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Globalization, Scottish Fisheries and ‘Political Work’: Global-EU-Local Dialectics¹

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Introduction

Like other fishing communities around the world, the Scottish industry faces global pressures of limited and diminishing resources. Collapses of North Sea herring (1970s) and Grand Banks cod (1990s) have had severe impacts on the pelagic and whitefish sectors (Couper and Smith 1997: 118). More recently, collapses of North Sea cod stocks resulted in further de-commissioning of the whitefish fleet, reducing it by 50% between 2000 and 2003 (Seafish 2003). As well as effects that diminishing resources are having on fishing activity in Scotland, international policy shifts on food prices and deregulation of international trade have also had repercussions for local fishing practice (Friis 1996). This is because, over time, ownership of processing plants and sales contracts between fishers, merchants and processors have become increasingly globalised through the extension of the supply and demand food chain beyond local configurations. For a long time, reaction to these processes of ‘global re-structuring of fisheries’ (Symes 1998: 254) has been analogous to others around the world, with commentators reporting fishers self-representing as ‘victims’ of global forces (Symes 1998: 254-255).

Yet, unlike other international fisheries, but in common with other European Union (EU) fishing regions, these global challenges faced in Scotland have been experienced through the prism of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Under CFP rules, the EU holds exclusive authority to conserve marine and biological resources in its common seas. For the Scottish industry, therefore, the EU regulatory context is significant in any assessment of global-local dynamics because global impacts upon production, inter-firm relations and commercial relationships are all refracted by CFP rules. Consequently, reactions to ‘the global’ are bounded by reactions to ‘the EU’. Indeed, like other fishing regions in Europe, there have been long and persistent periods of

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conflict and failure through the breakdown of catcher and EU manager relationships, during which time fishers were labelled ‘immoral’ and blamed for diminishing resources through over-fishing and breaking of laws. Similarly, lack of compliance with fishing quotas levels has been a regulatory feature acknowledged by catchers themselves as an industrial behaviour of the past.


However, recent changes made by actors within the Scottish fishing industry challenge this view of fishers as ‘victims’ and demonstrate that relationships between the global and the local are far more complex than the standard narrative has assumed. More precisely, since 2001, there has been a noticeable change in Scotland in the framing of the ‘problem’ for fisheries management and how to achieve a ‘sustainable’ fisheries in the light of global challenges. Moving away from what is referred to as a ‘command and control’ approach, actors have begun instead to institutionalise different sets of practices which collectively build activities towards ‘sustainable fisheries production’ (Crean and Wisner 2000: 471 - 473).

To evaluate these changes in the Scottish fisheries industry, and the transformative role of ‘global-local dialectics’ (Fløysand and Lindkvist 2001: 113) therein, the chapter applies the analytical model set out in chapter 1 of this volume. Methodologically, a central scientific concern raised by the literature, and responded to in this book, has been to clarify the object of research and how we define an ‘industry’ in this context. Here, we start from the supposition that industries such as fisheries are highly structured entities, or ‘Institutional Orders’ (IOs) (Carter and Smith 2008), and can be studied as four sets of *Institutionalised Relationships* (IRs). IRs shape actor strategy within their own institutional ‘logics’ of norms, rules, expectations and compromises, and systematize actor negotiation within four ‘spaces of mediation’ – namely, *Purchase, Commercial, Employment and Finance*.

To explain processes of institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation unfolding within each IR, these relationships have been studied as sites in which ‘political work’ is invested in by actors, either to bring about change or to preserve stasis in the IR’s configurations and competitions as outlined below. In the case of Scottish fisheries, we distinguish two types of competition to be examined. On the one hand, one can identify a competition between stakeholders around questions of regulation and, on the other, occurring simultaneously, a competition entailing commercial operators who compete for profit or resources (see bottom part of figure 2 below). Indeed, one of the characteristics which marks this industry as distinct from others presented in this volume is that extensive regulatory competition has constantly occurred between public and

collective actors who battle to set policy instruments. Lastly, it is acknowledged that both types of competition are situated within a broader institutional context, including trans-industry rules, horizontal measures and meta-conventions which either apply to the sector, or from which actors have negotiated derogations (top part of figure below).

Figure 6.1: Studying an IR (fisheries)



<u>Regulatory Dimension</u>	<u>Competitive Dimension</u>
Stakeholders vs stakeholders	Firms vs firms
<u>Conflict/co-ordination:</u> Who are the stakeholders?	<u>Conflict/co-ordination:</u> Who are the competitors?
<u>Compromise/convention:</u> What is the basis for compromise between stakeholders?	<u>Compromise/convention:</u> What is the basis for compromise between competitors?
<u>Cooperation/coercion:</u> Who dominates regulation?	<u>Cooperation/coercion:</u> Who are the dominant firms or competitors?

When applying this approach in the case of the Scottish fisheries industry, a first step in assessing the cause of change (or its absence) has thus been to apply the concept of ‘political work’. Here, political work has been studied as three simultaneous processes – the marshalling of arguments; the construction of alliances; and the activation of both through ‘problematization’ and ‘politicization’ to bring about change in regulatory and competitive competitions. More specifically, in the case of Scottish fisheries, this has entailed the following:

- identifying conservationist, economic, scientific, social and marketing arguments and their prominence within the industry;
- questioning whether Scottish actors have worked either to form alliances and/or new types of industrial communities and organizations, or to bring about change in membership in existing ones;

- questioning the extent to which shifts in, and activation of, discourse towards sustainable fisheries production have resulted in durable institutional change which is favourable to actors across the IO.

In so doing, and in keeping with the application of the *IR*, we have assessed whether there is evidence of a shift in underlying industrial relations and behaviour away from conflict towards co-ordination, or from convention to compromise, or from coercion to cooperation. What evidence is there of ‘successes’ of new inter-organisational relations and interdependencies?

Overall, three features of change within this industry are apparent and will structure the organisation of material in this chapter. *First*, due to the extensive institutionalisation of Scottish fisheries within EU arena resulting from transfers of regulatory authority to EU institutions, any study of how global-local dialectics have been mediated through the political work of Scottish actors would be incomplete without first examining regulatory bargains underpinning the CFP and serving to refract those dialectics. In Section 1, we consequently set out the key global challenges facing the fishing industry, the ways in which these have been refracted through the prism of the rules of CFP and opportunities thereby created for political work by local actors. *Second*, since the initial operation of the CFP in 1980s, the focus of Scottish activity, both in terms of mobilisations of arguments and in the building of alliances, has been centred on the *Purchase IR* and on issues of ownership and access to natural resources. This is perhaps not surprising given the scarcity of those resources. What is striking, however, are the number of significant changes brought about more recently within the *Commercial IR* over issues of marketing and selling of product (i.e. fish). In Section 2, we thus critically assess this political work which has taken place in Scotland. We show that where change has occurred within the Scottish fishing industry this is particularly unexpected given the commonly held view that the CFP acts to constrain political action at local levels. In this Section, and using the model outlined above, we are able to demonstrate that EU constraints are not all-encompassing, but pertain more to the *Purchase*, rather than the *Commercial, IR*. [1] *Third*, starting from the investigative position that local ‘knowledge’ is critical in explaining the impact of globalisation on local capitalism (Fløysand and Lindkvist 2001: 120), we argue throughout that not only is local knowledge generated by political work, but more precisely, that it can be transformative when accompanied by actor deployments of sector-territory arguments. Actor references to ‘territory’ can be powerful tools both in the mobilisation of resources and in the construction of legitimate arguments to bring about re-negotiations of compromises and re-setting of regulatory instruments (Carter and Smith 2008).

