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**Research Programme Session 5**  
**'Values and Ethos in an Enlarging Europe: A Public Sphere?'**

Elizabeth Frazer, University of Oxford; Virginie Van Ingelgom, Université Catholique de Louvain

**Citizens Talking About Europe: Discussion Becoming Political**

Presentation of preliminary results from '*Citizens Talking About Europe: French, British and Belgian Citizens in Political Discussion*' (CITAE: [http://erg.politics.ox.ac.uk/projects/discussion\\_political/index.asp#CITAE](http://erg.politics.ox.ac.uk/projects/discussion_political/index.asp#CITAE)).

Sophie Duchesne Cevipof, CNRS and Sciences Po (Coordinator); Elizabeth Frazer, University of Oxford; Andre-Paul Frogner, Université Catholique de Louvain; Guillaume Garcia, Cevipof; Florence Haegel, Cevipof, Sciences Po; Virginie Van Ingelgom, Université Catholique de Louvain et Cevipof

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1. The research project

The research design and analysis reported here is part of a longer established research project by Duchesne and Haegel on processes of 'politicisation' in micro-contexts of conflictual discussion across the cleavages of ethnicity, class, sex and party. [Duchesne and Haegel 2006] This project attempts to use analysis of carefully designed focus group research data as a critical contribution to the literature on citizens' attitudes to European integration. Our research project was designed in an intellectual context in which the ideas of European citizenship, developing and emerging European publics, and a new focus on legitimacy, are prominent. [Habermas 2001; Muller 2007; Nicolaidis 2007; Scheuer 2005; Siedentop 2000] We assume that articulated attitudes, and behaviour or conduct, are conditioned by knowledge and cognitive capacity, framed by publicly or at any rate socially available categories and narratives; and that these frames vary across social, economic and political groups, and also across national and state contexts. [Anderson, 1998; Belot 2000, 2002; Bruter 2004; Cautrès & Grunberg, 2007; Diez Medrano 2003; Gabel 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995; Scheuer 2005] Further than this, the focus group method enables us to analyse ambiguity in articulated attitudes, and to analyse the process by which in an interactive setting participants commit themselves to positions, and articulate these positions as it were publicly. That is to say, we focus on the way values and ethos, as well as beliefs and understandings, are disagreed about, both by subjects, as it were, with themselves, and also by subjects with each other.

The analysis we have conducted so far focusses more on frames and knowledge, and hence articulations of positions regarding 'Europe', than on conflictualisation and politicisation. A full and satisfactory analysis of the latter will involve micro analysis of our audio and visual data, and careful comparison of cases. However, as we shall show below, the structure of conflict within groups seems to be an indispensable factor for understanding frames and articulations; and even from the initial analysis conducted so far, we can see how values are disagreed about, and how much disagreement is about values.

## 2. Method

We moderated 24 focus groups in three cities: Oxford, Brussels and Paris, between January and June 2006. Participants in groups were selected so that groups were socially homogeneous, that is to say consisted of individuals who were similar in terms of occupation and education, but politically heterogeneous – individuals varied as regards their attitudes to Europe, in their left-right partisan identity, and vote, as measured by a questionnaire that was administered in the course of the recruitment and selection process. In addition, and as a kind of control, we put together two groups in each city of ‘political activists’ – individuals professionally or as activists involved in parties and other political organisations. Groups were heterogeneous as regards age, and we attempted to achieve a balance as between men and women, and also ethnic diversity. The analysis so far, and which is presented in what follows, has been conducted on half our sample of groups – one each of working class, white collar, and executive, and one group of political activists, from each city. This group (or ‘family’) of groups has been selected so that they are maximally comparable across the three cities. [See Appendix 1 for a representation of the social distance between the groups discussed here.]

It is worth noting that, although the overall pattern is satisfactory, there is a limit to the degree that we have been able to attain cross-country comparability, as Appendix 1 shows.

*First*, we faced the difficulties faced by all comparative research. The education and employment systems are quite different between France, UK and Belgium. This explains the distinct location of the Belgian working class group on our vertical axis, for example.

*Second*, we faced the added constraints of the focus group method, with its risk of defection. This was a problem early on, and later we tended to counteract it by the selection of socially atypical, but more reliable individuals, which has probably impacted on the comparability of groups (mostly those in the as yet unanalysed family 2).

*Third*, we wanted diversity and potential conflict within the groups, so we had to pay attention to difference. But there is undoubtedly a tension between this and our other aim to avoid domination. For that we needed people to have similar educational and status levels, and to avoid individuals characterised by intergenerational downward mobility, as experience at the pilot stage, and previously, told us that such individuals are likely to be aggressive or imperious when confronted with ‘true’ working class or routine occupation individuals.

Each group met on one occasion only, but for an extended period of about three hours. The groups were asked to discuss four main questions: What is it to be European? How should power in Europe be divided? Who profits from Europe? Should Turkey become a member of the European Union? We finished by asking the groups to talk about the policy of various national parties of the relevant country regarding Turkish entry. The session included a period of informal conversation and provision of refreshments as participants arrived, and a break in the middle during which food and drink were served. Hence, the aim was to achieve a friendly and relaxed atmosphere. [Appendix 2 for a plan of the room layout] The groups were moderated according to a method designed to make disagreement and diversity of view within the group as plain as possible. Participants sit facing a board; as the discussion proceeds the moderator records the main gist of what is said on cards, which are displayed on the board. [See Appendix 3 for an example]. Among the ‘rules of the game’ is that any disagreement is to be indicated on the board by a ‘flash’, which indicates that the point must be returned to in order for the disagreement to be discussed more explicitly. As is shown in the photograph, the moderator can also reiterate the points, including agreement and disagreement from the discussion, and invite the group to reconsider, or to consider how points are connected. All of this can be indicated visually, by for example drawing lines around connected cards.

Analysis of our data so far consists of:

*First* a relatively free interpretive analysis of each group’s discussion (transcribed) together with observation (from video) of the bodily interaction between group members.

*Second*, for each group we have conducted a somewhat more standardised, and hence comparative, analysis of disagreement and consensus, topics implicitly and explicitly discussed, what resources participants deploy in

competitive discussion, and the alliances between participants on these issues. Later stages will elaborate this comparative analysis using the package Atlas-ti. [A summary of this analysis for each group, with particular emphasis on topics pertaining to citizenship and political power, organised by country and by social class, is given in Appendix 5.]

*Third* we have also used an automated content analysis package, Alceste, which, taking sentences or quasi-sentences as the basic unit of analysis generates a classification of sentences based on vocabulary association. The advantage of such an automated procedure is the avoidance of coder-bias. However, researcher interpretation enters at the final stage when the classes produced by Alceste are substantively interpreted, and labelled, by the researcher. Furthermore, it is important not to over-interpret the results, as a large part of the corpus is omitted due to statistical insignificance, which does not, of course, imply social insignificance. (In our case, Alceste has taken into account 62.2% of the French speaking Belgian corpus, 61.7% of the British one and 75.56% of the French one. Analysis can be considered valid when it includes more than 50% of the corpus.) It is also important to note that this analysis has produced a vivid picture of country differences because of the way we inputted the data. With a different organisation of our data input, with participants social class marked, we would undoubtedly find interesting social class differences. However, this exercise would require the translation of our English transcripts into French, with obvious difficulties; or would require us to omit the English transcripts from the analysis of social class differences. [The results of the content analysis, by country, is given in Appendix 4.]

*Fourth*, we have subjected the responses to the third question 'Who profits from Europe' to coding and statistical analysis. For this analytic exercise we have included all 24 groups. [Codes and frequencies are given in Appendix 6]

### 3. National differences

Attitude measurement research, such as Eurobarometer, including critical research which is sceptical of the presumption that individuals should be treated as having well articulated views of Europe, tends to find marked national differences between respondents to survey and interview. [Medrano, Bruter] Both our interpretive and our content analysis indicate the importance of national differences. Alceste gives a first overview of each national corpus [see Appendix 4]. The French speaking Belgian corpus has automatically divided into six classes, the British and the French ones into four classes each. Among the six French speaking Belgian classes, two are directly associated with Europe, among the four British and French classes, only one for each national corpus is directly connected with Europe.

This simplistic overview points out the specificity of the French speaking Belgian corpus as far as European matters are concerned. When they are asked to speak about Europe, French speaking Belgians not only call up multidimensional meanings but do speak about Europe, while the others take all opportunities to escape and prefer to talk of national matters (especially our French participants). The Belgians are able to talk about Europe simply because they know Europe. They take advantage of their knowledge which is fuelled by personal experience (they live in the capital city of Europe and they benefit from the fact that are used to crossing the borders) but also with school knowledge (obviously, Europe has been learned, even more - implanted). Conversely, Britons and French are less knowledgeable, less interested, less talkative for the former and less focused on the topic for the latter.

Turning to our interpretive analysis, it seems that national framing is not vanishing in favour of any common European identification. [Appendix 5] As expected, in our sample, the French speaking Belgians are the "more European" and the Britons the less identified with Europe. But, few people claim that they really feel European, and even the more European think that European identification will occur in the future "it is for the next generation", "our grandchildren" as they, even the youngest ones, put it.

#### British managers

**Ian** : does anyone feel European at all ?

**Alexander (laughs)** = no, no, not at all

**Derek** (to Alexander) = no I tend to think of Europe or the rest of Europe as being something we compete with rather than being completely on the same side if you like I think that that's what comes to mind maybe it's the rest of Europe is a competitor rather than for Britain : it's something we kind of have to find our place in Europe but we have to be assertive about it it's not something that comes naturally if we've been part of Europe

**Bansuri** : to me it's like an ideology really I still don't think in practice, it's really there, it's a good idea

[For sociological characteristics for each speaker, see Appendix 10]

#### French speaking Belgian white collars

**David** : que ça va être : peut-être pas la génération après nous même celle d'après quoi qui vont voir quelque chose quand ils vont parler d'Europe ils pourront dire ah oui l'Europe maintenant on parle d'Europe ça fait : déjà quelque temps que l'Europe est : est en cours de : de cheminement (.) mais il y a pas beaucoup de gens je pense qui disent je me sens européen enfin moi je connais pas beaucoup de gens qui disent ah je suis européen

**Faïssal** = mais on se le dit pas comme ça quoi je me sens européen de toute façon

### 3.1. The significance of geo-politics

We find that for our respondents the construction of the country or nation is significantly 'geo-political'. Alceste analysis gives some evidence of this. Many countries inside and outside the EU are quoted and associated with different Alceste classes. For instance, when they speak of mobility and exchanges, Britons refer to France, Spain (two holiday destinations) and Australia; French speaking Belgians mention Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, and Germany (all European countries and the majority of them border countries). Significantly, Alceste didn't generate a specific class on exchanges and mobility from the French corpus (we discuss this further below). When they speak of economic and personal livelihood, participants mention other countries: mainly out of Europe (China, African countries, India) but also countries which have recently joined the EU (Czech Republic, Poland). Moreover, many geo-strategic considerations are made. For instance, the question of Europe's stand towards US or Africa and poor countries is animatedly discussed (especially in the French and French speaking Belgian groups).

Historical references are also important, notably the Cold War and colonialism. Almost all the groups, certainly the French and French Belgian ones, get onto discussion about colonialism. This cannot be explained by the questions we put because, most of time, the issue of colonialism was raised before we posed the question about Turkey (often in the context 'what is it to be European?'). Obviously, the place of colonialism in the discourse is related to the social composition of groups. It is partly connected to the presence of participants belonging to ethnic minorities, and to the salience of the issue of immigration, but it is also due we think to birth cohort. Rather than consciousness of a European past or a golden age of European civilisation participants focus on the question of responsibility towards countries that have been economically deprived and politically spoiled. In this perspective, the colonial past gives a geo-strategic dimension to European framing: the duty of Europeans is to counterbalance the power of US, but also to support the former colonized countries and to be aware of the fact that they need European funding in order to develop their economic wealth.

#### French white collar

**Laetitia** (*vers Patrice*) : mais je pense qu'on aide déjà les pays les plus pauvres parce qu'on enlève leurs dettes. On efface quand même pas mal de choses donc, c'est quand même les aider quoi

**Patrice** (*à Laetitia*) : on agrandit la nôtre aussi hein

**Laetitia** = comment ?

**Patrice** = on agrandit la nôtre aussi (*souriant*) (.)

**Hadia** (*vers Laetitia*) : Bof on efface leur dette après les avoir bien colonisés pendant des années c'est facile enfin tu vois ?

**Laetitia** = ouais mais non je dis pas

**Hadia** (*devant elle*) = après on peut faire les :

**Laetitia** (*à Hadia*) = c'est aussi une façon de les aider quoi (.)

### French managers

**Serge** : non mais c'est une catastrophe en Europe, les pires barbaries ont eu lieu en Europe et ce quelque soit le pays. Donc le mot européen si l'on se met sur le passé c'est une catastrophe (*vers Gabriel*). Le présent c'est autre chose : c'est pour ça que l'histoire montre que la civilisation a engendré beaucoup de drames, quelle que soit la couleur politique (*geste de je prends pas parti*) je fais pas de : (*regarde la caméra*) ...

