Research Papers

The Bosman judgment of the CJEU and the commercialization of football had a major impact on the activities of player agents. There was not only a rapid increase in their numbers but they would also become a pivotal figure in football. Besides, irregularities have been observed within their activities leading to increased calls for a better regulatory framework. The European Commission has been actively involved in the quest of such framework since its White Paper on Sport, prior to which, and in contrast, FIFA and other stakeholders in football traditionally enjoyed self-regulation to exercise control over their members. This paper analyses notions behind the Commission acting as a regulatory actor in view of searching for a better regulatory framework for player agents. The paper particularly focuses on public interest theories of regulation to investigate the Commission's involvement. It assesses the evolution of the Commission sport policy and explores public interest within the policy documents. By doing so, it draws particular attention to bilateral meaning of public interest. One meaning is the socio-cultural values as policy goals. A second is the commercial participatory force that is not only economic drive, but also a force that keeps European polity engaging in the professional game. The paper examines these meanings of public interest in their contrasting roles and their relationship as a collateral wholeness. Furthermore, the paper argues that the irregularities of player agents have a direct impact on public interest, hence, the justification of the Commission as a regulatory actor.