1. Refracting the Global: the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)

Before examining the political work of actors within the Scottish fisheries industry, it is important to first evaluate the different institutionalisations of the *Purchase* and *Commercial IRs* as they have occurred within EU arena through the creation and implementation of the CFP. In this section, we thus apply our approach as set out above to demonstrate the way in which EU negotiations have institutionalised both *IRs* and in so doing have established norms, rules and expectations which refract global problems as they have been experienced in Scotland.

1.1 EU institutionalisation of the *Purchase IR*: stakeholders vs. stakeholders

The central issues over which regulatory competition has been conducted in the *Purchase IR* of the EU fisheries industry are the determining of rights of access to common fishing grounds and agreeing the quantity of production in a global context of diminishing supply. In particular, regulatory challenges have centred on how to prevent an overexploitation of fish resources and instead achieve a sustainability of stocks (Hanna 1998). To these ends, EU actors have invested in an extensive institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation of regulatory competition of the *Purchase IR* on an EU scale. Here, we set out key elements of their political work as they pertain to conflict versus co-ordination of stakeholder competitions (for details see Carter 2007).

Initial Institutionalizations of Competition

Competition between European countries over custody of natural resources clearly pre-dates the EU, with disputes over the exercise of a state 'sovereignty' of the seas and territorial clashes over 'ownership' of fishing grounds part and parcel of Europe's maritime history (Wise 1984: 68). Attempts to regulate competing territorial claims on an international scale also pre-date the EU, commencing in the late 19th century and accelerating after the second World War with the international sanctioning of ownership of 'parts' of the seas by coastal states (Farnell and Ellis 1984: 5). Indeed, it was only once international thinking on control over resources recognised a new type of sea territory – an 'Exclusive Economic Zone' (EEZ) - that a 'common' EU resource was acknowledged through the claiming of an EU-EEZ in 1977 (Farnell and Ellis 1984). The declaring of these seas as 'common EU goods' thus marked the start of the institutionalisation of the EU *Purchase IR*, with the extension of a Community regulatory authority over a sea area up to 200 miles from the coasts of coastal states (Couper and Smith 1997: 115; Leigh 1983: 63).

From this point onwards, problematisations over method of regulation and hierarchy of authority within the *Purchase IR* have both been subject to political compromise and conflict within EU policy-making arenas and, at times, adjudicated upon by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Wise 1984). With regard to the method, levels of fishing effort and Member State (MS) quantities of production are decided upon through regulatory instruments of Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and national quotas negotiated by MSs on a yearly basis (Leigh 1983: 88-9). This process is also accompanied by a programme to reduce catching capacity through re-structuring fleets (Coull 1999: 351). Significantly, the particular institutionalisation of the TAC and quota quantitative method in an EU context determined the hierarchy of authority within this *IR*. First, TACs assigned an exclusive authority over EU resources to the European Commission, which was ‘alone in a position to come forward with quota proposals for the entire Community’ (Farnell and Ellis 1984: 107). Second, the particular institutionalisation of the instrument further required that MSs determined their own proposals on ‘TACs and quotas’ (TQs) by species and fishing areas, including a trade-off position (i.e. ranking of TQs by species). This organization of the instrument thus created new types of numerical-based competition between MSs within the *Purchase IR* over rights to acquire ‘common EU goods’. This in turn necessitated the taking of political decisions by national governments over often conflicting coastal community interests (Symes and Crean 1995).

Third, quantitative regulatory methods additionally accorded a specific role for science – and the scientific community. In its institutionalisation of marine biological advice, EU practice differed from that of other international regimes. This is because the provision of scientific advice, at the heart of the quantitative approach, has taken different forms in different management systems. For example in Canadian fisheries, the authority to do so has fluctuated, whereby epistemic scientific communities (Haas 1992) have sought to influence public authorities and become increasingly inter-connected with them:

‘such epistemic communities have little influence unless they can convince others of the superiority of their particular policy advice’ (Wiber 2005: 136).

By contrast, this type of competition between scientific communities was not initially a feature of EU regulation. As Commission officials writing at the time stated, with its limited resources and expertise, the Commission required the authority of a regular independent advice on which to base its proposals (Farnell and Ellis 1984: 114-115, 167). The provider of this advice came to be the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) and contracts were signed

between the EU and ICES to regularise this relationship in the *Purchase IR*. The legitimacy of this advice – and its provider – was thus premised on a conviction of its superiority derived from an uncontested vision of quantitative science as ‘objective’ and constructions of scientists as ‘distant’ from politics (Wilson and Hegland 2005: 21). Through the regularisation of provision of scientific advice constructed as ‘independent’, actors thus sought to de-politicise the question of its legitimacy within the decisional-process, and in so doing granted ICES a key role in regulation.

Significantly, whereas scientists were viewed as legitimate ‘holders of knowledge’ about ‘common EU goods’, at least in the first institutionalisation of the *Purchase IR*, fishers were not. Indeed, the institutionalisation of EU regulatory arenas was premised upon an unstated but implicit construction of fishers’ role in the industry derived from neo-classical economics as one of ‘exploiters’ of the common resource. According to this perception, fishers’ ‘natural’ behaviour - which was to fish without care for the future state of resources - required to be controlled through regulation. Accordingly, the catching sector was not initially accorded a formal regulatory role within this *IR*. Instead, fishers were assigned a consultative role to be conducted within the arena of Commission committees. As a result, actors at the heart of industry – namely fishers – were placed ‘outside’ decisional arenas institutionalised within the *Purchase IR*. From the point of view of our approach, therefore, it is possible to view initial EU institutionalisations of ‘how’ and by ‘whom’ the common property of EU fisheries would be distributed as putting in motion two core types of regulatory competition between stakeholders:

- Fishers vs. the EU
- Fishers vs. Scientists

Refracting the Global: Political Work and Re-Institutionalisation

Since its institutionalisation in 1983, and in common with other international fisheries management regimes, the *Purchase IR* of the EU industry has been faced with a number of global challenges. Predominant amongst these have been collapsing fish stocks. Up until the reform of the CFP in 2002, EU rules within the *Purchase IR* shaped management interpretations of these global pressures and this through the aforementioned institutionalised regulatory paradigm with its emphasis on ‘top-down’ instruments based on quantitative definitions of the health of stocks (Nielsen et al 2004: 153; Degnbol 2003: 47). This created a situation where management of ‘global shocks’ was refracted through the regulatory competitions this approach institutionalised. In a situation of crisis, conflict underpinning these relationships was not contained as actors

sought instead to politicise these competitions. Conflictual competition thus came to dominate industry negotiations resulting in an overall policy failure and ever-decreasing fish resources.

For example, hostilities between fishers and the EU resulted, throughout the 1990s, in collective catcher mobilisations to contest the quantities of production agreed by 'centralist' decision-making processes. Challenges were mounted against the social and political constructions of science and knowledge which had underpinned CFP processes for assessing the biomass of common resources. Until the end of the 1990s, these mobilisations were 'passive' in the sense that they predominantly consisted of non-compliance with quota levels, regarded by catchers as invalid (Deas 2006). This in turn bolstered managers' and scientists' perceptions of catchers as 'exploiters'. Problems such as these were not unique to the EU. For example, scholars document distrust between biologists, managers and fishermen in New England (Hanna 1998: 29) and a lack of representation of fishermen in Canada (Wiber 2005: 137). In the EU, however, global problems played out within EU rules and structures fostering a regulatory climate which responded initially to these challenges through conflict, convention and coercion. This occurred because the construction of science as 'objective' had institutionalised a separation of the 'scientific community' from the 'catching sector', a separation reflected in discussions within European Commission committees which were described on interview by catchers, scientists and Commission officials alike as 'confrontational'. The exclusion of fishermen from decision-making was, it was argued, a primary cause of the lack of compliance with rules, perceived by catchers as unsuited to their fisheries (Nielsen et al 2004: 153; interviews). In turn, lack of compliance further fuelled conflict with managers who accused catchers of being primarily responsible for failing fish stocks.