**Gabriel** : c'est : c'est .. c'est pas : (*à Serge*)

**Inès** : continental en fait c'est l'histoire d'un continent qui .. le continent asiatique un continent africain un continent américain ...

**Serge** : qui a été dramatique ... précisément pour le remettre dans un contexte précis, ça a été dramatique l'histoire de l'Europe ça a été, c'est un drame

**Gabriel** (*vague*) : mais : je pense que l'histoire de l'humanité est dramatique ça fait partie du : les Aztèques ou les.. c'est pareil

**Serge** : ah oui on est d'accord

(...)

[...]

**Gabriel** : les Indiens mais par exemple les Chinois qui étaient des civilisations extrêmement : extrêmement développées, ils se sont ... on va dire il y a eu des massacres. Les Européens ne sont pas intervenus dans ces massacres-là

**Serge** = on est d'accord

**Gabriel** = et puis il faut reconnaître que si on parle de la colonisation et de ... comment on appelle ça ? l'esclavage...

### French speaking Belgian working class

**Rose** : Non mais tu sais pas aider tout le monde non plus

**Saïd** = non mais bon l'Afrique c'était une richesse au départ quand on voit tous les pays européens...

**Marco** : mais c'est toujours...

**Saïd** = oui mais ils sont arrivés, ils leurs ont pris toutes leurs richesses et ils sont partis

**Marco** :... il y a des richesses hein

**Saïd** : alors maintenant quand j'entends des accords d'aide franchement pour ça moi...

**Marco** = c'est des richesses mal gérées

**Justine** : C'est sûr que sur le plan richesse l'Europe n'a pas de richesses

**Saïd** = c'est un voleur de richesses

**Justine** = elle en profite l'Europe n'a pas de richesses, non

**Saïd** = elle a volé les richesses des pays africains voilà

**Justine** : non (.) l'Europe n'a pas de matières premières

**Saïd** = si ils voulaient vraiment les aider ils auraient investi sur place ils auraient créé une économie sur place des écoles ils auraient pff... c'est du n'importe quoi. Moi c'est ce que je pense, j'aime bien dire cette phrase pour terminer (*rires*)

**Justine** : ils ont foutu la guerre

## 3.2. Economy and Market

Whatever the national membership of the participants economy is taken to be the driving force of European integration. Europe is most of all a matter of market and industry, commercial and financial exchanges. The Alceste analysis gives us an indication of this supremacy of the economic dimension [Appendix 4] In the British and French speaking Belgian corpuses, the economic dimension is divided into two classes (only one class of economy has been generated in the French corpus). The first one is characterised by words related to mobility and exchanges: in this class,

one can find the vocabulary of mobility (from tourism to immigration) within which economic exchanges have their place. The second is more specifically concerned with personal livelihood (money, taxes, wages, pensions, industry etc.). If you add these two classes for the British and French speaking Belgian corpus, we can compare the importance of economy in the three national corpuses: around 47% of the discourse taken into account by Alceste is related to economy and mobility in the British corpus, 28% of the French speaking Belgian corpus and 39% of the French corpus. When they attempt to speak about Europe, Britons talk mainly about free market, trade, industry, companies, competition. They talk about the pound but they are also concerned by how far the market is regulated and to what extent the British companies are forced to implement the European legislation and directives.

#### British activists

**Bethany** (*towards James*) = can I ask you ... if you were king of Europe how would you go on then

**James** = I would get rid of all employment legislation that we've got from Europe

**Bethany** = that is disgraceful

**James** = no it is not

**Allison** (*to James*) = can I just ask ...

**James** = You are destroying our competitiveness

Of course, the single market supplies foreign goods (especially, for the British groups foods and wines) and give opportunities for tourism and holidays. But it provides also a large list of threats: immigrants who are seen as competitors in the labor market because they take jobs and accept low wages, but also more specifically illegal immigration which some of them associated with pollutants: prostitution, HIV, illegal traffics of all sorts, drugs, terrorism.

#### British working class

**Robert** (*to Brenda*) : you can't really deny a legal immigrant because they're here legally but it's the illegal ones

**Brenda** = the ones that just come over from France and just yeah

**Ron** = hide in lorries and all that

**Brenda** = but they're bringing lots of diseases and stuff that comes with these people (.) that isn't being horrible about anybody by the way

**Robert** = no no see health wise ...illegal immigrants coming over on the back of lorries the male ones coming over and some of them might have HIV and could be sleeping with girls

**Brenda** (*to Robert*) = well girls that will : who are stupid : but there's also the sex trade has happened with that there's lots of girls being forced over here to sleep with forty men

**Robert** = that's actually quite big now here in England

#### British white collars

**Mike** = the breaking down of like ... national borders shouldn't exploit ... people trafficking

**Nina** = yea

**Mike** = it really facilitates that

**Kamal** = immigration

**Mel** = yea put that too ... to criminals

**Kamal** = well we could say illegal immigration

**Mel** = yeah

**Nina** = illegal

In sum, although seldom denounced as such the European single market is seen either as a hindrance for British economic and commercial potential or as a sort of "Cheval de Troie" of all the diseases of globalization. In French and French speaking Belgian groups, the critics of European free-market are stronger (as expected, this topic is largely and vividly discussed in the French activist group). Behind this, what is at stake is the competition in the labor market and the claim for European welfare legislation. Labour competition is a central matter of concern for the

French speaking Belgian and the French groups. Both of them are worried about labour immigration. But, on this matter, the French give less importance to the European level; the game is played elsewhere, above Europe. Both of them are attached to solidarity: Europe is viewed redistributive system where the richer countries have to help the poorer.

French speaking Belgian working class

**Ali** = oui ça fait aujourd'hui par des délocalisations voilà le mot est lâché (*rires*) et tout ça ne joue pas en faveur de l'image de l'Europe qui se veut unie... que ça apporte des privilèges aux Européens aujourd'hui. Vous voyez les gens qui manifestent parce que leur usine va être délocalisée au fin fond de la République tchèque. Moi j'ai rien contre les Tchèques je veux dire ils ont le droit aussi de d'améliorer leur quotidien mais c'est pas... c'est pas...

**Saïd** = il faut pas que ça devienne un inconvénient

**Ali** = ouais c'est ça pour les autres pays et c'est qui qui trinque finalement ? ce sont les gens les ouvriers

**Saïd** : les petits

**Ali** = oui c'est ça

**Saïd** : ouais c'est vrai

French working class

**Lionel** : Sur le continent Africain les gens n'ont pas accès au travail c'est encore pire

**Habiba** : ouais c'est partout

**Geoffroy** : ouais

**Ghislaine** : hum

**Lionel** : je : je pense que l'emploi c'est pas un problème européen

**Habiba** : l'Inde

**Lionel** : c'est un problème mondial comme l'écologie

**Ghislaine** (*vers lui*) : l'écologie, l'immigration

**Yasmina** : les salaires (*vers lui*), il y a tout hein

**Lionel** (*vers Sophie toujours*) : comme tout comme beaucoup de choses. Maintenant : maintenant il faut plus : il faut plus [relier ça au problème européen

**Geoffroy** (*vers Sophie*) : c'est sûr

**Albert** = la misère :

**Geoffroy** = la misère aussi (*devant lui*)

**Albert** = la famine (*devant lui*)

**Lionel** (*devant lui*) : voilà nous [...

**Yasmina** (*de biais*) : ça touche tout quoi

**Ghislaine** : la précarité (*de biais vers lui*)

**Albert** : la : (*devant lui*) la délinquance

**Lionel** (*de biais*): voilà

In the same vein, mobility is still considered by some of the participants (mainly the wealthier ones) as a positive European contribution, but it is often challenged by those who consider that the euro is not mainly an asset which facilitates tourism but also a drawback as it creates negative side-effects on the standard of living; those who think that mobility is only a theoretical benefit because they and others lack money for travelling; and those who blame the Erasmus academic programmes on the grounds that they concern only wealthy students.

### 3.3. The European political system

Students of European politics debate what political project (inter-governmentality versus federalism, transfer of competences or transfer of sovereignty) is supported by whom. Having listened to citizens talk about Europe, we don't have much data to contribute to this academic controversy. To put it bluntly, except for some activists our

participants really don't care about this issue because for the very large majority of them the European political system is distant. They don't know how it is organized and are neither aware of nor interested in it. In addition, the general feeling is that Europe is something that concerns first and foremost the elites and that has been launched without democratic consultation.

Despite this general feature, our analysis of discourse on the European political system leads us to emphasize the specificity of each national frame. The Alceste analysis gives evidence of the national contrast. Analysis of the British corpus has generated one class dedicated to the political dimension of Europe which includes 39.5% of the analysed part of the corpus. This class gathers the vocabulary of political and national identity (Britishness challenging continental and Muslim out-groups), national politics and European membership. When they talk about Europe, Britons deploy the discourse of identity and sovereignty which leads them to adopt a critical perspective. But behind this critical range of the discourse, the more striking point is the British non-interest and unawareness: Europe is far away from them. Some of them think that they have been "forced" to join EU, others are not clear whether they have already joined it.

#### British working class

**Brenda (to Ron)** : do you know why Brussels was used as the head place for it ?

**Ron** = I've no idea my knowledge of the EU is not very good

**Brenda (to Mina)** = do you know ?

**Mina** = say again

**Robert** = why was the ...

**Brenda (to Mary)** = Do you know why

**Mary** = no

**Robert (to Mina)** = why is Brussels like the main headquarters of the European Union? Is there any reason for it or what? Why do you have any idea why it is?

**Mina** = it has been decided long time ago

**Robert** = yeah yeah, it has been like that quite a while

**Brenda** = so if we join would it come here?

Analysis of the French speaking Belgian corpus produces two classes of "political" discourse which represent altogether 38.5 % of the analysed part of the corpus. These two classes refer to two sides of the political dimension of Europe: institutional arrangements and processes and geopolitics. These results confirm our interpretive analysis which attests the capacity of French speaking Belgians to tackle the complexity of European system (for them, multi-level government is easier to understand because they are used to it) and to justify Europe in terms of geo-strategy (they consider that EU provides them international audience and power by proxy).

#### French speaking Belgian white collar

**David** : non mais ce serait un peu ridicule de faire qu'on vote pour quelqu'un de notre pays et puis on fait des cellules parce que alors on va jamais : dans 50 ans ce sera toujours comme ça on sera toujours : nationalistes quoi (.) tandis que si on commence à voter pour

**Fabien** = oui c'est ça il faut : (.)

**David** : si on veut s'ouvrir sur l'Europe et ben :

**Fabien** = il faut que les hommes politiques soient européens et pas belges

**David** = voilà faut que les hommes politiques soient européens quoi (.) il faut pas que tu te dises ouais tu votes pour un Belge c'est vraiment (.)

**Fabien** : c'est vrai qu'à l'étranger tu pourrais peut-être trouver quelqu'un qui a des meilleures idées que ..

**David** = ouais c'est bien possible ça

**Victor** : mais d'un autre côté si ces futurs élus devaient faire des campagnes européens (*David souffle*) ce serait assez lourd ouais surtout pour notre budget (*rires*) t'imagines le gars il va faire la tournée des 25 pays distribuer ses affiches, ça c'est pas réaliste en fait

The Alceste analysis of the French corpus has generated two classes dedicated to political matters, but only one is related to Europe, the other one is about national politics. Talk of the European political system is exclusively generated by the activists - our French activists were very knowledgeable on European matters and especially on institutional and political matters in a rather abstract and ideological manner. Clearly the French 2005 public debate on the European referendum gave them the opportunity to “learn the EU”. In a position to re-play the scene, the group is divided between those who are eager to contest one more time (the “No” supporters who have already won) and those who are wearied (the “Yes” supporters who have been disappointed). But what is the most striking finding is that the other groups didn’t profit from this public and controversial debate to gain any better understanding of EU. Except for the activists, the French discussions give the impression that they are enmeshed in more general assumptions to which one can hardly attribute any precise referent but the national one. To such an extent that it is very difficult to find appropriate quotations: they don’t say explicitly that Europe is an extension of France but when they are asked to talk about Europe, they talk about France.

### 3.4. Detachment, incorporation and projection

All these elements of analysis lead us to underline the specificity of each national frame, knowing that this type of exercise is risky, as it conceals social differences and also group dynamics. Nevertheless, *detachment* towards EU characterizes the British corpus. The majority of the groups feel outside Europe. They hardly can speak about this topic, they are not sure whether they belong to the EU which they mix up with the Euro zone and, in any case, they don’t feel European. They don’t consider that EU is a legitimate political system: they have been “forced in” and they don’t want to “be ruled by France”. Those who are more aware of European matters criticize the European political system according to British standards of accountability, scrutiny, representativeness and so on.

