

*The contribution of the European Commission (2004- 2009) to the EU's  
leadership in global climate change politics -*

*Still ‘...off target...’*

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*Danger – work in progress*



*The contribution of the European Commission (2004- 2009) to the EU's leadership role in global climate change politics -*

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**ABSTRACT**

In the early years of the Presidency of Jose Manuel Barroso (2004-2009) the European Commission was criticised for giving economic development priority and not promoting the objectives of climate change politics. Barroso as Commission President appeared to be content to support incremental action which departed little from existing policies - a model of leadership described by Hayward (2008) as *humdrum*. However in the period 2007-2009 a 'sea change' came in the style of leadership which Barroso gave to the Commission. This 'sea change' was the result of the linkage of climate change and energy security and an apparent increase of interest in these issues on the part of President Barroso. His leadership style from 2004 had been presidential in nature but became increasingly so from 2007. Nevertheless it remained short of Hayward's alternate model of *heroic leadership* by an individual able to assert, in an ambitious manner, political will .

In addition to analysis by Hayward, Cini and Peterson of Barroso's leadership style Kille's analysis (2006) of the styles of leadership given to the United Nations by successive Secretary-Generals is used in this paper. Kille highlights the importance for the leaders of the executive arm of a supranational organisation to have *increased belief in their ability to influence* decisions made by the organisation. He identifies a model of *strategic* leadership, a 'mid-way proposition' between that of a visionary heroic leader and a humdrum manager. It is argued in this paper that it is the characteristics of this model of leadership that Commission President Barroso has demonstrated post 2007.

*The role of the European Commission (2004- 2009) in global climate change politics -*

*still... 'off target'...? <sup>1</sup>*

## INTRODUCTION

Within the European Union (EU) the climate change policy agenda both drives and is driven by the ambition of the EU to demonstrate its global leadership in those international agreements which have been negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. <sup>2</sup> The EU is the only supranational institution in existence that has implemented climate change policy internally and adopted the role of international actor and leader of global developments. Internal climate change policy and the approach adopted by the EU in global climate change politics are however inextricably linked. It is not the role of the Commission and its President to provide the leadership of the EU in the global environmental forums - that is the responsibility of the national governments. However the Commission is responsible for the initiation of internal climate change policy and as a consequence has much potential to determine the direction of the approach which the EU will adopt and has adopted in global developments. Despite some criticisms of the Barroso Commission's overall performance on environmental protection policy (as quoted above) the arena of climate change action was one of the more successful aspects of the period of his Presidency (2004-2009), the climate and energy package being perhaps the Commission's greatest uncontested success. (Kaczynski et al. (2009)

In this paper the leadership style of Jose Manuel Barroso as President the Commission in the development of the EU's climate change policy, not only internally but also the impact this has on the approach adopted internationally, is analysed. Barroso's style of leadership was described variously as pragmatic or technocratic in the early period of his Presidency, apparently consistent with Hayward's conclusion of a retreat by the Commission from a proactive role in integration to that of managing specific projects. (Hayward 2008) Barroso appeared to favour incremental action, departing little from existing policies. (cf. Table 1 Leadership styles) He was further criticised initially by environmental organisations for giving economic development priority and not

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<sup>1</sup> Green10 (2009) *Off Target – European Commission (2004-2009) Environmental Progress Report*, available [www.GREEN10.org](http://www.GREEN10.org) (accessed July 10<sup>th</sup> 2009). 12 sectors were considered in this report by the environmental groups - the average score being 4.4/10 with climate action registering the highest of the 12 sectors with a score of 7/10.

<sup>2</sup> The adoption of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992) , the Protocol signed in Kyoto in December 1997<sup>2</sup> and the preparations for successor to the Kyoto Protocol to be adopted in December 2009.

promoting the objectives of climate change politics. A view which Barroso appeared to reinforce in a 2005 speech when he commented, ‘Let me say this. It is as if I have three children – the economy, our social agenda, and the environment. Like any modern father – if one of my children is sick, I am ready to drop everything and focus on him until he is back to health. ...But that does not mean I love the others any less! We must deliver jobs and growth...’ (ie apparently ignoring the environment and social agendas in favour of the economy). (Barroso 2005)

A ‘sea change’ in Barrosos’s approach came in 2007 when the issue of energy security was linked with climate change and gained increased prominence on the political agendas of the national governments. From 2007 Barroso had more opportunity to exert political influence and arguably leadership on the decision-making process. As President of the European Commission his style of leadership became more presidential<sup>3</sup> as he was prepared to give much clearer direction to the climate change policy agenda. In the analysis which follows aspects of Kille’s study of the personal characteristics of the Secretary-Generals of the United Nations is utilised with that of Hayward, Cini and Peterson to derive an understanding of the importance of the leadership style of the Commission President and the contribution this has made to the arguable success of the Commission in its proposals for climate change measures.

Hayward identified leadership styles which he described as *heroic*<sup>4</sup> and *humdrum*<sup>5</sup>. (Hayward 2008:6/7) Cini (2008) describes the difficulty of determining whether the approach to leadership of the EU adopted by Commission and its President is that of political influence or leadership, concluding that the answer is nuanced. Kille in his analysis of the style of leadership given to the United Nations (another supranational organisation of Member States, albeit with a different legal and constitutional framework) by it’s Secretary-General introduces a leadership style positioned between the two extremes which he describes as that of *strategic leadership*. (Kille, 2006:20) In his analysis of the personality characteristics associated with the different leadership styles he highlights the importance of the individual’s belief *in their ability to influence decisions*. He links this with activism on the part of those leaders he indentifies as visionaries or strategists, whilst those who have a low degree of belief in their ability to influence decisions he concludes are most likely to evidence a managerial style of leadership. ( c.f Table 2)

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<sup>3</sup> As identified by Peterson and Birdsall (2008) and Missiroli (2009)

<sup>4</sup> *Heroic leadership* - ‘...sets explicit long term objectives to be pursued by maximum co-ordination of public policies and by an ambitious assertion of political will...’

<sup>5</sup> *Humdrum leadership* – this style does not ‘...have an explicit overriding long term objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as circumstances require’

Using Kille's analysis Barroso demonstrated the strategic style of leadership between 2007-2009. His approach was less managerial, not that of a visionary but a more nuanced style which approaches the mid-way proposition of strategist. In short an individual as a leader who is more responsive to contextual factors, displaying a greater need to build relationships and recognising the feelings and needs of others than either a visionary or managerial leader. It is argued in this paper that Barroso's increased activism was possible because of the coincidence of the factors which encouraged Barroso's belief in his ability to provide greater political direction to the debate about climate change policy. However this is not to argue that Barroso may be considered to have adopted the style of a 'strategic innovator', returning to a style of leadership which Hayward considers to have characterised the Commission Presidencies of Jacques Delors. Not only were the individuals, Delors and Barroso, different personalities whose views were determined by their political backgrounds and experiences, but the political environment and conditions which formed the context for the Barroso Commission were considerably different from those in which the Delors Commissions operated.

