of sovereignty to the supranational level. And yet, despite this perceived limitation in sovereignty those states are still regarded as international actors.

⁷⁸ On a very general level, devolution may be defined as the transfer of competencies from a central level of governance to a subordinate level, usually located at the subnational or (micro-) regional level.

⁷⁹ Regional cohesion funds and the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the treaty framework are good examples.

⁸⁰ Hettne, *Interregionalism and World Order*, p. 111.