By contrast, *incorporation* is what is at stake in the Belgian corpus. They have learned about the EU, and they are at ease with the complex political European system, reasoning by analogy with their domestic political system. The more educated support the European project (especially because EU is good way to compensate for the lack of international power). The less educated are less supportive because they consider they get no benefit from this system driven by an elite. But they are not at all in a position to reject it: Europe is a matter of fact and may be a matter of duty and it will benefit future generations (although some of them really wonder about this).

*Projection* appears to us as the best way to portray French framing. Except for the activists, the French groups are scarcely more knowledgeable than the British ones. But while the Britons attempt to focus on the topic even if it produces a very dull conversation, the French are talking of everything else and Europe appears as a sort of screen where all their threats are shown. They are in no doubt about French membership of Europe and the EU but to a certain extent, the French participants didn’t figure out the difference between French and European scene. This lack of perception of European otherness explains the fact that any French discourse on identity and sovereignty is missing from Alceste’s classification.

## 4. Social Differences

Analysts of EU public opinion and politics emphasise the significance of social and economic hierarchy in explaining support for the EU: the higher their social status the more likely Europeans are to support integration. Social differences are evident from our initial interpretive analysis as presented in Appendix 4, although the social differences are not as vivid or easy to characterise as the national ones that emerge from the same analysis. In our data the relative recessiveness of social differences is also explained, as we mentioned in the introduction, by technical issues to do with Alceste – were our corpus monolingual, we have no doubt that Alceste would show us interestingly distinct patterns of vocabulary as between social classes. In this section of our paper, accordingly, we present a different kind of analysis – statistical analysis of responses, from all groups both Family 1 and 2, treated as if they are

monolingual, to the question 'who profits from Europe?' Significantly for this analysis, these responses were written on cards by group members working in twos and threes, in the context of sotto voce discussion. Hence, we can consider these answers to be meaningful in a specific way – they are not 'off the top of the head', nor generated in the context of a (perhaps anxiety causing) group discussion. They are considered, and have been generated by people acting cooperatively together, having just had food and drink together, and prior to that having discussed the issue of European union for an hour and a half.

The responses to the question, coded, are given in the table in Appendix 6. The responses are predictable enough, although we may note the generally positive evaluation here, compared to what we interpret as the markedly negative notes of the discussions in the large. To begin with this might be a response to the tone of the question itself, which is already negative with the term 'profits' – there was frequently a discussion about the connotations of the term profit as compared with 'benefit'. But, further, there were numerous 'flashes' added to these cards – almost one in five was disputed, and the positive responses (such as citizens, and values) were disputed even more than negative ones (like crime).

Principal components analysis of these data [see Appendix 7] reveals two factors which together explain 35% of the variance (respectively 19.14% and 15.39%) (We have confirmed this result by running another analysis omitting some codes that seem to play an important role, interpretively speaking, but have only a small number of cases, such as USA, RICH, EXT and IMM. The general configuration hardly changes.)

The *first* factor opposes an economic and political construction of the EU to a construction more oriented towards value, mobility, equality and openness. A projection of the distribution of flashes between groups confirms that the latter conception, the evaluative one, is more contested.

The *second* factor opposes, within the economic understanding of EU, groups by whom the economy is conceived more as driven by big businesses, technocrats and politicians, and in the benefice of the United States, and groups for whom the economy seems to have more autonomy but also less direction. In this latter case, things seem ambivalent: the economy is both beneficial (to poor countries and poor people as well as rich ones) and damaging (growth goes together with the increase of crime for instance). Immigration, as we hear in the discussions, embodies this ambivalence: it's both beneficial for the people who migrate as they get a chance to avoid poverty, but this costs them a hard life, and damages the life of people in immigration countries because of the pressure on the labour market and the resulting low salaries.

Appendix 8 shows how the groups are positioned vis a vis these components. This analysis confirms a strong national differentiation in the ways European integration is framed in the three cities. Parisian groups display in contrast with the Brussels groups a conception of Europe mainly oriented towards the economy. Our French speaking Belgian participants mentioned more often, even if this was to be disputed, European values. Oxford participants share an understanding of European input into the economy which remains a free market with its own dynamic, which brings Europeans growth and crime at the same time, and advantages competitively the rich and the poor. The Brussels participants emphasize an EU political contribution to a globalized capitalism, for the benefit, amongst others, of the United States. This confirms the prevalence of national frames analysed above and reminds us that, as Cautrès and Grunberg put it, if social differences of opinions regarding European integration remain strong in all countries, the social bias operates within the countries. In this sense, national differences are first and social differences second.

However, the analysis also shows a clear differentiation between working class groups and others. Working class groups' representations of EU effects are much more embedded than others in an economic perspective that does not offer much consideration to other European achievements concerning mobility, citizenship or values. Moreover, working class groups' understanding of the economic influence of the EU is somehow parochial and fatalistic. By contrast, the managers display a conception of European integration that leaves room for political action. In this second opposition, white collars are, like activists, between working class groups and managers.

This social differentiation is supported by our interpretive analysis (which was conducted prior to and independently of (in the sense of conducted by a different team member) this principal components analysis. [Appendix 5]

What characterises all of our *working class groups* is the expression of a feeling of being dominated. British participants refuse the idea of being told by the French or by Brussels what they should do and seem to oppose the EU for that reason. But later on, they agree on the fact that as citizens in their own country they don't count for anything: they are just numbers, dots they say, while commenting of the general disaffection from voting. The French working class participants hardly talk about Europe or the EU. Their discussions evoke a globalised world dominated by the rich, a few people (they mention "the 200 families", a traditional image of the richest French families who are supposed to dominate the political system as well as the economy; or the "barbarian financiers"). The Belgians, even if they demonstrate knowledge of how the EU works as a political system, agree on the fact that they are currently paying for European integration. Some of them suggest that their children will benefit from it; but when others doubt that, no disagreement follows.

Although the *white collar groups* seem more receptive to some positive elements of the European project, in term of values, they remain rather indifferent. In the British group, a participant declares that she has talked about Europe in this discussion more than she ever wished to. The discussion doesn't really begin in this group until the question on Turkey's entry; and then conflict refers to Islam and Islamophobia. The only participant who seems to have a clue keeps asking questions that nobody answers. The others only ask, regarding the pound, why things should have to change. In the French group, the white collar participants keep sidetracking. The only participant who tries several times to go back to the topic, Europe, eventually gets to the conclusion that what matters is not that France belongs to Europe but the fact that it's a rich country. Again, the Belgian white collar participants are the only ones capable of carrying on the discussion about Europe. They first give a quite positive note, look clearly pro-European. But as the discussion goes on, the overall positive appreciation tends to weaken. Their reservation increases with the "who profits from Europe?" question and they clearly indicate that they said what they were told to believe. They consider that the current price for the EU is high and they have to pay. Although they are all quite young, they mention future generations who will have become European because they would have been made so – they compare this process to a chip that will have been incorporated in younger generations.

By contrast, being pro- or anti-European means something to the *managers*. In Oxford, the participant who is most engaged with the discussion challenges the others about their Euroscepticism on various grounds, meeting highly sceptical responses, again on various grounds. The Belgian managers also conflictualise the matter; although we should mention that religion is referred to from the beginning and Belgian groups always come to conflict when religion is at stake. As for the French, the discussion is structured by a growing antagonism between a young communist doctoral student and an engineer in his fifties. The clear Euroscepticism expressed by the young woman is only one among many other arguments in their sustained conflict.

In the three *activists* groups, European integration and the current state of the EU remains the main object of discussion for the whole session. Among the British, this disagreement is related to fundamental disagreements about social justice and market regulation. Among the Belgians, it is more a matter of geo-strategy but remains at the core of the discussion all the same. However, they play the conflict more than they feel it. The French activists are distinct: most of them are actually quite marginal regarding the dominant position of the party they represent in the discussion. They engage themselves in order to justify a position that is personal more than partisan. They are, among the French groups, the only ones to discuss at length the referendum on the Constitutional treaty: the three other French groups' participants hardly seem to remember it.

## 5. Ambivalence and Uncertainty

An obvious candidate explanation of both national and social differences is the utilitarian one: elites benefit more from the opportunities afforded by integration, and fear less the losses that would accompany the decreasing scope of national welfare states. [Cautrès and Grunberg; Hooghe and Marks] Given the reality of the British economy's place, the British also have more to lose from European economic and political integration. However, were interests in this clear sense driving attitude formation, we might expect that the articulation of attitudes would also be relatively clear. For the most part, however, the views and positions that our participants express are not strongly held commitments. [Billig 1991] The exceptions come from among the activist groups, and from some members of the managerial groups.

On our interpretation, rather than clear beliefs, theories, values and articulations of interests or ethical positions, our participants articulate, more or less vaguely, position in a social space or structure. [Cramer Walsh 2004] It is notable from our data that individuals vary significantly in the clarity or certainty in their perception of social structure and their position in it. Equally, it is notable that social position explains what is and can be said about Europe. However, this articulation of social position is expressed more through affect – embarrassment, fear, hostility, enjoyment – than through propositional argument. Further, these affects are clearly interactional – the embarrassment, anxiety, liking and disliking are responses to on the one hand the research setting and the team's setting a task for the group, and on the other hand to other group members, as well as to the social identities and resources that the respondents bring into the discussion. Our data enable us to pick up such affective aspects of attitudinal differences - fear, enjoyment, and the like – not only because of the lengthy and interactive production of discourse, but because video data enables us to observe, to some degree, embodied feeling. Certainly, this research suggests that 'attitudes to Europe' are by no means as clear as is suggested by survey research.

We expected, actually, that by the time of the break, after one hour and a half of discussion, we, and the participants, should be able to tell who could be considered pro- and who anti-European. Moreover, we expected participants to have developed some degree of collusion with or antagonism to each other regarding this general orientation. This did not happen, especially in working class and white collar groups. What happened instead was that participants either avoided the topic – by keeping very quiet, hardly speaking, as in the Oxford groups, or by sidetracking, as in Paris groups, or they basically agreed – as in Brussels groups. This meant that the discussion of 'who profits', which consisted of arguments and disagreements nevertheless was distinctly flat, emotionally speaking. As we have said, the groups as a whole did not lack affect and openly expressed disagreement. Participants got to conflict on important issues - immigration and welfare (how many incomers can a society absorb? how to evaluate the relative cost of immigration for those who come and those who receive them? how incompatible cultures can be? how much are European and former colonial countries responsible for poverty in ex-colonies, and hence immigration?); individual responsibility and state intervention (regarding unemployment and parents' education: who is responsible for incivility, petty crime and long term benefit? what can governments do in a globalized economy? who suffers the most in today's society) for instance. But: do we need more or less European power? do we want European federalism or a supra-national state? These questions never generated strong feelings nor conflict in our groups – apart from the activists.

In comparison, the next question on Turkey's entry did produce a large amount of conflict. Disagreement referred to human and women's rights, secularisation and Islam, immigration again, and geo-strategic issues. How far can enlargement go – in the sense of: how many countries might enter the EU without putting it at risk, as a political system – was never an issue. It was mentioned, but not debated.

## 6. Values, ethos – and politicisation

From the point of view of the main focus of this research panel we have a number of points to make. (But we hasten to add that these thoughts are provisional only, and need to be validated by further analysis of our visual and audio data) To begin with, we reiterate that our questions to the participants invited an explicitly normative

engagement: what is it to be European? how should power in Europe be divided? who profits? should Turkey be admitted? Further, we set up our focus groups so as to encourage conflict and argument. We are interested in the resources participants bring to arguing about conflictual and controversial matters such as European union, and the processes by which alliances are formed and broken, positions are committed to or retreated from, and argument becomes conflictual in the sense that participants are implicated in and stand by particular positions. It is too early in our analytic process to say anything very detailed about the microprocesses of conflict in these groups, but what we can do is present some patterns regarding what conflict centres on and what resources our participants bring to it.

First, we turn to our Alceste analysis [Appendix 4]. It is notable that according to this ‘values’ have different places in the three national corpuses. The Brussels groups generate a distinct vocabulary of ‘values and religion’, which includes reference to rights, persons in roles and identities, and ideologies such as the religions. This is in addition to value terms which appear in the context of other vocabulary classes such as politics, exchange, geopolitics, and economics. The French and British groups classes also, of course, are characterised by value terms embedded in vocabularies of exchange and economy. Notably, though, ‘ideologies’ terms such as socialism, law, truth, fascism are associated by the French with the vocabulary of (national) political competition, while for the British groups these terms, including respect, socialist, conservative, membership etc appear in the context of the vocabulary class we have labelled ‘political identity’. Obviously, we will want to test this finding against more detailed interpretive textual analysis using Atlas-ti.

Our statistical analysis of responses to the ‘who profits’ questions shows that where explicitly positively evaluative answers are given (rights, equality, citizens) these are very much contested, at least as much as the less clearly evaluative answers such as ‘corporations’ or the negative ones such as ‘crime’ or ‘not us’.