**Table 1. Leadership styles demonstrated by Presidents of the Commissions 1989-2009 coinciding with the period of increasing interest in global climate change politics.**

Date of Commission	Commission President	Style of Presidency, after Hayward	Style of President, after Kille
1985-1988 Delors I	Jacques Delors	Heroic/Strategic Innovator	Visionary
1989-1992 Delors II	Jacques Delors	Heroic/Strategic Innovator	Visionary
1993-1995 Delors III	Jacques Delors	Heroic/Strategic Innovator	Visionary/Strategic
1995-1999	Jacques Santer	Humdrum	Managerial
1999 (March to September)	Manuel Marin ( <i>caretaker</i> President)	Humdrum	Managerial
1999-2004	Romano Prodi	Humdrum	Managerial
2004-2009	Jose Manuel Barroso	Humdrum/Strategic Innovator	Strategic
(Nov 1) 2009 - (31 October) 2014	Jose Manuel Barroso (Council decision July 9 2009), EP vote to be held in September 2009	???	???

Source: Commission, various, Kille (2006), Hayward (2008)

## **THE EU'S EVOLVING POLITICAL AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE.**

As an organization the European Union (EU) has extensive powers and a special legal status which enables action to be taken within the wider regional context which now includes 27 Member States. Policy is made in the EU within a political system within which the balance of power between the actors and the institutions has oscillated throughout the history of the EU. Any consideration of the leadership style of the Commission President must begin with a reminder of the opportunities and constraints on the individual's capacity to operate resulting from the competences conferred on the institution and its President in Treaty on the European Union.

The role of the Commission, as outlined in the founding Treaties of the 1950s, was to be that of a small-scale de-politicized functionalist bureaucracy charged with taking the integration agenda forward. Decisions about policy and measures were to be taken within the College of Commissioners. (c.f. Box 1. Powers of the Commission, after Coombs.)

### **Box 1. Powers of the Commission, based on the analysis of Coombes ((1970), cited in Spence (2006:7))**

The powers of the Commission may be summarised as:-

1. Agenda setting
2. Formal right to initiate legislation
3. Consensus-building between the national governments, the EP and other interested parties and stake-holders
4. Management of Commission programmes
5. Representation of the EU in external (economic) relations
6. Provides oversight and enforcement of European law
7. Representation of the general interest of the EU.

However as a consequence of changes to the Treaties, successive phases of EU enlargement and increased responsibilities as the process of integration amongst the Member States has progressed different patterns of policy and decision-making have come to characterise differing policy areas. Whilst the Commission continues as a bureaucracy it has become a more *politicized bureaucracy* which is required to respond to an increasing number of challenges (Peterson and Birdsall, 2008). In the period since the Santer Commission (1994-1999) and the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty the powers conferred on the Commission President have altered. The President of the Commission is to provide the political orientation for the Commission. But the principle of the

Commission President as *primus inter pares* within the College of Commissioners remains. Decision-making within the College of Commissioners remains on the basis of a simple majority of its members, including the President.

At the same time, and as a consequence of the national concerns about the role of the Commission, the Commission's power in relation to the other institutions, particularly to the European Parliament (EP), appears to have diminished. As a result Hayward (2008) concluded that the Commission had 'retreated' from that aspect of the institution's role of the as path-finder for ever-closer integration and more emphasis has been placed on that of consensus mediator and manager of specific projects. This analysis seemingly undervalues the evolution of the role of the Commission overall and the Commission President in particular in the enlarged EU 27. It appears to suggest that the Commission and its President will no longer act as a promoter of integrative action, providing direction and hence leadership within the EU. But it that the case?

The competences which have been conferred on the Commission and its President in the Treaties determine the overall parameters within which the institution operates. The effectiveness of the contribution made by the Commission relies on the way in which these competences are exercised, particularly the formal right of initiation of policy. If this formal right, 'jealously guarded' by the Commission, is not exercised then no policy proposals will be forthcoming. In turn the agreements made by the national governments in the global negotiations become a pillar of the internal policy as the Commission seeks the measures to fulfil those agreement commitments. But Cini (2008) questions if the outcome of the interaction of the competences for internal policy and the way in which they are exercised is political leadership, or if a more accurate description is political 'influence'.

It is argued in this paper that Barroso has not shown evidence of political leadership on the climate change agenda but a result of a co-incidence of events Barroso demonstrates increased belief in his ability as President of the Commission to influence the policy making process. Barroso has not however stepped outside the competences which have been conferred on the Commission presidency but has used them increasingly to influence the decisions made through his proactive approach to gain consensus amongst the national governments and with the European Parliament on proposals.

### ***The legal framework for climate change action***

The Treaties of the 1950s did not contain any reference to action on climate change (it had not emerged on the political agendas of national governments at

the time). The basis for the EU's climate change policy has developed from environmental policy, an arena of supranational action which was not included in the founding Treaties of the EU until the Single European Act of 1987. Nonetheless environmental policy is considered to be one of the more proactive areas of EU action. The first Treaty reference provided for shared competence for the *Community to contribute to the conservation and improvement of the environment of the member states*. The role for the Commission was subject to application of the principle of subsidiarity i.e. '...the EU takes measures only if and insofar that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and may be better achieved by the Community'...Article 5 TEC.

In external climate change negotiations the member states and the Commission, representing the EU, are signatories and parties to international agreements on the basis of TEC article 174 ex 130r (1) subset 4 - promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems. TEC article 174 (4), 'Within their respective spheres of competence the Community and the Member States shall co-operate with third countries and with the competent international organisations. The arrangements for Community co-operation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with article 300. (and) Article 300 TEC, Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or international organisation the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations ...within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue.'

Despite these Treaty references and those introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and the environmental proactivity of Commission there remains no clear articulation of a legal framework for comprehensive EU action on climate change measures. The EU institutions can adopt environmental legislation on the basis of qualified majority vote apart from provisions which are primarily of a fiscal nature and measures significantly affecting choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. As the use of fossil fuels is identified as the primary source of the greenhouse gas emissions which contribute to climate change this is a considerable barrier to the development of an effective and holistic climate change policy for the EU.