Whereas both the general way in which EU fisheries was managed and the problems which the 'modern' system created were also ones experienced by other international fisheries systems (Nielsen et al 2004), it is through reform that both the importance of the EU refraction of the global and the specificities of its institutionalization become most apparent. First, in 2002, the EU was mandated by its own rules of access to undergo a reform. Second, in the run up to reform the Commission was expected, in keeping with the norms and codes of EU political projects of Better Regulation and 'good governance', to conduct a wide consultation of stakeholders on questions of substance. During these processes, actors invested in an important political work which resulted in re-problematisations within the *Purchase IR* (Carter 2007). The first stage of this political work was the re-problematisation of the territory of the EU common

estate into distinct fishing regions – e.g. the North Sea – understood to be fished by collective groups of catchers who shared a sense of guardianship of resources. The second stage was the re-problematisation of the ‘knowledge’ of the production of these regions and, in particular, a re-assessment of the ‘type’ of knowledge required to accurately assess the biomass of stocks within a region’s fishery (interviews). As we set out in Section 3 below, this political work included within it shifts in management and scientific discourses which re-framed fishers as holders of important types of ‘qualitative’ small-scale biological and commercial knowledge (e.g. water temperature, stock migrations, discards, landings - Deas 2006). Co-ordinated usage of this knowledge would enable more accurate interpretations of biological large-scale data to be undertaken by scientists (Degnbol 2003).

Although they did not cause the regulatory instrument of TQs to be abandoned, these re-problematisations within the *Purchase IR* did result in a re-institutionalisation of the rules for the provision of advice for setting levels of fishing effort and therefore quantities of production. In addition to the role ascribed to ICES, new EU arenas of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were set up to co-ordinate regulatory competitions in the provision of advice on the setting of instruments. The provision of co-ordinated advice would be achieved through the re-institutionalization of relationships between fishers and scientists and the enabling of new types of relationships – e.g. between fishers, community networks, environmental NGOs – for the regulation of the fishery concerned, e.g. the North Western Waters RAC. In addition to the regulatory competitions detailed above, a third competition was institutionalized:

- Fishers, NGOs, community networks, scientists vs. each other

From a worldwide perspective, that EU actors not only recognized but institutionalized fishers as legitimate holders of a legitimate ‘qualitative’ or ‘soft’ knowledge of natural resources and production constituted significant change. Further, certain features of RACs distinguish the EU from other international fisheries systems, e.g. Canada, where these types of approaches have been dismissed by the epistemic community as ‘soft science’ (Wiber 2005: 138). Additionally, the role accorded to environmental NGOs as members of RACs also contrasts with other regimes, such as the US, where the structure of management has been slower to accommodate a broader set of interests (Hanna 1998: 29). Re-institutionalisation through RACs has thus been an important process within the *Purchase IR*. RACs are now new and additional arenas for the mediations of regulatory competitions amongst a broader set of actors. For example, debates on managing collapsing fish stocks – such as collapsing North Sea cod stocks – are now refracted through RACs as well and hence through co-ordinated stakeholder competitions.

In the case of Scotland, therefore, a first set of questions emerges from our overview of change in the *Purchase IR*. EU competitions are no longer solely ones of conflict. In this changing context, we must question whether local discourses resonate with these changes or whether we find evidence of a political work to resist them. How have these processes of re-institutionalisation been experienced in Scotland in terms of Scottish actor engagement both in shaping them and in participating in them today?

1.2 EU Institutionalisation of the *Purchase IR* - firms versus firms

As we have seen, CFP rules play an important role in refracting global challenges through the prism of the regulatory competitions they institutionalise. With regard to competition between commercial operators, here too the EU has regulated to provide for collective structures to manage inter-firm relations in the form of Producer Organisations (POs). POs were initially created to enhance the common market organisation of fishery products and EU financial aid was provided to producer groups if they decided to organise themselves in this way (Phillipson 1999: 79). EU Council regulations ‘frame the parameters within which POs must operate’ (Phillipson 1999: 81) and cover their anticipated market role which was to adjust supply to demand through *inter alia* improving product quality, ordering marketing regimes to ensure continuity of supply and implementing market intervention mechanisms, such as withdrawing of products (Phillipson 1999: 81). In short, rules on POs structure commercial competitions between firms as follows:

- fishers versus fishers

Yet, because POs in different MSs display distinct characteristics and have adapted their functions to the local institutional order of which they are a part (Phillipson 1999: 80), compromises underpinning these competitions will differ from MS to MS and from PO to PO. This is particularly the case when one takes into consideration the role played by POs in the UK in sectoral quota management. For although since 1992, all EU POs can be assigned the authority to manage quotas (Phillipson 1999: 81), the UK is unique in being the only MS whose POs have engaged in this practice since the start (Phillipson 1999: 82). In the case of Scottish POs, therefore, CFP rules play an important role refracting what are commonly voiced as global solutions in quota management to address regulatory problems caused by of lack of compliance

with quotas. This is because in regulating ‘shortfalls in command and control approaches ... one of the most common solutions is to advocate the establishment of private property rights’ (Gibbs 2007: 3). Rights’ regimes apply instruments of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) whereby catchers can buy and sell quotas on an open market:

‘the underlying assumption of rights-based regimes is that rights holders will now have positive incentives to ensure the biological sustainability of the stock’ (Gibbs 2007: 3).

Examples of acclaimed strong regimes applying ITQs are New Zealand (Hughey et al 2000), Iceland and Australia (Couper and Smith 1997: 117).

Yet, because ITQs are a form of privatization of the ‘common estate’ or ‘the public ownership’ of resources, they have sparked political debate (Hatcher et. al. 2002). For example, commentators have questioned the extent to which quotas become the individual property of catchers or whether their content is being held ‘on behalf of’ public authority and can be reclaimed by government. Additionally, critical concerns have been voiced over the effects of ITQ systems on the re-structuring of fleets when their implementation has resulted in a contraction of the industry and a concentration of capital to favour large companies, putting small vessel owners out of business. Applying ITQ systems in certain types of small-scale fisheries, it has been argued, has the potential to de-stabilise coastal communities through causing high levels of local unemployment. Finally, with regard to questions of sustainability, others have pointed to the lack of evidence demonstrating a clear link between ITQs and greater sustainability of stocks and a lack of a correlation between ITQ systems and habitat quality issues (Hatcher et. al. 2002).

Within the current application of the CFP, how this global debate is resolved in an EU context, and how any resolution subsequently affects commercial competition between firms, is a matter for MSs and, in the case of Scotland, also for POs. This is not to say that EU rules are silent on these matters. For although the type of ‘regulatory orthodoxy’ (Wiber 2005: 136) adopted by the EU was similar in its generalities to that adopted by other fisheries regimes (such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States), nevertheless it differed in its specific institutionlisation of that quantitative approach:

‘in the European case [it was more complex], a first priority ... [was] not only the distribution of stocks, but the social and economic nature of the fisheries’ (Couper and Smith 1997: 117).

To evaluate the EU's commitment to protecting traditional fishing rights and the socio-economic stability of coastal regions, it has become commonplace to refer to negotiated principles of 'qualified access' to stocks and 'relative stability' in annual allocations of resources as illustrations thereof (Farnell and Ellis 1984). Here, we wish instead to address this specific global-EU-local dialectic through studying the competitions institutionalized around local choices on types of quota management. For, because Scottish POs have the opportunity within the frame of EU rules to take local decisions on whether or not to privatize quotas, we hypothesize that studying their choices will be critical in any assessment of local applications of EU regulatory capitalism.