Appendix 9 summarises, from our initial group by group interpretive analysis, the points on which groups agreed, the issues over which there was more or less overt disagreement, and the resources that participants deployed in the discussion. There is some missing analysis, and as is obvious the group analyses have been conducted and reports drafted by different hands. But the gist is clear enough for our purposes here.

*First*, we were interested in what issues are not disputed about, what the groups seem to agree, or at any rate, not dissent about. As is evident, our interpretations reveal a wide range of issues – from the inflationary effects of the Euro, to immigration, to the need for regulation of the market and the role of experts in this. But, of course, every one of the issues on which groups achieve a consensus in the sense of seeming agreement, could be contested. And indeed, many of them are also contested, by some group or another.

*Second*, we identify the issues on which there is overt conflict – which is to say that different group members take distinctly different positions. Several issues turn up across this table: the question of assimilation versus distinction of migrant groups in a society; the question of liberalisation versus control of markets; and the question of being pro- or anti-Europe. The question of euroscepticism itself is the dominant conflict for the British managers and activists, but a focus on the EU and its effects is also a question for the Belgian activists and the French managers.

*Third* we look at what resources group members deploy in the discussion. Knowledge – of facts, events, processes, institutions, history – is an indispensable condition of deliberation about normative or practical issues. It is striking after this first stage of our analysis that our groups are very differently situated vis a vis knowledge: the Belgian groups are all exceptionally well informed, and have confidence in talking about economy, political power, law, public policy and international affairs. Compare the extract from the Oxford working class group in S3 (p8) above with this:

Brussels working class:

**Marco :**

parce que ce serait

[car je ne verrai pas par exemple un budget sur le plan européen

**Justine** = ...

**Sophie** = non (*ton interrogatif*)

**Ali** = mais il y en a déjà un je crois

**Sophie** = oui

**Marco** = lequel

**Ali** = je veux dire il y a le budget je dis pas que il va s'occuper tout le budget de tous les pays mais il y a un budget qui s'occupe de : de choses bien : bien précises (.) par exemple la culture il y a de l'argent qui vient : qui vient de l'Europe je veux dire ou [la coopération au développement

**Marco** : [sur les recherches ou

**Saïd** : [l'agriculture aussi

**Ali** = la recherche même la recherche il y a des fonds européens je veux dire ça ne va pas c'est pas aussi complexe qu'un budget national et : [je pense pas que ce serait possible

**Marco** : [je ne verrais pas par exemple un budget national participer à une personne qui : qui travaillerait au : ou serait dans un autre pays

**Ali** = mais c'est déjà le cas [c'est déjà ça

**Saïd** : [ça se fait

**Marco** = oui des représentants du pays [tu veux dire

**Ali** : [non non c'est déjà le cas je veux dire il y a de l'argent de la Belgique qui va à l'Europe hein (.) comment crois-tu que l'argent qui est utilisé par l'Europe qui je sais pas moi qui va aider un pays qui a eu une catastrophe d'où [tu

**Marco** : [ah oui

**Ali** : crois cet argent il vient il vient des pays tu comprends (.)

**Saïd** : (*vers Ali*) il y a des aides aussi niveau agriculture [...

**Ali** : [c'est ça oui tout à fait

By contrast, concern about one's own sheer lack of knowledge had a distinctly inhibiting effect in the British groups, including, notably, on the part of at least one of our activists (this woman is a city councillor). She was dismayed at the topic of Europe, and as the first half of the session came to an end asked privately 'are we going to have to talk about Europe all evening?' and then told EJP that she felt terrible that she knew so little. Embarrassment about ignorance was dealt with with cheerful gusto by the working class group, but in the white collar group one member's higher level of knowledge was treated by others as itself an embarrassment. (We feel certain that we have further interesting analysis to do regarding the sources of knowledge that are apparent in different groups, in particular the role of mass and electronic media as opposed to schooling. We speculate that these diverse sources of knowledge possibly make a difference to the confidence with which knowledge is deployed, and also to the levels of knowledge that participants display.)

The second class of resources that will repay further analysis is personal testimony: one's own identity as black, or migrant, or as a woman; one's memory of parents; one's life experiences in work or education. The significance of these personal resources varies, and is obviously in part explained by the contingencies of group constitution and dynamics. The use of first person testimony also has different effects on the discussion in different groups – in some cases being itself a cause of conflict or at least resistance by interlocutors, in others meaning that the conversation flows albeit with a particular inflection to the competition. Finally under this head we should mention humour – humour is used in diverse ways, from the deflection of disagreement, and indeed in some cases (notably in Oxford?) the deflection of any kind of seriousness at all, to its use as a conflictual weapon or expression of hostility:

### **Brussels white collar**

**Faïssal** = non non mais c'est simplement dans l'état d'esprit : que je sais pas que dans les années 30 50 maximum 60 : il y avait des pays européens qui cherchaient : la fortune ailleurs en Afrique par exemple et ils colonisaient maintenant ça profite parce que les pays : européens ils sont en train de s'unir et en train d'avoir une même politique : enfin : enfin de voir : au futur plus loin et : ça suit quoi (.) d'office que ça va suivre pour

eux ils vont suivre ils vont regarder la France a fait ça la Belgique a fait ça bon on devrait faire ça aussi (.) je sais pas :

**Fabien :** [t'essaies de se baser sur l'histoire [...

[... **Faissal :** [non si si moi sincèrement je prends l'exemple de la Tunisie parce que moi je suis tunisien donc : on a été colonisé par la France

**Victor** = je pensais que t'étais européen (*ton plaisanterie*) (*rires*)

**Faissal** = si si ouais je suis européen je suis belge je suis européen d'origine belge (*Faissal sourit*) (*rires*)

**Victor** = t'es pas tunisien alors tu nous arnaques (*ton plaisanterie*) (*rires*)

**Faissal** = si non je suis multiculture moi (.)

This extract shows both the use of first person testimony, and the use of humour, perhaps implicitly to challenge the first person testimony, but in any case to establish friendly and solidaristic relationships within the group – as a basis for disagreement.

If we now turn back to Appendix 5 we can review the differences in the ways that our group members engage with values and ethos. *First* there is a class difference. The managers and activists are much more likely to identify values as topics for discussion – from talking about the history of 'European civilisation' or humanism, to explicitly identifying such values as tolerance and rights, a shared and public aesthetic in art and architecture as constitutive of 'Europe' such that the EU as such is then in a somewhat problematic relationship with this history. This is not to say that ethical humanist concerns do not come through from our working class and white collar groups. Rather, there, the values are implicit or even encoded in discussions of who gets what, when and how, for example, identifying big business as the beneficiaries of European integration, or seeing migration from the point of view of migrants and also of the country or region into which they come.

*Second*, there are national differences. Alceste analysis suggests that the Belgian groups' values discourse is entwined specifically with religion, although inspection of this class shows that reference ranges over ethnic identities and the related values of communism, humanism and democracy. The Oxford groups' values discourse is embedded first in the discourse of economic exchange which incorporates inter alia reference to choice, freedom, privilege, legality, honesty and so on. Second, values are embedded in the discourse of political identity where reference to secularism, nationality and membership are connected with discussion of respect and rights. In the case of the French groups, according to this Alceste analysis, value talk is much more embedded and encoded in vocabulary of struggle connected with political competition, anglo-saxonism connected with the European political system, and rich and poor connected with economy. This analysis is supported also by our interpretive analysis (with our usual caveats about further testing and validation). On our reading, explicit values talk comes through less clearly in the French groups (who are on the whole focussed on who has power, and what the effects of various formations of economic and political power are), than in the case of the Belgians who focus explicitly, albeit not at length, on European values, and on the normative aspects of racism etc. It also seems that insofar as the French groups engage in explicit evaluation or judgement it tends to be negative – certain policies and institutions are identified as European and not to be endorsed.

This extract illustrates the link between values and religion in the Belgian groups, and also shows a managerial group speaking about values (humanism, democracy, the importance of the person etc) as they are using history

### **Brussels managers**

**Roger** = mais le : les : les monothéismes le catholicisme pas le judaïsme c'est une exception mais ont jamais été des : des tendances n'ont jamais eu des tendances à la démocratie hein il a fallu : il a fallu que : que l'Eglise catholique en Europe perde du pouvoir pour que la démocratie ait sa chance il faut pas oublier que ça a été dix siècles on peut refaire l'histoire de la chute de l'Empire romain à la Renaissance l'Eglise catholique dicte tous les actes de la vie quotidienne en Europe les Rois sont des rois de : de droit divin etcetera donc le monothéisme catholique en Europe n'a pas été dans le sens de la démocratie il a fallu qu'il perde de la vitesse donc on ne peut pas dire que ce : ce soit compatible




Appendix 1

Social distance between Family 1 groups.


Horizontal axis: education and occupation (high, left; low, right);  
Vertical axis: independence and self-employment (top) v proletarianisation (bottom)

Graph 1:



Appendix 2.

Room layout for focus group sessions (Oxford)



# Un exemple de tableau-réponse



Appendix 4

Alceste content analysis: Family 1.

*Brussels*

**Class 1 : Vocabulary of politics (22,7%)**

Politique, Vote, Parlement, député décision, avis, nation, représentant, ministre, peuple/gens, loi, plan, projet, chef, cabinet, choix, commission, conseil, contrôler/incontrôlable,  
Consulter, influencer, défendre, entendre, préférer, proposer, légitime, crise, initiative, malentendu, effort, avis Régional, nation, intérieur  
Ecologie, lobby, Congo, coloniser, insécurité, Chirac  
*This class is associated with the words Europe, European*

**Class 2: Vocabulary of discussion (20,16%)**

Discussion/discuter, question, parole, accord, sujet, hésitation, écouter, expliquer, noter, écrire, afficher, signaler, tableau, panneau, minutes, gomme, buffet  
Socialisme, parti, droite, identité  
Boire, Manger, buffet

**Class 3 : Vocabulary of exchanges (17,42%)**

Euros, dollar, monnaie, langue  
Concurrence/concurrent, fusion/fusionner, monopole,  
Voyager, installer, changer, trouver  
Mobilité, frontière, tourisme/touriste,  
Banque, école/éducation/université, médecin/médicament, étudiant/étudier, recherche, agriculture  
Belge, italien, espagnol, Luxembourg, France/français, néerlandais, suisse, Allemagne,

**Class 4: Vocabulary of geopolitics (15,89%)**

Guerre, paix, puissance, armée, militaire, bloc, axe, volonté, géographie, espace, continent  
Culture, commun, proche, valeur, judéo-chrétien, appartenance, union, solidaire, subsidiarité, diversité, racine, appartenance  
Accepter, imposer, partager, aimer, refuser, réussir  
Etats-Unis, Amérique, Irak, Royaume-Uni, Amérique, Espagne, Nord  
*This class is associated with the words Europe, European*

**Class 5: Vocabulary of economics and livelihood (10,28%)**

Cher, argent, coût, prix, produit, taxe/taxer, pension acheter, salaire, caisse, couter, budget, impôt, riche, pauvre, capital/ capitalisme proprio, logement, immobilier, profit  
Chômage, emploi, travail, noir, délocaliser  
Afrique, Chine, république tchèque  
Haschich

**Class 6: Vocabulary of values and religion (13,55%)**

Droit, homme, femme, gitans, forains  
Musulman, islam, catholique, religion, christianisme, avortement, église, prêtre, bouddhisme, laïc, culte  
Turc/Turquie, Chypre, Asie/asiatique, Lituanie, Albanie, Iran, Arménien, grec  
Communisme, humanisme, démocratie

*Oxford*

**Class 1: Vocabulary of exchanges (35,10%)**

Buy, cheap, money, poor, privilege  
Holiday, job, skill, tradesmen, nurse, business, free, market  
Country, border, territory, defense, authority  
Abroad, move, immigrant freedom, choice, chance open  
English, France/French, Spanish, Australian  
Illegal, honest, drug,  
People, person, masses  
Wine, airbus, car

**Class 2: Vocabulary of political identity (39,51%)**

Human, cultural, identity, respect, right, culture, conflict  
Muslim, Islamic, religion, secular, believe  
Terrorism,  
Political, state, law, policy, political, socialist, conservative, lib, Blair, democracy, parties  
National, British/Britain, Kurds, Italy, Scottish, continent  
Join, union, member/membership, boundaries, unity, belong, geographical, different  
Strong

*This class is associated with the words Europe, European*

**Class 3: Vocabulary of discussion (13,14%)**

Discuss, topic, question, asking, talk disagree, explain, interrupt, debate, research, rule,  
Card, flash, board, session  
Citizen, Catholicism, capital

**Class 4: Vocabulary of economy (12,25%)**

Pay, pence, pound, price, wage, dollar, cost  
Company, manufactory, agencies, trade, industry, factory, employ/employment, goods, estate  
Staff, compete, work  
Pollution, environment  
Directive, protect/protection, legislation, tribunal, comply  
Council, city, Oxford  
China/Chinese, Indian, eastern