The Lisbon Treaty (still to be ratified at the time of writing this paper) although introducing a reference to climate change is unlikely to alter the current status quo towards the development of climate change policy as the opportunity for the dominance of national views remains. The Lisbon Treaty proposals include

in Article 191 (1) ex 174 TEC subset 4 ‘...promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems and in particular combating climate change ...’ But Article 192 Lisbon Treaty (2) para c ex 175 TEC continues the affirmation of the national competence for measures significantly affecting Member States choice between different energy resources and the general structure of energy supply – an indicator of the strength of support to protect national interests.

The competence for the Commission, as a non-state actor, to be a signatory of the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) was established on the basis of Article 24(2) UNFCCC which contains the provision that regional economic integration organisations may become parties to the Convention jointly with their member states as long as those states are already parties (a ‘mixed’ agreement under EU law). The member states and the organisation are required to identify their respective responsibilities and are not entitled to exercise concurrent responsibilities. The role of the Commission as a signatory to the UNFCCC is not to assume the leadership on behalf of the EU – that remains with the Council of Ministers/ European Council, but rather to exercise its competences to provide support and complementary actions.<sup>6</sup>

### *The political framework*

EU environmental policy emerged as a result of the imperative to remove national environmental policies which had the potential to distort the integration of the market. Lenschow (cited in Cowles (2004):145) concluded that the market imperative, coupled with the shared competence for action, led to a Commission response of re-orientation from task expansion to consolidation and further more from policy to governance-entrepreneurship, pushing for more co-ordination between policy sectors, actors and stakeholders in order to avoid conflict. Hayward (2008) has concluded that as a result of these factors the Commission has retreated from the role originally conceived for the institution as path-finder for ever-closer integration to that of consensus mediator and manager of specific projects.

As the EU has enlarged and national governments become more interested in the development of national environmental policies the ‘policy spaces’ which the Commission was able to occupy in the early history of environmental policy

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<sup>6</sup> Other groupings of states have emerged in the debates about global climate change politics (e.g.s. the AOSIS - Alliance of Small Island States, JUSSCANNZ - comprising Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, CARICOM - the Caribbean Community, the Alliance of African states). These groups do not have the legal status of regional economic organisations and so are not signatories to the UNFCCC. Their membership is not stable across phases of negotiations. As a result they are not able to present the collective position of a stable transnational group with its own legal and constitutional frameworks in place to support that position.

development have become less available. Development of internal climate change policy has become subject to a degree of ‘capture’ by the European Council and Council of Ministers, fuelled by national concerns about the impact of policy on national economic growth. The European Parliament has gained in formal legislative power, potentially undermining, certainly changing the dynamic between the Commission’s roles. Enlargement of the EU to 27 states has significantly increased the work of Commission to ensure that climate change measures are effectively implemented.

Furthermore the challenges posed by climate change were elevated to the plane of *high politics* in the 1990s primarily because of the high level representation of the US in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, followed by their equally high level opposition to its ratification and implementation (van Shaik and van Hecke, 2008:11) The high profile of global climate change politics has continued. Since the early 2000s issues of energy security and the linkage of concerns about the destabilising impact of the consequences of climate change in a number of regions, particularly in the developing world, have become important external drivers in global climate change politics. In external negotiations the potential impact on the European economy of climate change measure means the national governments are reluctant to transfer increased competence to the Commission. This is not the case in the negotiation of other international environmental agreements where the Commission is given a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EU.<sup>7</sup>

However the Commission is the institution which has the responsibility under pillar one of the Treaty of European Union to ensure that internal climate change policy is formulated on the basis of the best available scientific evidence. It is in the development of the EU’s internal actions on climate change that the Commission is most influential as it is these actions which are then *exported* to the international arena and as Vogler and Stephan comment ‘...for genuine directional leadership which goes beyond the defence of self-interest the Union will have to make internal policy coherence a greater priority...’. (Vogler and Stephan 2007:389). Oversight of regulatory measures agreed by the member states in an international agreement, are not within the remit of the Commission. But once adopted as policy the responsibility of the Commission is to ensure that international commitments are implemented within the EU. Internal policy and measures to comply with international climate change commitments are inextricably linked. The national domestic climate change policies and the EU’s mechanisms for harmonisation of these policies exert a direct influence on the position of the EU in global climate change politics. What is implemented to meet external commitments is not

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<sup>7</sup> Eg Montreal Protocol on substance that deplete the ozone layer (1992)

separate from internal climate change policy, but becomes a *pillar* of that policy.

Thus it is argued in this paper that the legal and political environments within which the Commission and its President are operating have been subject to much change since 1989 and the heightening of global awareness of the problems of climate change. It is possible to identify a movement by the Commission President away from the leadership model adopted by Jacques Delors, a strategic *innovator* (Hayward 2008) to that of a strategist. Barroso as a *strategist* after Kille's model is seeking to achieve consensus amongst the national governments and manage specific projects. But perhaps this is the model which is required for an EU 27. As Peterson, analysing the impact of the 2004/07 enlargement process on the Commission commented, the end result may be a "...more modern and less absorbed Commission...reconciling itself to the position... of a strategic node in the EU policy networks..." (Peterson 2008:762).

### **LEADERSHIP STYLE OF THE COMMISSION PRESIDENT**

Peterson somewhat wryly comments that '...the Commission (of the day) makes very little of its own luck. Its fate under Barroso, as under Delors, will be tied up with factors almost entirely beyond its control...' (Peterson 2005:15). (c.f. Box 2) In her discussion of the leadership role of the Commission Cini (2008:115) has questioned if what should be sought in the analysis of the role of the Commission is *political leadership* or *political* influence through its role in policy formulation. Certainly in the arena of global climate change politics the leadership of the Commission is demonstrated in the development of the internal climate change policy which is then fundamental to the position of the EU externally. As a leader dependent on *soft power* the ability to demonstrate that transnational action on climate change is possible is the primary weapon of the EU. As such the Commission is acting politically through its capacity to influence these wider political outcomes.

It is evident that the political influence of the Commission will come from the effectiveness and acceptability of the policy proposals which are presented by the institution. The competences conferred on the institution mean that role of the Commission is clearer in the development of the minutiae of agreements and policy instruments and not in terms of developing the broad strategic negotiating position of the EU that is the remit of the national governments. The national governments take the lead in global climate change politics but there is recognition both within the EU and the international community of the scientific expertise on which the Commission may rely and the input that the institution

may make to the development of the range of instruments adopted by the international community.

**Box 2. Factors affecting the capacity of the Commission President to exert political power and/or influence on the climate change policy agenda include the:-**

- Powers conferred in the Treaties of the EU on the Commission and the President of the Commission.
- Acceptance of role for the Commission by the international community.
- Style of leadership of the Commission President.
- Level of cohesion which may be achieved between the Commissioners with responsibility for the relevant portfolios.
- Element of ‘capture’ of the leadership role in global climate change politics by the European Council/Council of Ministers.
- Impact of changes to the powers and role of the European Parliament.
- Response of the Commission to the changing nature of the EU as a result of enlargement.
- Dynamics of the relationship between the Commission and the stakeholders in the multi-levelled governance of the EU.
- Context of the proposals including the adoption of the concept of ecological modernisation as part of the *belief system* underpinning policy proposals.

