Research Papers

Political conditionality, that is, the linking of benefits to the respect of democratic principles and human rights has, conceptually, always combined negative/punitive and positive/rewarding elements. Development assistance could be reduced or suspended in the case of the violation of democracy or human rights or aid could be made dependent or increased in case a recipient country improved its record. In the early 1990s, when political conditionality first became a tool in EU aid policies, the negative side was emphasized, based on the belief that the threat of aid suspension would encourage recipient states to reform. Soon, disillusionment with the tool spread, as neither did the EU use it in more than very few cases, nor did target states improve their human rights and democratic performance. In result, in the early-mid 1990s, the EU started to further develop the positive side of political conditionality and devised, in particular, the ENPI Governance Facility and the Governance Initiative for ACP countries. The proposed paper analyses and describes the specific purpose and mode of operation of these two tools, which differ considerably, and assesses their potential for being an effective instrument of democracy and human rights promotion. While in the ENP context at most two to three countries receive a considerably large extra share of development aid, in Africa, the large majority of countries gets a small extra amount. Additionally, in the ACP context, so-called governance profiles are developed with the target states and areas in need of reform identified. While the widespread distribution of funds in Africa appears to work against the logic of encouraging reform through promising more aid, the specific feature of establishing the governance profiles and their discussion suggests that it is indeed the more effective instrument of democracy and human rights promotion.