*Paris*

**Class 1: Vocabulary of the European political system (11,72%)**

Fiscal, libéral, social, national, scientifique, protection, participation, adhésion, communication, contradiction  
Fonctionnaire, technocratie, habitant, salarié, peuple, syndicat, élu, lobbies  
Parlement, constitution, démocratie, commission, loi, Bruxelles, charte, traité, institution, politique, ministre, chef,  
direction, principe, indépendance, fonctionnement  
Adopter, arrêter, intégrer,  
Anglais, Allemand, nordique, anglo-saxon, Allemagne, Portugal  
Fric, armée

*This class is associated with the words Europe, European*

**Class 2 : Vocabulary of political competition (9,88%)**

Extrême, Gauche, parti, Vert/écologie, centre, communisme, droite, socialisme, Bayrou, facho/fascisme, souverainiste, A.Laguiller, Le Pen, Fabius  
Minoritaire, alliance, bilan, mouvement, programme,  
Aimer, lutter, défendre, manquer, militer, rejeter, tuer, encourager, confondre  
Ouvrier, populisme, Porsche  
Elysée, énarques, Putain, avenir, éthique, vérité, beau, raison, affreux, autoritaire, vieilli

**Class 3 : Vocabulary of economy and livehood (39,38%)**

Argent, payer, pauvre, riche, aide, cher, salaire, banque, prix, euro, franc, coût, besoin, finance, impôt, profit  
Travail, emploi, chômage, boulot, congé, entreprise,  
Logement, bâtiment, maison, quartier, province, Paris  
Enfant, parent, jeune, femme, fille, fils  
Voiture, banlieue, brûler  
Mafia  
Etranger, papier, musulman, immigrer  
France/français, Afrique /Africain, Chine/Chinois, Inde, Italie, Pologne,

**Class 4 : Vocabulary of discussion (39%)**

Question, argument, accord, dire, discussion, penser, répondre, clair, sujet, bulletin, opinion, poids, position, sentiment, solution  
Gommette, tableau, règle, enregistrer  
Personnel, positif, ensemble, commun  
Géographie, culture, président, utopie, caucasien, international

## Appendix 5

Summary of interpretive analysis of discourses regarding European politics and citizenship: by social class; by country.

Ouvriers 1	Bxl 5	Paris 6	Oxford 9	
<b>Summary</b>	Prominent theme of racism in Belgium and Europe; discussion of state v market but not particularly focussed on EU 1.00; quite a lot of focus on nations in Q3 2.00 f 0 FH says: 'l'adhesion au cadre national comme indepassable, comme cadre protecteur et garantie d'une diversite'. Ali and Said not pro-European, others more pos 'pour l'avenir' but no sense of direct political relationship or 'ownership'; recognition of political, as opposed to market, cultural etc, dimension of Europe, but no sense of identification with this; more significance attached to interventionist state;	Europe associated with integration in a European country 0; discussion of global labour etc 10; q whether countries in or out 15. Distinction political power (of Chirac) v financial power (of corporations) - Europe an extension of this 35; Overall much greater consciousness of French state etc than of EU as such; EU v US 1.50; Nobody pro-European except contra US; identification with France as such;	Orientation to national policy: min wage, immigration; uncertainty about EU status, Britain's membership, history, insts etc. Discussion of Islam, racism etc – some sense of id with EU as 'ours' when discussing Turkey, but this overwhelmed by non-understanding of nature of European insts.	
<b>Comparison Ouvriers</b>	No group expresses any clear sense of European citizenship, engagement with the European political system, orientation to the institutions etc. Low levels of trust of politicians generally, but no mention of MEPs or officers in particular. Bxl and Ox say more about democratic deficit than Paris. Levels of understanding vary – the Brussels group are much more familiar with debates about institutions than the Ox or Paris. All groups focus on racism, migration; also on employment, welfare state etc, and focus overwhelmingly on state policy. Otherwise ref to diverse policy areas like Eur army, euthanasia, logement - unclear about competences.			
Employés 1	Bxl 1	Paris 3	Oxford 8	
<b>Summary</b>	Discussion mostly about labour, goods and services, markets, relevance of boundaries re this – v much a political economy focus; politicians, representatives mentioned only in this connection; Europe as geog/strategic in connection w Turkey q;	They do discuss political power quite seriously at Q2 – politicians are pathetic; sense Europe is not like France, overwhelming focus on France; fairly competent discussing Europe but 'assez ambivalent et faiblement impliqué'.	Europe a reality – there: seen from point of view of 'us' – loss of sovereignty, bad legislation; they tend to displace views ('people think MEPs are self-serving') – ie very weak engagement themselves; Main focus on goods and services etc; and on q of islam, racism etc re Turkey.	
<b>Comparison Employees</b>	Focus on goods and services, boundaries etc. Paris and Ox say more than do Bxl about politicians' corruption, powerlessness. Paris group focus more on political power, politicians, etc than the other two; Bxl group focus on labour, goods and services. Ox group have definite sense that Europe is a reality, but seen as a bad, as other. Uncertainty about their knowledge of European institutions an anxiety for the Ox group, not the others.			
Cadres 1	Bxl3	Paris 2	Ox 5	
<b>Summary</b>	Discussion of culture, geography, economy, history; Understanding of q of government structures; identify political dimension v economic, technical etc – ie show high level of competence; focus on failure in public policies; concern about deficit in 'l'Europe sociale'	national sentiment obvious – is there a European sentiment too? they distinguish political context from culture, history, philosophy etc; q of relative similarity to UK, Spain etc; Competent discussion of power; market power = pauperisation 1.5;	Discussion focusses on identification: non-European heritages, diverse travel and work experiences etc; Sundai tries to argue that Europe commands loyalty – the others don't go along with it at all	
<b>Comparison Cadres</b>	Between these three there is a distinction between a greater level of taken for granted identification with European institutions, and the political problems relevant to those, on the part of the Brussels and Paris participants, versus a greater level of detachment			

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	in the Oxford group. The Oxford group are conscious of Euroscepticism, somewhat detached from it, for different reasons. Sundai articulates the view that Europe is worthy of loyalty, as Britain or one's home country is, but the others are utterly unconvinced by him. All three groups have relatively high level of understanding of institutions, history, and related political problems, but take up different standpoints. Paris are less Europe oriented (more take up the nationalistic point of view) than Brussels; Ox noticeably more detached.			
<b>Militants 1</b>	<b>Bxl 2</b>	<b>Paris 7</b>	<b>Ox 7</b>	
<b>Summary</b>	Discuss different kinds of power: force, consensus 0; real basis of EU is economic 30; This group talk relatively more about political instns than the economic, cultural etc dimensions compared to other groups;(discussion of values more important in Q4); focus on realpolitik also v politics as focussed on ideals and future; This group do not speak personally – detached ironic tone to the discussion.	Very engaged in political discussion from party positions; very knowledgeable about French and EU instns and events; concentrate on 'rehearsal' of French party political debate with some jokes; objectivity about EU; disagreement about the Treaty and referendum; disagreement about values, also economic liberalism;	In this group the question of versions and degrees of Euroscepticism and UK sovereignty dominate; pro-Europeans concerned to say that the fears of Eurosceptics are ill-founded;	
<b>Comparison Militants</b>	Strikingly different attitudes. The Belgian group are ironic, detached, v critical of democratic deficit; disagree about best shape of institutions, appropriate relationship between regions, nations, localities, EU instns etc. British group completely bogged down in the argument between europhilia and euroscepticism – some eurosceptics become more europhile when they hear the right wing eurosceptic arguments. There is concern to debunk the eurosceptic position, reveal it to be based on lies etc. Europhile position includes passionate commitment to European project and values – this is in contrast to the Bxl group. However, the Bxl group are more unproblematically constrained and shaped by the fact of European membership, institutions etc. French group are very knowledgeable, rehearse French party debates plus irony and jokes about this; recognition of EU and Europe as fact with functions and some good outcomes (peace, power against other blocs etc) - marked lack of any emotional identification with Europe			
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Bxl 5 Ouvriers</b>	<b>Bxl 1 Employés</b>	<b>Bxl 3 Cadres</b>	<b>Bxl 2 Militants</b>
<b>Summary</b>	Prominent theme of racism in Belgium and Europe; discussion of state v market but not particularly focussed on EU 1.00; quite a lot of focus on nations in Q3 2.00 f 0 FH says: 'l'adhésion au cadre national comme indepassable, comme cadre protecteur et garantie d'une diversité'. Ali and Said not pro-European, others more pos 'pour l'avenir' but no sense of direct political relationship or 'ownership'; recognition of political, as opposed to market, cultural etc, dimension of Europe, but no sense of identification with this; more significance attached to interventionist state.	Discussion mostly about labour, goods and services, markets, relevance of boundaries re this – v much a political economy focus; politicians, representatives mentioned only in this connection; Europe as geog/strategic in connection w Turkey q;	Discussion of culture, geography, economy, history; Understanding of q of government structures; identify political dimension v economic, technical etc – ie show high level of competence;	Discuss different kinds of power: force, consensus 0; real basis of EU is economic 30; This group talk relatively more about political instns than the economic, cultural etc dimensions compared to other groups;(discussion of values more important in Q4); focus on realpolitik also v politics as focussed on ideals and future; This group do not speak personally – detached ironic tone to the discussion.
<b>Comparison Bxl</b>	The militants focus more on political power and politics as such than any of the others. The others show understanding of political economy dimensions, and also culture and q of boundaries. Acceptance of EU and European institutions; but to our question 'do they believe the European system represents them, as citizens?' the answer must be 'no'.			
<b>Paris</b>	<b>Paris 6 ouvriers</b>	<b>Paris 3 Employés</b>	<b>Paris 2</b>	<b>Paris militants</b>
<b>Summary</b>	Europe associated with integration in a European country 0; discussion of global labour etc 10; q whether countries in or out 15. Distinction political power (of	They do discuss political power quite seriously at Q2 – politicians are pathetic; sense Europe is not like France, overwhelming focus on France; fairly competent	National sentiment obvious – is there a European sentiment too? they distinguish political context from culture, history, philosophy etc; q of relative	Very engaged in political discussion from party positions; very knowledgeable about French and EU instns and events; concentrate on 'rehearsal' of French party political debate

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	Chirac v financial power (of corporations) - Europe an extension of this 35; Overall much greater consciousness of French state etc than of EU as such; EU v US 1.50; Nobody pro-European except contra US; identification with France as such.	discussing Europe but 'assez ambivalent et faiblement impliqué'.	similarity to UK, Spain etc; Competent discussion of power; market power = pauperisation 1.5.	with some jokes; objectivity about EU; disagreement about the Treaty and referendum; disagreement about values, also liberalism;
<b>Comparison Paris</b>	Notable for high level of consciousness of the French state, French politics, sense of French model, contra the US, market as pauperisation etc. All distinguish political power from other kinds - consciousness of political corruption, weakness, self-servingness. Consciousness of some policies etc as European (Bolkestein, Euro) – talked of negatively. Militants have marked level of expertise in political debate – the discussion is v much a rehearsal of French party debate, with irony and jokes about this, about the positions etc. Detached attitude to EU; marked lack of identification with Europe – but recognition of value of EU and Europe contra US, China etc.			
<b>Oxford</b>	<b>Ox 9 Ouvriers</b>	<b>Oxford 8 Employés</b>	<b>Ox 5 Cadres</b>	<b>Ox 7 Militants</b>
<b>Summary</b>	Orientation to national policy: min wage, immigration; uncertainty about EU status, Britain's membership, history, insts etc. Discussion of Islam, racism etc – some sense of id with EU as 'ours' when discussing Turkey, but this overwhelmed by non-understanding of nature of European insts.	Europe a reality – there: seen from point of view of 'us' – loss of sovereignty, bad legislation; they tend to displace views ('people think MEPs are self-serving') – ie very weak engagement themselves; Main focus on goods and services etc; and on q of islam, racism etc re Turkey.	Discussion focusses on identification: non-European heritages, diverse travel and work experiences etc; Sundai tries to argue that Europe commands loyalty – the others don't go along with it at all	In this group the question of versions and degrees of Euroscepticism and UK sovereignty dominate; pro-Europeans concerned to say that the fears of Eurosceptics are ill-founded;
<b>Comparison Ox</b>	Preoccupation with knowledge, or lack of it, including on the part of some of the activist group. Europe a reality – vague for ouvriers, more clear for employees and managers, but disputes within all groups about level and kind of 'identification'. Significant differences between participants of different ethnic/migratory background. Concern with immigration, labour mobility. Concern also with 'euroscepticism' – consciousness of this evident in all groups, very dominant in militants' discussion.			