In addition to the formal competences for action which both provide opportunities and constraints on the role of the Commission much also depends on the personality of the Commission President and/or the Environment Commissioner and their ability to mobilise support from other Commissioners and DGs (particularly those responsible for Industry, the Internal Market and Energy) before proposals are presented to the national governments. The dynamics within and of each of the Commissions and the context of events has altered since the early 1990s. Factors have combined to constrain or provide opportunities for each of the Commissions. No single model of leadership of the institution itself has emerged as the most favoured by the Presidents of the Commission or adopted by the Environment Commissioners. Different Commission Presidents and Environment Commissioners have demonstrated

aspects of what may be considered as models of *heroic* or *humdrum*<sup>8</sup> leadership.

It is argued in this paper that the analysis of Kille, introducing a model of leadership of a supranational institution which is a mid way proposition and hence a more nuanced view of leadership styles lies between these two extremes and enables increased understanding of the response of the Barroso as President of the European Commission to the issue of climate change politics. For Kille the strategist works to achieve accommodation between differing view-points. In particular it is argued that the characteristic which Barroso also clearly demonstrated was that of a belief he held in his ability to influence climate change politics increased because of a coincidence of events post 2007. Whilst becoming increasingly presidential in nature it is clear however that the style of leadership of Barroso did not become that of a visionary (Kille) heroic (Hayward) President of the Commission akin to Delors.

**Table 2 Characteristics of leadership styles, after Kille.**

Characteristic	Managerial	Strategic	Visionary
Responsivity	High	High	Low
Belief that can influence	Low	High	High
Need for recognition	Low	Low	High
Need for relationships	High	High	Low
Supranationalism	Low	High	High
Problem-solving emphasis	Low	Medium	High

Source Kille (2006:20)

**Table 3 Personal characteristics, after Kille**

Characteristic	Description
Responsivity	Sensitivity to context and analytical capability
Belief that can influence	Perceive self as capable of influencing events
Need for recognition	Unwilling to relinquish control and work behind the scenes without credit
Need for relationships	Desire to maintain good personal relationships
Supranationalism	Strong attachment to and desire to defend the <i>*European Union and the organization's values</i>
Problem-solving emphasis	Emphasize completing tasks over interpersonal concerns

Source Kille (2006:17) \* as applied to the European Union

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<sup>8</sup> Humdrum – this style does not “...have an explicit, overriding long term objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as circumstances require”. (Hayward 2008:6/7)

In the following section the background to the events which enabled Barroso to adopt a more strategic leadership style are considered. As the Commission continues to be regarded as a College of Commissioners the ability of the Commission President to achieve cohesion on policy proposals within the College of Commissioners is crucial. To ensure that proposals are accepted the Commission may look for support from specific Member States or, as the formal legislative powers of the European Parliament have increased, to the EP. In some cases this means that some element of compromise has to be accepted. As Barroso commented in early 2009 following the adoption of the EU's package of climate and energy measures, '...we would have preferred our initial proposals. But the suggestion that this is a watered down ambition is non-sense. We had to accept changes. That's the price to pay for unity in the end and it's a fair price'. (Grice 2008)

Climate change is a multi-faceted problem. In order to initiate effective climate change policy long term innovative political leadership is required. The Commission has the potential to provide the long term innovative leadership as it is not dependent on changes of policy content and orientation associated with changes to the other institutions as the result of national and European elections. The national governments however retain the right to elect the President of the Commission and nominate the Commissioners. The EP has increased supervisory power over the choice and the work of the Commission. The work of the Commission has become increasingly politicised as a result of successive phases of enlargement and increased number of actors in the EU's policy making. The importance of an institution which is able to act as a consensus builder between the national governments, the EP and the range of stakeholders involved in climate change policy has grown. Equally ensuring effective implementation of legislation is essential if the policy is to have efficacy and hence the emphasis which has been increasingly given to those aspects of the role of the Commission.

The style of leadership of the Commission which is regarded as an exemplar of proactive Commission leadership is that of Jacques Delors. Analysis of the Commissions led by Delors (1985-1994) demonstrates a Commission President with a clear view of the direction that European integration should follow and an ability to position the Commission as a major site for effective political activity to that end. (Cini 1995, Drake 2000, Cini 2008) But Delors in contrast to Barroso was President of the Commission during the period of growth of the EU from 10 states (1981) to 12 (1986) and he had the opportunity and ability to develop his presidential style of leadership. The presidential style of leadership of Delors was replaced in 1995 by the more *humdrum* leadership of Jacques Santer (1995-1999). His presidency of the Commission was undermined by the

fact of his compromise election by the national leaders when they were unable to reach a unanimous decision on the appointment of Jean-Luc Dehaene. As Peterson (1997), amongst others, has argued the national governments' choice of Santer was influenced by the pre-eminence Delors had gained both internally and as an external face of the EU and a deliberate choice was made of a less charismatic Commission President.

Santer's Presidency quickly became one characterised by confrontation between himself and the members of his Commission, between the Commission and the EP and latterly between the Commission and the Unions representing Commission officials. At the same time he could not rely on the support of the national governments for measures to adapt the Commission to the EU which had enlarged to 15 member states. The Commission had grown in size to include 20 members of the College of Commissioners. By the beginning of 1998 it was evident that there were problems in both the Santer Commission specifically and the way in which the Commission functioned in general which led to the establishment of a Committee of Independent Experts by the EP to investigate suspicions of fraud and financial mismanagement within the Commission. The first report of this Committee was published on March 15<sup>th</sup> 1999 and the whole Commission led by Santer subsequently resigned.

The Commission as an institution retained its independence of action and strong position in the policy process as the initiator of proposals. But the period following the resignation of the Commission was one of difficulty and loss of credibility for the Commission amongst the other EU institutions. The result was that the EU's climate change policy at the end of the 1990s was little more than a '...collection of incentive, informative and co-ordinating measures without any real constraining effect...' (Peeters and Dektelaere (2006:45)). The incoming Commission headed by Romano Prodi (1999-2004) had initially to focus on reform of both the political and the administrative 'arms' of the Commission and management of enlargement.