1.3 EU Institutionalisation of the *Commercial IR*

As we have shown above, CFP rules intensively institutionalize the *Purchase IR* of Scottish fisheries. Additionally, regulatory choices made by MSs acting collectively in the EU's Council of Ministers have also institutionalized relationships governing commercial practice and which have set in motion different types of competition in this *IR* and within which Scottish operators can act.

Initially, EU regulation in this *IR* affected both regulatory and commercial competitions between two sets of actors: catchers (producers) versus processors. Over time, we have seen both retailers and large supermarkets enter into these competitions as follows:

- producers vs. processors
- producers and processors amongst themselves and both vs. large supermarkets


Additionally, the balance of power between stakeholders and firms in both types of competition has changed and in part resulting from reform of EU regulations. To begin with, along with TQs, a central pillar of early institutionalizations' of the CFP in the 1980s were rules on common market organization, including rules on pricing and controls on EU-imports. On the whole, these rules tended to be protectionist to producers over processors (Farell and Ellis 1984: 130-3). This weighing of commercial competition in favour of producers has changed, however, and in particular throughout the 1990s. According to Friis (Friis 1998), EU action affected change in two main ways. First, through its engagement in the international de-regulation of trade, the EU gradually lifted its imports resulting in a reduced price until the mid-1990s, and this despite a falling volume of catch. Second, reform of the CAP also contributed to lower prices (Friis 1996: 178). Given that consumer choices are based on 'weighing quality and price', fish prices must

'keep pace with those of alternate food products which compete directly with fish', for example chicken (Friis 1996: 179). Both types of de-regulation have thus had effects, all be they indirect, on the balance of power between producers and retailers determining price formation. Whereas formerly this process was dominated by producers, but now multi-national retailers dominate as 'the internationalization of the retail trade [has added] to the retail sector's negotiating power' (Friis 1996: 181, 184).

In the de-regulatory environment, supermarkets have mobilised to legitimate their dominance through claiming ownership of knowledge of consumer preferences: 'to obtain advantage over the food producers in terms of a much more detailed and comprehensive knowledge of consumers' quality demands' (Friis 1996: 182). Actors have thus exploited opportunities presented through the de-regulation of the *Commercial IR* to alter patterns of power in both regulatory and commercial competitions.

Given these significant global changes in the 1990s, the final object of our research on the Scottish industry has been to question the extent to which these latter patterns of domination have been institutionalised. To what extent is this *IR* still dominated by supermarkets and/or multinational processors? Is there scope for local political work in the *Commercial IR*, for example in price formation? In particular, we raise these questions in a context where this *IR* has also experienced some global institutionalisation through the setting up of world wide instruments which create market incentives for local industry which are independent of EU rules - for example, the international joint initiative by the multi-national corporation Unilever PLC ('one of the world's largest buyers of fish' - Long 1999: 147-8) and the NGO WWF to set up an eco-labelling system accredited by a Marine Stewardship Council (Long 1999, Symes 1998: 255).

Figure 6.2: The EU IO of Fisheries



In summary, the *Purchase* and *Commercial IRs* of the Scottish fisheries industry have been significantly institutionalised within EU arenas. Global impacts in Scotland are consequently refracted first through negotiated interpretations and solutions to those challenges within these arenas. This institutionalisation has not been static, however. In both *IRs* examined, the norms and compromises underpinning intra-industry competitions have been subject to political work bringing about a process of re-institutionalisation, which in turn has resulted in a changed refraction of global influences.

2. Interpreting EU refractions of global fisheries: the 'political work' of the Scottish Fishing Industry

In this section, and following from above, we examine political work conducted by actors within the Scottish fisheries industry. In so doing, we note that Scottish fisheries is not a homogeneous industry, but consists instead of a number of different fishing constituencies, e.g. the north-east of Scotland, the north-west of Scotland, Shetland. Additionally, production has been centred on different types of fisheries: whitefisheries, e.g. haddock, monkfish, cod; shellfisheries, e.g. langoustine/nephrops, scallops; pelagic fisheries, e.g. mackerel, herring. Collectively, Scottish vessels land the highest volume (c.68%) and the highest value of landings for all UK landings,

although, since the 1980s, there have been shifts in both quantities of landings between fisheries and their respective commercial value. Furthermore, for some species, e.g. nephrops, an excess of Scottish landings over imports exists (the Scottish catch represents 60% of the world's catch), whereas for others, e.g. cod, landings are topped-up by imports. For all these reasons, interpretations of the 'global' differ across the industry.

Yet, despite these differences, a common political work can be detected. More precisely, we can identify a changed political work whereby building and transferring of local knowledge is increasingly being framed within a sustainable fisheries production model. Citing Crean and Wisner 2000, we can identify three goals of sustainable fisheries production:

- Establishing congruence of eco-system and governance boundaries;
- Re-shaping relations between human beings and the environment through new systems of governance – which includes establishing enabling institutional structures, processes of negotiation and participation of users;
- A re-programming of markets (Crean and Wisner 2000: 471 - 473).

Recent reforms which have been made in Scotland - and which are documented in this section – can be understood as attempts to move the Scottish approach to fisheries management towards the SFP model. This is not to say that this has been achieved, nor that all three goals outlined above are ones which are shared by all actors across the industry. Rather, talking about fisheries 'in this way', and as opposed to any other way, tends to dominate actors' assessment of recent choices made in the face of global challenges. Moreover, this shift in thinking has driven actors to vocalise new arguments and form new collective organisations in both the *Purchase* and *Commercial IRs*.

Our overall aim in this section is two-fold: to explore this political work and to demonstrate that it has not been static, but has responded to shifts in international and EU thinking; to show that it has been underpinned by a constant tension between conservation of natural resources and the survival of local communities.

2.1. Problematisation and Politicisation of the *Purchase IR*: stakeholders versus stakeholders

As we set out in Section 1 above, CFP institutions put in motion three significant regulatory competitions in the *Purchase IR*:

fishers vs. the EU as representative of natural resources, common goods and the interests of future generations

fishers vs. scientists as holders of knowledge about natural resources and common goods

fishers, NGOs, community networks, scientists vs. each other

Since 1999, political work invested in by Scottish actors has brought about change in all three competitions. This has occurred through strategies of problematisation, i.e. change in ideas, and politicisation, i.e. the forging of alliances. At the heart of this political work has been the re-problematisation of professional identities of Scottish fishers. As we argue above, the ‘command and control’ approach to fisheries management contained within it an implicit construction of fishers as ‘exploiters’ of natural resources who required to be controlled through both quantitative and coercive institutions. Enforcement was a matter for MSs: in Scotland, the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (FPA) was established in 1991 to carry out this task in the seas off the coast of Scotland and in its ports (Coull 1999: 347).