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Appendix 6


Codes constructed from responses to 'Who Profits from Europe?' (all groups)

Code	N	Examples	Flashes (estimate, %)
LIB	37	Liberalism, capitalism, big companies, world companies, Disney, L'Oreal, the world market	6
CIT	34	Us, to the citizens, the Europeans, those who are inside, equality between Europeans, consumers, workers (any word that would refer to the participants)	20
ECO	31	The economy, business, enterprises, retailers	5
MOB	29	Travels, mobility, translators, students (ref to Erasmus)	2
VAL	26	Rights, environnement, associations, peace, culture, or other values	6
POL	24	Politicians, MP's	2
PAUV	20	Poor countries, inside or outside the EU	4
NEG	18	Any explicit negative answer : NOT the Europeans, NOT the elderly, NOT the farmers, NOT us, and so on.	10 (inc CRIM)
TECH	18	Experts, technocrats, Commission people	1
NOUV	17	Eastern countries, new EU countries, former new countries	1
XXX	14	Other: very varied. May be a joke, or a topic that was quoted once only (ex. Eurovision, media)	
BANK	13	Banks, bankers, finance, money	2 (inc LOB)
EXT	12	Countries outside the EU, the world	
AGRI	11	Agriculture, farmers	
IMM	8	Immigration, to foreigners	
RICH	8	Rich countries, the rich	
USA	8	The United States, the anglo-saxon world	
CRIM	7	The mafia, crime, terrorism	
RECH	7	Research or researchers [these cards were explicitly a 'tribute' paid to the moderators ...]	
LOB	5	Lobbies, lobbyists	
PAY	5	Each time a specific country name is given, except the US	
DEF	3	Defence, the military	
BXL	2	Brussels, Brussels' inhabitants	

Principal Components Analysis of responses to 'Who profits?'



Position of groups relative to principal components



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Appendix 9.

Consensus, conflict and resources.

Working Class	Bxl	Ox	Par
<b>Consensus</b>	<p>-La question de la hausse des prix et des loyers permet</p> <p>- le rejet de l'extrême-droite</p> <p>- l'adhésion au cadre national comme indépasseable, comme cadre protecteur et garantie d'une diversité</p> <p>- le fait que les experts ne doivent pas être responsables</p> <p>-Le fait que le marché c'est l'insécurité, qu'il faut le contrôler ou s'en protéger</p>	<p>- Immigration is a problem – too many illegal immigrants, Britain too welcoming [15] – Robert dissents from the dominant view in some respects but goes along with the others - disagreement in the sense of highly consensus seeking dissent.</p> <p>- MPS are untrustworthy [40, 1.5]</p> <p>- Q3 there is no disagreement at all. This may be because it is after the break and they are tired and have drunk wine.</p>	<p>Le consensus du groupe est double :</p> <p>- sur un positionnement anti-élites et sur un anti-européanisme nourri d'une forte de fierté ou satisfaction à l'égard de la France.</p> <p>- on observe aussi un consensus étroit (au sens où il s'arrête à la question des responsabilités) sur le caractère central de l'éducation dans les sujets d'importance.</p> <p>- l'éducation, une question centrale : la première de façon consensuelle sur les difficultés qu'il y a de nos jours à élever les enfants, même si le consensus s'effrite quand Yasmina laisse entendre que la difficulté vient aussi du fait que les enfants à Paris sont démunis ; la seconde de façon très conflictuelle entre Yasmina et Habiba sur la responsabilité des parents immigrés.</p>
<b>Clivage/conflit</b>	<p>- Libéralisme économique. Sur la taxation des entreprises</p> <p>- Colonisation, question de la dette des pays colonisateurs versus ils doivent prendre en charge leur présent</p> <p>- A propos du travail au noir : égoïsme et vie au jour le jour versus sens de l'avenir individuel et collectif</p> <p>- Concurrence des immigrés sur le marché de l'emploi protectionnisme /ouverture</p> <p>- Turquie : droits de l'homme et de la femme</p>	<p>1. Islamophobia v liberal multiculturalism or at any rate anti-racism;</p> <p>2. open borders (humanitarianism and economic opportunities) v protectionism and immigration control</p> <p>3. Why change? we don't want change, keep things the same v change is inevitable</p>	<p>Aucune trace de clivage libéralisme/interventionnisme : même s'ils ont l'air conscients des problèmes que cela pose en terme de coût de l'emploi et se plaignent des délocalisation</p> <p>- le clivage est plutôt sur la capacité des gens de trouver quand même leur place dans une société que tous ont l'air de considérer comme inégalitaire.</p> <p>- Je pense qu'il y a en fait un clivage réel sur l'intégration, conçue comme assimilation/homogénéisation ou coexistence de la diversité, et que ce clivage a des conséquences sur les attitudes à l'égard de l'Europe.</p> <p>- Il y a également un clivage peuple/dominant mais celui-là solidarise le groupe.</p>
<b>Resources</b>	<p>A part Justine qui parle du Congo dont elle est originaire, ils ne font pas directement référence à leur identification ou expériences personnelles</p>	<p>Asking questions, admitting ignorance, expressing uncertainty, displaying desire and willingness to learn – Robert and especially Brenda are leaders in this. Brenda asks factual questions. Otherwise, Robert seems to have greater knowledge than the others of some issues: Turkey hasn't joined yet [15], he displays more sophisticated knowledge of EU than Mina</p> <p>There are some places where the conversation is at cross-purposes, or otherwise confused, because of uncertainty: eg are we in the EU already? [1.45];</p> <p>Brenda uses facility in conversation, groupwork skills, capacity to argue and ask questions, attitude of wanting to learn and wanting to know what other people think – she dominates the</p>	<p>- Ce groupe est intéressant à analyser en détail sur la question des ressources d'autorité. Albert, Lionel et Yasmina rivalisent d'affirmations, échangent des chiffres, des dates, des noms de façon plus ou moins fondée.</p> <p>- Yasmina puise volontiers dans sa propre existence ou plus largement, dans celles de son environnement pour ne pas reculer.</p> <p>- Albert évoque plus souvent les médias mais en vient lui aussi à livrer un peu de lui-même en mobilisant l'exemple de sa mère. Il utilise aussi l'humour pour déstabiliser (en vain en l'occurrence) Yasmina.</p> <p>Lionel est celui qui intervient le plus souvent de façon docte, en donnant des éléments historiques et sans citer ses sources.</p>

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		<p>conversation</p> <p>Robert as consensus builder – couches his disagreements in context of agreement</p>	<p>- Geoffroy ne joue pas au jeu de la remise de soi. Il intervient surtout de façon logique, pour souligner un enchaînement de causes dans lequel les questions d'emploi et de délocalisation sont centrales.</p>
<b>White Collar</b>	<b>Bxl</b>	<b>Ox</b>	<b>Par</b>
<b>Consensus</b>	<p>- Accord trouvé sur la distance à l'Europe : c'est souhaitable mais ce n'est pas pour nous (projection dans l'avenir)</p> <p>- Discussion se voulant constructive sur un système et sur un recrutement d'experts électoral permettant de dépasser les logiques nationales (ouvrir au maximum le recours aux experts, pluralisme des experts)</p> <p>- Accord sur le fait qu'il est mauvais que la religion et le pouvoir soient imbriqués (point consensuel qui permet de sortir de la logique conflictuelle sur la Turquie)</p>	<p>For all of them the question of belief in or commitment to Europe is a problem, not articulated as such but implicit in a sense that Europe is somewhere else. Despite differences between the business-oriented viewpoint implicitly taken by Mike, and the pro-subsidies viewpoint taken by Kenneth; and despite Kenneth's implicit attack on Euroscepticism, there is agreement that Europe is a problem.</p>	<p>Il y a un relatif consensus du groupe sur leur autositionnement – entre les riches et les pauvres, les assistés et ceux qui profitent.</p> <p>Le groupe est également assez homogène dans sa façon de focaliser la discussion sur la France</p> <p>- Corollaire, relatif désintérêt de tous pour l'Europe qui les fait exprimer en commun des opinions contradictoires sur l'UE : solidarité, ouverture, meilleure information, paix, et en même temps, homogénéisation, inflation, perte de sa culture...</p> <p>- Consensus aussi sur le fait qu'ils sont le jeu du marché – ce qui ne les empêche pas d'avoir des opinions assez différentes sur ce qu'il convient de faire, renforcer les protections contre le marché ou non.</p> <p>- Sont également unis dans leur méconnaissance – à peine consciente semble-t-il – de l'Europe en général voire au-delà, du fonctionnement d'un système politique.</p>
<b>Clivage/conflit</b>	<p>- Clivage sur le multiculturalisme versus défense de l'identité, sur l'ouverture. Assez confus tout au long de la discussion (faut-il aller vers plus d'homogénéisation ou non) mais plus visible au moment de la discussion sur la Turquie</p> <p>- Clivage sur le marché</p>	<p>- Eurosceptic v anti-Eurosceptic – Mike, implicitly; and Pat's thinking it's nice to have the pound for ourselves; v Kenneth.</p> <p>- Business point of view v social market point of view – Mike v Kenneth.</p> <p>- Commodities – liking travel, tourism, supermarkets – Pat and Mel v Kenneth. Implicitly: those who travel to Europe or know people who do v those who don't (Kamal).</p>	<p>- le clivage le plus visible est le clivage libéralisme versus interventionnisme qui oppose ceux qui considèrent la France comme un pays d'assistés et de profiteurs à ceux qui pensent que les droits sociaux sont des acquis et qu'ils n'y en a pas assez.</p> <p>- Belle séquence de conflictualisation avortée sur la question du chômage et de l'abus des aides sociales-</p> <p>- il y a sans doute un clivage ouvert/fermé,</p> <p>- clivage social : les unit contre les riches et les pauvres – se considèrent tous comme intermédiaires.</p> <p>- opposition gauche/droite assez claire qui ne structure pas les alliances de la discussion mais fait voler en éclat l'accord fragile conclu entre Hadia et Clelia/Laetitia sur la question de la Turquie : le discours antisarozyste net de Hadia heurte directement Clelia, et à l'inverse, rapproche Patrice et Clelia.</p>
<b>Resources</b>	<p>- Peu de mobilisation de ressources personnelles : à l'exception de Faissal (il parle de son projet en Allemagne, de sa nationalité tunisienne, durée de résidence en Belgique etc.)</p> <p>- Rôle de l'humour. Il faudrait qualifier le type d'humour...</p> <p>- Ressources en termes de connaissances</p>	<p>Knowledge Mike – but this doesn't help the conversation move along.</p> <p>Conciliation – use of humour especially to stop disagreement, by Nina.</p> <p>Cooperative discussion – they do know how to do this, but are stopped by unwillingness to engage in any disagreement, wariness about political</p>	<p>- pas mal de ressources personnelles : à part Victor et Clelia, tous livrent des éléments sur eux-mêmes. Patrice et sa femme Colombienne, Patrice qui travaille pour les riches ; Hadia qui ne trouve pas de boulot à son niveau de qualification ; Magali et ses grands parents Polonais et Italiens, Magali</p>

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	(Fabien et Victor). Fabien intervient pour données des éléments de connaissance ou d'information (l'un lui répond « <i>puisque tu le dis</i> ») - Ressources cognitives (modèle belge pour penser la complexité du système politique européen)	differences, and also concern about knowledge.	« immigrée » du Nord ; Laetitia qui n'a pas eu d'allocations pour son enfant. - ressources de seconde main : Clelia et Laetitia et les femmes voilées ; Magali et les sans-abris ou les prostituées d'Europe de l'Est ; la situation à Istanbul - medias : reportage sur les islamistes britanniques ; reportage sur les élections au Chili ou en Argentine ; informations sur Sarkozy - très peu de connaissances mises en jeu : semblent de fait en avoir très peu...
<b>Managers</b>	<b>Bxl</b>	<b>Ox</b>	<b>Par</b>
<b>Consensus</b>		<b>Eurocepticism</b> , but for different reasons. <i>Bansuri</i> has a British-Indian identity, <i>Ian</i> declares himself to be anti-European ( <i>Alex</i> isn't very explicit but is sceptical about MEPs [35], MPs in general. <i>Derek</i> stresses his British/English identity, (By contrast <i>Sundai</i> expresses himself to recognise Britain's place in Europe etc)	-Consensus sur une conception de l'Europe comme continent auquel on appartient ou non - consensus sur la classe politique qui ne pense qu'à se faire élire et à s'en mettre plein les poches. - Consensus sur l'absurdité du référendum d'une part, et sorte de consensus sur le Non puisque Franck qui a voté oui ne dit rien, et Gabriel dit avoir voulu voter non pour finalement voter oui mais insiste sur la question impossible. - Relatif consensus (Gabriel mis à part) sur la paupérisation récente/en cours mais aussi sur le fait qu'on est mieux en Europe qu'ailleurs - Consensus sur la confiance relative à accorder aux experts : à la fois une certaine confiance dans la science mais aussi une claire représentation des conflits d'intérêts - Consensus sur la nécessité de réguler le marché, même si positions assez divergentes quant à l'ampleur nécessaire de cette régulation.
<b>Clivage/conflit</b>		Eurocepticism ( <i>Bansuri</i> , <i>Ian</i> , <i>Alex</i> , <i>Derek</i> ) v Europhilia ( <i>Sundai</i> ) Migration ( <i>Sundai</i> v the rest) Anti-capitalism ( <i>Bansuri</i> ) not challenged by <i>Ian</i> , <i>Alex</i> and <i>Derek</i> who are not sympathetic to her view (they don't support or agree with her, and there is external evidence that they would not sympathise with anti-capitalism).	- Il y a un vrai clivage pro/anti europe mené par Fabienne qui est clairement antieuropéenne. Mais ceux qui sont favorables le sont sur des positions assez variables. Le clivage européen est double : -ouverture/fermeture de principe d'une part, -avantages/inconvénients en termes économiques - Fabienne/Gabriel porte notamment clairement sur la question de savoir si l'Europe profite aux Européens en général ou surtout aux riches. - Il y a un vrai clivage libéralisme économique/anticapitalisme
<b>Resources</b>		Quite good levels of knowledge. Capacity to deliberate, work cooperatively on a task. Capacity to disagree – uses of humour and friendliness to enable disagreement [ <i>Ian</i> 1.45], <i>Sundai</i> laughs often when the others disagree with him [with <i>Bansuri</i>	- Beaucoup d'éléments personnels de la part de Gabriel et Serge, un peu de Fabienne, Céline et Toufik. - Très nombreuses connaissances amenées voire assénées dans la discussion, parfois beaucoup d'autorité, tant par Gabriel, Fabienne que Serge, sur