The primary issue relating to global climate change politics for the Prodi Commission was the progress to ratify the Kyoto Protocol which had been undermined in 2000 when the incoming Bush US administration refused to present what was described as a 'fatally flawed' Treaty to Congress. The European Council had made a commitment to ratify the Protocol and mandated the Commission to begin the work to introduce the appropriate instruments. Strong support for the Kyoto Protocol ratification was mobilised within the Commission confirmed by support coming from the EU's industrial lobby. But disagreement developed between Environment Commissioner Wallstrom and Energy Commissioner de Palacio. (Anecdotally the relationship between the two Commissioners was described to the author of this paper by an official of

DG Environment as 'stormy', Wallstrom being 'ballistic with rage' at de Palacio's comments.)

The authority of the Commission and its ability to mobilise support from the other EU institutions relies on the effectiveness of its policy proposals. The Commission's right of initiation of proposals is in effect a *monopoly* of that power. But the authority of the Commission does require cohesion within the institution to support proposed actions. Climate change measures may have an impact on a number of DGs - transport, energy, industry, agriculture and environment. If, as during the Prodi Commission, disagreements emerge these have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of proposals. The Commission will not propose initiatives which are unlikely to be supported by the other institutions. Doing this undermines the credibility and reputation of the institution. If a proposal is subject to co-decision the Commission has less opportunity to incorporate ambitious or radical elements as they have to be acceptable to the majority of member states and the EP.

However despite the disagreement between Wallstrom and de Palacio about the instruments to ratify the Kyoto Protocol high profile support was given by the Commission President to Wallstrom. National government support meant that the proposal for legislation to introduce the EU's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was accepted. In the original proposal from the Commission a number of radical proposals were made but including auctioning of all permitted allowances but this was a *step too far* for the national governments. Following the adoption of the legislation the Commission is charged with the responsibility to ensure appropriate implementation of the EU ETS and compliance by the member states.

The Barroso Commission came into office in 2004 at the same time as an unprecedented wave of EU enlargement. Cruz in a paper for the Federal Trust concludes that the choice of Barroso for Commission President followed in a similar vein to the choice made in 1995 of Santer and again in 1999 of Prodi – ie to minimise the Commission's political profile. (Cruz J. (2006) The author of this paper would argue that a number of factors have combined, most notable amongst which have been cohesion within the Commission itself, the leadership style adopted by Barroso and the increased profile and heightened position of global climate change to revitalise the political profile of the Commission.

Certainly relatively few proposals for new legislative instruments have been made by the Barroso Commission. In their study of the Barroso Commission between 2005 and 2007 Kurpas et al (2008) conclude that continuity from the Prodi Commission into the Barroso Commission was the main characteristic of developments. The study used data on legislative output during a similar period

ie the first 30 months of both Commissions. Their analysis showed that whilst there was a slight increase in the overall number of legislative acts from the Barroso Commission there was a fall in the number of new proposals for legislation, much of what was proposed was amendment to existing legislation. In addition the number of ‘soft law’ (ie Communications, Green and White Papers Reports, and Opinions) had increased.

**Table 2 Comparison of acts adopted by Prodi (January 2000-June 2002) and Barroso Commission (January 2005-June 2007), figures are taken from Kurpas et al, Tables 4 and 5.**

<b>Hard Law</b>	<b>Dir. Prodi</b>	<b>Dir. Barroso</b>	<b>Reg. Prodi</b>	<b>Reg. Barroso</b>	<b>Decisions Prodi</b>	<b>Decisions Barroso</b>	<b>Total Prodi</b>	<b>Total Barroso</b>
Energy	3	1	3	4	12	10	<i>18</i>	<i>15</i>
Environment	13	17	6	8	38	27	<i>57</i>	<i>52</i>
<b>Soft Law</b>	<b>Comm. Prodi</b>	<b>Comm. Barroso</b>	<b>Reports Prodi</b>	<b>Reports Barroso</b>	<b>Others Prodi</b>	<b>Others Barroso</b>	<b>Total Prodi</b>	<b>Total Barroso</b>
Energy	5	22	7	3	1	2	<i>13</i>	<i>27</i>
Environment	21	36	13	20	4	2	<i>38</i>	<i>58</i>

#### **Notes to abbreviations**

Dir.	Directive
Reg.	Regulation
Comm.	Communications
Others.	White Papers, Green Papers, Opinions

The Barroso Commission preferred to opt for a programme to consolidate and simplify legislation with a focus on effective implementation of already enacted instruments. Initially it appeared as if the Barroso Commission was little different in its approach from that of the Prodi Commission. But much of this was the result of the requirement to complete the adoption and the implementation of the European Climate Change Programme, especially the EU ETS. The use of soft law instruments also increased. The importance of the review of the soft law instruments lies in the outline provided through them of future proposals which may include hard law initiatives. Between 2005 and 2007 the Commission produced a number of policy communications, reports, White Papers and Green Papers which led to dialogue with the other institutions and stake-holders (identified in Table 2 as *soft law*).

A similar, albeit more limited review of the period 2007-2009 by the author of this paper indicates that the pattern has continued. (c.f Tables 3 and 4)

**Table 3 Review of Initiatives DG Environment 2007-2009**

Type of initiative	Numbers
<b>HARD LAW includes proposals for directives and regulations</b>	<u><b>13</b></u>
<b>SOFT LAW</b>	<u><b>78</b></u>

Source: CEC Annual Management Plans DG Environment 2007, 2008, 2009

**Table 4**

**Review of initiatives DG Tren 2009 (relating to sustainable and competitive energy, including international action)**

Type of initiative	Numbers
<b>HARD LAW includes proposals for directives and regulations</b>	<u><b>16</b></u>
<b>SOFT LAW</b>	<u><b>7</b></u>

Source CEC Annual Management Plan DG Energy and Transport 2009 (Public Part)

At the beginning of his Presidency Barroso had committed himself to *lead from the front* and be involved in actual policy (Peterson, 2005:7). Unlike Prodi who had not carried a significant portfolio himself he identified a number of priorities to work closely with the relevant D-Gs. The evidence from developments in climate change policy support the view that Barroso, unlike both Santer and Prodi, demonstrated characteristics of a more strategic leadership style. Within the Commission agreement was easier to achieve between Dimas and Piebalgs than it had been between Wallstrom and de Palacio during the Prodi Commission. From 2007-2009 climate change became a priority for the Barroso Commission, with Barroso taking the opportunity to exert a more presidential style of leadership through his direction of the climate change portfolio. Barroso had the support of some national governments which neither Santer nor Prodi had and at the same time Commissioners who could work together and co-operate on proposals.

Although the national governments had agreed to appoint only 1 Commissioner from each member state the Commission nevertheless increased in size to 25 (2004) to 27 (2007), increasing the problem of how to achieve cohesion within the College. Initially the appointment of Stavros Dimas as Environment Commissioner was criticised by environmentalists and raised some concerns from the EP. The appointment of Dimas, a Greek conservative to the

environmental portfolio was compared unfavourably to the appointment which Prodi had made of Swedish socialist Wallstrom to the position. However in his hearing before the EP Dimas had established that he was clearly committed to environmental protection and climate change policy.

