Research Papers

Germany’s position in the Eurozone crisis confirms its new role as the dominant player in Europe, but it falls short of revealing a strategy of power behind Germany’s actions. So the strategic shift occurring in the realm of European politics, economics and security is more the outcome of timid leadership advances and reactions to ongoing challenges rather than the result of a deliberate strategy based on intentionality of power. Despite striving for the recovery of the stability of the euro and regional order, Germany’s positions are increasingly interpreted as an attempt of hegemonic assertion, inevitably leading to frictions among EU members and producing the potential for disorder and insecurity, which Germany - with its Europeanist stance - so wants to avoid. Whereas the Federal Republic’s traditional reluctance in engaging in intentional forms of power served the EU well while its international role was in its infancy, it now sits uneasily with growing expectations and perceptions of changed power regarding Germany. Berlin’s interest in recovering stability derives from economic reasons, but ultimately, and in the face of the lack of a norm-orientated strategy of power, stems from continued resistance to adapt the country’s Europeanist identity to the new post-Lisbon environment. This explains in part the hindrance of the European Union in its attempt to gradually assert itself as a credible international political and security actor capable of responding to contemporary political and security challenges. The paper analyses Germany’s role in the financial crisis and during the international military intervention in Libya to make the argument that Germany’s lack of a clearly defined norm-orientated strategy of power and vision of international order for the EU acts as a brake towards the EU’s role as an emerging political and security actor.