This construction of fishers as exploiters of a common resource, who ruthlessly fish for economic gain and without care for future generations, merits further consideration. For, lack of compliance with quotas has, in the past, been a major obstacle to the effective management of Scottish fisheries (Coull 1999: 347). Indeed, it was for a long time suspected (Nuttall 2000: 112), and more recently openly acknowledged by fishers, that fishing rules were being extensively broken through ‘black landings’ of fish. Yet, compliance is a complex phenomenon for it goes to the heart of the professional identity of fishers and the conceptualisation of their industry. This is because compliance with regulatory institutions is strongly intertwined with conceptions of their legitimacy – both in the way they are designed and talked about. Those who broke the rules argued that they had conflicts of interest over dumping quality fish and regarded landing ‘black fish’ as ‘necessary and legitimate’ (Nuttall 2000: 113): ‘nobody knows what they should do, whether to land fish illegally or throw it overboard’ (Nuttall 2000: 113). However, not all catchers broke the rules. Indeed, many regarded this practice as ‘immoral’ given that a large number of

skippers, for example in the north-east, were also senior figures in the church (Nuttall 2000: 112). Breaking the rules thus not only caused conflict across the industry, but also brought about splits within fishing communities (Couper and Smith 1997: 118). Indeed, because of the constructed links between fishing and representations of territory (Carter and Smith 2008), when fishers were defined as ‘dishonest’ this had broader effects in local communities who felt tarnished by the same brush:

‘In north-east Scotland ... to be seen as unskilful, to be labelled as dishonest and to be accused of poor seamanship in official reports, has an effect not only on the skipper and crew, but also on the wider community and social and economic contexts that derive their essential and respective identities from fishing’ (Nuttall 2000: 114)

Against this background, since 1999, actors have mobilized to make significant changes to this regulatory practice. This political work was led in early 2000 by the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF). SFF argued that an underlying cause of policy failure in Scotland was this representation of catchers as ‘rogues’, rather than ‘joint custodians’ of the sea (interviews). Re-claiming professional identities as ones of ‘guardians of resources’, SFF embarked upon strategies of politicisation of this new identity in order to de-politicise old regulatory competitions. One of these strategies was geared towards the re-building of alliances with scientists. This involved a number of different enterprises – for example, for the first time, SFF began to pay scientists to provide them with advice; SFF also engaged a scientist to enable them to examine science in a ‘more refined’ way (interviews). This shift in approach was one which went from ‘condemning to refuting the science’ (interviews). Significantly, new alliances were subsequently institutionalised with the setting up of the North Sea Commission, under whose umbrella scientists and fishers were brought together in the form of a partnership to explore new ways managing North Sea fisheries.

These politicisations of new identities were successful in finding common cause with scientists because the shift in catchers’ discourse found resonance in an already changing discourse of the regulatory science community (Hanna 1998: 29). Since the mid-1990s, scientists had recognized a problem with their non-biological data and in particular, had acknowledged an absence of data generally on the ways in which fishermen were adapting to quotas (Schwach et. al; 2007). This included a lack of accurate information on the numbers of fish discarded and catch recordings, which rendered bias in the calculations, e.g. in the North Sea cod assessments at the end of the 1990s (Schwach et. al. 2007; interviews). Aside from biological explanations, part of the reasons

accounting for bias was that stock assessment predictions had been based on rationalistic assumptions of human behaviour (e.g. by adding 'capital' to the model in the absence of commercial data - interviews). Calls were made within the scientific community for the need to 'model the human element' (Interviews). Greater engagement of catchers was viewed by scientists as necessary in order to aid in the interpretation of data.

A good example of this common cause was the political work carried out by fishers and scientists over Scottish langoustine quotas. Scottish nephrops had consistently been set a very low quota and black landings of prawns was commonplace. In 2005, it was decided that catchers would work with the Fisheries Research Service in Aberdeen to produce improved data on nephrops' reproduction and recruitment using a TV survey technique. The results of this targeted biological marine survey were presented in forms of scientifically grounded arguments to present a case to the European Commission for an increase in quota. The results were that, in 2006, the nephrops quota for the West Coast of Scotland was raised by 36% (32% for the North Sea) – levels of fishing effort which reflected what was being caught already. The increased quota was legitimated by a biological survey using peer approved techniques and was of a scale not possible for ICES. The success of this political work stemmed from the joint perception of the nature of the 'problem' shared by catchers and scientists alike who grasped the complexity of compliance. In short, regulatory competition which had been one of conflict was now turned into one of co-ordination.

This work through the generation of new marine biological knowledge, specific to the fishery concerned has more recently been accompanied by a number of other instruments. First, Scottish POs have internal codes of conduct of members not to over-fish a quota and have disciplinary powers e.g. fines (NC 2006). At times, internal organisational tensions have been such that the desire to protect membership (and quota) through safeguarding a cooperative and consensual mode of functioning and the desire to deliver a strict management regime to members to guarantee compliance have not always been easy to reconcile (Phillipson 1999: 87). Yet, a commonly held view is that 'this system by involving fishermen directly in dividing up the quotas effectively incorporates a measure of self-policing' (Coull 1999: 354). Second, and in response to arguments made by collective organisations such as Sea Fish Authority, stricter regulatory instruments have been enacted (Seafish 2005). There has been a proliferation of new regulatory instruments to ensure compliance; computerised log books on-board vessels; computerised landing declarations; records of first sales of fish; 'Buyers and Sellers' Register; transport

documents. Instruments such as these are the outcomes of political work in Scotland (and in the UK as whole) which rather than relying on coercion and the role of the Fish Protection Agency (FPA) to police the seas, are aimed at institutionalising compliance through regulated cooperation.

Politicisations of new professional identities have also driven strategies of action to re-institutionalise both EU and Scottish regulatory arenas. With regard to the former, finding common cause with the English/Welsh/Northern Irish Fishermen's Federation, the NFFO, SFF played a strategic role in the reform of the CFP in 2002 and in the setting up of the RACs. During this period, Scottish actors heavily invested in a collective political work with others both from the UK and from other MSs (e.g. Spain) to bring about change in EU arenas. Once again, at the heart of their argument for transformation was the re-construction of the fishing industry as an organization of production. Moreover, territorial arguments were deployed, not only to justify the boundaries of new policy arenas created by RACs, but also to lend support to desire for change – e.g. the SFF argued that it was not only fishers who wanted transformation, but the 'broad church of thinking in Scotland' (interviews). Finally, and since their establishment in 2004, Scottish actors have also mobilised to be active engagers in RACs. Indeed, the UK is the only MS to have two 'national' industry representations as members. Scottish representatives hold key positions and have been pivotal in driving new types of deliberation conducted within them (Carter 2007).

Within Scottish regulatory arenas, here too, actors have conducted a political work to institutionalise new partnerships. For, even though scholars continue to describe the UK's stakeholder engagement practice as 'ad hoc lobbying [rather than] formal representation' (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2007: 2), in Scotland this is currently undergoing change. A central outcome of a collective marshalling of arguments towards creating a sustainable fisheries production approach has been the institutionalisation of a new advisory partnership - the SeaFAR strategy and advisory group - bringing together managers, catchers, processors, environmental NGOs, retailers and consumers. To legitimise the institutionalisation of this arena and resources put to policy delivery, powerful evocations of the territorial significance of the fisheries industry to Scotland have been repeatedly made: 'Scotland's fishing industry has a long and proud past and sea fishing has always been a part of Scottish life' (Ross Finnie MP). Moreover, catchers' eligibility to be members has been legitimised by shifts in the dramatization of their identities and regulatory practice away from non-compliance towards 'appropriate'

strategies of engagement (interview material; Nuttall 2000: 115). This specific institutionalisation has been accompanied by other initiatives since Scottish political devolution in 1999. Resources have been deployed by the former Scottish Executive, now Scottish Government, to re-shape industry relations through establishing enabling regulatory structures and increased participation of users.

In summary, strategies to problematise and politicise professional identities away from ‘exploiters’ of a resource to ‘custodians’ of that resource have enabled fishers to re-define their relations with the scientific community, public authorities and the rest of the industry. With regard to their re-defining of relations with other actors across the industry, e.g. processors, political work in the *Purchase IR* has begun to have repercussions in the *Commercial IR* (see below). Overall, political work has been geared towards ensuring a multi-positionality and omnipresence of Scottish actors from across the industry in arenas determining supply. In particular, parallel engagement within RACs and the SeaFAR partnership has made a tremendous difference to the management of the industry. Whereas in the past industrial behaviour operated on the basis of conflict, today work is geared towards co-ordination of activities in a plethora of arena. This shift in the regulatory competition has had staggering results: Seafood Scotland now record a 99% compliance rate in Scottish fisheries practice.