Close collaboration of Commissioners Dimas and Andris Piebalgs (Energy Commissioner) with the support of Barroso was evident throughout his Presidency. Between 2005 and 2008 a number of policy communications were produced by the Commission combining aspects of energy policy and climate change (CEC 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b) which led to dialogue with the other institutions and stakeholders. By the time of the European Council in March 2007 a political consensus on the importance of increased action on climate change mitigation had emerged and agreement on the 20% by 2020 targets outlined by the Commission. These targets were based on assessments by the Commission of what was needed to cut the temperature of global warming by 2 degrees centigrade at a cost remaining under 0.5% of GDP a year by 2050. Evidence used to support these targets was also drawn from the Stern Review (HM Treasury, 2006) i.e. inaction would impose a cost of 5-20% of global GDP.

From the perspective of the national governments preparing for the Poznan CoP 14 in December 2008 the targets were controversial. A group of states led by Poland and including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia presented a joint paper to the October 2008 Brussels summit. The position of these countries was that the differentials in economic potential of each state should be taken into account in the adoption of the climate 'package' of measures. The Italian government also expressed similar concerns. It was evident by November 2008 that the EU would not have agreed a position to present at the CoP 14 negotiations.

Barroso proposed a compromise to facilitate agreement i.e. that the EU adopt the overall target but the internal distribution of action should be decided during 2009, before the Copenhagen CoP. This was accepted as the position of the EU for the Poznan negotiations. At the same time Dimas was involved in discussions with groups of attendees and other delegates in Poznan (Members of the EP, representatives of non-governmental organisations) dealing with technical details and agreements for development of clean technologies and the funding of transfer and adaptation initiatives.

During the March 2009 Brussels European Council decisions about the EU's position for the global climate change negotiations during the Copenhagen conference were postponed until the June Council meeting. However the ambition remained for the EU to be a global leader in climate change politics

‘..the EU remains committed to playing a leading role in bringing about a global and comprehensive climate agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009 designed to limit global warming to below 2 degrees centigrade.’ (Presidency conclusions Brussels 19/20 March 2009) In addition the commitment to a 30% emissions reduction if other developed states agreed and the more advanced of the developing countries also made a contribution was reaffirmed. The proviso was added that the overall target for developed countries should be distributed in a manner that is fair and ensures the compatibility of efforts.

A view which was supported by Barroso ‘...the EU should make no commitment while other nations, notably the US and China are not doing the same’. (EURACTIV.com 30.03.09) Other issues highlighted were the importance of building a global carbon market including a reformed Clean Development Mechanism. In postponing the decision the Council did remain committed to clarifying the EU’s position well in advance of the Copenhagen Conference including on the EU’s main positions on the approaches to financing for mitigation, adaptation, technology support and capacity building, the specifics of the EU’s contribution and the principles of burden sharing among Member States. Burden sharing remains a major concern for some EU states, particularly Poland.

## **ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION**

Overall the domain of global climate change politics is one dominated by the use of market-based mechanisms to achieve the objectives of control of emissions and the impact on climate change. (It is not the intention of this paper to discuss the effectiveness of measures of this type but rather to take as a given that these will be used.) Underlying the development of global climate change measures has been the philosophy of ecological modernisation. For the Commission the concept of ecological modernisation became an increasingly important aspect of the policy discourse and also of the ‘belief system’ of the institution in the 1980s. The concept of ecological modernisation informed the proposals and policy developments throughout the Barroso Commission. Initially Barroso was criticised by the non-governmental environmental organisations for giving economic development priority and not supporting or promoting the leadership of the EU in global climate change politics. (Green 10 2007:3). But when the Commission presented proposals for a revision of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs in 2005 the link was made between job creation and support for the introduction of new technologies to mitigate climate change.

Creating a positive ecological-economic relationship also underpinned the package of climate and energy measures to achieve the targets of the ‘20% by

2020' agreement, including revision of the EU ETS prepared by the Commission in January 2007. (CEC 2008) It was the result of work by Pieblags and Dimas and presented to the 2007 Spring European Council by Barroso. The result of their collaboration was an ambitious set of proposals (HoL 2008a:87), including legislation. Parts of the package were considered to be highly contentious because of their complexity, ambitious nature and the unpredictability of the final outcomes. Between 2005 and 2007 the Commission had produced a number of policy communications which led to dialogue with the other institutions and policy stakeholders.

By the time of the European Council in March 2007 the political consensus on the importance of increased action on climate mitigation and adaptation within the EU resulted in agreement by the European Council on a number of precise and legally binding targets to curb GHG emission. These included:-

1. A reduction of at least 20% in GHG by 2020, rising to 30% if there was international agreement with the other developed countries and from the more advanced of the developing countries to comparable reductions according to their responsibilities and capabilities
2. 20% share of renewable energies in EU energy consumption by 2020
3. 20% improvement in energy efficiency within the EU by 2020

In January 2008 a package of climate change and energy measures was proposed by the Commission to meet the above targets (CEC 2008). These proposals were approved in December 2008 for implementation from 2011. In addition to a non-legislative Communication (COM (2008) 30), the package of measures included:-

1. Legislative proposals for the EU ETS (COM (2008) 16).
2. Emission reductions outside the EU ETS (COM (2008) 17).
3. Carbon capture and storage (COM 2008) 18.
4. Renewable energy (COM (2008) 19).

From the perspective of a number of industrial sectors specific concerns were raised about the proposals. The electricity generators requested clarity in what was required from them because of the long term nature of investments to react to measures. Similar concerns were raised by the car manufacturers. The cement industry highlighted concern about 'carbon leakage' ie in the absence of appropriate safeguards to protect the industry in the face of competition from companies operating in locations with less stringent emissions regimes relocating and taking with them carbon emissions which would otherwise be traded. Barroso confirmed the commitment to ecological modernisation in 2009 when he stated that the major public investment programmes being introduced to combat the global financial and economic recession of the late

2000s could stimulate innovation, foster growth and create jobs while reducing global GHG emissions and saving energy costs.(CEC 2009:1)

### *The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme*

Whilst it is not the sole instrument developed by the EU the EU ETS is considered to be the *cornerstone* of internal policy and demonstration to the global community that transnational action is possible. The EU gained the *first-mover* advantage through the introduction of this scheme in 2005 before the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol proposals was due to begin (2008-2012). The legislation for the EU ETS was developed during the Prodi Commission. (Dir. 2003/87/EC of the EP and of the Council, 13<sup>th</sup> October) Originally the Commission had proposed auctioning all the CO<sub>2</sub> allowances but this was not supported by the national governments. Agreement on the legislation was reached on the basis of free allocation of the allowances with auctioning of 5% in the first period (2005-2007) and 10% in the second (2008-2012). It was accompanied by a linking directive (Directive 2004/101/EC of the EP and of the Council, 27<sup>th</sup> October) to provide the support within the EU for the adoption of the mechanisms to enable operators in the EU ETS to use credits from the Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms (Joint Implementation, JL, and Clean Development Mechanisms, CDM) to meet their targets in place of emissions cuts within the EU.

