Paper Titles & Abstracts

The European Union (EU) has a different situation with its specific institutional structure and decision making procedures among the international organisations. Its distinct structure has been criticised on the basis of democratic deficit and the legitimacy by its member states and many commentators. The ineffective role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative procedures has been accepted as one of the main problems of the democratic deficit and the legitimacy. In addition, it is admitted that the imbalance among the powers of the three main institutions (Council, Commission and the EP) also affect the institutional balance which is indispensable for an institutional structure negatively. Even though the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) does not have a role in decision making process, it is undeniable that the institutional structure and the powers of the institutions in decision making process have been shaped by its decisions. The ECJ has been known as the driving force of the european integration and the reflection of its decisions can be seen through the treaty amendments. If today the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) procedure which gives the same weight to the EP and the Council of the EU has become the most widely used legislative procedure, it is one of the achievements of the ECJ. This paper examines the effect of the ECJ's decisions on the institutional structure of the EU, especially on the allocation of powers between the institutions which take place in decision making process.