2.2 Containing conflict through co-ordination in the *Purchase IR*: firms versus firms

Although negotiations over resources have been important drivers of regulation and actor coalitions, political work has also occurred around competitive competitions within the *Purchase IR*. As we state above, EU rules on POs institutionalized inter-firm relations as follows:

- fishers versus fishers

The local application of these rules in Scotland has resulted in POs which tend to be ‘favourably disposed in terms of the strength of their managerial, administrative and financial capacities and on the basis of close regular contact maintained with their members’ (Phillipson 1999 87). There are currently 8 Scottish POs, the most prominent of which is the Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO). Membership consists of fishing vessel owners registered in the economic area assigned to them and finance for POs comes from membership fees, landing fees and company earnings (Phillipson 1999: 89). For these reasons, there are differences between the respective bargaining power of POs and also between their members. Indeed, POs are commonly constructed as ‘exclusive enclaves for larger capital and quota holders’ (Phillipson 1999: 84),

whereby large POs are seen to dominate inter-firm competition. These patterns notwithstanding, conflict between them is co-ordinated through collective organisations, such as the Scottish Association of Fish Producers Organisations (SAFPO) and Seafood Scotland (see below).

The central work carried out by POs is sectoral quota management. PO quota management started in the UK as early as 1984, the initiative taken by the Shetland PO (Phillipson 1999: 82). In Scotland, as in the UK, quota management is shared between the Scottish government and the POs. The government is responsible for the management of the quota for the non-sector and vessels under 10m within their territory: POs are responsible for quota management of their members. Since 1999, UK quotas are allocated according to the system of Fixed Allocation of Quotas (FAQ). These were fixed in 1999, based on historical catch record between 1996-1999.

Given that POs across Scotland are responsible for quota management for their members, a key concern has been to determine how best to administer them. In this context, quota trading has become part and parcel of quota management, but takes different forms. In Scotland, quota trading of a type practiced by English vessel owners, whereby substantial quantities of quota were sold to Dutch, Galician/Basque and Icelandic companies (who currently own the majority of the fishing industry in England, with the exception of the South West), has not been prevalent. Rather quota trading has tended to occur *within* POs. This has taken the form of ‘ring fencing’ track records (e.g. Shetland FPO see Phillipson 1999: 83), i.e. when fishers leave the industry the opportunity arises for POs to retain their vessel’s track record and hold it permanently by the PO either in a pool or for individual distribution (Phillipson 1999: 83). POs also implement policies to enable their members to swap or lease quotas (see NC 2006 for details). Some POs, for example, adopt a ‘pool’ system, others an Individual Quota system and others a ‘pool plus’ system, combining elements of pooling and individual quota management (NC 2006). The system adopted can also be linked to the type of fisheries – e.g. pelagic fishers have deployed individual quota management tools, nephrops fishers the pool system and the white fish sector a mix of both (NC 2006).

In 1999, concerns were raised that ‘fixing the track records [could] signify another step towards ...ITQs’ (Phillipson 1999: 89). This end point has not materialized, however. Rather what we find is a variety of practice. Officially, there is no ‘quota trading’ in that actor perceptions are that there is no legal entitlement to what is bought and sold – quotas remain ‘public property’ of the government (interviews). This is a ‘grey area’ in the UK: discussions over property rights have

dominated debates on whether to move to a fully ITQ scheme. More recent debates on tradeable quota rights within West Coast shellfisheries reveal the seriousness with which actors discuss the implications of ITQs for local communities (and resonate with local struggles elsewhere e.g. Nova Scotia – Wiber 2005). For example, in a survey conducted on the west coast nephrops industry, arguments were made weighing pros and cons of ITQs:

‘if fishing rights ... are freely tradeable they are more likely to end up in the hands of the most efficient businesses... but not necessarily benefiting west coast economies’ (Seafish 2006: 2).

‘If part of the available fishing rights are protected for local businesses (e.g. via the non-sector quota system)... there may be less profit generated by the nephrops fishery, but more of it may remain in west coast communities’ (Seafish 2006: 2).


In Scotland, the debate for ITQs is constantly couched in these terms of their potential impact on local fishing communities. This being said, it is also the case that current practice is premised more on convention than compromise over potentially conflicting approaches. Indeed, the question raised by the survey revealed that political work had not been conducted towards negotiating a compromise between local benefits and total profits (Seafish 2006: 2).

Where political work has been embarked upon by POs is to seek to optimise fishing opportunities for their members (NC 2006), i.e. increase the supply side of fishing. In this case, inter-firm competitions are shifted into the regulatory dimension of the *Purchase IR*. This political work has resulted in POs becoming active in policy shaping, and in particular, in discussions over levels of fishing effort and stock assessments in quota setting. In particular, the establishment of the RACs has provided a new opportunity for POs to perform this function and which has been seized. When exercising this role, POs shift from managing/marketing organisations to representative/‘political’ organisations and act as the interface between the two types of competition within the *Purchase IR*.

Overall, we can summarise two key features of Scottish inter-firm competitions within the *Purchase IR*. First, these competitions have been institutionalised both through the rules of quota allocations, including the continued role for public authority in managing quota for the under 10m sector, as well as through the internal rules governing POs. This institutionalisation has put in motion two expressions of competitive competition – the first between non-organised small vessel owners versus large vessel owners, the latter organised in POs; the second between

members of POs, whereby PO codes and practices dominate how competitive struggles are resolved. Second, the privatisation of the local in response to global pressures of sustainability has not occurred in Scotland to the extent it has in other jurisdictions, e.g. the Netherlands. Once again the examination of the political work of Scottish POs, as well as that of local fishermen, provides the key to explaining resistance to full privatisation.

Figure 6.3: The Purchase IR in today’s Scottish Fisheries Industry



Relationships between 6Cs	Stakeholders	Competitors
Conflict - Coordination	Fishers vs. the EU as a representative of natural resources, common goods, interests of future generations Fishers vs. scientists as holders of knowledge of the common resource	Fishers vs. fishers (within Scotland and the UK) Fishers vs. fishers (between MSs)
Compromise – Convention	TACs and Quotas Quota distribution principles affecting Scotland, e.g. relative stability (Re-) Constructions of knowledge Territorialised ownership of resources	Quota distribution principles, e.g. relative stability, fixed allocation of quotas (FAQs); Producer Organisation (PO) rules/norms
Cooperation - Coercion	EU determines regulatory instruments based on advice supplied by ICES and to a much lesser extent, RACs	Large POs dominate

2.3 Political Work and the Institutionalisation of the *Commercial IR*

As we state in Section 1 above, although the *Commercial IR* has been refracted to some extent by EU policies, this has not occurred to the same degree as that of the *Purchase IR*. Nonetheless, EU regulation has structured two types of competition within it:

- producers vs. processors
- producers and processors amongst themselves and both vs. large supermarkets

For many years, the *Commercial IR* consisted of price mechanisms and individual contracts for the selling of fish. Yet, recently a new and important political work has been invested in by actors and which has led to an institutionalisation of this *IR*. The finding of political work in this *IR* is particularly significant given the competition over limited resources within the fisheries industry and inter-professional struggles created by EU rules – and marks the Scottish case out by contrast to others in this volume, e.g. that of the foie gras industry. Overall, this political work has been conducted within an active strategy to re-programme markets to sell sustainable fish and has centred on three issues: quality, price and sustainability of product.

