Research Papers

The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened parliamentary rights in EU decision making. Not only have the rights of the European Parliament been expanded, the Treaty recognizes for the first time that ‘national parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union’. Among them, the German Bundestag represents a strong and active legislative chamber whose role in European affairs got furthermore reinforced by the ‘Lisbon judgement’ of the German Constitutional Court in June 2009. The main purpose of this paper is to assess whether the Lisbon Treaty increases the likelihood of parliamentary competition between the two powerful chambers by studying the nature of inter-parliamentary co-operation between the EP and the Bundestag. Methodologically, the paper conducts a quantitative analysis of formal co-operation built on document research; and it draws on interviews with MEPs and MPs as well as official coordinators to examine informal contacts. The paper finds that both chambers are active promoters of inter-parliamentary co-operation. However, their incentives to do so not only derive from the desire of strengthening parliamentary democracy in Europe. From a rational choice perspective, both chambers act strategically. The interest of the EP is to improve its own position at the EU level, whereas the Bundestag seeks to be on a par with the national government. This is demonstrated by the fact that political parties are the drivers behind inter-parliamentary cooperation with the respective opposition and smaller parties being particularly active and co-operative. The paper argues that this political dimension enhances parliamentary democracy in the European Union.