Paper Titles & Abstracts

In the EU agency literature, we are repeatedly reminded of the fact that agencies are typified by their diversity. Yet, a common feature among EU agencies seems to be that the Commission is a close interlocutor in their daily life, and it is asked whether EU agencies increasingly relate to particular 'parent' DGs. Apparently, this becomes even more likely within policy areas where the Commission itself disposes over considerable organisational resources. Hiving off tasks to agencies is often legitimized by the need to separate political from expert concerns. Although this separation is safeguarded in formal terms, the findings of the literature raise the question of what such a close relationship between an agency and one of its main principals implies in practice. In this paper, the role of the Commission vis-à-vis EU agencies is explored through an in-depth case study of the relationship between the Commission and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Two recent developments make this an especially interesting case. In March 2010, the responsibility of the pharmaceutical policy area was horizontally transferred from DG Enterprise to DG SANCO; and in January 2012, the pharmaceutical unit in DG SANCO was split in two, establishing a new unit with particular responsibility for the EMA and the centralised procedure. The following question is asked: To what extent was EMA's mode of operation affected by the recent reorganisations in the Commission? Hypotheses on variation in Commission impact on EMA's modus operandi are derived from organisational and institutional theory, emphasizing explanatory factors both at the Commission level and the agency level. The aim of the paper is to provide more knowledge about the extent to which the Commission may influence an agency, and to contribute to the debate on agency autonomy.