Until 1999, processors and producers have tended to pursue parallel strategies within the *Commercial IR*. With regard to processors, their engagement in this *IR* has traditionally been a unilateral one – for example, individual firms seeking to obtain fish on contract arrangements rather than through auction (Coull 1999: 355). However, as the Scottish processing industry has contracted over the years, so too has its organisation become less disparate and fragmented (interviews). As part of this process, Scottish processing has collectively organised through the Scottish Seafood Processors' Federation (SSPF) which has a representative role and shapes policy through its membership of the SeaFAR partnership. Similarly, although producers have tended to engage unilaterally in the *Commercial IR*, changing strategies are apparent here also. For, whereas in England, POs have done little to actively intervene in the market or conduct 'added-value' activities in addition to their quota management role (Phillipson 1999: 86), in Scotland the two largest POs have adopted active as well as passive marketing strategies. For example, the largest PO, the SFO has established a separate subsidiary processing company, Braehead Ltd; Shetland FPO is 'a major shareholder in Shetland Catch (the largest pelagic processor in the UK and a major trader in this product area)' (NC 2006 : 10).

Although separate approaches have thus been the dominant way of managing issues within the *Commercial IR*, recently they have been brought together through political work, whereby actors politicised a ‘common cause’ in commercial activities. Its origins can be traced to actor problematisations of sectoral problems in the whitefish fishery in the mid-1990s, when a marketing crisis for haddock occurred, whereby excess tonnes of haddock were withdrawn from the market to be processed as fishmeal. At that time, it became clear that there was no collective industry body which could have addressed this crisis in a different way. The existing Sea Fish Industry Authority is a UK wide body and did not recognise this sectoral issue as a public UK problem but rather as a local sectoral problem. No problematisation of a ‘Scottish’ interest was recognised. Since then, to render these sectoral issues public problems, actors mobilised around re-definitions of the ‘public’ in whose interest action required to be taken. Actors argued that what was needed was a separate organisation which would recognise and address ‘Scottish’ interests in fisheries marketing. The organisation which was subsequently established to carry out this work is Seafood Scotland (SFS), a Trade Association, which started trading in 2000.

Producers – led by the SFO – thus began to politicise the need for a Scottish inter-professional organisation to co-ordinate strategies in response to endogenous global impacts within the *Commercial IR*. The institutionalisation of the SFS has further continued through political work which is rooted in an on-going construction of its necessity to enable co-ordination of conflict arising from refracted global shocks in the *Purchase IR*. Initial issues over which actor struggles were mediated within SFS were quality and price of fish. Both of these political works have been conducted in reaction to EU quota cuts in whitefish and de-commissioning of the fleet in 2000 and 2003. During this period, the whitefish fleet was cut by 50% (Seafish 2003). In its examination of fishers practice following both sets of de-commissioning, SFS made a number of observations which would subsequently guide its work. First, that there was evidence of fishers behaving as ‘exploiters’ and not thinking about the market or quality of product, but just ‘racing to sea to fish as much as they could’. This behaviour was reflected also in their presentation of fish – for example, over-filling 6 stone boxes with 8 stone of fish was common practice. Second, the behaviour of fishers failing to comply with the quotas had resulted a large amount of ‘black landings’ and the operation of two markets – an official one and ‘black’ one. Yet, fleet restructuring was unfolding at time when, as we document above, re-problematisations of professional identities were already taking place and this was to drive change in the *Commercial IR* too. On the one hand, the fleet was much slimmer. On the other hand, actors describe those

operators remaining as fishers whose ‘mindset was altered’ and in keeping with broader changes taking place: ‘the people left were the better guys’ (interviews).

Within this changing environment, actors within SFS began to problematise and politicise the *Commercial IR* within a sustainable fisheries production model and the need to re-programme markets. Actors refer to this political work as a ‘quality drive’. In 1999, scholars writing on the UK industries reported that ‘quality and value issues have tended to give way to those of quantity and volume’ (Phillipson 1999: 84). This was to change. Discussions on quality had already begun within the European Commission, UK fisheries Departments and the Sea Fish Industry Authority mid-1990s (Phillipson 1999: 84-6), but had not produced any durable change:

‘icing of fish at sea was uneven... temperature control at most port auctions was poor; and in summer especially there were serious losses in quality along the distribution chain’ (Coull 1999: 355).

In response to these types of concern, SFS began to establish quality schemes for those who had not been forced to exit the industry. A vessel could become ‘accredited’ whereby it was benchmarked by SFS and awarded a (confidential) grade by comparison with its competitors with regard to the quality of its practice in, for example, icing, washing of fish, gutting. Within this process, individual fishermen acted as ‘pioneers’, for example one fisherman began to weigh and grade his fish at sea and others began to do the same.

To politicise strategies of action premised on quality, actors were keen to repeat arguments linking quality to price:

‘The link between financial reward and quality must be strong in order to move towards an overall higher standard of quality and maximise earnings from the fishery’ (Seafish 2006: 5)

‘The question of paying a pack-out rate, or some other mechanism to give skippers a clear financial incentive for better quality product, should now be addressed by a suitable industry group’ (Seafish 2006: 5).

Arguments were made that one could catch less but attain a higher price, and these encouraged fishers to invest in quality practices, include weighing and packing at sea, on-board ice-making, smaller box weights:

‘Despite the economic difficulties there has been some investment, with 50% of those surveyed investing in quality on board practices in the last 12 months’ (Seafish 2003)

Quality schemes started for whitefish sector were subsequently extended to pelagic and nephrops (langoustine or prawns). Prawns, too, in the past had had a high number of black landings with fishermen catching way above the quota and the Fish Protection Agency forever pursuing them. This began to change. Rather than continue with a strategy of non-compliance, the successfully obtained increase in quota meant that illegal landings no longer occurred. Moreover, the quality drive was supported by changes in technology (installation of satellite tracking systems) and new policy instruments, such as the 'Buyers and Sellers' register. As one interviewee put it, there was now 'nowhere to hide'. Additionally, it has been sustained through an increasing number of direct contracts between catchers and processors/retailers away from auction.

According to commissioned reports, political work invested in in this *IR* was successful in its re-orientation of fishers' practices to catch for the market, i.e. to encourage fishers not to come in all at once or all on a Friday: 'there has been a shift of influence towards the market throughout the value chain' (Seafish 2005). What has been recognised was that whilst it is true that the prices of fish products are determined by many different factors 'operating at all scales and throughout the fish chain' (Phillipson 1999: 87), there were choices which could be taken locally to effect price. For, although scholars document falling prices in fisheries up until 1998, recently in Scotland the price of fish has risen dramatically in some fisheries for example in haddock, where recently falling prices across the industry have not been seen, and langoustine, where there is a high demand.

The second element of the political work conducted by actors through the SFS has been to generate knowledge on consumer preferences and facilitate dialogue between different parts of the industry on the environmental sustainability of operations (Seafish 2005). From this perspective, in the last two years, the quality of product has been linked to a sustainability drive and one which is supported by processors, environmental NGOs and supermarkets (retail sector). In this political work, the concept of a 'quality' product in fisheries no longer refers solely to quality in harvesting but has been linked to proving that fishing practice is 'sustainable' practice. This was reported on interview as a 'global' demand: 'in the global market, one has to be green' and one's data to prove 'greenness' has to be robust. Indeed, two central challenges have been posed for retailers in matters of sustainability – first, whether to keep buying from Scotland, and second, how to brand fish on fish counters to indicate responsible sourcing of product. With regard to the former, processors looking to sell in global markets have requested evidence of provenance. Currently, most Scottish processors will buy Scottish products first and foremost,

and in the whitefish sector they top up, for example, from the Faroe Islands and Iceland. In the langoustine sector, the bulk of landings are native. With regard to the latter, provision of accurate data indicating provenance to enhance traceability of responsible fishing is essential (Seafish 2005). Pilot projects have been run for example, Scottish Processors Young's Bluecrest on tailed nephrops (Combes and Myers 2004).