The EU ETS was based on a compulsory cap and trade scheme but did not stipulate an EU-wide cap. Instead the national governments were asked to provide national allocation plans demonstrating how the allocations to the national companies would contribute to the overall objectives of the EU in global action. During the first phase a number of innovations were introduced to enable the scheme to work which included monitoring of the national action plans by the Commission and an electronic trading system. In excess of 10,000 industrial installations (including power stations, oil refineries and steel mills) producing approaching 50% of the total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the EU were targeted by the scheme. (CEC 2008) But the first phase of the scheme was undermined as the national governments set targets which did not trigger the carbon prices needed to bring about changes in the market. The carbon market collapsed to almost zero in 2007. The main problem was caused by the free allocations to national companies. When the national allocation plans were presented to DG Environment for the phase II of the scheme they were systematically and carefully scrutinised by Commissioner Dimas. As a result of this scrutiny by the Commission increased pressure on the national governments and the emissions ceiling in the second phase were tighter. The carbon price was sustained at a higher level in early 2008.

Proposals were made during the Barroso Commission to strengthen the EU ETS from 2013, including the full auctioning of emissions allowances to the power sector. In other industrial areas proposals are that auctioning should be progressively increased until full auctioning in 2020. Major transport sectors such as aviation (already brought into the EU ETS) and maritime transport were also targeted. Ambitious proposals which are most likely to succeed are those for which the Commission has been able to mobilize support from some of the national governments first. The UK originally opposed the idea of auctioning in the EU ETS but supported a strengthened scheme as a move of crucial importance and a striking example of the EU showing leadership internationally. (Hol.2004, para 83).

### **MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE RESPONSE OF THE COMMISSION**

Policy in the EU is not made in a vacuum. There may be a single source for formal initiation of a proposal, i.e. the Commission, but there is no single source for the ideas upon which the proposal is based. Successive Commissions have developed a number of formal and informal processes and structures to enable the dialogue with the various actors to take place. The hierarchical internal structuring of the Commission DGs has been the subject of criticism throughout the history of the EU. It is the result the increased responsibilities of the Commission as the EU has enlarged, increased numbers of policy issues and incremental and often ad hoc reforms responding to specific problems. Lack of communication between DG Environment and the other the DGs of the Commission dealing with related policy concerns was early identified by the Commission as a concern (e.g in the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (1992-2002)).

Barroso sought to address the problems of co-ordination within the Commission, of an ever increasing concern following 2004/7 enlargement of the EU. He established the practice of forming groups or clusters of Commissioners to deal with specific issues with cross sectoral dimensions. Initially five clusters were established dealing with the Lisbon agenda, competitiveness, external relations, anti-discrimination and equal opportunities and communication and programming. Later a cluster dealing with climate change, sustainable development and energy was to these groups. This provided opportunities for Barroso to exercise clearer leadership and adopt a more *hands on* approach through his chairing of the groups. They are not intended to take decisions on behalf of the Commission but to provide the policy input and guidance now needed in the Larger Commission. In late 2008 Barroso announced the plans to establish a DG Energy at the end of 2009. At the time there was speculation that a DG Climate Change might be established or that

the unit for climate change in DG Environment would be moved to the new DG following the increased effectiveness of the linkage of energy policy developments into those of climate change. However these steps were not taken.

Barroso established a Bureau of Policy Advisors, to assist the President, the members of the Commission and its services to define Commission annual policy and its Legislative and Work Programme. Within this Bureau an energy and climate change advisory working group was convened from 2007. This group has a range of skills and experiences and included Sir Nicholas Stern, author of the Stern Review. An inter-service co-ordination group of officials from a number of DGs began to convene in 2008 on an ad-hoc basis but with meetings increasing in number to once a month in 2009 as the preparations for the Copenhagen CoP intensified. The DGs represented in this inter-service group came predominantly from the DGs for Environment, Development, Transport and Energy, Research, Enterprise and Economic and Financial Affairs, although it was open to participation from all the DGs. Criticisms may be made that these structures led to greater concentration on the specific agendas of the groups and less focus broader remit of the Commission to take forward the process of European integration. However they did enable more openness within the Commission and discussion between the relevant DGs with responsibility for the sectoral interests of climate change policy.

### **The Commission's *duty to consult***

Proposals by the Commission emerge as a result of pressure from a number of directions – the stakeholders, the other institutions or from within the Commission itself, the necessity to respond to international commitments (e.g re-negotiating the Kyoto Protocol post 2012), and/or wider public and media debate (which has been very influential in helping to build the political momentum for action on climate change). Before initiating policy one of the Commission's duties is to be consult with a wide of interests, pressure groups, stakeholders to ensure that proposals are sound (Protocol number 9 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality).

In the early phases of policy preparation structures developed to bring the stakeholders together in open forum, seminars or conferences in addition to formal technical committees and working groups. None of these groups is charged with the role of competences as a scientific advisory body for the EU on the most effective instruments to introduce in internal climate change policy. That role is taken by the European Environment Agency (EEA) which was established in the early 1990s. Other sources the Commission relies on include the input of information from the International Panel on Climate Change reports

(IPCC), the 2006 Stern Review and commissioned reports from teams of scientific experts and consultants.

Pressure groups and lobbyists attempt to directly influence decisions by the decision makers through their involvement in the expert groups and committees which support the work of the Commission. Environmental interest groups, including those which are involved in climate change are considered to be the groups which are most effective and influential. Certainly the Commission took advantage of the opportunity to establish a *tradition* of openness to a wide range of interests because of the lack of a Treaty framework for environmental measures prior to SEA. The input of the environmental groups was encouraged for a number of reasons. The Commission, as a small organisation in comparison with many national administrative bodies, required the input of information which it is not possible for the individual DGs to gather themselves.

Many of the industrial sectors which are major producers of GHGs oppose measures which will lead to a lack of competitiveness in their sector. This inevitably leads to tension between the Commission and these groups. The EU ETS was less radical than the original directive proposed by the Commission as a result of lobbying by the heaviest industrial users of fossil fuels. Although not supportive of many proposals from DG Environment industrialists maintain their connection and commitment to lobbying the Commission to pre-empt alternative interests occupying the *space* their withdrawal from the lobby process may leave.

