The European Council and Accountability: the European Ombudsman
Nikos Vogiatzis, University of Hull
The inclusion of the European Council (EC) among the Union’s institutions (Article 13 TEU) upgrades its position in the institutional structure of the EU but simultaneously reinforces concerns about its accountability. This paper aims at contributing to this debate, by arguing that the European Ombudsman (EO), in so far as the EU rule of law is concerned, has comparative advantages in relation to the Court of Justice to provide accountability against the EC. A combined reading of Articles 263 and 275 TFEU and Article 24.1 TEU reveals how the role of the Court in relation to the EC is limited. Having said that, the incorporation of the EC into the Union’s institutions signifies the widening of the EO’s mandate towards the EC (Annual Report 2009: 23).What is more, the Ombudsman does not supervise ‘acts’, but ‘activities’ and has indeed adopted a broad definition of maladministration throughout the years. His record on complaints regarding transparency issues and access to documents is remarkable. The EO can start an inquiry on his own, without the prior submission of a complaint and is accessible to every resident of the EU without the threshold of ‘direct and individual concern’. Accordingly, further to the abolition of pillars, the EO can supervise activities of the EC in the CFSP (Annual Report 2009: 23). In this context, while the EO is not the ‘ultimate’ answer to the EC’s accountability issues, he might still be a good start.