Research Papers

Starting from the question under which conditions the Commission finds itself in a position to pursue its preferences against member states in the Council during international negotiations, I develop a Principal-Agent model that explains agent autonomy by way of two variables: i.) the scope of the negotiations and ii.) the degree of homogeneity displayed by the (collective) principal. I argue in my work that an increase in scope, analytically viewed as linked bargaining arenas, favors the Commission’s ability to coin negotiations by increasing its informational advantage. For member states to be able to counteract this advantage presupposes that they themselves exhibit sufficiently homogeneous preferences to coordinate one common position amongst each other. Empirically, I look at the negotiation of 38 general agreements since 1980. General agreements define international treaties from a substantive point of view and refer to agreements that have a general scope (e.g. cooperation agreements); rather than dealing with specific themes or sectors (e.g. fisheries agreements). The empirical validity of my theoretically deduced hypotheses will be assessed following the qualitative paradigm by way of an analytical narrative, combined with process tracing to increase the robustness of my findings. Splitting up my overall sample into three time periods I will select two case studies in each period as a proxy for scope. These two cases will show a varying amount of dispute within the Council and can thus be juxtaposed in a comparative research design