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		1.10, 1.45, Derek 1.35, 1.40 <i>more refs check DVD</i> ] and they all laugh quite a lot at moments of disagreement [Alex 1.35, Bansuri and Sundai 1.5, <i>more refs</i> ].	le mode « je connais bien la question ». - Evocation des médias à quelques reprises : Gabriel, émission de France culture sur l'économie ; Inès, une émission sur la condition des femmes en Turquie. Pas de sortie contre les médias
<b>Activists</b>	<b>Bxl</b>	<b>Ox</b>	<b>Par</b>
<b>Consensus</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accord sur le déficit démocratique de l'Europe (même si Stéphane met en cause le fait que les gens ne s'y intéressent pas alors que Simon et Maxime l'expliquent par le fait que l'on ne les y intéresse pas ou qu'on leur présente l'Europe de manière négative)</li> <li>- Consensus sur le fait que l'on doit adopter un raisonnement géostratégique (voir plus loin)</li> <li>- Accord sur la nécessité d'avoir des experts, voire des fonctionnaires pour faire marcher le système (même si Stéphane est le plus critique et que la corruption est plusieurs fois évoquée). Il n'y a pas remise en cause réelle. Il est vrai qu'ils en font en quelque sorte partie.</li> <li>- Accord sur le marché (même si Maxime est plus réservé)</li> <li>A- ccord sur la critique de la PAC (même si Maxime relève l'importance de l'enjeu pour l'alimentation)</li> <li>- Accord sur l'intérêt de développer une politique de l'université et de la recherche (y compris recherche fondamentale)</li> <li>- Accord sur le fait que l'Europe profite aux touristes et aux consommateurs (espace de mobilité et de liberté)</li> </ul>	<p>Between Annabel, Bethany, Allison: against the eurosceptic position. For somewhat different reasons.</p> <p>Between Charles and James on euroscepticism, but weak in Charles' case, extremely strong in James; both on broadly right wing eurosceptical grounds.</p> <p>Lewis is also eurosceptical, but for left, anti-capitalist and environmental reasons.</p> <p>Agreement between Bethany, Lewis, Allison and Annabel on social justice, market regulation.</p> <p>Agreement between Allison, Annabel somewhat, and Lewis, on environmental values (but disagreement between Lewis and them on environmental political strategy, and (probably) on the priority of environmentalism vis a vis other political issues.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accord sur le fait que la dimension économique et qu'il faut rendre visible une dimension humaine et sociale.</li> <li>- Ils sont d'accord pour considérer que le référendum sur le TCE était mal engagé mais ne sont pas d'accord sur les raisons :</li> <li>- Ils sont d'accord pour qu'il y ait un président européen.</li> <li>- Evocation du marché (Q2), ils sont d'accord pour parler du marché comme un « marché commun » = règles communes + protection.</li> <li>- Accord sur le fait que l'on doit privilégier l'harmonisation fiscale</li> </ul>
<b>Clivage/conflit</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clivage sur l'unité de l'Europe : Il existe un socle commun à l'Europe / L'Europe est profondément divisée ou ce socle est commun à d'autres pays non européens (pays différents GB, pays de l'Est)</li> <li>-Clivage valeurs/intérêts : L'Europe se construit sur des valeurs (valeurs de l'Etat (services publics), de la solidarité / valeurs « judéo-chrétiennes) / L'Europe se construit sur des intérêts économiques</li> <li>-Clivage réalisme (la réalité aujourd'hui)/ idéalisme (comment améliorer les choses dans l'avenir) .La politique est affaire de réalisme et de puissance/ La politique est affaire d'idéal et de consensus</li> <li>L'Europe a garantie la paix / L'Europe ne garantit pas la paix cf. Les Balkans</li> <li>-Clivage sur l'importance des valeurs judéo-chrétiennes et plus largement clivage religieux affleurant durant toute la discussion</li> <li>-Variante du précédent, clivage à l'égard de l'Islam</li> </ul>	<p><i>Eurocepticism</i> (Charles (mildly) and James (strongly) v Euroenthusiasm (Allison strongly), Annabel and Bethany (mildly). Lewis is also Eurosceptic but for different reasons from Charles and James.</p> <p><i>Capital power</i>, employers rights, 'competitiveness' (James (very strongly)) v employees' rights, social justice (Bethany, Annabel, Lewis, Allison).</p> <p><i>Environmentalism</i>: achievability and desirability of environmental care (Lewis, Allison (but Allison believes that European policy is efficacious and Lewis does not) v scepticism about environmental policy in the context of 'economic reality' (James).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clivage générationnel est à plusieurs reprises activé (généralement, il isole Guy qui incarne et revendique d'être de la génération soixante-huitarde :</li> <li>- Sur les valeurs judéo-chrétiennes qui ne représenteront plus rien progressivement Mais ce clivage est brouillé sur la question de la mobilité et d'Erasmus</li> <li>- Le clivage sur le TCE est présent</li> <li>- Clivage religieux-laïcité présent à propos de la Turquie.</li> <li>-Clivage libéralisme/ intervention de l'Etat.</li> <li>-Cclivage critique des fonctionnaires, de la technocratie/ démagogie, populisme</li> <li>- Clivage musulman= français de papiers/ français</li> <li>- Désaccord sur la mobilité.</li> </ul>

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	- Evidemment la question de la Turquie qui cristallise les clivages		
<b>Resources</b>	<p>Ils se situent à un grand niveau de généralité et ne mettent pas en avant leur implication personnelle.</p> <p>Ils mobilisent des ressources cognitives (connaissances, capacité d'argumentation)</p> <p>Humour, voire ironie, convivialité : ils ont l'habitude du conflit (dimension ludique)</p>	<p><i>Allison</i> has the resources of a 'party-line', a fluent account of European policy and regulation, together with a fluent account of a broadly liberal account of regulated markets, competitiveness, openness, protective legislation and social justice.</p> <p>-At one crucial point she deploys a strategy of as if it were mock facilitation and counselling, when she says that she is sorry that James feels so threatened, but she quickly backtracks from this back to her standard use of argument, deployment of facts</p> <p><i>Annabel</i> is emotionally affected by the offensiveness (from her point of view) of James's position and this discomforts her argumentatively, so she has recourse to the odd language of 'watch it mate'; she uses heavy handed irony and sarcasm. She uses mock group facilitation techniques – inviting James to put the argument for nations, etc.</p> <p>- Her assertions of her commitments to social justice rely heavily on first person testimony.</p> <p>- <i>Bethany</i> relies on a long time commitment to social justice, premised on historical knowledge of labour misery, disadvantage and injustice, in the old mining industries and so on.</p> <p>- <i>Charles</i> more than any of the others approaches the task as a cooperative team deliberation, and attempts to keep people on task.</p>	<p>Presque toute la panoplie des ressources est présente :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Les connaissances et les références intellectuelles. Ils sont tous très compétents (sauf Charles et surtout Cheik), connaissent le fonctionnement du système français et européen.</li> <li>- Les ressources médiatiques sont évidemment à la source de leurs arguments mais ne sont pas toujours visible. César fait une fois référence à un documentaire vu à la télé sur les chinois en Afrique.</li> <li>- Les ressources d'identifications personnelles sont nombreuses. Les catégories politiques sont nombreuses pour parler de soi. Guy parle en détail de sa trajectoire et son expérience politique, Déborah également (blairiste, anti-mitterrandienne...) ainsi que César (anti-sarkozyste). Ils n'hésitent pas à évoquer des éléments personnels : évocation du judaïsme par Déborah à deux reprises, plusieurs référence aux Antilles par César et au fait qu'ils sont des Français de papier, définition de lui comme anti-religieux.</li> </ul>



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Appendix 10

Sociological characteristics of respondents quoted.

Group	Pseud/ SPSS no.	Age	Age fin d'études	Diplôme le plus élevé	Profession	Profession du père	Profession de la mère	Axe gauche-droite	Lib-Auth	Sympathie partisane	Vote récent	Vote (hypothétique) au référendum	Critère ethnique	Religion
<b>Ox Managers</b>	BANSURI 110 338	42	18, then went back at 36	Diploma in childcare and NOP in counselling	Personal development trainer, counselling, life coaching	Carpenter	Housewife	5,6	Lib	No party	No vote	Against	Asian seikh	Sikh
	ALEXANDER 41 270	39	18	A'Levels	Bank manager	Mechanical engineer	Secretary	8	Auth	Con	Con	Against	White	Prot
	SUNDAI 25 254	36	21	BSc Finance	Store manager (Next retail)	Factory worker	Housewife	7	Auth	Lab	Lab	In favour	Black African	Prot
	IAN 98 327	38	22	BSc Estate Management	Salesman	Solicitor	Secretary	7	Auth	Con	Con	Against	White	Prot
	DEREK 57 286	37	25	PhD Physics	Lecturer and Researcher at Oxford Uni	Ticket seller for British rail	Housewife	3	Lib	Lib Dem	Con (protest vote)	Against	white	None
<b>Ox Activists</b>	ANNABEL 127 356	26	21	BA history	Campaign manager for women's charity	DK	Teaching assist in primary school	2,3		Lab	Lab	In favour	White	None
	JAMES 128 357	61	24	MBA	Company director in consumer goods industry	Architect and building firm director	Housewife	8	Auth	Con	Con	Against	White	None
	CHARLES 126 355	71	17	A'levels	Retired, but was in army, IT consultant and fin. services advisor, now district councillor	Pathologist	p/t secretary	6	Auth	Con	Con	Against	White	None
	BETHANY 112 341	79	16	None, but later social welfare and law diploma	Councillor for last 26 years	Medical corps in army	Secretary in colleges	5	Lib	Lab	Lab	In favour	White	Prot
	ALLISON 119 348	57	15		Houseswife, but volunteers for charities and was regional coordinator for Britain in Europe	Farmer	Housewife	4	Lib	Lib dem	Lib Dem	In favour	White	None
	LEWIS 103 332	70	24	Dr of Law	Worked in health advocacy and now is county	Salesman	Housewife	1	Lib	Green	Green	Against	white	Jewish

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					councillor										
<b>Ox White Collar</b>	MEL 213 371	37	18	A-Levels	Admin/secretarial work	Shift worker in car factory	Nursing auxiliary	4/5	Lib	Lab, little bit Lib Dem	Lab	DK	Black Caribbean	Prot	
	PAT 215 373	51	18	A-Levels	Now p/t receptionist; before dealt with large contracts in local gov	Office worker	Housewife	5/6	Lib	None, floating voter	Can't remember	DK, inclination in favour	White	Prot	
	KENNETH 220 378	51	18	A-levels	Office support worker, before in local gov trading standards enforcement	Shop assistant in men's wear shop	Housewife	5/6	Lib	Lib Dem	Lib Dem	In favour	White	Prot	
	NINA 209 367	31	21, then 25	Diploma of HE in Social change	Care support worker in mental health	Research scientist	Nurse	3	Lib	Lab	Lab	In favour	White	None	
	MIKE 235 393	45	18	A-Levels	Office manager	Factory worker and foreman	Clerical work	6	Lib	None, floating voter	Did not vote	Against	White	None	
	KAMAL 243 401	24	21	BA Business Management	Team leader in catering business	Taxi driver	Housewife	5	Lib	Green	Independent candidate	Against	Asian	Mus	
<b>Ox Working Class</b>	MINA 201 359	48	18	A-Levels	Private care assist	Superintendent in railway dept	Professional tailor	7	Lib	Lab	La	DK	Asian (Indian)	Prot	
	ROBERT 205 363	32	16	GCSE	Tankdriver and tank gunner, now disabled	Joiner carpenter	Childminder	7	Auth	Con	Did not vote	In favour	White	Prot	
	RON 217 375	31	16/17	Diploma in Leisure and Tourism	Technician for BMW, fixing robots	Dead	Housewife	5/6	Auth	Lab	Lab	DK	Asian	Muslim	
	MARY 236 394	54	16	None, but recently did GCSE English	School cleaner	Farm labourer	Housewife and cleaner	7	Lib	Green	Independent candidate	In favour	White	Prot	
	BRENDA 237 395	37	16	O-levels	Post person and receptionist	managed a pub	Housewife	DK	Auth	Lab, but weak	Did not vote	Against	White	Prot	
	<b>Name/ Pseud</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Age of last education</b>	<b>Highest educational qualification</b>	<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Father's occupation</b>	<b>Mother's occupation</b>	<b>Left-right</b>	<b>Lib-Auth</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Recent vote</b>	<b>Hypothetical referendum vote</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Religion</b>	
<b>Paris Managers</b>	Franck	35	25	Bac + 5 informatique	Informaticien	Architecte	Secrétaire juridique	7	lib	?	Chirac	Oui	européen	aucun	
	Céline	31	25	DESS négociation commerce international	Traductrice / régisseur indépendant	Psychologue scolaire	Institutrice	4	Sans opinion	?	Pas voté	Non	européen	Catholique non pratiquant	
		59	24	ESC Paris	Consultant	Agent pour	Au foyer	3	Sans	?	Jospin	Oui	européen	aucun	