Importantly, large retailers such as Sainsbury's, Tesco, Morrison's and Marks and Spencer have become leaders of political work to politicise sustainability. However, supermarkets do not act independently from global discourses. Pressure has been placed on them by NGOs, such as Greenpeace, for example through its 'league table' of supermarkets. The game of sustainability or 'being seen to be green' is also now something to which both French and Spanish retail sector are beginning to react, albeit slowly compared to the UK sector. This is encouraging fishers to provide evidence of their sustainable practice. The key is to 'establish information channels into the end user market to improve perception of UK caught fish' (Seafish 2005).

In all of this, the overlap of political work in this *IR* and that conducted in the *Purchase IR* has brought about significant change. The creation of the SeaFAR partnership to co-ordinate regulatory competitions in the *Purchase IR* has also had significant effects on the political work conducted within the *Commercial IR*. Its contribution in part results from its broad membership and its uniqueness as 'a partnership with a market face' (unlike any other in EU) (comments made by a range of EU actors at a conference on the Scottish Seafood Industry, held in Brussels February 2007). Further, the types of deliberations conducted within SeaFAR have helped the tones of discussions conducted within SFS Board meetings: 'in 2003 there used to be big punch ups between processors and fishers ... that has all changed now' (interviews):


'When asked what issues are facing the west coast nephrops sector, most processors identified the low quantity of nephrops available. Only one in five companies interviewed cited lack of communication, knowledge and trust between fishermen and their customers (the processors and/or exporters)' (Seafish 2006: 4).

SFS can and has carried on the work started by SeaFAR – e.g. on langoustine – and in ways to contain competitive competitions between firms identified above. Indeed, SFS not only represents the big trawlers, but extends the membership of its working groups to small creelers thereby engaging them in local choices over markets and accreditation. In this manner, a greater proportion of fishers can be involved in the taking of local choices, whose effects impact on

broader industry considerations of management of common resources and preservation of local communities.

In summary, political work in the *Commercial IR* has recognised the limits of that conducted within the *Purchase*, given that debates over common resources always remain unresolved due to uncertainties over the supply. The overall aim of this work has been to expand the 'seafood consumption market through product innovation and marketing' (Seafish 2005) whilst at the same time placing an emphasis on sustainability. In this political work, stakeholders and firms alike have been supported by public authorities in Scotland, and in particular the government. Indeed, changes in the *Commercial IR* in fisheries resonate with other sectors in Scotland and have recently been brought together within the new national policy on 'Scotland Food and Drink', which is part of an overall Scottish government national strategy for promoting Scotland in global markets. Consequently, in this *IR* too, our approach identifies successful strategies of both problematisation and politicisation to bring about behavioural and attitudinal changes on sustainability. This is not to suggest that patterns of domination have altered: nor that they are always co-ordinated. Rather, political work undertaken by coalitions of actors has both generated knowledge about consumer preferences to be held by producers and processors versus large supermarkets and also contained conflict underpinning inter-professional competitions.

Figure 6.4: The Commercial IR in today's Scottish fisheries industry



Relationships between 6Cs	Stakeholders	Competitors
Conflict - Coordination	Catchers, processors, retailers, representatives of WWF, inter-professional bodies, e.g. Seafood Scotland, amongst each other	Catchers and processors between themselves and/or against global catchers and processors; all vs. large supermarkets
Compromise – Convention	Constructions of ‘Scottish’ food and drink; traceability standards; ‘responsible’ fishing schemes; quality accreditation standards; ‘Buyers and Sellers’ register	Quality of product (raw and processed) Access to market via auction, port markets, processors, retailers, catering outlets
Cooperation - Coercion	Supermarkets; large multinational processors; WWF	Multinational processors and supermarkets

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have examined changes made within the Scottish fishing industry to move fisheries management away from the ‘command and control’ approach towards sustainable fisheries production. To do this, we have applied the analytical model as set out in Chapter 1 of this volume to analyse transforming ‘global-local dialectics’ (Fløysant and Lindkvist 2001: 113). The specific application of this approach as adopted in this chapter has been to give prominence to sub-state territories as venues for global and EU regulation, as well as coalitions of actors who seek to influence regulation on wider stages. In doing this, we draw two broad conclusions. First, that in the case of Scottish fisheries, global-local dialectics must be studied as refracted through the prism of the EU’s CFP. Second, that only by applying clear analytical concepts such as ‘political work’ can research accurately capture the causalities of the linkages between globalization and European integration across different industrial scales.

In bringing about change in their industry, Scottish fishers have invested in political work to re-define their relations with scientists, public authorities and other actors across the industry. At the heart of this political work has been a core strategy to re-problematise and politicise professional identities of catchers. We have shown how fishers re-problematised and politicised professional identities as ‘custodians’ not ‘exploiters’ of the seas, and in so doing institutionalised a changed perception of the organisation of fisheries production. Whereas initially such political work centred on re-shaping struggles within the *Purchase IR* over access to and management of resources, it was not contained there. Rather, changed professional identities and changed industrial relations also enabled actors to institutionalise new sustainable strategies in the marketing and selling of Scottish fish in the *Commercial IR*. Finally, political work was not only carried out in local arenas: Scottish fishers have conducted political strategies to find common cause with fishers from other parts of the UK, other MSs and other stakeholders (e.g. scientists) to bring about change in regulatory competitions in EU arenas as well. In so doing, they have radically shifted their response to global challenges and can no longer be described simply as ‘victims’ of globalisation.

Finally, our study reveals that there is an important relationship between ‘community’ versus ‘market driven’ approaches to fisheries management, on the one hand, and the institutional links between EU policy making and local community commercial activities, on the other. These are not separate processes but rather are shaped by a global/EU/local layering of institutions. Indeed, the significance of sustainable fisheries production is that it fundamentally recognises that local choices can affect applications of regulatory capitalism. We have shown that the extent to which the ‘global’ results in de-regulatory capitalism depends on the type of political work conducted by actors within the *Purchase* and *Commercial IRs*. In Scotland at least, we did not find as in other systems that ‘the internationalisation of seafood markets ...has distanced fishermen from local connections’ (Hanna 1998: 29). From our research, we thus hypothesise that when political work intersects sector-territory dialectics with global-local dialectics it can bring about significant institutional change. Exploring these links in more detail would be a fruitful area for future research.

Note:

1. By contrast, we found limited political work in the *Employment* and *Finance IRs*. Clearly, this did not mean that these *IRs* had had no effect on the industry. For example, central provisions of the EU working time directive threatened

to affect the share-system working practices of Scotland fishers in the north-east and caused political reaction within Scotland (Nuttall 2000: 111). Similarly, EU financial support to redress losses of earnings related to declining stocks and falling prices had certain effects. This is because, although the price of fish influences the volume of fishing activity (Friis 1996: 177), this can be off-set by local decisions over usage of EU monies for de-commissioning or 'tying-up' of vessels. Debates over these issues have taken place in Scotland; however, they have been episodic. Instead, it has been the political work conducted to destabilize and re-build the *Purchase* and *Commercial IRs* which has driven change across the industry and towards a sustainable fisheries production model. Consequently, whilst recognising the importance of the *Employment* and *Finance IRs* to the industry as a whole, we have chosen not to focus on these in the remainder of this chapter.

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