Although consultation has been a feature of the work of the Commission for some time the practice intensified during the Barroso Presidency. Margot Wallstrom was appointed to a newly designated office as Commission Vice President with responsibility for Institutional Relations and Communication. Amongst initiatives she led was the Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate. Although a response to the failed attempt to ratify the Constitutional Treaty it was an indication of increased openness to consultation and dialogue from the Barroso Commission. For example in presenting the proposals for adaptation measures to climate change in 2007 the Commission used a web-based consultation accompanied by a major international conference and 4 regional workshops for stakeholders.

## CONCLUSIONS

The model of political leadership in global climate change politics which the EU adopts is not determined by the Commission. But because of the Commission's role in internal EU policy-making it is a crucial actor in the development of the model of action exported by the EU to the rest of the world. In the analysis presented in this paper the competences of the Commission were initially outlined. It is in the exercise of these competences that the answer to the question about whether the Commission President exerts influence or leadership over the EUs' climate change agenda is to be found.

This paper has focussed on the role played by Commission President, in this case President of the Commission from 2004-009, Jose Manuel Barroso. At the beginning of his Presidency of the European Barroso was criticised for demonstrating the characteristics of a pragmatic and technocratic leader for the institution, a style of leadership described by Hayward as *humdrum*. Peterson highlighted the issues relating to the competences conferred on Barroso by the Treaties and the national governments and the constraints these imposed. By implication Peterson is suggesting that leadership by the President of the EU is not possible because of these constraints. He concludes that even Jacques Delors, considered to be an exemplar of what a visionary leader of the EU was only able to adopt that role because none of the national governments' leaders wanted to take it on. Cini concluded that the answer to question of leadership or influence by the Commission President is not as straightforward as these bodies of analysis appear to suggest and that it is a more nuanced role that the Commission President performs.

Post 2007 the Commission acquired a new dynamism and ambition in the arena of climate change policy as a result of the linkage of the issue with that of energy security. Barroso did not however demonstrate assertive political leadership of the type which Hayward describes as the opposite to his humdrum model – the *heroic leader*, rather he remained somewhere in between the two. The context for the Barroso Commission brought with it not only legal and constitutional constraints but the Barroso Commission was constrained by two events. Firstly the impact of enlargement on the size of the College of Commissioners and secondly the difficulties associated with renewing the Treaty on European Union. Both events required the Commission President to concentrate on his mediating role amongst the national governments in order to make progress on policy proposals. Commenting on the climate change and energy package of 2007 Barroso conceded that although the proposals could be considered to be less ambitious – '*That's the price to pay for unity in the end and it's a fair price*'. Barroso, cited in Grice (2008).

It is argued in this paper that Kille's analysis of the leadership styles of the Secretary-Generals of the United Nations provides a model which identifies a leadership style which is a mid-way position between a visionary heroic leader and a humdrum technocratic manager – ie a *strategist*. He highlights a number of characteristics which a strategist as leader would demonstrate, primarily concentrating on the belief the individual has that they are able to *influence* policy decisions, *sensitivity to the context* in which the decisions are made, *desire to maintain good relationships* and a *strong attachment to the supranational organisation* (cf. Table 3). For Barroso his belief in his opportunity to exert influence on the development of climate change policy comes from a co-incidence of a number of issues which have been discussed in this paper. Climate change policy provided an issue arena where the Commission and its President could provide that executive leadership described by Burns as indispensable and effective at accomplishing specific and limited goals (Burns 1978:396).

The support of the national governments and the European Parliament for climate change policy in general was present from the beginning of Barroso's Presidency. When this became linked to energy security as a result of actions in 2006 by Russia and then volatility in oil and gas prices this support grew. The commitments made by the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s with regard to the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol required implementation and the Commission is responsible for the development of the initiatives to implement the EU's commitments. As the deadline for the negotiations for the post 2012 Kyoto Protocol approached this support for the introduction of measures within the EU intensified (as long as national self-interests were not infringed). The speed at which the Climate Action and renewable Energy Package was adopted demonstrated the political commitment to the two issues by the national governments. However this agreement was not without heated discussion and much controversy and hence the necessity of Barroso to engage in mediation and facilitation between the competing national interests, especially those states facing more difficult economic situations. Where there was a lack of clear common position by the national governments in the preparations for the Poznan negotiations in 2008 Barroso was able to act as an independent source of political power by proposing and facilitating the position which the EU adopted.

Increased support for, and increased interest in the climate change agenda by Barroso may also reflect a recognition on his part that the Commission had an opportunity to be more effective in the development of this arena of policy. In other arenas of policy, especially those related to the financial and economic downturn of 2008 the Commission had less opportunity to find a 'policy space' to occupy in those areas where the national governments retain greater

competences. Climate change also provided an arena of action in which the Commission could demonstrate the effectiveness of its role as an institution to the citizens of the EU, 67% of whom regard climate change as a very serious problem (Eurobarometer 2009).

Climate change is a multi-faceted problem and requires the support of a number of actors and stakeholders for policy developments. Within the Commission itself in preparing proposals the collaboration of the Commissioners Dimas and Piebalgs provided a firmer foundation for measures taken forward by Barroso from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament. Being supported by agreement within the institution he headed Barroso was able to remind the EU leaders of the urgency and necessity of maintaining the ambition to take action on climate change irrespective of what the global community might decide (CEC 2009). However this does not support a view the climate and energy package adopted was an ambitious assertion of political will by Barroso. Much criticism by the environmental NGOs and Barroso's own reflections quoted above indicate that whilst his belief in his ability to influence events had increased but that he continued to be aware of the context in which policy was being made. The pragmatism and technocratic approach which had characterised his style of leadership in the early period of his presidency 2004-2006/7 therefore continued in 2007-2009. For Kille this would not be a surprising development as he concludes that a managerial leadership style may move to the mid-way strategic position but that the individual will not shift to the opposite pole of the visionary style of leadership.

Barroso came to identify climate change policy as a key objective of his Presidency and regard it as a success. As the institutional changes proceed during 2009 following European Parliamentary elections and the approach of the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 climate change will continue as one of the main challenges for an incoming Commission and its President. Although the re-appointment of Barroso for a further 5 years was not confirmed at the time of writing this paper there did not appear to be any alternative candidates with the necessary national support. For the incoming Commission the preparation for and then implementation of the new international climate change regime will constitute a major element of the work. The measures which are likely to be proposed by the international community will include measures to continue the search for climate mitigation, increased support adaptation measures, innovation in the financing of climate change projects and technology transfer. There is little in evidence to date of Barroso's approach to the climate change agenda to suggest that his leadership style will alter during a second term as President of the Commission from 2009-2014.

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