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	Gabriel				dans imprimerie	firme textile au Maroc			opinio n						
	Toufik	24	24	Diplôme d'ingénieur Centrale	Ingénieur conseil	Cadre à Tunis Air	Mère au foyer	4-5	lib	?	Pas droit de vote	Pas droit de vote	tunisien	Musulman non pratiquant	
	Inès	39	20 (32)	BTS action commerciale + école art moderne privée (Bac + 3)	Coordnatrice de style dans une agence de tendance	Cadre manager	Secrétaire de direction	7	lib	?	Chirac	Non	européen	Catholiqu e non pratiquant	
	Serge	42	21	Licence informatique Arts et métiers	Informaticien	Expert comptable	Directrice de vente	5-6	lib	?	Jospin	Non	européen	aucun	
	Fabienne	26	Doctoran te	Doctorante biologie	Bourse thèse	Chercheur CNRS	Chercheur CNRS	3	lib	PCF ?	Buffet	Non	européen	aucun	
<b>Paris Employe es</b>	Laetitia	23	21	BTS commerce international	Commerciale marketing	Ouvrier bâtiment	Assistante dentaire	5-6	lib	?	Chirac	Pas voté	européen	agnostiqu e	
	Magali	28	23	DEUG langues étrangères	Hôtesse d'accueil / télémarketing	Ouvrier Travaux Publics de l'Etat	Mère au foyer	Ne se situe pas	auth	?	Chirac	non ? (hésite)	européen	Catholiqu e non pratiquant	
	Victor	30	22	DUT action commerciale	Employé logistique	Intermédiaire re négoce	Au foyer	2	Sans opinio n	?	Mamère	non	européen	aucun	
	Patrice	33	21	Ecole hôtelière	Majordome	Artisan	Commerç ant	Ne se situe pas	auth	?	Pas voté	Pas voté (oui s'il avait pu)	européen	aucun	
	Hadia	36	25	Licence communicati on	Chômeuse / chargée projet publicité	Ouvrier bâtiment	Ouvrière éducation nationale	2-3	lib	?	Pas voté	Pas voté (aurait voté oui ?)	Maghreb	Aucun	
	Clélia	24	23	BTS graphisme	Standardiste / illustratrice livres	Kiné libéral	Kiné salarisée	5-6	Sans opinio n	?	Refuse de répondre	Pas voté	européen	agnostiqu e	
<b>Paris Working Class</b>	Albert	42	15	Niveau 3 <sup>eme</sup>	Chômeur / naturopathe	Docker	Femme de ménage	5-6	lib	?	Pas voté	Pas voté (aurait voté pour ?)	européen	aucun	
	Ghislaine	26	17	1 <sup>ere</sup> SMS	Aide soignante	Electricien	Agent service cantine	4	Sans opinio n	?	Jospin	Pas voté	Antille	Protestant pratiquant	
	Geoffroy	33	24	BEP <sup>+</sup> secréta riat comptabilité	Ouvrier imprimerie	Chef de rang dans cuisine de collectivité	Employée bureau / au foyer	5-6	lib	?	Pas voté	Non	européen	Catholiqu e non pratiquant	
	Lionel	42	17	1 <sup>er</sup> B / formations	Agent de sécurité	Fonctionna ire aux RH du MAE	Secrétaire dans un lycée	Ne se situe pas	lib	?	Besancen ot	Non	européen	Catholiqu e non pratiquant	
	Yasmina	35	15	3 <sup>eme</sup>	Au foyer / ménagère	Coiffeur	Au foyer	Ne se situe pas / à gauche	auth	?	Pas voté	Pas voté	Maghreb	Musulman pratiquant	

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	Habiba	41	18	Bac	Au foyer / secretariat	Directeur succursale banque en Algérie	Au foyer	3-4	auth	?	Jospin	Non	Maghreb	Musulman non pratiquant
<b>Paris Mil</b>	Pierre- Antoine	23	23	ESC Paris	Assistant direction à la com de l'UDF	Patron Bar PMU	Assistante import / export PME	4	lib	UDF	Besancen ot	Oui	européen	Catholiqu e non pratiquant
	César		28	Maîtrise droit	Sans profession / juriste / militant				auth	UMP / parti radical			Antille	aucun
	Charles	21	Etudiant	2 <sup>ème</sup> année école ingénieur	Etudiant	Ingénieur	Au foyer	8	auth	MPF	Pas encore majeur	Non	européen	Catholiqu e pratiquant
	Cheik	40	20	Capacité droit	Agent mairie paris	Epicier	Au foyer	6	auth	UMP	Chirac	Pas voté	Afrique	Musulman pratiquant
	Guy	59	26	Ecole commerce	Coach développeme nt personnel / expertise finance	Mécanicien	Tailleuse	2	auth	Verts	Mamère	non	européen	Protestant non pratiquant
	Dimitri	38	24	Bac + 5	Chef cabinet mairie 18 <sup>ème</sup>	Directeur agence banque	Secrétaire comptable	3	lib	PS	Jospin	Oui	européen	aucun
	Déborah	30	étudiante	thèse	Doctorante CIFRE et consultante stratégie Télécom et média	Médecin spécialiste	Chirurgien dentiste	5	Sans opinio n	PS	Jospin	Oui	européen	Juif pratiquant
	<b>Name/ Pseud</b>	<b>Ag e</b>	<b>Age of last educatio n</b>	<b>Educational qualificatio ns</b>	<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Father's occupatio n</b>	<b>Mother's occupatio n</b>	<b>Left- Right</b>	<b>Lib- Auth</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Vote</b>	<b>Hypothetic al referendu m vote</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Religion</b>
<b>Bxl Ouvriers</b>	ROSE	27	Suit encore des cours du soir		Stewardesse – Conseillère en publicité	Ouvrier – Jardinier	Ouvrière – Concierge	5	Lib	Aucun parti	Cdh	Ne sait pas	Origine italienne	Sans religion
	SIDI	27	19	Diplôme humanités	Ouvrier – Usine, marchés, vidéoclub...	Ouvrier – Magasinier	Cuisinière	4	Auth	Ecolo	Ecolo	Ne sait pas	Origine maghrébi ne	Musulman
	MARCO	43	Formatio n continue	Cycle inférieur	Intérimaire manuel et administratif	Chef d'atelier	Femme au foyer	5 ou 6	Lib	MR	N'a pas le droit de vote	Ne sait pas	Origine italienne	Catholiqu e
	SAID	24	21	Humanités	Animateur maison des jeunes – Nettoyage – Demandeur d'emploi	Technicien de surface	Femme au foyer	Ne sait pas, ne veut pas répondre	NA	PS	PS	Oui	Origine maghrébi ne	Musulman
	ALI	32	25	?	Assistant social	Ouvrier en invalidité	Femme au foyer	2 ou 3	Auth	PS	PS	Non	Origine maghrébi	Musulman

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													ne	
	JUSTINE	38	27	Graduat (Congo) = secondaire supérieur (humanités)	Comptable – demandeuse d'emploi	Ingénieur	Femme au foyer	10 (pas compris je pense)	Auth	Cdh	N'a pas le droit de vote	Ne sait pas	Congolaise	Autre : Chrétienne
<b>Bxl Emp</b>	FAISSAL	27	25		Employé - graphiste	Maître d'hôtel	Femme au foyer	5	Lib	Nonei	Ecolo	Oui	Maghrébin	Musulman
	DAVID	24	19		Militaire - sergent	Militaire de carrière	Secrétaire de direction	4	Auth	PS	PS	Oui	Belge	Autre : Athée
	VICTOR	28	21		Employé de bureau	Plombier	Femme au foyer	Rejette tout classement	NA	None	small parties eg RWF	Would vote but undecided	Belge	Autre : Athée
	FABIEN	26	24	DESS en commerce électronique (5 <sup>e</sup> année universitaire)	IT Consultant	Indépendant	Secrétaire de direction	6 ou 7	Auth	MR	MR	Oui	Belge	Autre : Agnostique
	<i>Isa</i>	35	18		<i>Réceptionniste intérimaire</i>	<i>Expert comptable</i>	<i>Femme au foyer</i>	5	<i>Auth</i>	<i>Aucun parti</i>	<i>MR</i>	<i>N'aurait pas voté</i>	<i>Belge</i>	<i>Catholique</i>
	<i>Julie</i>	22	18		<i>Petits jobs : caissière, surveillante</i>	<i>Comptable</i>	<i>Comptable</i>	5	<i>NA</i>	<i>Ecolo/MR</i>	<i>MR</i>	<i>Ne sait pas</i>	<i>Nom de famille 'asiatique'</i>	<i>Protestante</i>
<b>Bxl Cadres</b>	ALBAN	28	Cours du soir en génie nucléaire	Ingénieur (Sécurité nucléaire)	Responsable de la sécurité nucléaire	Military officer (Belgian army)	Enseignant en art plastique en cours du soir	8	Auth	MR	MR	Oui/Non dépend du moment du vote	Belge	NSP = DK (en recherche)
	ROGER	59	24		Cadre chez Siemens	Plumber	Employé	4 ou 5	NSP (DK)	PS	PS	Oui	Belge	Sans religion
	JF	29	25	Licence en histoire + Master	Chargé de mission au sein d'une ASBL	Médecin généraliste	Femme au foyer	3	NA	Ecolo	Ecolo	Oui	Belge	Catholique
	CLAIRE	51	26	Médecine	Médecin de formation mais actuellement administrateur d'une ASBL	Professeur d'université	Femme au foyer	7	Auth	Cdh	Cdh	Aurait voté comme le Cdh	Belge	Catholique
	FRANCK	40	15	Humanités inférieures	Administrateur d'un magasin d'alimentation bio et d'un restaurant	Représentant en matériel électrique	Secrétaire d'un dentiste	7	Lib	Ecolo	Ecolo	Il faut connaître le texte pour voter	Belge	Catholique
	VALERIE	45	25	Licence en histoire et journalisme	Journaliste Documentaliste à la RTBF	Cadre dans une banque	Femme au foyer	5 ou 6	Lib	Cdh	Cdh	Oui et fâchée contre les français...	Belge	Catholique
<b>Bxl Mil</b>	AURELIEN	28	23	Sciences politiques (ULG) +	Attaché parlementaire	Délégué commercial	Cheminot à la SNCB	8	Auth	MR	MR	Oui	Belge	Catholique

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				Master (KUL)										
	STEPHANE	30	27	Licence en droit (cours du soir)	Attaché parlementaire	Employé – Comptable	Femme au foyer	7	Lib	Cdh (il y travaille)	MR	Oui sauf... Non mais...	Origine coréenne, adopté	Autre : Agnostique
	CLEMENT	33	24	Enseignement secondaire supérieur + 1 candi. en économie.	Employé dans le secteur bancaire	Médecin	Médecin	6	Auth	Cdh	Cdh	Oui	Belge	Catholique
	MAXIME	25	22	Licence en communication sociale	Permanent chez Ecolo	Enseignant	Enseignante	2	Lib	Ecolo	Ecolo	Non	Son vrai prénom : Karim, maghrébin	Sans religion
	SIMON	30	23	Licence en droit	Chargé des relations à l'interne au PS	Professeur d'université	Régente en langue	2	Lib	PS	PS	Non	Belge	Sans religion
	ROMAIN	20	Etudiant	Graduat anglais – russe	Etudiant – Bénévole fédération du PS	Trésorier de la TVA	Directrice et gérante d'une maison de repos	1	NA	PS	PS	Oui	Belge	Sans religion

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