Research Papers

Questioning the British role inside the European Union is an ongoing issue, especially when the United Kingdom faces the Franco-German couple in the Euro crisis. When David Cameron meets the 'Merkosy family', two visions of European integration are clashing against each other. But this clash of interests, although it still needs careful definition, is not a new one. In 2000, Trouille underlined the special role of Great Britain inside the triangle Paris-Bonn/Berlin- London 'Le Royaume-Uni face a l'entente franco-allemande' in Documents 55:2). In 1968 already, German Chancellor Willy Brandt admitted a certain 'menage a trois' between France, the United Kingdom and Germany, but refused to compare it to an 'old-fashioned' relationship between 'hegemonic' powers. In our paper, we aim to analyze Franco-German entente or 'mésentente'during the first enlargement process of the European Community and the Werner Plan discussions in the 1960s and 1970s. We will show that two myths may need to be reconsidered: an ineffective Franco-German couple in the Werner Plan discussions on Economic and Monetary Union (because the Werner Plan was a failure) and a successful Franco-German marriage during the British accession negotiations (because Britain entered the EEC in 1973). We will also focus on the question 'How does the decision-making function inside the Common Market?' and may respond with the following answer: Some kind of 'old-fashioned' and 'hegemonic' powerful couples or triangles still exist in regional and international organizations, simply because there are no credible alternatives. Especially during the early 1970s, 'Paris-Bonn-London' was an inevitable and powerful triangle inside the EEC.